[G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES

ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO
PADRIGANO, RUFINO, ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.

L. S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J . C . Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J : p

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred

to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union. composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in
the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador
of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties
parties
"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM)
workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM
and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
 Mr. Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union
has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in
order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change
their plans inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'" (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.).
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
M[arch 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court,
a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging
them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.'" (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.).
Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-
30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise
of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it
was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p.
11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on
Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969,
on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10)
days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules
of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the
order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion
for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days
late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among
others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp.
61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated
October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73,
rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the motion
for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the
requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days
from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or
order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-
1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court,
a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues
posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that
"the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by
which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas
we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk,
but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his
full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely
in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in
Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-
interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated
by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
of a temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their
civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it
securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the
local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure
to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis
the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more emboldened thereby to
subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing
only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was
a stark reality abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected
their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the
workers the "duty . . . to observe regular working hours." The strained construction of the
Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working shifts deny the workers the
right to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the
freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing
or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in
the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will
be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration
especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as
their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding
government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced
by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration
is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose
of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two
days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to
excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969
which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in
the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on
the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation
to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of
the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of
the employees to engage in such a common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least equal
protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in
the appointment and promotion of bank employees . 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by
the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation
of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III,
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local
police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was
to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family
to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the
workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it
thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company,"
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of
loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost
expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products
were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of
fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the
absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as
the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight
(8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards
would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and
for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate
in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental
agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its
avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court
of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights.
Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who
is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights
and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegated legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of
these freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity, to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are
errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise,
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing
the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best and dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of its
order or writ should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from
notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by
the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness
of the Court of Industrial Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are
concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969,
is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with
law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension
of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 11 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the
arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I",
pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10 day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners
received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, or where the arguments in suppf of such motion are filed beyond the 10 day
reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. 29 But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not
involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available
must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or
defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue
can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of
the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule
of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair
labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require." 30 Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo 30 reiterated this principle and added that
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to
do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may
treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of
jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is
within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within
the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the ambit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain
proceeding any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly
categorized as a flow of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not
entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the
Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said
decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes
of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) 30

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in this
particular case at bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural niceties," which
denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm,
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no
actual material damage has been demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that
clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by the
specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application
in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by
herein respondent firm, is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in
the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms . . ."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et.
al., 30 thus:
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion
for new trial is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding
upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its. rules or procedure
and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice:
Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as
it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision, the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts.
Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties
but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We
believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court
to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence. . . . (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the
instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms secured to
them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that
he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969
filed his motion for reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which practically is only
one day late, considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30 stated:
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds
v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided
as far back as 1910, 'technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts.' (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936])
was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.' While 'procedural laws are no other than
technicalities' to view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends in
themselves for the compliance with which courts have been organized and
function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of the
law and of justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the
highly rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice of substantial rights of
a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the
sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161
[1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way to the
realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968, (Udan v.
Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968,
Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense'; but are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.'
(Ibid., p. 843) . . ." 30
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders
of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed, and
only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents
in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's
Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates
that not all the 400 or so employees participated in the demonstration, for which reason
only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor
practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to
charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight
(8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective
families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who
consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of
goodwill good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact
that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
". . . The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must
remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be
a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant
alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never
ending one.
". . . The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
". . . In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
". . . But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that
we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack
of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being
subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve
its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism.
Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter . . . to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act . . .). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has
been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity
protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d
416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to
air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls
the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure,
the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation
Corp. vs. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge
for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-
13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to
discharge them. it is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering
with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-
organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act." (Italics supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in
the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity
of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in
the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its
officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation
from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents.
Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO J.: Dissenting

I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts upon
which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:
"1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a
corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is
the employer of respondent;
"2 That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, PBMEO for short,
is a legitimate labor organization, and the respondents herein are either officers
of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM)
workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM
and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union
has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6. That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration i9 an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C. S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in
order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: "NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change
their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
 which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'"
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and
in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company". (p.
5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with
said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that:
"3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in
the first shift, in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement and
without filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
"4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-paragraph 6, in
relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective
bargaining agreement." (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from further committing the same and its representatives
namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Munsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor
practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of the
Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this decision
on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they were actually
served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice
in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the
industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days after they
were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See
Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days
after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days after the
expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.

Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent
private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion
for reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof within the periods
respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly
and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969
dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts hereof is
the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations 1
wherein it was ruled that:
"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then
Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth
earlier in this opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments
were advanced in support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in
support of its motion to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid
motion seeking reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for
reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the arguments were 'filed out of time'.
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time
lodged the present petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not
file their brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
"1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment not merely an
interlocutory order there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for
computation of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision
incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World
Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees Association, which
runs thus: 'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the compensation due, the Industrial
Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an
incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay
involves a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval by the very terms of the order
itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the
decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be
made clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab &
Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).'"
"2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no
longer be disturbed?
"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both
answer the question in the affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the
judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on
which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows
Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be submitted
simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that 'the movant
shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion
for reconsideration'. Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that
'(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for
dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be'.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that
where a pro forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is
in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support
of said motion were or were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers
& Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or
decision subject of reconsideration becomes final. And so also, where the
arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-
day reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in
Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the
motion for reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments in
support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes 'final and unappealable'.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of
this Court in the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the
judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider without arguments in support thereof of August 12 was filed
on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day reglementary period to file a
motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments
in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The
period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely
enough, said arguments were filed out of time five (5) days late. And the
judgment had become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension
of time within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel
in his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded
on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel' which would not
 enable him to do so within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The
arguments were only filed on August 27 five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that
the motion for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day
before the due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that
the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not
later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments on the
27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that 'obviously to speed up the disposition of
cases', CIR 'has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for
filing supporting arguments'. That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely,
and relied on the court's generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed
the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963
dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for
extension.
"We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not
review the same."
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any
way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen
not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in
holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold petitioners'
claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of
the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of
grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note
carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere
admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to
dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant
circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly
affects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of
this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related
thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be
protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with
substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can
be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as
niceties, but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set aside final
judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. I have not
come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main
opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon
the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional
right, unless such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial
precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if
it were universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that "a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which
is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment". And, of course,
Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres, 2 which, in principle, served as its
precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the accused were denied
due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness
for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present
evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.

As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry
from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process.
Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their constitutional
immunities . . .," contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed,
neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct
or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as
being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should
consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari humbly beg
this Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of
Court."
"xxx xxx xxx
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict
and narrow technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice,
equity and substantial merits of the case."
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in
their brief runs thus:
"III
ISSUES
"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion
that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the
persons allegedly responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act
one way or another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9,
1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of bargaining
in bad faith and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible
therefor, because such conclusion is contrary to the evidence on record; that the
dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and
petition the duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the
petitioners were charged and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not
borne out by the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What
has been alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of
the 'no-lockout no strike' clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
However, this allegation and proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the same decision stated
categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the
demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We do not think
so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.'
(Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
"The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith
is not tenable because:
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent
company convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration.
Petitioners requested that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even settling the matter
so that the hours of work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the
employees of mass dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company
that the first shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to
bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the
demonstration without their officers. It must be stated that the company intends
to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration because most of them
belonged to the first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed
will practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed
in the CBA is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence
on record. The demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions
of employment because it was only for one (1) day and the company knew
about it before it went through. We can even say that it was the company who
bargained in bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not to
dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same
and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP
Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union
participated in the demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight
officers to be dismissed from the union thus losing their status as employees of
the respondent company. The respondent court should have taken into account
that the company's action in allowing the return of more or less three hundred
ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and
the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines
Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31,
1968). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court, while
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on
demonstration or go on strike because it will change the terms and conditions of
employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union
to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875. This creates a had precedent
because it will appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon the
CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings
before the Court of Industrial Relations is that 'the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.' (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the
 administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs.
CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of
evidence to support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union
bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law."
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
"1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the
respondent company did not meet the meaning and comprehension of
'substantial merits of the case.' Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing of the case.
The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under the facts and
circumstances alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration
done by the petitioners amounted to on 'illegal strike' and therefore in violation
of the 'no strike no lock out' clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court
had altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does not amount to a
strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the
charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its
own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having
'bargained in faith.' The stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows
the principle in logic as 'non-siquitor';
"2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble
peaceably to air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as
guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the agreement in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the petitioners
to free speech and assembly is paramount to the provision in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the constitutional provision
would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent court;"
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue
of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void
on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court for having
priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein involved over and
above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their
grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or
contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a
nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's
action as a mere error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion
projects for this Court to roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for
the grievous violation of the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow
all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been
duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple
reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to
be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.

To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of

jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge
against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a mass demonstration,
which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but
definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color Indeed, We can even
assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential
importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management
and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm still, We cannot
rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of
jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions,
erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be endless;
no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious if
the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future". 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or
application of a constitutional precept, not constituting a denial of due process, should not
make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or
erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or
misapplied constitutional injunction affecting his individual freedoms. In both instances,
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount
considerations that inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this
must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion not cite any
constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its
basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due
process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education, 4 following Santiago vs. Far
Eastern Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices
that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners have not raised,
they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued the constitutional
issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous
resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process
renders its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after
said judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring
myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main
opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious
incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners
under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section
2(5) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines 6 (reenacted practically
ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further
reflection that the very power granted to Us to review decisions of lower courts involving
questions of law (and these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of
statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only
in the manner provided in the law or the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can
exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they
may be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law
or rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is
already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to review,
much less alter or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely
whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised by the
party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking
pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have
jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than
Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra, which is being relied upon by the
main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its
four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is,
that in view of the failure of the petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period,
"the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of
their judgments are made contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional
standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is
naturally as changeable as the members themselves are changed. I cannot conceive of
anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than the
idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the
court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in
instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code. 7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law of
respecting judgments once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final
decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors, 8 it is only when the
fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside, 9
and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38
Phil. 521, thus:
". . . Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating,
irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to
determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about
from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and as
capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become
more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.)."
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112,
October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of
final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in
question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my
attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the
dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the
revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to
emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from the
soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such
modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order I am
not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for
execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I
am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this
Court in G.R. No. L-0950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and,
by this opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest
view, is the true and correct meaning and implications of the decision of this
Court, not that of Judge Tengco's."
The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely involving cases in the
industrial court, wherein this Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of
procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the parties. I still believe in
those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and executory. It is too
obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference to any precedent or authority
that the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it
may be considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public
policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to
substantial justice.

Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main
opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule
governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations,
"as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations Rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness
of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are
concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion
suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual
or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days
from the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the
motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to
the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally
or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six
(6) copies, duly verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with
said motions, upon notice to the Court, the movant shall file same within ten
(10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The
adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by
him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
 "Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from
the receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the
motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it
is considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall
issue the corresponding order or notice to that effect.
"Failure to observe the above specified periods shall be sufficient cause for
dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or
the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951,
Court of Industrial Relations.)."
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with
proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a
judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any
argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the fundamental
ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same by making the
necessary exposition, with citations of laws and authorities, in the written arguments to
be filed ten (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has the effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with the judgment
due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of
this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to be sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to make
whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the
litigation is prolonged. It must be borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may
involve or affect the operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems
might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and all
concerned that the attitude of each party at every important juncture of the case be known
to the other so that other avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or
inadequate. In fact, the motion filed by petitioners was no more than the following:
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court
most respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this
Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the
above-entitled case.
"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective
arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of
the Rules of Court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration
be admitted.
"Manila, September 27, 1969."
 To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to
me simply incomprehensible. What is worse in this case is that petitioners have not
even taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with the
rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written
arguments in support of their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter
forgot to do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this
Court, as I shall explain anon, "is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by
the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance
and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for
the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real
nature, for in their operation they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights
pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that the court
that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or
modify the same enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have the
effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the
twin predicates of prescription are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is
unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and
he has no reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted
in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self evident principles to the case
of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for
the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other courts,
particularly one that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being an administrative
agency under the Executive Department. Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration
of substantial justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its reserve power to
amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has never done it for the purpose of reviving a
case in which the judgment has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their petition, in a belated
effort to salvage their cause, petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a
petition for relief alleging that their failure to file their "Arguments in Support of their
Motion for Reconsideration" within the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7),
days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
President of the respondent Union and of the office clerk of the counsel for respondents
as shown and attested in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, K-1, and K-2)
which in brief, consisted allegedly of the said President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions" and of the said office
employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work as instructed (sic) to (him)
by Atty. Osorio" because he "was too busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be
evoked by these allegations, for, under probably more justifying circumstances, this
Court ruled out a similar explanation in a previous case this wise:
"We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos as
reason for his failure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the
Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The
uncritical acceptance of this kind of commonplace excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive
of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L 4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado
vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)

For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed
in the present case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of
the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may
be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to
costs.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to
respondent employer company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift 1 should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court
ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union
officers and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint of
bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of the
union officers, manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since
respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded
by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the
demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement's
"no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found by
respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there
being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely "the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights
of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against
alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period
fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president
should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners'
petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their motion
for reconsideration due to such negligence which was not acted upon by respondent
court should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would
otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment,
simply because they sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them
by the Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-
day stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main
opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having included
the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but an act of
arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the
constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true substance and
meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without due process which
is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided . . . Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court
and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.

(Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., G.R.
|||

No. L-31195, [June 5, 1973], 151-A PHIL 656-719)

[G.R. No. 100150. January 5, 1994.]

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO

ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND
OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
 SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; POWERS AND

FUNCTIONS. The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time.
It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
The powers and functions of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus:
to - "(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights
of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons,
or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program, of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the
Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine
Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its
officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and
functions as may be provided by law."
2. ID.; ID.; CANNOT EXERCISE ADJUDICATING POWER. In its Order of 1
March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention
of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.
This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights, the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers
and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained: ". . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have."
3. ID.; ID.; POWER TO INVESTIGATE ALL FORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS INVOLVING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS; "CIVIL RIGHTS";
DEFINED. Now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or
on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1). The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring - "(to)
those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to
all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in
its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action." Also
quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "POLITICAL RIGHTS"; DEFINED. Political rights, are said to refer
to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and,
in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. In the particular case at hand,
there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be
that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; POWER TO CITE OR HOLD ANY PERSON IN DIRECT OR INDIRECT
CONTEMPT; APPLICATION. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That
power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of
its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigating work.
7. ID.; ID.; HAS NO POWER TO ISSUE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;
REASON THEREFOR. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds
from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina
Grio-Aquino, explained: "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to `provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. `Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law.' It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the
`preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in
which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals,
or of the Supreme Court. . . .. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." The Commission does
have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations
to any appropriate agency of government.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PROHIBITION; PROPER
REMEDY IN CASE AT BAR. The public respondent explains that this petition for
prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before
it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely
awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among
other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; HAS THE
POWER TO ISSUE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS
QUO PENDING INVESTIGATION OF A CASE INVOLVING AN ALLEGED
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION; REASONS THEREFOR. - J. Padilla reiterates his
separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January
1991 and his dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The
Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125.
He is of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain
the status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights
violation; that such cease and desist order may be necessary in situations involving a
threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate. In the case at
bench, He would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing
prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the
civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the
majority opinion and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section
18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). Human rights demand more than lip service and extend
beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are
what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us,
from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. He submits the
CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may
(or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

DECISION

VITUG, J : p

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is
again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order
and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90 1580, entitled "Fermo, et al.
vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon
City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the
North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the
stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July
1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the
petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again
directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation
of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
motion also averred, among other things, that:

"1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners)
of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila
Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;

"xxx xxx xxx

"3. . . ., a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium

referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of
poor dwellers;

"4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its
resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

"5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,

particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

"6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should)
be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel
 a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.
8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing
that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The
petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990, a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners,
stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to
the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in
business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution,
along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents,
albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was
still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order
to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
"Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The
motion to dismiss should be and hereby DENIED for lack of merit." 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
. . ." It added:
"The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic
rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions
have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness
and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man."
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also
issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from
further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the
Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor- General was excused from
filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18
through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to
dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to
comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. 19 It was
formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20
issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded,
but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution,
thus: to

"(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of

human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

"(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

"(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human

rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

"(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

"(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and

information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
 "(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human
rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights,
or their families;.

"(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international

treaty obligations on human rights;.

"(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or

whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

"(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency

in the performance of its functions;.

"(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

"(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by

law."
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes
that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a
quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court.
In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory
power itself. The Court explained:
". . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
"The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have."
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of
this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any
attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could be at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been
propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by 'human right'?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
"Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether in the Philippines
or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia. . . .
"Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and
the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right
to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services." 25
"Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person
from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights
are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it." 26
"(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 27
"Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth right, innate and inalienable." 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects
of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitution Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look
back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have
been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed
by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of
civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines," 29 observes:
 "But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their
Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant,
these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered
released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition
for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture
to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists."
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the
following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
"MR. GARCIA. . . ., the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear
in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political
rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill
of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide
territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
"So, it is important to delineate the parameters of its tasks so that the
commission can be most effective.
"MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and
political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and
political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
"MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been
made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on
the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and
so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political
rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
"MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political
rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
"MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this against torture.
"MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we
have?
 "MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
"xxx xxx xxx
"MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its
functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to
take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?

"MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would

like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of
political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced
during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
"MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore,
what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify
all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined
as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
"MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of
Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
"MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all rights
under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
"MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
"xxx xxx xxx
"MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human
rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the
violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as
a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food,
decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
"So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to
political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
"MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
"MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated
points raised by the previous speaker.
"There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights
could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment
of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
 "xxx xxx xxx
"The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
"MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
"I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term 'human rights' . I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
"If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
"MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration
of Torture of 1985?
"MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned
another.
"MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
"MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a
copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy
of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights
specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was
wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to
general terms like 'convention', rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
"As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of
these articles in the Declaration would fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human
rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need
arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a
civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
"MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific
civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this
provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture,
right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance,
salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically
related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific
group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.
"MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the
Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
"MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
"MR. GUINGONA. I know.
"MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and
every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
"MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not clear as to the
distinction between social and civil rights.
"MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights the rights of labor to organize, the right to education,
housing, shelter, et cetera.
"MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of
the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
"MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
"MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
"xxx xxx xxx
"SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of
human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. . . .
". . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and
very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones
more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very
delicate torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest,
massacre and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like
politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights
Commission must be independent.
"I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this
commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this
kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil
and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we
will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . ." 30
(emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or
on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
"(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or,
in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization
or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a
state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action."
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the
right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus
its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against
the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive
effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for
other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park."
More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its
is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed
vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in
providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the
Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
"The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived
by implication."
"Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in
the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on
behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of
the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).
The Commission does not have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the
instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners
has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has
already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true
that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however,
said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-
1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR
from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580
and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Cario, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et
al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29
January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The
Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125.
I am of the most considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human
rights violation; that such cease and desist order may be necessary in situations involving
a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private
respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an
impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil
rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned
authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of
placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause
of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect
and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without
dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude
to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human
rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for
further proceedings.
||| (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, [January 5, 1994])
[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant, VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-
appellee.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates and Asst. City Fiscal L.L. Arguelles for appellant.
Jose M . Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez and Luis Go for appellees.
Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY,

PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or
city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear
invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore,
the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is
unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail.
2. ID.; POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is a manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture
and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does "to all the great
public needs."
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY. On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional guaranties, the
exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property
of any person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be
considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process
or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
4. ID.; ID.; LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into
those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.
Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount
of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of
cases. Aside from applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng
v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).
5. ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF. Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular
mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed
to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise
of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the exercise of that power.
6. ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARDS OF LEGAL INFIRMITY. There is no
controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property,
in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to
reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking
body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to be an
abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the
state of public morals.
7. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed
as transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be
absolute.
8. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST; GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
10. ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; AMBIGUITY OF STATUTES AS DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS. What makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its
face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either for bidding or requiring
the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must
be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of
the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued
in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed
by both national and city authorities regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and representing an investment of more than P3
million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. (par.
3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was
the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the
City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; that the provision in the same section which would
require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration
forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by
the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination;
that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring
the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that
the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process
guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character;
and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed
to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds.
After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a
valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self- incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and
the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu
is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor
Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and
be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and
chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating
hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and
669 of the compilation of ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
 therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory noted signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05
from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was
laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing
its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only
U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum
likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity.
Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was
filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association,
and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by
the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable
objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and
came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him
from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed
to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity . .
. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect
given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 3 where the American Supreme
Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power.
We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid
in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective
as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence
to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. 6 Negatively
put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers." The
challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It
would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against
the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 providing
a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance hall; 9
prohibiting gambling;11 and monte; 12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than
Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; 14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting
a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are intended to protect
public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised
to the question of due process. 16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for
justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought." 18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process
are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction
in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided
it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here, to attach to an ordinance of
such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased
fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class
motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprise
and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu-Unjieng
case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and
the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion
in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of
imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount
of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for
revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors.
In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable." 23
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz V. Araneta 24 this Court affirmed the doctrine
earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement
the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities
is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax
so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the
City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case
 that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure. 26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on
behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive
them of their lawful occupation and means of livehood because they can not rent stalls
in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or
cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions
is permitted . . . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate
use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty
is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-
being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good . . . The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state . . . To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all." 29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, 30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption
by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest." 31 What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider. 32 How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and
sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity
for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with
the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with him at about the
same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint
would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such
lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co. 33 to Adderley v. Florida, 34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes
a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes
would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in constructing
laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law
principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ .,
concur.
Concepcion, C .J . and Dizon, J ., are on official leave.

(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
|||

G.R. No. L-24693, [July 31, 1967], 127 PHIL 306-326)

[G.R. No. L-24693. October 23, 1967.]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-
appellee.

J. M. Aruego, A. Tenchavez and L. U. Go for petitioners-appellees.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates for respondent-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ABSENCE OF INJURY TO RIGHTS BY OPERATION

OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of
his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance he has no standing,
except perhaps as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to
property.
2. ID.; FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, NOT A BAR TO POLICE POWER MEASURES.
In this jurisdiction, the liberty to contract, has never stood in the way of the enactment
of police power measures when called for by circumstances. The same is true in the
United States, where such concept has definitely fallen from its previously high estate
under the impact of the Nebbia (291 US 502), West Coast Hotel Co. (300 US 379), and
Olsen (313 US 1305) decisions.
3. ID.; DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY ALLOWED PROVIDED DUE PROCESS IS
OBSERVED. One could, consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of his
property, as long as due process is observed.
4. ID.; CHALLENGED ORDINANCE DOES NOT DENY EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE. Since the challenged ordinance applies to all the motels in Manila, an
assertion that there is denial of equal protection would be extremely far-fetched.
5. ID.; LAISSEZ FAIRE CONCEPT AS BAR TO ENACTMENT OF REGULATORY
MEASURES, MAY NOT BE INVOKED. The invocation of the laissez faire concept
as bar against the enactment of regulatory measures, which undoubtedly would result in
the diminution of income and the loss of business, does not occasion any misgiving as to
the conformity of the decision arrived at by the Court with controlling constitutional law
principles. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest. The state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. The mere fact that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a
living cannot prevent the exercise of police power. Persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967 was filed by
petitioners, followed by a Motion for new trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is
clearly without merit, there is no occasion for this sought-for new trial. Consequently,
both motions are denied.
(1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration.
In the decision of this Court of July 31, 1967, sought to be reconsidered, its basis was
categorically set forth in the following language:
"As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished
the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has
hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both
procedural and substantive aspects.
"Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
 statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: 'The
presumption is all in favor of validity . . . . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people . . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulations.'
"It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance
is void on its face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere
better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked
to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed
is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside."
The O'Gorman principle 1 fails to meet the approval of counsel of petitioners. They
would restrain unduly and unjustifiably its operation. In the language of the motion for
reconsideration: "The U.S. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule in
constitutional cases that there must be a factual foundation of record to offset the
presumption of constitutionality of any and every law."
To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, this interpretation is without support in authority or
reason and rests upon a misconception. It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of
the import and significance of the O'Gorman doctrine in American constitutional law.
Authorities on the subject of proven competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view.
Dodd, 2 Dowling, 3 Freund, Sutherland, De Wolfe Howe, and Brown, 4 and Kauper 5 in
their standard casebooks quote the same excerpt from O'Gorman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
appearing in the opinion of this Court. Dodd entertained no doubt: "The accepted view is
that stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the O'Gorman case." 6
Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their appreciation of what the O'Gorman
dictum means. "As doctrine, there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for
concreteness in passing judgment upon the legislative judgment. But perhaps last term
marks a more sedulous attention to its observance. Certainly the procedure followed by
the Court in O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., if regularly observed, will
affect not a little the fate of legislation. If insisted upon, it will compel the bar to argue
questions of legislative validity in the perspective of the circumstances which gave rise to
a particular statute." 7
The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School, one of the most distinguished
constitutionalist, would have been appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of
petitioners. For him, the O'Gorman opinion was a manifestation of the jurist's art at its
best:
"If the jurists have the feelings of other men, Monday, the fifth of January,
nineteen hundred and thirty-one, must have been a day of consequence in the
life of Mr. Justice Brandeis. On that day he handed down the judgment of the
United States Supreme Court in the O'Gorman case. The cause was a simple suit
in contract: the result depended upon the validity of a New Jersey statute
regulating the commissions to be paid by insurance companies to their agents
for securing business. The more general question was the tolerance to be
accorded to legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment. And, as
the fortunes of litigation broke, the issue came to be the intellectual procedure
by which the constitutionality of the acts which make up the public control of
business are to be determined. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became 'the
opinion of the court,' and a new chapter in judicial history began to be written.
"xxx xxx xxx
"In form 'the opinion of the court' is a very simple and unpretentous document.
It begins with a statement of the issue and a history of the case, continues with a
brief summary of the reasons for the statute and a statement that 'the business of
insurance is so affected with a public interest that the state may regulate the
rates,' and concludes with a declaration of the test for validity. As 'underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character,' it follows that `the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' It
did not appear 'upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court
must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey 'evils did not exist,' for which the
statute was 'an appropriate remedy.' Accordingly the court was compelled to
declare the statute valid; in fact it was left with no alternative.
"Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's
art . . . ." 8
This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute,
executive order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional
rights, especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous. That in
such an event there should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be
presented does not argue against the force of the above excerpts on the weight to be
accorded the O'Gorman doctrine in this case.
The prop here failing, is there anything else in the Motion for reconsideration that calls
for a modification of the decision of this Court? The answer must be in the negative. It
ought not to have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after noting the lack of
factual foundation to offset the presumption of constitutionality went on to discuss the
due process aspect to make clear that on its face, the Ordinance cannot be considered
void.
"Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is
fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty
does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading
decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is
`that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that
is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.'
"There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila, traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
'provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit' and
thus become the `ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.' The challenged
ordinance then 'proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up
a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at
all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests.'
Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
`establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal' and at
the same time, to increase `the income of the city government.' It would appear
therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it."
There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or
impairs the force of the above conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged
Ordinance is void on its face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless, with the
persistence worthy of a better cause, petitioners would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged
invasion of the rights against unreasonable search and seizure, to liberty, and to property.
As the unchallenged rule, to paraphrase Laurel, is that unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, 9 he
has no standing, the invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to
being free from unreasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does
their claim of the alleged infringement of their liberty deserve any further thought, its
implausibility being self- evident, except perhaps as to the liberty to contract, which is
part and parcel of their right to property. Unfortunately for them, in this jurisdiction the
liberty to contract, except in the Pomar 10 case as noted in the decision, has never stood in
the way of the enactment of police power measures when called for by circumstances
such as undoubtedly exist in this case. The same is true in the United States, where such a
concept has definitely fallen from its previously high state under the impact of the
Nebbia, 11 West Coast Hotel Co. 12 and Olsen decisions. 13
That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an unconstitutional invasion of
property rights. It goes without saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one
could, consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of his property as long as due
process is observed. The decision makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this
Ordinance was concerned. To that aspect, a considerable portion of the opinion was
devoted, citing a number of applicable decisions of this Court, all tending to demonstrate
that there was no due process infraction. The Motion for reconsideration is conspicuously
barren of any attempt to show that under our previous decisions referred to, the
challenged Ordinance could be successfully assailed. It would follow then that this
reiteration of an argument, previously shown to be far from persuasive, is deserving of a
similar fate.
That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. That and what Justice Cardozo aptly
referred to as reference to "grotesque or fanciful situations," which if they would arise
could then be appropriately dealt with. As the famed jurist aptly noted: "That they are
conceivable though improbable ought not to govern our construction." 14 That is not the
way then to impugn the validity of an ordinance. Neither could it be rightfully looked
upon as laying a foundation for setting aside a decision. The Motion for reconsideration,
to repeat, is palpably lacking in merit.
1. No occasion for new trial.
Subsequently, a supplemental Motion for new trial dated September 25, 1967, was filed
the same day. As earlier pointed out, with the Motion for reconsideration having been
shown to be devoid of merit, the supplemental Motion for new trial should likewise be
denied. In the main, what was so unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was
adhered to. Additional counsel would bring in new points, namely, the alleged denial of
equal protection and the repugnancy to "the laissez faire principle underlying our
economic system, as it would substantially reduce return on the investment." Neither
suffices to justify any modification of the decision, much less its reconsideration. A new
trial would therefore be a exercise in futility.
The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the greater advantages that the
motels in the suburbs of Manila would enjoy as against those within the city limits. On its
face, such argument is clearly unfounded. If the legislative power of the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila were not limited to its boundaries, if it could apply to the suburban
area, then perhaps plausibility could be imparted to such a claim. Since, as is undeniable,
the challenged Ordinance applies to all the motels in Manila, an assertion that there is
denial of equal protection would, to put it at its mildest, be extremely far-fetched.
Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the enactment of
regulatory measures, which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and
the loss of business, occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived
at by this Court with controlling constitutional law principles. Did not petitioners take
note of the view announced by Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to the effect that the
policy "of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest." The decision likewise cited this jurist, speaking for the Court in Calalang v.
Williams: 15 "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state . . . . To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated." That was in 1940. Then in 1955, came Co Kiam v. City of
Manila, 16 where Justice Reyes, A., for a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And
surely, the mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living can not prevent the exercise of
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which
may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power
embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal
exercise of that power. (City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417)."
Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state court decisions call for a
different conclusion. The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 17 decided in 1943, was equally explicit,
saying "the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."
Two names of great repute, Freund and Learned Hand, were cited by petitioners. Neither,
if properly understood, could help their cause at all. According to Freund: "In short, when
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of
respect, when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands
respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality
in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
process clause." 18 The illustrious Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone's concept
of the judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited attitude" of what he referred
to "as the old apostles of the institution of property . . . ." 19

What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the reconsideration of our decision of July
31, 1967. Nor is there the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence.
Wherefore, the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of September 16, 1967 and
supplemental Motion for new trial of September 25, 1967, are denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
|||

G.R. No. L-24693, [October 23, 1967], 128 PHIL 473-484)

[G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010.]

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE

TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

[G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.]

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR.,

REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not

assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
Justice Jose P. Laurel 1
 The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and
by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. 2 The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and
to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. 3
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time.
It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much
more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. 4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases 5 both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July
30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution 6 as it usurps the constitutional authority
of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. 7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members
of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to
carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. ITESAc

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need
for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates
that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all
times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the
political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts
untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the people's trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people's faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President's battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
cTIESa

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it
will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases
of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require
any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and
other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from
the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted
by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the
Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator,
information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state
witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose; TacADE

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the
Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other
personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary
to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and
to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in
connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. . . . .
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. . . . .
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. . . .
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. . . . .
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. . . . .
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. . . . .
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission
refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for
inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. . . . . .
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall
provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
aDSAEI

SECTION 12. Office. . . . .

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. . . . .
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its
mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. . . . .
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. . . . .
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
 SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared
unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office
of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public
office, as an ad hoc body is one. 8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not,
however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. cADaIH

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the
facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian
law in a country's past." 9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods
of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional
justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse
committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary
bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by
the State. 10 "Commission's members are usually empowered to conduct research,
support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more
about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way
for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms." 11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg
and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up
to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a
reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the
principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent
future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa's model. The latter placed more emphasis
on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is
the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer 12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by
Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if they
mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without
justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked
the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they
are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following
manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.cAaTED

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth
Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
 (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the
consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States
constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations,
which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of
international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure
in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere
populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty
will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the
other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged
is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question
on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."
13

In their Consolidated Comment, 14 the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office
because the President's executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 16 (as amended
by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970, 17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the
President to create or form such bodies. DIAcTE

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions
do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter's jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive
orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the
PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President
Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform
and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the
principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective
petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of
powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause;
and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its
power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 19 AIHDcC

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been
put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their
petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It
argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to
be the subject of the commission's investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in
its creation or as a result of its proceedings. 20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power
and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort
to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators. 22
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing
to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. 23 It emphasizes
that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be
taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the President's power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a
clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to
wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of
David v. Arroyo 24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus: ACcHIa

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is
"the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show
 that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing
in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where
it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of
the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the
real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that
"the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in
any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,
such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers'
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations
omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest." 25 cDAITS

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 26 the Court held that
in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved,
the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, 27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance 28 laid down
in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco 29 are non-existent in this case. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental
and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they
should be resolved for the guidance of all. 30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more
than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised
change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President. 31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed 32 since there is no provision
in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth
commission. 33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting
the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for
the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses
verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish." 34 Insofar
as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President
to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon
the effectivity thereof. 35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of
a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch
of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize
under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President
to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited
to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer
of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. 36 Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is
limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of
this delegated authority. HCEaDI
 The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation
by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to
numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President
to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been
recognized. 37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of
government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist
it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of
its administrative functions. 38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of
the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control
under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution. 39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct
fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by
public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of his officials. 40 The power of the President to investigate
is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the
executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his
power to discipline subordinates, 41 his power for rule making, adjudication and
licensing purposes 42 and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to
know. 43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, 44 where it was held that
the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a
valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the
power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to,
among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government. 45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC
fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by
the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization
of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an
office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the
answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable
to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC
was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, 46 aSIAHC

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must
not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express
grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes
place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department
of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power
of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or
his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the
above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities,
transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in
relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases
such as Larin v. Executive Secretary. 49
 The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for
the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the
power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of
the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency
during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio
upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view.
Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says
"it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to
parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that
P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the
promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct. cHSIDa

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:

Yes, Your Honor. 50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
 Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution
of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency
is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority. 51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: 52
. . . . The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government
with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government
and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that
the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. . . . .
cSATEH

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. 53 One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 54 the
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an
investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the
employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was
upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
 The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this
was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC,
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of
the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be
no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the
Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." 55 Moreover, since
the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department. 57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily
investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-
judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." 58 In simpler terms, judicial
discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is
exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in
the case of administrative agencies. caAICE

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate
was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights. 59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: .
. . to subject to an official probe . . . : to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose
of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the
facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge."
And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." HScaCT

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.
To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. 60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft
of any quasi-judicial power. 61
 Contrary to petitioners' apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of
the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation." 62 The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,
63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course
of its investigation," under Section 2 (g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. 64
At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in
the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution
and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the
Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction
with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
AIHDcC

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates

the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of
probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC's sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman's
primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of
the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but
will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations
of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its
sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." 66 Thus, in order to be
accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption
in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. 67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of
former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies" 68 were reported to have been committed
against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents
as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial
distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order
No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and
second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order
No. 1 to end corruption." 69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners
advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent
to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force." 70 cEaDTA

Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous
administration" as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof,
the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during
the said administration. 71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its
proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no
offense is committed against the equal protection clause for "the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane
to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct." 72 To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public
confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people's faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-
finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the
current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the
policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully
executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the
current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to
investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even
as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent
administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an
ad-hoc and independent citizens' committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor,
former President Fidel V. Ramos. 73 [Emphases supplied] TcHEaI

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been
embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general
may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause. 74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed." 75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." 76 "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." 77
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." 78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including
the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 81
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 82
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. 83 "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess
the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him." 84 cSICHD

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall
into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union 85 and reiterated in a long line of cases, 86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration" 87 only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
 and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied] HIaSDc

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just
a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration"
only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken
as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were
also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in,
and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit
the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG
ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." 89 The
reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds." 90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the
earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside
the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can
no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body's limited time
and resources. "The law does not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia). 91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century's worth of graft cases.
However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often
quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is
limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in
any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. 93 Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 94
While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions
of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial
distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the subject executive order
is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian, 95 it was
written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or
assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity
or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or
more generally the exercise of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. 96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are
relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of
the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by
it in the same way as are the members of the class." 97 TaDAIS

The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause." 98 "Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils
within its reach." 99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete. 100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid
reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process. 101 "With
regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked." 102
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from
the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the
past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination." 103
To disprove petitioners' contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the
OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale
graft and corruption committed during the previous administration. 104 The OSG points
to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of
graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that
they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will
still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include
them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of
officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration." 105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata
v. Sandiganbayan, 106 that the "PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1,
2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision, however, was
devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal
issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department,
is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the
doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the
Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the
nation's thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." SECHIA

Furthermore, in Section 4 (2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial

review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of
the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds
of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting
superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source
of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them." 107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its
own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of
any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again,
it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means."
No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means
to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional
parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. 108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye
and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.
 "The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude." 109
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as
nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive
issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the
test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches
of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional
bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men." 110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from
carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, Abad and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J., see separate opinion (concurring).
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Velasco Jr., J., C.J. Corona certifies that Justice Velasco left his concurring vote.
Nachura, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Brion, J., see separate opinion (concurring).
Peralta, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Bersamin, J., see his separate opinion.
Abad, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
Perez, J., see separate opinion (concurring).
Sereno, J., see dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
CORONA, C.J.:
OF TRUTH AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS
The fundamental base upon which a truth commission is created is the right to
the truth. 1 While the right to the truth is yet to be established as a right under customary
law 2 or as a general principle of international law, 3 it has nevertheless emerged as a
"legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the
obligation of the state to provide information to victims or to their families or even
society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human
rights." 4cDTHIE

A truth commission has been generally defined 5 as a "body set up to investigate

a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country . . .," 6 and includes
four elements:
. . . First, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is
not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of certain
human rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian law, over a
period of time. Third, a truth commission usually exists temporarily and for a pre-
defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its
findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some sort of authority,
by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater security
or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report. 7
As reported by Amnesty International, 8 there are at least 33 truth commissions
established in 28 countries from 1974 to 2007 and this includes the Philippines, which
created the Presidential Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) in 1986 under the post-
Marcos administration of Pres. Corazon C. Aquino.
THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE
Notably, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino created not one but two truth commissions. 9
Aside from the PCHR, which was created to address human rights violations, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG was also established. The
PCGG was tasked with assisting the President in the "recovery of all in-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," among others. 10 Unlike the present embattled and
controversial Truth Commission, however, the PCGG was created by Pres. Corazon C.
Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under Executive Order No. 1, 11 which in
turn, was sanctioned by Proclamation No. 3. 12 CaTcSA

And unlike the PCGG, the present Truth Commission suffers from both legal
and constitutional infirmities and must be struck down as unconstitutional.
POWER TO CREATE PUBLIC OFFICES: INHERENTLY LEGISLATIVE
 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. 13 This principle is one of the cornerstones of our constitutional democracy
and it cannot be eroded without endangering our government. 14 The 1987 Constitution
divides governmental power into three co-equal branches: the executive, the legislative
and the judicial. It delineates the powers of the three branches: the legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive department to the enforcement
of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and
controversies. 15 Each branch is independent and supreme within its own sphere and the
encroachment by one branch on another is to be avoided at all costs.
The power under scrutiny in this case is the creation of a public office. It is
settled that, except for the offices created by the Constitution, the creation of a public
office is primarily a legislative function. The legislature decides what offices are
suitable, necessary or convenient for the administration of government. 16
The question is whether Congress, by law, has delegated to the Chief Executive
this power to create a public office.
In creating the Truth Commission, Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) points to
Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
as its legal basis:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions: IDcAHT

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision pertains to the President's continuing delegated power to
reorganize the Office of the President. The well-settled principle is that the President
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line
with his constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of his delegated legislative power to reorganize them under existing statutes. 17
Needless to state, such power must always be in accordance with the Constitution,
relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. 18
 In creating the Truth Commission, did the President merely exercise his
continuing authority to reorganize the executive department? No.
Considering that the President was exercising a delegated power, his actions
should have conformed to the standards set by the law, that is, that the reorganization
be in the interest of "simplicity, economy and efficiency." Were such objectives met?
They were not. The Truth Commission clearly duplicates and supplants the functions
and powers of the Office of the Ombudsman and/or the Department of Justice, as will
be discussed in detail later. How can the creation of a new commission with the same
duplicative functions as those of already existing offices result in economy or a more
efficient bureaucracy? 19 Such a creation becomes even more questionable considering
that the 1987 Constitution itself mandates the Ombudsman to investigate graft and
corruption cases. 20 ASTcaE

THE TRUTH COMMISSION IN THE LIGHT OF

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Equal protection is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
. . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
It is a right afforded every man. The right to equal protection does not require a
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. 21 It
requires simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 22
In certain cases, however, as when things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. 23 In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, 24 the Court declared:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Thus, for a classification to be valid it must pass the test of reasonableness, 25
which requires that:
(1) it be based on substantial distinctions;
 (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to present conditions; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
All four requisites must be complied with for the classification to be valid and
constitutional.
The constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 is being attacked on the ground that it violates
the equal protection clause. EaDATc

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
deliberately vests the Truth Commission with jurisdiction and authority to solely target
officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration. 26 Moreover, they claim that
there is no substantial distinction of graft reportedly committed under the Arroyo
administration and graft committed under previous administrations to warrant the
creation of a Truth Commission which will investigate for prosecution officials and
employees of the past administration. 27
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the creation of the Truth Commission
does not violate the equal protection clause. According to them, while E.O. No. 1 names
the previous administration as the initial subject of the investigation, it does not confine
itself to cases of graft and corruption committed solely during the past administration.
Section 17 of E.O. No. 1 clearly speaks of the President's power to expand its coverage
to previous administrations. Moreover, respondents argue that the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane
to the evils which the executive order seeks to correct. 28
On its face, E.O. No. 1 clearly singles out the previous administration as the
Truth Commission's sole subject of investigation.
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action to be taken to ensure that the
full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
aCSEcA

Section 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any during the previous
 administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding Section 17, which provides:
If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administration, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
supplemental Executive Order." (Emphasis supplied).
such expanded mandate of the Truth Commission will still depend on the whim and
caprice of the President. If the President decides not to expand the coverage of the
investigation, then the Truth Commission's sole directive is the investigation of officials
and employees of the Arroyo administration.
Given the indubitably clear mandate of E.O. No. 1, does the identification of the
Arroyo administration as the subject of the Truth Commission's investigation pass the
jurisprudential test of reasonableness? Stated differently, does the mandate of E.O. No.
1 violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution? Yes. IDETCA

I rule in favor of petitioners.

(1) No Substantial Distinction
There is no substantial distinction between the corruption which occurred during
the past administration and the corruption of the administrations prior to it. Allegations
of graft and corruption in the government are unfortunately prevalent regardless of who
the President happens to be. Respondents' claim of widespread systemic corruption is
not unique only to the past administration.
(2) Not Germane to the Purpose of the Law
The purpose of E.O. No. 1 (to put an end to corruption in the government) is
stated clearly in the preamble of the aforesaid order:
WHEREAS, the President's battle-cry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds; . . .
In the light of the unmistakable purpose of E.O. No. 1, the classification of the
past regime as separate from the past administrations is not germane to the purpose of
the law. Corruption did not occur only in the past administration. To stamp out
corruption, we must go beyond the faade of each administration and investigate all
public officials and employees alleged to have committed graft in any previous
administration.
(3) E.O. No. 1 does Not Apply to Future Conditions
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the classification does not even refer to
present conditions, much more to future conditions vis-a-vis the commission of graft
and corruption. It is limited to a particular past administration and not to all past
administrations. 29
We go back to the text of the executive order in question.
xxx xxx xxx
Whereas, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases if graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;AcaEDC

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. Creating of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end investigate reports of graft and corruption, . . . if any, during the
previous administration; . . .
Section 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption . . ., if any, during
the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. . . .
The above-quoted provisions show that the sole subject of the investigation will
be public officers and employees of the previous administration only, that is, until such
time if and when the President decides to expand the Truth Commission's mandate to
include other administrations (if he does so at all).
(4) E.O. No. 1 Does Not Apply to the Same Class
Lastly, E.O. No. 1 does not apply to all of those belonging to the same class for
it only applies to the public officers and employees of the past administration. It
excludes from its purview the graft and the grafters of administrations prior to the last
one. Graft is not exclusive to the previous presidency alone, hence there is no
justification to limit the scope of the mandate only to the previous administration.
FACT-FINDING OR INVESTIGATION?
The nature of the powers and functions allocated by the President to the Truth
Commission by virtue of E.O. No. 1 is investigatory, 30 with the purposes of
determining probable cause of the commission of "graft and corruption under pertinent
applicable laws" and referring such finding and evidence to the proper authorities for
prosecution. 31
The respondents pass off these powers and functions as merely fact-finding,
short of investigatory. I do not think so. Sugar-coating the description of the Truth
Commission's processes and functions so as to make it "sound harmless" falls short of
constitutional requirements. It has in its hands the vast arsenal of the government to
intimidate, harass and humiliate its perceived political enemies outside the lawful
prosecutorial avenues provided by law in the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice.
SDHAcI

The scope of the investigatory powers and functions assigned by the President
to the Truth Commission encompasses all "public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration." 32
There is no doubt in my mind that what the President granted the Truth
Commission is the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints of
graft and corruption against his immediate predecessor and her associates.
The respondents see nothing wrong with that. They believe that, pursuant to his
power of control and general supervision under Article VII of the Constitution, 33 the
President can create an ad-hoc committee like the Truth Commission to investigate
graft and corruption cases. And the President can endow it with authority parallel to
that of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations. Citing Ombudsman v.
Galicia 34 the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations is not
exclusive but shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
I take a different view. The operative word is "authorized".
Indeed, the power of control and supervision of the President includes the power
to discipline which in turn implies the power to investigate. 35 No Congress or Court
can derogate from that power 36 but the Constitution itself may set certain limits. 37 And
the Constitution has in fact carved out the preliminary investigatory aspect of the
control power and allocated the same to the following:
(a) to Congress over presidential appointees who are impeachable officers
(Article XI, Sections 2 and 3);
(b) to the Supreme Court over members of the courts and the personnel
thereof (Article VIII, Section 6); and
AaIDCS

(c) to the Ombudsman over any other public official, employee, office or
agency (Article XI, Section 13 (1)).
However, even as the Constitution has granted to the Ombudsman the power to
investigate other public officials and employees, such power is not absolute and
exclusive. Congress has the power to further define the powers of the Ombudsman and,
impliedly, to authorize other offices to conduct such investigation over their respective
officials and personnel. 38
The Constitution has vested in Congress alone the power to grant to any
office concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases of graft and corruption.
 In a myriad of cases, this Court has recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of
other bodies vis--vis the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption as authorized by law, meaning, for any other person
or agency to be able to conduct such investigations, there must be a law authorizing
him or it to do so.
In Ombudsman v. Galicia (cited in the ponencia) as well as Ombudsman v.
Estandarte, 39 the Court recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of the Division School
Superintendent vis--vis the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption committed by public school teachers. Such
concurrent jurisdiction of the Division School Superintendent was granted by law,
specifically RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. 40
Likewise, in Ombudsman v. Medrano 41 the Court held that by virtue of RA 4670
the Department of Education Investigating Committee has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints against public
school teachers.
Even the Sangguniang Panlungsod has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Ombudsman to look into complaints against the punong barangay. 42 Such concurrent
authority is found in RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. IcESDA

The Department of Justice is another agency with jurisdiction concurrent with

the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of public officials and employees.
43 Its concurrent jurisdiction is based on the 1987 Administrative Code.

Certainly, there is a law, the Administrative Code, which authorized the Office
of the President to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation of graft and corruption cases. However, the scope and focus
of its preliminary investigation are restricted. Under the principle that the power to
appoint includes the power to remove, each President has had his or her own version of
a presidential committee to investigate graft and corruption, the last being President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) under E.O.
No. 268. The PAGC exercised concurrent authority with the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints of graft and corruption against presidential appointees who are not
impeachable officers and non-presidential appointees in conspiracy with the latter. It is
in this light that DOH v. Camposano, et al. 44 as cited in the ponencia should be
understood. At that time, the PCAGC (now defunct) had no investigatory power over
non-presidential appointees; hence the President created an ad-hoc committee to
investigate both the principal respondent who was a presidential appointee and her co-
conspirators who were non-presidential appointees. The PAGC (now also defunct),
however, was authorized to investigate both presidential appointees and non-
presidential appointees who were in conspiracy with each other.
However, although pursuant to his power of control the President may supplant
and directly exercise the investigatory functions of departments and agencies within the
executive department, 45 his power of control under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code is confined only to the executive department. 46 Without any law
authorizing him, the President cannot legally create a committee to extend his
investigatory reach across the boundaries of the executive department to "public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration" without setting apart those
who are still in the executive department from those who are not. Only the Ombudsman
has the investigatory jurisdiction over them under Article XI, Section 13. There is no
law granting to the President the authority to create a committee with concurrent
investigatory jurisdiction of this nature. SECHIA

The President acted in violation of the Constitution and without authority of law
when he created a Truth Commission under E.O. No. 1 to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption against public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration.
INVESTIGATION OR QUASI-ADJUDICATION?
Respondents argue that the Truth Commission is merely an investigative and
fact-finding body tasked to gather facts, draw conclusions therefrom and recommend
the appropriate actions or measures to be taken. Petitioners, however, argue that the
Truth Commission is vested with quasi-judicial powers. Offices with such awesome
powers cannot be legally created by the President through mere executive orders.
Petitioners are correct.
The definition of investigation was extensively discussed in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights: 47
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.2005jur

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
 discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 48
(Italics in the original)
The exercise of quasi-judicial power goes beyond mere investigation and fact-
finding. Quasi-judicial power has been defined as
. . . the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. 49
(Emphasis supplied)
Despite respondents' denial that the Truth Commission is infused with quasi-
judicial powers, it is patent from the provisions of E.O. No. 1 itself that such powers
are indeed vested in the Truth Commission, particularly in Section 2, paragraphs (b)
and (g):
b) Collect, receive, review, and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the
cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees
and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when
in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is
reasonable ground to believe they are liable for graft and corruption under
pertinent applicable laws; aDIHTE

xxx xxx xxx

The powers to "evaluate evidence" and "find reasonable ground to believe that
someone is liable for graft and corruption" are not merely fact-finding or investigatory.
These are quasi-judicial in nature because they actually go into the weighing of
evidence, drawing up of legal conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and the exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
The evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence is a quasi-judicial/judicial
function. It involves an assessment of the evidence which is an exercise of judicial
discretion. We have defined discretion
 as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for
which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. 50
It is the "the act or the liberty to decide, according to the principles of justice and one's
ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor."
51

Likewise, the power to establish if there is reasonable ground to believe that

certain persons are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws is
quasi-judicial in nature because it is akin to the discretion exercised by a prosecutor in
the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. It involves a
judicial (or quasi-judicial) appraisal of the facts for the purpose of determining if a
violation has in fact been committed. acHTIC

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to

usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer
conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the
commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an
information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when
the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial
inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is
opportunity to be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside
or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal
judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer,
strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and
must be considered to be a quasi judicial officer. 52
Hence, the Truth Commission is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the
discharge of its functions.
As a mere creation of the executive and without a law granting it the power to
investigate person and agencies outside the executive department, the Truth
Commission can only perform administrative functions, not quasi-judicial functions.
"Administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial
system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals." 53
Executive Order No. 1 and the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, being
contrary to the Constitution, should be nullified.
I therefore vote that the petitions be GRANTED.

BRION, J.:
 I concur, through this Separate Opinion, with the conclusion that the Executive
Order No. 1 (EO 1 or EO) creating the Truth Commission is fatally defective and thus
should be struck down.
I base my conclusion:
(1) On due process grounds;
(2) On the unconstitutional impact of the EO on the established legal
framework of the criminal justice system;
(3) On the violation of the rule on separation of powers;
(4) On the violations of the personal rights of the investigated persons
and their constitutional right to a fair trial; 1 and
(5) On the violation of the equal protection clause.
Two inter-related features of the EO primarily contribute to the resulting
violations. The first is the use of the title Truth Commission, which, as used in the EO,
is fraught with hidden and prejudicial implications beyond the seemingly simple truth
that purportedly characterizes the Commission. The second relates to the truth-telling
function of the Truth Commission under the terms of the EO. Together, these features
radiate outwards with prejudicial effects, resulting in the above violations.
The full disclosure of the truth about irregular and criminal government
activities, particularly about graft and corruption, is a very worthy ideal that those in
government must fully support; the ideal cannot be disputed, sidetracked or much less
denied. It is a matter that the Constitution itself is deeply concerned about as shown by
Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers. SACTIH

This concern, however, co-exists with many others and is not the be-all and end-
all of the Charter. The means and manner of addressing this constitutional concern, for
example, rate very highly in the hierarchy of constitutional values, particularly their
effect on the structure and operations of government and the rights of third parties.
The working of government is based on a well-laid and purposeful constitutional
plan, essentially based on the doctrine of separation of powers, that can only be altered
by the ultimate sovereign the people. Short of this sovereign action, not one of the
departments of government neither the Executive, nor the Legislature, and nor the
Judiciary can modify this constitutional plan, whether directly or indirectly.
Concern for the individual is another overriding constitutional value.
Significantly, the Constitution does not distinguish between the guilty and the innocent
in its coverage and grant of rights and guarantees. In fact, it has very specific guarantees
for all accused based on its general concern for every Filipino's life, liberty, security
and property. The Constitution, too, ensures that persons of the same class, whether
natural or juridical, are treated equally, and that the government does not discriminate
in its actions.
 All these, this Court must zealously guard. We in the Court cannot ever allow a
disturbance of the equilibrium of the constitutional structure in favour of one or the
other branch, especially in favour of the Judiciary. Much less can we pre-judge any
potential accused, even in the name of truth-telling, retribution, national healing or
social justice. The justice that the Constitution envisions is largely expressed and
embodied in the Constitution itself and this concept of justice, more than anything else,
the Judiciary must serve and satisfy. In doing this, the Judiciary must stand as a neutral
and apolitical judge and cannot be an advocate other than for the primacy of the
Constitution.
These, in brief, reflect the underlying reasons for the cited grounds for the
invalidity of E.O. 1.
I. THE EO AND THE "TRUTH" COMMISSION.
A. THE TERMS OF THE EO AND THE RULES;
NATURE OF THE "TRUTH COMMISSION"
The Philippine Truth Commission (Truth Commission or Commission) is a body
"created" by the President of the Philippines by way of an Executive Order (EO 1 or
EO) entitled "Executive Order No. 1, Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010." The Truth Commission's express and avowed purpose is 2
"to seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officials and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration, and thereafter recommend
the appropriate action to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of
justice shall be served without fear or favor."
Under these terms and by the Solicitor General's admissions and representations,
the Truth Commission has three basic functions, namely, fact-finding, 3 policy
recommendation, 4 and truth-telling, 5 all with respect to reported massive graft and
corruption committed by officials and employees of the previous administration.
The EO defines the Truth Commission as an "independent collegial body" with
a Chairman and four members; 6 and provides for the staff, 7 facilities 8 and budgetary
support 9 it can rely on, all of which are sourced from or coursed through the Office of
the President. It specifically empowers the Truth Commission to "collect, receive,
review and evaluate evidence." 10 It defines how the Commission will operate and how
its proceedings will be conducted. 11 Notably, its hearings shall be open to the public,
except only when they are held in executive sessions for reasons of national security,
public safety or when demanded by witnesses' personal security concerns. 12 It is tasked
to submit its findings and recommendations on graft and corruption to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman, 13 and submit special interim reports and a
comprehensive final report which shall be published. 14 Witnesses or resource persons
are given the right to counsel, 15 as well as security protection to be provided by
government police agencies. 16 caHIAS

The Rules of Procedure of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Rules),

promulgated pursuant to Section 2 (j) of EO 1, further flesh out the operations of the
Commission. 17 Section 4 assures that "due process shall at all times be observed in the
application of the Rules." It provides for formal complaints that may be filed before it,
18 and that after evaluation, the parties who appear responsible under the complaints
shall be provided copies of the complaints and supporting documents, and be required
to comment on or file counter-affidavits within ten (10) days. 19 The Rules declare that
the Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, 20 reiterate the
protection afforded to witnesses provided under the EO, 21 and confirm that hearings
shall be open to the public. 22
B. THE TITLE "TRUTH COMMISSION"
AND DUE PROCESS
Both the parties' memoranda dwelt on the origins and nature of the term "Truth
Commission," with both using their reading of the term's history and usages to support
their respective positions. 23 What comes across in available literature is that no nation
has a lock on the meaning of the term; there is only a long line of practice that attaches
the term to a body established upon restoration of democracy after a period of massive
violence and repression. 24 The term truth commission has been specifically used as a
title for the body investigating the human rights violations 25 that attended past violence
and repression, 26 and in some instances for a body working for reconciliation in
society. 27
The traditional circumstances that give rise to the use of a truth commission
along the lines of established international practice are not present in the Philippine
setting. The Philippines has a new democratically-elected President, whose election has
been fully accepted without protest by all presidential candidates and by the people. A
peaceful transition of administration took place, where Congress harmoniously
convened, with the past President now sitting as a member of the House of
Representatives. While charges of human rights violations may have been lodged
against the government during the past administration, these charges are not those
addressed by EO 1. 28 Rather, EO 1 focuses entirely on graft and corruption.
Significantly, reconciliation does not appear to be a goal either in the EO, in the
pleadings filed by the parties, or in the oral arguments thus, removing a justification
for any massive information campaign aimed at healing divisions that may exist in the
nation.
As a matter of law, that a body called a Truth Commission is tasked to investigate
past instances of graft and corruption would not per se be an irregularity that should
cause its invalidation. The use of the word "truth" is not ordinarily a ground for
objection. Not even the Constitution itself defines or tells us what truth is; the Charter,
fleshed out by the statutes, can only outline the process of arriving at the truth. After
the Constitution and the statutes, however, have laid down the prescribed procedure,
then that procedure must be observed in securing the truth. Any deviation could be a
violation depending on the attendant circumstances.
No international law can also prevent a sovereign country from using the term
as the title of a body tasked to investigate graft and corruption affecting its citizens
within its borders. At the same time, international law cannot be invoked as a source of
legitimacy for the use of the title when it is not based on the internationally-recognized
conditions of its use.
No local law likewise specifically prohibits or regulates the use of the term "truth
commission." Apart from the procedural "deviation" above adverted to, what may
render the use of the term legally objectionable is the standard of reason, applicable to
all government actions, as applied to the attendant circumstances surrounding the use
in the EO of the title Truth Commission. 29 The use of this standard is unavoidable since
the title Truth Commission is used in a public instrument that defines the Commission's
functions and affects both the government and private parties. 30 The Commission's
work affects third parties as it is specifically tasked to investigate and prosecute officials
and employees of the previous administration. This line of work effectively relates it to
the processes of the criminal justice system. TSaEcH

In the simplest due process terms, the EO as a governmental action must

have a reasonable objective and must use equally reasonable means to achieve this
objective. 31 When the EO viewed from the prism of its title and its truth-telling
function is considered a means of achieving the objective of fighting graft and
corruption, it would be invalid if it unreasonably or oppressively affects parties,
whether they be government or private.
C. THE COMMISSION'S FUNCTIONS
As worded, the EO establishes the Commission as an investigative body tasked
to act on cases of graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
This is an area that the law has assigned to the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute. 32 If probable cause exists, these same cases fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan 33 whose decisions are appealable to the
Supreme Court. 34
Whether a Commission can engage in fact-finding, whose input can aid the
President in policy formulation, is not a disputed issue. What is actively disputed is
whether the Truth Commission shall undertake its tasks in a purely investigative fact-
finding capacity or in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. This issue impacts on the
level of fairness that should be observed (and the standard of reason that should apply),
and thus carries due process implications. Equally important to the issue of due process
are the function of truth-telling and the effects of this function when considered with
the title "Truth Commission."
C.1. The Truth-Telling Function
 The Solicitor General fully verbalized the truth-telling function when he
declared that it is a means of letting the people know the truth in the allegations of graft
and corruption against the past administration. 35 The Solicitor General, in response to
the questions of J. Sereno, said:
Justice Sereno: . . . I go now to the truth-telling part of the commission. In
other words, can you describe to us the truth telling and truth seeking part of the
commission?
Solicitor General Cadiz: Your Honor, of course our people will find closure if
aside from the truth finding of facts, those who have been found by the body
to have committed graft and corruption will be prosecuted by the
Ombudsman. It is . . . Your Honor, there is a crime committed and therefore
punishment must be meted out. However, Your Honor, truth-telling part, the
mere narration of facts, the telling of the truth, will likewise I think to a
certain degree, satisfy our people.
Justice Sereno: Are you saying therefore the truth-telling, that the narration like
the other narrations in the past commissions has an independent value apart
from the recommendations to indict which particular persons?
Solicitor General Cadiz: I agree Your Honor. And it is certainly, as the EO
says, it's a Truth Commission the narration of facts by the members of the
Commission, I think, will be appreciated by the people independent of the
indictment that is expected likewise. [Emphasis supplied.]
His statement is justified by the EO's mandate to seek and find the truth under Section
1; the opening to the public of the hearing and proceedings under Section 6; and the
publication of the Commission's final report under Section 15 of the EO. 36 CIaDTE

C.2. Legal Implications of Truth-Telling

Truth-telling, as its name connotes, does not exist solely for the sake of "truth";
the "telling" side is equally important as the Solicitor General impressed upon this
Court during the oral arguments. 37 Thus, to achieve its objectives, truth-telling needs
an audience to whom the truth shall be told. 38 This requirement opens up the reality
that EO 1 really speaks in two forums.
The first forum, as expressly provided in the EO, is composed of the persons to
be investigated and the recipients of the Commission's reports who are expected to act
on these reports, specifically, the President (who needs investigative and policy
formulation assistance); Congress (who may use the Commission's information for its
own legislative purposes); and the Ombudsman as the investigative and prosecutory
constitutional office 39 to which, under the EO, the Commission must forward its
interim and final reports. The Commission's hearings and proceedings are important
venues for this forum, as this is where the investigated persons can defend themselves
against the accusations made. The element of policy formulation, on the other hand, is
present through the Commission's interim and final reports from which appropriate
remedial policy measures can be distilled. The element of truth-telling in the sense
of communicating to the public the developments as they happen and through the
interim and final reports exists but only plays a secondary role, as the public is not
a direct participant in this forum.
The second forum not as explicitly defined as the first but which must
implicitly and necessarily be there is that shared with the general public as the
audience to whom the President (through the EO and the Truth Commission) wishes to
tell the story of the allegedly massive graft and corruption during the previous
administration. This is the distinct domain of truth-telling as the Solicitor General
himself impliedly admits in his quoted arguments. 40 Section 6 of the EO fully supports
truth-telling, as it opens up the Commission's hearings or proceedings to the public (and
hence, to the mass media), subject only to an executive session "where matters of
national security or public safety are involved or when the personal safety of the witness
warrants the holding of such executive or closed-door session hearing."
These separate forums are not distinguished merely for purposes of academic
study; they are there, plainly from the terms of the EO, and carry clear distinctions from
which separate legal consequences arise.
Both forums involve third parties, either as persons to be investigated or as part
of the general public (in whose behalf criminal complaints are nominally brought and
who are the recipients of the Commission's truth-telling communications) so that, at the
very least, standards of fairness must be observed. 41 In the investigative function, the
standard depends on whether the tasks performed are purely investigative or are quasi-
judicial, but this distinction is not very relevant to the discussions of this opinion. In
truth-telling, on the other hand, the level of the required fairness would depend on the
objective of this function and the level of finality attained with respect to this objective.
42

In the first forum, no element of finality characterizes the Commission's reports

since from the perspective of the EO's express purposes of prosecution and policy
formulation they are merely recommendatory and are submitted for the President's,
Congress' and the Ombudsman's consideration. Both the President and Congress may
reject the reports for purposes of their respective policy formulation activities; the
Ombudsman may likewise theoretically and nominally reject them (although with
possibly disastrous results as discussed below).
In the second forum, a very high element of finality exists as the information
communicated through the hearings, proceedings and the reports are directly "told" the
people as the "truth" of the graft and corruption that transpired during the previous
administration. In other words, the Commission's outputs are already the end products,
with the people as the direct consumers. In this sense, the element of fairness that must
exist in the second forum must approximate the rights of an accused in a criminal trial
as the consequence of truth-telling is no less than a final "conviction" before the bar of
public opinion based on the "truth" the Commission "finds." Thus, if the Commission
is to observe the rights of due process as Rule 1, Section 4 of its Rules guarantees, then
the right of investigated persons to cross-examine witnesses against them, 43 the right
against self-incrimination, 44 and all the rights attendant to a fair trial must be observed.
The rights of persons under investigation under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution 45 must likewise be respected. ITcCSA

II. THE EO'S LEGAL INFIRMITIES.

A. THE TITLE "TRUTH COMMISSION" + THE TRUTH-TELLING
FUNCTION = VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
A.1. The Impact of the Commission's "Truth"
The first problem of the EO is its use of the title "Truth Commission" and its
objective of truth-telling; these assume that what the Truth Commission speaks of is the
"truth" because of its title and of its truth-telling function; thus, anything other than
what the Commission reports would either be a distortion of the truth, or may even be
an "untruth."
This problem surfaced during the oral arguments on queries about the effect of
the title "Truth Commission" on the authority of the duly constituted tribunals that may
thereafter rule on the matters that the Commission shall report on. 46 Since the
Commission's report will constitute the "truth," any subsequent contrary finding by the
Ombudsman 47 would necessarily be suspect as an "untruth;" it is up then to the
Ombudsman to convince the public that its findings are true.
To appreciate the extent of this problem, it must be considered that the hearings
or proceedings, where charges of graft and corruption shall be aired, shall be open to
the public. The Commission's report shall likewise be published. 48 These features
cannot but mean full media coverage.
Based on common and usual Philippine experience with its very active media
exemplified by the recent taking of Chinese and Canadian hostages at the Luneta, a full
opening to the media of the Commission's hearings, proceedings and reports means a
veritable media feast that, in the case of the Truth Commission, shall occur on small
but detailed daily doses, from the naming of all the persons under investigation all the
way up to the Commission's final report. By the time the Commission report is issued,
or even before then, the public shall have been saturated with the details of the charges
made through the publicly-aired written and testimonial submissions of witnesses,
variously viewed from the vantage points of straight reporting, three-minute TV news
clips, or the slants and personal views of media opinion writers and extended TV
coverage. All these are highlighted as the power of the media and the environment
that it creates can never be underestimated. Hearing the same "truth" on radio
and television and seeing it in print often enough can affect the way of thinking
and the perception, even of those who are determined, in their conscious minds, to
avoid bias. 49
 As expected, this is a view that those supporting the validity of the EO either
dismisses as an argument that merely relies on a replaceable name, 50 or with more
general argument couched under the question "Who Fears the Truth." 51
The dismissive argument, to be sure, would have been meritorious if only the
name Truth Commission had not been supported by the Commission's truth-telling
function; or, if the name "Truth Commission" were a uniquely Filipino appellation that
does not carry an established meaning under international practice and usage. Even if
it were to be claimed that the EO's use of the name is unique because the Philippines'
version of the Truth Commission addresses past graft and corruption and not violence
and human rights violations as in other countries, the name Truth Commission,
however, cannot simply be dissociated from its international usage. The term connotes
abuses of untold proportions in the past by a repressive undemocratic regime a
connotation that may be applicable to the allegations of graft and corruption, but is
incongruous when it did not arise from a seriously troubled regime; even the present
administration cannot dispute that it assumed office in a peaceful transition of power
after relatively clean and peaceful elections.
The "Who Fears the Truth?" arguments, on the other hand, completely miss the
point of this Separate Opinion. This Opinion does not dispute that past graft and
corruption must investigated and fully exposed; any statement to the contrary in the
Dissent are unfounded rhetoric written solely for its own partisan audience. What this
Opinion clearly posits as legally objectionable is the government's manner of "telling;"
any such action by government must be made according to the norms and limits of the
Constitution to which all departments of government including the Executive are
subject. Specifically, the Executive cannot be left unchecked when its methods grossly
violate the Constitution. This matter is discussed in full below.ISHaCD

A.2. Truth-telling and the Ombudsman

To return to the scenario described above, it is this scenario that will confront
the Ombudsman when the Commission's report is submitted to it. At that point, there
would have been a full and extended public debate heavily influenced by the
Commission's "truthful" conclusions. Thus, when and if the Ombudsman finds the
evidence from the report unconvincing or below the level that probable cause requires,
it stands to incur the public ire, as the public shall have by then been fully informed of
the "facts" and the "truth" in the Commission's report that the Ombudsman shall appear
to have disregarded.
This consequence does not seem to be a serious concern for the framers and
defenders of the EO, as the Commission's truth-telling function by then would have
been exercised and fully served. In the Solicitor General's words "Your Honor, there is
crime committed and therefore punishment must be meted out. However, your Honor,
truth-telling part, the mere narration of facts, the telling of the truth, will likewise I
think to a certain degree satisfy our people." On the question of whether truth-telling
has an independent value separate from the indictment he said: "And it is certainly,
as the EO says, it's a Truth Commission the narration of facts by the members of the
Commission, I think, will be appreciated by the people independent of the indictment
that is expected likewise." 52
In other words, faced with the findings of the Commission, the Ombudsman who
enters a contrary ruling effectively carries the burden of proving that its findings, not
those of the Commission, are correct. To say the least, this resulting reversal of roles is
legally strange since the Ombudsman is the body officially established and designated
by the Constitution to investigate graft and other crimes committed by public officers,
while the Commission is a mere "creation" of the Executive Order. The Ombudsman,
too, by statutory mandate has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and
prosecution of graft and corruption, while the Commission's role is merely
recommendatory.
Thus, what the EO patently expresses as a primary role for the Commission is
negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission and its truth-telling
function. Expressed in terms of the forums the EO spawned, the EO's principal intent
to use the Truth Commission as a second forum instrument is unmasked; the first
forum the officially sanctioned forum for the prosecution of crimes becomes
merely a convenient cover for the second forum.
A.3. Truth-telling and the Courts
The effects of truth-telling could go beyond those that affect the Ombudsman. If
the Ombudsman concurs with the Commission and brings the recommended graft and
corruption charges before the Sandiganbayan a constitutionally-established court
this court itself would be subject to the same truth-telling challenge if it decides to
acquit the accused. For that matter, even this Court, will be perceived to have sided
with an "untruth" when and if it goes against the Commission's report. Thus, the
authority, independence, and even the integrity of these constitutional bodies the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan, and the Supreme Court would have been
effectively compromised, to the prejudice of the justice system. All these, of course,
begin with the premise that the Truth Commission has the mandate to find the "truth,"
as it name implies, and has a truth-telling function that it can fully exercise through its
own efforts and through the media.
A.4. Truth-telling and the Public.
A.4.1. Priming and Other Prejudicial Effects.
At this point in the political development of the nation, the public is already a
very critical audience who can examine announced results and can form its own
conclusions about the culpability or innocence of the investigated persons, irrespective
of what conclusions investigative commissions may arrive at. This is a reality that
cannot be doubted as the public has been exposed in the past to these investigative
commissions. TSEcAD
 The present Truth Commission operating under the terms of the EO, however,
introduces a new twist that the public and the country have not met before. For the first
time, a Truth Commission, tasked with a truth-telling function, shall speak on the
"truth" of what acts of graft and corruption were actually committed and who the guilty
parties are. This official communication from a governmental body the Truth
Commission whose express mandate is to find and "tell the truth" cannot but make
a difference in the public perception.
At the very least, the widely-publicized conclusions of the Truth Commission
shall serve as a mechanism for "priming" 53 the public, even the Ombudsman and the
courts, to the Commission's way of thinking. Pervasively repeated as an official
government pronouncement, the Commission's influence can go beyond the level of
priming and can affect the public environment as well as the thinking of both the
decision makers in the criminal justice system and the public in general.
Otherwise stated, the Commission's publicly announced conclusions cannot but
assume the appearance of truth once they penetrate and effectively color the public's
perception, through repetition without significant contradiction as official government
findings. These conclusions thus graduate to the level of "truth" in self-fulfillment of
the name the Commission bears; the subtle manipulation of the Commission's name and
functions, fades in the background or simply becomes explainable incidents that cannot
defeat the accepted truth.
A very interesting related material about the effect of core beliefs on the
decision-making of judges is the point raised by United States Supreme Court Associate
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo 54 in his book The Nature of the Judicial Process 55 where
he said:
. . . Of the power of favour or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil sense, I
have found no trace, not even the faintest, among the judges whom I have
known. But every day there is borne in on me a new conviction of the
inescapable relation between the truth without us and the truth within. The
spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the
group in which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship
have given us place. No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly
and at all times the empire of the subconscious loyalties. "Our beliefs and
opinions," says James Harvey Robinson, "like our standards of conduct come to
us insensibly as products of our companionship with our fellow men, not as
results of our personal experience and the inferences we individually make from
our own observations. We are constantly misled by our extraordinary faculty of
'rationalizing' that is, of devising plausible arguments by accepting what is
imposed upon us by the traditions of the group to which we belong. We are
abjectly credulous by nature, and instinctively accept the verdict of the group.
We are suggestible not merely when under the spell of an excited mob, or a
fervent revival, but we are ever and always listening to the still small voice of
the herd, and are ever ready to defend and justify the instructions and warnings,
and accept them as the mature results of our own reasoning." This was written,
 not of judges specially, but of men and women of all classes. 56 [Emphasis
supplied]
Thus, Justice Cardozo accepted that "subconscious loyalties" to the "spirit" of the
group, i.e., the core beliefs within, is a major factor that affects the decision of a judge.
In the context of EO 1, that "spirit" or core belief is what a generally trusted
government's 57 repeated invocation of "truth" apparently aims to reach. This goal
assumes significance given the Solicitor General's statement that truth-telling is an end
in itself. Read with what Justice Cardozo said, this goal translates to the more concrete
and currently understandable aim to establish the "truth" as part of the accepted
public belief; the EO's aim is achieved irrespective of what the pertinent adjudicatory
bodies may conclude, as even they could be influenced by the generally accepted
"truth."aCIHcD

Further on, Justice Cardozo, speaking in the context of the development of case
law in common law, went on to say, quoting Henderson: 58
When an adherent to a systematic faith is brought continuously in touch with
influences and exposed to desires inconsistent with that faith, a process of
unconscious cerebration may take place, by which a growing store of hostile
mental inclinations may accumulate, strongly motivating action and decision,
but seldom emerging clearly into consciousness. In the meantime, the formulas
of the old faith are retained and repeated by force of habit, until one day the
realization comes that conduct and sympathies and fundamental desires have
become so inconsistent with the logical framework that it must be discarded.
Then begins the task of building up and rationalizing a new faith.
Although written in another context, this statement relating to how one's belief is
supplanted by another runs parallel to how the belief system of an individual judge
can be subtly affected by inconsistent influences and how he ultimately succumbs to a
new belief.
Without doubt, the process of converting to a new belief is an unavoidable and
continuous process that every decision maker undergoes as the belief system he started
with, changes and evolves through in-court experiences and exposure to outside
influences. Such exposure cannot be faulted, particularly when brought on by the media
working pursuant to its exercise of the freedoms of the press and speech, and speaking
in the course of the clash of ideas in the public forum. The same exposure, however, is
not as neutral and fault-free when it is precipitated by the government acting as a
catalytic agent to hasten the achievement of its own ends, in this case, the disclosure of
the "truth" regarding the alleged graft and corruption during the previous regime.
In the context of the EO, the Executive can investigate within the limits of its
legal parameters and can likewise publicize the results of its investigations to the full
limit of allowable transparency. But in so doing, it cannot act as catalyst by labelling
the action of the Commission it has created as officially-sanctioned and authoritative
truth-telling before the officially-designated bodies the Ombudsman and the courts
 have spoken. While the emergence of truth is a basic and necessary component of
the justice system, the truth-seeking and truth-finding processes cannot be speeded up
through steps that shortcut and bypass processes established by the Constitution and the
laws. As heretofore mentioned, the international experiences that gave rise to the title
Truth Commission were transitional situations where, for peculiar reasons (such as the
temporary absence of an established judicial system or the need to speed up the
transition to democratic rule), the use of ad hoc commissions were called for. In the
Philippine setting, the closest similar situation would be the immediate aftermath of the
1986 EDSA Revolution as the country struggled in the transition from authoritarian
martial law regime into a full-fledged democracy. To be sure, the shortcut to the
emergence of truth, fashioned under the terms of EO 1, finds no justification after
the 1987 Constitution and its rights, freedoms and guarantees have been fully put in
place.
A.4.2. The Effects on the Judicial System
To fully appreciate the potential prejudicial effects of truth-telling on the judicial
system, the effects of media exposure from the point of view of what transpires and
the circumstances present under truth-telling and under the present justice system
deserve examination. SCETHa

Under the present justice system, the media may fully report, as they do report,
all the details of a reported crime and may even give the suspects detailed focus. These
reports, however, are not branded as the "truth" but as matters that will soon be brought
to the appropriate public authorities for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted. In the courts, cases are handled on the basis of the rules of evidence and with
due respect for the constitutional rights of the accused, and are reported based on actual
developments, subject only to judicial requirements to ensure orderly proceedings and
the observance of the rights of the accused. Only after the courts have finally spoken
shall there be any conclusive narrative report of what actually transpired and how
accused individuals may have participated in committing the offense charged. At this
point, any public report and analysis of the findings can no longer adversely affect the
constitutional rights of the accused as they had been given all the opportunities to tell
their side in court under the protective guarantees of the Constitution.
In contrast, the circumstances that underlie Commission reports are different.
The "truth" that the Commission shall publicize shall be based on "facts" that have not
been tested and admitted according to the rules of evidence; by its own express rules,
the technical rules of evidence do not apply to the Commission. 59 The reported facts
may have also been secured under circumstances violative of the rights of the persons
investigated under the guarantees of the Constitution. Thus, what the Commission
reports might not at all pass the tests of guilt that apply under the present justice system,
yet they will be reported with the full support of the government as the "truth" to the
public. As fully discussed below, these circumstances all work to the active prejudice
of the investigated persons whose reputations, at the very least, are blackened once they
are reported by the Commission as participants in graft and corruption, even if the
courts subsequently find them innocent of these charges.
A.5. Truth-telling: an unreasonable means to a reasonable objective.
Viewed from the above perspectives, what becomes plainly evident is an EO
that, as a means of fighting graft and corruption, will effectively and prejudicially affect
the parties inter-acting with the Truth Commission. The EO will erode the authority
and even the integrity of the Ombudsman and the courts in acting on matters brought
before them under the terms of the Constitution; its premature and "truthful" report of
guilt will condition the public's mind to reject any finding other than those of the
Commission.
Under this environment, the findings or results of the second forum described
above overwhelm the processes and whatever may be the findings or results of the first
forum. In other words, the findings or results of the second forum obtained without
any assurance of the observance of constitutional guarantees would not only create
heightened expectations and exert unwanted pressure, but even induce changed
perceptions and bias in the processes of the first forum in the manner analogous to what
Justice Cardozo described above. The first casualties, of course, are the investigated
persons and their basic rights, as fully explained elsewhere in this Opinion.
While EO 1 may, therefore, serve a laudable anti-graft and corruption purpose
and may have been launched by the President in good faith and with all sincerity, its
truth-telling function, undertaken in the manner outlined in the EO and its
implementing rules, is not a means that this Court can hold as reasonable and valid,
when viewed from the prism of due process. From this vantage point, the Commission
is not only a mislabelled body but one whose potential outputs must as well be discarded
for being unacceptable under the norms of the Constitution. EaHATD

B. DISTORTION OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The EO and its truth-telling function must also be struck down as they distort
the constitutional and statutory plan of the criminal justice system without the authority
of law and with an unconstitutional impact on the system.
B.1. The Existing Legal Framework
The Constitution has given the country a well-laid out and balanced division of
powers, distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, with
specially established offices geared to accomplish specific objectives to strengthen the
whole constitutional structure.
The Legislature is provided, in relation with the dispensation of justice, the
authority to create courts with defined jurisdictions below the level of the Supreme
Court; 60 to define the required qualifications for judges; 61 to define what acts are
criminal and what penalties they shall carry; 62 and to provide the budgets for the courts.
63
 The Executive branch is tasked with the enforcement of the laws that the
Legislature shall pass. In the dispensation of justice, the Executive has the prerogative
of appointing justices and judges, 64 and the authority to investigate and prosecute
crimes through a Department of Justice constituted in accordance the Administrative
Code. 65 Specifically provided and established by the Constitution, for a task that would
otherwise fall under the Executive's investigatory and prosecutory authority, is an
independent Ombudsman for the purpose of acting on, investigating and prosecuting
allegedly criminal acts or omissions of public officers and employees in the exercise of
their functions. While the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is primary; it
takes precedence and overrides any investigatory and prosecutory action by the
Department of Justice. 66
The Judiciary, on the other hand, is given the task of standing in judgment over
the criminal cases brought before it, either at the first instance through the municipal
and the regional trial courts, or on appeal or certiorari, through the appellate courts and
ultimately to the Supreme Court. 67 An exception to these generalities is the
Sandiganbayan, a special statutorily-created court with the exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal acts committed by public officers and employees in the exercise of their
functions. 68 Underlying all these is the Supreme Court's authority to promulgate the
rules of procedure applicable to courts and their proceedings, 69 to appoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary other than judges, 70 and to exercise supervision over
all courts and judiciary employees. 71
In the usual course, an act allegedly violative of our criminal laws may be
brought to the attention of the police authorities for unilateral fact-finding
investigation. If a basis for a complaint exists, then the matter is brought before the
prosecutor's office for formal investigation, through an inquest or a preliminary
investigation, to determine if probable cause exists to justify the filing of a formal
complaint or information before the courts. Aside from those initiated at the instance of
the aggrieved private parties, the fact-finding investigation may be made at the instance
of the President or of senior officials of the Executive branch, to be undertaken by police
authorities, by the investigatory agencies of the Department of Justice, or by specially
constituted or delegated officials or employees of the Executive branch; the preliminary
investigation for the determination of probable cause is a task statutorily vested in the
prosecutor's office. 72 Up to this point, these activities lie within the Executive branch
of government and may be called its extrajudicial participation in the justice system.
cSEaTH

By specific authority of the Constitution and the law, a deviation from the above
general process occurs in the case of acts allegedly committed by public officers and
employees in the performance of their duties where, as mentioned above, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction. While the Executive branch itself may undertake
a unilateral fact-finding, and the prosecutor's office may conduct preliminary
investigation for purposes of filing a complaint or information with the courts, the
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction gives this office precedence and dominance once it
decides to take over a case. 73
Whether a complaint or information emanates from the prosecutor's office or
from the Ombudsman, jurisdiction to hear and try the case belongs to the courts,
mandated to determine under the formal rules of evidence of the Rules of Court and
with due observance of the constitutional rights of the accused the guilt or innocence
of the accused. A case involving criminal acts or omissions of public officers and
employees in the performance of duties falls at the first instance within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, 74 subject to higher recourse to the Supreme Court.
This is the strictly judicial aspect of the criminal justice system.
Under the above processes, our laws have delegated the handling of criminal
cases to the justice system and there the handling should solely lie, supported by all the
forces the law can muster, until the disputed matter is fully resolved. The proceedings
whether before the Prosecutor's Office, the Ombudsman, or before the courts are
open to the public and are thereby made transparent; freedom of information 75 and of
the press 76 guarantee media participation, consistent with the justice system's orderly
proceedings and the protection of the rights of parties.
The extrajudicial intervention of the Commission, as provided in the EO, even
for the avowed purpose of "assisting" the Ombudsman, directly disrupts the established
order, as the Constitution and the law do not envision a situation where fact-finding
recommendations, already labelled as "true," would be submitted to the Ombudsman
by an entity within the Executive branch. This arrangement is simply not within the
dispensation of justice scheme, as the determination of whether probable cause exists
cannot be defeated, rendered suspect, or otherwise eroded by any prior process whose
results are represented to be the "truth" of the alleged criminal acts. The Ombudsman
may be bound by the findings of a court, particularly those of this Court, but not of any
other body, most especially a body outside the regular criminal justice system. Neither
can the strictly judicial aspect of the justice system be saddled with this type of fact-
finding, as the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused lies strictly and
solely with the courts. Nor can the EO cloak its intent of undercutting the authority of
the designated authorities to rule on the merits of the alleged graft and corruption
through a statement that its findings are recommendatory; as has been discussed above,
this express provision is negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission
and its truth-telling function.
A necessary consequence of the deviation from the established constitutional
and statutory plan is the extension of the situs of the justice system from its
constitutionally and statutorily designated locations (equivalent to the above-described
first forum), since the Commission will investigate matters that are bound to go to the
justice system. In other words, the Commission's activities, including its truth-telling
function and the second forum this function creates, become the prelude to the entry of
criminal matters into the Ombudsman and into the strictly judicial aspect of the system.
 In practical terms, this extension undermines the established order in the judicial
system by directly bringing in considerations that are extraneous to the adjudication of
criminal cases, and by co-mingling and confusing these with the standards of the
criminal justice system. The result, unavoidably, is a qualitative change in the criminal
justice system that is based, not on a legislative policy change, but on an executive fiat.
cDTACE

Because of truth-telling and its consequence of actively bringing in public

opinion as a consideration, standards and usages other than those strictly laid down or
allowed by the Constitution, by the laws and by the Rules of Court will play a part in
the criminal justice system. For example, public comments on the merits of cases that
are still sub judice may become rampant as comments on a truth commission's findings,
not on the cases pending before the courts. The commission's "truthful" findings, made
without respect for the rules on evidence and the rights of the accused, would become
the standards of public perception of and reaction to cases, not the evidence as found
by the courts based on the rules of evidence.
Once the door is opened to the Truth Commission approach and public opinion
enters as a consideration in the judicial handling of criminal cases, then the rules of
judging would have effectively changed; reliance on the law, the rules and
jurisprudence would have been weakened to the extent that judges are on the lookout,
not only for what the law and the rules say, but also for what the public feels about the
case. In this eventuality, even a noisy minority can change the course of a case simply
because of their noise and the media attention they get. (Such tactics have been
attempted in the immediate past where pressure has been brought to bear on this Court
through street demonstrations bordering on anarchy, the marshalling of opinions locally
and internationally, and highly partisan media comments.) The primacy of public
opinion may, without doubt, appeal to some but this is simply not the way of a Judiciary
constitutionally-designed to follow the rule of law.
Another consequent adverse impact could be erosion of what the Constitution
has very carefully fashioned to be a system where the interpretation of the law and the
dispensation of justice are to be administered apolitically by the Judiciary. Politics
always enters the picture once public opinion begins to be a significant consideration.
At this point, even politicians ever attuned to the public pulse may register their
own statements in the public arena on the merits of the cases even while matters are sub
judice. The effects could be worse where the case under consideration carries its own
political dimensions, as in the present case where the target involves the misdeeds of
the previous administration.
Whether the Judiciary shall involve, or be involved, in politics, or whether it
should consider, or be affected by, political considerations in adjudication, has been
firmly decided by the Constitution and our laws in favour of insulation through
provisions on the independence of the Judiciary the unelected branch of government
whose standard of action is the rule of law rather than the public pulse. This policy has
not been proven to be unsound. Even if it is unsound, any change will have to be
effected through legitimate channels through the sovereignty that can change the
Constitution, to the extent that the Judiciary's and the Ombudsman's independence and
the exercise of judicial discretion are concerned, and through the Congress of the
Philippines, with respect to other innovations that do not require constitutional changes.
To be sure, the President of the Philippines, through an executive or
administrative order and without authority of law, cannot introduce changes or
innovations into the justice system and significantly water down the authoritative power
of the courts and of duly designated constitutional bodies in dispensing justice. The
nobility of the President's intentions is not enough to render his act legal. As has been
said often enough, ours is a government of laws, not of men.
C. LIMITS OF THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
While the Executive participates in the dispensation of justice under our
constitutional and statutory system through its investigatory and prosecutory arms and
has every authority in law to ensure that the law is enforced and that violators are
prosecuted, even these powers have limits. cTDECH

The independence of the Ombudsman and its freedom from interference from
all other departments of government in the performance of its functions is a barrier that
cannot be breached, directly or indirectly, except only as the Constitution and the laws
may allow. No such exception has been allowed or given to the President other than
through the prosecution the Department of Justice may undertake 77 when the
Ombudsman has not asserted its primary jurisdiction. The concurrent jurisdiction given
to the Department of Justice to prosecute criminal cases, incidentally, is a grant specific
to that office, 78 not to any other office that the Executive may create through an
executive order.
The Executive can, without doubt, recommend that specific violators be
prosecuted and the basis for this recommendation need not even come from the
Department of Justice; the basis may be the findings of the Office of the President itself
independently of its Department of Justice. Notably, the other branches of government
may also, and do in fact, make recommendations to the Ombudsman in the way that
Congress, in the course of its fact-finding for legislative purposes, unearths anomalies
that it reports to the Ombudsman. Even the Supreme Court recommends that Judiciary
officials and employees found administratively liable be also criminally prosecuted.
The Executive can also designate officials and employees of the Executive
Department (or even appoint presidential assistants or consultants) 79 to undertake fact-
finding investigation for its use pursuant to the vast powers and responsibilities of the
Presidency, but it cannot create a separate body, in the way and under the terms it
created the Truth Commission, without offending the Constitution.
 The following indicators, however, show that the President was not simply
appointing presidential assistants or assistants when he constituted the Truth
Commission as an investigating or fact-finding body.
First, the President "created" the Truth Commission; the act of creation goes
beyond the mere naming, designation or appointment of assistants and consultants.
There is no need to "create" i.e., to constitute or establish something out of nothing,
or to establish for the first time 80 if only the designation or appointment of a
presidential assistant or consultant is intended. To "create" an office, too, as the
petitioners rightfully claim, is a function of the Legislature under the constitutional
division of powers. 81 Note in this regard, and as more fully discussed below, that what
the Revised Administrative Code, through its Section 31, allows the President is to
"reorganize," not to create a public office within the Executive department.
Second, the Truth Commission, as created by the EO, appears to be a separate
body 82 that is clearly beyond being merely a group of people tasked by the President
to accomplish a specific task within his immediate office; its members do not operate in
the way that presidential assistants and consultants usually do.
It is not insignificant that the Commission has its own Rules of Procedure that it
issued on its own on the authority of the EO. Note that these are not the rules of the
Office of the President but of another body, although one constituted by the President.
The Commission has its own complete set of officers, beginning from the Chair
and members of the Commission; it has its own consultants, experts, and employees,
although the latter are merely drawn from the Executive department; 83 and it even has
provisions for its own budget, although these funds ride on and are to be drawn from
the budget of the Office of the President. STECAc

Third, the Commission has its own identity, separate and distinct from the Office
of the President, although it still falls within the structural framework of that office. The
Commission undertakes its own "independent" investigation 84 that, according to the
Solicitor General, will not be controlled by the Office of the President; 85 and it
communicates on its own, under its own name, to other branches of government outside
of the Executive branch.
Lastly, the Commission as an office has been vested with functions that not even
the Office of the President possesses by authority of law, and which the President,
consequently, cannot delegate. Specifically, the Commission has its truth-telling
function, because it has been given the task to disclose the "truth" by the President, thus
giving its report the imprimatur of truth well ahead of any determination in this regard
by the constitutional bodies authorized to determine the existence of probable cause and
the guilt or culpability of individuals.
If the President cannot give the official label of truth independently of the courts
in a fact-finding in a criminal case, either by himself or through the Department of
Justice, it only follows that he cannot delegate this task to any assistant, consultant, or
subordinate, even granting that he can order a fact-finding investigation based on the
powers of his office. This truth-telling function differentiates the Truth Commission
from other commissions constituted in the past such as the Agrava, Feliciano and Melo
Commissions; the pronouncements of the latter bodies did not carry the imprimatur of
truth, and were mere preliminary findings for the President's consideration. An exact
recent case to drive home this point is the Chinese hostage incident where the Office of
the President modified the Report submitted by a duly-constituted group headed by
Secretary Leila de Lima. 86 Apparently, the findings of the De Lima committee did not
carry the imprimatur of truth and were merely recommendatory; otherwise the Office
of the President would not have modified its findings and recommendations.
Still on the point of the President's authority to delegate tasks to a body he has
constituted, in no case can the President order a fact-finding whose results will operate
to undercut the authority and integrity of the Ombudsman in a reported violation of the
criminal laws by a public servant. The President's authority outside of the instance
when the Department of Justice acts in default of the Ombudsman is to bring to the
attention of, or make recommendations to, the Ombudsman violations of the law that
the Executive branch uncovers in the course of law enforcement. This authority should
be no different from that which Congress and the Supreme Court exercise on the same
point.
Given all the possibilities open to the President for a legitimate fact-finding
intervention namely, through fact-finding by the Department of Justice or by the
Office of the President itself, utilizing its own officials, employees, consultants or
assistants the President is not wanting in measures within the parameters allowed by
law to fight graft and corruption and to address specific instances that come to his
attention. To be sure, the Philippine situation right now is far from the situations in
South Africa, Rwanda, and South America, 87 where quick transitional justice 88 had to
be achieved because these countries were coming from a period of non-democratic rule
and their desired justice systems were not yet fully in place. This reality removes any
justification for the President to resort to extralegal (or even illegal) measures and to
institutions and mechanisms outside of those already in place, in proceeding against
grafters in the previous administration.
If the President and Congress are dissatisfied with the Ombudsman's
performance of duty, the constitutionally-provided remedy is to impeach the
Ombudsman based on the constitutionally-provided grounds for removal. The remedy
is not through the creation of a parallel office that either duplicates or renders
ineffective the Ombudsman's actions. By the latter action, the President already situates
himself and the Executive Department into the justice system in a manner that the
Constitution and the law do not allow.
D. THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY EITHER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OR UNDER THE LAWS
TO CREATE THE TRUTH COMMISSION.
 Under the 1987 Constitution, the authority to create offices is lodged exclusively
in Congress. This is a necessary implication 89 of its "plenary legislative power." 90
Thus, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or statutory grant, no public
office can be created except by Congress; any unauthorized action in this regard violates
the doctrine of separation of powers. SCHIac

In essence, according to Father Joaquin Bernas, "separation of powers means

that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the executive, settlement of legal
controversies to the judiciary." 91 This means that the President cannot, under the
present Constitution and in the guise of "executing the laws," perform an act that would
impinge on Congress' exclusive power to create laws, including the power to create a
public office.
In the present case, the exclusive authority of Congress in creating a public office
is not questioned. The issue raised regarding the President's power to create the Truth
Commission boils down to whether the Constitution allows the creation of the Truth
Commission by the President or by an act of Congress.
D.1 The Section 31 Argument.
EO 1, by its express terms, 92 is premised on "Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31
of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of
the Philippines, which gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President. The Solicitor General, of course, did not steadfastly hold on to
this view; in the course of the oral arguments and in his Memorandum, he invoked other
bases for the President's authority to issue EO 1. In the process, he likewise made
various claims, not all of them consistent with one another, on the nature of the Truth
Commission that EO 1 created.
Section 31 shows that it is a very potent presidential power, as it empowers him
to (1) to re-organize his own internal office; (2) transfer any function or office from the
Office of the President to the various executive departments; and (3) transfer any
function or office from the various executive departments to the Office of the President.
To reorganize presupposes that an office is or offices are already existing and
that (1) a reduction is effected, either of staff or of its functions, for transfer to another
or for abolition because of redundancy; (2) offices are merged resulting in the retention
of one as the dominant office; (3) two offices are abolished resulting in the emergence
of a new office carrying the attributes of its predecessors as well as their responsibilities;
or (4) a new office is created by dividing the functions and staff of an existing office.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary addresses this point when it
said:
[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
93
 These traditional concepts of reorganization do not appear to have taken place
in the establishment of the Truth Commission. As heretofore mentioned, by its plain
terms, it was "created" and did not simply emerge from the functions or the personality
of another office, whether within or outside the Office of the President. Thus, it is a
completely new body that the President constituted, not a body that appropriated the
powers of, or derived its powers from, the investigatory and prosecutory powers of the
Department of Justice or any other investigatory body within the Executive branch.
From the Solicitor General's Memorandum, it appears that the inspiration for the
EO came from the use and experiences of truth commissions in other countries that
were coming from "determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict" for purposes of
making "recommendations for [the] redress and future prevention" 94 of similar abusive
rule or conflict. It is a body to establish the "truth of what abuses actually happened in
the past;" the Solicitor General even suggests that the "doctrine of separation of powers
and the extent of the powers of co-equal branches of government should not be so
construed as to restrain the Executive from uncovering the truth about betrayals of
public trust, from addressing their enabling conditions, and from preventing their
recurrence." 95 By these perorations, the Solicitor General unwittingly strengthens the
view that no reorganization ever took place when the Truth Commission was created;
what the President "created" was a new office that does not trace its roots to any existing
office or function from the Office of the President or from the executive departments
and agencies he controls. IACDaS

Thus, the President cannot legally invoke Section 31 to create the Truth
Commission. The requirements for the application of this Section are simply not
present; any insistence on the use of this Section can only lead to the invalidity of EO
1.
D.2. The PD 1416 and Residual Powers Argument
Independently of the EO's express legal basis, the Solicitor-General introduced
a new basis of authority, theorizing that "the power of the President to reorganize the
executive branch" is justifiable under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416, as amended
by PD No. 1772, based on the President's residual powers under Section 20, Title I,
Book III of E.O. No. 292." He cites in this regard the case of Larin v. Executive
Secretary 96 and according to him:
. . . This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the
law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
 inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said
decrees. 97 [Emphasis supplied]
Unfortunately, even the invocation of the transitory clause of the 1987
Constitution (regarding the validity of laws and decrees not inconsistent with the
Constitution) cannot save EO 1, as PD 1416 is a legislation that has long lost its potency.
Contemporary history teaches us that PD 1416 was passed under completely
different factual and legal milieus that are not present today, thus rendering this
presidential decree an anachronism that can no longer be invoked.
Prior to the EDSA Revolution of 1986 (and the 1987 Constitution), President
Marcos exercised legislative powers and issued PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772,
which, by its express terms, allowed the President to reorganize and/or create offices
within the National Government. This was sanctioned in the exercise of the President's
martial law powers and on the basis of Article XVII, Section 3(2) of the 1973
Constitution. 98
Upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, and the re-introduction of the
presidential form of government, the "separation of legislative and executive powers"
99 was restored. Similarly recognized were the limits on the exercise of the carefully
carved-out and designated powers of each branch of government. Thus, Congress
regained the exclusive power to create public offices; PD 1416, as amended by PD 1776
a creation of the legal order under President Marcos lost its authority as a
justification for the creation of an office by the President.
That PD 1416, as amended by PD 1776, has been overtaken and rendered an
obsolete law, is not a new position taken within this Court. In his separate concurring
opinion in Banda v. Executive Secretary, 100 Justice Antonio T. Carpio pointedly
posited that the ruling in Larin v. Executive Secretary 101 (reiterated in Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora 102 and Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals), 103 which relied on Section 20, Chapter 7, Book II of
the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation with P.D. 1416, cannot validate Executive
Order No. 378 assailed in that case because "P.D. 1416, as amended, with its blending
of legislative and executive powers, is a vestige of an autrocratic era, totally
anachronistic to our present-day constitutional democracy." 104 aTADcH

Thus, the present and firmly established legal reality is that under the 1987
Constitution and the Revised Administrative Code, the President cannot create a public
office except to the extent that he is allowed by Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of the
Revised Administrative Code. As discussed above, even this narrow window cannot be
used as the President did not comply with the requirements of Section 31.
D.3. The Authority of the President under the Faithful Execution Clause
Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution directs and authorizes the
President to faithfully execute the laws and the potency of this power cannot be
underestimated. Owing perhaps to the latitude granted to the President under this
constitutional provision, the Solicitor General posited that the President's power to
create the Truth Commission may be justified under this general grant of authority. In
particular, the Solicitor General argues that the "President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the
President's powers as the Chief Executive." 105 The Solicitor General further argues:
"That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean he is bereft of such authority." 106
That the President cannot, in the absence of any statutory justification, refuse to
execute the laws when called for is a principle fully recognized by jurisprudence. In In
re Neagle, the US Supreme Court held that the faithful execution clause is "not limited
to the enforcement of acts of Congress according to their express terms." 107 According
to Father Bernas, Neagle "saw as law that had to be faithfully executed not just formal
acts of the legislature but any duty or obligation inferable from the Constitution or from
statutes." 108
Under his broad powers to execute the laws, the President can undoubtedly
create ad hoc bodies for purposes of investigating reported crimes. The President,
however, has to observe the limits imposed on him by the constitutional plan: he must
respect the separation of powers and the independence of other bodies which have their
own constitutional and statutory mandates, as discussed above. Contrary to what J.
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura claims in his Dissent, the President cannot claim the right
to create a public office in the course of implementing the law, as this power lodged
exclusively in Congress. An investigating body, furthermore, must operate within the
Executive branch; the President cannot create an office outside the Executive
department.
These legal realities spawned the problems that the Solicitor General created for
himself when he made conflicting claims about the Truth Commission during the oral
arguments. For accuracy, the excerpts from the oral arguments are best quoted
verbatim. 109
Associate Justice Nachura:
Mr. Solicitor General, most of my questions have actually been asked already
and there are few things that I would like to be clarified on. Well,
following the questions asked by Justice Carpio, I would like a
clarification from you, a definite answer, is the Truth Commission a
public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
No, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Ah, you mean it is not a public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
It is not a public office in the concept that it has to be created by Congress,
Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Oh, come on, I agree with you that the President can create public offices, that
was what, ah, one of the questions I asked Congressman Lagman. CSEHcT

Solicitor General Cadiz:

Thank you, your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Because he was insisting that only Congress could create public office
although, he said, the President can create public offices but only in the
context of the authority granted under the Administrative Code of 1987.
So, it is a public office?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
This is definite, categorical. You are certain now that Truth Commission
(interrupted)
Solicitor General Cadiz:
Yes, Your Honor, under the Office of the President Proper, yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Again?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
That this Truth Commission is a public office, Your Honor, created under the
Office of the President.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Okay, created under the Office of the President, because it is the President who
created it. And the President can create offices only within the executive
department. He cannot create a public office outside of the executive
department, alright.
Solicitor General Cadiz:
Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Okay. So, the Commissioners who are appointed are what, Presidential
Assistants? Are they Presidential Assistants?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
They are Commissioners, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
They are, therefore, alter-egos of the President?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
No, Your Honor. There is created a Truth Commission, and Commissioners are
appointed and it so stated here that they are independent.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Aha, okay. THIcCA

Solicitor General Cadiz:

Of the Office of the President.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Are you saying now that the Commissioners are not under the power and
control of the President of the Philippines?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
It is so stated in the Executive Order, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Aha, alright. So, the Truth Commission is not an office within the executive
department, because it is not under the power of control of the President,
then, Section 17 of Article VII would not apply to them, is that it?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
Your Honor, the President has delineated his power by creating an Executive
Order which created the Commission, which says, that this is an
independent body, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
Okay. So, what you are saying is, this is a creation of the President, it is under
the President's power of control, but the President has chosen not to
exercise the power of control by declaring that it shall be an independent
body?
Solicitor General Cadiz:
Yes, Your Honor.
Associate Justice Nachura:
 That is your position. I would like you to place that in your memorandum and
see. I would like to see how you will develop that argument.
The Solicitor General, despite his promise to respond through his Memorandum,
never bothered to explain point-by-point his unusual positions and conclusions during
the oral arguments, responding only with generalities that were not responsive or in
point. 110
Specifically, while admitting that the Truth Commission is a "creation" of the
President under his office pursuant to the latter's authority under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the Solicitor General incongruously claimed that the Commission is
"independent" of the Office of the President and is not under his control. Mercifully, J.
Nachura suggested that the President may have created a body under his control but has
chosen not to exercise the power of control by declaring that it is an independent body,
to which the Solicitor General fully agreed.
Truth to tell (no pun intended), the Solicitor General appears under these
positions to be playing a game of smoke and mirrors with the Court. For purposes of
the creation of the Truth Commission, he posits that the move is fully within the
President's authority and in the performance of his executive functions. This claim, of
course, must necessarily be based on the premise that execution is by the President
himself or by people who are within the Executive Department and within the
President's power of supervision and control, as the President cannot delegate his
powers beyond the Executive Department. At the same time, he claims that the
Commissioners (whom he refuses to refer to as Presidential Assistants or as alter egos
of the President) 111 are independent of the President, apparently because the President
has waived his power of control over them. DTESIA

All these necessarily lead to the question: can the President really create an office
within the Executive branch that is independent of his control? The short answer is he
cannot, and the short reason again is the constitutional plan. The execution and
implementation of the laws have been placed by the Constitution on the shoulders of
the President and on none other. 112 He cannot delegate his executive powers to any
person or entity outside the Executive department except by authority of the
Constitution or the law (which authority in this case he does not have), nor can he
delegate his authority to undertake fact-finding as an incident of his executive power,
and at the same time take the position that he has no responsibility for the fact-finding
because it is independent of him and his office.
Under the constitutional plan, the creation of this kind of office with this kind of
independence is lodged only in the Legislature. 113 For example, it is only the
Legislature which can create a body like the National Labor Relations Commission
whose decisions are final and are neither appealable to the President nor to his alter ego,
the Secretary of Labor. 114 Yet another example, President Corazon Aquino herself,
because the creation of an independent commission was outside her executive powers,
deemed it necessary to act pursuant to a legislative fiat in constituting the first Davide
Commission of 1989. 115
Apparently, the President wanted to create a separate, distinct and independent
Commission because he wants to continuously impress upon the public his audience
in the second forum that this Commission can tell the "truth" without any control or
prompting from the Office of the President and without need of waiting for definitive
word from those constitutionally-assigned to undertake this task. Here, truth-telling
again rears its ugly head and is unmasked for what it really is an attempt to bypass
the constitutional plan on how crimes are investigated and resolved with finality.
Otherwise stated, if indeed the President can create the Commission as a fact-
finding or investigating body, the Commission must perforce be an entity that is within
the Executive branch and as such is subject to the control and supervision of the
President. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the existence of the Commission
already outlined above in terms of its processes, facilities, budget and staff cannot
but lead to control. Likewise, if indeed the Truth Commission is under the control of
the President who issued the EO with openly-admitted political motivation, 116 then the
Solicitor General's representation about the Commission's independently-arrived
"truth" may fall under the classification of a smoke and mirror political move. Sad to
state, the Solicitor General chose to aim for the best of all worlds in making
representations about the creation and the nature of the Commission. We cannot allow
this approach to pass unnoticed and without the observations it deserves.
If the President wants a truly independent Commission, then that
Commission must be created through an act of Congress; otherwise, that
independent Commission will be an unconstitutional body. Note as added examples
in this regard that previous presidential fact-finding bodies, created either by Executive
or Administrative Orders (i.e., Feliciano, Melo, Zearosa and IIRC Commissions),
were all part of the Executive department and their findings, even without any express
representation in the orders creating them, were necessarily subject to the power of the
President to review, alter, modify or revise according to the best judgment of the
President. That the President who received these commissions' reports did not alter the
recommendations made is not an argument that the President can create an
"independent" commission, as the Presidents receiving the commissions' reports could
have, but simply did not, choose to interfere with these past commissions' findings.
In sum, this Court cannot and should not accept an arrangement where: (1) the
President creates an office pursuant to his constitutional power to execute the laws and
to his Administrative Code powers to reorganize the Executive branch, and (2) at the
same time or thereafter allow the President to disavow any link with the created body
or its results through a claim of independence and waiver of control. This arrangement
bypasses and mocks the constitutional plan on the separation of powers; among others,
it encroaches into Congress' authority to create an office. This consequence must
necessarily be fatal for the arrangement is inimical to the doctrine of separation of
powers whose purpose, according to Father Joaquin Bernas, is: HcaDTE

to prevent concentration of powers in one department and thereby to avoid

tyranny. But the price paid for the insurance against tyranny is the risk of a
degree of inefficiency and even the danger of gridlock. As Justice Brandeis put
it, "the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted . . . not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of governmental powers among the three departments, to save the
people from autocracy." 117
Indeed, to allow one department of government, without the authority of law or the
Constitution, to be granted the authority to bestow an advanced imprimatur of "truth"
bespeaks of a concentration of power that may well overshadow any initiative to combat
graft and corruption; in its own way, this grant itself is an open invitation to the very
evils sought to be avoided.
E. VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS
OF INVESTIGATED PERSONS
E.1 Violation of Personal Rights
Separately from the above effects, truth-telling as envisioned under the EO,
carries prejudicial effects on the persons it immediately targets, namely: the officials,
employees and private individuals alleged to have committed graft and corruption
during the previous administration. This consequence proceeds from the above
discussed truth-telling premise that whether the Commission reports (recommending
the charging of specific individuals) are proven or not in the appropriate courts the
Commission's function of truth-telling function would have been served and the
Commission would have effectively acted against the charged individuals.
The most obvious prejudicial effect of the truth-telling function on the persons
investigated is on their persons, reputation and property. Simply being singled out as
"charged" in a truth-telling report will inevitably mean disturbance of one's routines,
activities and relationships; the preparation for a defense that will cost money, time and
energy; changes in personal, job and business relationships with others; and adverse
effects on jobs and businesses. Worse, reputations can forever be tarnished after one is
labelled as a participant in massive graft and corruption.
Conceivably, these prejudicial effects may be dismissed as speculative
arguments that are not justified by any supporting evidence and, hence, cannot
effectively be cited as factual basis for the invalidity of the EO. Evidence, however, is
hardly necessary where the prejudicial effects are self-evident, i.e., given that the
announced and undisputed government position that truth-telling per se, in the manner
envisioned by the EO and its implementing rules, is an independent objective the
government wants to achieve. When the government itself has been heard on the
"truth," the probability of prejudice for the individual charged is not only a likelihood;
it approaches the level of certainty.
In testing the validity of a government act or statute, such potential for harm
suffices to invalidate the challenged act; evidence of actual harm is not necessary in the
way it is necessary for a criminal conviction or to justify an award for damages. In
plainer terms, the certainty of consequent damage requires no evidence or further
reasoning when the government itself declares that for as long as the "story" of the
allegedly massive graft and corruption during the past administration is told, the
Commission would have fulfilled one of its functions to satisfaction; under this reckless
approach, it is self-evident that the mistaken object of the "truth" told must necessarily
suffer.CEIHcT

In the context of this effect, the government statement translates to the message:
forget the damage the persons investigated may suffer on their persons and
reputation; forget the rights they are entitled to under the Constitution; give
primacy to the story told. This kind of message, of course, is unacceptable under a
Constitution that establishes the strongest safeguards, through the Bill of Rights, in
favor of the individual's right to life, security and property against the overwhelming
might of the government.
E.2 Denial of the right to a fair criminal trial.
The essence of the due process guarantee in a criminal case, as provided under
Section 14 (1) of the Constitution, is the right to a fair trial. What is fair depends on
compliance with the express guarantees of the Constitution, and on the circumstances
of each case.
When the Commission's report itself is characterized, prior to trial, and held out
by the government to be the true story of the graft and corruption charged, the chances
of individuals to have a fair trial in a subsequent criminal case cannot be very great.
Consider on this point that not even the main actors in the criminal justice system
the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan and even this Court can avoid the cloud of
"untruth" and a doubtful taint in their integrity after the government has publicized the
Commission's findings as the truth. If the rulings of these constitutional bodies
themselves can be suspect, individual defenses for sure cannot rise any higher.
Where the government simply wants to tell its story, already labelled as true,
well ahead of any court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind of publicity
and the ferment in public opinion that news of government scandals generate, it does
not require a leap of faith to conclude that an accused brought to court against
overwhelming public opinion starts his case with a less than equal chance of acquittal.
The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the playing field cannot but be uneven
in a criminal trial when the accused enters trial with a government-sponsored badge of
guilt on his forehead. 118 The presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an
accused in a biased atmosphere pointing to guilt in fact because the government
and public opinion have spoken against the accused.
Viewed from the perspective of its cause, the prejudicial publicity, that adversely
affects the chances of an accused for a fair trial after the EO has done its job, is not the
kind that occurs solely because of the identity of the individual accused. This prejudice
results from a cause systemic to the EO because of its truth-telling feature that allows
the government to call its proceedings and reports a process of truth-telling where the
tales cannot but be true. This kind of systemic aberration has no place in the country's
dispensation of criminal justice system and should be struck down as invalid before it
can fully work itself into the criminal justice system as an acceptable intervention.
F. THE TRUTH COMMISSION AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The guarantee of equal protection of the law is a branch of the right to due
process embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. It is rooted in the same
concept of fairness that underlies the due process clause. In its simplest sense, it requires
equal treatment, i.e., the absence of discrimination, for all those under the same
situation. An early case, People v. Cayat, 119 articulated the requisites determinative of
valid and reasonable classification under the equal protection clause, and stated that it
must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class. SaDICE

In our jurisdiction, we mainly decide equal protection challenges using a

"rational basis" test, coupled with a "deferential" scrutiny of legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. 120 Our views on the matter, however, have not remained
static, and have been attuned to the jurisprudential developments in the United States
on the levels of scrutiny that are applied to determine the acceptability of any
differences in treatment that may result from the law. 121
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. 122 summarizes the three tests
employed in this jurisdiction as follows:
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality
of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny
in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related
to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny
in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related
to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative
 classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. [Emphasis supplied]
The most exacting of the three tests is evidently the strict scrutiny test, which
requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves a compelling
state interest and that the classification is necessary to serve that interest. 123 Briefly
stated, the strict scrutiny test is applied when the challenged statute either:
(1) classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic; or
(2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights.
In these situations, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it
falls upon the government to demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly
tailored to further compelling governmental interests; otherwise, the law shall be
declared unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. 124
In EO 1, for the first time in Philippine history, the Executive created a public
office to address the "reports of graft and corruption of such magnitude that shock and
offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed. . . . during the
previous administration" through fact-finding, policy formulation and truth-telling. 125
While fact-finding has been undertaken by previous investigative commissions for
purposes of possible prosecution and policy-formulation, a first for the current Truth
Commission is its task of truth-telling. The Commission not only has to investigate
reported graft and corruption; it also has the authority to announce to the public the
"truth" regarding alleged graft and corruption committed during the previous
administration.
EO 1's problem with the equal protection clause lies in the truth-telling function
it gave the Truth Commission.
As extensively discussed earlier in this Opinion, truth-telling is not an ordinary
task, as the Commission's reports to the government and the public are already given
the imprimatur of truth way before the allegations of graft and corruption are ever
proven in court. This feature, by itself, is a unique differential treatment that cannot but
be considered in the application of the jurisprudential equal protection clause
requirements. cDIHES

Equally unique is the focus of the Commission's investigation it solely

addresses alleged graft and corruption committed during the past administration. This
focus is further narrowed down to "third level public officers and higher, their co-
principal, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration." 126 Under these terms, the subject of the EO is limited only to
a very select group the highest officials, not any ordinary government official at the
time. Notably excluded under these express terms are third level and higher officials of
other previous administrations who can still be possibly be charged of similar levels of
graft and corruption they might have perpetrated during their incumbency. Likewise
excepted are the third level officials of the present administration who may likewise
commit the same level of graft and corruption during the term of the Commission.
Thus, from the points of truth-telling and the focus on the people to be
investigated, at least a double layer of differential treatment characterizes the Truth
Commission's investigation. Given these disparate treatment, the equal protection
question that arises is: does the resulting classification and segregation of third level
officials of the previous administration and their differential treatment rest on
substantial distinctions? Stated more plainly, is there reasonable basis to differentiate
the officials of the previous administration, both from the focus given to them in
relation with all other officials as pointed out above, and in the truth-telling treatment
accorded to them by the Commission?
Still a deeper question to be answered is: what level of scrutiny should be given
to the patent discrimination in focus and in treatment that the EO abets? Although this
question is stated last, it should have been the initial consideration, as its determination
governs the level of scrutiny to be accorded; if the strict scrutiny test is appropriate, the
government, not the party questioning a classification, carries the burden of showing
that permissible classification took place. This critical consideration partly accounts,
too, for the relegation to the last, among the EO's cited grounds for invalidity, of the
equal protection clause violation; the applicable level of scrutiny may depend on the
prior determination of whether, as held in Serrano, the disparate treatment is attended
by infringement of fundamental constitutional rights.
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution. Justice Carpio-Morales, although in dissent in Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 127 elaborated on this point when she
said:
Most fundamental rights cases decided in the United States require equal
protection analysis because these cases would involve a review of statutes which
classify persons and impose differing restrictions on the ability of a certain class
of persons to exercise a fundamental right. Fundamental rights include only
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. And precisely because these statutes affect fundamental
liberties, any experiment involving basic freedoms which the legislature
conducts must be critically examined under the lens of Strict Scrutiny. ATHCac

Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment
freedoms such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so
forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. [Emphasis supplied]
 In the present case, as shown by the previously cited grounds for the EO's
invalidity, EO No. 1 infringes the personal due process rights of the investigated
persons, as well as their constitutional right to a fair trial. Indisputably, both these
rights one of them guaranteed under Section 1, Article III, and under Section 14 of
the same Article are, by jurisprudential definition, fundamental rights. With these
infringements, the question now thus shifts to the application of the strict scrutiny test
an exercise not novel in this jurisdiction.
In the above-cited Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. case, 128 we stated:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice.
xxx xxx xxx
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental
right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more
strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the
rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional
act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor. [Underscoring supplied]
Stripped of the usual deference accorded to it, the government must show that a
compelling state interest exists to justify the differential treatment that EO 1 fosters.
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. 129 helpfully tells us the compelling
state interest that is critical in a strict scrutiny examination:
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In this same cited case, the Court categorically ruled that "the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest." 130
On its face, the compelling state interest the EO cites is the "urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption
in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public
servants." 131 Under these terms, what appears important to the government as means
or mediums in its fight against graft and corruption are (1) to expose the graft and
corruption the past administration committed; (2) to prosecute the malefactors, if
possible; and (3) to set an example for others. Whether a compelling State interest
exists can best be tested through the prism of the means the government has opted to
utilize.
cSICHD

In the usual course and irrespective of who the malefactors are and when they
committed their transgressions, grafters and corruptors ought to be prosecuted. This is
not only a goal but a duty of government. Thus, by itself, the prosecution that the EO
envisions is not any different from all other actions the government undertakes day to
day under the criminal justice system in proceeding against the grafters and the corrupt.
In other words, expressed as a duty, the compelling drive to prosecute must be the same
irrespective of the administration under which the graft and corruption were
perpetrated. If indeed this is so, what compelling reasons can there be to drive the
government to use the EO and its unusual terms in proceeding against the officials of
the previous administration?
If the EO's terms are to be the yardstick, the basis for the separate focus is the
"extent and magnitude" of the reported graft and corruption which "shock and offend
the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people." What this "extent and magnitude" is
or what specific incidents of massive graft are referred to, however, have been left
vague. Likewise, no explanation has been given on why special measures i.e., the
special focus on the targeted officials, the creation of a new office, and the grant of
truth-telling authority have been taken.
Effectively, by acting as he did, the President simply gave the Commission the
license to an open hunting season to tell the "truth" against the previous administration;
the Commission can investigate an alleged single billion-peso scam, as well as
transactions during the past administration that, collectively, may reach the same
amount. Only the Commission, in its wisdom, is to judge what allegations or reports of
graft and corruption to cover for as long as these were during the past administration.
In the absence of any specific guiding principle or directive, indicative of its rationale,
the conclusion is unavoidable that the EO carries no special compelling reason to single
out officials of the previous administration; what is important is that the graft be
attributed to the previous administration. In other words, the real reason for the EO's
focus lies elsewhere, not necessarily in the nature or extent of the matters to be
investigated.
If, as strongly hinted by the Solicitor General, dissatisfaction exists regarding
the Ombudsman's zeal, efforts, results, and lack of impartiality, these concerns should
be addressed through the remedies provided under the Constitution and the laws, not
by bypassing the established remedies under these instruments. Certainly, the remedy
is not through the creation of new public office without the authority of Congress.
Every successful prosecution of a graft and corruption violation ought to be an
opportunity to set an example and to send a message to the public that the government
seriously intends to discharge its duties and responsibilities in the area of graft and
corruption. To be sure, the conviction of a third level officer is a high profile
accomplishment that the government can and should announce to all as evidence of its
efforts and of the lesson that the conviction conveys. This government's
accomplishment, however, does not need to be against an official or officials of the
previous administration in order to be a lesson; it can be any third level or higher official
from any administration, including the present. In fact, the present administration's
serious intent in fighting graft may all the more be highlighted if it will also proceed
against its own people.
It is noteworthy that the terms of the EO itself do not provide any specific reason
why, for purposes of conveying a message against graft and corruption, the focus should
be on officials of the previous administration under the EO's special truth-telling terms.
As mentioned above, the extent of the alleged graft and corruption during the previous
administration does not appear to be a sufficient reason for distinction under the EO's
vague terms. Additionally, if a lesson for the public is really intended, the government
already has similar successful prosecutions to its credit and can have many more
graphic examples to draw from; it does not need to be driven to unusual means to show
the graft and corruption committed under the previous administration. The host of
examples and methodologies already available to the government only demonstrate that
the focus on, and differential treatment of, specific officials for public lesson purposes
involves a classification unsupported by any special overriding reason. IDATCE

Given the lack of sufficiently compelling reasons to use two (2) of the three (3)
objectives or interests the government cited in EO 1, what is left of these expressed
interests is simply the desire to expose the graft and corruption the previous
administration might have committed. Interestingly, the EO itself partly provides the
guiding spirit that might have moved the Executive to its intended expose as it
unabashedly points to the President's promise made in the last election "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." 132 There, too, is the Solicitor General's very
calculated statement that truth-telling is an end in itself that the EO wishes to achieve.
Juxtaposing these overt indicators with the EO's singleness of focus on the
previous administration, what emerges in bold relief is the conclusion that the EO was
issued largely for political ends: the President wants his election promise fulfilled in a
dramatic and unforgettable way; none could be more so than criminal convictions, or
at least, exposure of the "truth" that would forever mark his political opponents; thus,
the focus on the previous administration and the stress on establishing their corrupt
ways as the "truth."
 Viewed in these lights, the political motivation behind the EO becomes
inescapable. Political considerations, of course, cannot be considered a legitimate state
purpose as basis for proper classification. 133 They may be specially compelling but
only for the point of view of a political party or interest, not from the point of view of
an equality-sensitive State.
In sum, no sufficient and compelling state interest appears to be served by the
EO to justify the differential treatment of the past administration's officials. In fact,
exposure of the sins of the previous administration through truth-telling should not even
be viewed as "least restrictive" as it is in fact a means with pernicious effects on
government and on third parties.
For these reasons, the conclusion that the EO violates the equal protection clause
is unavoidable.
G. A FEW LAST WORDS
Our ruling in this case should not in any way detract from the concept that the
Judiciary is the least dangerous branch of government. The Judiciary has no direct
control over policy nor over the national purse, in the way that the Legislature does.
Neither does it implement laws nor exercise power over those who can enforce laws
and national policy. All that it has is the power to safeguard the Constitution in a manner
independent of the two other branches of government. Ours is merely the power to
check and ensure that constitutional powers and guarantees are observed, and
constitutional limits are not violated.
Under this constitutional arrangement, the Judiciary offers the least threat to the
people and their rights, and the least threat, too, to the two other branches of
government. If we rule against the other two branches of government at all in cases
properly brought before us, we do so only to exercise our sworn duty under the
Constitution. We do not prevent the two other branches from undertaking their
respective constitutional roles; we merely confine them to the limits set by the
Constitution.
This is how we view our present action in declaring the invalidity of EO 1. We
do not thereby impugn the nobility of the Executive's objective of fighting graft and
corruption. We simply tell the Executive to secure this objective within the means and
manner the Constitution ordains, perhaps in a way that would enable us to fully support
the Executive. TICDSc

To be sure, no cause exists to even impliedly use the term "imperial judiciary"
134 in characterizing our action in this case.

This Court, by constitutional design and for good reasons, is not an elective body
and, as already stated above, has neither reason nor occasion to delve into politics
the realm already occupied by the two other branches of government. It cannot exercise
any ascendancy over the two other branches of government as it is, in fact, dependent
on these two branches in many ways, most particularly for its budget, for the laws and
policies that are the main subjects for its interpretation, and for the enforcement of its
decisions. While it has the power to interpret the Constitution, the Judiciary itself,
however, is subject to the same Constitution and, for this reason, must in fact be very
careful and zealous in ensuring that it respects the very instrument it is sworn to
safeguard. We are aware, too, that we "cannot be the repository of all remedies" 135 and
cannot presume that we can cure all the ills of society through the powers the
Constitution extended to us. Thus, this Court by its nature and functions cannot
be in any way be "imperial," nor has it any intention to be so. Otherwise, we ourselves
shall violate the very instrument we are sworn to uphold.
As evident in the way this Court resolved the present case, it had no way but to
declare EO invalid for the many reasons set forth above. The cited grounds are neither
flimsy nor contrived; they rest on solid legal bases. Unfortunately, no other approach
exists in constitutional interpretation except to construe the assailed governmental
issuances in their best possible lights or to reflect these effects in a creative way where
these approaches are at all possible. Even construction in the best lights or a creative
interpretation, however, cannot be done where the cited grounds are major, grave and
affect the very core of the contested issuance the situation we have in the present
case.
Nor can this Court be too active or creative in advocating a position for or against
a cause without risking its integrity in the performance of its role as the middle man
with the authority to decide disputed constitutional issues. The better (and safer) course
for democracy is to have a Court that holds on to traditional values, departing from
these values only when these values have become inconsistent with the spirit and intent
of the Constitution.
In the present case, as should be evident in reading the ponencia and this
Separate Opinion, we have closely adhered to traditional lines. If this can be called
activism at all, we have been an activist for tradition. Thereby, we invalidated the act
of the Executive without however foreclosing or jeopardizing his opportunity to work
for the same objective in some future, more legally reasoned, and better framed course
of action.
BERSAMIN, J.:

I register my full concurrence with the Majority's well reasoned conclusion to

strike down Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) for its incurable unconstitutionality.
I share and adopt the perspectives of my colleagues in the Majority on why the
issuance has to be struck down. I render this Separate Opinion only to express some
thoughts on a few matters.
I
Locus Standi of Petitioners
I hold that the petitioners have locus standi.
 In particular reference to the petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, I think that their
being incumbent Members of the House of Representatives gave them the requisite
legal standing to challenge E. O. No. 1 as an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature. Indeed, to the extent that the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each Member, whose office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution; consequently, an act of the Executive
that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury that a Member of Congress can assail. 1 Moreover, any intrusion of one
Department in the domain of another Department diminishes the enduring idea
underlying the incorporation in the Fundamental Law of the time-honored republican
concept of separation of powers.
Justice Mendoza's main opinion, which well explains why the petitioners have
locus standi, is congruent with my view on the matter that I expressed in De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., 2 viz.: aSTAIH

Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with
the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present
need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any
official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of
public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore,
that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,
for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of
a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct
injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi.
There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute
must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio
v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la
Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to
be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to
resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications,"
even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of
Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases,
permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their
suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
HICATc

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a

supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such
petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as
are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer
to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to
concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the
petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court
aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer"
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in
Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former,
the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the
New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of
mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan
held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied."
xxx xxx xxx
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of
legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has
 transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel
the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of
the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging
our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out:
"Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits
are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners "are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion
of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."
II
The President Has No Power to Create A Public Office
A public office may be created only through any of the following modes,
namely: (a) by the Constitution; or (b) by statute enacted by Congress; or (c) by
authority of law (through a valid delegation of power). 3 HcTEaA

The power to create a public office is essentially legislative, and, therefore, it

belongs to Congress. It is not shared by Congress with the President, until and unless
Congress enacts legislation that delegates a part of the power to the President, or any
other officer or agency.
Yet, the Solicitor General contends that the legal basis for the President's
creation of the Truth Commission through E. O. No. 1 is Section 31, Chapter 10, Book
III, of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
reads:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following actions:
1. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
2. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department
or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
 3. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.
nowhere refers to the creation of a public office by the President. On the contrary, only
a little effort is needed to know from reading the text of the provision that what has
been granted is limited to an authority for reorganization through any of the modes
expressly mentioned in the provision.
The Truth Commission has not existed before E. O. No. 1 gave it life on July 30,
2010. Without a doubt, it is a new office, something we come to know from the plain
words of Section 1 of E. O. No. 1 itself, to wit:
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION", which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
CDaTAI

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
If the Truth Commission is an entirely new office, then it is not the result of any
reorganization undertaken pursuant to Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, the contention of the Solicitor General is absolutely
unwarranted.
Neither may the creation of the Truth Commission be made to rest for its validity
on the fact that the Constitution, through its Section 17, Article VII, invests the
President with the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In my view, the
duty of faithful execution of the laws necessarily presumes the prior existence of a law
or rule to execute on the part of the President. But, here, there is no law or rule that the
President has based his issuance of E. O. No. 1.
I cannot also bring myself to accept the notion that the creation of the Truth
Commission is traceable to the President's power of control over the Executive
Department. It is already settled that the President's power of control can only mean
"the power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter." 4 As such, the creation by the President of a public office like the
Truth Commission, without either a provision of the Constitution or a proper law
enacted by Congress authorizing such creation, is not an act that the power of control
includes.
 III
Truth Commission Replicates and Usurps the
Duties and Functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman
I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the duties and functions
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the Truth Commission is superfluous and may
erode the public trust and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally-created quasi-judicial body
established to investigate and prosecute illegal acts and omissions of those who serve
in the Government. Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the power to:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents. aTDcAH

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
The Framers of the Constitution, particularly those of them who composed the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, intended the Office of the
Ombudsman to be strong and effective, in order to enable the Office of the Ombudsman
to carry out its mandate as the Protector of the People against the inept, abusive, and
corrupt in the Government. This intent is clear from the proceedings on the
establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman, as follows:
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER MONSOD
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers is respectfully submitting its proposed Article in the Constitution, and
we would just want to make a few remarks on the articles and sections that we
have included.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan, the Committee decided
to make a distinction between the purely prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan
and the function of a pure Ombudsman who will use the prestige and persuasive
powers of his office. To call the attention of government officials to any
impropriety, misconduct or injustice, we conceive the Ombudsman as a
champion of citizens . . . The concept of the Ombudsman here is admittedly a
little bit different from the 1973 concept . . . The idea here is to address
ourselves to the problem that those who have unlawfully benefitted from the
acquisition of public property over the years, through technicalities or
practice, have gained immunity and that, therefore, the right of the people to
recover should be respected . . . . 5
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER COLAYCO
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you, Madam President.
The Committee is proposing the creation of an office which can act in a
quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against the
administrative inaction, abuse and arbitrariness of government officials
and employees in dealing with the people. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e have proposed as briefly as possible in our resolution an office which will
not require any formal condition for the filing of a complaint. Under our proposal,
a person can file a complaint even by telephone and without much ado, the office
of the Ombudsman is under obligation to see to it that the complaint is acted upon,
not merely attended to but acted upon. . . . . If the employee admits that there was
reason behind the complaint, he is told to do what the complainant wanted him to
do without much ado. And then that is followed up by the corresponding report
to the department of the government which has supervision over the employee at
fault, with the proper recommendation. SHIcDT

xxx xxx xxx

Under our proposal, the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate, to inquire
into and to demand the production of documents involving transactions and
contracts of the government where disbursement of public finds is reported
. . . [t]he main thrust is action; the disciplinary and punitive remedy is
secondary. On a higher level then, the Ombudsman is going to be the eyes and
ears of the people. Where administrative action demanded is not forthcoming . . .
he (Ombudsman) is authorized to make public the nature of the complaint and the
inaction of the official concerned, . . . . 6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER NOLLEDO
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President.
xxx xxx xxx
 Madam President, the creation of the Ombudsman . . . is in answer to the crying
need of our people for an honest and responsive government. The office of the
Ombudsman as proposed by the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
. . . is really an institution primarily for the citizens as against the
malpractices and corruption in the government. As an official critic, the
Ombudsman will study the law, the procedure and practice in the
government, and make appropriate recommendations for a more systematic
operation of the governmental machinery, free from bureaucratic
inconveniences. As a mobilizer, the Ombudsman will see to it that there be a
steady flow of services to the individual consumers of government. And as a
watchdog, the Ombudsman will look after the general, as well as specific
performances of all government officials and employees so that the law may
not be administered with an evil eye or an uneven hand. 7
On the other hand, E. O. No. 1 enumerates the objectives of the creation of the
Truth Commission, thus:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates
that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at
all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to
put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those
involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the
people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; TaDAIS

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
 "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action
or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall
be served without fear or favor.
xxx xxx xxx
A comparison between the aforequoted objectives of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Truth Commission quickly reveals that the Truth Commission is
superfluous, because it replicates or imitates the work of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The result is that the Truth Commission can even usurp the functions, duties, and
responsibilities of the Office of the Ombudsman. That usurpation is not a desirable
result, considering that the public faith and trust in the Office of the Ombudsman, as a
constitutionally-created office imbued with specific powers and duties to investigate
and prosecute graft and corruption, may be eroded.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petitions.

PEREZ, J.:

Executive Order No. 1 of President Benigno S. Aquino III Creating the

Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates Article XI, Section 5 and Section 7
together with Section 13 (1) and (7) and related provisions in Paragraphs (2), (3), (4),
(5) and (6) of the same Section 7, all of the Philippine Constitution.
Particularized, the presidential issuance offends against the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman; defies the protection against legislation of the mandates of
the Ombudsman; and defiles the bestowal of these mandates by their reappointment to
the lesser body. The presidential creation, if unchecked, would, under the layer of good
intentions, sully the integrity of the organic act which, for law to rule, can be touched
by no one except the sovereign people and only by the way and manner they have
ordained. This is a democratic original. The sovereign people can, of course, choose to
cut the essential ties, scatter the existing entirety and slay the standing system. That did
not happen. The sovereign elected to stay put; to stay in the present ordinance. Everyone
must honor the election. And there can be no permissible disregard, even in part, of the
free and deliberate choice.
The proposition is truly significant in this study of the questioned executive
order. The country has had a historic revolution that gave the people the chance to right
the wrong that shoved the nation on the verge. A new charter was written. But the topic
of Executive Order No. 1, accountability of public officers, was rewritten and as the
same constitutional heading. The injunction that public office is a public trust, including
its meaning and import, was copied from the otherwise discarded document. And
having adopted the objective of the old, the new law assumed likewise the means for
the end which are the anti-graft institutions of 1973, to wit, the special graft court named
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman, the corruption investigator and prosecutor then
known as the Tanodbayan both of which were, in the 1973 Charter, ordered created by
legislation.
The transplant of idea and mechanism, the adoption of the ends and the
assumption of the means of 1973 leads to the definite conclusion that the present
Constitution is an affirmance that, driven by the breadth of corruption in public office
needing enduring solutions, there must be no less than a constitutionally secured
institution with impregnable authority to combat corruption. This is the Ombudsman.
DaHISE

Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, 1 chronicled the origins of the Ombudsman. It was there

recounted that:
In the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional
Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office of the Ombudsman, to
give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its
recommendations. The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create an
office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not be
limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also
include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case before
the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution read:
Section 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the
Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case
before the proper court of body.
Uy went on to enumerate the implementing presidential decrees, issued as legislation,
namely Presidential Decree No. 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman known as
the Tanodbayan; Presidential Decree No. 1607 broadening the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of administrative agencies; Presidential
Decree 1630 reorganizing the Office of the Tanodbayan and vesting the powers of the
Special Prosecutor in the Tanodbayan himself.
The events at and following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, as likewise
historified in Uy, must be made part of this writer's position:
With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman
was created. The present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated to
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. He possesses the
following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursements or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so
warrant and with due prudence. ASaTHc

7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,

and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules or procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing
Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to
function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution.
The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino in Executive Order
(EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.
In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. As in the previous laws
on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to
receive and relay the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and
 prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative offenses
committed by government officers and employees as embodied in Sections 15
and 11 of the law. 2
Clear then from the chronicle, that, as it was at the time of its
constitutionalization in 1973, the power of the Ombudsman "shall not be limited to
receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and
prosecution of criminal . . . cases before the appropriate body . . . ." More importantly,
the grant of political independence to the Ombudsman which was the spirit behind the
1973 provisions was specifically stated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy,
and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the Military establishment may likewise be appointed.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Of direct relevance and application to the case at bar is the reason behind the
constitutionalization of the Ombudsman. Again, we refer to Uy 3 citing Cortez, Redress
of Grievance and the Philippine Ombudsman (Tanodbayan):
In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past
Presidents to serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and seeking
redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. These offices were
conceived with the view of raising the standard in public service and ensuring
integrity and efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President Elpidio
Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against
public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and irregularity in office,
and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints. The Integrity Board
was succeeded by several other agencies which performed basically the same
functions of complaints-handling and investigation. These were the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon Magsaysay, the
Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency under
President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President
Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
Operations and the Office of the Citizens counselor, both under President
Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however, that these agencies failed to realize
their objective for they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic. Furthermore, their
powers extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.
The lack of political independence of these presidential commissions, to which
was attributed their failure to realize their objectives, was clarified during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on what is now Article XI of the
Constitution with, as already observed, the same heading used in 1973, "Accountability
of Public Officials." The Commissioners also alluded to the unsuccessful presidential
attempts.
 In his sponsorship speech, Commissioner Colayco, Vice-Chairman of the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, articulated:
In 1950, for instance, President Quirino created the Integrity Board in an attempt
to formalize the procedure for executive direction and control of the bureaucracy.
This Board lasted for six months. When President Magsaysay took over the reins
of government in 1953, he created the Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee. The primary purpose of this Committee was to expedite action on
complaints received by the Office of the President against the manner in which
the officials of the executive departments and offices were performing the duties
entrusted to them by law, or against their acts, conduct or behavior. . . . . But again
politics came in this office did not last long. Two months after President
Magsaysay's death, the office was abolished.
Next, President Garcia created his own Presidential Committee on
Administration, Performance and Efficiency [PCAPE]. Again this office did not
last long and was replaced by the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations or PARGO under the regime of President Marcos. 4 IaECcH

As Commissioner Colayco pointed out in the continuation of his sponsorship

speech: although these programs were "good per se," the succeeding Presidents
discarded them as the incoming Presidents generally tend to abandon the policies
and programs of their predecessors a political barrier to the eventual success of these
bodies. He concluded by saying that "[t]he intention, therefore, of our proposal is to
constitutionalize the office so that it cannot be touched by the Presidents as they come
and go."
It may thus be said that the 1987 Constitution completed the Ombudsman's
constitutionalization which was started in 1973. The past Constitution mandated the
creation by the legislature, the National Security Assembly, later the Batasang
Pambansa, of an office of the Ombudsman, which mandate, incidentally, was given also
for the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan. The present Constitution, while
allowing the continuation of the Sandiganbayan and leaving its functions and
jurisdiction to provisions "by law," itself created "the independent Office of the
Ombudsman" and itself determined its powers, functions and duties. The independence
of the Ombudsman is further underscored by the constitutional orders that the
Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council which appointments shall require no confirmation; that
the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary,
which shall not be decreased during their term of office; that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and its approved annual appropriations shall
be automatically and regularly released; and that the Ombudsman may only be removed
from office by impeachment. 5
It is with the ground and setting just described that Executive Order No. 1 created
the Philippine Truth Commission. Naturally, the Order had to state that the Philippine
Truth Commission was created by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
further describing the act as the exercise of his "continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President." The Order specified that the budget of the Commission shall
be provided by the Office of the President and even its furniture and equipment will
come from the Office of the President. More significantly, a basic premise of the
creation is the President's battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last
elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap," which is considered a "solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds." So much so that
the issuance states that "a comprehensive final report shall be published upon directive
of the President" upon whose directive likewise, interim reports may issue from time to
time.
The Philippine Truth Commission anchored itself on the already
constitutionalized principle that public office is a public trust. It adopted the already
defined goal to circle and contain corruption, an enemy of the good state already
identified way back in 1973. What Executive Order No. 1 did was to shorten the sight
and set it from the incumbent's standpoint. Therefrom, it fixed its target at "reported
cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplice and accessories from the private sector" and further pinpointed
the subjects as "third level public officers during the previous administration." For this
commission, the Philippine Truth Commission was presidentially empowered as an
"investigative body" for a thorough fact finding investigation, thereafter to:
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutional authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplice or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws.
Having thus taken account of the foregoing, this writer takes the following
position:STHDAc

1. In light of the constitutionally declared and amply underscored independence

of the Office of the Ombudsman, which declaration is winnowed wisdom from the
experienced inherent defects of presidential creations, so real and true that the
Ombudsman's constitutionalization was adopted to completion even if from the charter
of an overthrown regime, Executive Order No. 1 cannot pass the present constitutional
test. Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional precisely because it was issued by the
President. As articulated by Commissioner Colayco of the Commission that resurrected
the Ombudsman, "our proposal is to constitutionalize the office so that it cannot be
touched by the Presidents as they come and go." And as this Court stated, repeating the
observation regarding the erstwhile presidential anti-graft commissions, such
commissions failed to realize their objective because they did not enjoy the political
independence necessary for the effective performance of a government critic.
 Relevant too are the words of Commissioner Regalado:
It is said here that the Tanodbayan or the Ombudsman would be a toothless or a
paper tiger. That is not necessarily so. If he is toothless, then let us give him a
little more teeth by making him independent of the Office of the President
because it is now a constitutional creation, so that the insidious tentacles of
politics, as has always been our problem, even with PARGO, PCAPE and so
forth, will not deprive him of the opportunity to render service to Juan dela Cruz.
6

Verily, the Philippine Truth Commission is a defiance of the constitutional wisdom that
established the politically independent Ombudsman for one of its reasons for being is
the very campaign battlecry of the President "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
Not that there is anything wrong with the political slogan. What is wrong is the pursuit
of the pledge outside the limits of the Constitution. What is wrong is the creation by the
President himself of an Ombudsman-like body while there stands established an
Ombudsman, constitutionally created especially because of unsuccessful presidential
antecedents, and thus made independent from presidential prerogative.
2. A simple comparison will show that likeness of the Philippine Truth
Commission with the Ombudsman. No such likeness is permitted by the Constitution.
It can easily be seen that the powers of the Truth Commission to: 1) identify and
determine the reported cases of graft and corruption which it will investigate; and 2)
collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large
scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, 7 are the same as the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate any illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency. 8
The authority of the Truth Commission to require any agency, official or
employee of the Executive Branch to produce documents, books, records and other
papers 9 mirrors the authority of the Ombudsman to direct concerned government
officials to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by the latter's office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties. 10
Likewise, the right to obtain information and documents from the Senate, the
House of Representatives and the courts, 11 granted by Executive Order No. 1 to the
Truth Commission, is analogous to the license of the Ombudsman to request any
government agency for assistance and information and to examine pertinent records
and documents. 12
And, the powers of the Truth Commission to invite or subpoena witnesses, take
their testimonies, administer oaths 13 and impose administrative disciplinary action for
refusal to obey subpoena, take oath or give testimony 14 are parallel to the powers to
administer oaths, issue subpoena, take testimony and punish for contempt or subject to
administrative disciplinary action any officer or employee who delays or refuses to
comply with a referral or directive granted by Republic Act (RA) 6770 15 to the
Ombudsman.
If Executive Order No. 1 is allowed, there will be a violation of Section 7 of
Article XI, the essence of which is that the function and powers (enumerated in Section
13 of Article XI) conferred on the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution
cannot be removed or transferred by law. Section 7 states:
Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now
or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
There is a self-evident reason for the shield against legislation provided by
Section 7 in protection of the functions conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman in
Section 13. The Ombudsman is a constitutional office; its enumerated functions are
constitutional powers.
So zealously guarded are the constitutional functions of the Ombudsman that the
prohibited assignment of the conferred powers was mentioned in Section 7 in relation
to the authority of the Tanodbayan which, while renamed as Office of the Special
Prosecutor, remained constitutionally recognized and allowed to "continue to function
and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law." CcEHaI

The position of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, as a continuing office with
powers "as may be provided by law" vis--vis the Ombudsman created by the 1987
Constitution would be unraveled by subsequent law and jurisprudence. Most apt is
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 16 which said:
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The Constitution likewise provides that:
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the
incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987.
From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
 Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute
cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot
initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do
so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still
claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the
Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection
with the cases he is ordered to investigate. (Underscoring supplied.)
The ruling was clear: the duty to investigate contained in Section 13 (1) having
been conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman, left the then Tanodbayan without
authority to conduct preliminary investigation except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
The message was definite. The conferment of plenary power upon the Ombudsman to
investigate "any act or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient" cannot, after 1987 and while the
present Constitution remains, be shared even by the body previously constitutionalized
as vested with such authority, even if there is such assignment "by law."
Indeed, the subsequent law obeyed Section 7 as correctly read in Zaldivar. Thus,
in Republic Act No. 6770, an Act Providing for the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes, it was made
clear in Section 11 (3) second sentence that "the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall
be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman."
Constitutional history, specific constitutional provisions, jurisprudence and
current statute combine to say that after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, no
body can be given "by law" any of the powers, functions and duties already conferred
on the Ombudsman by Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. As already shown,
the Truth Commission insofar as concerns the mentioned third level officers or higher
of the previous administration appropriates, not just one but virtually, all of the powers
constitutionally enumerated for the Ombudsman. The violation of Section 7 in relation
to Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution is evident.
3. No comfort is given to the respondents by the fact that, as mentioned in
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, 17 there
are "jurisprudential declarations" that the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) have concurrent jurisdiction. Concurrence of jurisdiction does not allow
concurrent exercise of such jurisdiction. Such is so that the Ombudsman Act
specifically states in Section 15 that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan precisely the kind of cases covered by the
Philippine Truth Commission and proceeds to define "primary jurisdiction" by
again, specifically, stating that the Ombudsman "may take over, at any stage, from any
investigation of such cases." This primary jurisdiction was the premise when a majority
of the Court in Honasan discussed the relevance of OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001 (which provides that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses
committed by public officers in relation to office filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
shall be "under the control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman") in relation
to Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on
Preliminary Investigation, which concerns the review of the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor in such cases. Honasan would conclude that the authority of
the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is subject to the qualification: DTaAHS

. . . that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,

the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and their
resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the
prosecutor cannot dismiss the complaint without prior written authority of the
Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information with the
Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and without prior written authority
of the Ombudsman, or his deputy. 18 (Underscoring in the original)
Three separate opinions, two of which were dissents were submitted in Honasan.
Justice Vitug said that the investigating fiscal must be particularly deputized by the
Ombudsman and the investigation must be conducted under the supervision and control
of the Ombudsman; 19 Justice Ynares-Santiago discussed at length the concept of
primary jurisdiction and took the position that: 20
Where the concurrent authority is vested in both the Department of Justice and
the Office of the Ombudsman, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should operate
to restrain the Department of Justice from exercising its investigative authority if
the case will likely be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In such cases, the Office
of the Ombudsman should be the proper agency to conduct the preliminary
investigation over such an offense, it being vested with the specialized
competence and undoubted probity to conduct the investigation.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez was more straightforward: 21
While the DOJ has a broad general jurisdiction over crimes found in the Revised
Penal Code and special laws, however, this jurisdiction is not plenary or total.
Whenever the Constitution or statute vests jurisdiction over the investigation and
prosecution of certain crimes in an office, the DOJ has no jurisdiction over those
crimes. In election offenses, the Constitution vests the power to investigate and
prosecute in the Commission on Elections. In crimes committed by public officers
in relation to their office, the Ombudsman is given by both the Constitution and
the statute the same power of investigation and prosecution. These powers may
not be exercised by the DOJ. . . .
At the very least, therefore, the prosecutor, in Sandiganbayan cases must, after
investigation transmit the records and their resolution to the Ombudsman whose prior
written authority is needed before the prosecutor can dismiss a complaint or file an
information in which latter instance, a deputization of the fiscal is additionally needed.
Even as this writer submits that the position of the minority in Honasan hews far better
to the Constitution since, as already observed, the Ombudsman's authority excludes
even the Tanodbayan which used to be the constitutionally recognized holder of the
power, the further submission is that the majority ruling to the effect that the
Ombudsman is the supervisor of the prosecutor who investigates graft in high places,
nonetheless illegalizes the Philippine Truth Commission.
Respondent's main reliance is that
Unlike that of the OMB or DOJ which conducts formal investigation as a result
of criminal complaints filed before them, or upon reports, the Truth Commission
conducts fact-finding investigation preliminary to the filing of a complaint that
could lead to a criminal investigation. 22
If the Philippine Truth Commission would, indeed, conduct only fact-finding
investigations preliminary to a criminal investigation, then the foregoing discussion
would truly be irrelevant. The fact, however, is that the Philippine Truth Commission
is, to use the Solicitor General's phrase a "criminal investigator" or one who conducts a
preliminary investigation for the prosecution of a criminal case.
Detailing the powers and functions of the Philippine Truth Commission, Section
2 of Executive Order No. 1 says that the Commission shall identify and determine the
reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate (Section 2 [a]) and
collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large
scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate (Sec. 2 [b]). As aforenoted, the
Philippine Truth Commission's power to investigate graft and corruption is no different
from the constitutional power of the Ombudsman to investigate any act of any public
official when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The
Philippine Truth Commission cannot avoid the comparison by differentiating "formal
investigation" or "criminal investigation" which it says is conducted by the Ombudsman
or the DOJ, from the "fact-finding investigation" of the Philippine Truth Commission.
Let us go back to Zaldivar. There it was as much as stated that the power to investigate
mentioned in Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation which authority was removed from the Tandobayan called
Special Prosecutor when it was given to the Ombudsman. This equivalence was
affirmed in Acop vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 23 where it was stated: cHSTEA

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petitioners have not borne out any
distinction between "the duty to investigate" and "the power to conduct
preliminary investigations;" neither have the petitioners established that the latter
remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special Prosecutor. Thus, this Court can
only reject the petitioners' first proposition.
Such established definition of "investigation" of graft and corruption cases,
especially for the purpose of determining the authority of one body in relation to
another, which is exactly one of the issues in this case, must be read into Executive
Order No. 1. No source citation is needed for the generally accepted rule that the words
used in a legal document, indeed one which is intended to be a law, has the meaning
that is established at the time of the law's promulgation. "Investigation" in Section 1 (a)
of Executive Order No. 1 is the same as preliminary investigation and its conduct by
the Truth Commission cannot be independent of the Ombudsman. The Truth
Commission cannot exist outside the Ombudsman. Executive Order No. 1 so places the
Truth Commission and, is, therefore unconstitutional.
Indeed, Executive Order No. 1 itself pronounces that what it empowers the
Philippine Truth Commission with is the authority of preliminary investigation. Section
2 (g) of the executive order states:
Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutional authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplice or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Investigation to find reasonable ground to believe "that they are liable for graft
and corruption under applicable laws" is preliminary investigation as defined in Rule
112, Section 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Moreover, as clearly stated in Section 2 (g) of Executive Order No. 1, the
Philippine Truth Commission will be more powerful than the DOJ prosecutors who are
required, after their investigation, to transmit the records and their resolution for
appropriate action by the Ombudsman or his deputy, which action is taken only after a
review by the Ombudsman. Section 4 of Rule 112 states that:
xxx xxx xxx
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint
but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a
probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the
respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so
without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice
may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the
resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
 dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same
Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
In other words, under existing Rule which follows the statutorily defined
primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in obeisance to the constitutional conferment
of authority, the Ombudsman reviews and may reverse or modify the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor. In the case of the Philippine Truth Commission, the
Ombudsman not only shares its constitutional power but, over and above this, it is
divested of any and all investigatory power because the Philippine Truth Commission's
finding of "reasonable ground" is final and unreviewable and is turned over to the
Ombudsman solely for "expeditious prosecution."
4. There is an attempt by the Solicitor General to read around the explicitness of
Section 2 (g) of Executive Order No. 1. Thus, skirting the words "for expeditious
prosecution" and their obvious meanings as just discussed, the respondents argue that:
aHIEcS

The Truth Commission will submit its recommendation to, among others, the
OMB and to the "appropriate prosecutorial authorities" which then shall exercise
their constitutional and statutory powers and jurisdiction to evaluate the
recommendation or endorsements of the Truth Commission. While findings of
the Truth Commission are recommendatory, the facts gathered by the
Commission will decisively aid prosecutorial bodies in supporting possible
indictments for violations of anti-graft laws. Moreover, the policy
recommendations to address corruption in government will be invaluable to the
Executive's goal to realize its anti-corruption policies. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The Reports of the Truth Commission will serve as bases for possible
prosecutions and as sources of policy options . . . .
Fact gathering as basis for preliminary investigation and not as preliminary
investigation itself and basis for prosecution, is, seemingly, the function respondents
want to attribute to the Philippine Truth Commission to escape the obvious
unconstitutional conferment of Ombudsman power. That is no route out of the bind.
Fact gathering, fact finding, indeed truth finding is, as much as investigation as
preliminary investigation, also constitutionally conferred on the Ombudsman. Section
12 of Article XI states:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.
 The Ombudsman on its own investigates any act or omission of any public
official when such act or omission appears to be illegal (Section 13(1), Article XI of
the Constitution). The power is broad enough, if not specially intended, to cover fact-
finding of the tenor that was given to the Philippine Truth Commission by Executive
Order No. 1 which is:
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases
of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate . . . .
And, the objective of the Philippine Truth Commission pointed to by the
Solicitor General which is to make findings for "policy recommendations to address
corruption in government" and to serve as "sources of policy options" is exactly the
function described for and ascribed to the Ombudsman in Section 13 (7), Art. XI of the
Constitution:
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
Moreover, as at the outset already pointed out, the power of the Philippine Truth
Commission to obtain information and documents from the Congress and the Judiciary
[Section 2 (c) and (d) of Executive Order No. 1] is a reproduction of the Ombudsman
powers provided for in Section 13 (4) and (5), Article XI of the Constitution.
Virtually, another Ombudsman is created by Executive Order No. 1. That cannot
be permitted as long as the 1987 Constitution remains as the fundamental law.
5. To excuse the existence of the presidentially created, manned, funded and
equipped Truth Commission side-by-side with the Constitutionally created and
empowered Ombudsman, the Solicitor General provides the very argument against the
proposition. In page 75 of his memorandum, the Solicitor General says that:
The concerned agencies need not wait until the completion of the investigation of
the Truth Commission before they can proceed with their own investigative and
prosecutorial functions. Moreover, the Truth Commission will, from time to time,
publish special interim reports and recommendations, over and above the
comprehensive final report. If any, the preliminary reports may aid the concerned
agencies in their investigations and eventually, in the filing of a complaint or
information. (Underscoring supplied)
Apparently, the statement proceeds from the position that "the power of the
OMB to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government." 25
Without cutting off from the discussions that the concurrence of jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman with any other body should be read to mean that at the very least any
finding by any other body is reviewable by the Ombudsman and that in full obedience
to the Constitution, graft cases against high officials should be investigated alone by or
under the aegis of the Ombudsman, it need only be repeated that concurrence of
jurisdiction does not allow concurrent exercise of jurisdiction. This is the reason why
we have the rule that excludes any other concurrently authorized body from the body
first exercising jurisdiction. This is the reason why forum shopping is malpractice of
law.
The truth is, in the intensely political if not partisan matter of "reports of graft
and corruption . . . committed by public officers . . ., if any, during the previous
administration," there can only be one finding of truth. Any addition to that one finding
would result in din and confusion, a babel not needed by a nation trying to be one. And
this is why all that fall under the topic accountability of public officers have been
particularized and gathered under one authority The Ombudsman. This was done by
the Constitution. It cannot be undone as the nation now stands and remains.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the grant of the petition and the declaration of
Executive Order No. 1 as unconstitutional. aETAHD

CARPIO, J., dissenting:

The two petitions before this Court seek to declare void Executive Order No. 1,
Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (EO 1), for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 192935, petitioner Louis C. Biraogo (Biraogo), as a Filipino citizen
and as a taxpayer, filed a petition under Rule 65 for prohibition and injunction. Biraogo
prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to declare EO 1 unconstitutional, and to direct the Philippine Truth Commission
(Truth Commission) to desist from proceeding under the authority of EO 1.
In G.R. No. 193036, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr.,
Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (Lagman, et al.), as Members of the
House of Representatives, filed a petition under Rule 65 for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioners Lagman, et al. pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction to declare void EO 1 for being unconstitutional.
The Powers of the President
Petitioners Biraogo and Lagman, et al. (collectively petitioners) assail the
creation of the Truth Commission. They claim that President Benigno S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) has no power to create the Commission. Petitioners' objections are
mere sound bites, devoid of sound legal reasoning.
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 1 pursuant to Section 31, Chapter
10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292). 1 Section 31 reads: IcSEAH

Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.

The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For
this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
 (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
The law expressly grants the President the "continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President," which necessarily
includes the power to create offices within the Office of the President Proper. The
power of the President to reorganize the Office of the President Proper cannot be
disputed as this power is expressly granted to the President by law. Pursuant to this
power to reorganize, all Presidents under the 1987 Constitution have created, abolished
or merged offices or units within the Office of the President Proper, EO 1 being the
most recent instance. This Court explained the rationale behind the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President Proper in this way:
. . . The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need
of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the
President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind
the President's continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
The Power to Execute
Faithfully the Laws
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that "[t]he executive power
is vested in the President of the Philippines." Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution states that "[t]he President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed." 3 Before he enters office, the President takes the following oath prescribed
in Section 5, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "I do solemnly swear that I will
faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President of the Philippines, preserve
and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate
myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." 4
 Executive power is vested exclusively in the President. Neither the Judiciary nor
the Legislature can execute the law. As the Executive, the President is mandated not
only to execute the law, but also to execute faithfully the law. STADIH

To execute faithfully the law, the President must first know the facts that justify
or require the execution of the law. To know the facts, the President may have to
conduct fact-finding investigations. Otherwise, without knowing the facts, the
President may be blindly or negligently, and not faithfully and intelligently,
executing the law.
Due to time and physical constraints, the President cannot obviously conduct by
himself the fact-finding investigations. The President will have to delegate the fact-
finding function to one or more subordinates. Thus, the President may appoint a single
fact-finding investigator, or a collegial body or committee. In recognizing that the
President has the power to appoint an investigator to inquire into facts, this Court held:
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that his investigation as acting general
manager is for the purpose of removing him as such for having already been
relieved, the obvious purpose of the investigation is merely to gather facts that
may aid the President in finding out why the NARIC failed to attain its objectives,
particularly in the stabilization of the prices of rice and corn. His investigation
is, therefore, not punitive, but merely an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land. In this sense, the President may authorize the appointment of
an investigator of petitioner Rodriguez in his capacity as acting general
manager even if under the law the authority to appoint him and discipline him
belongs to the NARIC Board of Directors. The petition for prohibition, therefore,
has no merit. 5 (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The Power to Find Facts
The power to find facts, or to conduct fact-finding investigations, is necessary
and proper, and thus inherent in the President's power to execute faithfully the law.
Indeed, the power to find facts is inherent not only in Executive power, but also in
Legislative as well as Judicial power. The Legislature cannot sensibly enact a law
without knowing the factual milieu upon which the law is to operate. Likewise, the
courts cannot render justice without knowing the facts of the case if the issue is not
purely legal. Petitioner Lagman admitted this during the oral arguments:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
. . . The power to fact-find is inherent in the legislature, correct? I mean, before
you can pass a law, you must determine the facts. So, it's essential that
you have to determine the facts to pass a law, and therefore, the power to
fact-find is inherent in legislative power, correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
 Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
And it is also inherent in judicial power, we must know the facts to render a
decision, correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
And it is also inherent in executive power that [the] President has to know the
facts so that he can faithfully execute the laws, correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN: cEDIAa

Yes, Your Honor, in that context (interrupted).

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So (interrupted)
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
Your Honor, in that context, the legislature has the inherent power to make
factual inquiries in aid of legislation. In the case of the Supreme Court
and the other courts, the power to inquire into facts [is] in aid of
adjudication. And in the case of the Office of the President, or the
President himself [has the power] to inquire into the facts in order to
execute the laws. 6
Being an inherent power, there is no need to confer explicitly on the President,
in the Constitution or in the statutes, the power to find facts. Evangelista v. Jarencio 7
underscored the importance of the power to find facts or to investigate:
It has been essayed that the lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact[s], the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence.
Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for
supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose
sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or
judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and
make recommendations for actions. (Emphasis supplied)
The Power to Create
A Public Office
The creation of a public office must be distinguished from the creation of an ad
hoc fact-finding public body.
The power to create a public office is undeniably a legislative power. There are
two ways by which a public office is created: (1) by law, or (2) by delegation of law, as
found in the President's authority to reorganize his Office. The President as the
Executive does not inherently possess the power to reorganize the Executive branch.
However, the Legislature has delegated to the President the power to create public
offices within the Office of the President Proper, as provided in Section 31 (1), Chapter
10, Title III, Book III of EO 292.
Thus, the President can create the Truth Commission as a public office in his
Office pursuant to his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. 8 In such
a case, the President is exercising his delegated power to create a public office within
the Office of the President Proper. There is no dispute that the President possesses this
delegated power.
In the alternative, the President can also create the Truth Commission as an ad
hoc body to conduct a fact-finding investigation pursuant to the President's inherent
power to find facts as basis to execute faithfully the law. The creation of such ad hoc
fact-finding body is indisputably necessary and proper for the President to execute
faithfully the law. In such a case, members of the Truth Commission may be appointed
as Special Assistants or Advisers of the President, 9 and then assigned to conduct a fact-
finding investigation. The President can appoint as many Special Assistants or Advisers
as he may need. 10 There is no public office created and members of the Truth
Commission are incumbents already holding public office in government. These
incumbents are given an assignment by the President to be members of the Truth
Commission. Thus, the Truth Commission is merely an ad hoc body assigned to
conduct a fact-finding investigation.
The creation of ad hoc fact-finding bodies is a routine occurrence in the
Executive and even in the Judicial branches of government. Whenever there is a
complaint against a government official or employee, the Department Secretary, head
of agency or head of a local government unit usually creates a fact-finding body whose
members are incumbent officials in the same department, agency or local government
unit. 11 This is also true in the Judiciary, where this Court routinely appoints a fact-
finding investigator, drawn from incumbent Judges or Justices (or even retired Judges
or Justices who are appointed consultants in the Office of the Court Administrator), to
investigate complaints against incumbent officials or employees in the Judiciary. CcSTHI

The creation of such ad hoc investigating bodies, as well as the appointment of

ad hoc investigators, does not result in the creation of a public office. In creating ad
hoc investigatory bodies or appointing ad hoc investigators, executive and judicial
officials do not create public offices but merely exercise a power inherent in their
primary constitutional or statutory functions, which may be to execute the law, to
exercise disciplinary authority, or both. These fact-finding bodies and investigators are
not permanent bodies or functionaries, unlike public offices or their occupants. There
is no separate compensation, other than per diems or allowances, for those designated
as members of ad hoc investigating bodies or as ad hoc investigators.
Presidential Decree No. 1416 (PD 1416) cannot be used as basis of the
President's power to reorganize his Office or create the Truth Commission. PD 1416,
as amended, delegates to the President "continuing authority to reorganize the National
Government," 12 which means the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of
government, in addition to the independent constitutional bodies. Such delegation can
exist only in a dictatorial regime, not under a democratic government founded on the
separation of powers. The other powers granted to the President under PD 1416, as
amended, like the power to transfer appropriations without conditions and the power to
standardize salaries, are also contrary to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 13 PD
1416, which was promulgated during the Martial Law regime to facilitate the transition
from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution, 14 is now functus officio and deemed repealed upon the ratification of the
1987 Constitution.
The President's power to create ad hoc fact-finding bodies does not emanate
from the President's power of control over the Executive branch. The President's power
of control is the power to reverse, revise or modify the decisions of subordinate
executive officials, or substitute his own decision for that of his subordinate, or even
make the decision himself without waiting for the action of his subordinate. 15 This
power of control does not involve the power to create a public office. Neither does the
President's power to find facts or his broader power to execute the laws give the
President the power to create a public office. The President can exercise the power to
find facts or to execute the laws without creating a public office.
Objections to EO 1
There is No Usurpation of Congress'
Power to Appropriate Funds
Petitioners Lagman, et al. argue that EO 1 usurps the exclusive power of
Congress to appropriate funds because it gives the President the power to appropriate
funds for the operations of the Truth Commission. Petitioners Lagman, et al. add that
no particular source of funding is identified and that the amount of funds to be used is
not specified.
Congress is exclusively vested with the "power of the purse," recognized in the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 16 The specific purpose of an appropriation
law is to authorize the release of unappropriated public funds from the National
Treasury. 17
 Section 11 of EO 1 merely states that "the Office of the President shall provide
the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers,
execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible." Section 11 does not direct the National
Treasurer to release unappropriated funds in the National Treasury to finance the
operations of the Truth Commission. Section 11 does not also say that the President is
appropriating, or is empowered to appropriate, funds from the unappropriated funds in
the National Treasury. Clearly, there is absolutely no language in EO 1 appropriating,
or empowering the President to appropriate, unappropriated funds in the National
Treasury.
Section 11 of EO 1 merely states that the Office of the President shall fund the
operations of the Truth Commission. Under EO 1, the funds to be spent for the
operations of the Truth Commission have already been appropriated by Congress to the
Office of the President under the current General Appropriations Act. The budget for
the Office of the President under the annual General Appropriations Act always
contains a Contingent Fund 18 that can fund the operations of ad hoc investigating
bodies like the Truth Commission. In this case, there is no appropriation but merely a
disbursement by the President of funds that Congress had already appropriated for the
Office of the President.
The Truth Commission is Not
a Quasi-Judicial Body
While petitioners Lagman, et al. insist that the Truth Commission is a quasi-
judicial body, they admit that there is no specific provision in EO 1 that states that the
Truth Commission has quasi-judicial powers. 19
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Now. Let's tackle that issue. Where in the Executive Order is it stated
that [the Truth Commission] has a quasi-judicial power? Show me the
provision.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
There is no exact provision.
There is no language in EO 1 granting the Truth Commission quasi-judicial
power, whether expressly or impliedly, because the Truth Commission is not, and was
never intended to be, a quasi-judicial body. The power of the President to create offices
within the Office of the President Proper is a power to create only executive or
administrative offices, not quasi-judicial offices or bodies. Undeniably, a quasi-judicial
office or body can only be created by the Legislature. The Truth Commission, as created
under EO 1, is not a quasi-judicial body and is not vested with any quasi-judicial power
or function.
 The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves the determination, with respect
to the matter in controversy, of what the law is, what the legal rights and obligations of
the contending parties are, and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. 20 The tribunal, board or officer
exercising quasi-judicial functions must be clothed with the power to pass judgment on
the controversy. 21 In short, quasi-judicial power is the power of an administrative
body to adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties under its jurisdiction in a
manner that is final and binding, unless there is a proper appeal. In the recent case
of Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 22 this Court declared: ScTaEA

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is

the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. 23 (Emphasis
supplied)
Under EO 1, the Truth Commission primarily investigates reports of graft and
corruption and recommends the appropriate actions to be taken. Thus, Section 2 of EO
1 states that the Truth Commission is "primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption and thereafter submit
its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman."
The President, Congress and the Ombudsman are not bound by the findings and
recommendations of the Truth Commission. Neither are the parties subject of the fact-
finding investigation bound by the findings and recommendations of the Truth
Commission.
Clearly, the function of the Truth Commission is merely investigative and
recommendatory in nature. The Truth Commission has no power to adjudicate the
rights and obligations of the persons who come before it. Nothing whatsoever in EO
1 gives the Truth Commission quasi-judicial power, expressly or impliedly. In
short, the Truth Commission is not a quasi-judicial body because it does not exercise
the quasi-judicial power to bind parties before it with its actions or decisions.
The creation of the Truth Commission has three distinct purposes since it is
tasked to submit its findings to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. The Truth
Commission will submit its findings to the President so that the President can faithfully
execute the law. For example, the Truth Commission may recommend to the President
that Department Secretaries should personally approve disbursements of funds in
certain contracts or projects above a certain amount and not delegate such function to
their Undersecretaries. 24 The Truth Commission will also submit its findings to
Congress for the possible enactment by Congress of remedial legislation. For example,
Congress may pass a law penalizing Department Secretaries who delegate to their
Undersecretaries the approval of disbursement of funds contrary to the directive of the
President. Lastly, the Truth Commission will submit its findings to the Ombudsman for
possible further investigation of those who may have violated the law. The Ombudsman
may either conduct a further investigation or simply ignore the findings of the Truth
Commission. Incidentally, the Ombudsman has publicly stated that she supports the
creation of the Truth Commission and that she will cooperate with its investigation. 25
That EO 1 declares that the Truth Commission "will act as an independent
collegial body" cannot invalidate EO 1. This provision merely means that the President
will not dictate on the members of the Truth Commission on what their findings and
recommendations should be. The Truth Commission is free to come out with its own
findings and recommendations, free from any interference or pressure from the
President. Of course, as EO 1 expressly provides, the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman are not bound by such findings and recommendations.
There Is No Usurpation of the
Powers of the Ombudsman
Petitioners Lagman, et al. argue that since the Ombudsman has the exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate graft and corruption cases, the Truth Commission encroaches
on this exclusive power of the Ombudsman.
There are three types of fact-finding investigations in the Executive branch.
First, there is the purely fact-finding investigation the purpose of which is to establish
the facts as basis for future executive action, excluding the determination of
administrative culpability or the determination of probable cause. Second, there is the
administrative investigation to determine administrative culpabilities of public officials
and employees. Third, there is the preliminary investigation whose sole purpose is to
determine probable cause as to the existence and perpetrator of a crime. These three
types of fact-finding investigations are separate and distinct investigations.
A purely fact-finding investigation under the Office of the President is the first
type of fact-finding investigation. Such fact-finding investigation has three distinct
objectives. The first is to improve administrative procedures and efficiency, institute
administrative measures to prevent corruption, and recommend policy options all
with the objective of enabling the President to execute faithfully the law. The second is
to recommend to Congress possible legislation in response to new conditions brought
to light in the fact-finding investigation. The third is to recommend to the head of office
the filing of a formal administrative charge, or the filing of a criminal complaint before
the prosecutor.
 Under the third objective, the fact-finding investigation is merely a gathering
and evaluation of facts to determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with a
formal administrative charge, or the filing of a criminal complaint before the prosecutor
who will conduct a preliminary investigation. This purely fact-finding investigation
does not determine administrative culpability or the existence of probable cause. The
fact-finding investigation comes before an administrative investigation or preliminary
investigation, where administrative culpability or probable cause, respectively, is
determined.
On the other hand, an administrative investigation follows, and takes up, the
recommendation of a purely fact-finding investigation to charge formally a public
official or employee for possible misconduct in office. Similarly, a preliminary
investigation is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty of such
crime, and should be held for trial. 26 A preliminary investigation's sole purpose is to
determine whether there is probable cause to charge a person for a crime. TCDHIc

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 27 provides:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties: . . .
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; . .
. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ombudsman has "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan." The cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are criminal cases as
well as quasi-criminal cases like the forfeiture of unexplained wealth. 28 "[I]n the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction" over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman "may take over . . . the investigation of such cases" from any investigatory
agency of the Government. The cases covered by the "primary jurisdiction" of the
Ombudsman are criminal or quasi-criminal cases but not administrative cases.
Administrative cases, such as administrative disciplinary cases, are not cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. With more reason, purely fact-finding investigations conducted by
the Executive branch are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Purely fact-finding investigations to improve administrative procedures and
efficiency, to institute administrative measures to prevent corruption, to provide the
President with policy options, to recommend to Congress remedial legislation, and even
to determine whether there is basis to file a formal administrative charge against a
government official or employee, do not fall under the "primary jurisdiction" of the
Ombudsman. These fact-finding investigations do not involve criminal or quasi-
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
If the Ombudsman has the power to take-over purely fact-finding investigations
from the President or his subordinates, then the President will become inutile. The
President will be wholly dependent on the Ombudsman, waiting for the Ombudsman to
establish the facts before the President can act to execute faithfully the law. The
Constitution does not vest such power in the Ombudsman. No statute grants the
Ombudsman such power, and if there were, such law would be unconstitutional for
usurping the power of the President to find facts necessary and proper to his faithful
execution of the law.
Besides, if the Ombudsman has the exclusive power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, then even the Judiciary and the Legislature cannot perform their
fundamental functions without the action or approval of the Ombudsman. While the
Constitution grants the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "[i]nvestigate on its own
. . . any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency," 29 such
power is not exclusive. To hold that such investigatory power is exclusive to the
Ombudsman is to make the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary wholly dependent on
the Ombudsman for the performance of their Executive, Legislative and Judicial
functions.
Even in investigations involving criminal and quasi-criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman does not have exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigations. In Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice, 30 this Court held:
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by
public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors.
However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. 31
(Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, Honasan II categorically ruled that "the Constitution, Section 15 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended,
do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officials and employees."
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman refers to the conduct of a
preliminary investigation to determine if there is probable cause to charge a public
officer or employee with an offense, not to the conduct of a purely administrative fact-
finding investigation that does not involve the determination of probable cause. 32 The
Truth Commission is a purely fact-finding body that does not determine the existence
of probable cause. There is no accused or even a suspect before the Truth Commission,
which merely conducts a general inquiry on reported cases of graft and corruption. No
one will even be under custodial investigation before the Truth Commission. 33 Thus,
the claim that the Truth Commission is usurping the investigatory power of the
Ombudsman, or of any other government official, has no basis whatsoever.
In criminal fact-finding investigations, the law expressly vests in the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigatory
powers. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975 34 provides:
Section 24. Powers and Functions. The PNP shall have the following powers
and duties:
(a) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice, and assist in their prosecution;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 157 also provides:
Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the
Department of Justice which shall have the following functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws
of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require;
DCAHcT

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

The PNP and the NBI are under the control of the President. Indisputably, the
President can at any time direct the PNP and NBI, whether singly, jointly or in
coordination with other government bodies, to investigate possible violations of penal
laws, whether committed by public officials or private individuals. To say that the
Ombudsman has the exclusive power to conduct fact-finding investigations of crimes
involving public officials and employees is to immobilize our law-enforcement
agencies and allow graft and corruption to run riot. The fact-finding arm of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate crimes, whether committed by public or
private parties, is the NBI. 35 The DOJ Proper does not conduct fact-finding
investigations of crimes, but only preliminary investigations.
The Truth Commission
Has Subpoena Powers
Section 2 of EO 1 provides that the Truth Commission shall have all the powers
of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292, which reads:
Sec. 37. Powers Incidental to Taking of Testimony. When authority to take
testimony or receive evidence is conferred upon any administrative officer or
 any non-judicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall
include the power to administer oaths, summon witnesses, and require the
production of documents by a subpoena duces tecum. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 (e) of EO 1 confers on the Truth Commission the power to "[i]nvite or
subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmation as the case may be." Thus, the Truth Commission, a body authorized to take
testimony, can administer oaths and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum pursuant
to Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292. In fact, this power to administer oaths and
to issue subpoena andsubpoena duces tecum is a power of every administrative fact-
finding investigative body created in the Executive, Legislative or Judicial branch.
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292 grants such power to every fact-finding
body so created.
The Truth Commission
Has No Contempt Powers
Section 9 of EO 1 provides:
Section 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear
upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
There is no provision in EO 1 that gives the Truth Commission the power to cite
persons for contempt. As explained by Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, if the
person who refuses to obey the subpoena, take oath or give testimony is a public officer,
he can be charged with "defiance of a lawful order," 36 which should mean
insubordination 37 if his superior had ordered him to obey the subpoena of the Truth
Commission. If the person is not a public officer or employee, he can only be dealt with
in accordance with law, which should mean that the Truth Commission could file a
petition with the proper court to cite such private person in contempt pursuant to
Sections 1 38 and 9 39 of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.
However, the mere fact that the Truth Commission, by itself, has no coercive
power to compel any one, whether a government employee or a private individual, to
testify before the Commission does not invalidate the creation by the President, or by
the Judiciary or Legislature, of a purely administrative fact-finding investigative body.
There are witnesses who may voluntarily testify, and bring relevant documents, before
such fact-finding body. The fact-finding body may even rely only on official records of
the government. To require every administrative fact-finding body to have coercive or
contempt powers is to invalidate all administrative fact-finding bodies created by the
Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government.
The Name "Truth Commission"
Cannot Invalidate EO 1
There is much ado about the words "Truth Commission" as the name of the fact-
finding body created under EO 1. There is no law or rule prescribing how a fact-
finding body should be named. In fact, there is no law or rule prescribing how
permanent government commissions, offices, or entities should be named. 40 There is
also no law or rule prohibiting the use of the words "Truth Commission" as the
name of a fact-finding body. Most fact-finding bodies are named, either officially or
unofficially, after the chairperson of such body, which by itself, will not give any clue
as to the nature, powers or functions of the body. Thus, the name Feliciano Commission
or Melo Commission, by itself, does not indicate what the commission is all about.
Naming the present fact-finding body as the "Truth Commission" is more descriptive
than naming it the Davide Commission after the name of its chairperson.
The name of a government commission, office or entity does not determine its
nature, powers or functions. The specific provisions of the charter creating the
commission, office or entity determine its nature, powers or functions. The name of the
commission, office or entity is not important and may even be misleading. For example,
the term Ombudsman connotes a male official but no one in his right mind will argue
that a female cannot be an Ombudsman. In fact, the present Ombudsman is not a man
but a woman. In the private sector, the name of a corporation may not even indicate
what the corporation is all about. Thus, Apple Corporation is not in the business of
selling apples or even oranges. An individual may be named Honesto but he may be
anything but honest. All this tells us that in determining the nature, powers or
functions of a commission, office or entity, courts should not be fixated by its name
but should examine what it is tasked or empowered to do. EHaCID

In any event, there is nothing inherently wrong in the words "Truth Commission"
as the name of a fact-finding body. The primary purpose of every fact-finding body is
to establish the facts. The facts lead to, or even constitute, the truth. In essence, to
establish the facts is to establish the truth. Thus, the name "Truth Commission" is as
appropriate as the name "Fact-Finding Commission." If the name of the commission
created in EO 1 is changed to "Fact-Finding Commission," the nature, powers and
functions of the commission will remain exactly the same. This simply shows that the
name of the commission created under EO 1 is not important, and any esoteric discourse
on the ramifications of the name "Truth Commission" is merely an academic exercise.
Of course, the name "Truth Commission" is more appealing than the worn-out name
"Fact-Finding Commission." Courts, however, cannot invalidate a law or executive
issuance just because its draftsman has a flair for catchy words and a disdain for trite
ones. Under the law, a fact-finding commission by any other name is a fact-finding
commission. 41
The Public Will Not Be Deceived that
Findings of Truth Commission Are Final
 The fear that the public will automatically perceive the findings of the Truth
Commission as the "truth," and any subsequent contrary findings by the Ombudsman
or Sandiganbayan as the "untruth," is misplaced. First, EO 1 is unequivocally clear that
the findings of the Truth Commission are neither final nor binding on the Ombudsman,
more so on the Sandiganbayan which is not even mentioned in EO 1. No one reading
EO 1 can possibly be deceived or misled that the Ombudsman or the Sandiganbayan
are bound by the findings of the Truth Commission.
Second, even if the Truth Commission is renamed the "Fact-Finding
Commission," the same argument can also be raised that the public may
automatically perceive the findings of the Fact-Finding Commission as the
unquestionable "facts," and any subsequent contrary findings by the Ombudsman or
Sandiganbayan as "non-factual." This argument is bereft of merit because the public
can easily read and understand what EO 1 expressly says that the findings of the
Truth Commission are not final or binding but merely recommendatory.
Third, the Filipino people are familiar with the Agrava Board, 42 a fact-finding
body that investigated the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. The
people know that the findings of the Agrava Board were not binding on the then
Tanodbayan or the Sandiganbayan. The Agrava Board recommended for prosecution
26 named individuals 43 but the Tanodbayan charged 40 named individuals 44 before
the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan convicted only 16 of those
charged by the Tanodbayan and acquitted 20 of the accused. 45
Fourth, as most Filipinos know, many persons who undergo preliminary
investigation and are charged for commission of crimes are eventually acquitted by the
trial courts, and even by the appellate courts. In short, the fear that the public will be
misled that the findings of the Truth Commission is the unerring gospel truth is more
imagined than real.
EO 1 Does Not Violate
The Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners Lagman, et al. argue that EO 1 violates the equal protection clause
because the investigation of the Truth Commission is limited to alleged acts of graft
and corruption during the Arroyo administration.
A reading of Section 17 of EO 1 readily shows that the Truth Commission's
investigation is not limited to the Arroyo administration. Section 17 of EO 1 provides:
Section 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of
cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)
The President can expand the mandate of the Truth Commission to investigate alleged
graft and corruption cases of other past administrations even as its primary task is to
investigate the Arroyo administration. EO 1 does not confine the mandate of the
Truth Commission solely to alleged acts of graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration.
Section 17 of EO 1 is the same as Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1 dated
28 February 1986 issued by President Corazon Aquino creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG Charter). Section 2 (b) of the PCGG Charter
provides:
Section 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates . . . .
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Section 2 (b) of the PCGG Charter, the President can expand the
investigation of the PCCG even as its primary task is to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses and their cronies. Both EO 1 and the PCGG Charter have the same
provisions on the scope of their investigations. Both the Truth Commission and the
PCGG are primarily tasked to conduct specific investigations, with their mandates
subject to expansion by the President from time to time. This Court has consistently
upheld the constitutionality of the PCGG Charter. 46 CITcSH

Like Section 2 (b) of the PCGG Charter, Section 17 of EO 1 merely prioritizes

the investigation of acts of graft and corruption that may have taken place during the
Arroyo administration. If time allows, the President may extend the mandate of the
Truth Commission to investigate other administrations prior to the Arroyo
administration. The prioritization of such work or assignment does not violate the
equal protection clause because the prioritization is based on reasonable grounds.
First, the prescriptive period for the most serious acts of graft and corruption
under the Revised Penal Code is 20 years, 47 15 years for offenses punishable under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 48 and 12 years for offenses punishable under
special penal laws that do not expressly provide for prescriptive periods. 49 Any
investigation will have to focus on alleged acts of graft and corruption within the last
20 years, almost half of which or 9 years is under the Arroyo administration.
While it is true that the prescriptive period is counted from the time of discovery
of the offense, the "reported cases" 50 of "large scale corruption" 51 involving "third
level public officers and higher," 52 which the Truth Commission will investigate, have
already been widely reported in media, and many of these reported cases have even
been investigated by the House of Representatives or the Senate. Thus, the prescriptive
periods of these "reported cases" of "large scale corruption" may have already began to
run since these anomalies are publicly known and may be deemed already discovered.
53 These prescriptive periods refer to the criminal acts of public officials under penal
laws, and not to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which under the Constitution is
imprescriptible. 54
Second, the Marcos, Ramos and Estrada administrations were already
investigated by their successor administrations. This alone is incontrovertible proof
that the Arroyo administration is not being singled out for investigation or
prosecution.
Third, all the past Presidents, with the exception of Presidents Ramos, Estrada
and Arroyo, are already dead. The possible witnesses to alleged acts of graft and
corruption during the Presidencies of the deceased presidents may also be dead or
unavailable. In fact, the only living President whose administration has not been
investigated by its successor administration is President Arroyo.
Fourth, the more recent the alleged acts of graft and corruption, the more readily
available will be the witnesses, and the more easily the witnesses can recall with
accuracy the relevant events. Inaction over time means the loss not only of witnesses
but also of material documents, not to mention the loss of public interest.
Fifth, the 29-month time limit given to the Truth Commission prevents it from
investigating other past administrations. 55 There is also the constraint on the enormous
resources needed to investigate other past administrations. Just identifying the
transactions, locating relevant documents, and looking for witnesses would require a
whole bureaucracy.
These are not only reasonable but also compelling grounds for the Truth
Commission to prioritize the investigation of the Arroyo administration. To prioritize
based on reasonable and even compelling grounds is not to discriminate, but to act
sensibly and responsibly.
In any event, there is no violation of the equal protection clause just because the
authorities focus their investigation or prosecution on one particular alleged law-
breaker, for surely a person accused of robbery cannot raise as a defense that other
robbers like him all over the country are not being prosecuted. 56 By the very nature of
an investigation or prosecution, there must be a focus on particular act or acts of a
person or a group of persons.
Indeed, almost every fact-finding body focuses its investigation on a specific
subject matter whether it be a specific act, incident, event, situation, condition,
person or group of persons. This specific focus results from the nature of a fact-finding
investigation, which is a necessary and proper response to a specific compelling act,
incident, event, situation, or condition involving a person or group of persons. Thus,
the fact-finding commissions created under the previous Arroyo administration had
specific focus: the Feliciano Commission focused on the Oakwood mutiny, the Melo
Commission focused on extra-judicial killings, and the Zearosa Commission focused
on private armies. SaIHDA

Significantly, the PCGG Charter even specifies the persons to be investigated

for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Thus, Section 2 (a) of the PCGG Charter provides:
Section 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The PCGG Charter has survived all constitutional attacks before this Court, including
the claim that its Section 2 (a) violates the equal protection clause. In Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, 57 this Court categorically ruled that the PCGG Charter "does not
violate the equal protection clause and is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto
law." 58
This specific focus of fact-finding investigations is also true in the United States.
Thus, the Roberts Commission 59 focused on the Pearl Harbor attack, the Warren
Commission 60 focused on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and the 9/11
Commission 61 focused on the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
These fact-finding commissions were created with specific focus to assist the U.S.
President and Congress in crafting executive and legislative responses to specific acts
or events of grave national importance. Clearly, fact-finding investigations by their very
nature must have a specific focus.
Graft and corruption cases before the Arroyo administration have already been
investigated by the previous administrations. President Corazon Aquino created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their cronies. 62 President Joseph Estrada created the Saguisag
Commission to investigate the Philippine Centennial projects of President Fidel Ramos.
63 The glaring acts of corruption during the Estrada administration have already been
investigated resulting in the conviction of President Estrada for plunder. Thus, it stands
to reason that the Truth Commission should give priority to the alleged acts of graft and
corruption during the Arroyo administration.
The majority opinion claims that EO 1 violates the equal protection clause
because the Arroyo administration belongs to a class of past administrations and the
other past administrations are not included in the investigation of the Truth
Commission. Thus, the majority opinion states:
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission
as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The PTC [Philippine Truth Commission], to be true to its mandate of
searching the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The
PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be
arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial
distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the subject
executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "Such a classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number
included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may hereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who
are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory
legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the
class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the
same way as are the members of the class." (Emphasis supplied) DTAcIa

The majority opinion goes on to suggest that EO 1 could be amended "to include the
earlier past administrations" to allow it "to pass the test of reasonableness and not
be an affront to the Constitution."
The majority opinion's reasoning is specious, illogical, impractical, impossible
to comply, and contrary to the Constitution and well-settled jurisprudence. To require
that "earlier past administrations" must also be included in the investigation of the
Truth Commission, with the Truth Commission expressly empowered "to investigate
all past administrations," before there can be a valid investigation of the Arroyo
administration under the equal protection clause, is to prevent absolutely the
investigation of the Arroyo administration under any circumstance.
 While the majority opinion admits that there can be "reasonable prioritization"
of past administrations to be investigated, it not only fails to explain how such
reasonable prioritization can be made, it also proceeds to strike down EO 1 for
prioritizing the Arroyo administration in the investigation of the Truth Commission.
And while admitting that there can be a valid classification based on substantial
distinctions, the majority opinion inexplicably makes any substantial distinction
immaterial by stating that "[t]o exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
"substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the
subject executive order is only an 'adventure in partisan hostility.'"
The "earlier past administrations" prior to the Arroyo administration cover the
Presidencies of Emilio Aguinaldo, Manuel Quezon, Jose Laurel, Sergio Osmea,
Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia, Diosdado
Macapagal, Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, and Joseph Estrada, a
period spanning 102 years or more than a century. All these administrations, plus
the 9-year Arroyo administration, already constitute the universe of all past
administrations, covering a total period of 111 years. All these "earlier past
administrations" cannot constitute just one class of administrations because if they
were to constitute just one class, then there would be no other class of administrations.
It is like saying that since all citizens are human beings, then all citizens belong to just
one class and you cannot classify them as disabled, impoverished, marginalized,
illiterate, peasants, farmers, minors, adults or seniors.
Classifying the "earlier past administrations" in the last 111 years as just one
class is not germane to the purpose of investigating possible acts of graft and corruption.
There are prescriptive periods to prosecute crimes. There are administrations that have
already been investigated by their successor administrations. There are also
administrations that have been subjected to several Congressional investigations for
alleged large-scale anomalies. There are past Presidents, and the officials in their
administrations, who are all dead. There are past Presidents who are dead but some of
the officials in their administrations are still alive. Thus, all the "earlier past
administrations" cannot be classified as just one single class "a class of past
administrations" because they are not all similarly situated. AECIaD

On the other hand, just because the Presidents and officials of "earlier past
administrations" are now all dead, or the prescriptive periods under the penal laws
have all prescribed, does not mean that there can no longer be any investigation of these
officials. The State's right to recover the ill-gotten wealth of these officials is
imprescriptible. 64 Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. (Emphasis supplied)
Legally and morally, any ill-gotten wealth since the Presidency of Gen. Emilio
Aguinaldo can still be recovered by the State. Thus, if the Truth Commission is
required to investigate "earlier past administrations" that could still be legally
investigated, the Truth Commission may have to start with the Presidency of Gen.
Emilio Aguinaldo.
A fact-finding investigation of "earlier past administrations," spanning 111
years punctuated by two world wars, a war for independence, and several rebellions
would obviously be an impossible task to undertake for an ad hoc body like the Truth
Commission. To insist that "earlier past administrations" must also be investigated
by the Truth Commission, together with the Arroyo administration, is utterly bereft of
any reasonable basis other than to prevent absolutely the investigation of the Arroyo
administration. No nation on this planet has even attempted to assign to one ad-hoc
fact-finding body the investigation of all its senior public officials in the past 100 years.
The majority opinion's overriding thesis that "earlier past administrations"
belong to only one class and they must all be included in the investigation of the Truth
Commission, with the Truth Commission expressly empowered "to investigate all past
administrations" is even the wrong assertion of discrimination that is violative of
the equal protection clause. The logical and correct assertion of a violation of the equal
protection clause is that the Arroyo administration is being investigated for possible
acts of graft and corruption while other past administrations similarly situated were
not.
Thus, in the leading case of United States v. Armstrong, 65 decided in 1996, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "to establish a discrimination effect in a race case, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not
prosecuted." 66 Applied to the present petitions, petitioners must establish that
similarly situated officials of other past administrations were not investigated.
However, the incontrovertible and glaring fact is that the Marcoses and their cronies
were investigated and prosecuted by the PCGG, President Fidel Ramos and his officials
in the Centennial projects were investigated by the Saguisag Commission, and
President Joseph Estrada was investigated, prosecuted and convicted of plunder under
the Arroyo administration. Indisputably, the Arroyo administration is not being
singled out for investigation or prosecution because other past administrations
and their officials were also investigated or prosecuted.
In United States v. Armstrong, the U.S. Supreme Court further stated that "[a]
selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over a "special
province" of the Executive," 67 citing Hecker v. Chaney 68 which held that a decision
whether or not to indict "has long been regarded as the special province of the
Executive Branch, inasmuch it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution
to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" 69 These U.S. cases already
involved the prosecution of cases before the grand jury or the courts, well past the
administrative fact-finding investigative phase.
In the present case, no one has been charged before the prosecutor or the courts.
What petitioners want this Court to do is invalidate a mere administrative fact-finding
investigation by the Executive branch, an investigative phase prior to preliminary
investigation. Clearly, if courts cannot exercise the Executive's "special province" to
decide whether or not to indict, which is the equivalent of determination of probable
cause, with greater reason courts cannot exercise the Executive's "special province" to
decide what or what not to investigate for administrative fact-finding purposes.
For this Court to exercise this "special province" of the President is to encroach
on the exclusive domain of the Executive to execute the law in blatant violation of the
finely crafted constitutional separation of power. Any unwarranted intrusion by this
Court into the exclusive domain of the Executive or Legislative branch disrupts the
separation of power among the three co-equal branches and ultimately invites re-
balancing measures from the Executive or Legislative branch.
A claim of selective prosecution that violates the equal protection clause can
be raised only by the party adversely affected by the discriminatory act. In Nunez
v. Sandiganbayan, 70 this Court declared:
'. . . Those adversely affected may under the circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far
from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason.' . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
EHaASD

Here, petitioners do not claim to be adversely affected by the alleged selective

prosecution under EO 1. Even in the absence of such a claim by the proper party, the
majority opinion strikes down EO 1 as discriminatory and thus violative of the equal
protection clause. This is a gratuitous act to those who are not before this Court, a
discriminatory exception to the rule that only those "adversely affected" by an alleged
selective prosecution can invoke the equal protection clause. Ironically, such
discriminatory exception is a violation of the equal protection clause. In short, the
ruling of the majority is in itself a violation of the equal protection clause, the very
constitutional guarantee that it seeks to enforce.
The majority opinion's requirement that "earlier past administrations" in the
last 111 years should be included in the investigation of the Truth Commission to
comply with the equal protection clause is a recipe for all criminals to escape
prosecution. This requirement is like saying that before a person can be charged with
estafa, the prosecution must also charge all persons who in the past may have committed
estafa in the country. Since it is impossible for the prosecution to charge all those who
in the past may have committed estafa in the country, then it becomes impossible to
prosecute anyone for estafa.
This Court has categorically rejected this specious reasoning and false
invocation of the equal protection clause in People v. dela Piedra, 71 where the Court
emphatically ruled:
 The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. . . .
. . . The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the
commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's
eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution
officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before
the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of
crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant
guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy
for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the
exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society . . . . Protection of the law
will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations,
but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission
of a crime. (People v. Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437 [1941])
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons
should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result
would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an
issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown (State v. Hicks, 325
P.2d 794 [1958]). 72 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has reiterated this "common sense" ruling in People v. Dumlao 73 and in
Santos v. People, 74 for to hold otherwise is utter nonsense as it means effectively
granting immunity to all criminals.
Indeed, it is a basic statutory principle that non-observance of a law by disuse is
not a ground to escape prosecution for violation of a law. Article 7 of Civil Code
expressly provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
A person investigated or prosecuted for a possible crime cannot raise the defense that
he is being singled out because others who may have committed the same crime are not
being investigated or prosecuted. Such person cannot even raise the defense that
after several decades he is the first and only one being investigated or prosecuted
for a specific crime. The law expressly states that disuse of a law, or custom or practice
allowing violation of a law, will never justify the violation of the law or its non-
observance. ACcTDS

A fact-finding investigation in the Executive or Judicial branch, even if limited

to specific government officials whether incumbent, resigned or retired does not
violate the equal protection clause. If an anomaly is reported in a government
transaction and a fact-finding investigation is conducted, the investigation by necessity
must focus on the public officials involved in the transaction. It is ridiculous for anyone
to ask this Court to stop the investigation of such public officials on the ground that
past public officials of the same rank, who may have been involved in similar
anomalous transactions in the past, are not being investigated by the same fact-finding
body. To uphold such a laughable claim is to grant immunity to all criminals, throwing
out of the window the constitutional principle that "[p]ublic office is a public trust" 75
and that "[p]ublic officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people." 76
When the Constitution states that public officials are "at all times" accountable
to the people, it means at any time public officials can be held to account by the people.
Nonsensical claims, like the selective prosecution invoked in People v. dela Piedra, are
unavailing. Impossible conditions, like requiring the investigation of "earlier past
administrations," are disallowed. All these flimsy and dilatory excuses violate the
clear command of the Constitution that public officials are accountable to the people
"at all times."
The majority opinion will also mean that the PCGG Charter which tasked the
PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies violates the
equal protection clause because the PCCG Charter specifically mentions the Marcoses
and their cronies. The majority opinion reverses several decisions 77 of this Court
upholding the constitutionality of the PCCG Charter, endangering over two decades of
hard work in recovering ill-gotten wealth.
Ominously, the majority opinion provides from hereon every administration a
cloak of immunity against any investigation by its successor administration. This will
institutionalize impunity in transgressing anti-corruption and other penal laws. Sadly,
the majority opinion makes it impossible to bring good governance to our government.
The Truth Commission is only a fact-finding body to provide the President with
facts so that he can understand what happened in certain government transactions
during the previous administration. There is no preliminary investigation yet and the
Truth Commission will never conduct one. No one is even being charged before the
prosecutor or the Ombudsman. This Court has consistently refused to interfere in the
determination by the prosecutor of the existence of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. 78 With more reason should this Court refuse to interfere in the purely
fact-finding work of the Truth Commission, which will not even determine whether
there is probable cause to charge any person of a crime.
 Before the President executes the law, he has the right, and even the duty, to
know the facts to assure himself and the public that he is correctly executing the law.
This Court has no power to prevent the President from knowing the facts to
understand certain government transactions in the Executive branch, transactions
that may need to be reviewed, revived, corrected, terminated or completed. If this
Court can do so, then it can also prevent the House of Representatives or the Senate
from conducting an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the financial transactions of
the Arroyo administration, on the ground of violation of the equal protection clause.
Unless, of course, the House or the Senate attempts to do the impossible conduct an
investigation on the financial transactions of "earlier past administrations" since the
Presidency of General Emilio Aguinaldo. Indeed, under the majority opinion, neither
the House nor the Senate can conduct any investigation on any administration, past or
present, if "earlier past administrations" are not included in the legislative investigation.
DHTECc

In short, the majority opinion's requirements that EO 1 should also include

"earlier past administrations," with the Truth Commission empowered "to
investigate all past administrations," to comply with the equal protection clause, is a
requirement that is not only illogical and impossible to comply, it also allows the
impunity to commit graft and corruption and other crimes under our penal laws. The
majority opinion completely ignores the constitutional principle that public office is a
public trust and that public officials are at all times accountable to the people.
A Final Word
The incumbent President was overwhelmingly elected by the Filipino people in
the 10 May 2010 elections based on his announced program of eliminating graft and
corruption in government. As the Solicitor General explains it, the incumbent President
has pledged to the electorate that the elimination of graft and corruption will start with
the investigation and prosecution of those who may have committed large-scale
corruption in the previous administration. 79 During the election campaign, the
incumbent President identified graft and corruption as the major cause of poverty in the
country as depicted in his campaign theme "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." It
was largely on this campaign pledge to eliminate graft and corruption in government
that the electorate overwhelmingly voted for the incumbent President. The Filipino
people do not want to remain forever at the bottom third of 178 countries ranked in
terms of governments free from the scourge of corruption. 80
Neither the Constitution nor any existing law prevents the incumbent
President from redeeming his campaign pledge to the Filipino people. In fact, the
incumbent President's campaign pledge is merely a reiteration of the basic State policy,
enshrined in Section 27, Article II of the Constitution, that:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
(Emphasis supplied)
 The incumbent President's campaign pledge also reiterates the constitutional principle
that "[p]ublic office is a public trust" 81 and that "[p]ublic officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people." 82
This Court, in striking down EO 1 creating the Truth Commission, overrules the
manifest will of the Filipino people to start the difficult task of putting an end to graft
and corruption in government, denies the President his basic constitutional power to
determine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, and suppresses whatever truth
may come out in the purely fact-finding investigation of the Truth Commission. This
Court, in invoking the equal protection clause to strike down a purely fact-finding
investigation, grants immunity to those who violate anti-corruption laws and other
penal laws, renders meaningless the constitutional principle that public office is a public
trust, and makes public officials unaccountable to the people at any time.
Ironically, this Court, and even subordinates of the President in the Executive
branch, routinely create all year round fact-finding bodies to investigate all kinds of
complaints against officials and employees in the Judiciary or the Executive branch, as
the case may be. The previous President created through executive issuances three
purely fact-finding commissions similar to the Truth Commission. Yet the incumbent
President, the only official mandated by the Constitution to execute faithfully the law,
is now denied by this Court the power to create the purely fact-finding Truth
Commission.
History will record the ruling today of the Court's majority as a severe case of
judicial overreach that made the incumbent President a diminished Executive in an
affront to a co-equal branch of government, crippled our already challenged justice
system, and crushed the hopes of the long suffering Filipino people for an end to graft
and corruption in government.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petitions. SDTIaE

CARPIO MORALES, J., dissenting:

Assailed for being unconstitutional in the present consolidated cases is

Executive Order (EO) No. 1 of July 30, 2010 that created the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
In issue is whether EO No. 1 violates the Constitution in three ways, viz., (i) for
usurping the power of Congress to create public office and appropriate public funds,
(ii) for intruding into the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and (iii) for
infringing on the equal protection clause with its limited scope of investigation.
The ponencia submits the following findings and conclusions which have been
synthesized:
 1. The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President. It has all the powers of an investigative body under the Administrative Code.
1 It is a fact-finding body, and not a quasi-judicial body;

2. The President has the power to create a new office like the Truth Commission.
The power inheres in his powers as Chief Executive and springs from the constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws. 2 Otherwise stated, the President has the power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring that laws are faithfully executed. It does
not emanate from the President's power of control under the Constitution, 3 nor by virtue
of the power to reorganize under the Administrative Code 4 which pertains to certain
modifications of existing offices, nor by authority of a stale law 5 governing
reorganization of the national government;
3. There is no transgression of the legislative power to appropriate public funds
since what is involved is only an allotment or allocation of existing funds that have
already been appropriated and which shall equally be subject to auditing rules; AaDSEC

4. The Truth Commission does not duplicate, supersede or erode the powers and
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice, since its
investigative function complements the two offices' investigative power which is not
exclusive. This investigative function is not akin to the conduct of preliminary
investigation of certain cases, over which the Ombudsman exercises primary
jurisdiction; and
5. EO No. 1 violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution, 6 for it singles out the previous administration as the sole subject of
investigation.
Sustaining only the fifth ground that the EO violates the equal protection
clause, the ponencia disposes:
WHEREFORE, the petition is (sic) GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are enjoined from implementing (sic) and
operating the Truth Commission. 7 (underscoring supplied)
I submit that the petitions should be DISMISSED.
It bears noting at the outset that none of the petitioners properly raises the issue
of equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, with legal standing as legislators, cannot
properly assert the equal protection claim of the previous administration. While
legislators have locus standi in certain cases, their legal standing as such is recognized
only insofar as the assailed issuance affects their functions as legislators. In the absence
of a claim that the issuance in question violated the rights of petitioner-legislators or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, they have no legal standing
to institute the present action in their capacity as members of Congress. 8
No doubt, legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action upon a claim of usurpation of legislative power. 9 That is why, not every time
that a Senator or a Representative invokes the power of judicial review, the Court
automatically clothes them with locus standi. 10 The Court examines first, as the
ponencia did, if the petitioner raises an issue pertaining to an injury to Congress as an
institution or a derivative injury to members thereof, 11 before proceeding to resolve
that particular issue.
The peculiarity of the locus standi of legislators necessarily confines the
adjudication of their petition only on matters that tend to impair the exercise of their
official functions. In one case, the Court ruled:
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing
to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates
and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not
shown, however, that they have sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the
non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their
contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and
enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to
complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are available
under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations
and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts. ACIDSc

As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that 'to the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes the
power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into
by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to
order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to
allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the
institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the
Senate. 12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Breach of the equal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-
legislators on behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past administration,
has nothing to do with the impairment of the powers of Congress. Thus, with respect to
the issue in Pimentel, Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita 13 that did not involve any
impairment of the prerogatives of Congress, some Senators who merely invoked their
status as legislators were not granted standing.
 Moreover, petitioner-legislators cannot take the cudgels for the previous
administration/s, unless they admit that they are maintaining a confidential relation with
it/them or acting as advocates of the rights of a non-party who seeks access to their
market or function. 14
The petitioner in G.R. No. 192935, Louis Biraogo, does not raise the issue of
equal protection. His Memorandum mentions nothing about equal protection clause.
15 While the ponencia "finds reason in Biraogo'sassertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance," 16 not even his successful invocation of
transcendental importance can push the Court into resolving an issue which he never
raised in his petition.
On the foregoing score alone, the ponencia should not have dealt with the issue
of equal protection. 17
Such barriers notwithstanding, the claim of breach of the equal protection clause
fails to hurdle the higher barrier of merit.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The ponencia holds that the previous administration has been denied equal
protection of the laws. To it, "[t]o restrict the scope of the commission's investigation
to said particular administration constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction." 18
I find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the Truth Commission's defined scope
of investigation.
In issues involving the equal protection clause, the test developed by
jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. 19 ETDHSa

The classification rests on

substantial distinction
Reasonableness should consider the nature of the truth commission which, as
found by the ponencia, emanates from the power of the President to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws. The ponencia
explains that the Executive Department is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed. It adds:
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history
is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created
in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
 Melo Commission, and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in
the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds ha[s]
changed. 20 (underscoring supplied)
This Court could not, in any way, determine or dictate what information
the President would be needing in fulfilling the duty to ensure the faithful
execution of laws on public accountability. This sweeping directive of the ponencia
to include all past administrations in the probe tramples upon the prerogative of a co-
equal branch of government.
The group or class, from which to elicit the needed information, rests on
substantial distinction that sets the class apart.
Proximity and magnitude of incidents
Fairly recent events like the exigencies of transition and the reported large-scale
corruption explain the determined need to focus on no other period but the tenure of the
previous administration.
The proximity and magnitude of particular contemporary events like the
Oakwood mutiny and Maguindanao massacre similarly justified the defined scope of
the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, respectively. As applied to
the two commissions whose objective the ponencia itself recognizes, the same test of
reasonableness rejects the absurd proposition to widen their respective scopes to include
all incidents of rebellion/mutiny and election-related violence since the First Republic.
Certainly, it is far removed not just from the present time but also from logic and
experience.
This explained need for specific information removes the arbitrariness from
recognizing the previous administration as a distinct class of its own.
Without a complete and definitive report
The ponencia brushes aside the proffered reasons for limiting the investigation
to the previous administration since "earlier administrations have also been blemished
by similar widespread reports of impropriety." 21 HEITAD

The ponencia employs the premise that previous administrations have all been
blemished by reports of improprieties similar 22 to those of the previous administration.
Whether reports of such nature exist is not borne by the pleadings submitted by
petitioners who allege unequal protection. Without any factual basis, the statement is
inconclusive and, at best, arguable.
Assuming arguendo that comparable reports of large-scale graft and corruption
existed during administrations previous to the last, petitioners do not allege that
information regarding these reported activities is not yet available in the Executive
Department. On the contrary, respondents disclose that the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and the Saguisag Commission have already probed into certain
anomalous transactions that occurred during the Marcos and Ramos administrations,
respectively. During past administrations, parallel functions had been discharged by the
Integrity Board, Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Presidential
Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE), and Presidential Anti-
Graft Committee (PAGCOM, later replaced by the Presidential Committee on
Administering Performance Efficiency), that were created by former Presidents
Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia and Macapagal, respectively. 23 Not to mention the plunder
committed during the Estrada administration, the facts of which already judicially
ascertained, at that are contained in public records.
The Executive Department's determination of the futility or redundancy of
investigating other administrations should be accorded respect. Respondents having
manifested that pertinent and credible data are already in their hands or in the archives,
petitioners' idea of an all-encompassing de novo inquiry becomes tenuous as it goes
beyond what the Executive Department needs.
The exclusion of other past administrations from the scope of investigation by
the Truth Commission is justified by the substantial distinction that complete and
definitive reports covering their respective periods have already been rendered. The
same is not true with the immediate past administration. There is thus no undue favor
or unwarranted partiality. To include everybody all over again is to insist on a useless
act.
The distinction is not discriminatory
I find it contradictory for the ponencia to state, on the one hand, that the Truth
Commission would be labeled as a "vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution"
24 and declare, on the other, that "its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts .
. . and its findings "would at best be recommendatory in nature[,] [a]nd . . . [the
concerned agencies] have a wide degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject
the recommendation." 25
After precisely explaining that "fact-finding is not adjudication," 26 the ponencia
relates it to retribution which it depicts, in the context of truth commissions, as a
"retributory body set up to try and punish those responsible for the crimes." 27 The
ponencia jumps into conclusion but lands nowhere for it has no ground on which to
stand.
Further, the Court should not concern itself with the nebulous concept of
"partisan hostility," a relatively redundant term that eludes exact definition in a political
world of turncoatism. Had the assailed issuance provided exemption to former members
of the previous administration who have joined the prevailing political party, I would
not hesitate to declare EO No. 1 void. CDcaSA

Far from being discriminatory, E.O. No. 1 permits the probing of current
administration officials who may have had a hand in the reported graft and corruption
committed during the previous administration, regardless of party affiliation. The
classification notably rests not on personalities but on period, as shown by the repeated
use of the phrase "during the previous administration." 28
The ponencia treats adventures in "partisan hostility" as a form of undue
discrimination. Without defining what it is, the ponencia gives life to a political creature
and transforms it into a legal animal. By giving legal significance to a mere say-so of
"partisan hostility," it becomes unimaginable how the Court will refuse to apply this
novel doctrine in the countless concerns of the inherently political branches of
government under an invocation of equal protection. And to think, the present matter
only involves the gathering of information.
To knowingly classify per se is not synonymous to intentional discrimination,
which brings me to the next point that the classification is germane to the purpose of
the law.
The classification is germane
to the purpose of the law
I entertain no doubt that respondents consciously and deliberately decided to
focus on the corrupt activities reportedly committed during the previous administration.
For respondents to admit that the selection was inadvertent is worse. The ponencia,
however, is quick to ascribe intentional discrimination from the mere fact that the
classification was intentional.
Good faith is presumed. I find it incomprehensible how the ponencia overturns
that presumption. Citing an array of foreign jurisprudence, the ponencia, in fact,
recognizes that mere under-inclusiveness or incompleteness is not fatal to the validity
of a law under the equal protection clause. Thus the ponencia pontificates:
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause." "Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all
the evils within its reach." It has been written that a regulation challenged under
the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because
it happens to be incomplete. In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose
can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the
"step by step" process. "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature
does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it
fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked."
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no clear indicia of inadvertence.
That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional
as can be gathered from the fact that it was stressed three times in the assailed
executive order. "The equal protection clause is voided by purposeful and
intentional discrimination." 29 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) SaCIAE
 According to the ponencia itself, the E.O.'s failure to include all evils within its
reach, even by design, is not vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. How the
ponencia arrives at a contrary conclusion puzzles.
Within our own jurisprudential shores, the Court expounded in Quinto v.
Comelec 30 on those classifications which, albeit not all-inclusive, remain germane to
the purpose of the law.
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to
remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the
evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time." In addressing a societal
concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some
inequity as to those included or excluded. Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds
of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative
judgment. We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim
would have been more fully achieved by expanding the class. Stated differently,
the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not
render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is no constitutional
requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be
applied; that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all
or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly
show that the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or
capricious." He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing
treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment, such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if
the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable." In the case at bar,
the petitioners failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this
heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this
point even while we submitted the following thesis:
. . . [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that
the statute's distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best
solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there
is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.
(underscoring supplied)
The "one step at a time" approach is thus not unconstitutional. E.O. No. 1 is not
the first, but the latest, step in a series of initiatives undertaken by Presidents, as earlier
illustrated. Neither will it be the last step. E.O. No. 1 contains a special provision 31
concerning the expansion of mandate. There being no constitutional violation in a step-
by-step approach, the present and future administrations may release supplementary or
comparable issuances.
The wisdom behind the issuance of the E.O. No. 1 is "outside the rubric of
judicial scrutiny." 32 Analogous to Quinto's instructions, this Court cannot and should
not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the President the best or
complete way of obtaining information to eradicate corruption. Policy choices on the
practicality or desirability of data-gathering that is responsive to the needs of the
Executive Department in discharging the duty to faithfully execute the laws are best
left to the sound discretion of the President.
Most enlightening as to how the classification is germane to the purpose of the
law is knowing first what is the purpose of the law.
According to the ponencia, the objective of E.O. No. 1 is the "stamping out [of]
acts of graft and corruption." 33 aDcETC

I differ.
The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is the gathering of needed information to aid the
President in the implementation of public accountability laws. Briefly stated, E.O. No.
1 aims to provide data for the President.
The ponencia, in fact, has earlier explained: "It should be stressed that the
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land." 34
The long-term goal of the present administration must not be confused with what
E.O. No. 1 intends to achieve within its short life. The opening clauses and provisions
of E.O No. 1 are replete with phrases like "an urgent call for the determination of the
truth," "dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth," and "primarily seek
and find the truth."
The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to produce a report which, insofar as the Truth
Commission is concerned, is the end in itself. Thepurpose of the report is another matter
which is already outside the control of E.O. No. 1.
Once the report containing the needed information is completed, the Truth
Commission is dissolved functus officio. At that point, the endeavor of data-gathering
is accomplished, and E.O No. 1 has served its purpose. It cannot be said, however, that
it already eradicated graft and corruption. The report would still be passed upon by
government agencies. Insofar as the Executive Department is concerned, the report
assimilates into a broader database that advises and guides the President in law
enforcement.
To state that the purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to stamp out acts of graft and corruption
leads to the fallacious and artificial conclusion that respondents are stamping out
corrupt acts of the previous administration only, as if E.O. No. 1 represents the entire
anti-corruption efforts of the Executive Department.
To state that the purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to eradicate graft and corruption begs
the question. What is there to eradicate in the first place, if claims of graft and corruption
are yet to be verified by the Truth Commission? Precisely, by issuing E.O. No. 1,
respondents saw the need to verify raw data before initiating the law enforcement
mechanism, if warranted.
The classification is not limited
to existing conditions only
The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President. The nature of an ad hoc body is that it is limited in scope. Ad hoc means for
the particular end or case at hand without consideration of wider application. 35 An ad
hoc body is inherently temporary. E.O. No. 1 provides that the Truth Commission "shall
accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012." 36
That the classification should not be limited to existing conditions only, as
applied in the present case, does not mean the inclusion of future administrations. Laws
that are limited in duration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent the
guarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that may, in the years to come, be in
similar conditions even beyond the effectivity of the law. CASaEc

The requirement not to limit the classification to existing conditions goes into
the operational details of the law. The law cannot, in fine print, enumerate extant items
that exclusively compose the classification, thereby excluding soon-to-exist ones that
may also fall under the classification.
In the present case, the circumstance of available reports of large-scale
anomalies that fall under the classification (i.e., committed during the previous
administration) makes one an "existing condition." Those not yet reported or unearthed
but likewise fall under the same class must not be excluded from the application of the
law. There is no such exclusionary clause in E.O. No. 1.
The ratiocination on this third requisite so as to include previous administrations
already goes into the "classifications," not the "conditions." The ponencia rewrites the
rule leading to the absurd requirement that the classification should not be limited to
the existing "classification" only.
The classification applies equally
to all members of the same class
Petitioners concede, by their failure to allege otherwise, that the classification
applies equally to all members within the same class (i.e., all reports of large-scale graft
and corruption during the previous administration). By this implied admission, this
fourth requirement meets no objection.
Petitioners' only insistent contention, as sustained by the ponencia, is that all
prior administrations belong to the same class, citing that equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 37
Petitioners do not espouse the view that no one should be investigated. What
they advocate is that all administrations should be investigated or, more accurately, all
 reports of large-scale graft and corruption during the tenure of past administrations
should be subjected to investigation.
Discrimination presupposes prejudice. I find none.
First, no one complains of injury or prejudice. Petitioners do not seek the lifting
of their own obligations or the granting of their own rights that E.O. No. 1 imposes or
disallows. As earlier expounded, petitioner-legislators cannot plausibly invoke the
equal protection claims of other persons, while petitioner Biraogo did not invoke it at
all.
Second, petitioners do not allege that previous administrations, other than the
immediate past administration, have been denied the right to appear before or be
examined by the Truth Commission. Neither do petitioners identify the specific fact-
finding obligations exclusively imposed upon the immediate past administration by the
Truth Commission whose primary duty is merely to "investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action." 38 cSaCDT

Third, assuming that there already exists an imposition of obligation from the
mere recommendation for prosecution (as one of the possible appropriate measures) by
the Truth Commission, the act of not recommending the prosecution of all those who
could be probably guilty of graft and corruption is not violative of the equal protection
clause. Even in the succeeding stage of preliminary investigation, which is already "out
of the Truth Commission's sphere of functions," 39 jurisprudence instructs that the right
to equal protection of the laws "may not be perversely used to justify desistance by the
authorities from prosecution of a criminal case, just because not all of those who are
probably guilty thereof were charged." 40
Verily, where there is claim of breach of the due process and equal protection
clauses, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a
need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. 41
Finally, even assuming arguendo that all prior administrations should be
included within the scope of investigation of the Truth Commission, E.O. No 1 is saved
by a separability clause, 42 considering that the remaining portions can stand
independently of the assailed portions and constitute a complete, intelligible and valid
law which carries out the intent of the law. 43 There is thus no basis for denying the
other provisions of their continued force and enjoining the operation of the Truth
Commission.
I, therefore, submit that there exists a "reasonable foundation or rational
basis" 44 for defining the subject of the special fact-finding investigation by the
Truth Commission.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

SERENO, J., dissenting:

 Sir, I say that justice is truth in action.
Benjamin Disraeli, in a speech delivered before the British House of Commons,
February 11, 1851
The majority Decision defeats the constitutional mandate on public
accountability; it effectively tolerates impunity for graft and corruption. Its invocation
of the constitutional clause on equal protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse of
the same and is a disservice to those classes of people for whom the constitutional
guarantee was created as a succor. The majority Decision accomplished this by
completely disregarding "reasonableness" and all its jurisprudential history as
constitutional justification for classification and by replacing the analytical test of
reasonableness with mere recitations of general case doctrines to arrive at its forced
conclusion. By denying the right of the President to classify persons in Executive Order
No. (EO) 1 even if the classification is founded on reason, the Decision has
impermissibly infringed on the constitutional powers of the President. It wafts the smell
of hope onto the air towards those who seek the affirmance of EO 1 by saying: TCHcAE

. . . [T]his is not a death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to
include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution . . . 1
but the scent of hope, as will be demonstrated, is that which emanates from a red
herring. Since Ferdinand Marcos's presidency, no Court has stifled the powers of the
Philippine presidency as has this Court through the majority Decision.
The Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo Brion reveals one undercurrent
beneath the majority's logically indefensible conclusion that flows thusly: (1) the
Filipino people cannot be trusted to recognize truth from untruth; (2) because the people
cannot make the distinction, there exists a large possibility that the people would accept
as truth the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) version of the story on reports of graft
and corruption under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo even if
it turns out to be untruth; (3) this potential public belief in the untruth also enables the
credulous public's inordinate pressure on the Ombudsman and the courts to concur in
the untruth; (4) because of the possibility of this inordinate pressure being brought to
bear, the probability that the Ombudsman and the courts would give in to such pressure
exists; (5) thus the formula emerges the public clamor supportive of the untruth plus
the Ombudsman and the courts possibly giving way to this clamor equals violation of
the due process rights of former President Arroyo and her officials; in turn, this sum
equals striking down the Philippine Truth Commission for being unconstitutional.
The separate opinions of Chief Justice Renato Corona and Justices Teresita de
Castro, Lucas Bersamin, and Jose Perez hold an extreme view on EO 1, opposing well-
established jurisprudence which categorically pronounce that the investigatory powers
of the Ombudsman may be concurrently exercised with other legally authorized bodies.
Chief Justice Corona and Justices de Castro, Diosdado Peralta, and Bersamin even go
further in saying that it would take congressional action, by means of legislation, to
create a truth commission with the same mandate as that in EO 1; and even if Congress
itself were to create such commission, it would still be struck down for violating the
equal protection right of former President Arroyo.
Justice Antonio Carpio opines that the effect of the majority Decision is the
absolute prevention of the investigation of the Arroyo administration. 2 I agree with his
assessment, especially considering the further views on the matter expressed separately
by Chief Justice Corona and Justices de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, and Perez. In
my view, the Decision and the separate concurring opinions manifest the "backlash
effect" wherein movements to achieve social justice and a more equitable distribution
of powers are met with opposition from the dominant group. When the people start
demanding accountability, in response to which truth commissions and other fact-
finding bodies are established, those from the previously ruling elite, who retain some
hold on power, lash back at the effort by crying "persecution," "violation of due
process" and "violation of the equal protection guarantee." Some of the petitioners,
according to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, are in essence acting for and in behalf
of former President Arroyo and her officials, otherwise they would not be invoking the
"equal protection clause," a defense that is inherently personal to President Arroyo and
her officials. These petitioners are wielding the backlash whip through the Petitions. In
bending over backwards to accommodate the Petitions, especially on equal protection
claims which Petitioners could not properly raise, this Court is wittingly or unwittingly
compromising important constitutional principles and rendering the path to a genuinely
strong democratic Philippines more difficult. With all due respect, the Decision in effect
conveys the immoral lesson that what is all-important is to capture and retain political
power at all costs and misuse the legal infrastructure, including the Bill of Rights and
the power of appointment, to create a shield of immunity from prosecution of misdeeds.
ITHADC

Findings and Dispositive Conclusion of the Majority

The dispositive conclusion of the majority Decision contradicts its own
understanding of both the Constitution and the legal implication of recent political
events. It finds that: (1) the Filipino people convinced in the sincerity and ability of
Benigno Simeon Aquino III to carry out the noble objective of stamping out graft and
corruption, "catapulted the good senator to the Presidency"; 3 (2) to transform his
campaign slogan into reality, "President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
administration of his predecessor"; 4 (3) the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is an
ad hoc committee that flows from the President's constitutional duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed, and thus it can conduct investigations under the authority
of the President to determine whether the laws were faithfully executed in the past and
to recommend measures for the future to ensure that the laws will be faithfully executed;
5 (4) the PTC is constitutional as to its manner of creation and the scope of its powers;
6 (5) that it is similar to valid investigative bodies like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zearosa Commission. 7
Nevertheless, the majority Decision concluded that the PTC should be struck down as
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause for the reason that the PTC's
clear mandate is to "investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only." 8
There is a disjoint between the premises and the conclusion of the Decision
caused by its discard of the elementary rules of logic and legal precedents. It suffers
from internal contradiction, engages in semantic smoke-and-mirrors and blatantly
disregards what must be done in evaluating equal protection claims, i.e., a judge must
ask whether there was indeed a classification; the purpose of the law or executive
action; whether that purpose achieves a legitimate state objective; the reason for the
classification; and the relationship between the means and the end. Within those layers
of analysis, the judge must compare the claimed reason for classification with cases of
like or unlike reasoning. He knows the real world, he looks at its limitations, he applies
his common sense, and the judge knows in his judicial heart whether the claimed reason
makes sense or not. And because he is a practical man, who believes as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes did that the life of the law is in experience, he knows false from
genuine claims of unconstitutional discrimination. DEIHAa

With all due respect, it is bad enough that the Decision upsets the long line of
precedents on equal protection and displays self-contradiction. But the most
unacceptable effect of the majority Decision is that a court of unelected people which
recognizes that the President "need(s) to create a special body to investigate reports of
graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration" to
"transform his campaign promise" "to stamp out graft and corruption" 9 proposes to
supplant the will of the more than 15 million voters who voted for President Aquino
and the more than 80% of Filipinos who now trust him, by imposing unreasonable
restrictions on and impossible, unknowable standards for presidential action. The
Decision thereby prevents the fulfillment of the political contract that exists between
the Philippine President and the Filipino people. In so doing, the Court has arrogated
unto itself a power never imagined for it since the days of Marbury v. Madison 10 when
the doctrine of judicial review was first laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
majority does not only violate the separation of powers doctrine by its gratuitous
intrusion into the powers of the President which violation the Decision seeks to deny.
Nay, the majority created a situation far worse the usurpation by the judiciary of the
sovereign power of the people to determine the priorities of Government.
The Majority Decision's Expansive Views of the Powers of the Presidency and the
Mandate of the Aquino Government
The majority Decision starts with an expansive view of the powers of the
Philippine presidency and what this presidency is supposed to accomplish for the
Filipino people:
 The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people convinced in his
sincerity and in his ability to carry out this noble objective catapulted the good
senator to the Presidency. 11SEDaAH

Here we have the majority affirming that there exists a political contract between
the incumbent President and the Filipino people that he must stamp out graft and
corruption. It must be remembered that the presidency does not exist for its own sake;
it is but the instrument of the will of the people, and this relationship is embodied in a
political contract between the President and the people. This political contract creates
many of the same kinds of legal and constitutional imperatives under the social contract
theory as organic charters do. It also undergirds the moral legitimacy of political
administrations. This political contract between President Aquino and the Filipino
people is a potent force that must be viewed with the same seriousness as the 1987
Constitution, whose authority is only maintained by the continuing assent thereto of the
same Filipino people.
Then the Decision proceeds to affirm the power of the President to conduct
investigations as a necessary offshoot of his express constitutional duty to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. 12 It then proceeds to explain that fact-finding powers
must necessarily carry the power to create ad hoc committees to undertake fact-finding.
And because the PTC is only an ad hoc committee that is to be funded from the
approved budget of the Office of the President, the Executive Order that created it is
not a usurpation of any legislative power.
The Decision upholds in extensive affirmatory language what, since the creation
of the Republic, has been understood about the powers of the Presidency and the need
for the effective exercise of the investigatory powers of that office to serve state
objectives. Unfortunately, it then breaks its own chain of thought and shrinks the vista
from its grand view of representative government to a view that is myopic and logically
infirm.
The Majority Decision's Turn-Around to Unconstitutionally Restrict the Powers
of the Aquino Presidency, its Unpredictable Standard for "Reasonable
Prioritization," and the Resulting Imposition of an Impossible Condition on
Aquino's Campaign Promise, as Well as Its Internal Contradiction
Having strongly expounded on the need of President Aquino to fulfill his
political contract with the Filipino people to address graft and corruption, and his
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, the Court suddenly
finds itself impermissibly restricting this power when the object of the exercise of the
Presidential powers of investigation under EO 1 focused on the reported misdeeds of
the Arroyo administration. From full support of the incumbent President and his
constitutional powers, the majority Decision reverses its track to unconstitutionally
restrict his powers by effectively denying him the right to choose the priority in this
case the Arroyo administration in his graft-busting campaign.
The reasoning of the Decision proceeds thus: (a) all past administrations are a
class and to exclude other past administrations is on its face unlawful discrimination;
(b) the reasons given by the Solicitor General for the limited scope of the intended
investigation administrative overburden if other past administrations are included,
difficulty in unearthing evidence on old administrations, duplication of investigations
already made are either specious, irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of
the PTC to stamp out corruption, or beside the point and thus do not justify the
discrimination; (c) to be constitutional, the PTC must, "at least, have authority to
investigate all past administrations" 13 and "must not exclude the other past
administrations"; 14 (d) "[p]erhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include
the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not
be an affront to the Constitution"; 15 and (e) "reasonable prioritization is permitted," but
"it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down as unconstitutional." 16
The Decision is telling the President to proceed with his program of anti-
corruption on the condition that, when constituting a fact-finding commission, he must
include "all past administrations" without exception, save he cannot be expected to
investigate dead presidents 17 or those whose crimes have prescribed. He may prioritize,
but he must make sure such prioritization is not arbitrary.
In talking about an acceptable formulation for a fact-finding commission, it is as
if the Decision is talking past EO 1. The President has already made his fact-finding
prioritization in EO 1, and his prioritization is not arbitrary. The government has
already explained why investigation of the Arroyo administration is its priority (a)
the audit of an immediate past administration is usually where audits begin; (b) the
evidence of graft and corruption is more likely to still be intact; (c) the most immediate
deleterious effects of the reported graft and corruption of the immediate past
administration will need to be faced by the present administration; (d) the resources
required for investigation of the immediate past administration alone will take up all
the resources of the PTC; and (e) other past administrations have already been
investigated and one past president has already been jailed. But this Court is saying that
all the above are not indicators of rational prioritization. Then, what is? This Court
seems to have set an inordinately high standard for reasonableness that is impossible to
satisfy, primarily because it is unknowable and unpredictable. The only conclusion is
that there is no other standard out there acceptable to the majority, and there never will
be. 18 Even the majority Decision gives no clue, and perhaps the majority has no clue
on what those reasonable standards are. As Justice Florentino Feliciano said in his
concurrence in Taada v. Tuvera: 19 SHADEC

. . . The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and

unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
 constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the
relations between a government and its people.
This is the red herring for the majority Decision to speak as if there were a
way to "tweak" EO 1 so that it becomes acceptable to the majority when in reality there
is no way that can be done without loss of dignity to the incumbent presidency. The
tweaked EO, according to the Decision, must include all past administrations in its
coverage, and can identify its priority; but a reading of the Decision already indicates
that the moment the prioritization hints at focusing on the Arroyo administration, then
the majority is ready to once again strike it down. Such proposition is to require the
Aquino administration to engage in hypocrisy to fact-find on "the elephant in the
room" without talking about that elephant in particular because the majority finds that
to talk about that particular elephant without talking about all other elephants is to
deprive that particular elephant of its equal protection right. This Court has imposed an
unbearable and undignified yoke on the presidency. It is to require the Aquino
Presidency to pretend that addressing the reported graft and corruption of the Arroyo
administration was never a major campaign promise of this Presidency to the people.
It is incumbent upon any administration to conduct an internal audit of its
organization in this case, the executive department. This is standard practice in the
private sector; it should likewise be standard practice for the public sector if the mandate
of public accountability is to be fulfilled. No President should be prevented from
creating administrative structures to exact accountability; from conducting internal
audits and creating controls for executive operations; and from introducing governance
reforms. For the Court to do so would be to counter progress and to deny the executive
department the use of best practices that are par for the course in modern democracies.
The Decision contradicts itself by concluding that the graft and corruption fact-
finding mandate of the PTC is confined only to those incidents in the Arroyo
administration. In the same breath, it acknowledges that the express language of EO 1
indicates that the President can expand the focus of the PTC at any time by including
other past misdeeds of other administrations. In other words, the clear and unmistakable
language of EO 1 precludes any conclusion that the PTC's investigation of graft and
corruption is confined only to the administration of President Arroyo. EO 1 should be
read as empowering the PTC to conduct its fact-finding on the Arroyo administration,
and that this fact-finding may expand to include other past administrations on the
instruction of President Aquino. DTAHSI

The use of the word "only" in the majority Decision 20 is unwarranted, as it

indicates exclusivity of the PTC's focus on the Arroyo administration an exclusivity
that is incompatible with the unequivocally non-exclusive language of Sec. 17 of EO 1.
21 The litmus test that should have been applied by this Court is whether or not EO 1 is
unconstitutional for prioritizing fact-finding on the reported graft and corruption of the
Arroyo administration without foreclosing, but not guaranteeing, future investigation
into other administrations.
Unwarranted Creation of "Class of All Political Administrations" as the Object
of Constitutional Review by This Court
At the outset, it must be emphasized that EO 1 did not, for purposes of
application of the laws on graft and corruption, create two classes that of President
Arroyo and that of other past administrations. Rather, it prioritized fact-finding on the
administration of President Arroyo while saying that the President could later expand
the coverage of EO 1 to bring other past administrations under the same scrutiny.
Prioritization per se is not classification. Else, as all human activities require
prioritization, everyone in a priority list for regulation or investigation can make out a
case that there is prima facie classification, and that the prioritization is not supported
by a reasonable objective. All acts of government would have to come to a halt and all
public offices would need to justify every plan of action as to reasonableness of phases
and prioritization. The step-by-step approach of legislative and regulatory remedies
recognized as valid in Quinto v. COMELEC 22 and in the case law 23 cited by the
Decision in essence says that prioritization is not classification, much less invalid
classification.
The majority looks at the issue of equal protection by lumping into a single class
all past administrations, 24 i.e., those of former Presidents Aguinaldo, Quezon, Osmea,
Laurel, Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal, Marcos, Aquino, Ramos,
Estrada and Arroyo. Justice Carpio makes the case that recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
imprescriptible. Then conceivably under the formulation of the majority, all past
administrations are required to be investigated. In fact, even with the exceptions
introduced by the Decision, its conclusory parts emphasize the need to include all past
administrations in the coverage of EO 1. It then pronounces that any difference in
treatment between members of this class is unequal protection, such that to treat the
Arroyo administration differently from the administration of President Aguinaldo is
unconstitutional. After all, says the majority Decision, corruption was reported in other
past administrations as well. SEIacA

The lumping together of all Philippine political administrations spanning 111

years, for purposes of testing valid legislation, regulation, or even fact-finding is
unwarranted. There is inherent illogic in the premise of the Decision that
administrations from the time of Aguinaldo to Arroyo belong to one class. 25
Assuming arguendo that all the political administrations can be categorized as
one class, the test of reasonableness has been more than met by EO 1, as extensively
discussed by Justices Carpio, Carpio Morales, Antonio Eduardo Nachura, and Roberto
Abad. Let me just add to their voices by looking at the constitutional problem before
this Court from other angles.
The Majority Decision Indirectly Admits that the "Reasonableness Test" Has
Been Satisfied in the Same Breath that it Requires the Public to Live with an
Unreal World View
 To quote from the majority Decision's discussion of the claim of violation of the
equal protection clause:
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative powers of the President . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into
a certain classification.
xxx xxx xxx
As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union and reiterated in a
long line of cases,
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. The Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest . . .
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not
substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous
administration" only.
. . . The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at
this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness." The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to a
legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and
the evil it breeds."
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or
that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already
inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases
which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the
PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of
previous administrations, given the body's limited time and resources. "The Law
does not require the impossible" (Lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century's worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from
arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the
truth, must not exclude the other past administration. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
being unconstitutional. . . .
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its
scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that
although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the law should not in any way be circumvented. The
Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. While the
thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the
provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the
guise of "substantial distinctions" only an "adventure in partisan hostility." . . .
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to
the class. "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be
in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations
and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which
are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought
under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as members of
the class."
 The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause" . . . In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law
or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process. "With regard
to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the
entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned
from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the
investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is
violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."
. . . Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope
of the investigations of the Truth Commission so as to include the acts of graft
and corruption, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future.
Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and
caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section
would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that
the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials
and personalities of the Arroyo administration." 26 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In an earlier portion, I discussed the findings of the majority Decision regarding
the mandate of President Aquino from the electorate and the vast expanse of his powers
to investigate and ensure the faithful execution of the laws. The majority concedes the
reasonableness of the purpose of EO 1, but, as shown in the above excerpts, it contests
the manner by which President Aquino proposes to achieve his purpose. The very
discussion above, however, demonstrates the self-contradiction and unreality of the
majority Decision's worldview.
First, the Decision concedes that classification per se is not forbidden in the
process of legislation or regulation. Indeed, cases identified by the Decision, when
examined, pronounce that the legislature and the regulators must necessarily pick and
choose in the process of their work.
Second, in legislation or regulation, a step-by-step process resulting in a
classification of those that are immediately included therein versus those that have yet
to be included in the future is constitutional.
Third, the Decision also concedes that the under-inclusiveness of remedial
measures is not unconstitutional, especially when the purpose can be attained through
inclusive future legislation or regulation. I note of course, that the Decision states in an
earlier part that "under-inclusiveness" makes for invalid classification. It is important
to note the observation of Justice Carpio that the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has consistently been upheld by the Court
despite constitutional challenges on equal protection grounds. The PCGG's charter has
the same "future inclusion" clause as Section 17 of EO 1; yet, the majority Decision
ignores jurisprudence on the PCGG.
Fourth, the Decision, through a quoted case, 27 observes that valid under-
inclusiveness can be the result of either inadvertence or deliberateness.
Regardless of the foregoing findings and discussions, which in effect support its
validity, EO 1 is struck down by the Decision. The majority creates an argument for the
invalidity of EO 1 by quoting only from general principles of case law and ignoring
specific applications of the constitutional tests for valid classification. Instead of
drawing from real-world experiences of classification decided in the past by the Court,
the Decision relies on general doctrinal statements normally found in cases, but
divorces these doctrinal statements from their specific contextual setting and thereby
imposes unrealistic standards for presidential action.
The law has always been that a class can be validly distinguished from others if
there is a reasonable basis for the distinction. The reasonableness of the classification
in EO 1 was amply demonstrated by the Solicitor General, but the majority simply
responds dismissively that the distinctions are superficial, specious and irrelevant,
without clearly explaining why they are so. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority,
jurisprudence bear out the substantial and reasonable nature of the distinction.
With respect to the first reason for the classification claimed by the Solicitor
General that other past administrations have already been investigated and, hence,
there is constitutional basis not to include them in the immediate focus of the
investigation the case of Luna v. Sarmiento 28 supports the conclusion that the
distinction is constitutional.
Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 703, which was sustained by Luna v. Sarmiento,
created two sets of situations one in which persons were delinquent in their tax
payments for half of the year 1941 and the entirety of the years 1942-45 (during the
Japanese occupation), and another in which persons had paid their taxes for the said
periods. Only the first set of persons was benefited by the tax amnesty provision of CA
703. The law was silent on the treatment of the tax payments made by compliant
taxpayers during that period. A claim of unequal protection was raised. The Court said:
Does this provision cover taxes paid before its enactment, as the plaintiff
maintains and the court below held, or does it refer, as the City Treasurer
believes, only to taxes which were still unpaid?
There is no ambiguity in the language of the law. It says "taxes and penalties
due and payable," the literal meaning of which is taxes owed or owing. (See
Webster's New International Dictionary.) Note that the provision speaks of
penalties, and note that penalties accrue only when taxes are not paid on time.
The word "remit" underlined by the appellant does not help its theory, for to
 remit is to desist or refrain from exacting, inflicting, or enforcing something as
well as to restore what has already been taken. (Webster's New International
Dictionary)
We do not see that literal interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 703 runs
counter and does violence to its spirit and intention, nor do we think that such
interpretation would be "constitutionally bad" in that "it would unduly
discriminate against taxpayers who had paid in favor of delinquent
taxpayers." The remission of taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes
already collected does not constitute unfair discrimination. Each set of taxes is a
class by itself, and the law would be open to attack as class legislation only if all
taxpayers belonging to one class were not treated alike. They are not. 29
In other words, within the class of taxpayers obligated to pay taxes in the period
from the second half of 1941 to the end of 1945 are two subclasses those who did
not pay their taxes and those who did. By the same kind of reasoning, within the class
of political administrations, if past administrations have already been the subject of a
fact-finding commission, while one particular administration has not been so, that alone
is a good basis for making a distinction between them and an administration that has
not yet been investigated. There is a constitutionally valid basis, therefore, to
distinguish between the Marcos, Ramos, and Estrada administrations which have
already been the subject of fact-finding commissions and the Arroyo administration.
With respect to the second reason for the classification that it would be unduly
oppressive and burdensome to require the PTC to investigate all administrations case
law holds that administrative constraints are a valid basis for classification.
In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 30 the Court declared the legislative
classification freeze on the four-tiered system of cigarette taxes as a valid and
reasonable classification arising from practicality and expediency. 31 Thus, freezing
the tax classification of cigarettes based on their 1996 or 2003 net retail prices was
found to be the most efficient way to respond to Congress' legitimate concern with
simplifying tax collections from cigarette products. In a similar vein, the President
believed that the most efficient and effective way of jump-starting his administration's
fight against corruption was to focus on one freezable time frame the latest past
administration. The legitimate and valid administrative concern is obviously the limited
resources and time available to the PTC to make a comprehensive yet valuable fact-
finding report with recommendations to address the problem of graft and corruption in
a timely and responsive manner within a period of two years. Hence, there can be no
violation of equal protection based on the fact that the PTC's investigation is limited to
the investigation of what can be feasibly investigated, a classification based on the
Executive's practical administrative constraints.
With respect to the third reason for the classification made by EO 1, one that
lumps together the various temporal reasons, the Solicitor General describes it thus:
 . . . The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding
is warranted by the reality that unlike with administration long gone, the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies
of the previous administration.
. . . The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully
executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede
the current administration.
The temporal dimension of every legal argument is supremely important,
imposed by the inevitable fact that this world and its inhabitants are creatures of space
and time. Every public official, therefore, must accomplish his duties within the
constraints of space and time. To ignore the limitation of time by assuming that a public
official has all the time in the world to accomplish an investigative goal, and to force
the subject of the universe of his scrutiny to comprise all past administrations, is the
height of legal unreasonableness. In other words, according to the majority Decision,
within the limited term of President Aquino, and within the more severely limited life
span of an ad hoc fact-finding committee, President Aquino must launch his pursuit to
eradicate graft and corruption by fact-finding into all past administrations spanning
multitudes of decades. Truth commissions, of which the PTC according to Chief Justice
Corona is one, are all highly limited in investigations, statement taking, and transcribing
information. 32 In order to be swift and independent, truth commissions operate within
strict time constraints. They are also restricted in the subject matter they can review. 33
This is the real world of truth commissions, not that imagined by the majority.
The Majority Decision Grievously Omitted the Analytical Process Required of this
Court in Equal Protection Claims
A judicial analysis must not stop at reciting legal doctrines which are its mere
beginning points, but, especially in equal protection claims, it must move forward to
examine the facts and the context of the controversy. Had the majority taken pains to
examine its own cited cases, it would have discovered that the cases, far from
condemning EO 1, would actually support the constitutionality of the latter.
The majority Decision and the separate opinion of Chief Justice Corona rely
greatly on Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 34 for their main doctrinal
authority. The Court in that case held that the questioned classification was
constitutional, and it went through a step-by-step analysis to arrive at this conclusion.
To clarify the kind of analytical process that must go into an examination of the equal
protection claim, let us quote from the case in extenso:
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily
favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions,
in violation of Article III, Section 1(7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said
Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to
labor organizations.
. . . that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal
protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their
religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of
the law, and applies to all the members of a given class . . .
. . . All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render
it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all
possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted.
. . . In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this Court had occasion to state that the government
should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even
if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect . . .
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a
labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate
force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens
of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent
economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes
the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects
of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the
interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit
those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tents of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be
preferentially aided.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a
wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of
their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union,
and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions.
The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions . . .
. . . The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on
substantial distinctions.cEAIHa

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose.

The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of
their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right
to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop
security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide
that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to
 apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist.
As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor
union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from
affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said
agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is
evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to
members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act
unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them
their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken
away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not
prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance,
that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not
granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for
every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves
inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality
in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification
otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in
practice it results in some inequality. Anent this matter, it has been said
that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for
the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be
obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though
incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the
general public. 35
The above analysis is the kind of processed reasoning to which EO 1 should be
subjected. The majority Decision falls short of satisfying this process.
On the first test. Is the classification reasonable, based on substantial
distinctions that make for real difference? The government has already given several
reasons why the distinction between the administration of President Arroyo is different
from other past administrations. The distinction does not lie in any claim that corruption
is the sole hallmark of the Arroyo administration far from it. The distinction lies in
reason administrative constraints, availability of evidence, immediate past acts, non-
prescription of causes of actions all of which are not whimsical, contrived,
superficial or irrelevant. It must also be emphasized that the Court, as quoted above,
recognizes that in many cases, the classification lies in narrow distinctions. We have
already discussed how in Luna v. Sarmiento the Court recognized subclasses within a
class and upheld the narrow distinction made by Congress between these subclasses.
So if past administrations have already been the subject of a fact-finding commission,
while one particular administration has not been so subjected, that alone is a good basis
for making a distinction between them and an administration that has not yet been
investigated. It must be emphasized that the Victoriano case, which the majority heavily
relied on, reiterated that as long as there is a public benefit to be obtained in a
government action, incidental advantage (and conversely, disadvantage) to a group is
not sufficient to upset the presumption of constitutionality of a government action. DSEaHT

On the second test. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law
to get a headstart on the campaign against graft and corruption. If the investigation into
the root of corruption is to gain traction, it must start somewhere, and the best place to
start is to examine the immediate past administration, not distant past administrations.
On the third test. Of course this is not relevant in this case, for the law being
examined in Victoriano was one that granted prospective rights, and not one that
involves fact-finding into past acts as with EO 1.
On the last test. This asks whether the law applies equally to all members of the
segregated class. It must be emphasized that in the Victoriano case, this last test was
applied not to all the workers in the bargaining unit, but it was applied to the subclass
of workers whose religions prohibit them from joining labor unions. In application to
this case, the question should then have been, not whether there is equality of treatment
between all political administrations under EO 1, but whether within the subclass of
third level public officials of the Arroyo administration that is, the subject of EO 1
there is unequal treatment. Obviously, the answer is no. The majority applied the
last test backwards by asking whether there is equality of treatment among all political
administrations and concluding that there was no equality of treatment, even before it
could answer the first test of whether the classification between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations was reasonable.
It must be emphasized that the Victoriano case on which the majority heavily
relies states in several parts that classification must necessarily result in inequality of
treatment and that such inequality does not give rise to a constitutional problem. It is
the lack of reason that gives rise to a constitutional issue, not the inequality per se. To
quote again:
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is
not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law
is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not
offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some inequality.
Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of
the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the
benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even
though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by
the general public. 36
Selective Investigation, Enforcement and Prosecution
 Fact-finding or investigation can only begin by identifying the phenomenon,
event or matter that is to be investigated. Then it can only proceed if the fact-finder, or
the authority under whom he works, identifies or selects the persons to be investigated.
The validity of the Feliciano Commission created by Administrative Order No.
(AO) 78 of former President Arroyo is affirmed by the majority Decision. AO 78 zeroed
in on the investigation of "the rebellion of misguided military officers last July (2003),"
in order "to investigate the roots of the rebellion and the provocations that inspired it,"
and concludes that "this rebellion is deplorable." AO 78 labeled the officers involved
in the July 2003 Oakwood rebellion as "misguided" and cast their actions as "rebellion"
and "deplorable." President Arroyo selected a class the officers involved in the July
2003 "rebellion" in contradistinction to all other all military officers who had ever
rebelled against the Republic since its founding. The acts were stigmatized as acts of
"rebellion," a crime punishable by law. The majority does not condemn this
classification made in AO 78 by President Arroyo which uses condemnatory language
on the class of people targeted. In contrast, the language of EO 1 of President Aquino
is mild, willing to grant the administration of President Arroyo the benefit of the doubt
by using adjectives to denote the tentativeness of the observations on corruption such
as "alleged" and "reported" instead of treating them as actuality. AO 78 is affirmed
while EO 1 is struck down; no explanation for the differing treatment is made by the
majority Decision. This difference in treatment is disturbing considering the long
history of the treatment by courts of the defense of selective investigation and
prosecution.
In fulfilling its duty to execute the laws and bring violators thereof to justice, the
Executive is presumed to undertake criminal prosecution "in good faith and in a
nondiscriminatory fashion." 37
The government has broad discretion over decisions to initiate criminal
prosecutions 38 and whom to prosecute. 39 Indeed, the fact that the general evil will only
be partially corrected may serve to justify the limited application of criminal law
without violating the equal protection clause. 40 Mere laxity in the enforcement of laws
by public officials is not a denial of equal protection. 41 SEIaHT

Although such discretion is broad, it is not without limit. 42 In order to constitute

denial of equal protection, selective enforcement must be deliberately based on
unjustifiable or arbitrary classification; the mere failure to prosecute all offenders is no
ground for the claim of a denial of equal protection. 43 To support a claim of selective
prosecution, a defendant must establish a violation of equal protection and show that
the prosecution (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. 44 First, he must show that "he has been singled out for
prosecution while other similarly situated generally have not been proceeded against
for the type of conduct forming the basis of the charge against him." 45 Second, he must
prove that his selection for prosecution was invidious or in bad faith and was "based
on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the
exercise of constitutional rights." 46 In American constitutional history, it is the
traditionally oppressed racial or religious minorities and the politically
disenfranchised who have succeeded in making a case of unequal protection when
their prejudiced status is shown to be the principal invidious or bad faith consideration
for the selective prosecution.
The standard for demonstrating selective prosecution therefore is demanding: a
"presumption of regularity supports prosecutorial decisions and in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official functions." 47
In People v. Dela Piedra, 48 the Philippine Supreme Court, adhering to the
precedents set in American jurisprudence, likewise denied the equal protection
argument of an illegal recruiter, who claimed that others who had likewise performed
acts of recruitment remained scot-free:
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class
or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a
discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But
a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and
intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in charging
appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the
part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound
assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The
mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of
a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied
appellant equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the
PTC's investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal
protection. The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and
enjoys clear presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For
petitioners to overcome that presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that
the PTC is a preliminary step to selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a
discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has sorely
failed in discharging that burden.
The presumption of good faith must be observed, especially when the action
taken is pursuant to a constitutionally enshrined state policy such as the taking of
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. 49 For this purpose, the
President created the PTC. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the Court must uphold the classification, as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. 50
The same presumption of good faith and latitude in the selection of what a truth
commission must fact-find must be given to the President. Too wide a mandate would
no doubt drown the commission in a sea of history, in the process potentially impeding
the more forward-looking aspects of its work. 51 To require the PTC to look into all acts
of large-scale corruption in all prior administrations would be to make truth-telling
overly comprehensive, resulting in a superficial fact-finding investigation of a
multitude of allegations without depth and insightful analysis. The Philippines' past
experience with ad hoc investigating commissions has been characterized by a focus
on the truth regarding a key period or event in our collective history and by a reasonable
time frame for achieving their purpose, i.e., the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, 52 the
1989 coup d'tat, 53 the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, 54 the extra-judicial killings of media
and activists, 55 and private armed groups. 56 EScaIT

Here, petitioners who are not even the injured parties are invoking the equal
protection clause. Their standing to raise this issue is seriously contested in the Dissent
of Justice Carpio Morales. They do not claim in any manner that they are the subject of
EO 1. Courts have warned that the right of equal protection of the law "may not be
perversely invoked" to justify desistance by the authorities from the prosecution of a
criminal case, just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were
charged. 57 This characterization would apply especially if the ones who invoke the
equal protection clause are those who are not injured by the contested executive action.
EO 1 activities are at most initiatory investigations. There is no preliminary
investigation much less prosecution to be conducted under the auspices of EO 1.
The PTC is tasked to "collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or
regarding the cases of large scale corruption," 58 tasks that constitutes nothing more
than a general inquiry into such reported cases in the previous administration. Similar
to an initiatory police investigation, the PTC is tasked with general fact-finding to
uncover the truth of the events pertaining to an alleged unsolved crime. To strike down
the PTC's mandate to investigate the previous administration simply because other
administrations are not immediately included is tantamount to saying that a police
investigation of a recent murder case is violative of equal protection because there are
other prior yet equally heinous murders that remain uninvestigated and unsolved by the
police.
What renders the plaint regarding an alleged violation of the equal protection
clause ridiculous is that it is being raised at the inception stage for the determination of
possible criminal liability, where threat to liberty is most absent. In contrast, with
respect to petitions to stop later and more freedom-threatening stages in the
determination of criminal liability such as in formal criminal investigations and
prosecutions, Philippine courts instinctively reject the defense of a suspect or accused
that the investigation is illegitimate because others who may have also violated the
relevant rule, are not being investigated. 59 In Gallardo v. People, 60 the Supreme Court
held that there was no violation of the equal protection clause when the Ombudsman
recommended the filing of an information against a public officer, even if it had
previously dismissed sixteen (16) other cases of similar factual circumstances:
The contention that petitioners' right to equal protection of the law has been
transgressed is equally untenable. The equal protection clause requires that the
law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both
in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable
classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial
differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply because
the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the
case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part,
absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the
instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed
there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial.
On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information
against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial.
He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the
constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise, the circumstances
obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by the Ombudsman are
entirely divergent from those here existing. (Emphasis supplied)
Even on the assumption that the recommendation of the PTC is that acts of graft
and corruption were indeed committed by the Arroyo administration, there is still a long
way to go before the recommendation would ripen to criminal prosecution, much less
conviction. The Ombudsman must accept the referral and conduct its own preliminary
investigation. It must find probable cause, then file the appropriate information. The
Court must then preside over a criminal trial at which the findings of the PTC have no
conclusive effect on the Court's ultimate judgment, in the same way they treated the
findings of the Davide Commission in Kapunan v. Court of Appeals: 61
We do not wish to denigrate from the wisdom of the Davide Commission.
However, its findings cannot be deemed as conclusive and binding on this
Court, or any court for that matter. Nothing in R.A. No. 6832 mandates
that the findings of fact or evaluations of the Davide Commission acquire
 binding effect or otherwise countermand the determinative functions of the
judiciary. The proper role of the findings of fact of the Davide Commission in
relation to the judicial system is highlighted by Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 6832,
which requires the Commission to '[t]urn over to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities all evidence involving any person when in the course of its
investigation, the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe
that he appears to be liable for any criminal offense in connection with said
coup d'tat.'
aAEIHC

Whatever factual findings or evidence unearthed by the Davide

Commission that could form the basis for prosecutorial action still need be
evaluated by the appropriate prosecutorial authorities to serve as the
nucleus of either a criminal complaint or exculpation therefrom. If a
criminal complaint is indeed filed, the same findings or evidence are still subject
to the normal review and evaluation processes undertaken by the judge, to be
assessed in accordance with our procedural law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Who Fears the Truth?
Truth commissions operate on the premise that the truth if faced squarely,
documented thoroughly, and acknowledged officially will reduce the likelihood that
a repetition of government abuses will recur in the future. 62 Official acknowledgment
of the truth is extremely powerful in the healing process, especially in an atmosphere
previously dominated by official denial. 63 Aside from their cathartic value, truth
commissions like the PTC can be useful in uncovering the causes and patterns that led
to such corruption, if it indeed existed, so that it may be prevented in the future. The
absence of any form of accountability for public officials' past misconduct of a grave
nature and massive scale will promote a culture of impunity. If the present
administration does not demonstrate that it can hold accountable persons who
committed acts of corruption, such inability may be interpreted as a "license to engage
in further acts of corruption" 64 and embolden public officials to steal from the
government coffers more often and in greater quantity.
The Concurring Opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Brion speaks to the
fear that the PTC would be a mind-conditioning commission such that if the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court itself were to reject the PTC's
findings, they would incur the ire of the people. The potential imminence of public
wrath would thus serve as a deterrent to rejection (and an incentive to acceptance) of
the findings of the PTC. He regards the release of the conclusions of the PTC as a
"priming" mechanism upon the public, the Ombudsman and the Court to concur with
the PTC's way of thinking. He objects to the PTC's appropriation of the word "truth"
and assumes that all conclusions contrary to the PTC's would be more likely labeled as
"untruth." According to the Concurring Opinion, because President Aquino is highly
trusted by Filipinos, then repeated "truth" from him or his government would be
believed, wholesale and with finality, by a credulous people. This would thus, the
Concurring Opinion states, bring undue pressure to bear on the Ombudsman, the
Sandiganbayan, and the Supreme Court: in the event of any of these bodies "go[ing]
against the Commission's report," the consequent public perception that said body sided
with an "untruth" would compromise "the authority, independence, and even the
integrity of these constitutional bodies . . . to the prejudice of the justice system." 65
Justice Brion theorizes that, in the light of the potential of the Commission's influence
to "prime the public" and "go beyond the level of priming" in a way that "can affect the
public environment as well as the thinking of both the decision makers in the criminal
justice system and the public in general," the PTC's primary role is "negated in actual
application by the title Truth Commission and its truth-telling function." 66 According
to the Concurring Opinion, this renders the Commission an "unreasonable means to a
reasonable objective." 67 I believe these arguments betray a very poor view of the
Filipino people and that this view lies at the root of his "due process" problem.
Woven as binding threads throughout the Concurring Opinion are a denial of an
imbalance of power and an unwillingness to see it shift in favor of a weaker group
seeking redress for the perpetration of injustice against its members. It is an oft-
observed phenomenon that when there are attempts to address past abuses committed
by a powerful group, and when steps are taken to rectify the systemic inequalities,
members of the powerful group decry the threats represented by these efforts to
rebalance the scales. In this manner cries and accusations of reverse "discrimination"
and "persecution" are raised by persons who have to answer to the demands of those
seeking the righting of past wrongs. This reaction may be viewed as part of a larger
pattern of backlash, meant to both "lash back" against those perceived to be behind the
threat to the security of power and to return the system to the state it occupied before
attempts to seek redress were made. 68 In the United States, this pattern is evident in
various bills, policies and initiatives from the campaign rhetoric of a presidential
contender, immigration bills, and laws on language to university admissions policies
that aim to challenge and minimize any gains made by disadvantaged and
subordinated groups over the past years. 69
To be sure, the differences both in history and circumstance, between the
backlash experienced by various disprivileged groups in the U.S. and the situation at
hand, are not insignificant. However, the parallels that can be drawn are striking and
unsettling. In our present context, it is the Filipino people a great majority of whom
have been disprivileged by institutions that heavily favor the ruling elite that have
suffered the damaging consequences of graft and corruption. It is the Filipino people
who have been wronged by past abuses and systematic inequality; and it is they who
now desire justice in truth. In the Philippine context, the pre-redress state was that of
an imbalance so great it allowed the immunity of past high officials (the privileged
class) from public accountability; members from such group will try to return to that
state by seeking to continue eluding accountability.
By ignoring the Filipino public's experience as a witness to the frustration of
attempts to hold the past administration accountable for its reported misdeeds, and
framing it instead as a group that stands ready to convict past officials at the bar of
public opinion, the Concurring Opinion turns social reality on its head. It minimizes the
status of the Filipino people as a group wronged by the imbalance of power and the
betrayal of public trust. It ignores the need of this group to see these rectified. It ascribes
an excess of strength to public opinion and grounds its logic on fear of the public acting
as an angry mob. It does not attribute the proper importance to the active, participatory
role the Filipino people desire to take in the process of dealing with the possible
misdeeds of the past. AcICTS

Implicit in Justice Brion's Concurring Opinion are the roles the public is
expected to take: that of passive observer, receiver of information and susceptible to
the branding of "truth" and its repetition; 70 and that of a source of pressure. In the latter
role, the Concurring Opinion envisions the Filipino people, having adjudged guilt
according to what it was told by the PTC and the media, wielding the threat of public
disapproval against the Ombudsman and the judiciary so as to shift the burden to these
bodies to demonstrate proof and the basis for their actions if they were to disagree with
the findings of the PTC.71
This is gross speculation. It does not follow that repetition of information
guarantees the acceptance of its veracity; to make that logical leap in this instance is to
insinuate that repetition would rob the Filipino people of the capacity to make
distinctions between what to accept and what to reject. Neither does it follow that the
Ombudsman and the judiciary must inevitably accede to public clamor, or that the entry
of public opinion into the discussion would cause a "qualitative change in the criminal
justice system" and weaken "reliance on the law, the rules and jurisprudence." 72
The public does not need sheltering from the "potentially prejudicial effects of
truth-telling." Nor is the public to be viewed as unwitting victims to "a noisy minority
[who] can change the course of a case simply because of their noise and the media
attention they get." 73 The Filipino people have a genuine stake in the addressing of
abuses possibly committed by the past administration and are entitled to information on
the same.
Striking down efforts to give the public information regarding the misdeeds of
powerful officials sends a signal of the continuing dominance of "might makes right"
and the futility of attempting to hold public officials accountable for their actions.
Conversely, by carrying out investigations of the past actions of public officials, and by
holding up its results to public scrutiny and criticism, the government reinforces respect
for the rule of law and educate the people on the nature and extent of past wrongdoing.
74 Moreover, the characterization of public discussion the "second forum" as an
inappropriate venue for the release of the PTC's findings devalues the utility and
meaning that truth possesses for the aggrieved group, and denigrates the need for the
construction and repair of the group's collective memory. Indeed, the Concurring
Opinion implies that the PTC's influence on public perceptions and consequently the
shaping of the collective memory of Filipinos will only instigate more injustice.
 To the contrary, the need to shape collective memory as a way for the public to
confront injustice and move towards a more just society should not be diminished or
denied. The Concurring Opinion disregards the significance to justice of what is seen
and remembered and eliminates the vital role of the people themselves in "constructing
collective memories of injustice as a basis for redress." 75 This disregard need not
prevail. There is much value to be found in memory, as Hom and Yamamoto recounted:
For many of the 10,000 Philippine citizens tortured and murdered for their
political opposition to the former Ferdinand Marcos regime, reshaping memory
became both a means to challenge injustice and a psychological end in itself.
Consider the anguish of the family of Archimedes Trajano, a college student
who posed a mildly critical question to Marcos's daughter at a forum and was
whisked away, tortured for days, and thrown off a building. For his family, and
thousands of others, there existed the need to create a new memory beyond the
excruciating story of personal loss and suffering a memory that included a
sense of social justice and government accountability. To write this new
memory collectively, many families, lawyers, bureaucrats risked much in the
Philippines to aid the thirteen-year human rights multidistrict class action
litigation in the United States. 76
While it is true that public opinion will be influenced by the information that the
public can access, it would be specious to claim that the possible turning of the tide of
public opinion against those subject to investigation is tantamount to a conviction
before the court of the Filipino people. To declare the Filipino public undeserving of
the truth on the grounds of its supposed lack of capacity to deal with the truth and its
alleged susceptibility to the "priming" effect of the PTC's findings, while ignoring the
public's need to know the truth and to seek redress for wrongs, is to deny the public the
means to move towards social justice.
In Razon v. Tagitis, 77 the Court, speaking through no less than Justice Brion
himself, affirmed the grant of the Writ of Amparo petitioned by the wife of Engineer
Morced Tagitis, and touched on the "the right of relatives of the disappeared persons
and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the
disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation," as expressed in
the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance. It would be inconsistent for this Court not to afford the same level of
openness and accountability in enforced disappearances of individuals to allegations of
criminal acts of massive corruption committed against the entire Philippine nation,
under the fundamental premise of Razon v. Tagitis that the Filipino have the right to
know and can handle the truth. The public's right to know 78 and the concomitant public
policy of full public disclosure 79 support the fact-finding mandate of the PTC to
uncover the truth of these allegations and reports in the Arroyo administration. 80 Justice
Brion's Concurring Opinion does not lay down enough legal basis for his argument that
the PTC has to be struck down due to the possibility of bias to be created in the public
mind through public reports of the PTC and the inordinate pressure this bias will bring
on the Ombudsman and the judiciary. The Philippine judiciary has had more than a
century's worth of experience dealing with judicial cases and criminal investigations
under the harsh light of public scrutiny, yet not one case or investigation has been
stopped on the simple basis of the public forming a strong opinion on them and voicing
this opinion in a loud manner. 81 A judge is expected to act impartially and
independently, under any set of circumstances, with or without the public as witness.
This is the role of a judge and if the neutrality required of a judge is not maintained, the
fault lies not in the creation of a fact-finding commission that started the search for
truth, but in the judge's character. To this end, the statement of the Court in People v.
Sesbreo 82 on undue publicity and its effect on the right of the accused is worth
recalling:EaTCSA

. . . Besides, a thorough review of the records yields no sufficient basis to show

that pervasive publicity unduly influenced the court's judgment. Before we
could conclude that appellant was prejudiced by hostile media, he must first
show substantial proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a showing
that adverse publicity indeed influenced the court's decision, as held in Webb v.
De Leon, 247 SCRA 653 (1995) and People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54
(1995).
"[T]o warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity."
"Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given
a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of the members
of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings
news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. . . . Our judges are learned in
the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se infect their
impartiality.
"At best appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of
the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
 prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of
the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden. (Italics in the original)"
Absent a persuasive showing by the appellant that publicity prejudicial to his
case was responsible for his conviction by the trial judge, we cannot accept his
bare claim that his conviction ought to be reversed on that ground.
Justice Cardozo, the Judge and Society
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Brion quotes Justice Benjamin Cardozo of
the United States Supreme Court in the context of "what the repeated" "truth from a
generally trusted government can achieve" and "the effect of outside influence on
judging." The Concurring Opinion uses quotations from Justice Cardozo's book, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, to drive home its points on how "the Commission's
influence can go beyond the level of priming and can affect the public environment as
well as the thinking of both the decision makers in the criminal justice system and the
public in general" and on the "potential prejudicial effects of truth-telling." 83
The source of the quotations featured in Justice Brion's Concurring Opinion is
entitled "Adherence to Precedent. The Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process.
Conclusion," fourth in a series of lectures delivered by Justice Cardozo at Yale
University and subsequently published as a book. In the lecture, Justice Cardozo spoke
about the gaps left by absence of precedents in systems of law, the development of
principles to address these gaps, and adherence to the rule of precedent. With regard to
the latter he expressed his belief that "when a rule, after it has been duly tested by
experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social
welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment." 84
Building on this principle, he discussed the rule of precedent in application, and from
there went on to survey judicial methods, comparing "static" with "dynamic"
precedents, narrating his personal struggles first to find certainty, then to reconcile
himself with uncertainty.
Throughout all this, one forms the image of a man fully aware of the doubts and
tensions that beset a judge, keenly cognizant of the limitations of his position and the
temporal nature of even those principles of whose development he earlier spoke: "I
have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation;
and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind,
the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day
expire, and new principles are born." 85 HEScID
 Justice Cardozo was also conscious of the close intertwining between a judge's
philosophy and the judicial process, in his analysis of Roosevelt's statement on the
philosophy of judges, the timeliness of their philosophy, and the impact of the same on
the decisions of the courts. 86 It is due to the limits of human nature, Justice Cardozo
conceded, that the ideal of "eternal verities" is beyond the reach of a judge; thus it is
impossible to completely eliminate the "personal measure of the [judicial] interpreter."
Of such personal measures and the signs of the times he wrote: "My duty as judge
may be to objectify in law, not my own aspirations and convictions and
philosophies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men and
women of my time. Hardly shall I do this well if my own sympathies and beliefs
and passionate devotions are with a time that is past." 87
It is clear that Justice Cardozo did not expect a judge to cut himself completely
off from the pressures, forces, and beliefs of his society far from it. "We may figure
the task of the judge, if we please, as the task of a translator, the reading of signs
and symbols given from without," 88 he went on to say. Indeed, the first lines of the
paragraph quoted in Justice Brion's Concurring Opinion 89 state: "I have no quarrel,
therefore, with the doctrine that judges ought to be in sympathy with the spirit of
their times." 90 Justice Cardozo did not regard the influence of "the truth without us"
on the shaping of individual beliefs as harmful in and of itself, nor did he say that judges
must be completely free of outside influences. He spoke of the effect the thinking of
the group could play in the thinking of the individual, and how these factors and
influences, as part of human nature, might play out in the judicial process, without
considering such effect as a problem. He wrote, following his quoting of James Harvey
Robinson, that "[t]he training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the judicial
temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate him from the suggestive power
of individual dislikes and prepossessions. It will help to broaden the group to which his
subconscious loyalties are due. Never will these loyalties be utterly extinguished while
human nature is what it is." 91
Accepting fully the flaws inherent in human nature and the "eccentricities of
judges," optimistic in the belief that "because [the flaws] are not only there but visible,
we have faith that they will be corrected," 92 Justice Cardozo concluded with words on
the temporal nature of the work of a judge: "The work of a judge is in one sense
enduring and in another sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is erroneous
is pretty sure to perish." It was in this sense the building of new structures upon good
foundations, the rejection of errors as they are determined by the years that Justice
Cardozo wrote the lines that constitute the second excerpt quoted in Justice Brion's
Concurring Opinion. Preceding Justice Cardozo's quoting of Henderson, he wrote:
"Little by little the old doctrine is undermined. Often the encroachments are so gradual
that their significance is at first obscured. Finally we discover that the contour of the
landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be cast aside, and the ground
charted anew." 93 It was change in the spirit of the times, in the principles
underpinning the judicial process, in the personal and very human beliefs of individual
judges that Justice Cardozo spoke of in this passage. It does not speak of damage
wrought by societal influence, nor of destructive or prejudicial effects due to shifts
in public opinion and belief, but rather of how law develops and changes. Indeed,
Justice Cardozo ends on a note rich with hope in change:
Ever in the making, as law develops through the centuries, is this new faith
which silently and steadily effaces our mistakes and eccentricities. I sometimes
think that we worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of
our errors. They may work a little confusion for a time. In the end, they will be
modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future takes care of such
things. In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant
rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound
and fine. 94
Truly, the role of the judge is to do his utmost to exercise his independence, even
against overwhelming pressure, to uphold the rule of law. But simply because the
possibility exists that the judiciary may go along with a public that is hungry for the
truth does not mean we do not allow the truth to be found out. As we can see from a
reading of Justice Cardozo's lecture, we need not fear societal influences and forces.
The "truth without us" does not negate the validity of "the truth within."
Appropriateness of Establishing a "Truth" Commission
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Brion raises the points that: (1) the term "truth
commission" is usually reserved for a body "investigating the human rights violations
that attended past violence and repression, and in some instances for a body working
for reconciliation in society," and (2) reconciliation is not present as one of the goals of
the PTC. 95 These two points, according to the Concurring Opinion, further distance the
PTC from other truth commissions; the latter point in particular thereby "remov[es] a
justification for any massive information campaign aimed at healing divisions that may
exist in the nation." 96
To arrive at this conclusion is to place unwarranted restrictions on the definitions
and functions of bodies bearing the name of "truth commission." While many truth
commissions have indeed been established in the wake of a violent conflict leading to
a transition between two regimes, this does not preclude that truth commissions in some
countries may be used for circumstances that do not duplicate the violence of the
conflict or the character of the regime transition in other countries. The needs of various
countries differ and consequently determine a great deal of variation in the fundamental
goals, purposes, and characteristics of the bodies they establish, to deal with the abuses
of previous administrations. 97 David Crocker puts forth the view that even nations other
than new democracies may see the need for ways to "reckon with past wrongs," and
classifies these other nations into three broad categories: (1) post-conflict societies
aspiring to transition to democracy, but occupied with pressing security issues; (2)
authoritarian and conflict-ridden societies; (3) mature democracies that are reckoning
with abuses their own governments may have committed in the past. 98 The Philippine
context does not, therefore, close off the avenue of a truth commission as a permissible
means to address past abuses. Likewise, a definition that expects reconciliation as a
requisite goal for the PTC 99 is an unduly narrow definition. HSCATc

Another argument raised in Justice Brion's Concurring Opinion refers to the EO

1's creation of the PTC as a "shortcut to the emergence of truth" 100 one which should
not be taken as it "bypass[es] processes established by the Constitution and the laws."
Because it deems "the international experiences that give rise to the title Truth
Commission" as not applying to the present Philippine situation and claims there is no
need for "quick transitional justice," the Concurring Opinion reasons that "there is no
need to resort to . . . institutions and mechanisms outside of those already in place." 101
In other words, only the Ombudsman and the judiciary have the rightful duopoly on
truth-finding and truth-telling in graft and corruption cases.
Yet the justifications for the use of truth commissions are not confined only to
certain post-conflict scenarios or the absence of functioning judicial systems. Even in
some contexts where there is a judicial system already in place, a truth commission may
be used by the government as a redress mechanism. 102 There are numerous reasons
prosecution and other means usually undertaken within the judicial system may not be
viable. There may be too many incidents to prosecute; due to the atmosphere of secrecy
in which abuses took place, evidence may be insufficient for a criminal conviction. 103
Current political policies, as well as concerns about vengeance and the resulting societal
tensions, may also make prosecution difficult or impossible. 104 The element of time
may also be a significant factor. 105 In addition, some of the aims of truth commissions
may be outside the purview of courts, as in the case of giving an account of events that
transpired: "A court is not supposed to give an account about the circumstances of the
historic, economic, and political reasons for a crime, nor about the involvement of
different groups in the society or political influence from the outside which may have
encouraged the perpetrators . . . Giving an account, providing explanations, and offering
recommendations for a better future are exactly the purposes of a truth commission."
106 Means of redress attempted within the confines of the judicial system may also not
be viable precisely because of elements influencing the system itself. Officials allied
with the previous regime may also still retain power, and through various means hinder
proceedings undertaken within the judicial system.
This last point regarding situations wherein the former regime still possesses a
certain degree of influence over the system is especially salient in the light of state
capture. According to the World Bank, state capture may be treated as akin in essence
to regulatory capture as it is used in economics literature: state regulatory agencies are
considered "captured" when they "regulate businesses in accordance with the private
interests of the regulated as opposed to the public interest for which they were
established." State capture, then, encompasses the state's "capture" as evinced in the
"formation of laws, rules, and decrees by a wider range of state institutions, including
the executive, ministries and state agencies, legislature, and the judiciary." 107 State
capture alters the "rules of the game" in favor of those who have captured the state.
While state capture encompasses a variety of situations, its fundamental characteristic
is that it is channeled through illicit, informal, and non-transparent means of providing
private gains to public officials as incentives for these very officials to influence the
formation of laws and prejudice the rules to these captors' narrow advantage. 108 If
public officials are perceived to have been captured, the credibility of official processes
such as rendering decrees, forming laws, and shaping policies will suffer. It is
not difficult to see how state capture may render traditional means such as prosecution
completely ineffective against those who may have captured the state.
To that end, S. Sandile Ngcobo writes:
. . . many transitional governments do not represent a complete break with
the past. In some cases, members of the police and security forces that were
responsible for heinous acts under the old regime remain in influential
positions. Their numbers and their continued control of deadly weapons provide
them with the capability to undermine the peaceful transition. Their continued
influence may threaten the new democratic order, making prosecutions both
undesirable and impractical. Given these realities, the emerging democracy may
be compelled to look for alternative approaches. At this point, a truth
commission may become an attractive option. 109 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in the Philippine context we may not be speaking of a past regime's
continuing control of guns and armed men; but power, in any form, is power. In any
event, the appropriateness of naming the PTC as a "truth commission" is not a legal
argument for its invalidation, as Justice Brion himself conceded.
Unlawful Discrimination is not an Argument of the Powerful; the Phenomenon of
State Capture
Unlawful discrimination, as shown in American cases on equal protection claims
in criminal investigation and prosecution, is not inherently an argument of the powerful,
but that of the traditionally oppressed. This is because the politically powerful, as in the
past administration, still contain all the advantages that such past formal political power
begot. It is the height of incongruity that an administration that held power for nine
years, successfully evaded all congressional investigations, and effectively invoked all
legal defenses from investigation for all those nine years will be extended the same
immunity that the former presidential office gave it. The Philippines will be the
laughing stock of the world, incapable of correcting any error, unable to erase the
perception by many that it is a country where the law only serves the ends of the
powerful.
If evidence will later turn out, congruent to the theory of some quarters as
intimated by the Solicitor General during the oral arguments, that the reason that former
President Arroyo and her closest relatives and officials have not been prosecuted by the
present Ombudsman is because the Ombudsman is not independent but is acting out of
loyalty for her appointment to the position, then such evidence reinforces the immoral
political lesson that the misuse of the law and the power of appointment can be
purposively committed to create a strong shield of immunity from accountability. With
or without such evidence, however, and especially because the belief in the non-
independence of the Ombudsman is openly expressed by people, the only way for this
Court to not abet such a plan if such a plan indeed existed on the part of Arroyo
administration, is to allow the people to exact accountability upon those from whom
accountability is due. It must let the President fulfill his promise to the people, and if
the President believes that the best way for him is to start from fact-finding into the past
administration, then he must be allowed to do so without unconstitutional judicial
restraint.EaSCAH

The "Least Dangerous" Branch

The majority took pains to reiterate the honorable role of the Court in exercising
the constitutional and awesome power of judicial review, amidst the recent string of
rebukes against the initiatives of the legislature and elected executives
democratically elected representatives of the people.
In the seminal book "The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics," Alexander M. Bickel expounded on the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" 110 of judicial review exercised by an unelected court to declare null and void
an act of the legislature or an elected executive in this wise:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system. . . . when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act
or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what
actually happens. It is an altogether different kettle of fish, and it is the reason
the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic. 111
Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is met by the argument that the Court's
duty is to uphold the Constitution, that in determining the "boundaries of the great
departments of government" is not to assert superiority over them but merely to assert
its solemn and sacred obligation to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution. 112
If the Court is to avoid illegitimacy in its actions as suggested by Professor
Bickel, then it must ensure that its discharge of the duty to prevent abuse of the
President's executive power does not translate to striking down as invalid even a
legitimate exercise thereof, especially when the exercise is in keeping with the will of
the people. 113 Invalidating the PTC is an unconstitutional denial of the legitimate
exercise of executive power and a stinging reproach against the people's sovereign right.
Sadly, there is a wide fissure between the public's hunger for governance justice through
the successful delivery by President Aquino of his promise to get behind the stories on
corruption of the former administration, and the Court's confirmation of an alleged
violation of former President Arroyo's equal protection right. To emphasize, it is not
even former President Arroyo who is officially raising this matter before the Court.
 Rather than exercise judicial restraint, the majority has pushed the boundaries of
judicial activism bordering on what former Chief Justice Puno once described as an
imperial judiciary:
"[T]he Court should strive to work out a constitutional equilibrium where each
branch of government cannot dominate each other, an equilibrium where each
branch in the exercise of its distinct power should be left alone yet bereft of a
license to abuse. It is our hands that will cobble the components of this delicate
constitutional equilibrium. In the discharge of this duty, Justice Frankfurter
requires judges to exhibit that 'rare disinterestedness of mind and purpose, a
freedom from intellectual and social parochialism.' The call for that quality of
"rare disinterestedness" should counsel us to resist the temptation of unduly
inflating judicial power and deflating the executive and legislative powers. The
1987 Constitution expanded the parameters of judicial power, but that by
no means is a justification for the errant thought that the Constitution
created an imperial judiciary. An imperial judiciary composed of the
unelected, whose sole constituency is the blindfolded lady without the right to
vote, is counter-majoritarian, hence, inherently inimical to the central ideal of
democracy. We cannot pretend to be an imperial judiciary for in a government
whose cornerstone rests on the doctrine of separation of powers, we cannot be
the repository of all remedies." 114 (Emphasis supplied)
When forgotten, history does have a tendency to repeat itself. 115 Unless an
official and comprehensive narrative of findings of fact on large-scale corruption that
reportedly occurred during the previous administration is made public, the country may
find the same alleged patterns of corruption repeating themselves. Worse, public
officials subject of the investigation and who may actually be guilty with
continued possession or access to power may spin these events and cause a revision of
our history to make those allegations of wrongdoing appear nothing more than
unsubstantiated rumors whispered in secret and perpetuated by bitter opponents. The
PTC is a step towards national healing over a sordid past. The Court must allow the
nation to move forward and the people's faith in a just and accountable government to
be restored.ESIcaC

NACHURA, J., concurring and dissenting:

Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions:

1. G.R. No. 192935 is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Louis Biraogo
(Biraogo), in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailing Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 1, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" for violating
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; and
2. G.R. No. 193036 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua, Sr., in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives, similarly
bewailing the unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 1.
 First, the all too familiar facts leading to this cause celebre.
On May 10, 2010, Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III was elected President of the
Philippines. Oft repeated during his campaign for the presidency was the
uncompromising slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
Barely a month after his assumption to office, and intended as fulfillment of his
campaign promise, President Aquino, on July 30, 2010, issued Executive Order No. 1,
to wit:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people,
must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the
political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts
untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the people's trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;HAICcD

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people's
faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President's battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by the public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to
be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendation to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which
it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the
cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end
require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporation, to produce documents, books,
records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information and documents
from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission; EDaHAT

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator,
information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state
witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines
be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees
and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when
in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable
ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent
applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the
Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource person, professional and other
personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary
to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order
and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in
connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. The Commission shall be assisted by
such assistants and personnel as may be necessary to enable it to perform its
functions, and shall formulate and establish its organization structure and
staffing pattern composed of such administrative and technical personnel as it
may deem necessary to efficiently and effectively carry out its functions and
duties prescribed herein, subject to the approval of the Department of Budget
and Management. The officials of the Commission shall in particular include,
but not limited to, the following:
a. General Counsel
b. Deputy General Counsel
c. Special Counsel
d. Clerk of the Commission
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. The President, upon recommendation of
the Commission, shall detail such public officers or personnel from other
department or agencies which may be required by the Commission. The detailed
officers and personnel may be paid honoraria and/or allowances as may be
authorized by law, subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and
procedures.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. The Truth Commission shall have the
power to engage the services of experts as consultants or advisers as it may
deem necessary to accomplish its mission.
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. The proceedings of the Commission
shall be in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Commission. Hearings
or proceedings of the Commission shall be open to the public. However, the
Commission, motu propio, or upon the request of the person testifying, hold an
executive or closed-door hearing where matters of national security or public
safety are involved or when the personal safety of the witness warrants the
holding of such executive or closed-door hearing. The Commission shall
provide the rules for such hearing.CDEaAI

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resources Persons. Any person

called to testify before the Commission shall have the right to counsel at any
stage of the proceedings.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. The Commission
shall always seek to assure the safety of the persons called to testify and, if
necessary make arrangements to secure the assistance and cooperation of the
Philippine National Police and other appropriate government agencies.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear
upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. The
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of the Government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to
extend such assistance and cooperation as the Commission may need in the
exercise of its powers, execution of its functions and discharge of its duties and
responsibilities with the end in vies of accomplishing its mandate. Refusal to
extend such assistance or cooperation for no valid or justifiable reason or
adequate cause shall constitute a ground for disciplinary action against the
refusing official or personnel.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall
provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. The Commission may avail itself of such office space
which may be available in government buildings accessible to the public space
after coordination with the department or agencies in control of said building or,
if not available, lease such space as it may require from private owners.
 SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. The Commission shall also be entitled
to use such equipment or furniture from the Office of the President which are
available. In the absence thereof, it may request for the purchase of such
furniture or equipment by the Office of the President.
SECTION. 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish
its mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. On or before December 31,
2012, the Commission shall render a comprehensive final report which shall be
published upon the directive of the president. Prior thereto, also upon directive
of the President, the Commission may publish such special interim reports it
may issue from time to time.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. Upon
the completion of its work, the records of the Commission as well as its
equipment, furniture and other properties it may have acquired shall be returned
to the Office of the President.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared
unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the
other provisions hereof.
Section 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President: cEAaIS

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary
Without delay, petitioners Biraogo and Congressmen Lagman, Albano,
Datumanong, and Fua filed their respective petitions decrying the constitutionality of
the Truth Commission, primarily, for being a usurpation by the President of the
legislative power to create a public office.
In compliance with our Resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed its Consolidated Comment to the petitions. Motu proprio, the Court heard oral
arguments on September 7 and 28, 2010, where we required the parties, thereafter, to
file their respective memoranda.
 In his Memorandum, petitioner Biraogo, in the main, contends that E.O. No. 1
violates Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because it creates a public office
which only Congress is empowered to do. Additionally, "considering certain
admissions made by the OSG during the oral arguments," the petitioner questions the
alleged intrusion of E.O. No. 1 into the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
mandated in, and protected under, Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Holding parallel views on the invalidity of the E.O., petitioner Members of the
House of Representatives raise the following issues:
I.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010 VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS BY USURPING THE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS (1) TO
CREATE PUBLIC OFFICES, AGENCIES AND COMMISSIONS; AND (2)
TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS.
II.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT LIMITS THE
JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION TO
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE "PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION"
(THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO).
III.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 SUPPLANTS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS
PROVIDED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SUPPLEMENTED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 OR THE "OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989."
Expectedly, in its Memorandum, the OSG traverses the contention of petitioners
and upholds the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 on the strength of the following
arguments:
I.
PETITIONERS HAVE NOT AND WILL NOT SUFFER DIRECT
PERSONAL INJURY WITH THE ISSUANCE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
1. PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE LEGAL STANDING TO ASSAIL THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1.
II.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 DOES NOT ARROGATE THE POWERS OF
CONGRESS TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS FOR ITS OPERATIONS.
 III.
THE EXECUTIVE CREATED THE TRUTH COMMISSION PRIMARILY
AS A TOOL FOR NATION-BUILDING TO INDEPENDENTLY
DETERMINE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CORRUPTION AND TO MAKE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THEIR REDRESS AND FUTURE PREVENTION. ALTHOUGH ITS
INVESTIGATION MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SUBSEQUENT
PROSECUTORIAL EFFORTS, THE COMMISSION WILL NOT
ENCROACH BUT COMPLEMENT THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
AND THE DOJ IN INVESTIGATING CORRUPTION. IcHSCT

IV.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 IS VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. IT DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE TRUTH
COMMISSION HAS LEGITIMATE AND LAUDABLE PURPOSES.
In resolving these issues, the ponencia, penned by the learned Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza, concludes that:
1. Petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petitions; petitioner Biraogo
only because of the transcendental importance of the issues involved, while petitioner
Members of the House of Representatives have standing to question the validity of any
official action which allegedly infringes on their prerogatives as legislators;
2. The creation of the Truth Commission by E.O. No. 1 is not a valid exercise of
the President's power to reorganize under the Administrative Code of 1987;
3. However, the President's power to create the herein assailed Truth
Commission is justified under Section 17, 1 Article VII of the Constitution, albeit what
may be created is merely an ad hoc Commission;
4. The Truth Commission does not supplant the Ombudsman or the Department
of Justice (DOJ) nor erode their respective powers; and
5. Nonetheless, E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional because it transgresses the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
I agree with the ponencia that, given our liberal approach in David v. Arroyo 2
and subsequent cases, petitioners have locus standi to raise the question of
constitutionality of the Truth Commission's creation. I also concur with Justice
Mendoza's conclusion that the Truth Commission will not supplant the Office of the
Ombudsman or the DOJ, nor impermissibly encroach upon the latter's exercise of
constitutional and statutory powers.
I agree with the ponencia that the President of the Philippines can create an ad
hoc investigative body. But more than that, I believe that, necessarily implied from his
power of control over all executive departments and his constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws, as well as his statutory authority under the Administrative Code of
1987, the President may create a public office.
However, I find myself unable to concur with Justice Mendoza's considered
opinion that E.O. No. 1 breaches the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.
Let me elucidate.
The Truth Commission is a Public Office
The first of two core questions that confront the Court in this controversy is
whether the President of the Philippines can create a public office. A corollary, as a
consequence of statements made by the Solicitor General during the oral argument, is
whether the Truth Commission is a public office.
A public office is defined as the right, authority, or duty, created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some sovereign power of government
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. 3 Public offices are created either
by the Constitution, by valid statutory enactments, or by authority of law. A person who
holds a public office is a public officer.
Given the powers conferred upon it, as spelled out in E.O. No. 1, there can be
no doubt that the Truth Commission is a public office, and the Chairman and the
Commissioners appointed thereto, public officers.
As will be discussed hereunder, it is my respectful submission that the President
of the Philippines has ample legal authority to create a public office, in this case, the
Truth Commission. This authority flows from the President's constitutional power of
control in conjunction with his constitutional duty to ensure that laws be faithfully
executed, coupled with provisions of a valid statutory enactment, E.O. No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. DCcHAa

E.O. No. 1 and the Executive Power

Central to the resolution of these consolidated petitions is an understanding of
the "lines of demarcation" of the powers of government, i.e., the doctrine of separation
of powers. The landmark case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer 4
has mapped out this legal doctrine:
The Government of the Philippines Islands is an agency of the Congress of the
United States. The powers which the Congress, the principal, has seen fit to
entrust to the Philippine Government, the agent, are distributed among three
coordinate departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It is true
that the Organic Act contains no general distributing clause. But the principle is
clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our
Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by this
court.
 No department of the government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise
any of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again
it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibitions. But it is
fairly implied by the division of the government into three departments. The
effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly
been announced by this court that each of the branches of the Government is in
the main independent of the others. The doctrine is too firmly imbedded in
Philippine institutions to be debatable.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine
islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the
Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The
Governor-General must find his powers and duties in the fundamental law. An
Act of the Philippine Legislature must comply with the grant from Congress.
The jurisdiction of this court and other courts is derived from the constitutional
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands. In addition to specified functions, he is given "general
supervisions and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government
of the Philippine Islands as far is not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act." He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the
Philippine islands and of the United States operative within the Philippine
Islands." The authority of the Governor-General is made secure by the
important proviso "that all executive functions of Government must be directly
under the governor-General or within one of the executive departments under
the supervision and control of the governor-general." By the Administrative
Code, "the governor-general, as Chief executive of the islands, is charged with
the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or
through the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to
law."
These "lines of demarcation" have been consistently recognized and upheld in all
subsequent Organic Acts applied to the Philippines, including the present fundamental
law, the 1987 Constitution.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution 5 vests executive power in the
President of the Philippines. On the nature of the executive power, Justice Isagani A.
Cruz writes:
Executive power is briefly described as the power to enforce and administer the
laws, but it is actually more than this. In the exercise of this power, the
President of the Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority, and the
corresponding awesome responsibility, that makes him, indeed, the most
influential person in the land. 6
In National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, 7 this Court said that, as
the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power to
execute, administer and carry out laws into practical operation. Impressed upon us,
then, is the fact that executive power is the power of carrying out the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
Relevant to this disquisition are two specific powers that flow from this
"plenitude of authority." Both are found in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
8 They are commonly referred to as the power of control and the take care clause. EIDaAH

Section 17 is a self-executing provision. The President's power of control is

derived directly from the Constitution and not from any implementing legislation. 9 On
the other hand, the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the
President a dominant figure in the administration of the government. The law he is
supposed to enforce includes the Constitution itself, statutes, judicial decisions,
administrative rules and regulations and municipal ordinances, as well as the treaties
entered into by our government. 10 At almost every cusp of executive power is the
President's power of control and his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful
execution of the laws.
Demonstrating the mirabile dictu of presidential power and obligation, we
declared in Ople v. Torres: 11
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him
to discharge his duties effectively.
Mondano v. Silvosa, 12 defines the power of control as "the power of an officer
to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties, and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It includes
the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate, or to undo such act or to
assume a power directly vested in him by law. 13
In this regard, Araneta v. Gatmaitan 14 is instructive:
If under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
authority to regulate or ban fishing by trawl, then the President of the
Philippines may exercise the same power and authority because of the
following: (a) The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus or offices pursuant to Section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution; (b)
Executive Orders may be issued by the President under Section 63 of the
 Revised Administrative Code: governing the general performance of duties by
public employees or disposing of issues of general concern;" and (c) Under
Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code, "All executive functions of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the
Executive Department, subject to the supervision and control of the President of
the Philippines in matters of general policy."
Our ruling in City of Iligan v. Director of Lands 15 echoes the same principle in
this wise:
Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive control among others
in the lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of the
public domain subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the
President of the Philippines has control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, etc., the President of the Philippines has therefore the same
authority to dispose of the portions of the public domain as his subordinates, the
Director of Lands, and his alter-ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
From these cited decisions, it is abundantly clear that the overarching framework
in the President's power of control enables him to assume directly the powers of any
executive department, bureau or office. Otherwise stated, whatever powers conferred
by law upon subordinate officials within his control are powers also vested in the
President of the Philippines. In contemplation of law, he may directly exercise the
powers of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of National Defense, the
Commissioner of Customs, or of any subordinate official in the executive department.
Thus, he could, for example, take upon himself the investigatory functions of the
Department of Justice, and personally conduct an investigation. If he decides to do so,
he would be at liberty to delegate a portion of this investigatory function to a public
officer, or a panel of public officers, within his Office and under his control. There is
no principle of law that proscribes his doing so. In this context, the President may,
therefore, create an agency within his Office to exercise the functions, or part of the
functions, that he has assumed for himself. Even the ponencia admits that this can be
done. ASHICc

When this power of control is juxtaposed with the constitutional duty to ensure
that laws be faithfully executed, it is obvious that, for the effective exercise of the take
care clause, it may become necessary for the President to create an office, agency or
commission, and charge it with the authority and the power that he has chosen to assume
for himself. It will not simply be an exercise of the power of control, but also a measure
intended to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
To reiterate, the take care clause is the constitutional mandate for the President
to ensure that laws be faithfully executed. Dean Vicente G. Sinco observed that the
President's constitutional obligation of ensuring the faithful execution of the laws "is a
fundamental function of the executive head [involving] a two-fold task, [i.e.,] the
enforcement of laws by him and the enforcement of laws by other officers under his
direction." 16
As adverted to above, the laws that the President is mandated to execute include
the Constitution, statutes, judicial decisions, administrative rules and regulations and
municipal ordinances. Among the constitutional provisions that the President is obliged
to enforce are the following General Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution:
Section 4, Article II: The prime duty of government is to serve and protect the
people . . .
Section 5, Article II: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 9, Article II: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality
of life for all.
Section 13, Article II: The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 27, Article II: The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
Section 28, Article II: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Closer to home, as head of the biggest bureaucracy in the country, the President must
also see to the faithful execution of Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution, which
reads: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people; serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives."
These are constitutional provisions the enforcement of which is inextricably
linked to the spirit and objective of E.O. No. 1.
Although only Section 1, Article XI, is cited in the Whereas clauses of E.O. No.
1, the President is obliged to execute the other constitutional principles as well. Absent
any law that provides a specific manner in which these constitutional provisions are to
be enforced, or prohibits any particular mode of enforcement, the President could
invoke the doctrine of necessary implication, i.e., that the express grant of the power in
Section 17, Article VII, for the President to faithfully execute the laws, carries with it
the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and
efficient exercise of the expressly granted power. 17 Thus, if a Truth Commission is
deemed the necessary vehicle for the faithful execution of the constitutional mandate
on public accountability, then the power to create the same would necessarily be
implied, and reasonably derived, from the basic power granted in the Constitution.
Accordingly, the take care clause, in harmony with the President's power of control,
along with the pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, would justify
the issuance of E.O. No. 1 and the creation of the Truth Commission. ICTaEH

Further to this discussion, it is cogent to examine the administrative framework

of Executive Power, as outlined in the Administrative Code.
Quite logically, the power of control and the take care clause precede all others
in the enumeration of the Powers of the President. Section 1, Book III, Title I simply
restates the constitutional provision, to wit:
SECTION 1. Power of Control. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Next in the enumeration is the ordinance power of the President which defines
executive orders, thus:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional
or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
At the bottom of the list are the other powers (Chapter 7, Book III of the Code) of the
President, which include the residual power, viz.:
SEC. 19. Powers Under the Constitution. The President shall exercise such
other powers as are provided for in the Constitution.
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
president shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance
with law.
In addition, pursuant to the organizational structure of the Executive
Department, 18 one of the powers granted to the President is his continuing authority to
reorganize his Office: 19
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common staff Support
 System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office
of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of
the President from other departments or agencies.
Consistent therewith, the Administrative Code provides in Section 1, Chapter 1,
Book IV (The Executive Branch) that "[t]he Executive Branch shall have such
Departments as are necessary for the functional distribution of the work of the President
and for the performance of their functions." Hence, the primary articulated policy in the
Executive Branch is the organization and maintenance of the Departments to insure
their capacity to plan and implement programs in accordance with established national
policies. 20
With these Administrative Code provisions in mind, we note the triptych
function of the Truth Commission, namely: (1) gather facts; (2) investigate; and (3)
recommend, as set forth in Section 1 of E.O. No. 1:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall [1] primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, [2] investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by the public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter [3] recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor. (emphasis and numbering supplied) AcEIHC

It is plain to see that the Truth Commission's fact-finding and investigation into "reports
of large scale corruption by the previous administration" involve policy-making on
issues of fundamental concern to the President, primarily, corruption and its linkage to
the country's social and economic development.
On this point, I differ from the ponencia, as it reads the President's power to
reorganize in a different light, viz.:
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the Truth
Commission fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the
 President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent
by a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an
office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer is in the negative.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he creation of the Truth Commission is not justified by the president's
power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices.
The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
I am constrained to disagree because, contrary to the ponencia's holding, the President's
power to reorganize is not limited by the enumeration in Section 31 of the
Administrative Code.
As previously discussed, the President's power of control, in conjunction with
his constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws, allows his direct assumption
of the powers and functions of executive departments, bureaus and offices. 21 To repeat,
the overarching framework in the President's power of control enables him to assume
directly the functions of an executive department. On the macro level, the President
exercises his power of control by directly assuming all the functions of executive
departments, bureaus or offices. On the micro level, the President may directly assume
certain or specific, not all, functions of a Department. In the milieu under which the
Truth Commission is supposed to operate, pursuant to E.O. No. 1, only the investigatory
function of the DOJ for certain crimes is directly assumed by the President, then
delegated to the Truth Commission. After all, it is axiomatic that the grant of broad
powers includes the grant of a lesser power; in this case, to be exercised and
delegated at the President's option.
My conclusion that the transfer of functions of a Department to the Office of the
President falls within the President's power of reorganization is reinforced by
jurisprudence.
In Larin v. Executive Secretary, 22 the Court sustained the President's power to
reorganize under Section 20, Book III of E.O. 292, in relation to PD No. 1416, as
amended by PD No. 1772:
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
 "Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance
with law.
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the president under the
law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential decree
No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree no. 1416. These decrees expressly
grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus
and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The
validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly
provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet
not law amending or repealing said decrees. HSIaAT

Subsequently, Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 23 affirmed the holding in

Larin and explicitly recognized the President's authority to transfer functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President, consistent with his powers of
reorganization, to wit:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very sources of the power that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the president." For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office
of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization
"involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of government or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Then, and quite significantly, in Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,
24 this Court clarified the nature of the grant to the President of the power to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President, thus:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo d.
Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had
occasion to also delve on the President's power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the
power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. The Court has there
observed:
". . . . Under Section 31(1) of E.O. 292, the President can reorganize the Office
of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31(2)
and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa."
The provisions of Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative code of 1987), above-referred to, reads thusly:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office
of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of
the President from other departments or agencies. IaDTES

The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of
provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of
the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith.
Section 31(1) of Executive order No. 292 specifically refers to the President's
power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring
functions from unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive
offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to
transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency and vice versa, and the transfer of any agency under
the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice
versa. (Emphasis supplied)
 Notably, based on our ruling in Bagaoisan, even if we do not consider P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the abstraction of the Truth Commission, as
fortified by the President's power to reorganize found in paragraph 2, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code, is demonstrably permitted.
That the Truth Commission is a derivative of the reorganization of the Office of
the President should brook no dissent. The President is not precluded from transferring
and re-aligning the fact-finding functions of the different Departments regarding certain
and specific issues, because ultimately, the President's authority to reorganize is derived
from the power-and-duty nexus fleshed out in the two powers granted to him in Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution. 25
I earnestly believe that, even with this Court's expanded power of judicial
review, we still cannot refashion, and dictate on, the policy determination made by the
President concerning what function, of whichever Department, regarding specific
issues, he may choose to directly assume and take cognizance of. To do so would
exceed the boundaries of judicial authority and encroach on an executive prerogative.
It would violate the principle of separation of powers, the constitutional guarantee that
no branch of government should arrogate unto itself those functions and powers vested
by the Constitution in the other branches. 26
In fine, it is my submission that the Truth Commission is a public office validly
created by the President of the Philippines under authority of law, as an adjunct of the
Office of the President to which the President has validly delegated the fact-finding
and investigatory powers [of the Department of Justice] which he had chosen to
personally assume. Further, it is the product of the President's exercise of the power to
reorganize the Office of the President granted under the Administrative Code.
This conclusion inevitably brings to the threshold of our discussion the matter
of the "independence" of the Truth Commission, subject of an amusing exchange we
had with the Solicitor General during the oral argument, and to which the erudite Justice
Arturo D. Brion devoted several pages in his Separate Concurring Opinion. The word
"independent," as used in E.O. No. 1, cannot be understood to mean total separateness
or full autonomy from the Office of the President. Being a creation of the President of
the Philippines, it cannot be totally dissociated from its creator. By the nature of its
creation, the Truth Commission is intimately linked to the Office of the President, and
the Executive Order, as it were, is the umbilical cord that binds the Truth Commission
to the Office of the President.
The word "independent," used to describe the Commission, should be
interpreted as an expression of the intent of the President: that the Truth Commission
shall be accorded the fullest measure of freedom and objectivity in the pursuit of its
mandate, unbound and uninhibited in the performance of its duties by interference or
undue pressure coming from the President. Our exchange during the oral argument
ended on this note: that while the Truth Commission is, technically, subject to the power
of control of the President, the latter has manifested his intention, as indicated in the
Executive Order, not to exercise the power over the acts of the Commission.
E.O. No. 1 and the Equal Protection Clause
Enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Philippine Constitution is the assurance
that all persons shall enjoy the equal protection of the laws, expressed as follows: EDISTc

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws. (emphasis supplied)
The equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions
and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to
the object to be accomplished. 27 When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstances, they may be treated in law differently. On this score, this Court has
previously intoned that:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 28
Thus, when a statute or executive action is challenged on the ground that it violates the
equal protection clause, the standards of judicial review are clear and unequivocal:
It is an established principle in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. Classification, to be valid, must: (1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. 29
Further, in a more recent decision, we also declared:
In consonance thereto, we have held that "in our jurisdiction, the standard and
analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the
'rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing
of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution." . . . .
Under this test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection
challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. The
 classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Since every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, the burden of proof is on
the one attacking the constitutionality of the law to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the legislative classification is without rational basis. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that
a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular
persons and classes, and that there is no conceivable basis which might support
it. 30
The "rational basis" test is one of three "levels of scrutiny" analyses developed
by courts in reviewing challenges of unconstitutionality against statutes and executive
action. Carl Cheng, in his dissertation, "Important Right and the Private Attorney
General Doctrine," 31 enlightens us, thus:
[I]n the area of equal protection analysis, the judiciary has developed a 'level of
scrutiny' analysis for resolving the tensions inherent in judicial review. When
engaging in this analysis, a court subjects the legislative or executive action to
one of three levels of scrutiny, depending on the class of persons and the rights
affected by the action. The three levels are rational basis scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. If a particular legislative or executive act does not
survive the appropriate level of scrutiny, the act is held to be unconstitutional. If
it does survive, it is deemed constitutional. The three tensions discussed above
and, in turn, the three judicial responses to each, run parallel to these three levels
of scrutiny. In response to each tension, the court applies a specific level of
scrutiny.AEIHCS

He goes on to explain these "levels of scrutiny", as follows:

The first level of scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny, requires only that the purpose
of the legislative or executive act not be invidious or arbitrary, and that the act's
classification be reasonably related to the purpose. Rational basis scrutiny is
applied to legislative or executive acts that have the general nature of economic
or social welfare legislation. While purporting to set limits, rational basis scrutiny
in practice results in complete judicial deference to the legislature or executive.
Thus, a legislative or executive act which is subject to rational basis scrutiny is
for all practical purposes assured of being upheld as constitutional.
The second level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, requires that the purpose of
the legislative or executive act be an important governmental interest and that the
act's classification be significantly related to the purpose. Intermediate scrutiny
has been applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. The rationale
for this higher level of scrutiny is that gender and illegitimacy classifications
historically have resulted from invidious discrimination. However, compared to
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny's presumption of invidious discrimination is
more readily rebutted, since benign motives are more likely to underlie
classifications triggering intermediate scrutiny.
 The third level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the
legislative or executive act's purpose be a compelling state interest and that the
act's classification be narrowly tailored to the purpose. Strict scrutiny is triggered
in two situations: (1) where the act infringes on a fundamental right; and (2) where
the act's classification is based on race or national origin. While strict scrutiny
purports to be only a very close judicial examination of legislative or executive
acts, for all practical purposes, an act subject to strict scrutiny is assured of being
held unconstitutional. (Citations omitted.)
It is noteworthy that, in a host of cases, this Court has recognized the applicability of
the foregoing tests. Among them are City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 32 Central Bank
Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 33 and British American
Tobacco v. Camacho, et al., 34 in all of which the Court applied the minimum level of
scrutiny, or the rational basis test.
It is important to remember that when this Court resolves an equal protection
challenge against a legislative or executive act, "[w]e do not inquire whether the
[challenged act] is wise or desirable . . . . Misguided laws may nevertheless be
constitutional. Our task is merely to determine whether there is 'some rationality in the
nature of the class singled out.'" 35
Laws classify in order to achieve objectives, but the classification may not
perfectly achieve the objective. 36 Thus, in Michael M. v. Supreme Court of Sonoma
County, 37 the U.S. Supreme Court said that the relevant inquiry is not whether the
statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen [by the
legislature] is within constitutional limitations. The equal protection clause does not
require the legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of
enforcement. 38
It is equally significant to bear in mind that when a governmental act draws up
a classification, it actually creates two classes: one consists of the people in the
"statutory class" and the other consists precisely of those people necessary to achieve
the objective of the governmental action (the "objective class").39 ] It could happen that

The "statutory class" may include "more" than is necessary in the classification
to achieve the objective. If so, the law is "over-inclusive." The classification may
also include "less" than is necessary to achieve the objective. If so, the statute is
"under-inclusive." DEScaT

A curfew law, requiring all persons under age eighteen to be off the streets
between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m., presumably has as its objective the
prevention of street crime by minors; this is "over-inclusive" since the class of
criminal minors (the objective class) is completely included in the class of people
under age eighteen (the statutory class), but many people under age eighteen are
not part of the class of criminal minors.
 A city ordinance that bans streetcar vendors in a heavily visited "tourist quarter"
of the city in order to alleviate sidewalk and street congestion is "under-
inclusive". All streetcar vendors (the statutory class) contribute toward sidewalk
and street congestion, but the class of people causing sidewalk and street
congestion (the objective class) surely includes many others as well.
It is rare if not virtually impossible for a statutory class and an objective class to
coincide perfectly. 40
And, as the ponencia itself admits, "under-inclusion" or "over-inclusion, per se, is not
enough reason to invalidate a law for violation of the equal protection clause, precisely
because perfection in classification is not required. 41
Thus, in the determination of whether the classification is invidious or arbitrary,
its relation to the purpose must be examined. Under the rational basis test, the presence
of any plausible legitimate objective for the classification, where the classification
serves to accomplish that objective to any degree, no matter how tiny, would validate
the classification. To be invalidated on constitutional grounds, the test requires that the
classification must have one of the following traits: (1) it has absolutely no conceivable
legitimate purpose; or (2) it is so unconnected to any conceivable objective, that it is
absurd, utterly arbitrary, whimsical, or even perverse. 42
Given the foregoing discussion on this constitutional guarantee of equal
protection, we now confront the question: Does the mandate of Executive Order No. 1,
for the Truth Commission to investigate "graft and corruption during the previous
administration," violate the equal protection clause?
I answer in the negative.
First, because Executive Order No. 1 passes the rational basis test.
To repeat, the first level of scrutiny known as the rational basis test, requires
only that the purpose of the legislative or executive act not be invidious or arbitrary,
and that the act's classification be reasonably related to the purpose. The classification
must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. 43 In its recent equal
protection jurisprudence, the Court has focused primarily upon (1) the "rationality" of
the government's distinction, and (2) the "purpose" of that distinction.
To the point, we look at the definition of an executive order and the articulated
purpose of E.O. No. 1.
An executive order is an act of the President providing for rules in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers. 44 From this
definition, it can easily be gleaned that E.O. No. 1 is intended to implement a number
of constitutional provisions, among others, Article XI, Section 1. In fact, E.O. No. 1 is
prefaced with the principle that "public office is a public trust" and "public officers and
employees, who are servants of the people, must at all time be accountable to the latter,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
 What likewise comes to mind, albeit not articulated therein, is Article II, Section
27, of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption." In addition, the immediately following section provides: "[s]ubject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 45 There is also
Article XI, Section 1, which sets the standard of conduct of public officers, mandating
that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." There is, therefore, no gainsaying that
the enforcement of these provisions, i.e., the fight against corruption, is a compelling
state interest.
IcaHCS

Not only does the Constitution oblige the President to ensure that all laws be
faithfully executed, 46 but he has also taken an oath to preserve and defend the
Constitution. 47 In this regard, the President's current approach to restore public
accountability in government service may be said to involve a process, starting with the
creation of the Truth Commission.
It is also no secret that various commissions had been established by previous
Presidents, each specifically tasked to investigate certain reports and issues in
furtherance of state interest. Among the latest of such commissions is the Zearosa
Commission, empowered to investigate the existence of private armies, as well as the
Maguindanao Massacre. 48
Under E.O. No. 1, the President initially classified the investigation of reports of
graft and corruption during the previous administration because of his avowed purpose
to maintain the public trust that is characteristic of a public office. The first recital
(paragraph) of E.O. No. 1 does not depart therefrom. The succeeding recitals
(paragraphs) enumerate the causality of maintaining public office as a public trust with
corruption as "among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and
notorious violation of this mandate." Moreover, the President views corruption as "an
evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a
nation." Thus, the incumbent President has determined that the first phase of his fight
against graft and corruption is to have reports thereof during the previous administration
investigated. There is then a palpable relation between the supposed classification and
the articulated purpose of the challenged executive order.
The initial categorization of the issues and reports which are to be the subject of
the Truth Commission's investigation is the President's call. Pursuing a system of
priorities does not translate to suspect classification resulting in violation of the equal
protection guarantee. In his assignment of priorities to address various government
concerns, the President, as the Chief Executive, may initially limit the focus of his
inquiry and investigate issues and reports one at a time. As such, there is actually no
differential treatment that can be equated to an invalid classification.
 E.O. No. 1 cannot be subjected to the strict level of scrutiny simply because there
is a claimed inequality on its face or in the manner it is to be applied. On its face, there
is actually no class created. The ponencia harps on three provisions in the executive
order directing the conduct of an investigation into cases of large scale graft and
corruption "during the previous administration." On that basis, the ponencia concludes
that there is invidious discrimination, because the executive order is focused only on
the immediate past administration.
I disagree. While the phrase "previous administration" alludes to persons, which
may, indeed, be a class within the equal protection paradigm, it is important to note that
the entire phrase is "during the previous administration," which connotes a time frame
that limits the scope of the Commission's inquiry. The phrase does not really create a
separate class; it merely lays down the pertinent period of inquiry. The limited period
of inquiry, ostensibly (but only initially) excluding administrations prior to the
immediate past administration, is not, per se, an intentional and invidious
discrimination anathema to a valid classification. Even granting that the phrase creates
a class, E.O. No. 1 has not, as yet, been given any room for application, since barely a
few days from its issuance, it was subjected to a constitutional challenge. We cannot
allow the furor generated by this controversy over the creation of the Truth Commission
to be an excuse to apply the strict scrutiny test, there being no basis for a facial
challenge, nor for an "as-applied" challenge.
To reiterate for emphasis, the determination of the perceived instances of graft
and corruption that ought to claim priority of investigation is addressed to the executive,
as it involves a policy decision. This determination must not to be overthrown simply
because there are other instances of graft and corruption which the Truth Commission
should also investigate. 49 In any event, Section 17 of E.O. No. 1 responds to this
objection, when it provides: SICaDA

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the

judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
It may also be pointed out that E.O. No. 1 does not confer a right nor deprive
anyone of the exercise of his right. There is no right conferred nor liability imposed that
would constitute a burden on fundamental rights so as to justify the application of the
strict scrutiny test. A fact-finding investigation of certain acts of public officers
committed during a specific period hardly merits this Court's distraction from its regular
functions. If we must exercise the power of judicial review, then we should use the
minimum level of scrutiny, the rational basis test.
On more than one occasion, this Court denied equal protection challenges to
statutes without evidence of a clear and intentional discrimination. 50 The pervasive
theme in these rulings is a claim of discriminatory prosecution, not simply a claim of
discriminatory investigation. In People v. Piedra, 51 we explained:
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on
its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated
alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it
an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the
face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only
be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not
to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not
presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional
discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in
court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the
prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound
assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant
equal protection of the laws. There is also common sense practicality in sustaining
appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before
the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of
crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal
enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the
guilty at the expense of society . . . . Protection of the law will be extended to all
persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the
right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
Likewise, [i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some
persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the
result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would
become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown. (emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the abstraction of the President's power to directly prosecute crimes,
hand in hand with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, carries with it the lesser power
of investigation. To what extent, then, should this Court exercise its review powers over
an act of the President directing the conduct of a fact-finding investigation that has not
even commenced? These are clearly issues of wisdom and policy. Beyond what is
presented before this Court, on its face, the rest remains within the realm of speculation.
It bears stressing that by tradition, any administration's blueprint for governance
covers a wide range of priorities. Contrary to the ponencia's conclusion, such a roadmap
for governance obviously entails a "step by step" process in the President's system of
priorities.TAHIED

Viewed in this context, the fact that the "previous administration" was mentioned
thrice in E.O. No. 1, as pointed out by the ponencia, is not "purposeful and intentional
discrimination" which violates the equal protection clause. Such a circumstance does
not demonstrate a "history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." 52 It simply has to be taken in the light of the President's
discretion to determine his government's priorities.
It, therefore, remains unclear how the equal protection clause is violated merely
because the E.O. does not specify that reports of large scale graft and corruption in other
prior administrations should likewise be investigated. Notably, the investigation of
these reports will not automatically lead to prosecution, as E.O No. 1 only authorizes
the investigation of certain reports with an accompanying recommended action.
The following provisions of the executive order are too clear to brook objection:
1. 5th Whereas Clause
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people's faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
2. Section 1
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by the public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
3. Section 2
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
 Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendation to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Second, petitioners do not even attempt to overthrow the presumption of
constitutionality of executive acts. They simply hurl pastiche arguments hoping that at
least one will stick.
In any imputed violations of the equal protection clause, the standard of judicial
review is always prefaced by a presumption of constitutionality:
As this Court enters upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-
equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that statute is
presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government
a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. Hence, to doubt is to sustain. The
theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were
made by Congress, or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would
not be breached. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words,
before a statute or a portion thereof may be declared unconstitutional, it must be
shown that the statute or issuance violates the Constitution clearly, palpably and
plainly, and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the
Court. 53
Clearly, the acts of the President, in the exercise of his or her power, is preliminarily
presumed constitutional such that the party challenging the constitutionality thereof (the
executive act) on equal protection grounds bears the heavy burden of showing that the
official act is arbitrary and capricious. 54
Indeed, laws or executive orders, must comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution, and as challenged herein, the equal protection of the laws.
Nonetheless, only in clear cases of invalid classification violative of the equal
protection clause will this Court strike down such laws or official actions.
Third, petitioner Members of the House of Representatives are not proper parties
to challenge the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 on equal protection grounds. Petitioner
Members of the House of Representatives cannot take up the lance for the previous
administration. Under all three levels of scrutiny earlier discussed, they are precluded
from raising the equal protection of the laws challenge. The perceptive notation by my
esteemed colleague, Justice Carpio Morales, in her dissent, comes to life when she
observes that petitioner Members of the House of Representatives cannot vicariously
invoke violation of equal protection of the laws. Even assuming E.O. No. 1 does draw
a classification, much less an unreasonable one, petitioner Members of the House of
Representatives, as well as petitioner Biraogo, are not covered by the supposed arbitrary
and unreasonable classification. cdasia

If we applied both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the nakedness of petitioners'

arguments are revealed because they do not claim violation of any of their fundamental
rights, nor do they cry discrimination based on race, gender and illegitimacy.
Petitioners' equal protection clause challenge likewise dissolves when calibrated
against the purpose of E.O. No. 1 and its supposed classification of the administration
which the Truth Commission is tasked to investigate. Nowhere in the pleadings of
petitioners and their claim of violation of separation of powers and usurpation of
legislative power by the executive is it established how such violation or usurpation
translates to violation by E.O. No. 1 of the equal protection of the laws. Thus, no reason
exists for the majority to sustain the challenge of equal protection if none of the
petitioners belong to the class, claimed by the majority to be, discriminated against.
Finally, I wish to address the proposition contained in Justice Brion's
concurrence the creation of the Truth Commission has a reasonable objective, albeit
accomplished through unreasonable means. According to him, E.O. No. 1 is
objectionable on due process grounds as well. He propounds that the "truth-telling"
function of the Truth Commission violates due process because it primes the public to
accept the findings of the Commission as actual and gospel truth.
Considering all the foregoing discussion, I must, regrettably, disagree with the
suggestion. Peculiar to our nation is a verbose Constitution. Herein enshrined are
motherhood statements exhortations for public officers to follow. A quick perusal
of E.O. No. 1 bears out a similar intonation. Although the Solicitor General may have
made certain declarations, read as admissions by the other Members of this Court, these
cannot bind the Supreme Court in interpreting the constitutional grant of executive
power. The matter is simply a failure of articulation which cannot be used to diminish
the power of the executive. On the whole, the erroneous declarations of the Solicitor
General, preempting and interpreting the President's exercise of executive power
beyond the articulated purpose of E.O. No. 1, is not equivalent to the wrongful exercise
by the President of executive power.
Let me then close this dissertation with Marcos v. Manglapus 55 which
trailblazed and redefined the extent of judicial review on the powers of the co-equal
branches of government, in particular, executive power:
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to "determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the party of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." . .
.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But
 nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination
which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves
through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the
President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant.
Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought
before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on
the political question doctrine. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commission
cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial
review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies
before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action
is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its
nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear
that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling
in Lansang v. Garcia that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying
our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own
sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not
absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks
and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. ADHCSE

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to

check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether
he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
It is for the foregoing reasons that I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Jose Catral Mendoza and join
the separate opinions of my colleagues, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Justice Arturo
D. Brion and Justice Jose Portugal Perez. I vote to declare Executive Order No. 1 (EO
No. 1) unconstitutional, as a well-intentioned, but ill-devised, presidential issuance that
transgresses the boundaries of executive power and responsibility set by the
Constitution and our laws. CSHDTE

While I agree with the majority consensus that equal protection is an issue that
must be resolved in these consolidated petitions, the weightier legal obstacles to the
creation of the Philippine Truth Commission (the Commission) by executive order
deserve greater attention in this discussion.
If the Commission created by EO No. 1 were a living person, it would be
suffering from the most acute identity crisis. Is it an independent body? Is it a mere ad
hoc fact-finding body under the control of the President? And in either case, what legal
repercussion does its creation have on our constitutionally and statutorily developed
system for investigating and prosecuting graft and corruption cases?
Indeed, from the answers to these questions, it becomes evident that those who
have designed this constitutional anomaly designated as a "truth commission" have
painted themselves into a legal corner with no escape.
If the Commission is an office independent of the President, then its creation by
executive fiat is unconstitutional.
The concept of a "truth commission" in other jurisdictions has a primordial
characteristic independence. As a body created to investigate and report on the
"truth" of historical events (ordinarily involving State violations of human rights en
masse) in a country in transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one or
from a conflict situation to one of peace, the freedom of the members of the truth
commission from any form of influence is paramount to ensure the credibility of any
findings it may make.
Thus, "truth commissions" have been described in this wise: cIaCTS

Truth commissions are non-judicial, independent panels of inquiry typically

set up to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or
of international humanitarian law in a country's past. Commissions' members are
usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations,
the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions
and recommend institutional reforms. Most commissions focus on victims' needs
as a path toward reconciliation and reducing conflict about what occurred in the
past. 1 (Emphases supplied.)
Notably, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
likewise lists operational independence as one of the core principles in the
establishment of a truth commission:
 The legitimacy and public confidence that are essential for a successful truth
commission process depend on the commission's ability to carry out its work
without political interference. Once established, the commission should operate
free of direct influence or control by the Government, including in its
research and investigations, budgetary decision-making, and in its report
and recommendations. Where financial oversight is needed, operational
independence should be preserved. Political authorities should give clear signals
that the commission will be operating independently. 2 (Emphases supplied.) AcISTE

With due respect, I disagree with Justice Antonio T. Carpio's opinion that the
naming of the body created by EO No. 1 as the "Philippine Truth Commission" was a
mere attempt to be novel, to depart from the tired and repetitious scheme of naming a
commission after its appointed head/leader or of calling it a "fact-finding" body.
Obviously, the title given to the Commission is meant to convey the message that it is
independent of the Office of the President.
Those who dissent from the majority position gloss over the fact that EO No. 1
itself expressly states that the Commission's members shall "act as an independent
collegial body." 3 During oral arguments, the Solicitor General confirmed that what EO
No. 1 intended is for the Commission to be an independent body over which the
President has no power of control. 4 The Solicitor General further claimed that one of
the functions of the Commission is "truth-telling." Verily, the creation of the Philippine
Truth Commission and its naming as such were done as a deliberate reference to the
tradition of independent truth commissions as they are conceived in international law,
albeit adapted to a particular factual situation in this jurisdiction.
If this Philippine Truth Commission is an office independent of the President
and not subject to the latter's control and supervision, then the creation of the
Commission must be done by legislative action and not by executive order. It is
undisputed that under our constitutional framework only Congress has the power to
create public offices and grant to them such functions and powers as may be necessary
to fulfill their purpose. Even in the international sphere, the creation of the more familiar
truth commissions has been done by an act of legislature. 5
Neither can the creation of the Commission be justified as an exercise of the
delegated legislative authority of the President to reorganize his office and the executive
department under Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The acts of reorganization authorized under said provision are limited to the
following: cCTaSH

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
 (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one
unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies. (Emphases supplied.)
There is nothing in EO No. 1 that indicates that the Commission is a part of the
executive department or of the Office of the President Proper. Indeed, it is Justice
Carpio who suggests that the President may appoint the commissioners of the
Philippine Truth Commission as presidential special assistants or advisers in order that
the Commission be subsumed in the Office of the President Proper and to clearly place
EO No. 1 within the ambit of Section 31. To my mind, the fact that the commissioners
are proposed to be appointed as presidential advisers is an indication that the Philippine
Truth Commission was initially planned to be independent of the President and the
subsequent appointment of the commissioners as presidential advisers will be merely
curative of the patent defect in the creation of the Commission by an Executive Order,
as an independent body. HEIcDT

I agree with Justice Brion that what EO No. 1 sought to accomplish was not a
mere reorganization under the delegated legislative authority of the President. The
creation of the Philippine Truth Commission did not involve any restructuring of the
Office of the President Proper nor the transfer of any function or office from the Office
of the President to the various executive departments and vice-versa. The Commission
is an entirely new specie of public office which, as discussed in the concurring opinions,
is not exercising inherently executive powers or functions but infringing on functions
reserved by the Constitution and our laws to other offices.
If the Commission is under the control and supervision of the President, and not an
independent body, the danger that the Commission may be used for partisan political
ends is real and not imagined.
For the sake of argument, let us accept for the moment the propositions of our
dissenting colleagues that:
(a) The Commission is not a separate public office independent of the
President;
(b) The Commission is an executive body (or a part of the Office of the
President Proper) that may be created by the President through an
executive order under Section 31; and
 (c) The Commission is merely an ad hoc fact-finding body intended to
apprise the President of facts that will aid him in the fulfillment of
his duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
If the foregoing statements are true, then what EO No. 1 created is a body under
the control and supervision of the President. In fact, if the commissioners are to be
considered special advisers to the President, the Commission would be a body that
serves at the pleasure of the President. Proponents who support the creation of the
Commission in the manner provided for under EO No. 1 should drop all arguments
regarding the purported independence and objectivity of the proceedings before it. acCETD

Indeed, EO No. 1 itself is replete with provisions that indicate that the existence
and operations of the Commission will be dependent on the Office of the President. Its
budget shall be provided by the Office of the President 6 and therefore it has no fiscal
autonomy. The reports of the Commission shall be published upon the directive of the
President. 7 Further, if we follow the legal premises of our dissenting colleagues to their
logical conclusion, then the Commission as a body created by executive order may
likewise be abolished (if it is part of the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System of the Office of the President Proper) or restructured by executive order. EO
No. 1 may be amended, modified, and repealed all by executive order. More
importantly, if the Commission is subject to the power of control of the President, he
may reverse, revise or modify the actions of the Commission or even substitute his own
decision for that of the Commission.
Whether by name or by nature, the Philippine Truth Commission cannot be
deemed politically "neutral" so as to assure a completely impartial conduct of its
purported fact-finding mandate. I further concur with Chief Justice Corona that
attempts to "sugar coat" the Philippine Truth Commission's functions as "harmless"
deserve no credence.
The purported functions to be served by the Commission, as the concurring opinions
vividly illustrate, will subvert the functions of the Ombudsman and the constitutional
and statutory developed criminal justice system.
First, it is apparent on the face of EO No. 1 that in general "it is primarily tasked
to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption [of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people], involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration." 8 I agree with the Chief Justice's proposition that there is no
law authorizing the President to create a body to investigate persons outside the
executive department in relation to graft and corruption cases, concurrently with the
Office of the Ombudsman which has such express legal authority. Indeed, even in
jurisprudence, the instances when the power of the President to investigate and create
ad hoc committees for that purpose were upheld have been usually related to his power
of control and discipline over his subordinates or his power of supervision over local
government units. HSaCcE

In Ganzon v. Kayanan, 9 a case involving the investigation of a mayor, we held

that the power of the President to remove any official in the government service under
the Revised Administrative Code and his constitutional power of supervision over local
governments were the bases for the power of the President to order an investigation of
any action or the conduct of any person in the government service, and to designate the
official committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted.
In Larin v. Executive Secretary, 10 where the petitioner subject of the
investigation was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, we
held that:
Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the
"power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" conferred to the President
by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that
Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the
administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power
of removal of the President. . . . . 11 (Emphases supplied.)
In a similar vein, it was ruled in Joson v. Executive Secretary, 12 that:
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective
local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions." cITAaD

The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to

see that the subordinate officers perform their duties". If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's
power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that
laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. 13
(Emphases ours.)
Still on the same point, Department of Health v. Camposano 14 likewise
discussed that:
 The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation
is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices
and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. 15 (Emphases supplied.)DAaEIc

Second, the functions of the Commission, although ostensibly only

recommendatory, are basically prosecutorial in nature and not confined to objective fact
finding. EO No. 1 empowers the Commission to, among others:
SECTION 2. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the
cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end
require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books,
records and other papers;
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws. (Emphasis ours.)
I agree with Justice Perez that the aforementioned functions run counter to the
very purpose for the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, to constitutionalize a
politically independent office responsible for public accountability as a response to the
negative experience with presidential commissions. His discussion on the constitutional
history of the Office of the Ombudsman and the jurisprudential bases for its primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (i.e., specific offenses,
including graft and corruption, committed by public officials as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is apropos indeed.
I likewise find compelling Justice Brion's presentation regarding the
Commission's "truth-telling" function's potential implications on due process rights and
the right to a fair trial and the likelihood of duplication of, or interference with, the
investigatory or adjudicatory functions of the Ombudsman and the courts. I need not
repeat Justice Brion's comprehensive and lucid discussion here. However, I do find it
fitting to echo here former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, Sr.'s dissenting opinion in
Evangelista v. Jarencio, 16 the oft-cited authority for the President's power to
investigate, where he stated that: cESDCa

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and
resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and
corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the
individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-
incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. . . . . 17 (Emphases ours.)
The constitutional mandate for public accountability and the present
administration's noble purpose to curb graft and corruption simply cannot justify
trivializing individual rights equally protected under the Constitution. This Court
cannot place its stamp of approval on executive action that is constitutionally abhorrent
even if for a laudable objective, and even if done by a President who has the support of
popular opinion on his side. For the decisions of the Court to have value as precedent,
we cannot decide cases on the basis of personalities nor on something as fickle and
fleeting as public sentiment. It is worth repeating that our duty as a Court is to uphold
the rule of law and not the rule of men.
Concluding Statement
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Undeniably, from the foregoing, judicial review is not only a power but a constitutional
duty of the courts. The framers of our Constitution found an imperative need to provide
for an expanded scope of review in favor of the "non-political" courts as a vital check
against possible abuses by the political branches of government. For this reason, I
cannot subscribe to Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno's view that the Court's exercise of its
review power in this instance is tantamount to supplanting the will of the electorate. A
philosophical view that the exercise of such power by the Judiciary may from a certain
perspective be "undemocratic" is not legal authority for this Court to abdicate its role
and duty under the Constitution. It also ignores the fact that it is the people by the
ratification of the Constitution who has given this power and duty of review to the
Judiciary.
The insinuations that the members of the majority are impelled by improper
motives, being countermajoritarian and allowing graft and corruption to proliferate with
impunity are utterly baseless. Not only are these sort of ad hominem attacks and populist
appeals to emotion fallacious, they are essentially non-legal arguments that have no
place in a debate regarding constitutionality. At the end of the day, Justices of this Court
must vote according to their conscience and their honest belief of what the law is in a
particular case. That is what gives us courage to stand by our actions even in the face
of the harshest criticism. Those who read our opinions, if they are truly discerning, will
be able to determine if we voted on points of law and if any one of us was merely
pandering to the appointing power.
Needless to say, this Court will fully support the present administration's
initiatives on transparency and accountability if implemented within the bounds of the
Constitution and the laws that the President professes he wishes to faithfully execute.
Unfortunately, in this instance, EO No. 1 fails this ultimate legal litmus test. HDICSa

PERALTA, J., concurring:

On July 30, 2010, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission), which is "primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption . . . involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman."
Petitioners filed their respective petitions questioning the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 1. In G.R. No. 193036, petitioners, as members of the House of
Representatives, have legal standing to impugn the validity of E.O. No. 1, since they
claim that E.O. No. 1 infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. 1 In G.R. No.
192935, petitioner, who filed his petition as a taxpayer, may also be accorded standing
to sue, considering that the issues raised are of transcendental importance to the public.
2 The people await the outcome of the President's effort to implement his pledge to find
out the truth and provide closure to the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration. The constitutional issues raised by petitioners seek the
determination of whether or not the creation of the Truth Commission is a valid exercise
by the President of his executive power.
Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional, because only Congress
may create a public office, pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution. 3
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that the
issuance of E.O. No. 1 is mainly supported by Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, 4 Section 31, Title III, Book III of E.O. No. 292, and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
Quoted in E.O. No. 1 as the legal basis for its creation is Section 31, Title III,
Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides:
 SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; aCHDAE

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments and agencies.
In Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, 5 the Court held that the first
sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. Section 31 (1) of
Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the President's power to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another. 6 Section
31 (2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper
allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the
Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa. 7
Thus, the reorganization in Section 31 involves abolishing, consolidating or
merging units in the Office of the President Proper or transferring functions from one
unit to another in the Office of the President Proper, and the transfer of any function or
any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and
vice-versa. Nowhere is it stated that the President can create an office like the Truth
Commission, which does not result from any reorganization under Section 31. Hence,
the said section cannot be used to justify the creation of the Truth Commission.
Moreover, in its Comment, the OSG stated that one of the bases for the creation
of E.O. No. 1 is P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, which amendment was
enacted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 15, 1981.
P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is inapplicable as basis in the creation of the Truth
Commission, since it was intended by President Ferdinand E. Marcos to promote
efficiency and flexibility in the organization of the national government to strengthen
the government bureaucracy when the government was in the transition from
presidential to the parliamentary form of government. This is evident in the preamble
of P.D. No. 1416, 8 which states:
WHEREAS, the transition toward the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government; . . . 9
The OSG admitted during the oral argument 10 that the 1987 Constitution ended
the power of the President to reorganize the national government. It is noted that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos exercised legislative power concurrently with the
interim Batasang Pambansa (1976) and, subsequently, with the regular Batasang
Pambansa (1984). 11 After the February 1986 revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino
assumed revolutionary legislative power, and issued Proclamation No. 3, the
Provisional Freedom Constitution. Section 3, Article I of Proclamation No. 3 abolished
the Batasang Pambansa, while Section 1, Article II of the said Proclamation vested
legislative power in the President until a legislature would be elected and convened
under a new Constitution. Thus, Section 6, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he incumbent President (President Corazon Aquino)
shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened." 12
In view of the foregoing, the decision in Larin v. Executive Secretary 13 insofar
as P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, is cited as a law granting the President
the power to reorganize, needs to be re-examined. DCATHS

Assuming that P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is still a valid law, it cannot be the
basis of the creation of the Truth Commission, because all the cases, from Larin v.
Executive Secretary; 14 Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora; 15 Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot; 16 Bagaoisan v.
National Tobacco Administration; 17 Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. DENR Region 12 Employees; 18 Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals; 19 Malaria Employees and Workers Association of
the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) v. Romulo 20 to Banda v. Ermita, 21 which cited P.D.
No. 1416, as amended, as a basis to reorganize, involved reorganization or streamlining
of an agency of the Executive Department. However, the Truth Commission was not
created for streamlining purposes.
The purpose of reorganization under P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772, is to "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it
to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development, and to improve upon the services of the government in the transaction of
the public business."
The creation of the Truth Commission, however, is not to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government. The Truth Commission is primarily tasked
to conduct fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving
third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, which separate investigative body, as stated in the preamble, "will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all." It is, in part, the
implementation of the pledge of President Benigno Aquino, Jr. during the last election
that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds.
In its Memorandum, the OSG justifies the power of the President to create the
Truth Commission based on his authority to create ad hoc fact-finding committees or
offices within the Office of the President, which authority is described as an adjunct of
his plenary executive power under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17,
both of Article VII of the Constitution. 22 It cited the case of Department of Health v.
Camposano, 23 which held:
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
To clarify, the power of control is "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter;" 24 hence, it cannot be
the basis of creating the Truth Commission.
The ponencia justifies the creation of the Truth Commission based on the
President's duty to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. 25
According to the ponencia, to ascertain if laws are faithfully executed, the
President has the power to create ad hoc investigating committees, which power has
been upheld in Department of Health v. Camposano. 26 In the said case, some
concerned employees of the Department of Health (DOH)-National Capital Region
(NCR) filed a complaint before the DOH Resident against certain officers of the DOH
arising from alleged anomalous purchase of medicines. The Resident Ombudsman
submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of
a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against the
respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of Republic Act No.
3019. Thereafter, the Executive Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the
DOH-NCR employees. The said Administrative Order was indorsed to the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), which found the respondents
guilty as charged and recommended their dismissal from the government. However, the
Court overturned the dismissal of respondents by the Secretary of DOH, because
respondents were denied due process, but it declared valid the creation of the ad hoc
committee, thus: ACETID

. . . The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated
October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.
The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC:
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, Commissioner Dario C. Rama and
Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to
"follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law
(PD 807), as amended." It was tasked to "forward to the Disciplining Authority
the entire records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations, as
well as the draft decision for the approval of the President."
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. 27
The ponencia stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. The ponencia stated that this was
also the objective of investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE,
PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission. Hence, the ponencia held that the President's power to create investigative
bodies cannot be denied.
Albeit the President has the power to create ad hoc committees to investigate or
inquire into matters for the guidance of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed, I am of the view that the Truth Commission was not created in the nature of
the aforementioned ad hoc investigating/fact-finding bodies. The Truth Commission
was created more in the nature of a public office.
Based on the creation of ad hoc investigating bodies in Department of Health
v. Camposano and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, 28 the members of an ad hoc investigative body are heads and representatives
of existing government offices, depending on the nature of the subject matter of the
investigation. The ad hoc investigating body's functions are primarily fact-
finding/investigative and recommendatory in nature. 29
 In this case, the members of the Truth Commission are not officials from existing
government offices. Moreover, the Truth Commission has been granted powers of an
independent office as follows:
1. Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and
other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its
mandate; 30
2. Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems
necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of
this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation
of evidence. 31
3. The Truth Commission shall have the power to engage the services of
experts as consultants or advisers as it may deem necessary to
accomplish its mission. 32
In addition, the Truth Commission has coercive powers such as the power to
subpoena witnesses. 33 Any government official or personnel who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing
before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary
action. 34 Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with
law. 35 Apparently, the grant of such powers to the Truth Commission is no longer part
of the executive power of the President, as it is part of law-making, which legislative
power is vested in Congress. 36 There are only two instances in the Constitution wherein
Congress may delegate its law-making authority to the President: 37 SHADEC

Article VI, Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Article VI, Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the government. 38
 Although the President may create investigating bodies to help him in his duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, he cannot be allowed to encroach on or
usurp the law-making power of the Legislature in the creation of such investigative
bodies.
Moreover, the Truth Commission's function is questioned on the ground that it
duplicates, if not supersedes, the function of the Office of the Ombudsman. The OSG
avers that the Ombudsman's power to investigate is not exclusive, but is shared with
other similarly authorized agencies, citing Ombudsman v. Galicia. 39
Based on Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, the powers and functions of the Truth
Commission do not supplant the powers and functions of the Ombudsman. 40
Nevertheless, what is the use of the Truth Commission if its power is merely
recommendatory? Any finding of graft and corruption by the Truth Commission is still
subject to evaluation by the Office of the Ombudsman, as it is only the Office of the
Ombudsman that is empowered to conduct preliminary investigation, determine the
existence of probable cause and prosecute the case. Hence, the creation of the Truth
Commission will merely be a waste of money, since it duplicates the function of the
Office of the Ombudsman to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption.
Further, E.O. No. 1 violates that equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution. The guarantee of equal protection of the laws means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances. 41
In this case, investigation by the Truth Commission covers only third level
public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. 42
The OSG, however, counters in its Memorandum that the equal protection clause
of the Constitution is not violated, because although E.O. No. 1 names the previous
administration as the initial subject of the investigation of cases of graft and corruption,
it is not confined to the said administration, since E.O. No. 1 clearly speaks of the
President's power to expand its coverage to prior administrations as follows:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order. 43
As provided above, the mandate of the Truth Commission may be expanded to
include the investigation of cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations,
but it is subject to the "judgment" or discretion of the President and it may be so
extended by way of a supplemental Executive Order. In the absence of the exercise of
judgment by the President that the Truth Commission shall also conduct investigation
of reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations, and in the
absence of the issuance of a supplemental executive order to that effect, E.O. No. 1
covers only third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This is admitted by the OSG in its Memorandum
44 as it explains that "to include the past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the Commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." The OSG's position
shows more consideration for the burden that the investigation may cause to the
Commission, while losing sight of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The OSG further states that even if the Truth Commission would solely concern
itself with graft and corruption, if there be any, of the previous administration, there is
still no violation of the equal protection clause. It submits that the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane
to the evils which the E.O. seeks to correct. The distinctions cited are:
1) E.O No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded
public confidence in public institutions.
2) The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-
finding investigations is warranted by the reality that the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate consequences of
the policies of the previous administration, unlike those of the
administrations long gone.
3) The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal
activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies
illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that
anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precedes the current
administration.
4) Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to
investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national
life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent administration.
Indeed, the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows classification. 45 If
the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the
people without violating the equal protection clause. 46 To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements: (1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
 be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class. 47 CDTSEI

Peralta v. Commission on Elections 48 held:

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What [it]
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those
belonging to the same class. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do
not. There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary
classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of
which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made in
accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which
is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon
material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those
excluded. There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore,
such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And,
finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who
stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike.
The distinctions cited by the OSG are not substantial to separate the previous
administration as a distinct class from prior administrations as subject matter for
investigation for the purpose of ending graft and corruption. As stated by the ponencia,
the reports of widespread corruption in the previous administration cannot be taken as
a substantial distinction, since similar reports have been made in earlier administrations.
Moreover, a valid classification must rest upon material differences between the
persons, or activities or thing included and excluded. 49 Reasonable grounds must exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.
50 There is no substantial distinction cited between public officers who may be involved
in reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration and public
officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during prior
administrations in relation to the purpose of ending graft and corruption. To limit the
investigation to public officers of the previous administration is violative of the equal
protection clause.
I vote, therefore, to GRANT the petitions as Executive Order No. 1 is
unconstitutional since it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and
encroaches on the law-making power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution.

ABAD, J., dissenting:

Brief Background
 As the opinion written for the majority by Justice Jose Catral Mendoza says,
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III (President P-Noy to distinguish him from former
President Corazon C. Aquino) campaigned on a platform of "kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap." On being elected President, he issued Executive Order 1, 1 creating
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that he tasked with the investigation of
reported corruption during the previous administration. The Truth Commission is to
submit its findings and recommendations to the President, the Congress, and the
Ombudsman.
Petitioners Louis Biraogo, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr.,
Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong, and Rep. Orlando B. Fua, Sr. have come to this Court to
challenge the Constitutionality of Executive Order 1.
The Issues Presented
The parties present four issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Executive Order 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order 1 usurps the authority of Congress to
create and appropriate funds for public offices, agencies, and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ; and
4. Whether or not Executive Order 1 violates the equal protection clause
in that it singles out the previous administration for investigation.
Discussion
The majority holds that petitioners have standing before the Court; that President
P-Noy has the power to create the Truth Commission; that he has not usurped the
powers of Congress to create public offices and appropriate funds for them; and, finally,
that the Truth Commission can conduct investigation without supplanting the powers
of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice since the Commission has not been
vested with quasi-judicial powers. I fully conform to these rulings. cDSAEI

The majority holds, however, that Executive Order 1 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. It is here that I register my dissent.
The 1987 Constitution provides in section 1 of Article III (The Bill of Rights) as
follows:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
 The idea behind the "equal protection clause" is that public authorities should
treat all persons or things equally in terms of rights granted to and responsibilities
imposed on them. As an element of due process, the equal protection clause bars
arbitrary discrimination in favor of or against a class whether in what the law provides
and how it is enforced.
Take the comic example of a law that requires married women to wear their
wedding rings at all times to warn other men not to entice women to violate their
marriage vows. Such law would be unfair and discriminatory since married men, who
are not covered by it, are exposed to similar enticements from women other than their
wives.
But it would be just as unfair and discriminatory if people who hardly share
anything in common are grouped together and treated similarly. 2 The equal protection
clause is not violated by a law that applies only to persons falling within a specified
class, if such law applies equally to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within it and those who
do not. 3
For example, restaurant cooks and waiters cannot complain of discrimination
against an ordinance that requires them but not other workers to undergo periodic
medical check-ups. Such check-ups are important for food-handlers in the interest of
public health but not for ordinary office clerks. Also, a law that grants a 60-day paid
leave to pregnant workers but not to other workers, male or female, is not discriminatory
since female workers who just had their babies need more time to care for the latter and
make adjustments for going back to work.
Here, the issue I address is whether or not President P-Noy's decision to focus
the Truth Commission's investigation solely on the reported corruption during the
previous administration, implicitly excluding the corruption during the administrations
before it, violates the equal protection clause. Since absolute equality in treating matters
is not required, the ultimate issue in this case is whether or not the President has
reasonable grounds for making a distinction between corruptions committed in the
recent past and those committed in the remote past. As a rule, his grounds for making
a distinction would be deemed reasonable if they are germane or relevant to the purpose
for which he created the Truth Commission. 4
And what is the President's purpose in creating the Truth Commission? This can
be inferred from section 1 of Executive Order 1 which states that the Commission's
primary function is to IEHTaA

. . . seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officials
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration, and thereafter
 recommend the appropriate action to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
Evidently, the objective the President sets for the Truth Commission is the
uncovering of the "truth" regarding reported corruption in the previous administration
"to ensure that the full measure of justice [evidently upon those responsible for it] is
served without fear or favor." Ultimately, the purpose of the creation of the Truth
Commission is to ensure that the corrupt officials of the previous administration are
exposed and brought to justice.
The majority holds that picking on the "previous administration" and not the
others before it makes the Commission's investigation an "adventure in partisan
hostility." To be fair, said the majority, the search for truth must include corrupt acts
not only during the previous administration but also during the administrations before
it where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies" has been reported.
The majority points out that corruption in the previous administration and
corruption in the administrations before it have no substantial difference. And what
difference they have, the majority adds, is not relevant to the purpose of Executive
Order 1, which is to uncover corrupt acts and recommend their punishment. Superficial
difference like the difference in time in this case does not make for a valid classification.
But time differentiation should not be so easily dismissed as superficial. The
world in which people live has two great dimensions: the dimension of space and the
dimension of time. Nobody can say that the difference in time between two acts or
events makes for a superficial difference. Such difference is the substance of human
existence. As the Bible says:
There is an appointed time for everything,
and a time for every affair under the heavens.
A time to be born, and a time to die;
a time to plant, and a time to uproot the plant.
A time to kill, and a time to heal;
a time to tear down, and a time to build.
A time to weep, and a time to laugh;
a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
A time to scatter stones, and a time to gather them;
a time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.
A time to seek, and a time to lose;
a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
A time to rend, and a time to sew;
 a time to be silent and a time to speak.
A time to love, and a time to hate;
a time of war, and a time of peace.
(Ecclesiastes 3:1-8, New American Bible)
Recognizing the irreversibility of time is indispensable to every sound decision
that people make in their lives everyday, like not combing the hair that is no longer
there. In time, parents let their married children leave to make their own homes. Also,
when a loved one passes away, he who is left must know that he cannot bring back the
time that is gone. He is wise to move on with his life after some period of mourning.
To deny the truth that the difference in time makes for substantial difference in human
lives is to deny the idea of transition from growth to decay, from life to death, and from
relevant to irrelevant.EcATDH

Here the past presidential administrations the country has gone through in
modern history cover a period of 75 years, going back from when President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo ended her term in 2010 to the time President Manuel L. Quezon
began his term in 1935. The period could even go back 111 years if the administration
of President Emilio Aguinaldo from 1989 to 1901 is included. But, so as not to
complicate matters, the latter's administration might just as well be excluded from this
discussion.
It should be remembered that the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials does not prescribe. 5 So, if the majority's advice
were to be literally adopted, the Truth Commission's investigation to be fair to all should
go back 75 years to include the administrations of former Presidents Arroyo, Estrada,
Ramos, Aquino, Marcos, Macapagal, Garcia, Magsaysay, Quirino, Roxas, Osmena,
Laurel, and Quezon.
As it happens, President P-Noy limited the Truth Commission's investigation to
the 9 years of the previous administration. He did not include the 66 years of the 12
other administrations before it. The question, as already stated, is whether the
distinction between the recent past and the remote past makes for a substantial
difference that is relevant to the purpose of Executive Order 1.
That the distinction makes for a substantial difference is the first point in this
dissent.
1. The Right to Equal Protection
Feasibility of success. Time erodes the evidence of the past. The likelihood of
finding evidence needed for conviction diminishes with the march of time. Witnesses,
like everyone else, have short memories. And they become scarce, working overseas,
migrating, changing addresses, or just passing away. Official or private documents
needed as evidence are easily overwhelmed by the demand to file and keep even more
documents generated by new activities and transactions. Thus, old documents are stored
away in basements, garages, or corridors, and eventually lost track of, misplaced, or
simply destroyed, whether intentionally or not. In a government that is notorious for
throwing away or mishandling old records, searching for a piece of document after ten
years would be uncertain, tedious, long, and costly.
When the government of President Marcos fell in 1986, the new government
acted swiftly to sequester suspected wealth, impound documents believed to constitute
evidence of wrong-doing, and interview witnesses who could help prosecute the
Marcoses and their cronies. One would think that these actions will ensure successful
prosecution of those who committed graft and corruption in that era. Yet, after just a
decade, the prosecution has been mostly unable to find the right documents or call the
right witnesses. Today, after 24 years, the full force of government has failed to produce
even one conviction. aAcDSC

Clearly, it would be a waste of effort and time to scour all of 66 years of the
administrations before the last, looking for evidence that would produce conviction.
Time has blurred the chance of success. Limiting the Truth Commission's investigation
to the 9 years of the previous administration gives it the best chance of yielding the
required proof needed for successful action against the offenders.
Historically, there have been no known or outstanding inquiries done by the
Executive Department into corrupt acts of the past that went beyond the term of the
immediately preceding administration. It makes sense for President P-Noy to limit the
investigation to what is practical and attainable, namely, the 9 years of the previous
administration. He strikes at what is here and near. Perchance, he can get a conviction.
Investigating corruption in the past 75 years rather than in the nearest 9 years, under a
nebulous claim of evenhandedness, is the key to failing altogether. It has been held that
if the law presumably hits the evil where it is felt, it is not to be overthrown because
there are other instances to which it might have been applied. 6
Neutralization of Presidential bias. The Court can take judicial notice of the
fact that President P-noy openly attacked the previous administration for its alleged
corruption in the course of his election campaign. In a sense, he has developed a bias
against it. Consequently, his creation of the Truth Commission, consisting of a former
Chief Justice, two former Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and two law
professors serves to neutralize such bias and ensure fairness. The President did not have
to include the 66 years of earlier administrations for investigation since he did not
specifically target them in his election campaign.
At any rate, it does not mean that when the President created the Truth
Commission, he shut the door to the investigation of corruption committed during the
66 years before the previous one. All existing government agencies that are charged
with unearthing crimes committed by public officials are not precluded from following
up leads and uncovering corruptions committed during the earlier years. Those corrupt
officials of the remote past have not gained immunity by reason of Executive Order 1.
 Matching task to size. The Truth Commission is a collegial body of just five
members with no budget or permanent staffs of its own. It simply would not have the
time and resources for examining hundreds if not thousands of anomalous government
contracts that may have been entered into in the past 75 years up to the time of President
Quezon. You cannot order five men to pull a train that a thousand men cannot move.
Good housekeeping. Directing the investigation of reported corrupt acts
committed during the previous administration is, as the Solicitor General pointed out,
consistent with good housekeeping. For example, a new treasurer would be prudent to
ensure that the former treasurer he succeeds has balanced his accounts and submitted
himself to a closing audit even after the new treasurer has taken over. This prevents the
latter having to unfairly assume the liabilities of his predecessor for shortages in the
cash box. Of course, the new treasurer is not required to look farther into the accounts
of the earlier treasurers.
aHSAIT

In like manner, it is reasonable for President P-Noy to cause the investigation of

the anomalies reportedly committed during the previous administration to which he
succeeded. He has to locate government funds that have not been accounted for. He has
to stanch the bleeding that the government could be suffering even now by reason of
anomalous contracts that are still on-going. Such is a part of good housekeeping. It does
not violate the equal protection clause by its non-inclusion of the earlier administrations
in its review. The latter's dealings is remotely relevant to good housekeeping that is
intended to manage a smooth transition from one administration to the next.
2. The President's Judgment
as against the Court's
That is the first point. The second point is that the Court needs to stand within
the limits of its power to review the actions of a co-equal branch, like those of the
President, within the sphere of its constitutional authority. Since, as the majority
concedes, the creation of the Truth Commission is within the constitutional powers of
President P-Noy to undertake, then to him, not to the Court, belongs the discretion to
define the limits of the investigation as he deems fit. The Court cannot pit its judgment
against the judgment of the President in such matter.
And when can the Supreme Court interfere with the exercise of that discretion?
The answer is, as provided in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, only
when the President gravely abuses his exercise of such discretion. This means that, in
restricting the Truth Commission's investigation only to corruptions committed during
the previous administration, he acted capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary
or despotic manner. 7
To act capriciously and whimsically is to act freakishly, abruptly, or erratically,
like laughing one moment and crying the next without apparent reason. Does this
characterize the President's action in this case, considering that he merely acted to set a
feasible target, neutralize political bias, assign the Commission a task suitable to its
 limited capacity, and observe correct housekeeping procedures? Did he act arbitrarily
in the manner of little children changing the rules of the game in the middle of the play
or despotically in the manner of a dictator? Unless he did, the Court must rein in its
horses. It cannot itself exceed the limits of its power of review under the Constitution.
Besides, the Court is not better placed than the President to make the decision
he made. Unlike the President, the Court does not have the full resources of the
government available to it. It does not have all the information and data it would need
for deciding what objective is fair and viable for a five-member body like the Truth
Commission. Only when the President's actions are plainly irrational and arbitrary even
to the man on the street can the Court step in from Mount Olympus and stop such
actions.
Notably, none of those who have been reported as involved in corruption in the
previous administration have come forward to complain that the creation of the Truth
Commission has violated their rights to equal protection. If they committed no wrong,
and I believe many would fall in this category, they would probably have an interest in
pushing for the convening of the Commission. On the other hand, if they believe that
the investigation unfairly threatens their liberties, they can, if subpoenaed, to testify
invoke their right to silence. As stated in the majority opinion, the findings of the
Commission would not bind them. Such findings would not diminish their right to
defend themselves at the appropriate time and forum.
For the above reasons, I join the main dissent of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
(Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036,
|||

[December 7, 2010], 651 PHIL 374-773)

[G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.]

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION

and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J : p

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist
district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between
government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between
law and morality. CcaASE
 In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city
ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within
the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance
that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as
pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the
city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal
protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition 2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which
seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of
Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law
the Ordinance. 4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City
Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of
its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-
up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels,
inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. aDECHI

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance

and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the
renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the
same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any
provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding
one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court;
Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the
persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That
in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the
guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
 SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not
consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby
deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon
approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10,
1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila
(the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court
in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit
customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays
of only three hours. DACTSa

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium

Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground
that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels
and motels in Manila. 8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of
Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. 9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC
also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section
4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. 11
ADTCaI

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The
RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance. 13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging
that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. 14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. 15 A month later, on March 8,
1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is
constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the
case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On
October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of
Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED. 17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was
made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the
RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was
sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and
carabeef. ITSCED

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated
January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals. 21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of the Local Government Code
which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. 22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City
under Article III, Section 18 (kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation
of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. 23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of
police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
acIHDA

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the
right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as
held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is
regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25
In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they
made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an
invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege
that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being
unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the
equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of
the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead
for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.aTcSID

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court

sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that
party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on
the principle of separation of powers, 26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived
directly from the Constitution. 27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine
incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. 28 In
this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most
obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 29 In a similar
vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the
three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in
Allen v. Wright. 30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as
the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the
Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. 31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception
and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 32 the United States
Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions
on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant
must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete
interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation
to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests". 33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such
special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the
United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. 34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were
allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well
as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely
affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this
kind of confidential relation to them." 36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren, 37 wherein
the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to
raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme
prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age
of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting
as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function".
38 HacADE

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons
for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play.
In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to
raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom
of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the
Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can
see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional
rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only
the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40 Ermita-Malate
concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating
personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation
before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals.
A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket
ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the
constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All
three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as
the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another
case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.ESDHCa

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions

including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable. 41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the
Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. 43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie
theaters, 45 gas stations 46 and cockpits. 47 The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power
of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a
rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism. ETDHaC

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of
due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due
deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet
another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing
fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity
is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch
of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by
acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to
that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards
through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional
questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise
definition. 48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned. cAaTED

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process". Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range
from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are
followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due
process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. 50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law,
has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance
of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with
which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends
should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause
has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless
there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a
"fundamental right". 52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were
established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. aITECA

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later

adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender 53
and legitimacy. 54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,
55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first
been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of
equal protection challenges. 57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances
are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability
of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought
to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access 63 and interstate travel. 64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to
the lodging establishments in question. HEaCcD

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers are
trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the
sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their
cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those
"trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day
without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately
reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated
as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style
enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom
where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with
each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which
we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial
of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." [ 65 ] In accordance with this
case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. [ 66 ]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify
the meaning of "liberty". It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . .
. guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad
indeed. 67 [Citations omitted] DHSaCA
 It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject
establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and
fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers'". 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it
cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or
consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected 69 will be curtailed as well,
as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our
purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy
and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the
words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His
separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so
fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built.
He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be
a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen. 70
SDIaHE

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would

proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room
out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose to pass the time in
a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit
passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for
abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need
of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a
convenient alternative.

E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of
a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. 71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. 72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the
exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. 73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of
State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising
space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The Ordinance
makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities
and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places
where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all
susceptible to illicit patronage and subjects them without exception to the unjustified
prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate
area, its longtime home, 76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital
city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third
World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila
will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban
decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted
by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay
is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities
revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting
the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. IDCcEa

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active
police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict
enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into
the lives of its citizens. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect
an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves
the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights
this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a
function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as a
school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may
foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a
society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so
long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate
morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi,
that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality
will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80
Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there
are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
EcHIDT

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the
acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties
as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from
non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral
and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices
in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges
themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the
rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath
of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of
the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts
 to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by
employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, [January 20, 2009], 596 PHIL
|||

444-472)
[G.R. No. 163087. February 20, 2006.]

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL

PANLILIO, petitioners, vs. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO
SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO
MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER,
respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J : p

The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the Court of Appeals
Decision 1 of March 26, 2004 holding herein petitioners Silahis International Hotel, Inc.
and Jose Marcel Panlilio, along with Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, civilly liable
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for violation of respondents'
constitutional right against unreasonable search of their office.
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-
petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents Rogelio Soluta
(Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate (Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and Florentino
Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis
Union Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union).
Petitioners' version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier
Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the
hotel contracted to provide its security force, had been receiving reports that sale and/or
use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office at
the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the
approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union. 2
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Dizon,
Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva
(Villanueva) entered the union office located at the hotel basement, with the permission
of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about the suspected illegal
activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic
bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. 3
Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
DHECac

On the other hand, respondents' version follows:

On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed
overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11,
1988, she heard pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker
room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but
she was sure were not employees of the hotel, 4 forcibly opening the door of the union
office. 5 She even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She then closed the
door and went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the
door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a
locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed
Bautista open the door. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived
and started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker
room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for police
assistance. 6
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter's request, met.
At the meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they
would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the office
could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and
the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over
the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. 7 A plastic bag
was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the
police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union
officers, 8 namely: Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta,
Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino Meneses,
Matilla, and Norman Agtani 9 was filed before the Fiscal's Office of Manila, for violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act).
An Information 10 indicting the union officers was subsequently filed by the Fiscal's
Office before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering tops
allegedly found inside the Union Office occupied by the accused not
admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of
confiscation, for lack of sufficient evidence, accused Henry Babay, Isaac
Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta, Teodoro F. Gimpayan, Vicente Delola, Edna
Bernate, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Avelino Meneses,
Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the charge. The
bonds they put up for their provisional liberty are cancelled.
The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the seized plastic bag
containing flowering tops of marijuana to the NBI Director as Permanent
Custodian of the seized Dangerous Drugs.
SO ORDERED. 11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the
Manila RTC a Complaint 12 against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose
Bautista and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case against
them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal
search.HTcADC

After trial, Branch 55 of the Manila RTC, by Decision 13 dated June 2, 1994, held the
hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and severally liable for damages as a
result of malicious prosecution and illegal search of the union office. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants Silahis International Hotel, Inc., Jose Marcel Panlilio, Floro
Maniego and Steve Villanueva, individually and collectively, jointly and
severally, to pay to:
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino
Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the
sum of P70,900.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of
P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs, except the Union, in the
same concept and nature.
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta
Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay the sum of P100,000.00 each
for moral damages.
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and
Edna-Bernate-Dacanay the sum of P30,000.00 each as
exemplary damages.
4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees.
 The complaint, insofar as plaintiff Erlisa Ilustrisimo and defendants Ramos,
Bautista and Tutaan are concerned, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of
factual and legal basis.
Costs against the remaining defendants.
SO ORDERED. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. It
found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable for damages for violation of individual
respondents' constitutional right against illegal search, not for malicious prosecution, set
aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and reduced the award of actual
damages to individual respondents to P50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
55, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion should read:
"1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola
and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages,
and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs in the same
concept and nature."
The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED. 15
Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32
OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS' APPLICATION OF PEOPLE V. ARUTA (288
SCRA 626[1998]) AND SECTION 13, RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS LEGALLY
FLAWED. CcaASE

2. PETITIONERS' SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT

CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
16

While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited the principles
enunciated in People v. Aruta 17 and Section 13, Rule 126 18 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, it gravely erred when it applied Aruta to justify petitioners' alleged liability
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code. They argue that Aruta does not involve Article
32 as nowhere in the decision is there any reference to Article 32. 19
Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the
standards set forth in Aruta as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and
seizures is not meant to be invoked against private individuals. 20
Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under the
circumstances, 21 given that the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the
search was not without probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports
received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for illegal
activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs; 22 and the search was
conducted with the consent and in the presence of union officer Babay. 23

The petition fails.

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every
civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their
violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. As the
Code Commission noted,
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms
named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not
come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices of
suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where
the greatest danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen will always have,
under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts because of
the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission
complained of does not constitute a criminal offense. 24
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose,
which is the effective protection of individual rights. 25 It suffices that there is a violation
of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
AcSIDE

In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received
reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and
Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11,
1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without
a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the
objection of Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any
of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners'
violation of individual respondents' constitutional right against unreasonable search thus
furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 26 a case for unfair competition, the
progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the
therein private respondents' premises showed that there was sufficient time for the therein
petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Yet they did not apply for
one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the therein private respondents.
Under the circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court to the
therein private respondents for violation of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
As for petitioners' contention that property rights justified the search of the union office,
the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. 27
Neither does petitioners' claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the
union office lie. Babay's account of why petitioners and company went to the union
office to consider Panlilio's suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible,
as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a
search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be
presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. 28 There must be proof of the following: (a)
that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.
That a violation of one's constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the
basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10)
of the New Civil Code, there is no doubt. Since the complaint 29 filed before the trial
court was for damages due to malicious prosecution and violation of constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages to
respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible
for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the
actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. 30
Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who
orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and
exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-
quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly "to justify [their]
liability" under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which petitioners allege is erroneous as said
case did not involve Article 32.
Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners' liability but to
rule out the legality of the search in the union office as the search was not done as an
incident of a lawful arrest. cTCADI

Petitioners cite People v. Marti 31 to support their thesis that the determinants in the
validity of the constitutional right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against
private individuals.
But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether "an
act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of [one's] constitutional rights, [may] be
invoked against the State." In other words, the issue in that case was whether the
evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity without the
participation of the State, is admissible.
The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover
damages for violation of constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation
to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
(Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, [February 20, 2006], 518
|||

PHIL 90-102)

[G.R. No. 14078. March 7, 1919.]

RUBI, ET. AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL

BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams and Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF

1917; VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTION; HISTORY. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: "With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites
on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board." Beginning with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, having reference to the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the province of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos
Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No. 547 referred
especially to the Manguianes. All of these special laws with the exception of Act No.
1306 were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and
embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The last Administrative Code retains the provision
which originated in Act No. 387, enacted in 1202, in Section 2145 herein quoted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY. These different laws denote
an anxious regard for the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and
a settled and consistent practice with reference to the method to be followed for their
advancement.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Every really new question that comes before the
courts is in the last analysis determined by the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. In balancing conflicting solutions that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation
as a general rule or principle.
4 ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" HISTORY. A skeleton history of the
attitude assumed towards the backward inhabitants of the Islands both before and after
the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States is set forth in the opinion. The
most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject are compiled
in Book 6, Title 3. A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government in its
efforts to improve the conditions of such inhabitants by concentrating them in
"reducciones" is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the
United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive
inhabitants has been a perplexing one. Organic and statutory law has given the subject
consideration.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. "Non-Christian" is an awkward and
unsatisfactory expression. Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has held that
the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degree of civilization. This has been
the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called upon to interpret
and enforce the law. The term "non-Christian" refers not to religious belief, but in a
way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUIANES" The name "Manguian" signifies
savage, mountaineer, pagan, negro. The Manguianes are very low in culture.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY. From the beginning of the
United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage."
The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has
been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of
Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature,
not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the Government.
9. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER. The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected.
 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made. " (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution
of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to
give prominence to the "necessity," of the case.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by
immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers
to local authorities.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial
officials and a department head.]
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION. Since the term "non-
Christian" is here construed to refer to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade
of civilization, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate
between individuals on account of religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY. Various conceptions of civil liberty are
quoted in the opinion. Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which
may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. "Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license;
it is "liberty regulated by law." "Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen
would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and
equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The authority conferred upon executive officials by
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not unduly interfere with the
liberty of the citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
18. ID; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS. "Due process of law" is defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Due process of law and the equal protection of the
laws are not violated by Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there
exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods
of procedure; and it applies to all of a class.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. Slavery
and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Confinement in reservations in accordance with Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER. The police power of the State is a
power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling
necessity."
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on
reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion
of the general welfare and the public interest.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past.
The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power,
the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in
enacting Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE
INTENTION. The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish
friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization.
27. ID.; ID; ID.; ID.; ID. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are
concerned, the purposes of the Government are to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals is in fine, to begin the
process of civilization.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the
State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the
executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop
the resources of that great Island.

29. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION. Most cautiously should the power of
this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch,
be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration.
 30. ID.; ID.; ID. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Per CARSON, J., concurring:
31. STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED. The words "non-
Christian" have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the
Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective applied to "tribes," "peoples" or
"inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the
Islands.
32. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. The tests for the determination of the fact that an
individual or tribe is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words
"non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have
been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or
lack of connection with some civilized community."
33. ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT
NON-CHRISTIAN. The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine
Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must
be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the
descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is
that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is
feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws
and regulations, administrative, legislative and judicial, which control the conduct of
the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which
does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or
debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose
to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the
members of the tribe.
34. ID.; ID.; ID. So the standard of civilization to which any given number
or group of inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual
member of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such
group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-
Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in
the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-
Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a
tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat
of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart
from that maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life as would not be inimical to
the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with
whom they are brought in contact.
35. ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917;
BASIS; WHEN PROPERLY APPLICABLE. The power to provide for the issuance
of the reconcentration orders contemplated in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
 rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action
of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes,
but for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that
"great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where certain individuals or
groups of individuals are found to be of such a low grade of civilization, that their own
wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J : p

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional

History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first
luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an
Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to
introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be
placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of a state, the controlling
power of the constitution and laws, the rights, if they have any, the political existence
of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered. To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his
outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of
the so-called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Chritans" with
that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes
of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
"1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
"'The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the
following resolution: " 'Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a
failure,
 "'Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other
measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will
be obtained toward educating these people,
"'Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place in
order to make a permanent settlement,
"'Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board,
"'Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao
on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"'Resolved, That under Section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800
hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of
the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"'Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.'
"2. That said Resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
"3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued
Executive Order No. 2 which says:
"'Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement
of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"'Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"'Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, Jr., provincial governor of Mindoro,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code,
do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"'Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code.'
"4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in
paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied
in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
 Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
"5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in
accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
"6. That the undersigned has no information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of
the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711." It thus appears
that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the
shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of
this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount
question which the court is called upon to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by
provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board." In
connection with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted Section 2759
of the same Code, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Chritian to take up appointed habitation.

Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred
and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said
governor shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty
days."
The substance of what is now found in said Section 2145 is not new to
Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use
such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; Section
62, Act No. 1397; Section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No.
547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; Section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of
the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to
the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton
history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with
particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at
hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language:
"LAW I.
"The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March
21,1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of
the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20. 1578.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' BE REDUCED INTO
'POBLACIONES'(COMMUNITIES).
"In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith
and the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a
civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special
attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment o these
purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other
religious persons met at various times; the prelates of New Spain assembled by
order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five
hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to
serve God and our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be
made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from
one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual
and temporal benefits and wherein they can not profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men
are obliged to give one another. Having realized the convenience of this
resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and
ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and
moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences,
so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own
accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay
taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied
with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomenderos shall entreat
compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title."
xxx xxx xxx
"LAW VIII.
 "Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October
10, 1618.
THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
"The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should
have the facilities of waters, lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry
and a passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock
that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
"LAW IX
"Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
THAT THE 'INDIOS' IN 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT DEPRIVED OF
THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
"With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in
reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which
they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall
be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them
previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom."
xxx xxx xxx
"LAW XIII.
"THE SAME AS ABOVE. "THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT
REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
"No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the
right to alter or to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and
founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal
district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request
such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that end. And,
because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the
indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the
change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this
law."
"LAW XV.
"Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMAN IN THE REDUCCIONES,'
WHO SHALL BE 'INDIOS.'
"We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should
be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a
big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen.
If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more
than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the
 presence of the priests, as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and
indios."
"LAW XXI.
"Philip II, in Madrid, on May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At
Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Tordesillas,
on July 12,1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For
this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
"THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE 'INDIOS,' THERE SHALL LIVE NO
SPANIARDS, NEGROES, 'MESTIZOS,' AND MULATTOES.
"We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattoes, or mestizos
to live in the reducciones and towns of the indios, because it has been found that
some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of
troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and
useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their
towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad
customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt
and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquility. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon
the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the
towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in
executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of
the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and
Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among
them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they shall not be affected
by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents."
(Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to
improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating
them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
"It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a
territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the
laws in force therein; while, on the other-hand, it is the duty to conscience and to
humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in
the nation, and which, living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack all the notions
which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be
acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
"It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer
the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the metropolis.
 "It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been heretofore
accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have
even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought
to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have
the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have
not been guarded against, thus giving way for the majority of these races to persist
in their mode of living and customs of isolation.

"As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable

state of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and
the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory
under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful
study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization,
from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the
illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of
the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity
of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu,
and the provincial prelates of the Orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians,
Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of
Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate
conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the
only form of accomplishing such a task.
"For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
"DECREE.
"1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Island of Luzon are, from this
date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this
decree which are based upon the differences of instruction, of the customs, and
of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
"2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races
which may be divided into three classes: one, which comprises those which
live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the
social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries
of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character,
beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must
be observed in the manner prescribed below.
 "3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall
proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them,
to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlements already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and
for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards
the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be
finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year
they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns
of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall
not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
"4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located in fertile
lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to
move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new
residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient
for them and which prejudices the least their interests; and, in either of these
cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes within the reach of the
sound of the bell.
"5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christians, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulation based upon
that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
"6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have
as to where and how they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with
the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the
same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition
against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce or any
other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be
punished with deportation.
"7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond
the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
"8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all who have settled and who profess our sacred
religion shall by this fact alone be exempt for eight years from rendering personal
labor.
"9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountain igorots) the following advantages in return for their
voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of
good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way
they deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon affecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not
opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they
want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of
recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and
trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax)
for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authority of the
province or district.
"10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit
the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided,
that the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the
latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivation, and provided
further that the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in
the towns already constituted.
"11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of
the tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them,
continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from
now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for this purpose,
the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions
of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have
to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall
destroy their dwelling- houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year,
and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall
take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the
same.
"12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local authorities,
and other subordinates to my authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall
give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
"13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
"14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General,
Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations
that may be brought to it for consultation by the chiefs of provinces and priests
and missionaries.
"15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement
to the foregoing, in bringing about due compliance with this decree, shall be
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
 jurisdictions." (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B AFTER ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a
perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines, was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions
have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of
particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of
our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment,
surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such
tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation;
and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."

Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of Section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to
name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This law
transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by
the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (Sec. 12). It divided the
Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed
of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth
district (Sec. 16). The law established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and
representatives (Sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line
between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of
the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and
49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act No. 82, the Municipal
Code; Act No. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Charter of the
city of Manila; Act No. 787, providing for the organization and government of the
Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of
settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio Charter; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been
carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and 1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government
of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, enacted on
April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579,
753 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra. Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva
Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an
example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
"No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL
CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE
OF MINDORO.
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted the Philippine Commission,
that:
"SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro have
not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and
badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon
township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled 'An
Act providing for the establishment of local civil governments in the townships
and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya.'
"SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the
provincial governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary
in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
 habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions
shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days.
"SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes
of his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful
local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be
exercised to this end, and to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.
"SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-
seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township,
and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial
board.
"SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An
Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of
laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, December 4, 1902."
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by
Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the
provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions
in question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the
welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in
varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instructions
to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in Section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in Section
22 of the Jones Law., They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippine
Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of
the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into Sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which
contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549,
550, 1397 1639, and 2551.
 "Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian
Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes,"
since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in
Sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; Sections 701-705,
2145, 2422, 2426 Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444,
2674 of the Philippine Legislature, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian"
shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917;
Sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, Sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would
of course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christians would
be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who
do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could
also be cited Section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuniga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand
Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin
of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898,
vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I, p.
107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate
further to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to
be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the
authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the
"territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly. " The Philippine
Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in Article XII of the Provincial Law of the
Administrative Code. The first section of this article, preceding Section 2145, makes
the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro,
Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has
never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however,
exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
 It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live
persons some of whom are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact,
the law specifically recognizes this. (Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so again the geographical
conception is likewise inadequate. The reason is that the motive of the law relates not
to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of
its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated on the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people
under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation,
speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian
tribes.'" (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate,
Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of
the people of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands
and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of
the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906 circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive
authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674,
and Sections 701 et seq., and Sections 2422 et seq., of the Administrative Code of
1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view
to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29 Phil., 434). The question here
arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with Article 423 of the Penal
Code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In
discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
". . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal
a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed
by General Orders No. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown
to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured
and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance."
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who
have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member
of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called
non-Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former
Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter
to all governors of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government
Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was
circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
"SIR: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people
who were originally non-Christians but have recently been baptized or who are
children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Acts
1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
"It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in
these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
"The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree
of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member
of so-called 'wild tribes' of your province the benefit of the doubt even though
they may recently have embraced Christianity.
"The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to
remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form
of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
"I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General,
who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act." (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of
this court, has the following to say on the subject:
"As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate,
but while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand. . . . I believe the term carries the same
meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30,
1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of
religious denomination, for to hold that it is indicative of religious denomination
will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom."
 Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was
the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relative to the cedula
taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the
Interior , was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the
interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This construction of the Collector
of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
"The internal revenue law exempts 'members of non-Christian tribes' from
the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted
this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian
worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other persons are exempt;
he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the
so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,
including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax
so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition.
In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or
profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more
dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question
has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but
throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be
subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed
to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a
Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all of the
Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the
nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and others are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also
exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being
collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving
their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) "JNO. S. HORD,
"Collector of Internal Revenue."

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular

letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial
treasurers. This letter in part reads:
"In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial
treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when
they come in from the hills for the purpose of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification
of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby
published for the information of all concerned:
"Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by
reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into
three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned. . . .
"Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and
attaches himself to some civilized community, becoming a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs
the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so
attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from
him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the
delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from
foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of
such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should
be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to play the tax for
former years.

"In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factor in

determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the
circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known
wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and
connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason
so called 'Remontados' and 'Montescos' will be classed by this office as members
of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is
concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode
of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of
the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christian tribes.
"Very respectfully, ( Sgd. )
"ELLIS CROMWELL, "
Collector of Internal Revenue,

"Approved:
(Sgd.) "GREGORIO ARANETA,
"Secretary of Finance and Justice."
 The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector
of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa,
Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief
of Constabulary requested the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a
non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise
questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges
of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of
the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act
No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same
authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
"In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that the
person in question remains a non-Christian, so that in purchasing intoxicating
liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to
prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these
should be the constructions placed upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise."
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
"With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants
has in the provisions of the Administrative Code which we are studying, we
submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include
all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipinos or strangers,
civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the
non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed
residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order. . . .
"The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of
the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intend to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the
individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines.
"The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of Articles
2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (Articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood
as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because
this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its literal meaning
would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions based on the
religion of the individual."
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than
Dr. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the
population into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes.
(Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present Director
of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in
the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos. " In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a subdivision under the title non-
Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes,"
which sufficiently shows that the term refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-
Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization.
The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes.
Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro. Of the
derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimologia de los
nombres de Razas de Filipinas, says:
"In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies 'savage,' 'mountainer,'
'pagan,' 'negro.' It may be that the se of this word is applicable to a great number
of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of
Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of
that island who bear it to-day, but its employment in three Filipino languages
shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten.
In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies 'ancient,' from which we can
deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants,
and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in
whose language they were called the 'ancients.' "
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood
and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
Manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of
the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by
the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-
Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by
the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons,
it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian
and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those
humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the
opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian
nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by
civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ( [1886], 118 U. S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of
the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The
court then proceeds to indite a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United
States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
"The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States,
has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
"Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
America towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the
Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land
itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe
wished to dispose of its land, or any part of it, or the State or the United States
wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this
could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in
other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians
themselves these relations are equally difficult to define. They were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they resided."
 The opinion then continues:
"It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise
the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by
the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen. . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist
in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all
the tribes."
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U. S., 28) the
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands
was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into
those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court
looked to the reports of the different superintendents charged with guarding their
interests and found that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and
protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the
court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated
as wards requiring special protection, were subjected to restraints and official
supervision in the alienation of their property." And finally, we note the following:
"Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within
its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without
the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not
within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good
reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197
U. S., 488; U. S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U. S., 278; U. S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U. S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; The Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall., 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U. S., 218; Thomas vs.
Gay [1898], 169 U. S., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock [1903], 187 U. S., 553; Wallace
vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U. S., 84; Tiger vs.
Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U. S., 286; U. S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U. S., 598; Cyr
vs. Walker [1911], 29 Okla., 281; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the
United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority
to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the
Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U. S. vs. Thomas
[1894], 151 U. S., 577.)
All this is borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook (
[1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas
corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing
Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition
alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the
Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations
therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or
assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were
arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The
substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and
connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had
departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of
the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which
required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested
on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance,
related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian
escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government
had adopted in its dealings with the friendly tribe of Poncas. Then, continuing, the
court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the
purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain
officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority. . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary
power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not, need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing,
the exercise of the power must be upheld. "The decision concluded as follows:
"The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
"1. That an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the
United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or
in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained
of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
"2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of
authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof.
"3. That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the
relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
"4. That the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as
the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to 'life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness,' so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on
forbidden ground. And,
"5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United
States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered."
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as
authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of
the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act,
and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race
Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all
that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they
have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United
States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should
not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many
forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for
the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature
could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full
responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will,
however, disclose that it has not been violated in this instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S.
vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature
merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U. S., 80) was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking
of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United
States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States
Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out of the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good
deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before
saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously
made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress
is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special
provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U. S. [1907], 204 U.
S., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court; U. S.
vs. Lane [1914], 232 U. S., 598.)
 There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state ?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a
department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted
on behalf of his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and
unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language
can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The
inevitable result, then, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to
discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his argument is unanswerable the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial
construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the
statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as
hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals on account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the
President's instructions to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law,
providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions,
it has been said, "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual
is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
"Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties,
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other." (Spencer, Social
Statistics, p. 94.)
"Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the
offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint
on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . That man is free who
is protected from injury." (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
"Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not
being forced to do what one ought not to desire." (Montesquieu, Spirit of the
Laws.)
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to
act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others." (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U. S., 86.)
"Liberty does not import 'absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On
any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members.
Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be
confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person
to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the
injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere within which
the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute
the authority of any human government especially of any free government
existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will.
But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general
public may demand.' " (Harlan, J., in Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.
S., 11.)
"Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by
reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual." (Apolinario
Mabini.)
 Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like
freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-
making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the
citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to
labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things
which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri
[1866], 4 Wall., 277, Wilkinson vs. Leland [18293, 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears
[1900], 179 U. S., 274; Allgeyer vs.Louisiana [1896], 165 U. S., 578; State vs.
Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R. C. L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
"liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of
citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which
are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of
the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.
(See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U. S., 539: Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co.
vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Ala., 66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case
before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that
the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are
not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion
of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee,
Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of
liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883],
110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a
law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of
the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it
shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody
[1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must
have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statements, leaving the logical deductions to
be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions
of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor
shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment,
since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has
force in the Philippines. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by
adoption, with necessary modifications, of Sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United
States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and
involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition
of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U. S. [1906], 208 U.
S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been
applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude
may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U. S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners
rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which
the State must act if Section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to
note at this moment is the far reaching scope of the power, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health. peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113
U. S., 27.) What we are most interested in is the right of the government to restrain
liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried
onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the
onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not
go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not
arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the
right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest. "There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of
the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited
only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the
foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty
[1915], 32 Phil., 580; U. S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated
by Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such
legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the
action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successful method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
Solicitor-General adds the following: (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the
motives for its selection, the following:
"To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken
together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a
trip to that place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable
progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc.,
 that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school
the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the
first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since
the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
"Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his
return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
" 'It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who
prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The
Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities
and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of
this country. To permit them to live a way-faring life will ultimately result in a
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes
and make depredations, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.' "
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision
of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration The
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
"(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized
communities.
"(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public
health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
"(c) The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions
to facilitate their development and the extension of government control.
"(d)Construction of roads and trails between one place and another among
non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
"(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources,
especially agriculture.
"(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of
private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu."
The Secretary adds:
"To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been
continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate
the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
 settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities,
thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and
work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children,
and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized
brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of
the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and
unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country." (See Report
of the Department for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly

relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization.
(Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people
in the following unequivocal terms:
"It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid,
and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago." (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States,
proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may
not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be
advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes,
leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the
Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing them into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
This method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes
and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved,
that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in
some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized
people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the Manguianes.
 Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal.
Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for
instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their
more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the
rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as
surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who
are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the
purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in
enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons
protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say
that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Island of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive
regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest
of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State
to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great
law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the
Interior:
"Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the Manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction
burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not
bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to
preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception
of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty
as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully,
how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?
xxx xxx xxx
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have
a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
 "To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the
one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience."
xxx xxx xxx
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has
tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the
Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which
is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has
already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the
backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain
element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a
measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to
lead this people in the path of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat,
treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance
and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked
in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse
to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will
thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of
attack by those who doubt, any challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with
our backward brothers.
"The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at
Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions.
They are being made to understand that the object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being
aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially
established for them. In short, everything is being done for them in order that their
advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly
their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a
condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody
but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
"But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to
some other place under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the
conditions of living warrant, and the entire space where they are roving about is
 the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain.
Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the
government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the
public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This
measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives. of the Government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they
will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless
a penalty is provided for, you can not make them live together and the noble
intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught."
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific
objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking,
to go where he pleases. Could he not, however, be kept away from certain localities?
To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802
(2 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 141) punished those intruders who should cross the line into an
Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of
locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians.
Without any doubt, this law and other similar laws were accepted and followed time
and again without question.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak

and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials.
What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer
would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the
law would have little or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the
law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers,
and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the
validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is
called to the attention of the courts, it would seem that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with
freedom, may the rights and liberties of the individual members of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has as sailed the
very existence of government from the beginning of time. Not now purely an ethical
or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the
peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize
that the very existence of government renders imperative a power to restrain the
individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class
attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the
Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a long
time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental
activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two
branches of the Government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed,
an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained
for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws. there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of
doubt, would lead to the determination that Section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which
the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late
decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last
analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by
such prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its
probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing
inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and
a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-
called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent
governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the
present. The idea is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach
the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful
country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good
and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the
best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever
political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms
for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal
contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U. S., 1.) If in
the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court must
take "a chance," it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception
which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of
law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous
to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed
against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:

I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set
forth in the prevailing opinion.
The words "non-Christian" have a clear, definite and well settled signification
when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes,"
"people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces
throughout the Islands.
 Justice Malcolm as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this
connection in our statute-book, denote the "low grade of civilization" of the
individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add that
the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe is, or is not of the
"low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian" are, and throughout
the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of
advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910,
and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to
have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive
term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree
of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible
and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and
regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the
admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which
does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or
debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose
to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the
members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such
a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual
from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that
degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by
such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had
they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would
qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian"
tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or
property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they
are brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity
of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as
well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by the reconcentration
order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the
question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law
for the issuance of such an order.
 If the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by the order complained of had
attained that degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to serve
notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the members of the tribe
affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the provincial board and the
Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By what
proceeding known to the law, or to be especially adopted in a particular case, could
the officers of any province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a
reconcentration order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or
upon one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of
Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of residence,
or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro?
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted,
after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have
been placed upon reservations; but since non-Christian headmen and chiefs in the
Philippines have no lawful authority to bind their peoples by their acts or their
consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have the same force whether
the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this
kind.
The truth of the matter is that the power to provide for the issuance of such
orders rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of
action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting
their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests upon
necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where
certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low grade of
civilization that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life
or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and
necessarily paternal attitude assumed toward them by the Insular Government is well
illustrated by the following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
"SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian
tribes). It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue
the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid,
and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago."
"SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. There shall be maintained
in the provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a
special fund to be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall be
available, exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships and
 settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon
approval of the Secretary of the Interior."
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the
jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the
action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration orders
issued, under authority of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, against a
petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian" as that term is used
in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at this time.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That
fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest
citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-
Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at least,
before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., with whom ARAULLO, and STREET, JJ., concur, dissenting:

I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice
will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong
dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I
shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall
simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human side of the case as it presents
itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the
provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately
2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of the
Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the
provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging
that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied
in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the
prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the placing of the
petitioners and others on a reservation.
 The Manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low
in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people.
They number approximately 15,000 (?). The Manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal government."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of
Mindoro (not including the smaller islands which together make the Province of
Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a population of 28,361 of which
7,369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the total
Mangyan population of the province. The total population was less than seven to the
mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered. It has no savage
population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and by
Manguianes.
The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will
long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the waters of Cebu. They
have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful,
timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government of the Philippine
Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for
those who like Dabalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them
Section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but
only the fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the
Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion, are in violation
of the first paragraph of Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which
reads as follows:
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws."
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by
that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is
similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all
through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with
reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases for the
simple reason that all the Indian nations in the United States were considered as
separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate
treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, in
compliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they
lived and were protected from intrusion and molestation by white men. Some of these
reservations were larger than the Island of Luzon, and they were not measured in
hectares but in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a
certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the
Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and
privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the provincial governor of
the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold
them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights
and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied the equal
protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos
whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be
moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "brought under the bells"
and made to stay on a reservation.

Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return
of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed
by these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." A memorandum of the
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in the majority
opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which is that
"Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the Manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction
burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not
bringing any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to
preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception
of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty
as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
 xxx xxx xxx
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have
a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way ?
"To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the
one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has
tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens."
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that
the Manguianes destroy the forests by making a caigin. What is a "caigin?" Simply
this. These people move their camp or place of abode frequently and when they do
move to a new place, it is necessary to clear the land in order to plant corn and
camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller trees and burn these around
the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires never spread
in the tropical undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caigin
are killed and crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on
due to superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from
exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on. Granting that the Manguianes do
make caigins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them for the more fertile
lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that they are
committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land
for incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to
the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who
want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and never will be.
They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law punish them. The
authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-
nomadic people." Their history does; not demonstrate that we must expect them to
commit crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they
will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." Are they
more liable to be subjected to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native
hills and gain a livelihood as they have been accustomed to for hundreds of years,
than they will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not
escape without facing a term in jail? Is it not more likely that they will be glad to
exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding
themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed
them and clothe them in return for their services?
I think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will all be subjected
to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will
they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them money with which to
buy food on the promise that they will work for them. And if they accept the loan and
do not work for the lender we have another law on the statute books, Act No. 2098,
into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be fined not more than two
hundred pesos or imprisoned for not exceeding six months or both, and when the
sentence expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this may be repeated till they are too old to work and are cast
adrift.
The Manguianes have committed no offense and are charged with none. It does
not appear that they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not
appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It seems they
were gathered here and there whenever found by the authorities of the law and
forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they are "non-Christians," and because
the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination because of
religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it
also means any of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These
non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and
various others, about one million souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros,
Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. They have beautiful
fields reclaimed by hard labor they have herds of cattle and horses and some few
of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the
Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but they are one and all "non-
Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be
taken from their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial
governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state such a monstrous
proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the section of the law under
which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is no
probability of the department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the
fact that he can do it and has done it in the present case is what makes the law
unconstitutional. The arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be the
measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.
"It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is
no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by
these provisions which the people have, through the organic law, declared shall be the
measure and scope of all control exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth
amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the
individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it
was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty,
or arbitrary spoliation of property.
"As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or
unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular individual or class
as the subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional
as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal
protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion."
(Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
"When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not
mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source
of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies
of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation
of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere,
and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of
mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except
to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of
opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may be a
government of law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential
to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)

It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of
the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for
determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the
lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, it is void.
 In my opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their
liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of their
life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe
from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a
reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death. From my long experience in
the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take the
Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made
it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile,
unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields
than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so
taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation in effect an
open air jail then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more
progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands.
All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department,
have the power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different
provinces from their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the
general good of the Philippines," and the courts will grant them no relief. These
unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives,
may be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor
decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on
the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he
could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not
within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the
majority opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
"During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering
the laws of my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case
that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration.
On the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful,
but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the
other, we have the representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened,
and most christianized nations of modern times. On the one side, we have the
representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of ours,
asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and
to pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on
the other side, we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government,
resisting this application with the determination of sending these people back to
the country which is to them less desirable than perpetual imprisonment in their
own native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and
distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no sort of
sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a part so
conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper
to say that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to
freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in
their behalf were closed. No examination or further thought would then have been
necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by law,
something more satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy must furnish and
constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that this case must be
examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators are entitled
to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some
treaty made pursuant thereto, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer
who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left
without the consent of the government.
"On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five
others, during the session of the court held at that time at Lincoln, presented their
petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus and
their final discharge from custody thereunder.
"The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have
formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general
habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their
own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that
whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the
laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by
order of the respondent, George Crook.
"The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April,
and, the distance between the place where the writ was made returnable and the
place where the relators were confined being more than twenty miles, ten days
were allotted in which to make return.
"On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority or the arrest
and detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the
additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individual members if, and
connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a
reservation situated in some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had
departed therefrom without permission from the government; and, at the request
of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had issued an order which
required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for
the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.
 "It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the
relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe
to which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony
produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and the
return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the questions to be determined
are purely questions of law.
"On the 8th of March, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with
the Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the
Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of
the said Indians, in which the government agreed to protect them during their
good behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under what circumstances, the
Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not
appear.
xxx xxx xxx
"A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which,
when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the
right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose
of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the
Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a
question like the one under consideration. But, as the matter furnishes so much
valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to
present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to consequences
or criticisms, which, though not specially invited, will be sure to follow.
xxx xxx xxx
"On the 15th day of August, 1876, Congress passed the general Indian
appropriation bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the
interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and
providing them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
xxx xxx xxx
"The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and
cultivated a portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when they removed
therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At all events, we
find a portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the Indian
Territory. There, the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble commenced.
Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five hundred and eighty-
one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one
hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the
others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change
of climate; and to save himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the
feeble remnant of his little band of followers, he determined to leave the Indian
Territory and return to his old home, where, to use his own language, 'he might
live and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers.' He also stated that he
informed the agent of their final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and
his followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with
 the Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of
Indians, and to cut loose from the government, go to work, become self-
sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a higher civilization. To
accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, all who were
able to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the
same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long continued to
intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make them
self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus
employed, that they were arrested by order of the government, for the purpose of
being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the
justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their
own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country, in which they can see
little but new-made graves opening for their reception. The land from which they
fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and native land was
strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to
return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones of the dead son of
Standing Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but
were carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to them a
melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and
such love of home and native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to me
that they are not unlike Christian in principle."

And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and ordered their release from custody. This case is very similar to the case
of Standing Bear and others.
I think this Court should declare that Sections 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been denied the
equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of
the petitioners.

(Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. 14078, [March 7, 1919], 39 PHIL 660-
|||

738)
[G.R. No. 112386. June 14, 1994.]

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION;
TERM "OFFICE" CONSTRUED. In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, (173 SCRA 409) this
Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso who, at the time of
issuance of the suspension order, was already occupying the office of governor and not the
position of municipal mayor that he held previously when charged with having violated
the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, (128 SCRA 383) the
suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts
committed as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit. In both instances, this
Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer
charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which
he was charged.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW; RATIONALE THEREFOR. Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to
a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner
invokes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL BASIS FOR SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE IN SUBSEQUENT
TERM. Petitioner's so-called "covenant" with the people of Eastern Samar is far from
being synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license, and it is not one that can cut athwart
the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, (57 SCRA 163) we have said: "Since the
criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his
reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic
Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a
subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of
the Act."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION THEREOF MANDATORY. When the statute is clear
and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of
the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official
from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that
such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J : p

Petitioner Marcelino C, Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a

member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992
elections. He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan, on 25 May 1992, with
having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an information, docketed
Criminal Case No. 17756, stating
"That on or about 08 January 1991, and for sometime thereafter, in Borongan,
Eastern Samar, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Lutgardo B. Barbo, Governor of Eastern Samar; Camilo A. Camenforte, Vice-
Governor of same province; Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Marcos B.
Alido, Nonato A. Gerna, Ismael G. Kho, Marcelino C. Libanan, Nicolas P.
Pimentel, and Generoso A. Yu, of the same province, conspiring with one
another, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, through evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, prevent and exclude Agustin B. Docena, a duly appointed
and Qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis
A. Capito, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said
body, by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein accused expressed their recognition
of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official replacement of aforesaid deceased
member, notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the Department of
Local Government, to the damage and prejudice of Agustin B. Docena. prLL

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 1
On motion of the prosecution for the suspension of the accused public officials pendente
lite, and finding that said accused were charged under a valid information, the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, dated 26 July 1993, to the following
effect:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Gov. Lutgardo Barbo, Vice-Gov.
Marcelino C. Libanan, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A.
Gerna and Generoso A. Yu are hereby suspended from their respective public
positions, or from any other public office that they may be holding, the same to
commence upon their receipt hereof and for a period of ninety (90) days
thereafter.cdphil

"Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Hon. Secretary, Department of

Interior and Local Government, and the Hon. Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, for their information and guidance and they are hereby directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof of any action they have
undertaken on the matter.
"SO ORDERED." 2
Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which
the Sandiganbayan denied in its resolution of 30 September 1993. From the orders,
Libanan appealed.
Petitioner presents three grounds to support his appeal, to wit: That
I. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE
AN AFFRONT ON PETITIONER('S) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
 II. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE IMPLEMENTED WOULD
AMOUNT TO AN ASSAULT OF THE SACRED COVENANT REPOSED ON
PETITIONER VICE-GOVERNOR, MARCELINO C. LIBANAN BY THE
PEOPLE OF EASTERN SAMAR. LibLex

III. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY THE SUSPENSION

ORDER PENDENTE LITE NO LONGER EXIST.
The petition is without merit.
The amendatory provision of Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable, provides:
"Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under title 7, book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. . . ."
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly
committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him
now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The
implementation of the suspension order, he further claims, would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Cdpr

In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by

Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already
occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held
previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 4 the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also sustained
even as he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the Commission on
Audit. In both instances, this Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply
to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office under which he was charged.
Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust," 5 and it is not the property
envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which petitioner invokes.
Libanan's second contention neither holds water. His so-called "covenant" with the people
of Eastern Samar is far from being synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license, and it is
not one that can cut athwart the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 7 we have
said:cdll

"Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not

abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal
basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his
reelection by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act."
The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into. When the statute is
clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension
of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, 8 and there are no "ifs" and
"buts" about it. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto. LLphil

SO ORDERED.
||| (Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386 (Resolution), [June 14, 1994])
[G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002.]

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, THE
SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA
KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioners.

Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for respondent P.K. Ledesma.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners purchased a registered parcel of land from Mariano Lising. Subsequently,

private respondent, the registered owner of Lot 689, filed Civil Case No. Q-12918 against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon her lot. The trial
court adjudged Pedro and Lising to pay damages, remove all constructions and relocate
the boundaries. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to prohibit the
judge from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from implementing the alias writ
of execution against their property. They claimed that they were not impleaded in Civil
Case No. Q-12918, hence, they would be deprived of their property without due process
of law. The CA dismissed the petition ruling that as buyers of Mariano Lising, petitioners
were privies and could be reached by the execution order. EHCaDS

The Supreme Court granted the petition and thereby reversed and set aside the assailed
decision. The Court noted that petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of
Civil Case No. Q-12918. They could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising's certificate of
title because at the time of purchase, it was still free from any third party claim. As
builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners are proper parties in
any case involving subject property. But since private respondents failed to implead them
in Civil Case No. Q-12918, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PERSON DEALING WITH REGISTERED

PROPERTY IS CHARGED WITH NOTICE ONLY OF CLAIMS AS ARE
ANNOTATED ON THE TITLE; CASE AT BAR. Where a case like the present one
involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, the person dealing with the
registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the
title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on
the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola,
are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; WRIT OF EXECUTION
MAY ISSUE ONLY AGAINST A PARTY AND NOT AGAINST ONE WHO DID
NOT HAVE HIS DAY IN COURT; CASE AT BAR. As builders in good faith and
innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence
are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents
should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so,
petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real
parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of
execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. STaCcA

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J : p

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit
Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, from
issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the
same court from implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution 2
of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. SEDICa

The facts are as follows:

Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267
and 111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain
portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October
29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered
both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into
smaller lots.
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-
A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33
Doa Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were
registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and
Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the
action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as
plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said
corporation. Trial continued for three decades.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly
and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff's land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the
amount of P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally
constructed by defendants on plaintiff's property at defendants' expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their
own expense;
(d) to pay attorney's fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) with interest computed from the date of filing of the
complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners' Report,
particularly, Annexes "A" and "B" thereof, at the expense of the
defendants. 3
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners,
through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they
were occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the
trial court stating as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the "Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A
Writ of Demolition," filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance
of an Order directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition
of the structures on the plaintiff's property constructed by defendants and/or the
present occupants. The defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their
comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and
executory, the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance
of an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However,
despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present
occupants of the subject property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the
Partial Sheriff's Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the Deputy Sheriff of
this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the structures in
order to implement the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense,
all constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which defendants
constructed on plaintiff's property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this
Order; otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
SO ORDERED. 4
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from
issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ
of execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. 5 Petitioners
alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they
were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the
writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them
because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers
and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who
derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the
execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was
ordered dismissed. 6
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition, where petitioners
aver that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED
 AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED
AS PARTIES THERETO.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
PETITIONERS' TITLE DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD
FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR VALUE.
III.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING
THAT THEY STAND TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY
IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY
THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE
DEMOLITION OF ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WHO
WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT. 7

For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may
be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for
value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced
against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our
ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz 8 in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest
of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil
Case No. Q-12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners
submit that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are
different from the circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496 in
1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied
and built houses on the lot without the PRC's consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to
Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120
to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial
court dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and
surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory.
When Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in
her favor and a new title was consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then sought the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120. This was opposed by petitioner
Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said
that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she
purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter
held the land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April
29, 1894. In opposing the execution, Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her, claiming that she was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she
could not be considered as "a person claiming under" Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120,
which had long become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even
though she was not a party thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were
formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in
turn sold them to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two
judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the order
of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we
sustained Magbanua's ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title. We
declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land
referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly
issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria,
or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title.
Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not
required to go beyond what appears on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in
Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners
acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right
over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was
based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners
is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the
registered title in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the
title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of
the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land
under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered
property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. 9 It is
our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully
entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in
the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value?
A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a
full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property. 10 The determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court
to determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to
take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 11 The instant case is covered by this exception to the general rule.
As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent, petitioners
purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising. 12 Civil Case No. Q-12918 was
commenced sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In
other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the
lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising's Certificate of Title which at the
time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this
dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note
that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this
could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise
for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial
and even during proceedings before the Court of Appeals. 13 Nevertheless, we deem it
proper that this issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in
the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in
good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is
his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. 14 As earlier discussed, petitioner
spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of
Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was
only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondent's adverse claim. The institution
of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners
since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over
the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. 15
Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-
12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said
case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers
to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have
his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. 16 In our view,
the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the
demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. ACTaDH
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 28, 1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the
decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition
issued against petitioners. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141463, [August 6, 2002], 435 PHIL 323-333)
[G.R. Nos. 104805-07. January 13, 1993.]

AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

(FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Francisco Ed Lim and Rowena L. Garcia for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS OBLIGATORY

IN WHATEVER FORM ENTERED INTO PROVIDED ALL REQUISITES FOR
VALIDITY ARE PRESENT; IN CASE AT BAR; VERBAL LEASE OF TRACTORS,
VALID AND ENFORCEABLE. All the witnesses of the defense as well as of the
Government uniformly attested to the reality of verbal agreements between the
Municipality and the tractors lessees, i.e., that all said lessees were made aware of the
obligations they were assuming prior to the delivery to them of the tractors; and that on
their taking delivery thereof, they all bound themselves in writing "to all the terms and
conditions which the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales may impose . . ." And the fact
that the lease agreements were not initially reduced to writing, this having been done only
some time later by the Sangguniang Bayan through a resolution adopted for that purpose,
certainly does not make the transactions anomalous or felonious, nor preclude the
generation of the contractual relation of lessor and lessee between the Municipality and
the farmers. It is axiomatic that contracts may be entered into in any form, orally or in
writing, or parol in part and written in part, it being needful merely that the essential
requisites for their validity be present a precept of general application unless "the law
requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, . . ."
Quite obviously, the lease of the tractors in this case is not one of those required by law
to be in writing or other particular form in order that it may be valid or enforceable.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT; LEASE OF
TRACTORS NOT MADE THROUGH CANVASS OR PUBLIC BIDDING AND
WITHOUT BOND, NOT CRIMINAL; REASONS THEREFOR. The absence of a
bond does not make the transactions criminal either. There is no proof whatever that,
under the circumstances, such a bond was required by any law or regulation of the
"tractor recipients to secure the proper performance by them of the terms and conditions
of their alleged contract or even for the purpose of security for loss or damage from
malevolent handling." The lower Court's opinion that the "grant of (the) farm tractors to
the beneficiaries were (sic) not made through canvass or public bidding, . . ." is
inconsequential. There is no evidence that this is a requirement for leases of government
equipment, one exigible of the petitioner Mayor, prescinding from the fact that under the
circumstances, a public bidding would have been a futile exercise, given the reluctance of
the farmers in the area, as already mentioned, to accept the tractors by way of lease.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; IN CASE AT
BAR, EVIDENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY INSUFFICIENT TO INDUCE MORAL
CERTAINTY OF GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The Court a quo
completely ignored the plain circumstance that Ferrer's testimony is corroborated in all its
material aspects by the other witness of the Government as well as the defense. What is
more, even conceding that Ferrer's testimony could be correctedly discarded and
disregarded as self-contradictory, no reason exists to reject the evidence given by the
other prosecution witnesses-lessees, specially considering that, as already repeatedly
pointed out, their evidence is substantially identical to that of the defense witnesses. Also
incorrect is the declaration that Mayor Deloso did not follow the requirement of the
"Local Government Audit Office, LGAO, of the Commission on Audit . . . that (private
individuals renting) government equipment or machineries must . . . (pay) rental fees
based on rates (set) by the Department of Public Works and Highways." Apart from the
fact that no proof of any such requirement is found in the record, the statement is
inconsistent with the lower Court's own view that the consideration for the use of the
tractor "is too burdensome for a single person to uphold." The record shows that there
was complete accord between the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Deloso regarding the
acquisition and subsequent disposition of the tractors in question. Their acts were done
officially and publicly, without any attempt at disguise or dissimulation. There is no
indication of such intimacy or closeness of relation between Mayor Deloso, or any
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, on the one hand, and any of the lessees, on the other,
as could reasonably engender a suspicion that the former had cause to grant unwarranted
benefits to the latter. Considered in its entirety, the evidence is, as the Solicitor General
manifests, "insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The conscience remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative
character of the . . . (declared basis of) the judgment of conviction."

DECISION

NARVASA, C . J : p
The petitioner, Amor D. Deloso, is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Zambales.
Prior to being elected Governor, he was the Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan,
Zambales. He stands charged with violating, sometime in the 1978, Section 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 1 in that while Mayor of Botolan
". . . taking advantage of his public and official position, he did . . . wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to . . . (five [5] private
individuals) thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his
official functions by issuing to . . . (each of them) a tractor purchased by the
Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the
Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost without any agreement
as to the payment of rentals for the use of said tractor . . . thereby causing undue
injury to the Municipality of Botolan."
The names of the five (5) persons to whom the tractors were allegedly given, and the
dates they received possession of the tractors in question, are as follows, viz.:
1. Alfonso Lim, Jr. February 3, 1978
2. Daniel Ferrer April, 1978
3. Maximiano Quinsay February 3, 1978
4. Augusto Deloso -do-
5. Isidro Encarnacion -do-
The charges involving these particular persons were set out in five (5) separate
informations filed in 1984. The indictments were identically formulated except, of
course, as regards the names of the identified beneficiaries and were respectively
docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Cases Numbered 9200, 9201, 9202, 9203 and
9204.
It was not, however, until some five years later, or on January 6, 1989 that Deloso was
arraigned. This was due to various motions filed by him with the Sandiganbayan seeking
either a reinvestigation of the charges, or quashal of the informations, or consolidation of
the accusations in one pleading, as well as an unsuccessful recourse to this Court
impugning the Sandiganbayan's resolutions on those initiatives. On arraignment, Deloso
entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed as a matter of course.
After the prosecution rested its case, Deloso filed a demurrer to evidence impugning the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in all five (5) criminal actions.
The demurrer was denied as regards Cases Numbered 9200, 9201 and 9204, but granted
as to Cases Numbered 9202 2 and 9203. 3 The Sandiganbayan agreed with Deloso that in
these last two cases, the prosecution had indeed failed to establish a prima facie case
against him. Deloso then presented evidence in his behalf in the remaining three (3)
cases.
On October 18, 1991 the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision in the three cases
(Numbered 9200, 9201 and 9204). In all said cases, it found Deloso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and
sentenced him in each case "to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS; to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office; to indemnify the government . . . 4 ; and to pay the
costs." 5
Upon certain of the material antecedents recounted in the Sandiganbayan's decision, the
Court observes no serious disagreement between the prosecution and the defense. These
are the following:
1. On recommendation of an ad hoc committee, the Sangguniang Bayan, of Botolan
authorized and caused the obtention by the Municipality (through the mayor) of a loan
from the Land Bank of the Philippines, for the explicit purpose of purchasing five (5)
farm tractors from the Gregorio Araneta Machines, Inc. to aid the farmers in the area "in
tilling their respective agricultural land so as to undertake full production." 6
2. However, after acquisition of the tractors in December, 1977, and public
announcements that the machines were available for lease to farmers on an hourly or
daily basis, not one farmer opted to make use thereof. This negative reaction was due, in
Deloso's view, to the following circumstances:
a) at that time, the need of the farmers therefor "was not yet imperative;" cdphil

b) the demand for sugar for export had diminished, causing the Central
Azucarera de Bataan to slow down operations; and
c) the proposed irrigation system in Botolan failed to operate as expected. 7
3. To make the best of a bad situation, and to prevent deterioration of the tractors from
non-use, the Sangguniang Bayan conceived a plan to lease them to "affluent landowners"
to be selected by the municipality, who "would be responsible for maintenance and repair
and . . . (payment of) annual rentals equivalent to 1/5 of the annual amortization
payments payable by the municipality to the Land Bank of the Philippines." A committee
was created to screen and evaluate the prospective lessees. 8 The persons chosen as
lessees were (a) Alfonso Lim, Jr., (b) Daniel Ferrer, (c) Maximiano Quinsay, 9 (d)
Augusto D. Deloso, 10 and (e) Isidoro Encarnacion, Jr. Mayor Deloso had no part in the
selection. The award of the tractors to the beneficiaries was not made through canvass or
public bidding.

4. The tractors were turned over to the selected lessees without any written contract; and
it was not until the tractors had been actually delivered to the lessees and used by them
that a resolution was adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan setting out generally the
conditions for the use of the tractors, this act being characterized as an "afterthought" by
the Sandiganbayan. 11
5. The tractors were returned to the Municipality after a year or so. The machines
eventually deteriorated over time, and were later "sold as junk." After applying the
proceeds of the sale and other amounts paid as rentals to liquidation of the loan obligation
owing to the Land Bank, the Municipality was still left with a balance due to the Bank of
P300,000.00 or so. 12
It is in light of the foregoing undisputed facts, in relation to the evidence regarding other
facts submitted by the parties, that the Sandiganbayan arrived at the following
conclusions, to wit:
1. "The farm tractors were irresponsibly delivered to the individual beneficiaries . . .
without so much as a piece of paper to evidence delivery." 13
2. "There was no written agreement entered into between the municipality, on the one
hand, and the aforesaid beneficiaries, on the other, (1) as to the nature of the transactions;
(2) as to payment of consideration therefor; (3) as to maintenance and repair; and, (4) as
to period of use or utilization by the beneficiaries . . ." 14
3. "There was no bond which ordinarily is posted by tractor recipients to secure the
proper performance by them of the terms and conditions of their alleged contract or even
for the purpose of security for loss or damage from malevolent handling." 1 5
4. "The beneficiaries paid nary a cent to the Municipality for the use of the tractors until
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation had started to question them on the legality
of their possession of the equipment. . . .;" and "only after July, 1983." 16 "(T)he tractors
were given out to these beneficiaries without thought of compensation for their use . . ."
17

5. "The grant of farm tractors to the beneficiaries were (sic) not made through canvass or
public bidding. . . ."
From the verdict of conviction of October 18, 1991, Deloso has appealed to this Court.
Here, he prays for acquittal, imputing the following errors to the Court a quo, viz.:
1) having "wrongly made many damaging conclusions that are highly speculative,
without evidentiary basis and/or contrary to law and evidence," including "the crucial
finding that there was no rental agreement between the lessees and the Municipality of
Botolan, a conclusion that goes against the evidence of record, including the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses themselves;" 18
2) having "improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach its own witness (Ferrer)
through the use of a prior, allegedly contradictory affidavit; and subsequently . . . (using)
this affidavit . . . not merely as impeaching evidence, but as substantive proof to establish
the truth of the statement therein (that no conditions were imposed on Ferrer when a
tractor was issued to him), for the purpose of contradicting Ferrer's court testimony that
he received the tractor on the understanding that he would pay rent, among other
prestations;" 19
3) having made "a statement of economic policy (that it was wrong for the Municipality
of Botolan to engage in the business of leasing farm tractors in competition with private
enterprise) and . . . using petitioner Deloso's participation in the formulation of said
policy as a basis for his conviction;" 20
4) having assumed "without proof that the Municipality of Botolan, through then Mayor
Deloso, violated an unspecified COA Circular allegedly fixing rental rates for
government equipment and in concluding on the basis of said assumption that the
petitioner acted with 'manifest partiality and evident bad faith;'" 21
5) having concluded "that through the disputed lease contracts (which respondent Court
refused to recognize allegedly due to absence of consideration), petitioner Deloso had
caused undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan and given unwarranted benefits to the
lessees; and that said act was done through manifest partiality and evident bad faith." 22
The gravamen of the three (3) offenses ascribed to Deloso 23 the other two accusations
against him, as already pointed out, having been dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence,
supra 24 is that he "issued" (gave possession and custody) to each of three persons
(Daniel Ferrer, Isidoro Encarnacion, Jr., and Alfonso Lim, Jr.) "a tractor purchased by the
Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for
lease to local farmers at reasonable cost without any agreement as to the payment of
rentals for the use of said tractor . . . thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of
Botolan." 25
The evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense, proves the contrary.
All the three "beneficiaries" above mentioned: Ferrer, Encarnacion, and Lim, were
presented by the prosecution as its witnesses; and all of them positively declared that they
received the tractors from the Municipality of Botolan upon the explicit understanding
that they would pay rentals therefor, and keep them in good repair. cdphil

Ferrer, described by the Sandiganbayan as "a 64-year old U.S. Navy retiree," 26 testified
that when he got one of the tractors, he was told by Mayor Deloso that he was bound to
maintain the tractor in good repair and house it in a secure place, 27 as well as pay rental
therefor - equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the amortization due on the loan from the Land
Bank used for the purchase of the tractor, the precise amount to be subsequently
determined, the mayor's estimate being P60,000.00 per year; 28 that while using the
tractor, and after the Municipal Treasurer had talked to him, he had in fact paid P5,000.00
in concept of rental; 29 and that he realizes that he still is bound to pay arrears in rentals to
the Municipality of Botolan. 30
Similarly, the second beneficiary, Encarnacion, referred to by the Sandiganbayan as "a
merchant-farmer by occupation," 31 deposed that (a) he was aware, on receiving the
tractor allotted to him, that he was obliged to "share the payment of the amortization (to
the Land Bank)," although the precise amount was yet undetermined, there being merely
a "calculation" that the amount he would have to pay was P30,000.00 every six months;
32 (b) that he knew that he was obligated to maintain the tractor in good order and secure
it in a safe place, at his own expense; and that (c) he had paid P10,000.00 on account of
said amortization. 33
The other lessee, Lim, a businessman, according to the Sandiganbayan, 34 testified to
substantially the same things: that Mayor Deloso had told him of his obligations in
connection with the award to him of the use of a tractor by the Municipality, one of
which was to pay 1/5 of the amortization payment due the Land Bank, amounting to
about P60,000.00 a year; 35 and that he had in fact paid something on account of the
rental, P7,000.00. 36
Of no little significance is that the facts established by these proofs of the prosecution
relative to the lease are the same as those demonstrated by the evidence of the defense. 37
Fredesvinda Encarnacion of the Integrated Health Office of Iba, the wife of Isidoro
Encarnacion, Jr., corroborated her husband's declarations to the effect that he was aware
of his obligation to pay an annual rental of P60,000.00 for the use of the tractor, and that
in truth her husband had paid P10,000.00 on account of said rentals in 1978 and 1979
pursuant to requests therefor of the Botolan Municipal Treasurer. 38
Mrs. Bernardita Sison the incumbent Municipal Treasurer of Botolan, appointed in
August, 1980, and who held the position of Assistant Municipal Treasurer and Municipal
Secretary from April, 1978 to December, 1979 testified that she addressed letters to
the lessees of the farm tractors in July, 1978, in July, 1979, and on other subsequent
occasions, requiring payment of the rentals for the tractors; and that in response,
payments were made by the lessees in connection with which official receipts were
issued in due course. Mrs. Sison was however able to produce copies only of the letters
addressed to Alfonso Lim, and only the official receipts evidencing the latter's rental
payments, the others having been lost or destroyed. According to her, these official
receipts, and other relevant documents still available, show rental payments made for the
tractors at various times during the period from 1979 to 1983 in the total amount of
P69,978.03. 39
Petitioner Deloso himself took the witness stand to give evidence in his defense. His
testimony is more detailed than that of the other defense witnesses, but as regards the
terms of the lease, is substantially of the same tenor. He declared that because no farmer
came forward to avail of the public offer to all and sundry for lease of the tractors on an
hourly or daily basis, the Sangguniang Bayan decided to choose five responsible lessees
who would be answerable for the upkeep of the machines and would pay an annual rental
equivalent to one-fifth of the amortization payment due to the Land Bank of the
Philippines. The lessees were selected by a screening committee of said Sangguniang
Bayan. The Mayor had asked that the terms of the lease be embodied in a resolution, but
the Sanggunian had declined at the time, professing its inability to do so because copies
of the loan documents were not yet in its possession. What Deloso did was to instruct the
Municipal Treasurer to incorporate the general terms and conditions of the lease in a
memorandum receipt to be issued to each lessee on or about the time of delivery to them
of the tractors. 40 This was done, albeit quite imperfectly; the receipts set out the
following undertaking (aside, of course, from the acknowledgment of delivery of the
tractors and accessories): 41

"I undertake that by receiving and taking possession of the above items, I agree
to all the terms and conditions which the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales
may impose upon and I commit myself to sign any document necessary
thereof."LexLib

Deloso also deposed that he personally explained the terms of the lease to Ferrer,
Encarnacion and Lim, when they came to see him about the matter; and when the loan
documents were eventually transmitted by the Land Bank to the Mayor's Office, the
Sangguniang Bayan finally passed Resolution No. 19 dated March 30, 1979 (Exh. 21)
putting in writing the terms of the parol agreements respecting the lease of the tractors. 42
Full corroboration of petitioner Deloso's evidence also proceeds from the testimony of
Dr. Tito Doble y Blanco at present the Mayor of Botolan, and from 1976 to 1979, a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of that town, representing the professional sector. 43
It will thus be seen that the Sandiganbayan's conclusions fly in the teeth of the recorded
evidence submitted by both the prosecution and the defense.
It is not true that, as the lower Court alleges, the tractors "were irresponsibly delivered to
the individual beneficiaries without so much as a piece of paper to evidence delivery." 44
As just stated, memorandum receipts were in fact prepared by the municipality and
signed by the lessees. 45
It is not true that as the informations state, said tractors were delivered to the lessees
"without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of said tractor . . .," 46 or
that, as the Sandiganbayan avers, "the tractors were given out to these beneficiaries
without thought of compensation for their use . . ." 47 For all the witnesses of the defense
as well as of the Government uniformly attested to the reality of verbal agreements
between the Municipality and the tractors lessees, i.e., that all said lessees were made
aware of the obligations they were assuming prior to the delivery to them of the tractors;
and that on their taking delivery thereof, they all bound themselves in writing "to all the
terms and conditions which the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales may impose . . . ." 48
And the fact that the lease agreements were not initially reduced to writing, this having
been done only some time later by the Sangguniang Bayanthrough a resolution adopted
for that purpose, certainly does not make the transactions anomalous or felonious, nor
preclude the generation of the contractual relation of lessor and lessee between the
Municipality and the farmers. It is axiomatic that contracts may be entered into in any
form, orally or in writing, or parol in part and written in part, it being needful merely that
the essential requisites for their validity be present a precept of general application
unless "the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, . . . " 49 Quite obviously, the lease of the tractors in this case is not one of
those required by law to be in writing or other particular form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable. cdrep

It is also not true that the "beneficiaries paid nary a cent to the Municipality for the use of
the tractors until agents of the National Bureau of Investigation had started to question
them on the legality of their possession of the equipment. . . .;" and "only after July,
1983." 50 The unrebutted and uncontradicted declarations on the witness stand of all three
(3) lessees is that they did make partial payments of rentals as early as 1979; and said
declarations are entirely consistent with the testimony of an impartial witness, Mrs.
Bernardita Sison who held the positions of Assistant Municipal Treasurer and
Municipal Secretary of Botolan, concurrently, from April, 1978 to December, 1979. Mrs.
Sison's evidence is to the effect that rental payments were made by the users of the
tractors at various times during the period from 1979 to 1983 in the total amount of
P69,978.03. 51 These rental payments are in fact summarized by the Sandiganbayan in its
decision, 52 as follows:
"1979 Rental on Equipment (tractors) P20,000.00
1980 Rental of Tractors 13,160.00
1981 Rental of Tractors 6,500.00
1982 Rental of Tractors 11,222.00
1983 Rental of Tractors 19,096.00."
Nor is it correct to conclude that the lessees made payment of rentals only because the
National Bureau of Investigation had commenced in 1983 an investigation concerning
their possession and use of the tractors. Nothing in the declarations of the lessees
themselves justifies such a conclusion. On the contrary, such a conclusion is negated by
the testimony of Bernardita Sison, just adverted to. Much less may an inference to drawn
that they had agreed to pay rentals in consideration of their not being made defendants in
cases to be filed against Mayor Deloso. 53 There is simply no evidence at all on which
this inference may be predicted.
The absence of a bond does not make the transactions criminal either. There is no proof
whatever that, under the circumstances, such a bond was required by any law or
regulation of the "tractor recipients to secure the proper performance by them of the
terms and conditions of their alleged contract or even for the purpose of security for loss
or damage from malevolent handling." 54
The lower Court's opinion that the "grant of (the) farm tractors to the beneficiaries were
(sic) not made through canvass or public bidding, . . . " is inconsequential. There is no
evidence that this is a requirement for leases of government equipment, one exigible of
the petitioner Mayor, prescinding from the fact that under the circumstances, a public
bidding would have been a futile exercise, given the reluctance of the farmers in the area,
as already mentioned, to accept the tractors by way of lease. 55
The lower court declared prosecution witness Daniel Ferrer to be unworthy of belief. It
cited inconsistencies between Ferrer's sworn statement given to the NBI in 1983, on the
one hand, and an affidavit subsequently executed by him in 1989 and his testimony
before the Sandiganbayan, on the other. The Court a quo spurned Ferrer's testimony
despite his proffered explanation of the specified discrepancies, and his categorical
assertion that his later affidavit and his testimony before the Sandiganbayan reflected the
truth. The lower Court theorized that Ferrer had been suborned by Deloso, a theory it
draws from Ferrer's admission that prior to the execution of his affidavit, he had been
invited by Deloso to his beach house to talk to the latter's lawyer "concerning the
tractors;" and that he had accepted the invitation and had in fact spoken to the attorney.
However, these occurrences are too tenuous a premise to support a conclusion of
subordination on the part of Deloso, "by himself or through his lawyers and
subordinates."
What is worse is that on the same speculative predicate that Ferrer had had a
conversation with the attorney of Deloso at the latter's beach house, without more the
Court a quo extended its theory of subordination to the other two (2) lessees, Encarnacion
and Lim, opining that they, too, had been induced by the mayor to execute recantations of
prior statements. No such recantations were ever made by Encarnacion and Lim.
Moreover, the fact that Ferrer might have been induced to make such a recantation is not
competent proof that his fellow lessees were also induced to make similar recantations, a
proposition that rests upon the same logical foundation, and would seem to the Court as
acceptable, as the familiar doctrine of res inter alios acta.
The Court a quo completely ignored the plain circumstance that Ferrer's testimony is
corroborated in all its material aspects by the other witness of the Government as well as
the defense. What is more, even conceding that Ferrer's testimony could be correctedly
discarded and disregarded as self-contradictory, no reason exists to reject the evidence
given by the other prosecution witnesses-lessees, specially considering that, as already
repeatedly pointed out, their evidence is substantially identical to that of the defense
witnesses.
Also incorrect is the declaration that Mayor Deloso did not follow the requirement of the
"Local Government Audit Office, LGAO, of the Commission on Audit . . . that (private
individuals renting) government equipment or machineries must . . . (pay) rental fees
based on rates (set) by the Department of Public Works and Highways." Apart from the
fact that no proof of any such requirement is found in the record, the statement is
inconsistent with the lower Court's own view that the consideration for the use of the
tractor "is too burdensome for a single person to uphold." 56
The record shows that there was complete accord between the Sangguniang Bayan and
Mayor Deloso regarding the acquisition and subsequent disposition of the tractors in
question. Their acts were done officially and publicly, without any attempt at disguise or
dissimulation. There is no indication of such intimacy or closeness of relation between
Mayor Deloso, or any member of the Sangguniang Bayan, on the one hand, and any of
the lessees, on the other, as could reasonably engender a suspicion that the former had
cause to grant unwarranted benefits to the latter.
Considered in its entirety, the evidence is, as the Solicitor General manifests, "insufficient
to induce that moral certainty of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience remains
uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the . . .
(declared basis of) the judgment of conviction." LLjur

What has already been said makes unnecessary the consideration and resolution of the
other issues raised in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on October 18, 1991 in
Criminal Cases Numbered 9200, 9201 and 9204 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, and the petitioner, Amor D. Deloso, is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged with
costs de officio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
||| (Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 104805-07, [January 13, 1993])
[G.R. Nos. L-68379-81. September 22, 1986.]

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; DISMISSAL OF ACTION; ISSUES BECAME MOOT AND

ACADEMIC; NOT A CASE OF. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and
the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a
convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues
involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on
the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no
longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right,
though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; GIVEN FULL
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES FROM BEGINNING TO END AND
ALL MATTERS RELATED THERETO. We believe that in making the
Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear
and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto,
including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
3. ID.; ID.; "CONTEST"; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A RESTRICTIVE MEANING.
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary,
it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words
used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving
the title or claims as title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of
the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless
to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the
same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the
Constitution.
4. ID.; ID.; PHRASE "ELECTION RETURNS AND QUALIFICATION," DEFINED
IN THE SAME SENSE UNDER SEC. 2(2) AND SEC. 3, ART. XII-C,
CONSTITUTION. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred
to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning
the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his delivery or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
5. ID.; ID.; ISSUED ON ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS; TO BE
HEARD AND DECIDED ONLY BY SITTING EN BAND INSOFAR AS THEY
APPLIED TO MEMBERS OF B.P. All these came under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members
of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF B.P. TO BE HEARD AND
DECIDED BY SITTING EN BANC; PURPOSE. As correctly observed by the
petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of
the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was
to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-
familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will
and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre-proclamation proceedings, being
summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division,
without the cause and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by
the Commission en banc. After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might
then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very
judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be
sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his
office would have already expired.
7. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS GUARANTY; VIOLATED IN CASE AT
BAR. Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but
accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due
process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark
of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on
the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he
obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased.
8. ID.; ID.; COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE; INDISPENSABLE
IMPERATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. This Court has repeatedly and consistently
demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to
no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can
go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point
in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
9. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; INTENDED TO INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
RUDIMENTS OF FAIR PLAY. Due process is intended to insure that confidence
by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make
the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established
facts and the pertinent law.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEMANDS THAT THE JUDGE INHIBIT HIMSELF OUT OF A
SENSE OF DELICADEZA. The relationship of the judge with one of the parties
may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where
this is probable or even only possible, due possible, due process demands that the
judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he
must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have
recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For
refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceedings null and
void.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUST DECIDE
ALL ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE BATASAN
PAMBANSA SITTING EN BANC. Although this petition has become moot and
academic, the decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly
elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique must be set aside or, more
accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. J. Feliciano reaches
this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-
Herrera, J., that all election contests involving members of the former Batasan
Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not
distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor
between "cases" and "contests."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HAS
JURISDICTION OVER CONTESTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE BATASAN
PAMBANSA. I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second
Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent,
Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique,
should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without distinction
as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3
of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
 DECISION

CRUZ, J :p

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as
a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as
simple as that, Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including
that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of
suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of
those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts.
The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy
more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the
KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections,
the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the
climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against
supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling
party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts
to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by
the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not
by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation,
already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in
favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for
the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This
ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the
Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed
the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent both of whom have
gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing this
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important
purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that
the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no
longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right,
though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that
elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a
desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal
listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented
and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did
not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a
rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity,
and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included
the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the decision and provoked
the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness
of elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special
feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no
less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal
perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their
supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power. LLjur

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent
attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It
is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of
his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces
without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian
of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted
the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the
tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of
its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many
opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the
election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically,
the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated
by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of
the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San
Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the
ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June
7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and
to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board
of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally,
on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of
this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners
Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the
ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion
had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division
of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23,
1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election? LibLex

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials."
Section 3 provides:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision."
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have
arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the
pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the
noble profession of the law despite all the canards that have been flung against
it exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of
the truth.
The petitioner complains that the proclamation made by the Second Division is
invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa
come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it
should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance
of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests
need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be in fact, should
be filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible
distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply
put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner
and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could
be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant
with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble
by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.

A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for
the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also
to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made
when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner
nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member
of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications
could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding
election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the
general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc
requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang
Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be
permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily,
subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under
the general heading of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising
before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the
exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the
proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of
its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as
sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter
affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no
contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc could not do what
one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation
controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear
and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and
city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to
the election protest, In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then
judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would
begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any
time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial
power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the
whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was
the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an
irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all
contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution
intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to
end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the
proclamation of the winners. Cdpr

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now
called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws,
having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as
the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
 "Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation. The
Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies
and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It
may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and
hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or
annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof."
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of
public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or
tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore
could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth
Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed,
to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-
proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C, Section
2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of
a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of
1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution
was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could
be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee
although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it
should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words
used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving
the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of
the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless
to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the
same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the
Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality
as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
"qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. LLjur
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and,
under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and
decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard
and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule
except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that
cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-
protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the
election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre-
proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by
only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have
otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to
rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the
division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself
with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already
expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre-proclamation
question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the
Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the
greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also
allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of
the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest,
as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the
Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other
tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission. A decision made on
the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution.
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre-proclamation
controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body
sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard
and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded
cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of
law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free
society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground
that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted
on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14

Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in
power at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion
and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the
decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was.
Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer
of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His
conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved
the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision. cdll

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice.
They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with
what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort
the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only
possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense
of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner
Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-
known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second
Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act,
and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place,
not the least significant of which was the February revolution of "people power"
that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this
captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly
purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent
has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the
Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the
previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as
has been suggested not without reason, to send the records of this case to the
archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down
in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many
kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in
hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did
not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a
singular and all exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And
though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot
and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his
people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would
impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the
breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made
that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than
eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late
Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother
of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost
all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as
so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent
us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying "I am 82 years old now. I
am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I
die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons,' May I also add that the
people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections
will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon." LLpr
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake
of the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all
the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A
new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look
forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall
be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine
ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will
be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny.
If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until
then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated
July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ ., concur.
Teehankee, C . J ., I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.
Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:

I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the
COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F.
Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique, should
be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction
as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3
of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.

FELICIANO, J ., concurring:

I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and
academic, the decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly
elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more
accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result
on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.:
that all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must
be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish between
"pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and
"contests."
[G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986.]

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P.

BENGZON, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO
GARCHITORENA, ** ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C.
LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR.,
CECILIA MUOZ PALMA, JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ,
JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ,
EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA,
CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS,
VICENTE JAYME, *** , petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and
Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members),
JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN.
FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG.
GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO,
COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT.
LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT.
JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE
MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT.
FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT.
ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT.
LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO
DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO
MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO,
AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, respondents.

Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.

Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
 Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FINDINGS OF COMMISSION

THAT PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS,
UPHELD; CASE AT BAR. The Commission submitted the following
recommendation: "Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that
the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also
predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered
thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable court,
that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and
hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a
mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther
Custodio, et al.,' be granted." The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings
and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record set that the then President
(codenamed Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted
and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino Galman murder
case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. The Court finds that the
Commission's Report and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence
and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with
a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the
prosecutorial and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at
sifting, the chaff from the grain, the Commission properly appraised the evidences
presented and denials made by public respondents.
2. ID.; ID.; MOCKERY OF JUDICIAL PROCESS; A CASE OF. The record shows
suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely,
misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to
corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
As graphically depicted in the Report, and borned out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases
against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the
streets and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy
scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang
conference, would accomplish the two principal clamor for the suspected killers to be
charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double
jeopardy. Indeed, the secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President
called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez
and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them
how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without parallel
and precedent in out annals and jurisprudence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRET CONFERENCE AT MALACAANG AND THE ENTIRE
PROSECUTION PANEL REGARDING IMMINENT FILING OF THE CRIMINAL
CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED; VITIATED ALL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN. The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10,
1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the
criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice
Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel
Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under
out penal laws. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their ready
acquiescence thereto the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified. . . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent
action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacaang Palace on January 10, 1985."
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW COLLUSION AS TO
HANDLING AND TREATMENT OF CASES. No court whose Presiding Justice has
received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree
made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which
is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by
law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondent at
the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio
its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly General Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of
the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all
these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered
before a neutral and impartial court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL; DECLARED UNLAWFUL AND VOID AB INITIO;
CASE AT BAR. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render
impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the
non-trial of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful
and void ab initio.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE
PROSECUTION IS DENIED DUE PROCESS.- No double jeopardy. It is settled
doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the
trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar, "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOID WHERE DENIAL OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS

APPARENT. "The cardinal present is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the
State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of
the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-
30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN APPLICABLE. "Respondent Judge's
dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same
does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution
to due process. "In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy."
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the
case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was
forcefully disposed of by the Court in People Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable
here, as follows: "That is the general rule and pre-supposes a valid judgment. As earlier
pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. . . .
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE INVOKED IN A SHAM AND MOCK TRIAL. More
so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as
we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal
and total absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and
reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in
about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)"
and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as
compared to the nil situation for the defense.
10. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID WHERE VERDICT WAS DICTATED, COERCED
AND SCRIPTED. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in
the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. Such judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as
an outlaw." It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people.
11. ID.; ID.; COURTS; CALLED UPON TO RENDER JUSTICE WHERE IT IS DUE.
"Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail, the scales
must be balance. It is not to be dispensed for he accused alone. The interests of the
society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily
spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also
mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where
justice is due.
12. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DURING PENDENCY OF FINAL ACTION OF SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTES
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of
Valdez vs. Aquilzan, wherein the Court is setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that
"prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court.
But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by
deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
13. ID.; ID.; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; OPINION IN LUZON
BROKERAGE CO., INC. vs. MARITIME BLDG., CO., INC. (36 SCRA 305 [1978],
NOT APPLICABLE. Respondent invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., is inappropriate. The writer therein held that
a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital
changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public
policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro
forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending
so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration). This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the
denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was
admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is not being resolved within five
months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who
were heard by the Court only last August 26th. Then the second motion for
reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the
time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e., the
secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen
months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the
Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had
dictated and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the
Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for
reconsideration.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; GRANTING THEREOF JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE
CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NOT PREVIOUSLY
DISCLOSED TO THE COURT. Considering that certain significant facts and
circumstances not previously disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission
constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity of the same, to
be duly established by sufficient evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case . .
.;" and that there exists "adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist and
which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the outcome of the
case; . . ." I join in granting petitioner's second motion for reconsideration.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES;
RULE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. As it is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate
its position and to lay out before respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could
have helped that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task. "A
public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case but that justice and every definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." (Suarez v. Platon, 69
Phil. 556 [1940]). "He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the
court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that
the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the
guilty may not escape unpunished" (People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453 [1948]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL;
SANDIGANBAYAN; EQUALLY CULPABLE FOR MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE;
CASE AT BAR. Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from
beginning to end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and all liability, is equally culpable for
miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which "requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; NULL AND VOID

AB INITIO; VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS. The proceedings below,
having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the detriment of the State and the People,
were invalid and the judgment rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no
trial at all in contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of
double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the
proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W. 757; State vs. O'Day 185
So. 290). The lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment
would make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State,
242 S.W. 1047).
4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ATTACHES EVEN IF COLLUSION TAKES
PLACE AND THE ACCUSED WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE SAME; PRINCIPLE
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The accused, however, argue that double
jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did
take place, they were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only either
as accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged offense involved only a
cover-up in the investigation of the crime so that, whatever pressure was exerted could
only have benefited the principals, consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put
them twice in jeopardy. It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a
conviction cannot be avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App.
222). However, that exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the
prosecution and the Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it
be said that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder charge
in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused could no longer be
prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into
principals, accomplices and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail
during the trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of
protecting them for subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A
verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does
not put him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same
offense (State vs. Lee, 30A, 1110, 65 Conn. 265, 48 Am. S.R. 202, 27 L. RA. 498).

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J : p

Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the
third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former
Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the
imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses
alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose
jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but
mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the
General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the
President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when
he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming." 1 This
followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the
opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971 elections (when eight
persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator
Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971.
The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never been
known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil
courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to
undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's
refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine national
reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort
away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport
on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into
the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed
by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was)
technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was
then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman,
although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up
from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the
military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the
killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels
as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military
version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the
evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military
had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the
way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free
world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning
and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's
funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom. LibLex
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on
August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national
shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and
local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth
through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22,
1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings
in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194
witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority
and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark
another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day
ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially
by the then President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a
minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final
resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better
known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was submitted
on the following day to the then President who coldly received them and could scarcely
conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can
live with your conscience with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando
Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary]
that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the
military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers
who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service
stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn,
of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that the
majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of
the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who
were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther
Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented
without his intervention."Cdpr

The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue
to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the
President may thereafter direct to be taken." The four-member majority report (also
prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and
intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our
traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing" They
wrote:cdphil

"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former
Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to
uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over
irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test,
the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place among the
sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and
justice are a way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of
the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading
Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been haunting
this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and
order, economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing
number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our
country the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however,
convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these
institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble
mission in the service of our country and people.
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of
what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority can be trusted
not to go beyond its proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity and indifference and
neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values
held sacred by freedom-loving people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public
officials should regard public service as a reflection of human ideals in which
the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that
followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the
Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem
and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all
other considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and
statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and
insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view
that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told
David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on September 9,
1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I would
have known somehow . . . Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know how
they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in
May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict
earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the
guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy)."
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are
the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence still
proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there were
intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing.'" 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of
absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e
are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has chosen to
implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion
and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you
have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended "My very best
wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he
announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo
Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will
probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and
Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five
incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present
action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present
vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the
Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and
that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the
truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a
temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November
20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. 10
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order
prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit
a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his
comment. cdll

But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order
issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently
was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his
partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to
respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining
the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set
for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the
respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due
process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence
is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be
restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the
crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.
This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted
the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary
to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In opposition,
respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case
had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad
Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration
was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino
Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to
whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal.
cdrep

On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15

Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April

11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he
was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in
his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged
attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted
perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation and
actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against
herein private-party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There
is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures
can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15a He submitted that "even as
he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in
any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable
Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he
would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been caused may be
righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises
may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had
done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New
Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no
objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said
cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of
April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and
decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if
it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably
alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to
the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent
Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he
passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had
nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any
lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by
this Court to settle the note-passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the
fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was dooned to an ignominous end.
Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was
sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto
Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by
the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as principals was
forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former
President) summoned to Malacaang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the
Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice)
and all the members of the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former
President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as
principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the
contents thereof. LLjur
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot
Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory,
to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former President
became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino
and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel.
Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It will be bloody . . .
Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not
know what to do' . . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is
only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious;' . . . 'the boys were frantic when
they heard that they will be charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic
approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political and
legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court. Politically, as it
will become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case
 towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the
other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted, double
jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the resolution be
revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was
ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and
Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective
institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding
officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in
four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na lang kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his
desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as
well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with
sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all
involves in the trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and
injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to
say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations
with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of
the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacaang; the
installation of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle
witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by
U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of
rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier
disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first
making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-
kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil
liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the
prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil
liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal." He "associated himself with the
motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would
require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body
of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners'
claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a
double jeopardy claim. prLL

Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its
denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to file a
direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence
of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked
that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985,
with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct
action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to
establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.

After petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate
Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear
and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and
pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their
findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on
19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986. On the said last day,
respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the
projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely
corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan
Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in
capsulized form, as follows:
"1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the
Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and
Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six
(26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be
charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator
Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
 2. When Malacaang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before
the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a
draft Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos
summoned Justice Fernandez, the three members of the Special Investigating
Panel, and Justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacaang in the early evening
of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement
with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the
findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the
advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as
planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of
double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied
bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with capital
offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be 'categorized' so
that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest
possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacaang conference were followed to the
letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in
the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the
special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its
assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment
of witnesses, recantation of witnesses who gave adverse testimony before the
Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of
proceedings, and even in the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-
Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on
those involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent course of
the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion
against complying with the Malacaang directive, Justice Herrera played his
role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case, as stage-managed from Malacaang and performed by willing dramatis
personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omni-present
influence of an authoritarian ruler."
The Commission submitted the following recommendation. prcd
 "Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided
the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to
fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have
otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the
Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better
opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said
case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully
recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in
Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther
Custodio, et al.,' be granted."
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the
Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties
and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for
the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof
and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by
the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then
President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a
scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who
tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to
be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public
record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of
141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and
judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff
from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and
denials made by public respondents, thus:
"The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in
a manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide
international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those
then in power who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive
to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the
case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof
which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
"The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish thus purpose . . .
"President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From
the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals
of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator
Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by
evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera
on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that
the filing of the charge in court would at least mollify public demands and
possibly prevent further street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that
such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are
charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the
doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
"After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it,
but with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or
accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused having
thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of
who would try the case and how long it would take to be finished.
"According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point
blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No
similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-
day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have been
given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try
the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to
a particular Justice thereof.
"It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such
presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact
that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division
headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the
circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the
Malacaang conference wherein the said directive was given . . .

"The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as
to how long it would take him to finish the case.
"The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an
agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;'
and that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to
the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate,' did not receive any denial or
contradiction either on the part of Justice Fernandez or Justice Pamaran. (No
other person present in the conference was presented by the respondents.
Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present
Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any
reason having been given therefor.).
"The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the
mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is
that pressure from Malacaang had indeed been made to bear on both the court
and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case.
The intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the
one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his
instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the
nature of the government prevailing at that time which enabled the then head of
state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or
stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the public
eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those directly involved
were called to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the Palace.
Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors
in the reception hall waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention
was ever made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some
fifteen (15) months later when the former President was no longer around.
"President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted
to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it
personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the
presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome implications
on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from
their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the
existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went
there out of 'curiosity,' or 'out of respect to the Office of the President,' or that it
would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of
mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of
capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang
and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining,
are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. Their abject deference
to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not
having been given seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said
 it was not that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did
the talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be
said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential
pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacaang
Palace on January 10, 1985." 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is
on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to
such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective
handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in
the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino-
Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and instances it
enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and
Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-
six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals,
Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and
recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be
completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no
sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The majority
of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of the
accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may
hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of
the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest
category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented in
the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of
action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all
the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for
categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacaang
instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization
came only after the then President's instruction at Malacaang when Gen. Ver's counsel
Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November,
1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacaang
conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special
Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the
crime of double murder. 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never
denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit
'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a press
conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons
for them to go to Malacaang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses: "Realizing, no doubt, that a
party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts
were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby
assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were
sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse
witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying
or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies
before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at
the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Raas who also testified before the Board "disappeared
all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the
efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya, eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful
flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing)
sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August
20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an
undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to
Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in accordance
with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English
transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there
was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in
Nippon-go. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice
Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running
away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him."
Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday (August
24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could testify the following
Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the
Commission reported that Cdpr

". . . Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed

testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts
exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case
of Wakamiya . . . She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having
been hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked,
her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the
local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its
manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William
Farias offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farias of
Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to warn her not to
testify; that, later, Rudy and William Farias offered her two million pesos
supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the
dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons
responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from testifying.
 "It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or
perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by Justice Fernandez of the displeasure
expressed by Olympus at Justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms.
Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the
birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's
testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her
testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness stand. In the course
of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the
defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be
asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having
coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit 'D'); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for
about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making most
of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing
of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the
brownout was limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having
affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building Justice Herrera
declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was
located beside the room occupied by Malacaang people who were keeping
track of the proceedings."
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing
that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on
September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the
name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took
them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board,
Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a
neighbor named Rogelio Taruc. They have been missing since then, despite his attempts
to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons
because they said Marcos was in power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National
Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he
appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen: "While it is true that the U.S.
airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to
divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not necessarily
contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was
killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that
such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,'
it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to accomplish the same
purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece of
evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent or
wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite
minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of
the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by
Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally
uncalled for.LLjur

"4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented

5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the
Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the
testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a
motion for the reconsideration of said denial, for the reason that it would be futile to do
so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same . . . His posture . . . is, in the
least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as
soon as possible, if not of something else.
"6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-
forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such
directive having been complied with to the letter . . .
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President
Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the
Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a
division thereof. The evidence before the Commission on how the case
happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that
such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran . . .
Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the
respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was
not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like
to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the
Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were present during the
supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice Pamaran as
regards the said raffle.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case
were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the
members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18
minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual
assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is need
for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary
requirements were done in this case within the limited time available therefor,
 the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people
would ring with truth.
"What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been
actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence
on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the
decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his division . .
."
7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the
City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the
Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail.
The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that
point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers.
Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the
Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito
Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime . . .
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by
Malacaang personnel. "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the
Court had been monitored by Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening
and to take remedial measures as may be necessary, Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the President of
the Philippines'" were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There was a room in
the Sandiganbayan, mischievously called 'war room', wherein military and Malacaang
personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings," the close monitoring by Malacaang
showed its results oh several occasions specified in the Report. Malacaang was
immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence in Justice Herrera's
office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the
Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino
Diego, Malacaang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of
Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI
agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an
undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be
deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed
deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding: "It is abundantly clear
that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be
handled. He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with.
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of
the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to
accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable
both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the
foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in
the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.

"In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. . . . It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard
ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most
logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total
absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to
pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly,
they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person
accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. . . .
"Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice
Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being prepared,
Justice Augusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should
be convicted, he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to
Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that
Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986,
p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this statement
(which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony of
Justice Herrera remained unrebutted." (Emphasis supplied).
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or
more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne
out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura 22 ), since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the
Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to
the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the
rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang conference, would accomplish the two principal
objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the
entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to
handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent
in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter
withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys'"
acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that
he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino" and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators.
"2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four
majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the
legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four
majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the
indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser
seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he
totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly
insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and
sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any
security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin
Galman and sealing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who
wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and
pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence
on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers'
version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the
entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against
all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been
confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding
day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra.
This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The
very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified
. . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacaang Palace on January 10, 1985." LLphil

No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men 26a ) made it possible to refer
the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of
due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be
determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too
easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." 26b
This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those
categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against
them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an
accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of
the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.LLphil

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and
equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools
of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before
the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due
process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once
more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial
of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.

1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked

against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. 27a
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51
SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]).
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
 "In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused
to a second jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal
and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the
laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself
from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone
conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers
of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its
evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent
them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses
and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent
Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year,
pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's
seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera
likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making
assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses,"
Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other
pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time
where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28
Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law
with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring
and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case
at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw".
It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase
Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he
breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he
invites anarchy.prLL

Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the

case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was
forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully
applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail, the scales
must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society,
which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean
injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is
due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. The private
prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of
the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising
from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had
been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion
and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that
respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first making
a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him
and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacaang"
"PJ PAMARAN
"Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later
on with that. After all the most important thing here is, shall we say, the
decision of the case."
"J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the
capacity of the Justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything
else." (p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Italics supplied by Herrera)." 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him,
in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary
to the facts above-stated, as follows:
". . . the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the
contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither
joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar
motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not
alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance." (Page 22,
Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case
of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a
verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of
the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overriding and transcendental public interest
that would make out a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on
the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is
substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order
was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This
is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan 35 , wherein the court in setting aside the hasty
convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding
the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending
action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted
precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of
the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting
to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."

3. Re: Objections of respondents. The other related objections of respondents'

counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock
trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment,
instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to
enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment
for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by
the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the
beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the
public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a predetermined verdict
of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused. cdll

(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of
the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the
judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are
not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and
jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied
by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed
against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for
their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should
be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the
Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound
practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for
reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over
six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration).
This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of
February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the
Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its
filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by
the Court only last August 26th. Then, the second motion for reconsideration is based on
an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the
petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacaang
conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per-adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the
merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and predetermined
the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new
appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. There has been the long dark night of
authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger the
imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of
Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the
new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy
attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers
both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality.
In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and
naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith
and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword
nor of the purse. Its strength has mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and
moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity
and impartiality, integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the
rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The
lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment
today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new
trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as
vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should
not become simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents
accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the
people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the
accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing
when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.cdrep

The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their
primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not
to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing
authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus
given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and
the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the
sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges
must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve
only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only
the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation. The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros
German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough, competent and dedicated service
in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and
submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period and greatly
easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The
resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and
its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to
all.
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, Fernan and Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., I join Gutierrez, Jr., J., in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior
to the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth behind the vicious
assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as expressed in my dissenting opinion
in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA 294, 379 [1985]), and so that justice may be done, I
vote for the re-trial prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed by the
prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant, evidence which, if
presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it is, the prosecution failed to fully
ventilate its position and to lay out before respondent Court all the pertinent facts which
could have helped that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
"A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and every definite sense the servant of the law, the
two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." [Italics
ours] (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil 556 [1940]).
"He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the
end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may not
suffer, and the guilty may not escape unpunished" (People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil.
453 [1948]).

Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to end, from the
raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment, which absolved the accused,
en masse, from any and all liability, is equally culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due
process of law, which "requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal"
and the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
[1975]), was violated. prLL
The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the detriment of
the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment rendered null and void ab initio.
There having been no trial at all in contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment
on which a plea of double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of
former jeopardy, the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W., 757;
State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental requisite which would render
void the judgment would make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings
(Steen vs. State, 242 S.W. 1047).
The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without
conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place, they were not a party to the same;
and, for those who were charged only either as accomplices or accessories, they contend
that their alleged offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so
that, whatever pressure was exerted could only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction secured
fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So.
459,19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where
both the prosecution and the Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor
can it be said that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder
charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused could no longer be
prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into
principals, accomplices and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail
during the trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of
protecting them from subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C.
2d. 682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a
nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial
for the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265, 48 Am. S.R. 202, 27 L.
RA. 498).
The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and collusion, with
the legal consequence that there was no trial and judgment to speak of, and under the
circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I vote for a re-trial in the interest of truth and
the ends of public justice. As in all criminal proceedings, however, the accused must be
guaranteed a fair, speedy, and impartial re-trial before an unbiased Tribunal and
prosecutor and, I might add, safeguarded against trial by publicity.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not previously disclosed to
the Court were found by the Commission constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire
and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be duly established by sufficient evidence and
are indicative of "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case . . .;" and that there exists "adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it could have otherwise presented, but
also predetermined the outcome of the case; . . ." I join in granting petitioners' second
motion for reconsideration.
In my considered view, the ends of Justice will be best served by allowing the trial anew
of the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain a judgment that will be removed from
any suspicion of attendant irregularities. With the greatest significance being given by
our people to the said cases, which are evidently of historical importance, I am readily
persuaded that it is to our national interest that all relevant evidence that may be now
available be provided an opportunity to be received and made known so that whatever is
the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained.
I, therefore, vote for a declaration of mistrial and for nullifying the proceedings of the
referred Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the
ordering of a re-trial.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary Restraining Order earlier granted. We
are now acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate concurring and
dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and momentous. I felt that in
immediately dismissing the petition, we were denying the petitioners every reasonable
opportunity to prove their allegations of non-independent and biased conduct of both the
prosecution and the trial court. I stated that the issues of miscarriage of justice and due
process arising from that conduct should be allowed more extended treatment. With then
Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented
from the Court's resolution denying the petitioners' motions to continue presenting their
case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the petition on its merits
and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were still for the future, I concurred in the
result of this Court's action on two grounds (1) the right of the accused to speedy trial
and (2) the presumption in law that judicial acts are regularly performed and that public
officers have discharged their duties in accordance with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial misgivings and more
than overcome the presumption of regular performance of official duty upon which I
based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the accused nor the
prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We had the unusual phenomenon of
the relatives of one victim, prominent lawyers and law professors, and retired Justices
assuming the uncommon role of alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a
Tanodbayan holding back its own evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions and
emotions generated by the Aquino assassination to cool off or die down, the accused
insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with the Supreme
Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in its Comment, the
Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look into the exercise of its jurisdiction.
There was the further matter of television cameras during trial, their effect on the
witnesses and the judges, and other mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Commission now shows that there was more to these
misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that time. The Court's opinion
penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial
tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an unbiased prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated litigations and
continuous harassment of a person who has already undergone the agony of prosecution
and trial for one and the same offense. It certainly was never Intended to cover a situation
where the prosecution suppresses some of its own evidence, where the accused correctly
and eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and where the court appears to have made
up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a failure of trial
tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not possibly result in a just or valid
decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a concern of this
Court and of all Filipinos who want genuine justice to be realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to the judgment of
acquittal, we must insure that absolutely no indication of bias, prejudgment, or
vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case. The fairly strong language used by the
Court in its main opinion underscores the gravity with which it views the travesties of
justice in this "trial of the century." At the same time, nothing expressed in our opinion
should be interpreted as the Supreme Court's making a factual finding, one way or
another, about the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman killing. Any statements
about the circumstances of the assassination or about the military version of the killings
are intended solely for one issue - whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquittals should be
set aside and a retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons involved,
pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or reappointment, or any other extraneous
matters should color or influence the future course of this case.

Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally expressed opinions
about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be neither a prosecutor or judge in any
forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future proceedings to be fair; they should be
above any suspicion of partiality, bias, rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate
if, in the conduct of further proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may arise that
a prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of any accused. Having just
declared a mistrial, we should not again declare the retrial as another mistrial, ad
infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant the petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration.
Feliciano, J., concur in the last three paragraphs (prior to the dispositive paragraph).
||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
[G.R. No. 120282. April 20, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT

CASTILLO y MONES, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Salacnib F. Baterina and Ismael R. Baterina for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant was charged with murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of Antonio
Dometita. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense of denial and alibi claiming
that he was then asleep in his house at the time of the incident. Prosecution witness Eulogio
Velasco testified that he was sitting outside the pub house when appellant suddenly arrived
and stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest. Another prosecution witness, Melinda
Mercado, testified that although she did not see the actual stabbing, she saw appellant
wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt. However, defense witness Edilberto Marcelino, a
tricycle driver, testified that he was about twenty-five meters away from the crime scene
when he saw a group of persons ganging up on a person who was later identified as the
victim, and that appellant was not one of the assailants. The trial court gave full credence
to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses and rendered judgment of conviction
of the crime charged, with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Hence, this recourse, appellant questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
the partiality of the trial judge in favor of the prosecution as shown by his participation in
the examination of witnesses. SAHIaD

The Supreme Court held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and are even conclusive and
binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance.
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge's prerogative and duty
to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. The propriety of a judge's queries is
determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the
test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge.
In fact, even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would
still be convicted.
The defense of alibi cannot overturn the clear and positive testimony of the credible
eyewitnesses who located appellant at the locus criminis and identified him as the assailant.
DCASIT

The Court, however, disagreed with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse
of superior strength. The prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked
difference in the stature and build of the victim and the appellant which would have
precluded an appropriate defense from the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument
would constitute abuse of superior strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face
an attack, or if he was obviously physically superior to the assailant.
Nonetheless, the killing was qualified by treachery. Where the accused appeared from
nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye
to his friend. Said action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE

TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. The factual
findings of the trial court, as well as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are
entitled to great weight and are even conclusive and binding, barring arbitrariness and
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The evaluation of the
credibility of witness is a matter that peculiarly falls within the power of the trial court, as
it has the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses on
the stand. In this case, appellant failed to provide any substantial argument to warrant a
departure from this rule. CHEIcS

2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; IT IS A JUDGE'S PREROGATIVE AND DUTY TO

ASK CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS; PROPRIETY OF QUERIES DETERMINED
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY SUCH QUESTIONING. It
is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the
whole, the Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory
in nature. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant
evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations
of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the
queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is
determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the
test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that
he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "there was no showing that the judge had an
interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs.
Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18)." That the trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution more
than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater
credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. acADIT

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; REQUISITE TO PROSPER

AS A DEFENSE. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.
This the appellant miserably failed to do. Appellant contends that he was then asleep in his
house at the time of the incident. This was supported by his mother who stated that he was
asleep from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the next day and by Rosemarie Malikdem who said that
she visited the accused on the night of May 24, 1993 to counsel him, which was her task
in the Samahang Magkakapitbahay. Appellant failed to demonstrate, however, the distance
between the crime scene and his house. Indeed, he testified that his house was "near" the
crime scene. In any event, this defense cannot overturn the clear and positive testimony of
the credible eyewitnesses who located appellant at the locus criminis and identifies him as
the assailant.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; WHEN
APPRECIATED; CASE AT BAR We likewise agree that the prosecution was unable
to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For this circumstance to
be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the
following elements: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, 2) an
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination and 3) a sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. These requisites were never established by the prosecution. We
hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed when two
conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and that such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused without danger to his person." These requisites were evidently present in this case
when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim
just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said action rendered it
difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense wounds" does not
negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was
inflicted on the chest. The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was
already rendered defenseless. cDTIAC

6. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH;

ASSAILANT MUST PURPOSELY USE EXCESSIVE FORCE OUT OF PROPORTION
TO THE DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO THE PERSON ATTACKED. On the other
hand, we disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior
strength. "To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, the prosecution must prove that the assailant purposely used excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." (People vs. Ruelan,
231 SCRA 650, April 19, 1994; People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, March 29, 1995) The
prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the stature and build
of the victim and the appellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from
the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior
strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was obviously
physically superior to the assailant.
7. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES; MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY PROOF. The trial court awarded indemnity and actual and moral
damages to the heirs of the victim. We sustain the award of indemnity in the amount of
P50,000, but we cannot do the same for the actual and moral damages which must be
supported by proof. In this case, the trial court did not state any evidentiary basis for this
award. We have examined the records, but we failed to find any, either.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

The trial court judge is not an idle arbiter during a trial. He can propound clarificatory
questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of a judge cannot be
assailed on the mere ground that he asked such questions during the trial. cdrep

The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 23, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-45235 convicting Robert Castillo
y Mones of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. 2
On July 23, 1993, an amended Information 3 was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph
S. Lee, charging appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 25th day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill[,] qualified by evident premeditation,
use of superior strength and treachery did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of
one ANTONIO DOMETITA, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed
weapon[,] hitting him on his chest thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO DOMETITA.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon arraignment, Appellant Castillo, assisted by Counsel Salacnib Baterina, entered a
plea of not guilty. 4 After trial in due course, appellant was convicted. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROBERTO CASTILLO y
MONES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and [is]
hereby sentenced to suffer [the] penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Antonio Dometita actual damages in the
sum of P60,000.00, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of
the victim and moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00. He is likewise ordered
to pay costs.
SO ORDERED." 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The Appellee's Brief 7 presents the facts as follows:
"On May 25, 1993, around one o'clock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor
manager of the Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veteran's Village, Quezon
City, was sitting outside the Pubhouse talking with his co-worker, Dorie. Soon,
Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their customers, came out of the pubhouse. As
he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony Dometita
was about an armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert Castillo
suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his
left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting
him on the left hand.
 Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and
appellant to stop appellant from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony
to run away. Tony ran towards the other side of EDSA, but appellant pursued
him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the
fence of the Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City.
Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the medico-legal officer who autopsied Tony's cadaver,
testified that the proximate cause of Tony's death was the stab wound on his left
chest. Tony also suffered several incised wounds and abrasions, indicating that
he tried to resist the attack." 8
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense viewed the facts in this way: 9
"On May 25, 1993, the late Antonio Dometita was found dead by the police
officers at the alley on the right side of the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at EDSA in
Bago Bantay.
It is the theory of the prosecution that the deceased Antonio Dometita was stabbed
by the accused Robert Castillo y Mones as testified to by Leo Velasco. The
corroboration of Leo Velasco's testimony is that of Melinda Mercado who (tsn
Oct. 11, 1993) stated that Leo Velasco informed her that Dometita was stabbed.
Robert Castillo was walking away from the pubhouse with the bladed weapon.
Leo Velasco himself detailed the way Castillo stabbed the deceased Antonio
Dometita.
On the other hand the defense claims that the deceased died in the alley at the
right side of the church. That decedent Dometita was attacked by two malefactors
as testified to by Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver who saw two people
ganging up on a third. The same witness saw the victim falling to the ground. (tsn
January 5, 1994, page 8). A report of Edilberto Marcelino to the Barangay
Tanod's Office was made in the blotter of the Barangay and the extract (xerox of
the page) was marked as Exhibit '2'."
The Trial Court's Ruling
The court a quo gave full credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses,
who positively identified the appellant as the killer. It explained:
"From the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and the defense, it can
be gleaned that the accused, to exculpate himself from the liability, clung to the
defense of alibi[,] saying that he was not at the place where the incident took place
at the time of the killing. This was supported by the testimony of his mother and
his neighbor and guide Malikdem. This, however, is contradicted by the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses of the prosecution who positively identified
accused as the person who stabbed the victim. While the testimony of Mercado
is to the effect that she did not actually see the accused hit the victim, she
however, saw him walking away and carrying a bladed weapon at the scene of
 the crime. Velasco on the other hand, actually saw him lunged [sic] his fan knife
at the victim. These were further strengthened by the findings of the medico-legal
officer that the weapon used in killing the victim [was] similar to a balisong." 10
The trial court also found that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength,
because "the accused used a deadly weapon in surprising the victim who [was] unarmed."
Although treachery was present, the trial court held that this was absorbed by abuse of
superior strength.
The Issues
The appellant raises the following assignment of errors: 11
"I
That the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence presented by the accused that
there was a stabbing/mauling incident at the side street near the Iglesia ni Cristo
Church at Edsa-Bago Bantay, Quezon City (at about the time of the alleged
stabbing of victime [sic] Antonio Dometita according to the prosecution version),
the same evidence for the accused being butressed and supported by the barangay
blotter, marked Exhibit '2.'
II
That the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of: the medical finding
that the heart and the lungs of the victim were impaled; that according to the
testimony of the prosecution witness, PO3 Manolito Estacio, the victim was
found at the side street near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church; and that the side street
distant from the place the witnesses for the prosecution stated the victim was
stabbed. These matters create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
cast distrust on the testimony of the witness Eulogio Velasco who allegedly
witnessed the stabbing of the victim.
III
That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against the accused
and in several instances asked questions that [were] well within the duty of the
prosecution to explore and ask; it never appreciated other matters favorable to the
accused, like the frontal infliction of the mortal wound and the presence [of]
"defense wounds" which negate treachery and superiority.
IV
That the trial judge was bias[ed] against the accused hence the judgment of
conviction."
In the main, appellant questions the trial judge's (1) assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies and (2) alleged partiality in favor of the prosecution as
shown by his participation in the examination of witnesses.
This Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Time and again, this Court has adhered to the rule that the factual findings 12 of the trial
court, as well as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 13 are entitled to great weight
and are even conclusive and binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a
matter that peculiarly falls within the power of the trial court, as it has the opportunity to
watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses on the stand. 14 In this case,
appellant failed to provide any substantial argument to warrant a departure from this rule.
The testimony of Prosecution Witness Eulogio Velasco that he saw the appellant stab the
victim is clear and unequivocal. He was sitting outside the pub house when the victim came
out. Dometita, who was then only an arm's length away from him, turned around to say
goodbye when, suddenly, the accused came out of nowhere and stabbed the victim. Velasco
narrated further that the victim asked him for help, so he responded by placing a chair
between the victim and the appellant to block the assault of the accused. 15 Thereafter, he
told Dometita to run away. The accused then chased the victim towards the other side of
EDSA. 16 The relevant portions of Velasco's testimony are reproduced hereunder:
"Q Immediately thereafter, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A When Dorie went inside the pub house, that was the time Tony went out, sir.
COURT:
Q Who is this Tony?
A Antonio Dimatita alias Tony, Your Honor.
PROS. LEE: cdrep

Q When Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony went out, what happened?
A Tony asked permission from me that he will go home, sir.
Q And what happened thereafter?
A When he ha[d] not gone far yet from me, Robert Castillo suddenly attacked
him and stabbed him, sir.

Q What happened to Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony when he was stabbed by
accused Robert Castillo?
A He was taken aback. He was not able to cover up himself and he was hit by the
stab made by Robert Castillo, sir.
Q On what part of the body was he hit?
A On the left side of the chest, sir.
 Q And did you see in what summer [sic] accused Robert Castillo stabbed Antonio
Dimatita [sic]?
A Like this, sir. (Witness demonstrating with his right arm above his shoulder
with downward stabbing position.)
Q As you stated, after Tony was hit on the left side of [his] chest, what happened
next?
A He was stabbed again and was hit on the arm, sir.
Q What arm? Left or right?
A On the left arm, sir. (Witness is pointing to his left arm in between the 1st and
second finger.)
Q After he was hit on the left arm, what happened next?
A He went near me and asked for help, sir. I placed a bench on the middle to
block the way so that Robert Castillo [would] not be able to reach him and
I told Tony to run away, sir.
Q Did Tony run away thereafter?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about accused Robert Castillo, what was he doing the[n]?
A He chased, sir.
Q What happened next?
A I heard Tony was already dead, sir."
The testimony of Velasco that the accused stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest
and then on the left arm was confirmed by the medical findings, 17 particularly the autopsy
report of Dr. Munoz, who testified as follows: 18
"COURT
Q Can you tell the Court the relative position of the victim and the assailant when
the stab wound was inflicted?
TRIAL PROS. RALPH S. LEE
Based on the wound, doctor.
WITNESS
A If the victim and the assailant were in a standing position, the assailant and the
victim would be facing each other and the fatal wound was delivered from
upward to downward, your honor."
Witness Velasco further testified that the accused used a bladed weapon which looked like
a fan knife. 19 This was also supported by Dr. Munoz, viz.: 20
 "Q Dr. Munoz, in your learned medical knowledge, what could have caused this
stab wound marked as Exhibit "D"?
A This was inflicted by a sharp pointed single bladed instrument like kitchen
knife or "balisong" or any similar instrument."
Melinda Mercado, the other prosecution witness, corroborated the story of Velasco. She
testified that when she was inside the pub, she heard Velasco shout that Antonio Dometita
was stabbed. 21 She went out to verify and saw the accused walking away. What she saw
was not the stabbing incident itself, but the accused wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt.
22 This confirms the assertion of Velasco that the accused was still holding the bladed
instrument as he chased the victim. 23
Clearly, the straightforward, detailed and consistent narrations of the government witnesses
show that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the account of the prosecution.
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the testimony of Defense Witness
Edilberto Marcelino who narrated a "stabbing/mauling incident" on a side street that fateful
night near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church, where the victim's body was found. Said witness
testified that he was driving his tricycle, when he noticed a group ganging up on a man
(pinagtutulungan). 24 He then saw the person fall. 25 He did not notice if the assailants had
weapons, as he was a bit far from them, illumination coming only from the headlight of his
tricycle. He stated that the appellant, with whom he was familiar because he often saw him
selling cigarettes along EDSA, 26 was not one of those he saw ganging up on the person
who fell to the ground. He described one of the malefactors as long-haired and lanky, and
the other one as fair-complexioned with medium build, 27 descriptions which did not fit the
accused. Upon witnessing the incident, Marcelino immediately proceeded to the barangay
hall to report the matter.
The trial court did not accord weight to said testimony. We sustain this holding. Marcelino
admitted that he was about twenty-five meters away from the place of incident 28 and that
said place was not lighted. Furthermore, his tricycle was then moving because he was in a
hurry. 29 Thus we agree with this statement of the trial court: [C]onsidering that it was dark
and the distance from where the witness saw the incident [was] quite far, it could not have
been possible for him to recognize the victim and his attackers " 30
Appellant also asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of the medical
finding that the heart and lungs of the victim were impaled. He argues that these wounds
made it impossible for the victim to traverse the distance from the pub house to the Iglesia
ni Cristo Church area, where his body was eventually found. However, the testimony of
the medico-legal expert did not rule out this possibility, as gleaned from the following:
"Q And if the stab wound was fatal, how long could have he [sic] lived after the
infliction of the wound? cdrep

A It would be very difficult to give the duration of survival because different

individual[s] would have different types of survival. Others would [live]
for five minutes and others would survive for at least . . . in shorter time.
 Q But five minutes doctor would be a long time already. It could be the survival
time of a person who has a strong constitution. Do you agree with me?
A No, sir. In this particular case considering that the involvement here of the
heart is the left ventricle which is a very thick portion of the heart. I don't
think he would die in less than five minutes because the thick portion of
the heart serves as a sealer once the instrument is pulled out, the tendency
of the thick muscle is to close the injury so there is a much longer time for
survival." 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Second Issue: Partiality of the Trial Judge
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him for propounding questions
that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. More pointedly,
appellant alleges that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in
a leading manner, 32 interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers
favorable to the prosecution, 33 and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion
and allusions of bad moral character, which could not be objected to by defense, counsel,
because they have been ventilated by the judge himself. 34 To substantiate the alleged bias
and prejudice of the judge, appellant in his brief cited several pages from the transcript of
stenographic notes. 35
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge's prerogative and duty
to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. 36 On the whole, the Court finds that
the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions
which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within
judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of
the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge
did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is determined not
necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact,
even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be
convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, "there was no showing that the judge had an
interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore,
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs.
Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18)." 37 That the trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution
more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded
greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused.
38

Alibi
Appellant's defense of alibi and denial is unavailing. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was
committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis
at the time of the alleged crime. 39 This the appellant miserably failed to do. Appellant
contends that he was then asleep in his house at the time of the incident. This was supported
by his mother who stated that he was asleep from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the next day 40 and
by Rosemarie Malikdem who said that she visited the accused on the night of May 24,
1993 to counsel him, which was her task in the Samahang Magkakapitbahay. 41 Appellant
failed to demonstrate, however, the distance between the crime scene and his house.
Indeed, he testified that his house was "near" the crime scene. In any event, this defense
cannot overturn the clear and positive testimony of the credible eyewitnesses who located
appellant at the locus criminis and identified him as the assailant. 42
Aggravating Circumstances
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant is guilty of murder for the death of
Antonio Dometita. We likewise agree that the prosecution was unable to prove the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For this circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the
following elements: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, 2) an
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and 3) a sufficient lapse of
time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 43 These requisites were never established by the prosecution.

On the other hand, we disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse
of superior strength. "To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, the prosecution must prove that the assailant purposely used excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." 44 The
prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the stature and build
of the victim and the appellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from
the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior
strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was obviously
physically superior to the assailant.
Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed
when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and
that such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person." 45 "These requisites were evidently
present in this case when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly
stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said
action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense
wounds" does not negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal
as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when
the victim was already rendered defenseless.
 Damages
The trial court awarded indemnity and actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim.
We sustain the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000, but we cannot do the same
for the actual and moral damages which must be supported by proof. In this case, the trial
court did not state any evidentiary basis for this award. We have examined the records, but
we failed to find any, either.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED,
46 but the award of actual and moral damages is DELETED for lack of factual basis. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED. cdrep

||| (People v. Castillo y Mones, G.R. No. 120282, [April 20, 1998], 352 PHIL 39-57)
[G.R. No. 159190. June 30, 2005.]

CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON.

OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with application for
temporary restraining order, seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's disapproval of the
memorandum 1 dated 03 November 1999 of Special Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
21654, as well as the memorandum 2 dated 09 June 2003 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB)
Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation
regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better
Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings Account No. 365-5355-6-4.
The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus A. Micael, is as
follows: 3
. . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa (Bank Executive
Officer of PNB Cebu) handed a note to Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier) instructing
her to include her cash requisition for the day from Central Bank Cebu, the
amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20 July 1992 at about
 past 10:00 A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier III), upon the instruction of Cayetano A.
Tejano Jr. (Vice President and Branch Manager of PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 M
from Ms. Jecong and delivered the same to Mr. Tejano; that at about noontime
of same day, Mr. Mara handed to Ms. Jecong a pre-signed withdrawal slip
against SA No. 365-535506-4 under the name of V & G Better Homes for the
same amount to replace the cash withdrawn and to serve as cash-on-hand at the
end of the day's transaction; that the withdrawal slip was approved by Mr.
Tejano and was postdated 21 July 1992; that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better
Homes SA No. 365-535506-4 has only P33,436.78; that in the afternoon of 20
July 1992 the amount of P2,336,563.32 (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash;
P100,000.00 in check; and P36,563.22 in withdrawal slip) was received by
Teller Mary Ann Aznar as payment for the loan of V & G Better Homes for
which PNB Official Receipt No. 952981E was issued; that the transaction was
recognized as an increase in PNB Cebu Branch's cash-on-hand and a decrease in
the loan account of V & G Better Homes; that the PNB Cebu Credit Committee
approved the loan at the rate of 23% lower than the 26% interest rate on its first
renewal and 27% on its second renewal; that the loan proceeds was credited to
the account of V & G Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the same day that the
withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr. Montesa from Ms. Jecong and
given to Irene Abellanosa to be taken as her transaction for the day; and that
upon the instruction of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4 of V & G
Better Homes was debited and the withdrawal slip was validated by Teller
Abellanosa although no actual cash withdrawal was made. AaIDCS

The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President Cayetano A.
Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising
Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela
Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
P2.2 million of PNB funds.
In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas ordered Tejano, Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz to file
their respective counter-affidavits. 4
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton
recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, 5 as amended, against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana
dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. 6 The case against Montesa and Jecong was
dismissed for lack of evidence. The resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
In a Memorandum 7 dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft
Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the
approval of the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the
approval of Ferrer. 8 Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11
November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a
Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation.
In an order dated 9 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reinvestigation.
On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
conduct the reinvestigation. 10 The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution
Officer III Jesus Micael.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana
and Vicente dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum 11 dated 03
November 1999, recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was
approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the
initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note "assign the case to another
prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively."
On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was
attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case. TAESDH

On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by

Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael.
Apparently, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits
because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion
to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due
course to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion
which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of the
reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the
motion for reconsideration. 12
Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution 13 dated 24 March
2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said
motion.
In a memorandum 14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer
recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy
Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his previous position and recommended that
the memorandum for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with
Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto
when he retired, approved Joselito Ferrer's memorandum recommending the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case
No. 21654.
On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining
order prayed for.
On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISAPPROVED THE EARLIER RECOMMENDATION FOR THE
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST ALL THE ACCUSED WITHOUT
ANY COGENT OR VERIFIABLE REASON AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY:
1. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE RESOLUTION
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1999 AGAINST ALL ACCUSED FOR
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS MANDATED UNDER SECTION
13 R.A. 6770 IN RELATION TO SECTION 3, RULE 112 OF THE
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
2. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DID NOT
DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN A
RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
 RECONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL BY THE NEW
OMBUDSMAN. STIcEA

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS A
CLEAR CASE OF PERSECUTION AND NOT PROSECUTION
CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII,
BOOK II OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
Ruling of the Court
Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently glossed over by the parties
whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in
disapproving the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 against petitioner Tejano, and
spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, where he had earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the said
criminal case recommending the filing of the information.

This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and
respect the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who "beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public
service." 15 Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this
Court to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. 16
Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in
the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a
case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. 17 In
Zambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, 18 the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been
established that the case concerned an appeal of the Secretary's own previous decision,
which he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. We have
equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission, because one of its members, Commissioner Raul Aquino,
participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided on as a former labor
arbiter. 19 Likewise, this Court struck down a decision of Presidential Executive
Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he,
then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred. 20
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto
to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation.
He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act
No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such
authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
powers, functions and duties herein or hereinafter provided; . . .
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was
already convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It
becomes a farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman
Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.
ACcTDS

Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his
decision on appeal. 21 We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v.
Court of Appeals 22 which succinctly explained that:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government 23 concedes the
applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier
decided, thus:
 Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and
impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses,
he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance
when appearance is as important as reality.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a
preliminary investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the
former Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has
supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is given ample power
to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution of a
case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by
personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty. (Underlining
supplied)
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desierto's disapproval of the
03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer,
Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desierto's actuation. As
stressed in Singson v. NLRC: 24
. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without
the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an
impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not
only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his
appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
(Underlining supplied)
With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsman's disapproval of the memorandum dated 03 November
1999, where Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum
dated 09 June 2003, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for further proceedings.
No costs. aCTADI

SO ORDERED.
||| (Tejano, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, [June 30, 2005], 501 PHIL 243-254)
[G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.]
 FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and
THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DELAY OF

THREE YEARS IN THE TERMINATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A
VIOLATION THEREOF. We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under
the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16
of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is
violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LONG DELAY IN FILING OF
INFORMATIONS AGAINST ACCUSED WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASES.
We are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed.

DECISION

YAP, J :p

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October
16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of
April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August
12, 1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan
from continuing with trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,
10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, all entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco
S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los
Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
(DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report
with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who
was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP
Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices
in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint
repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the
Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los
Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June
16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC,
submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered
indicates that former Min. TATAD had violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019,
respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5
of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his
motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July
5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special
Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the following informations be filed against
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: LLphil

"1. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
"2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;
"3. Violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file
his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and
1978."
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad
with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a
check for P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of
Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the payment to said
Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused
in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds
for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accused FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department
(now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true
detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31,
1973, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public
officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:
That on the about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully
and unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a
private corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the
President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing
the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia
Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose
organization and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the
Department of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research,
projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds
advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof
by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of
the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department
(now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and
sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including
a statement of the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1976), as required of
every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of
Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare
and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of
his assets and liabilities, as a December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of
the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash
the information on the following grounds: LLjur

"1. The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the
right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of
jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and
10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended."
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion
to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that
needed refutation, namely:
1. The offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501, have
already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For failure
to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an
offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the
fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were
filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed
on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges
were actually filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to
prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period has not yet
lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to
acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets
and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural
or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more . . ." to submit a statement
of assets and liabilities ". . . regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is
for ALL government employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and
liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct from
each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it
render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law
which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period
of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation. prcd

On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying

petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's
"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of
merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one
which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to
amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of the
offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED."
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8,
1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500,
changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22,
1985, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective
immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said
resolution, the respondents, through Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their
comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, The Court required the parties to move in the premises considering
the supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and
the provisions for Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court insofar as the public respondents
were concerned, which required the successor official to state whether or not he
maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the
new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and they
have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases
against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the position; that in any event,
petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as
the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new
Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with
the position taken by the new Tanodbayan. LexLib

Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion
for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the
cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not
aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be
that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan
has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the
instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and
the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised
by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-existence of
prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the
questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of
"due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of
the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more
than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to
loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan
dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by
him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant
the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere
allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any
showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed
rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the
Sandiganbayan:
"That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of
the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not
appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate
upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former
high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are of the considered
opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the
resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from
termination of the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in
view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.

The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in
concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court
prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of
its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its
discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the
dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply
with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may be
presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved
may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein
attempts to have the Court grant such as radical relief during this stage of the
proceedings which precludes a precocious or summary evaluation of insufficient
evidence in support thereof."
This bring us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich-like, bury its head
in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue
only after the trial?
prcd
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that the has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October
1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
(then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07.
The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two
months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring
the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavit and counter-affidavits were in and
the case was ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5)
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report. cdphil

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without
fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless
or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's
perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be
justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day
period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from
its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is
merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has
included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated
as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We
are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify
a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. LexLib
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to
hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on
the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same.
The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10502 and 10503, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
[G.R. No. 129900. October 2, 2001.]

JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jorge V. Miravite & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Jane Caras was found guilty of 15 counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) violations by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said conviction. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner herein admitted the issuance of the checks which were the subject
of this case, except for one. However, she insisted that she issued them merely to
guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain Marivic Nakpil and were not
supposed to be deposited in the bank. Petitioner also denied having transacted with
private complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza, and asserted that the latter did not have
personality to prosecute the case against her. The Supreme Court found that the
resolution of the petition depended on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence
was adequate to convict the accused. HAEIac

According to the Supreme Court, in order to convict an accused for violation of

B.P. Blg. 22, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of
her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment
 within the period prescribed by law. In this case, the Court found no clear evidence,
which showed that the petitioner was informed that her checks had been dishonored.
The prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioner's actual receipt
of any demand letter, which could have served as notice to petitioner. Such omission
and neglect on the part of the prosecution was fatal to its cause. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor was a
clear ground for her acquittal. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court was reversed and set aside by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Jane Caras was acquitted on the ground that her guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt, but without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate civil case, if warranted, to determine the civil aspect of petitioner's
transactions.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (BOUNCING CHECKS LAW);

ELEMENTS. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge by
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment; and
(3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
2. ID.; ID.; WHAT THE LAW PUNISHES IS THE ISSUANCE OF A WORTHLESS
CHECK; RATIONALE. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check
and not the purpose for which the check was issued, nor the terms and conditions of its
issuance. There are matters we need to pursue, because, as said in Llamado v. Court of
Appeals, . . . to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. Thus, petitioner's contention that she issued the checks
subject of this case merely to guarantee payment of her obligation is hardly a defense.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is punishable under
B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.
3. ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF DISHONOR, REQUIRED; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. In particular, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act
of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue.
However, this presumption may be rebutted by the accused-petitioner. Such presumption
does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of
the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been
dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of
her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment
within the period prescribed by law. Petitioner denies having received any notice that the
checks she issued had been dishonored by the drawee bank. After carefully going over
the records of this case, we find that indeed no clear evidence is shown on whether
petitioner was informed that her checks had been dishonored. The absence of proof that
petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were dishonored
and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for payment of the
said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent
such presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks, otherwise,
she cannot be held liable under the law. Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of
dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of the petitioner's
right to due process.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF. Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually
knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements
for payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given
the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J : p

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, finding
petitioner Jane Caras y Solitario guilty of 15 counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) violations.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
JANE S. CARAS has appealed from the judgment of conviction in fifteen (15)
related cases of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The first Information
(docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-44420) against her reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1992 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on
account or for value PCI Bank, Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No.
017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to the order of CASH in the
 amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing
that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment
which check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. SHECcT

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-44421 to Q-93-44434, the informations were

similarly worded as above, except for the respective amounts involved, dates,
numbers of checks and dates of commission.
When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded "not guilty".
Thereafter, trial proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18,
1992, up to May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from
complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and
purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued
to the complainant the following checks drawn against Philippine Commercial
Bank:
Check No. Date Amount

017744 3-18-92 P 14,125.00

017743 3-03-92 P 14,625.00
017627 3-03-92 P 14,125.00
017745 4-03-92 P 14,125.00
017664 4-18-92 P 23,500.00
017746 4-18-92 P 14,125.00
017789 3-18-92 P 14,125.00
017790 4-03-92 P 14,125.00
017663 4-02-92 P 23,500.00
017662 3-18-92 P 24,440.00
017768 3-18-92 P 7,062.50
017788 3-03-92 P 14,125.00
017665 5-02-92 P 23,500.00
017767 3-03-92 P 7,062.50
017769 3-31-92 P 540,318.35
When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed". Despite repeated verbal and
written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she
failed and refused to do so.
The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed,
however, that they were given to Marivic Nakpil, 2 alleged sister of the
complainant, as "guarantee deposit," that is, for every gift check and purchase
order given to the accused, she issued personal checks to guarantee its payment.
The checks are not to be encashed nor deposited with any bank. With regard to
Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35 (Exh. "O"), accused claimed
that she entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her signature
but without any amount or numerical figures on the face of the check.
On May 13, 1994, the Court a quo rendered its judgment with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44420 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44421 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,625.00 and to
pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44422 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
4. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44423 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
5. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44424 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P23,500.00 and to
pay the costs;
6. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44425 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
7. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44426 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
8. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44427 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
9. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44428 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P23,500.00 and to
pay the costs;
10. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44429 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P24,440.00 and to
pay the costs;
11. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44430 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P7,062.50 and to
pay the costs;
12. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44431 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00 and to
pay the costs;
13. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44432 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P23,500.00 and to
pay the costs;
14. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44433 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
 22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P7,062.50 and to
pay the costs;
15. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44434 the Court finds accused Jane Caras
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of eight (8)
months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P540,318.35 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
On June 13, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
trial court in an Order dated September 22, 1994. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals which rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED. 4
On April 11, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 15, 1 997.
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
I IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT OUT IN THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION;
II IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE PURPOSE OF THE ISSUANCE OF
THE CHECKS;
III IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE LACK OF PERSONALITY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO INITIATE AND PROSECUTE
THESE CASES;
IV IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF
CONSIDERATION (AS TO PCIB CHECK NO 017769 FOR
P540,318.35) AND FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF HER FUNDS;
V IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD NO
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE. 5
Petitioner admits having issued the checks subject of this case, save for one, but insists
that she issued them merely to guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain Marivic
Nakpil; they were not supposed to have been deposited in a bank. Petitioner also denies
having transacted with private complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza, and asserts that the
latter did not have personality to prosecute this case.
Petitioner argues that one of the checks, PCIB check no. 017769, was issued in blank.
She claims that this check was issued without consideration and that the element of the
crime that the check must be issued for value is lacking as regards this particular check.
Also in relation to her fourth assignment of error, petitioner asserts that she was not
properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains that the prosecution failed
to show that she received the notices of dishonor purportedly sent to her. She points out
that no return card nor acknowledgment receipt for the first demand letter was presented
in evidence. While there was a return card attached to the second demand letter, this was
not marked nor offered in evidence, and hence must be ignored. 6 ETDSAc

Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Quezon City RTC over the case, maintaining
that there is no evidence showing that the checks were issued and delivered in Quezon
City. Neither is there evidence as to where the private complainant received the checks,
and whether or not she received them from the accused herself.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any
distinction regarding the purpose for which the checks were issued. Thus, it is of no
moment even if it were true that, as claimed by accused, the checks she issued were
meant only to guarantee payment of her obligation. Criminal liability attaches whether
the checks were issued in payment of an obligation or to guarantee payment of that
obligation. 7 There is violation of B.P. 22 when a worthless check is issued and is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The OSG also points out that accused did
not deny having issued the subject checks.
After a careful consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find
that the resolution of this petition hinges on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence
suffices to convict the accused, herein petitioner Jane Caras. The elements of the offense
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) drawing and issuance of any check to apply on
account or for value; (2) knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon presentment; and (3) said check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 8
What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which
the check was issued, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. There are matters we
need to pursue, because, as said in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 9
. . . to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
Thus, petitioner's contention that she issued the checks subject of this case merely to
guarantee payment of her obligation is hardly a defense. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum and is punishable under B.P. 22, provided the other
elements of the offense are properly proved.
In particular, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. Knowledge
of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making,
drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However,
this presumption may be rebutted by the accused-petitioner. Such presumption does not
hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check
within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored. 10
Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so
she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period
prescribed by law.
Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. After carefully going over the records of this case, we
find that indeed no clear evidence is shown on whether petitioner was informed that her
checks had been dishonored.

The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 11 may be sent by the offended
party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and
send the demand letters. 12 The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters
demanding payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution
presented no evidence that would establish petitioner's actual receipt of any demand letter
which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an
indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgment receipt nor
return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such
omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause.
There is testimony on record that private complainant asked petitioner to pay the value of
the checks. However, there is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether
before or after the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. 13 It is possible that
payment was requested before the checks were deposited, since, as testified to by
petitioner, the usual arrangement was that she issues checks and then she replaces them
with cash. The checks were not deposited but were, instead, returned to her. 14 However,
according to the prosecution, petitioner started having problems with her cash flow
resulting to her inability to replace the checks she issued with cash. But such problems
leading to illiquidity of petitioner are not material elements of the crime. What is
pertinent here is prior notice to the drawer that her checks have been dishonored, so that
within five banking days from receipt of such notice she could pay the check fully or
make arrangements for such payment.
Even the testimony of Manuel Panuelos, branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner
maintained her checking account, indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to
petitioner for her to pay the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment
within five days from the dishonor of the said checks. Note his testimony on cross-
examination:
Q: Did you give the accused notice within five (5) banking days within which to
make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the
bounced checks?
Atty. Palaa:
Your Honor, that is already answered by the witness.
Atty. Dela Torre:
No, that is not the answer, what I want is that. . . . .
Court:
Reform
Atty. Dela Torre:
Is it not your procedure that when a check bounced, you give notice to the . . . .
A: It is not our procedure.
Q: It is not your procedure?
A: No. In fact we do it verbally. . . .
Q: Is it not standard operating procedure in your bank to give customers notice
within five (5) banking days to make arrangement with the bank within
ninety (90) days regarding the bounced check?
A: No, that is not our procedure.
Q: You do not follow that procedure?
A: We do not. That is not our standard procedure. 15
Petitioner on the witness stand denied receiving any notice from the bank.
Q: Madam Witness, all these checks were deposited with the bank in one day.
Will you please tell this Honorable Court when the first check bounced
by the reason of DAIF, were you notified by your depositary bank which
is PCIB within five (5) banking days to make arrangement within . . .
days regarding that bouncing checks?
A: No, sir, I did not receive any notice. 16
The absence of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her
checks were dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make
arrangements for payment of the said checks prevents the application of the disputable
presumption that she had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she
issued the checks. Absent such presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove
that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said
checks, otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law. 17 aEHADT

Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received
by the accused is a violation of the petitioner's right to due process. This is in effect our
ruling in Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 18 where we held:
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator
"a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt
the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated". This was
also compared "to certain laws" (citing E.O. 107, 83 O.G. No. 7, p. 576
(February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349 (November 1,
1993) allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to
surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring
any criminal liability" (citing Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), pp. 121-122). In this light, the fill payment
of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a "complete defense" (citing Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234
SCRA 639). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an
accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates
of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received
by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
(Underscoring and emphases supplied.) EDHTAI

Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and
was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the
law, we cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure
of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a
clear ground for her acquittal. 19 Discussion of the other assigned errors need no longer
detain us.
However, it should be stressed that this decision in no way prejudices the civil
obligations, if any, that she might have incurred by reason of her transactions with private
complainant. For we note that petitioner does not deny having issued the subject checks.
20 And while no criminal liability could be imposed in this case for lack of sufficient
proof of the offense charged, a fair distinction should be made as to civil aspects of the
transaction between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jane Caras is
ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not been established beyond reasonable
doubt. This decision is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil case, if
warranted, to determine the civil aspects of petitioner's transactions.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Caras y Solitario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129900, [October 2, 2001], 418 PHIL
|||

655-669)
[G.R. No. 144134. November 11, 2003.]

MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, LUIS REGONDOLA, * MANUELIT GATALAN, *
ORESCA AGAPITO, NOEL ALBADBAD, * ROGELIO PINTUAN,
DANILO CRISOSTOMO, ROMULO MACALINAO, NESTOR
FERER, * RICKY CUESTA, ROLLY ANDRADA, * LARRY
ROGOLA, FRANCISCO LENOGON, AUGUSTO QUINTO, *
ARFE BERAMO, BONIFACIO TRINIDAD, ALFREDO
ASCARRAGA, * ERNESTO MAGNO, HONORARIO HORTECIO,
* NELBERT PINEDA, GLEN ESTIPULAR, FRANCISCO
COMPUESTO, ISABELITO CORTEZ, * MATURAN ROSAURO,
SAMSON CANAS, FEBIEN ISIP, JESUS RIPARIP, ALFREDO
SIENES, ADOLAR ALBERT, HONESTO CABANILLAS, AMPING
CASTILLO and ELWIN REVILLA, respondents.

King Capuchino Tan & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
C.S. Cruz & Associates for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Corporation sought before the Court of Appeals the nullification of the
decision of the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision finding it jointly and
severally liable with the Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. for the
underpayment of wages and overtime pay due to the latter's security guards, private
respondents herein, deployed at the petitioner's shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan. Petitioner
denied any liability, arguing that it had religiously and promptly paid the compensation of
the security guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. The Court of
Appeals dismissed outright petitioner's petition for certiorari and its subsequent motion
for reconsideration, due to a defective certificate of non-forum shopping and non-
submission of the required documents to accompany said petition. The appellate court
found that the verification and certification on non-forum shopping was signed not by the
duly authorized officer of petitioner, but by its counsel.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner corporation prayed for
liberal construction of the Rules.
The Supreme Court denied petitioner's plea for liberality. It held that the appellate court
did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the requirements governing
the certification of non-forum shopping. The Rule requires that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff or the principal. In the
case of the corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, in behalf of the
corporate entity, only by specifically authorized individuals. The requirements of the
Rule means that the counsel cannot sign said certification unless clothed with special
authority to do so. A certification signed by the counsel alone is defective and constitutes
a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. Here, not only was the originally appended
certification signed by counsel, but in its motion for reconsideration, petitioner utterly
failed to show that the Personnel Manager who signed the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping attached thereto, was duly authorized for this purpose.
The Court further held that petitioner's liability was joint and several with that of the
security agency pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. The security
agency is liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed
the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of
failure of the agency to pay them. Petitioner Corporation cannot hide behind its contract
with the security agency in order to evade liability for noncompliance with the statutory
minimum wage. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in
violation thereof are considered null. However, the joint and several liability imposed on
petitioner Corporation was without prejudice to its claim for reimbursement against the
security agency for such amounts as it may have to pay to private respondents therein.
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; CERTIFICATION OF NON-

FORUM SHOPPING; CONSIDERED DEFECTIVE IF SIGNED BY COUNSEL
ALONE. It is settled that the requirement in the Rules that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff or the principal means that
counsel cannot sign said certification unless clothed with special authority to do so. The
reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a
petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE SIGNED BY SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED
INDIVIDUALS IN CASE OF CORPORATIONS; CASE AT BAR. In the case of
natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping. However, in the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing
may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized
individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally
do the task themselves. In this case, not only was the originally appended certification
signed by counsel, but in its motion for reconsideration, still petitioner utterly failed to
show that Ms. Rosanna Ignacio, its Personnel Manager who signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto, was duly authorized for this
purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of procedural rule is
needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Thus, on this point, no
error could be validly attributed to respondent Court of Appeals. It did not err in
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the requirements governing the
certification of non-forum shopping.
3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; REQUIREMENT OF DUE
PROCESS IN LABOR CASES BEFORE LABOR ARBITER SATISFIED WHERE
PARTIES ARE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT THEIR POSITION PAPERS.
Well settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not all
cases require a trial-type hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a
Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their
position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or
documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the event the Labor
Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was
not necessary. In any event, as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and
in the position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that
such opportunity more than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
4. ID.; LABOR STANDARDS; PAYMENT OF WAGES; SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF
INDIRECT EMPLOYER WITH THE CONTRACTOR FOR THE NON-PAYMENT OF
WAGES. Petitioner's liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant
to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows: x x x. In this
case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security
agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation,
petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107
abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the
guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards'
wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions,
including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by
virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect
employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the
agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection
consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYERS CANNOT HIDE BEHIND THEIR CONTRACTS
IN ORDER TO EVADE THEIR CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE. Petitioner cannot
evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as
stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the
legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs
of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in
violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed
amendments to the contract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order
to evade their (or their contractors' or subcontractors') liability for noncompliance with
the statutory minimum wage.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INDIRECT EMPLOYER HAS RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
FROM THE CONTRACTOR. However, we must emphasize that the solidary liability
of petitioner with that of Longest Force does not preclude the application of the Civil
Code provision on the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid. As
held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v NLRC, the joint and several
liability imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by
petitioner against the security agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants, the private respondents herein. The security agency may not seek
exculpation by claiming that the principal's payments to it were inadequate for the guards'
lawful compensation. As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of
labor laws; and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services
is its principal concern and not any other's.

7. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; AWARD OF

BACKWAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. Upon review of the award of backwages
and attorney's fees, we discovered certain errors that happened in the addition of the
amount of individual backwages that resulted in the erroneous total amount of backwages
and attorney's fees. These errors ought to be properly rectified now. Thus, the correct sum
of individual backwages should be P126,648.40 instead of P126,684.40, while the correct
sum of total backwages awarded and attorney's fees should be P3,926,100.40, and
P392,610.04, instead of P3,927,216.40 and P392,721.64, respectively.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; APPEAL VIA CERTIORARI; ONLY QUESTIONS
OF LAW MAY BE REVIEWED THEREIN. On the issue of the propriety of the
award of overtime pay despite the alleged lack of proof thereof, suffice it to state that
such involves a determination and evaluation of facts which cannot be done in a petition
for review. Well-established is the rule that in an appeal via certiorari, only questions of
law may be reviewed.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p

For review on certiorari is the Resolution, 1 dated December 29, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55416, which dismissed outright the petition for certiorari of
Mariveles Shipyard Corp., due to a defective certificate of non-forum shopping and non-
submission of the required documents to accompany said petition. Mariveles Shipyard
Corp., had filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to nullify
the resolution 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated April 22,
1999, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision, 3 dated May 22, 1998, holding petitioner jointly and severally liable with
Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., for the underpayment of wages
and overtime pay due to the private respondents. Likewise challenged in the instant
petition is the resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals, dated July 12, 2000, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:
Sometime on October 1993, petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the
services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter, "Longest
Force") to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest
Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioner's
shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract
with Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter.
However, it found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and
inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995. 5
Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed
at petitioner's shipyard.
On September 2, 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay and attorney's fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the
Labor Arbiter. Docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, the case sought
the guards' reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
For its part, Longest Force filed a cross-claim 6 against the petitioner. Longest Force
admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the
premises of petitioner from October 16, 1993 to April 30, 1995, rendering a 12 hours
duty per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment
of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the
liability to petitioner alleging that the service fee paid by the latter to it was way below
the PNPSOSIA and PADPAO rate, thus, "contrary to the mandatory and prohibitive laws
because the right to proper compensation and benefits provided under the existing labor
laws cannot be waived nor compromised."
The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing
that no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It
further pointed out that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for
monetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force
against it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that
Longest Force had benefited from the contract, it was now estopped from questioning
said agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal.
On May 22, 1998, the Labor Arbiter decided NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondents as follows:
1. DECLARING respondents Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency,
Inc. and Mariveles Shipyard Corporation jointly and severally liable to
pay the money claims of complainants representing underpayment of
wages and overtime pay in the total amount of P2,700,623.40 based on
the PADPAO rates of pay covering the period from October 16, 1993 up
to April 29, 1995 broken down as follows:
UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES:
MONTHLY UNDER
PERIOD PADPAO ACTUAL PAYMENT
COVERED RATES SALARY FOR WAGE

(8 hrs. duty) RECEIVED THE PERIOD DIFFERENTIALS

Oct. 16-Dec. P5,485.00 P5,000 P485.00 P970.00

15/93 (2 mos.)

Dec. 16/93-Mar. 6,630.00 5,000 1,630.00 5,705.00

31/94 (3.5 mos.)

Apr. 1-Dec. 31/94 7,090.00 5,810 1,280.00 11,520.00

(9 mos.)

Jan. 1-Apr. 29/95 7,220.00 5,810 1,410.00 5,597.70

(3.97 mos.)
TOTAL UNDERPAYMENTS P23,792.70
 =========
OVERTIME:

Oct. 16-Dec. 15/93 P5,485 x 2 = P5,485.00

(2 mos.) 2

Dec. 16/93-Mar. 31/94 6,630 x 3.5 = 11,602.50

(3.5 mos.) 2

Apr. 1-Dec. 31/94 7,090 x 9 = 31,905.00

(9 mos.) 2

Jan. 1-Apr. 29/95 7,220 x 3.97 = 14,331.70

(3.97 mos.) 2
TOTAL OVERTIME P63,324.20
=========
Sub-Total of Underpayments and Overtime P87,116.90

1. Luis Regondula (the same) P87,116.90

2. Manolito Catalan (the same) 87,116.90
3. Oresca Agapito (the same) 87,116.90
4. Noel Alibadbad (the same) 87,116.90
5. Rogelio Pintuan (the same) 87,116.90
6. Danilo Crisostomo (the same) 87,116.90
7. Romulo Macalinao (the same) 87,116.90
8. Nestor Ferrer (the same) 87,116.90
9. Ricky Cuesta (the same) 87,116.90
10. Andrada Ricky (the same) 87,116.90
11. Larry Rogola (the same) 87,116.90
12. Francisco Lenogon (the same) 87,116.90
13. Augosto Quinto (the same) 87,116.90
14. Arfe Beramo (the same) 87,116.90
15. Bonifacio Trinidad (the same) 87,116.90
16. Alfredo Azcarraga (the same) 87,116.90
17. Ernesto Magno (the same) 87,116.90
18. Honario Hortecio (the same) 87,116.90
19. Nelbert Pineda (the same) 87,116.90
20. Glen Estipular (the same) 87,116.90
21. Francisco Compuesto (the same) 87,116.90
22. Isabelito Cortes (the same) 87,116.90
23. Maturan Rosauro (the same) 87,116.90
24. Samson Canas (the same) 87,116.90
25. Febien Isip (the same) 87,116.90
26. Jesus Riparip (the same) 87,116.90
27. Alfredo Sienes (the same) 87,116.90
28. Adolar Albert (the same) 87,116.90
29. Cabanillas Honesto (the same) 87,116.90
30. Castillo Amping (the same) 87,116.90
31. Revilla Elwin (the same) 87,116.90

GRAND TOTAL P2,700,623.90
===========
2. DECLARING both respondents liable to pay complainants attorney's fees
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award recovered or the sum
of P270,062.34.
3. ORDERING respondent Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency,
Inc. to reinstate all the herein complainants to their former or equivalent
positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full
backwages which as computed as of the date of this decision are as
follows: ACTIcS

Backwages:

10/16 12/15/93 = 2 mos.

P5,485.00 x 2 mos. = P10,970.00

12/16/93 3/31/94 = 3.5 mos.

P6,630.00 x 3.5 mos. = 23,205.00

4/1 12/31/94 = 9 mos.

P7,090.00 x 9 mos. = 63,810.00

1/1 4/29/95 = 3.97 mos.

P7,220.00 x 3.97 mos. = 28,663.40

TOTAL P126,684.40 7
==========

1. Luis Regondula (same) P126,684.40 8

2. Manolito Catalan (same) 126,684.40
3. Oresca Agapito (same) 126,684.40
4. Noel Alibadbad (same) 126,684.40
5. Rogelio Pintuan (same) 126,684.40
6. Danilo Crisostomo (same) 126,684.40
7. Romulo Macalinao (same) 126,684.40
8. Nestor Ferrer (same) 126,684.40
9. Ricky Cuesta (same) 126,684.40
10. Andrada Rolly (same) 126,684.40
11. Larry Rogola (same) 126,684.40
12. Francisco Lenogon (same) 126,684.40
13. Augosto Quinto (same) 126,684.40
14. Arfe Beramo (same) 126,684.40
15. Bonifacio Trinidad (same) 126,684.40
16. Alfredo Azcarraga (same) 126,684.40
17. Ernesto Magno (same) 126,684.40
18. Honario Hortecio (same) 126,684.40
19. Nelbert Pineda (same) 126,684.40
20. Glen Estipular (same) 126,684.40
21. Francisco Compuesto (same) 126,684.40
 22. Isabelito Cortes (same) 126,684.40
23. Maturan Rosauro (same) 126,684.40
24. Samson Canas (same) 126,684.40
25. Febien Isip (same) 126,684.40
26. Jesus Riparip (same) 126,684.40
27. Alfredo Sienes (same) 126,684.40
28. Adolar Albert (same) 126,684.40
29. Cabanillas Honesto (same) 126,684.40
30. Castillo Amping (same) 126,684.40
31. Revilla Elwin (same) 126,684.40

GRAND TOTAL P3,927,216.40 9
4. ORDERING said Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award
recovered representing backwages in the amount of P392,721.64. 10
5. DISMISSING all other claims for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-
96-A. The labor tribunal, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC.

The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment
for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55416. The Court of Appeals, however, denied due course
to the petition and dismissed it outright for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification on non-forum shopping is signed not by
duly authorized officer of petitioner corporation, but by counsel (Section
1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
2. The petition is unaccompanied by copies of relevant and pertinent documents,
particularly the motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC
(Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). 12
The petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The appellate
court denied the motion, pointing out that under prevailing case law subsequent
compliance with formal requirements for filing a petition as prescribed by the Rules, does
not ipso facto warrant a reconsideration. In any event, it found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC to grant the writ of certiorari.
Hence, this present petition before us. Petitioner submits that THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED:
1. . . . IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DENYING THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1, RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
2. . . . IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
3. . . . IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT "LONGEST FORCE" AND
PETITIONER ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
PAYMENT OF WAGES AND OVERTIME PAY DESPITE THE
CLEAR SHOWING THAT PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY PAID
THE SECURITY SERVICES THAT WAS RENDERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
4. . . . WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT ONLY "LONGEST FORCE"
SHOULD BE SOLELY AND ULTIMATELY LIABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE. 13
We find the issues for our resolution to be: (1) Was it error for the Court of Appeals to
sustain its order of dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari,
notwithstanding subsequent compliance with the requirements under the Rules of Court
by the petitioner? (2) Did the appellate court err in not holding that petitioner was denied
due process of law by the NLRC? and (3) Did the appellate court grievously err in
finding petitioner jointly and severally liable with Longest Force for the payment of wage
differentials and overtime pay owing to the private respondents?
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 observed
that: (1) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not signed by any
duly authorized officer of petitioner but merely by petitioner's counsel; and (2) the
petition was not accompanied by a copy of motion for reconsideration filed before the
NLRC, thus violating Section 1, 14 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, a dismissal was
proper under Section 3, 15 Rule 46 of the Rules.
In assailing the appellate court's ruling, the petitioner appeals to our sense of compassion
and kind consideration. It submits that the certification signed by its counsel and attached
to its petition filed with the Court of Appeals is substantial compliance with the
requirement. Moreover, petitioner calls our attention to the fact that when it filed its
motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, a joint verification and
certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by its Personnel Manager 16 and a copy
of the Motion for Reconsideration 17 filed before the NLRC were attached therein. Thus,
petitioner prays that we take a liberal stance to promote the ends of justice.
Petitioner's plea for liberality, however, cannot be granted by the Court for reasons herein
elucidated.
It is settled that the requirement in the Rules that the certification of non-forum shopping
should be executed and signed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot
sign said certification unless clothed with special authority to do so. 18 The reason for this
is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a
certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for
dismissal of the petition. 19 In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties
themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, in the case of the
corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate
entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations,
as artificial persons, cannot personally do the task themselves. 20 In this case, not only
was the originally appended certification signed by counsel, but in its motion for
reconsideration, still petitioner utterly failed to show that Ms. Rosanna Ignacio, its
Personnel Manager who signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached thereto, was duly authorized for this purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that
obedience to the requirements of procedural rule is needed if we are to expect fair results
therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction. 21
Thus, on this point, no error could be validly attributed to respondent Court of Appeals. It
did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the requirements governing
the certification of non-forum shopping.
Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that there was denial of due process of law when
the Labor Arbiter failed to have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds that the
Arbiter did not observe the mandatory language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now
Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New
Rules of Procedure which provided that:
If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have
submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an
Order to that effect and shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor . . .
22

Petitioner's contention, in our view, lacks sufficient basis. Well settled is the rule that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 23 Not all cases require a trial-
type hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is
satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to
which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence
that would prove their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter determines that
no formal hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not necessary. 24 In any
event, as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side
in several hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position papers and
other supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that such opportunity more
than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that it should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Longest Force for underpayment of wages and overtime pay because it had been
religiously and promptly paying the bills for the security services sent by Longest Force
and that these are in accordance with the statutory minimum wage. Also, petitioner
contends that it should not be held liable for overtime pay as private respondents failed to
present proof that overtime work was actually performed. Lastly, petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals failed to render a decision that finally disposed of the case because
it did not specifically rule on the immediate recourse of private respondents, that is, the
matter of reimbursement between petitioner and Longest Force in accordance with Eagle
Security Agency Inc. v. NLRC , 25 and Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v.
NLRC . 26
Petitioner's liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows:
ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. Whenever an employer
enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's
work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any,
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately
preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or
corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent
contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY . The provisions of existing laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held
responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any
provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil
liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.
In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the
security agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard
corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to
Article 107 abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to
pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the
guards' wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its
provisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security agency is held
liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the
indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of
failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample
protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 27

Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the
compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor
standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages
barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in
every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated
wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus, employers cannot hide
behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors' or subcontractors')
liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage. 28
However, we must emphasize that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest
Force does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of
reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid. 29 As held in Del Rosario & Sons
Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC , 30 the joint and several liability imposed on
petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the
security agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, the
private respondents herein. The security agency may not seek exculpation by claiming
that the principal's payments to it were inadequate for the guards' lawful compensation.
As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and the
adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal
concern and not any other's. 31
On the issue of the propriety of the award of overtime pay despite the alleged lack of
proof thereof, suffice it to state that such involves a determination and evaluation of facts
which cannot be done in a petition for review. Well established is the rule that in an
appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed. 32
One final point. Upon review of the award of backwages and attorney's fees, we
discovered certain errors that happened in the addition of the amount of individual
backwages that resulted in the erroneous total amount of backwages and attorney's fees.
These errors ought to be properly rectified now. Thus, the correct sum of individual
backwages should be P126,648.40 instead of P126,684.40, while the correct sum of total
backwages awarded and attorney's fees should be P3,926,100.40, and P392,610.04,
instead of P3,927,216.40 and P392,721.64, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner and Longest Force are held liable jointly
and severally for underpayment of wages and overtime pay of the security guards,
without prejudice to petitioner's right of reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation
and Security Agency, Inc. The amounts payable to complaining security guards, herein
private respondents, by way of total backwages and attorney's fees are hereby set at
P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, respectively. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, [November 11, 2003],
|||

461 PHIL 249-269)

[G.R. No. 79690-707. February 1, 1989.]

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.

[G.R. No. 80578. February 1, 1989.]

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M.

GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS; RULE 139

(b), REVISED RULES OF COURT; REFERENCE OF COMPLAINTS TO
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES OR TO SOLICITOR GENERAL NOT
MANDATORY UPON SUPREME COURT; CASE AT BAR. In its per curiam
Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out
that: "[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such
reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not
an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court." The above
statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this
case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule
139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only
necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General
was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course of action open to the
Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of
Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139
is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn
complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by
the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed
against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which
referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
charges against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor
General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the
present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was
"no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his
defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of
his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law
and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues."
2. ID.; ID.; INDEFINITE SUSPENSION FROM PRACTICE OF LAW NOT "CRUEL,
DEGRADINGS OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT"; REASON THEREFOR. In his
point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension from the
practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment." The Court finds it
difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the
respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect
of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in
his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge
himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; USE OF PHRASE "IN
FACIE CURIAE" EXPLAINED. In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court
concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae
and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did
not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though
we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking
of "direct contempts" as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to
convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct
of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a
frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial
system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated
2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and
given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose
punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting
"direct contempt."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF EXERCISE OF POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt
does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and
vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to
respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially
from those who are officers of the court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF PHRASE "VISIBLE TENDENCY" EXPLAINED; "CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER RULE" AND "BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST"
CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine
of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71
of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct
including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice." The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by
respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses
with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and
which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent
proof of impending apocalypse. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of
assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized
and applied by courts. In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, this Court, speaking through Mme.
Justice Melencio-Herrera said: ". . . The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the 'hierarchy of civil liberties' (Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It
is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835, 858 [1960]: 'From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.'
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
'balancing-of interests test' (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970
ed., p. 79). The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation' (Separate
Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra,
p. 899)." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test"
we believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October
7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court
has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical
disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting
not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as
palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and
more far reaching in its implications for society.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCLAIMER OF INTENT TO ATTACK AND DENIGRATE THE

COURT CANNOT PREVAIL OVER PLAIN IMPORT OF WHAT WAS SAID AND
DONE. What the Court actually said on this point was: "Respondent Gonzalez disclaims
an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is,
upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in
his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. The actual subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as psychological
phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human
intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and
statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent
to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say
and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply
pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is
scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his
criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the
victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM : p

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez,
relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have
reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the
argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The
Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts
which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the
"Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration. prcd

1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge respondent
[with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is
guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of
the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a
technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United
States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts" as "contempts in
the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious
acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the
Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is
that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in
respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present
all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of this
Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it
could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to
consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge
respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court pointing out that:
"[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court;
such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General
is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the
 Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before
the Supreme Court."
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139,
referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not
the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal
or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion,
or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied).
The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided
for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another
person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate
motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against
an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which
referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed
with the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself
has initiated charges against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to
the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is
needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court
(page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for
it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the
amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the
statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his
part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration
is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United Stated. 1 It may be
pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held,
among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess
of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to injury trial as
a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt
subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand jury indictments. LLjur

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
"Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious
manuscript of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the
foundation of the United Stated the constitutionality of the power to punish for
 contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First
Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that
reported the bill to the Senate, five members including the chairman, Senator,
later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional
Convention (Oliver Ellswoth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard
Bassett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen members, including Madison who contemporaneously introduced
the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse
under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly the
summary power vested in the court, it did not remotely deny the existence of the
power but merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act
'declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court.' Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat
487.LLpr

xxx xxx xxx

Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout
its existence. In at least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass
of decisions in the lower federal courts the power to punish summarily has been
accepted without question . . ." 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best.
The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does
so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and
vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to
respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially
from those who are officers of the court.

3. In his point D, respondent's counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
'visible tendency' rule rather than the 'clear and present danger' rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate
a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse.
The "clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. In Lagunzad v.
Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said: Cdpr
 ". . . The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupied a preferred position in
the 'hierarchy of civil liberties' (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is
not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
'From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of
life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist
that all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.'
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the 'balancing-of interests test' (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation' (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice
Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899)." (Emphasis
supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test" we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October
7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court
has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical
disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting
not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as
palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and
more far reaching in its implications for society. LexLib

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that
intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point
was:
"Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his
conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim
the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not
 irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance. (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted)."
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as psychological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied
from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear
import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting
that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted
from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5. In his point I, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish
respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends
in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are,
however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction.
The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on this matter in its
per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would
suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a century
or so, ought to be reversed. LexLib

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment." The Court
finds it difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness
of the respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has
the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to
purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging
such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988
and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent.
(Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79690-707, 80578 (Resolution), [February 1,
|||

1989], 252 PHIL 1-13)

[G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003.]
 PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D.
FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR. and MARILOU M.
CLEOFAS, respondents.

Jonathan M Polines for petitioner.

Cayanga Zuniga & Angel for private respondents.'

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), detailed respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. and Marilou
M. Cleofas of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC) to the Office of DOTC
Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal. After the lapse of 90 days, petitioner failed and refused
to reinstate respondents to their mother unit. Thus, respondents filed a petition for
Mandamus and Damages against him. He failed to file his answer. Accordingly, he was
declared in default and the judgment in favor of respondent was rendered. Petitioner,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the Court of
Appeals. However, it was dismissed for failure of the OSG to file the required
memorandum. Subsequently, the Writ of Execution was issued. Petitioner, through his
new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale.
He alleged that the trial court's decision never became final and executory as he was
deprived of his right to due process. He further asserted that the resolution of the
Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
No. 6713 superseded the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the trial court quashed the
Writ of Execution because the sheriff failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, however, it issued an alias Writ of Execution. The petitioner then filed a petition
for certiorari wherein the Court of Appeals ruled that the OSG's negligence found
petitioner and it concurred with the trial court's ruling that the nature of the case before
the Ombudsman was different from the case before the trial court. Hence, this petition. AcHSEa

The Court did not agree with the petitioner It ruled that due process, in essence, is simply
an opportunity to be heard, and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout
the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the
opportunity to present his side, but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner's former counsel,
the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, was binding on petitioner. The trial
and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from
becoming final and executory.
Moreover, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding
petitioner liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is
completely different from the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The
two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented two
different causes of action. Petitioner's cause of action arose from respondents' alleged
violation of certain provisions of RA 6713, whereas respondents' cause of action resulted
from petitioner's refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC.

SYLLABUS

l. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; ESSENTIAL

REQUISITES; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. We begin by pointing
out that petitioner failed to allege the essential requisites under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Specifically, petitioner never
alleged that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders. Neither did petitioner allege that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In other words, there is no
issue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On this score alone, the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is in order.
2. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; A CLIENT IS BOUND BY
THE MISTAKES OF HIS COUNSEL. In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz, which
petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled: It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner
neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein
petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when
the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception
thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice
against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its
counsel, without an explanation to that effect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
COULD NOT RELIEVE PETITIONER OF THE EFFECTS OF SUCH NEGLIGENCE.
Due process, in essence. is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was
not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court
of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so.
Clearly, petitioner's former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however,
binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts ruled that the negligence of the OSG could
not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial
court from becoming final and executory.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PROOF THAT PETITIONER SUFFERED SERIOUS
INJUSTICE TO EXEMPT HIM FROM THE GENERAL RULE. In the present case,
there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt from the general
rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to
refute the respondents' allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE REPLACED THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL WITH ANOTHER LAWYER. [P]etitioner is not
entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG's failure to file the
answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring
petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another
lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent
lack of interest in petitioner's case, until the trial court's decision became final.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE OF
MAKING PERIODIC INQUIRIES FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE APPELLATE COURT ABOUT THE STATUS OF HIS CASE.
Petitioner should have taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG
and the appellate court about the status of his case. Litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and wait the outcome of their
case. To agree with petitioner's stance would enable every party to render inutile any
adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part
of his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which
contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; RESOLUTION OF THE
OMBUDSMAN IS NOT A SUPERVENING EVENT TO STAY ITS EXECUTION.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable. This, however, is not the case here. In the present case, the
Ombudsman issued his resolution prior to the finality of the trial court's decision. The
Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial court's decision
became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the
Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the
decision of the trial court.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
OMBUDSMAN IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE ACTION INSTITUTED
BY RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. [T]he resolution of the
Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating 7 (d) of RA 6713 did not and could not
supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages. The action
filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action
instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly
separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action.
Petitioner's cause of action arose from respondents' alleged violation of certain provisions
of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of action resulted from petitioner's refusal to
recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before the
Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In
contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether respondents were
entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and damages.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF THE OMBUDSMAN DID NOT RENDER THE
EXECUTION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE;
CASE AT BAR. The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the
trial court's decision unjust and inequitable, The resolution of the Ombudsman finding
Abarca guilty of violating Section 7 (d) of RA 6713 did not state that petitioner had a
valid reason to detail respondents to the Office of Undersecretary Cal. In fact, the
Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando and Mary Lou Cleofas.
Thus, the trial court correctly awarded to respondents. Contrary to petitioner's contention,
awarding damages to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents for their
alleged wrongdoing. The award merely compensates respondents for petitioner's own
unlawful acts. Clearly illegal were petitioner's acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents
to the office of DOTC Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November
1995 directive of Secretary Garcia to recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.

DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 3 dated 30 September 1998 denying due course to the
petition for certiorari 4 filed by Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. and the Resolution dated 3
December 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. ("petitioner") is the former Assistant Secretary of the
Air Transportation Office ("ATO"), Department of Transportation and Communication
("DOTC"). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. ("Abarca"), and
Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative
Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center ("CATC"). The CATC is an
adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators
and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the
Southeast Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents,
detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May
1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and
Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of
the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office
of Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents' request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a
memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under "preventive
suspension" for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to
order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed.
Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the
Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents' request for
reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a
memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous
detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate
respondents to their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with
Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0139. Respondents prayed for the
following:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners herein respectfully pray of this
Honorable Court that:
1. Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued ex parte directing respondent Panfilo V.
Villaruel, Jr., to recall the petitioners herein within twenty four (24) hours from
receipt hereof to their mother unit, the Civil Aviation Training Center, Air
Transportation Office, DOTC, and to forthwith allow them to assume, perform
and discharge the functions, duties and responsibilities inherent, appurtenant
and incident to their respective offices.
2. After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered confirming the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction earlier issued by this Honorable Court and
 declaring the same permanent, and ordering the respondent Panfilo Villaruel,
Jr., to pay petitioners herein the following damages, to wit:
a) to pay petitioner Reynaldo D. Fernando the amount of P50,000 as actual and
compensatory damages;
b) to pay petitioners herein moral, exemplary and temperate damages, in such
amounts as may hereafter be proven in the course of trial, which petitioners
herein are leaving to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court to determine
and adjudge;
c) to pay petitioners herein attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000;
d) to pay petitioners herein the costs of suit.
Petitioners herein pray for such other and further relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises. 5
On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents' prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial court was appointed Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to
Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. 6
On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of
Judge Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
petitioner to comply with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing
petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit until further orders by the trial court.
For petitioner's continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction,
respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare
petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial
court's order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals 7 assailing the trial court's order finding petitioner
guilty of indirect contempt. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41263.
Meanwhile, the trial court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to
the petition for mandamus and damages. Accordingly, respondents adduced their
evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court.
On 11 July 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the petitioners and against the respondent declaring mandamus
 permanent and thereby ordering respondent Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., to pay the
following:
(1) One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) each as moral damages;
(2) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as exemplary
damages;
(3) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as temperate
damages, and;
(4) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 8
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42447. 9 With the filing of the appeal, the Court
of Appeals granted respondents' motion for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December
1996 within which to file petitioner's memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the
memorandum. Subsequently, Solicitor Restituto Tuando, Jr. who was handling the case
was appointed Regional Trial Court judge of Dumaguete City. The case was re-assigned
to Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued
a Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file the required memorandum.
The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Resolution became final
and executory on 14 June 1997.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although
served a copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition.
Acting on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution on 22
September 1997. On 3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued Notice of Sheriff's Sale setting
on 23 February 1998 the sale of petitioner's real property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 83030.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, 10 filed a Motion to Quash the
Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriff's Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the
trial court's decision never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioner's
memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the dismissal of his
appeal and of the trial court's order granting respondents' motion for execution. Petitioner
further asserted that the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-96-0090 11
superseded the decision of the trial court. The Ombudsman's Resolution approved the
following recommendation of the reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent MODESTO ABARCA, JR., is hereby
found GUILTY of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713, for which the
penalty of Suspension Without Pay for Six (6) Months is hereby recommended
pursuant to Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation
to Section 25(2) of Republic Act No. 6770.
It is also respectfully recommended that the charge against respondents
REYNALDO FERNANDO and MARY LOU CLEOFAS be DISMISSED. 12
On 23 February 1998, the trial court issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution
because the Sheriff failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial
court, however, issued an Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same on 28 April 1998.
Dissatisfied with the trial court's orders, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 assailing the execution of
the trial court's decision of 11 July 1996. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the
petition for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the motion in a
Resolution of 3 December 1998.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner raised before the Court of Appeals the following issues:
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 11, 1996 IS VOID
FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND COULD NOT HAVE
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2. SUPERVENING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE
TRANSPIRED WHICH RENDERED EXECUTION OF THE
JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE. 13
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial
court from becoming final and executory. In short, the OSG's negligence binds petitioner.
The Court of Appeals admonished petitioner for his failure to ascertain periodically from
the OSG or from the Court of Appeals the status of his appeal. The appellate court cited
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 14 which held that it is the duty of a party litigant to make
inquiries to his counsel on matters concerning his case. A party litigant bears the
responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to apprise himself of the progress of
the case. A lawyer's negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer the consequences
of such negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no proof that the
OSG failed to inform petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court's ruling that the
nature of the case before the Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial court.
The former deals with a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713") 15 punished
with suspension from office while the latter deals with an ultra vices act punished with
damages. The appellate court ruled that the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to do
with the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are separate and distinct from each
other.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals opined that petitioner failed to prove that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion to warrant the writ of certiorari. The appellate court
ruled that the trial court acted in accord with law and prevailing jurisprudence in issuing
the questioned orders.
The Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for resolution of this Court: 16
1. Whether the award of moral, exemplary and temperate damages to
respondents has legal basis.
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG
could not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and
prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory.
3. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due process when the
appellate court dismissed his appeal for failure of the OSG to file
the memorandum.
4. Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr.
guilty of violating Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of
the trial court's decision unjust and inequitable.
The main issue to resolve is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari assailing the trial court's orders dated 23 February 1998 and 28 April 1998.
Resolving this issue necessarily determines the validity of the questioned orders. This in
turn resolves the questions of whether the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due
process and whether the Ombudsman's resolution rendered the execution of the trial
court's decision unjust and inequitable.
We can no longer resolve the issue regarding the validity and reasonableness of the award
of damages for three reasons. First, the decision of the trial court dated 11 July 1996 is
already final and executory. Second, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner was
simply a direct consequence of the trial court's issuance of the writ of execution and
notice of sheriff's sale. In other words, petitioner merely questioned the execution of the
trial court's decision in his petition for certiorari. Third, petitioner did not raise the issue
of the validity and reasonableness of the award of damages before the Court of Appeals.
17
 The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
We begin by pointing out that petitioner failed to allege the essential requisites under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari to prosper.
Specifically, petitioner never alleged that the trial court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. Neither did petitioner allege that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
other words, there is no issue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On
this score alone, the dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is
in order. However, in disposing of the instant case, we shall still resolve the principal
issues raised by petitioner.
No Denial of Petitioner's Right to Due Process
Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 96-
0139 is void for lack of due process. Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him
the chance to be heard and to submit his evidence. Petitioner, formerly represented by the
OSG, failed to file an answer to respondents' petition for mandamus and damages.
Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner in default. While the OSG filed a notice
of appeal of the judgment by default, it failed to file with the Court of Appeals the
required memorandum resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. In petitioner's words, the
OSG "virtually abandoned" 18 his case. Petitioner argues that the inexcusable negligence
of the OSG did not bind him and prevented the decision of the trial court from becoming
final and executory.
We do not agree.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard 19 and this opportunity was
not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court
of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so.
Clearly, petitioner's former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however,
binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the
OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence 20 and prevent the
decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz, 21 which petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to
his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the
client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client. the herein petitioner. As
a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the
application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
no undue prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated.
 At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been
prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that
effect. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt
him from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner
did not even attempt to refute the respondents' allegations in the petition for mandamus
and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the
OSG's failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have
the order declaring petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the
OSG with another lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG,
despite its apparent lack of interest in petitioner's case, until the trial court's decision
became final. In Salva v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court declared:
Respondent's reliance on Legarda is inapropos. Notably, the decision in said
case was not yet final in 1991. The private respondent therein then filed a timely
motion for reconsideration. In granting the motion for reconsideration, the Court
en banc held:
xxx xxx xxx
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross
negligence of Legarda's counsel. If she may be said to be 'innocent'
because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with
more reason are respondents truly 'innocent.' . . . In this case, it was not
respondents, but Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the
lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued to retain
him even after his proven apathy and negligence."
At any rate, we find that respondent Governor Sato, as well as the Province of
Occidental Mindoro which she represents, were not denied their day in court.
Responsive pleadings were filed before the lower courts, and respondent was
given all the opportunities to prove her case. Her chosen counsel did not
diligently exhaust all legal remedies to advance respondent's cause, yet
respondent did not terminate his services. She was aware of the repeated
negligence of her counsel and cannot now complain of counsel's errors. Hence,
there is no justifiable reason to exempt her from the general rule that clients
should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence
of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at
any time and replace with another even without justifiable reason. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSG's errors. Petitioner should have
taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court
about the status of his case. 23 Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all
they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. 24 To agree with
petitioner's stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or
decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel. 25
The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled
doctrines of trial and procedure. 26

The Ombudsman's Resolution Does Not Render

the Execution of the Trial Court's Decision
Unjust and Inequitable
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman's Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating
Section 7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial court's decision finding petitioner liable for
damages. Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman's resolution rendered the execution of the
trial court's decision unjust and inequitable.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes. 27 True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions
is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. 28 This, however, is not the case here. In the present
case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial court's
decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial
court's decision became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of
the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the
decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding
petitioner liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is
completely different from the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The
two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented two
different causes of action. Petitioner's cause of action arose from respondents' alleged
violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents' cause of action resulted
from petitioner's refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the
administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were
guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court
was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and
damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial court's decision
unjust and inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of
violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail
respondents to the Office of Undersecretary Cal. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the
charges against Reynaldo Fernando and Mary Lou Cleofas. Thus, the trial court correctly
awarded damages to respondents. Contrary to petitioner's contention, awarding damages
to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents for their alleged wrongdoing.
The award merely compensates respondents for petitioner's own unlawful acts. Clearly
illegal were petitioner's acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to the office of DOTC
Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive of
Secretary Garcia to recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 and the Resolution dated 3 December
1998 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, G.R. No. 136726, [September 24, 2003], 458 PHIL 642-660)

[G.R. No. 139884. February 15, 2001.]

SPOUSES OCTAVIO and EPIFANIA LORBES, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO DELOS REYES and JOSEFINA
CRUZ, respondents.

Magsino Cristal-Tenorio Law Office for petitioners.

Antonio A. Cablitas for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners spouses Octavio and Epifania Lorbes where the registered owners of a parcel
of land located in Antipolo, Rizal. The said property was mortgage to Florencio and
Nestor Carlos. Fearing for the foreclosure of the property, petitioners asked their son-in-
law, herein private respondent Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in redeeming their property.
Private respondent delos Reyes solicited the assistance of private respondent Josefina
Cruz. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a Deed of Sale conveying the mortgaged
property in favor of private respondent Cruz and Cruz will apply for a housing loan with
Land Bank of the Philippines using the subject property as collateral. The proceeds of the
loan will be paid to the Carloses as mortgagees and to other expenses in relation thereto.
Moreover, the monthly amortization on the housing loan which was supposed to be
deducted from the salary of private respondent Cruz will be reimbursed by private
respondent delos Reyes. Cruz's loan had been approved. Sometime in 1993, petitioners
notified private respondent delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the subject
property but the offer was refused. Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for
reformation of instrument and damages. Summons and a copy of the complaint were
served upon private respondents on August 1, 1994. Private respondents filed their
answer beyond the reglementary period. Thus, on September 5, 1994, petitioners filed a
motion to declare private respondents in default, which the trial court granted by the trial
court. Thus, petitioners presented their evidence ex parte. Private respondents filed a
motion to lift order of default and to strike out evidence presented ex parte, but it was
denied by the trial court. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside
orders of default for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it
clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders
of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of
obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. However,
we do not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the
proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for by private
respondents, and second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that private
respondents would have presented before the RTC were capably ventilated before
respondent court, and were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the correctness
of the evaluation of petitioners' evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the
decision of the RTC. To the merit of this case, the court ruled that the presence of even
one of the circumstances laid out in Article 1602, and not a concurrence of the
circumstances therein enumerated, suffices to construe a contract of sale to be one of
equitable mortgage. This is simply in consonance with the rule that the law favors the
least transmission of property rights. Applying the foregoing considerations to the instant
case, the Court finds that the true intention between the parties for executing the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the property in question but merely to
secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a direct interest since the
proceeds thereof were to be immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation
to the Carloses. The facts further bear out that petitioners remained in possession of the
disputed property after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the transfer of
registered title to Cruz in October 1992. Copies of realty tax receipts attached to the
record also show that petitioners continued paying for the taxes on the property for the
period 1992 to 1994, or after the property was supposed to have been sold to Cruz. From
the above, the Court is satisfied that enough of the circumstances set out in Article 1602
of the Civil Code are attendant in the instant case, as to show that the true arrangement
between petitioners and private respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COURTS SHOULD BE LIBERAL

SETTING ASIDE ORDERS OF DEFAULT FOR JUDGMENTS OF DEFAULT ARE
FROWNED UPON. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless ins cases where
it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of
orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear
cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION THEREOF WILL NOT JUSTIFY A REMAND OF
PROCEEDINGS TO THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND EVIDENCE WERE CAPABLY VENTILATED BEFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS. Under the factual milieu of this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in
denying private respondents' motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the
evidence presented by petitioners ex parte, especially considering. that an answer was
filed, though out of time. We thus sustain the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
default order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of private respondents' due
process rights. However, we do not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify a
remand of the proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for
by private respondents, and second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that
private respondents would have presented before the RTC were capably ventilated before
respondent court, and were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the correctness
of the evaluation of petitioners' evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the
decision of the RTC. This is evident from the discussions in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, which cited with approval a number of private respondents' arguments and
evidence, including the documents annexed to their opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction filed with the RTC. To emphasize, the reversal of respondent court
was not simply on due process grounds but on the merits, going into the issue of whether
the transaction was one of equitable mortgage or of sale, and so we find that we can
properly take cognizance of the substantive issue in this case, while of course bearing in
mind the inordinate manner by which the RTC issued its default order.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY AND PAROL EVIDENCE MAY BE
SUBMITTED AND ADMITTED TO PROVE THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.
On the outset, it must be emphasized that there is no conclusive test to determine
whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a
mortgage. "The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the
parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the
surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the
attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading
to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the
real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence
may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties."
4. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE PRESUMED TO BE AN
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE; CIRCUMSTANCES. Thus, under Article 1602 of the
Civil Code, a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage when (a) the
price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after the expiration of the right of
repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new
period is executed; (d) the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e)
the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case
where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.;ID.; PRESENCE OF ONE CIRCUMSTANCE IS SUFFICIENT. The
conditions which give way to a presumption of equitable mortgage, as set out in Article
1602 of the Civil Code, apply with equal force to a contract purporting to be one of
absolute sale. Moreover, the presence of even one of the circumstances laid out in Article
1602, and not a concurrence of the circumstances therein enumerated, suffices to construe
a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage. This is simply in consonance with the
rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE INTENTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES EXECUTING THE
DEED OF SALE WAS NOT TO CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BUT MERELY TO SECURE HOUSING LOAN. Applying the
foregoing considerations to the instant case, the Court finds that the true intention
between the parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership
of the property in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which
petitioners had a direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be immediately applied
to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the Carloses. It is not disputed that before the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale petitioners' mortgage obligation to the Carloses
was nearing maturity and they were in dire need of money to meet the same. Hence, they
asked for the help of their son-in-law delos Reyes who in turn requested Cruz to take out
a housing loan with Land Bank. Since collateral is a standard requirement of banks in
giving out loans, it was made to appear that the subject property was sold to Cruz so she
can declare the same as collateral for the housing loan. This was simply in line with the
basic requirement in our laws that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property
sought to be mortgaged. Consistent with their agreement, as soon as the housing loan was
approved, the full amount of the proceeds were immediately turned over to petitioners,
who promptly paid P500,000.00 therefrom to the Carloses in full satisfaction of their
mortgage obligation. The balance was spent by petitioners in transferring title to the
property to Cruz and registering the new mortgage with Land Bank.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NONE OF THE LOAN PROCEEDS WERE KEPT BY THE
SUPPOSED PURCHASER. Were we to accept, as respondent court had, that the loan
that Cruz took out with Land Bank was indeed a housing loan, then it is rather curious
that Cruz kept none of the loan proceeds but allowed for the bulk thereof to be
immediately applied to the payment of petitioners' outstanding mortgage obligation.
8. ID.; ID.;ID.; EXECUTION OF DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WAS DUE TO THE
URGENT NECESSITY OF OBTAINING FUNDS BY THE OWNERS TO PREVENT
FORECLOSURE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY. It also strains credulity that petitioners,
who were exhausting all means to save their sole conjugal real property from being
foreclosed by the Carloses, would concurrently part with the tame in favor of Cruz. Such
urgent prospect of foreclosure helps to explain why petitioners would subscribe to an
agreement like the Deed of Absolute Sale in the herein case, which on its face represents
their unconditional relinquishment of ownership over their property. Passing upon
previous similar situations the Court has declared that "while it was true that plaintiffs
were aware of the contents of the contracts, the preponderance of the evidence showed
however that they signed knowing that said contracts did not express their real intention,
and if they did so notwithstanding this, it was due to the urgent necessity of obtaining
funds. "Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present
emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; OWNERS REMAINED IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
The facts further bear out that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed property
after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the transfer of registered title to
Cruz in October 1992. Cruz made no demand on petitioners to vacate the subject
premises until March 19, 1994; interestingly, this was two days after petitioners signified
their intention to redeem the property by paying the full amount of P600,000.00. On this
basis, the finding of respondent court that petitioners remained in possession of the
property only because they refused to vacate on Cruz's demand is not accurate because
the records reflect that no such demand was made until more than a year since the
purported sale of the property.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; OWNER CONTINUED PAYING FOR THE TAXES ON THE
PROPERTY AFTER THE PROPERTY WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN SOLD.
Copies of realty tax receipts attached to the record also show that petitioners continued
paying for the taxes on the property for the period 1992 to 1994, or after the property was
supposed to have been sold to Cruz.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF THE
SUPPOSED PURCHASER DOES NOT IMPORT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF
OWNERSHIP. That a transfer certificate of title was issued in favor of private
respondent Cruz also does not import conclusive evidence of ownership or that the
agreement between the parties was one of sale. As was stated in Oronce vs. Court of
Appeals, citing Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide: . . . it must be borne in mind that the
equitable doctrine . . . to the effect that any conveyance intended as security for a debt
will be held in effect to be a mortgage, whether so actually expressed in the instrument or
not, operates regardless of the form of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as
the repository of their will. Equity looks through the form and considers the substance;
and no kind of engagement can be adopted which will enable the parties to escape from
the equitable doctrine to which reference is made. In other words, a conveyance of land,
accompanied by registration in the name of the transferee and the issuance of a new
certificate, is no more secured from the operation of the equitable doctrine than the most
informal conveyance that could be devised.
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; NATURE
THEREOF IS NOT DETERMINED BY THE CAPTION OF THE PLEADINGS BUT
BY THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN. Before we fully set aside this issue, it will be
recalled that the instant petition originated as a complaint for reformation filed before the
RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners' action for reformation
unmeritorious because there was no showing that the failure of the deed of sale to express
the parties' true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident.
Indeed, under the facts of the present case, reformation may not be proper for failure to
fully meet the requisites in Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because as the evidence
eventually bore out the contested Deed of Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the
true agreement between the parties but was merely to comply with the collateral
requirements of Land Bank. However, the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners
before the trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not
preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an
equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been
the subject of arguments and evidence of the parties. Thus we have held that it is not the
caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action,
and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such
relief is prayed for.
13. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; WHERE NO ACTUAL DAMAGES ARE
ADJUDICATED, THE AWARDS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
MAY BE REDUCED; AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS SUSTAINED. Finally,
on the award of damages. Considering the due process flaws that attended the default
judgment of the RTC, and applying the rule adopted by this Court that in instances where
no actual damages are adjudicated the awards for moral and exemplary damages may be
reduced, we reduce the award for moral damages in the instant case from P50,000.00 to
P30,000.00. At the same time, we sustain the award of attorney's fees in the amount of
P50,000.00, it being clear that petitioners were compelled to incur expenses and undergo
the rigors of litigation to recover their property.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J : p

This petition for review on certiorari arose from an action for reformation of instrument
and damages originally filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
the decision on which was reviewed and reversed by the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners were the registered owners of a 225-square meter parcel of land located in
Antipolo, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009. Sometime in August
1991, petitioners mortgaged this property to Florencio and Nestor Carlos in the amount of
P150,000.00.
About a year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to P500,000.00 and fearing
foreclosure of the property, petitioners asked their son-in-law, herein private respondent
Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in redeeming their property. Private respondent delos
Reyes agreed to redeem the property but because he allegedly had no money then for the
purpose he solicited the assistance of private respondent Josefina Cruz, a family friend of
the delos Reyes and an employee of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property
in favor of private respondent Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan
with Land Bank, using the subject property as collateral. It was further agreed that out of
the proceeds of the loan, P500,000.00 will be paid to the Carloses as mortgagees, and any
such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital gains tax, expenses for the
cancellation of the mortgage to the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz, and
registration of a mortgage in favor of Land Bank. 1 Moreover, the monthly amortization
on the housing loan which was supposed to be deducted from the salary of private
respondent Cruz will be reimbursed by private respondent delos Reyes.
On September 29, 1992, the Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the
Carloses, informing them that Cruz's loan had been approved. On October 22, 1992,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 229891 in the name of Josefina Cruz was issued in lieu thereof. 2 On November 25,
1992, the mortgage was discharged.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners notified private respondent delos Reyes that they were
ready to redeem the property but the offer was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on
July 22, 1994 a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages with the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3296.
In the complaint, petitioners claimed that the deed was merely a formality to meet the
requirements of the bank for the housing loan, and that the real intention of the parties in
securing the loan was to apply the proceeds thereof for the payment of the mortgage
obligation. 3 They alleged that the deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties, and that the transaction was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage,
considering that the price of the sale was inadequate considering the market value of the
subject property and because they continued paying the real estate taxes thereto even
after the execution of the said deed of sale. Petitioners averred that they did not see any
reason why private respondents would retract from their original agreement other than
that they (petitioners) and the members of their family resigned en masse from the Mahal
Namin Organization, of which private respondent delos Reyes was the president and
chairman of the board of directors, and private respondent Cruz was the treasurer. In the
same complaint, they demanded moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
On July 29, 1996, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining private
respondents from ejecting petitioners from the premises of the disputed property; this was
soon replaced by a writ of preliminary injunction.

Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon private respondents on August
1, 1994. Private respondents filed their answer beyond the reglementary period, or only
on September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5, 1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare
private respondents in default, which the trial court granted in an order dated September
16, 1994. On September 30 of the same year, petitioners presented their evidence ex
parte before the trial court. The principal witness presented was petitioner Octavio
Lorbes, whose testimony was corroborated by his son, Atty. Salvador Lorbes.
On October 12, 1994, private respondents filed a motion to lift order of default and to
strike out evidence presented ex parte, which the court denied in an order dated October
26, 1994.
On June 20, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, upon finding
that: (1) the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 21, 1992 did not reflect the true
intention of the parties, and (2) the transaction entered into between petitioners and Cruz
was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage, considering that the price stated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale was insufficient compared to the value of the property,
petitioners are still in possession of the property, and petitioners had continued to pay the
real estate taxes thereon after the execution of the said deed of sale. As explained by the
trial court in its decision:aTEScI

The foregoing uncontroverted facts clearly show that the transaction entered
into between the plaintiffs and the defendants is not an absolute sale but merely
an equitable mortgage as the sale was executed in order to secure a loan from a
certain bank to save the property from the danger of foreclosure and to use it as
collateral thereof for bank loan purposes and that the same does not reflect the
real intention of the parties in executing the said Deed of Sale. The court notes
that at the time the transaction and the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by
the plaintiffs sometime in 1992, the prevailing market value of the lot alone was
P400,000.00 per square meter such that the lot alone consisting of 255 square
meters, excluding the house and improvements thereon would already cost more
than a million pesos already hence, the consideration of P600,000.00 in the said
Deed of Sale is considerably insufficient compared to the value of the property.
Further, the plaintiffs are still in possession of the subject property and had been
paying the realty taxes thereon even after the execution of the sale and the
transfer of the title from the plaintiffs to defendant Josephine Cruz which clearly
evinces the true badge of the transaction which occurred between the plaintiffs
and defendants as that of an equitable mortgage and not an absolute sale and
 that the plaintiffs were only compelled to enter into the said transaction of sale
with the defendants as the former were in extreme need of money in order to
redeem their only conjugal property and to save it from being foreclosed for
non-payment of the mortgage obligation and that it was never the intention of
the plaintiffs to sell the property to the defendants, as it was their agreement that
plaintiffs can redeem the property or any member of the family thereof, when
they become financially stable. 4
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision thus provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter jointly and
severally, as follows:
1. To reconvey the subject property to the plaintiffs upon payment of the
price stipulated in the contract of sale;
2. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision, finding that private respondents were
denied due process by the refusal of the trial court to lift the order of default against them,
and that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale, not of
equitable mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be constitutionally infirm for its
failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Court of Appeals held that the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the
instant case is improper because there is no showing that such instrument failed to
express the true intention of the parties by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct,
or accident in the execution thereof. 6 To the Court of Appeals, the transaction was
unmistakably a contract of sale, as evidenced by the numerous supporting documents
thereto, such as the Contract to Sell dated June 1992, Affidavit of Waiver/Assignment
dated August 14, 1992, Receipt of Partial Advance Payment dated September 9, 1992,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 229891 issued in the name of private respondent
Cruz. Going over the indicators giving rise to a presumption of equitable mortgage cited
in the decision of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held: (1) inadequacy of price is material
only in a sale with right to repurchase, which is not the case with herein petitioners and
Cruz; moreover, the estimate of the market value of the property came only from the bare
testimony of petitioner Octavio Lorbes, (2) petitioners' remaining in possession of the
property resulted only from their refusal to vacate the same despite the lawful demands of
private respondent Cruz, and (3) there was no documentary evidence that petitioners
continued paying the taxes on the disputed property after the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals also pointed out that under the usual arrangement of
pacto de retro the vendor of the property is a debtor of the vendee, and the property is
used as security for his obligation. In the instant case, the mortgage creditors (the
Carloses) are third persons to the Deed of Absolute Sale.
This petition raises three issues before the Court: (1) whether respondent court erred in
ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 21, 1992 was an equitable mortgage,
(2) whether respondent court erred in ruling that by declaring private respondents in
default they were denied due process of law, and (3) whether respondent court erred in
ruling that the trial court's decision violates the constitutional requirement that it should
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. 7
We shall first deal with the second and third issues, these being preliminary matters.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for
judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the
reopening of the case is intended for delay. 8 The issuance of orders of default should be
the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by
the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 9
Under the factual milieu of this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying private
respondents' motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented by
petitioners ex parte, especially considering that an answer was filed, though out of time.
We thus sustain the holding of the Court of Appeals that the default order of the RTC was
immoderate and in violation of private respondents' due process rights. However, we do
not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings to
the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for by private respondents, and
second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that private respondents would
have presented before the RTC were capably ventilated before respondent court, and
were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the correctness of the evaluation of
petitioners' evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the RTC.
This is evident from the discussions in the decision of the Court of Appeals, which cited
with approval a number of private respondents' arguments and evidence, including the
documents annexed to their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
filed with the RTC. 10 To emphasize, the reversal of respondent court was not simply on
due process grounds but on the merits, going into the issue of whether the transaction was
one of equitable mortgage or of sale, and so we find that we can properly take cognizance
of the substantive issue in this case, while of course bearing in mind the inordinate
manner by which the RTC issued its default order.
As regards the third issue, we reverse for being unfounded the holding of the Court of
Appeals since the RTC decision, some parts of which we even reproduced in our earlier
discussions, clearly complied with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based.
Thus, the one issue essential to the resolution of this case is the nature of the transaction
between petitioners and private respondent Cruz concerning the subject parcel of land.
Did the parties intend for the contested Deed of Absolute Sale to be a bona fide and
absolute conveyance of the property, or merely an equitable mortgage?
On the outset, it must be emphasized that there is no conclusive test to determine whether
a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.
11 "The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as
shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding
circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts,
conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed,
and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of
their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be
submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties." 12

The conditions which give way to a presumption of equitable mortgage, as set out in
Article 1602 of the Civil Code, apply with equal force to a contract purporting to be one
of absolute sale. 13 Moreover, the presence of even one of the circumstances laid out in
Article 1602, and not a concurrence of the circumstances therein enumerated, suffices to
construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage. 14 This is simply in
consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights. 15
Thus, under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, a contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage when (a) the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate; (b) the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after
the expiration of the right of repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) the purchaser retains for himself a
part of the purchase price; (e) the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
and, (f) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any
other obligation.
Applying the foregoing considerations to the instant case, the Court finds that the true
intention between the parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey
ownership of the property in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz, in
which petitioners had a direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be immediately
applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the Carloses. HTCaAD

It is not disputed that before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale petitioners'
mortgage obligation to the Carloses was nearing maturity and they were in dire need of
money to meet the same. Hence, they asked for the help of their son-in-law delos Reyes
who in turn requested Cruz to take out a housing loan with Land Bank. Since collateral is
a standard requirement of banks in giving out loans, it was made to appear that the
subject property was sold to Cruz so she can declare the same as collateral for the
housing loan. This was simply in line with the basic requirement in our laws that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property sought to be mortgaged. 16 Consistent
with their agreement, as soon as the housing loan was approved, the full amount of the
proceeds were immediately turned over to petitioners, who promptly paid P500,000.00
therefrom to the Carloses in full satisfaction of their mortgage obligation. The balance
was spent by petitioners in transferring title to the property to Cruz and registering the
new mortgage with Land Bank.
Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and its supporting documents do not reflect
the true arrangement between the parties as to how the loan proceeds are to be actually
applied because it was not the intention of the parties for these documents to do so. The
sole purpose for preparing these documents was to satisfy Land Bank that the
requirement of collateral relative to Cruz's application for a housing loan was met.
Were we to accept, as respondent court had, that the loan that Cruz took out with Land
Bank was indeed a housing loan, then it is rather curious that Cruz kept none of the loan
proceeds but allowed for the bulk thereof to be immediately applied to the payment of
petitioners' outstanding mortgage obligation. It also strains credulity that petitioners, who
were exhausting all means to save their sole conjugal real property from being foreclosed
by the Carloses, would concurrently part with the same in favor of Cruz.
Such urgent prospect of foreclosure helps to explain why petitioners would subscribe to
an agreement like the Deed of Absolute Sale in the herein case, which on its face
represents their unconditional relinquishment of ownership over their property. Passing
upon previous similar situations the Court has declared that "while it was true that
plaintiffs were aware of the contents of the contracts, the preponderance of the evidence
showed however that they signed knowing that said contracts did not express their real
intention, and if they did so notwithstanding this, it was due to the urgent necessity of
obtaining funds. "Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answers a
present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.'" 17
The facts further bear out that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed property
after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the transfer of registered title to
Cruz in October 1992; Cruz made no demand on petitioners to vacate the subject
premises until March 19, 1994; 18 interestingly, this was two days after petitioners
signified their intention to redeem the property by paying the full amount of P600,000.00.
19 On this basis, the finding of respondent court that petitioners remained in possession of
the property only because they refused to vacate on Cruz's demand is not accurate
because the records reflect that no such demand was made until more than a year since
the purported sale of the property.
Copies of realty tax receipts attached to the record also show that petitioners continued
paying for the taxes on the property for the period 1992 to 1994, 20 or after the property
was supposed to have been sold to Cruz.
From the above, the Court is satisfied that enough of the circumstances set out in Article
1602 of the Civil Code are attendant in the instant case, as to show that the true
arrangement between petitioners and private respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage.
That a transfer certificate of title was issued in favor of private respondent Cruz also does
not import conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties
was one of sale. As was stated in Oronce vs. Court of Appeals, 21 citing Macapinlac vs.
Gutierrez Repide: 22
. . . it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine . . . to the effect that any
conveyance intended as security for a debt will be held in effect to be a
mortgage, whether so actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates
regardless of the form of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the
repository of their will. Equity looks through the form and considers the
substance; and no kind of engagement can be adopted which will enable the
parties to escape from the equitable doctrine to which reference is made. In
other words, a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in the name of
the transferee and the issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from the
operation of the equitable doctrine than the most informal conveyance that
could be devised.
Before we fully set aside this issue, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated
as a complaint for reformation filed before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The Court of
Appeals found petitioners' action for reformation unmeritorious because there was no
showing that the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties' true intention was
because of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. 23 Indeed, under the facts of
the present case, reformation may not be proper for failure to fully meet the requisites in
Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because as the evidence eventually bore out the
contested Deed of Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the true agreement between
the parties but was merely to comply with the collateral requirements of Land Bank.
However, the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court was
categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not preclude the Court from
passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an equitable mortgage as the
same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been the subject of arguments
and evidence of the parties. Thus we have held that it is not the caption of the pleading
but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall
grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
24

Finally, on the award of damages. Considering the due process flaws that attended the
default judgment of the RTC, and applying the rule adopted by this Court that in
instances where no actual damages are adjudicated the awards for moral and exemplary
damages may be reduced, 25 we reduce the award for moral damages in the instant case
from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. At the same time, we sustain the award of attorney's fees
in the amount of P50,000.00, it being clear that petitioners were compelled to incur
expenses and undergo the rigors of litigation to recover their property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal is REINSTATED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced to P30,000.00, and in all
other respects AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, [February 15, 2001], 404 PHIL
|||

567-586)

[G.R. No. L-48672. July 31, 1987.]

TROPICAL HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, and ARTURO CORDOVA, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; RIGHT TO APPEAL; NEITHER A NATURAL

RIGHT NOR A PART OF DUE PROCESS. The right to appeal is not a
natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in
which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. (Bello v. Francisco, 4 SCRA 134; Rodriguez v. Director of
Prisons, 47 SCRA 153). In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not
constitutional origin.
2. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1344 PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE
MODE OF APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES; JUDICIAL
REVIEW NOT PRECLUDED. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not
specifically provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed
by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review. The power of
the Supreme Court to strike down acts which infringe on constitutional
protections or to nullify administrative decisions contrary to constitutional
mandates cannot be reduced or circumscribed by any statute or decree. No
statute is needed to bring arbitrary acts or decisions within our jurisdiction.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; AVAILABLE ONLY
WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY.
The extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or quo
warranto (Rules 65 and 66) are always available in proper cases where there
is no appeal or other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
 4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY;
APPEAL FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACT
THEREON; QUESTIONED DECISION DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
BECOME FINAL. On the issue of "affirmance-by-inaction," failure on the
part of the President to act upon an appeal does not necessarily mean that
the appealed decision automatically becomes final and executory. Access to
the courts of law may still be made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such
decision is far from being final and executory.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; ALL REASONABLE
DOUBTS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. There is the
well-settled principle that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a statute, for which reason, it will not be set aside as
violative of the constitution except in "clear cases".
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JURISDICTION; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129; PROVIDED FOR A UNIFORM APPELLATE BODY FOR ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa 129
empowers the Court of Appeals to have: . . . "(3) Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." B.P. Blg. 129
was signed into law on August 14, 1981 and provides a uniform appellate
body for all administrative agencies, instrumentalities, boards and
commissions subject to the limited exceptions cited above.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p

The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential

Decree No. 1344, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 957, giving the
National Housing Authority exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
real estate business and limiting the appeal from such decisions only to
the President of the Philippines, is constitutional.
The facts which led to the filing of the present petition are as
follows:
 On April 17, 1972, petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc. entered into a
contract with private respondent Arturo P. Cordova for the sale to the
latter of a lot at Better Living Subdivision in Paraaque, Metro Manila.
The contract price was P32,108.00. A ten (10) percent downpayment
upon the execution of the contract was required and the balance payable
at a monthly amortization of P318.16 beginning May 17, 1972 for 20
years. Section 14 of the contract provided that the contract will be
automatically cancelled upon default in payment of any installment within
90 days from its due date.
On July 16, 1973, Cordova was informed through a letter signed by
Manuel M. Serrano, executive vice-president and general manager of the
petitioner corporation that the contract was cancelled due to non-
payment of installments for a period of seven (7) months in violation of
the contract, particularly the above-mentioned section. All the earlier
payments were considered forfeited in favor of the corporation as
liquidated damages.
On February 14, 1975, Cordova filed a letter-complaint with the
Investigating Committee of the Department of Trade asking for a refund
of the total payments he made amounting to P8,627.86.
This case was referred to respondent National Housing Authority
(NHA) which, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 957, was vested with
jurisdiction over the said case. Cdpr

On February 21, 1978, NHA issued the following resolution:

"This is a complaint for refund of payments made on a lot
filed by Arturo Cordova against Tropical Homes, Inc., owner of
Better Living Subdivision at Paraaque, Metro Manila.
"Complainant's evidence shows that on April 17, 1972, he
bought on installment basis a lot in the above-named subdivision at
a contract price of P32,108.00 (Exhibit "A"); that contract was
arranged by Atty. Nelson Revilla, an authorized broker of said
corporation; that after paying the downpayment and its monthly
amortization, he was asked by Atty. Revilla to pay for the 20% of
the lot value in order that he may apply for a loan with the SSS; that
in compliance with this requirement, he paid the respondent
corporation the amount of P4,406.78; that not being satisfied what
is to be granted to him by SSS as loan, he was told by Atty. Revilla
that he will arrange for a second loan with Tropical Homes, Inc. and
for this he gave Atty. Revilla the amount of P650.00 for Mayor's
permit; that since then, he has not heard from Atty. Revilla; that he
was told by the respondent corporation that Atty. Revilla was no
longer connected with it and that he could not use his lot to secure
 a second loan from it; that he had paid a total amount of P8,627.86;
that on May 1973, a separate contract covering a house and lot on
the same subdivision was entered into by complainant with
respondent; that through SSS housing loan, the house was
constructed by respondent and turned over to complainant; and
that complainant demanded for the refund of the payments he
made on the first lot.
"Respondent in its answer states that the contract it entered
into with the complainant had been duly cancelled in accordance
with Section 14 thereof due to non-payment of installments for a
period of seven (7) months. Regarding the claim for refund, it
believes that the complainant is not entitled to it under the Maceda
Law as the contract was entered into on April 17, 1972 before the
effectivity of the said law. In connection with the alleged amounts
given to a certain Atty. Revilla, the said person is not an employee
or authorized representative of the respondent corporation.
"We are inclined to believe the claim of complainant that
because the SSS and THI financing plan on the first lot pushed
through, he obtained the second lot. Respondent claimed that there
is nothing in the second contract to show that it was in lieu or in
substitution of the first contract. However, the circumstances under
which the P4,046.78 (required 20% downpayment) was paid clearly
shows that what complainant wanted was a lot which could be used
for SSS housing loan so that he could have a house on the lot.
Because he could not obtain such housing loan on the first lot, he
applied for and was given the house and lot and for which the
second contract was executed by the respondent. Therefore the
second contract was deemed entered into by the parties in lieu of
or in substitution of the first contract especially when we consider
the fact that it was on the second contract that complainant was
able to attain his objective of having a house and lot. Complainant
is, therefore, entitled to the refund of his payments on the first
contract totalling P8,627.86 with interest from 1 October 1976, the
date the NHA took cognizance of this case.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that
respondent Tropical Homes, Inc. be ordered to refund to Arturo
Cordova the amount of P8,627.86 with 12% interest per annum
from 1 October 1976, until fully paid." (Rollo, pp. 36-37).
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by NHA. prLL

In the meantime, on April 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1344 was passed

providing, inter alia:
 xxx xxx xxx
"Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices;
b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority
shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of
the Philippines and in the event the appeal is filed and the decision
is not reversed and/or amended within a period of thirty (30) days,
the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision
must be furnished the National Housing Authority."

On June 19, 1978, the petitioners, availing of this decree, appealed

to the President of the Philippines.
In said appeal, it stated that ". . . we do not thereby waive the right
to question the constitutionality of said Decree, which we believe to be
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as well as contrary
to the primordial concept of separation of powers." (p. 55, Rollo).
No copy of this appeal was furnished to respondent NHA.
On July 10, 1978, Cordova then filed a motion for execution. Acting
on the motion, NHA issued a Writ of Execution dated July 14, 1978.
On August 2, 1978, the petitioner was served with said writ by a
deputy of respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal.
The President failed to act on the appeal.
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction.
The only issue raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1344.
 The petitioner contends that P.D. No. 1344 is unconstitutional on
grounds that a) it deprives herein petitioner access to courts of law and
b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is violative of due process.
This Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case i.e. the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (Alger Electric, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections,
95 SCRA 392; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). LexLib

On this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.

The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in any way affect the correctness of
the decision rendered against him. There is no discussion whatsoever on
the merits of the original case. As far as the records show, the NHA
decision appears to be fair and correct. Moreover, the resolution
promulgated by respondent NHA, was issued before the passage of the
questioned decree. The writ of execution it issued, as admitted by the
petitioner in its memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D. No. 1344.
The issue of constitutionality is poorly discussed.
Nonetheless, we decided to give due course and require
memoranda from the parties instead of summarily denying the petition on
a minute resolution because it is best for public policy that the issue
raised should be resolved. (See Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481); Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835). Sufficiently numerous
persons are affected by NHA powers and functions.
It is alleged that the mode of review on appeal prescribed by the
decree violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.
This is predicated on the petitioner's theories that (1) the word
"only" as used in Sec. 2 of said decree, ". . . appealable only to the
President of the Philippines . . ." is a bar to recourse to courts of law; and
(2) the "affirmance-by-inaction" on the part of the President of the
Philippines would render the NHA decision as final and executory.
Both premises are without merit.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process,
except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (Bello v.
Francisco, 4 SCRA 134; Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 47 SCRA 153).
In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not constitutional origin.
 The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial
review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not
necessarily preclude judicial review.
The extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or quo
warranto (Rules 65 and 66) are always available in proper cases where
there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The power of the Supreme Court to strike down
acts which infringe on constitutional protections or to nullify administrative
decisions contrary to constitutional mandates cannot be reduced or
circumscribed by any statute or decree. No statute is needed to bring
arbitrary acts or decisions within our jurisdiction. cdrep

On the issue of "affirmance-by-inaction," failure on the part of the

President to act upon an appeal does not necessarily mean that the
appealed decision automatically becomes final and executory. Access to
the courts of law may still be made as mentioned above. Therefore, any
such decision is far from being final and executory.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very
definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with
quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and
functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the
active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot
possibly be handled by regular courts.
Moreover, there is the well-settled principle that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, for
which reason, it will not be set aside as violative of the constitution
except in "clear cases" (People v. Vera, supra).
We, therefore, hold that P D. No. 1344 in so far as the vesting of
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the sales of lots in
commercial subdivisions to NHA and the mode of appeal provided
therein are concerned, is not unconstitutional.
Parenthetically, Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa 129 empowers
the Court of Appeals to have:
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
 provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
B.P. Blg. 129 was signed into law on August 14, 1981 and
provides a uniform appellate body for all administrative agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions subject to the limited
exceptions cited above.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999.]

FELIX A. SAJOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Narciso E. Ramirez for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was convicted of estafa and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals where he
was required to file an appellant's brief within 30 days from receipt of notice. Petitioner
instead filed a Petition for Extension of Time to File Brief and the same was granted. He
was able to ask for three Extensions of Time to File Brief when the Court of Appeals
resolved to dismiss petitioner's appeal for failure to file his brief within the third
extension. Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied. With a new lawyer, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied for being a prohibited pleading. Hence, this petition.
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals denied him the
right to due process when it dismissed his appeal because of his counsel's negligence. The
Court did not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his
conviction and of the requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse that he relied
on the services of his counsel and that he was busy was flimsy. The Court of Appeals did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal tor petitioner's failure
to file appellant's brief.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE
REQUIRED TO INSURE AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
2. ID.; CONTENTION THAT A PARTY WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HIS
APPEAL WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE OF HIS COUNSEL'S NEGLIGENCE, NOT
APPRECIATED. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied him the right to
due process when it dismissed his appeal because of his counsel's negligence. We do not
agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse that he relied on the services of his
counsel and that he was busy is "flimsy." "Equally busy people have in one way or the
other learned how to cope with the same problem he had. Were we to accept his excuse,
this Court would have to open cases dismissed many years ago on the ground of counsel's
neglect. In many cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is matched by his client's own
negligence."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; RESTITUTION TO THE OFFENDED PARTY OF
THE MONEY SWINDLED DOES NOT EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
Indeed, petitioner does not claim innocence of the crime charged (estafa). He invokes
partial restitution as a defense contending that long before the lower court's decision,
complainant had been practically restituted the amount of P65,000.00. The
"reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the money or property swindled
does not extinguish criminal liability. It only extinguishes civil liability."

DECISION

PARDO, J : p

What is before the Court is a petition to set aside a resolution of the Court of Appeals, 1
denying petitioner's "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the dismissal of his appeal
for having been filed out of time, and another resolution denying petitioner's "Motion for
Reconsideration" 2 for being a prohibited pleading. prLL

On April 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City, convicted
petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal Case No. 97-12635, of estafa. The court
sentenced each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional to thirteen (13) years of prision mayor, and to reimburse Father Modesto
Teston in the amount of P75,000.00, as actual damages, P50,000.00, as moral damages,
P10,000.00, as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit. 3
Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, 4 and, thereafter, filed an
appellant's brief, which appeal is now pending therein.
On the other hand, on June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal
through Attorney Mariano Cervo. Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the
Court of Appeals. Per notice dated January 14, 1992, the Court of Appeals required
petitioner to file an appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. 5
On February 21, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for
Extension of Time to File Brief," asking for an additional thirty-day period to file
appellant's brief, which the court granted. 6 On March 20, 1992, petitioner filed a
"Petition for Second Extension of Time to File Brief", which the court likewise granted. 7
Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "Petition for Third Extension of Time to File Brief."
The court granted the motion. 8
On November 27, 1992, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss petitioner's appeal for
failure to file his brief within the third extension granted by the court. Petitioner
contended that he only learned about the dismissal through a friend. When confronted,
his counsel could not give any plausible explanation for his failure to file brief. On
February 4, 1993, petitioner, "for and by himself," 9 filed with the Court of Appeals an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The court denied the motion. 10
On March 12, 1993, petitioner, by a new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging the following grounds:
"I. Substantial justice/Ends of justice can be fully served
"II. Excusable negligence on the part of the moving appellant
"III. Exercise of equity jurisdiction by this Honorable Court of Appeals" 11
Petitioner alleged further that his counsel, Attorney Mariano H. G. Cervo, never
submitted the brief because of "utter and gross ignorance of procedures and/or negligence
or omission, intentional or otherwise, in the performance of his avowed professional
duty." 12
On March 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the motion for being a
prohibited pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on April 12, 1993.
Hence, this petition. prLL

The issue boils down to whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief.
Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of Court provides
"Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An Appeal may be dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
 xxx xxx xxx
(e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;"
In a minute resolution, 13 we said:
"True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal,
particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right,
however, carries with it the correspondent respect for the appellee's similar
rights to fair play and justice. The appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules
of Court."
In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, 14 we ruled that:
"Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And
while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances."
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied him the right to due process when it
dismissed his appeal because of his counsel's negligence.
We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his conviction
and of the requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse that he relied on the
services of his counsel and that he was busy is "flimsy". 15 "Equally busy people have in
one way or the other learned how to cope with the same problem he had. Were we to
accept his excuse, this Court would have to open cases dismissed many years ago on the
ground of counsel's neglect. In many cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is
matched by his client's own negligence." 16
We note that even during the trial of the estafa case before the lower court, petitioner
never appeared in court except during the arraignment. Thus, the court issued a warrant
for his arrest and interpreted his non-appearance as "flight." 17 Petitioner's lack of
vigilance as found by the trial court in its decision is emphasized when his counsel in the
instant petition filed a motion to withdraw primarily on the ground of irreconcilable
professional relationship between Attorney Florentino Temporal and petitioner. Despite
petitioner's repeated assurances relayed by phone, letters and telegrams that he will meet
with Atty. Temporal to formulate the appellant's brief, he never did so. Moreover,
petitioner paid Atty. Temporal's professional fees with checks drawn against closed
accounts.
Indeed, petitioner does not claim innocence of the crime charged. He invokes partial
restitution as a defense contending that long before the lower court's decision,
complainant had been practically restituted the amount of P65,000.00. 18 The
"reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the money or property swindled
does not extinguish criminal liability. It only extinguishes civil liability." 19

We do not see that the Court of Appeals committed any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal for petitioner's failure to file appellant's brief.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for certiorari to annul the
resolutions dated February 11, 1993 and March 30, 1993, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 11912, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Felix A. Sajot, et al.
With costs. prcd

SO ORDERED.
||| (Sajot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109721, [March 11, 1999], 364 PHIL 182-188)
[G.R. No. 129978. May 12, 1999.]

FELICIDAD M. ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO,

petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and HON. MARGARITO P.
GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.

Martin B. Delgra III for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department

of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until
her compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991. Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was
likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao
Province, until his compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997. The Commission on Audit
(COA) Regional Office conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the
DECS Regional Office No. 11 to its Division Offices. The Auditors found some major
deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and COA Circular
Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of P.D. No. 1445.
Affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
against several persons including petitioners Roque and Mabanglo. In an order dated June
11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a
preliminary investigation. On March 18, 1997, the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended
the filing of the appropriate complaints against several respondents, among them were
petitioners. The same was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. On August 14,
1997, petitioners instituted a petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that more
than six (6) years had passed since the initial orders finding the cases proper for
preliminary investigation, yet no case has been filed with the appropriate court against
them. On November 24, 1997, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases filed
against petitioners. On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in
contempt, contending that a criminal complaint was filed in violation of the TRO. Hence,
the present petition for mandamus praying that respondent public officers be directed to
dismiss the graft cases filed against them and subsequently to issue the necessary
clearance in petitioners' favor.cdasia

The Supreme Court granted the mandamus but denied the prayer to cite respondents in
contempt. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. The
said rule, however, does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. The exceptions cited are applicable to
the present case. It is undisputed that there had been a long and unwarranted delay in the
resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners. Clearly, the delay of almost six
years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. The delay also violated the
petitioners' right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
them.
The petition to cite respondents in contempt was patently devoid of merit. The
information against petitioner Mabanglo was filed before the issuance of the TRO.
Hence, the TRO could not have been violated. The said petition was also filed in
contravention of Section 4(2), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which states that if a
petition for contempt arises from or is related to a principal action pending in court, it
"shall be docketed, heard and decided separately," unless the court orders that both the
principal action and the petition for contempt be consolidated for joint hearing and
decision. In the instant case, the Petition for Contempt, which arose from the Petition for
Mandamus, was filed as an integral part of the latter and under the same docket or case
number and there was no showing that the Court has ordered their consolidation.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; THE
PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL ACT OR DUTY, WHICH NECESSARILY
INVOLVES THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION OR JUDGMENT, CANNOT BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS; RULE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THERE IS
GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, MANIFEST INJUSTICE, OR PALPABLE
EXCESS OF AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. Respondents argue that petitioners
cannot, by this special action for mandamus, compel the ombudsman to dismiss the
criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a discretionary, not a
ministerial, duty. The argument is not meritorious. As a general rule, the performance of
an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment,
cannot be compelled by mandamus. This Court, however, has held that the rule does not
apply "in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority." It is undisputed that there has already been a long and unwarranted
delay in the resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners. The Complaint
against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao
way back on May 7, 1991, and that against Petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. On June
11, 1991, the said Office found the Complaints sufficient for preliminary investigation.
Significantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of almost six years. For violation
of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, the same Office recommended the filing of an Information
against Petitioner Mabanglo only on March 18, 1997, and against Petitioner Roque only
on April 30, 1997.
2. ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT; PETITION TO CITE RESPONDENTS IN CONTEMPT IS
PATENTLY DEVOID OF MERIT; THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER
WAS FILED BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND SAID PETITION WAS FILED IN CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION
14 (2), RULE 71 OF THE 1997 RULES OF COURT. Petitioner Mabanglo moves to
have respondents and their agents cited in contempt of court for allegedly filing an
Information against him in violation of the November 24, 1997 TRO issued by the Court,
which ordered them to cease and desist from proceeding with the cases. The Petition to
cite respondents in contempt is patently devoid of merit. In the first place, the
Information against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed on September 25, 1997, before the
issuance of the TRO on November 24, 1997. Hence, the TRO could not have been
violated: In the second place, the said Petition for Contempt was filed in contravention of
Section 4 (2), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which states that if a petition for
contempt arises from or is related to a principal action pending in court, it "shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately," unless the court orders that both the principal
action and the petition for contempt be consolidated for joint hearing and decision. In the
instant case, the Petition for Contempt, which arose from the Petition for Mandamus, was
filed as an integral part of the latter and under the same docket or case number. There is
no showing that this Court has ordered their consolidation. IHDCcT

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; THE DELAY OF SIX YEARS

VIOLATED THE PETITIONERS' RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF THE CASES FILED AGAINST THEM. The delay of almost six
years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the
petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman
Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation
was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. Thus, in
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had been
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as follows:
"After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds
the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal
of said criminal cases. . . "

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the
Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints
filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that
has been pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials'
rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.cdasia

The Case
Filed before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus praying that the respondent public
officers be directed to dismiss Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-
MIN-91-0203 and subsequently to issue the necessary clearance in petitioners' favor.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are narrated in respondents' Memorandum 1 as follows:
"Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal,
South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991 (pp. 2-3,
Petition).
"Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division
Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his
compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997 (ibid.).
"On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of
the COA, by virtue of COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174
dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment
released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices (Annexes
M and N, Petition).

"As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major
deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS
Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (ibid.).
"Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo
on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991 (ibid.).
"In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. The case involving
petitioner Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving
petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0203 (Annex O, Petition).
"Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits (p. 4, Petition).
"On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner
Mabanglo, was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding
that all the respondents [were] probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and
(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019). The same
was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
"An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila,
against several respondents, among them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo.
The same was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24229.
"On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, recommending the filing
[of cases] and prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section 3 (e)
and (g) of Republic Act 3019. The same was approved by respondent
Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.
"Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g)
of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019, as amended, were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila.
The Informations charged several respondents, among whom was petitioner
Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 24105 and Criminal
Case No. 24106, respectively.
"On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus
premised on the allegation that '[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper
for preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent
 submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or more than six (6)
years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent [and no] case
[has] been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner' (par. 3,
p. 4, Petition).
"On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary restraining
order directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
cases filed against petitioners." 2
On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in contempt,
contending that a criminal information was filed in violation of the Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO). In compliance with this Court's Resolution dated October 21,
1998, 3 the respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for Contempt. 4
Issues
In their Memorandum, 5 petitioners present before this Court the following issues:
"Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the]
complaints against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their
constitutional right to [a] speedy disposition of cases[; and]
Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints
against petitioners, would warrant dismissal of said complaints." 6
In addition, we shall also discuss (1) the propriety of mandamus as a remedy and (2) the
respondent's liability for contempt for allegedly violating the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on November 24, 1997.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the Petition for Mandamus, but denies the prayer to cite respondents in
contempt of court.
Preliminary Issue:
Propriety of Mandamus
Respondents argue that petitioners cannot, by this special action for mandamus, compel
the ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal
involves a discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.
The argument is not meritorious. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or
duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be
compelled by mandamus. This Court, however, has held that the rule does not apply "in
cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority." 7 In First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court
explained:
"Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But
where there is 'gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
 authority' equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue." 8
The Court gave a similar ruling in Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government: 9
"Although as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the
performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding
official can only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or
another, 'yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control his
discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in
cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority."
In Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 10 this Court likewise held:
"It is correct, as averred in the comment, that in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule
admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority." 11
The exceptions cited apply to this case. It is undisputed that there has already been a long
and unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners.
The Complaint against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
in Mindanao way back on May 7, 1991, and that against Petitioner Roque on May 16,
1991. On June 11, 1991, the said Office found the Complaints sufficient for preliminary
investigation. Significantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of almost six years.
For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same Office recommended the filing of an
Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only on March 18, 1997, and against Petitioner
Roque only on April 30, 1997.
Main Issue: Violation of Petitioners' Constitutional Rights
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by
the Constitution 12 and Republic Act No. 6770, 13 to act promptly on complaints before
him. More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the
six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for the
latter to resolve the Complaints. 14 Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court
dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for
more than six years, ruling as follows:
"After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
 constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the
cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases . . ." 15
Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 16 this Court dismissed the Complaints, which the
then tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the lapse of three years since the cases had
been submitted for disposition, viz.:
"We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of 'speedy
disposition' of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that 'delay
may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high-ranking government official.' In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such 'painstaking and grueling
scrutiny' as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period
of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case." (Italics
supplied.)

We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the Petition for Mandamus became
moot and academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad
v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that the long and unexplained delay in the
resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual
filing of the Informations. The Court ruled:
"It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True
 [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time."
". . . the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing
the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right of the petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against
him. Accordingly, the informations . . . should be dismissed . . . ." 17
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal of
Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this Court, in the
interest of the speedy disposition of cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly.
This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed the complaints
outright, although petitioner therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.
Additional Issue:
No Contempt of Court
Petitioner Mabanglo moves to have respondents and their agents cited in contempt of
court for allegedly filing an Information against him in violation of the November 24,
1997 TRO issued by the Court, which ordered them to cease and desist from proceeding
with the cases.
The Petition to cite respondents in contempt is patently devoid of merit. In the first place,
the Information against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed on September 25, 1997, before the
issuance of the TRO on November 24, 1997. Hence, the TRO could not have been
violated. In the second place, the said Petition for Contempt was filed in contravention of
Section 4 (2), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court, 18 which states that if a petition for
contempt arises from or is related to a principal action pending in court, it "shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately," unless the court orders that both the principal
action and the petition for contempt be consolidated for joint hearing and decision. In the
instant case, the Petition for Contempt, which arose from the Petition for Mandamus, was
filed as an integral part of the latter and under the same docket or case number. There is
no showing that this Court has ordered their consolidation. LexLib

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case Nos.
OMB-91-0201 and OMB-91-0203 are accordingly DISMISSED. The Petition to declare
respondents in contempt is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Roque v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129978, [May 12, 1999], 366 PHIL 568-580)
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
 ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of

Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.

SYLLABUS

1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The nature of the

Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first
of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
 a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance
of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. In
the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This result,
however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this' case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth in the decision.

DECISION

LAUREL, J : p

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations

in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for
the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino
fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad
de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la obra;
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya
individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto
obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica
en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de
trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
 consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en
la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su
negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado
organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro."
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the
vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of
the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,1938, there was
shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members
of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September
29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum,
p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective
bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. ( Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)
principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and
should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions
of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial peace has
always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice
for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents
that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."
 The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after stated with
reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion
for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations
and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of
cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is
evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout,
arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers
and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or
by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest.
(Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5,
ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose
of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have
been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58
S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs.
McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice
or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
(City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937,
XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.
648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.
2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d
13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98
F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.
860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.
Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead
v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law.
ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.)Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public
official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation,
and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the
said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that
the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before
them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe
here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of
law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition
hereinabove quoted of the National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed
lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that
"the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition
to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
 and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents
attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be,
and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
(Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, [February 27, 1940], 69
|||

PHIL 635-645)
[G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO

SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M . Gonzales for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed
by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to
enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a
qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. In addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which
are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated
in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired." (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:
"Sec. 7. Term of office. Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years. which
shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980."
. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51
"Sec. 4. . . .
"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not
be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes
shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and.
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact.
". . . (Batas Pambansa Blg. 52) (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied).
"Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials. . . . The election shall be held
on January 30, 1980." (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52).
"Section 6. Election and Campaign Period. The election period shall be fixed
by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the
 Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and
terminate on January 28, 1980." (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question
the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als.,
vs. COMELEC et als. (G.R. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. cdasia

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null
and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of
parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden
of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They, respectively, contest
completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his
individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in
the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead time constraints as the reason of
their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort for petitioner
Dumlao, on one hand, and petitioners Igot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed
separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function
be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question
be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases
and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which
this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a
hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
"rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's case is
clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice
Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which
reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and
functions.
1) . . .
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial
and city officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which
provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied
that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has
been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions
they assail as unconstitutional. Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal
nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no
locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit,
and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual
vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
 disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public
funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys." (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als.
15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative
power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
[1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
[1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial
review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking
through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not
a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised an presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not
an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan.
They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the
issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be
dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the
Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict
procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta
(35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion
in the Tinio and Gonzales cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The
reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the
proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed
with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject
to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations,
one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons
more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not
be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither
result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong,
etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies: (Chief Justice
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of
the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable
doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14;
Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the competence
of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for
office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged,
may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of
the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and
that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case."
(People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case. Cdphil

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes
the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running
from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a
civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except
as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office
on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries
with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination
of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of
Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing
laws which are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of the elective
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52
providing that ". . . the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ ., concur.
De Castro, J ., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J ., concurring:

I concur. But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that
Sec. 9(1) Art. XII is more expensive than the equal protection clause.

AQUINO, J ., concurring:

I concur in the result as to paragraph 1 of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as
to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid,
being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa,
92 Phil. 856.

ABAD SANTOS, J ., concurring:

I concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.

FERNANDO, C .J ., concurring:

It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of
the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the
power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice
Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2
did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised.
It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases
in the recent past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in
character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate
responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3
While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by the fetters of judicial timidity, it
remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be given
encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional
deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever
endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this
Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to
the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It
cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly
proceeding that cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a
pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of
judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper
that the voice of the Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of
rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by
the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the
petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times,
however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase
uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the
merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court. cdasia

It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words
may not be amiss on what for me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of
this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of
petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental
concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the
nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against
him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a
known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted
and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come
back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly
attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as
disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former
elective provincial official who has received his retirements benefits, he desires to run for
the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now
seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age." 4 Clearly then, the plea for
invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For
petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the
petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a
proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam
far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings
that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what
inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That
would be the test for its validity or lack of it. there is this relevant excerpt from McCray v.
United States: 5 "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from
the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain
the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has
caused the power to be exerted." 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion
in United States v. O'Brien, 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation,
the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the
legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought
sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different
matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional
on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates
scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.
We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress
had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the
same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a
denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic
response. As the opinion of the Court makes a clear, such imputation is not deserving of
credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane
to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits
are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to
impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration:
9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical, are analogous.
If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should
be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It
was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within the
proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be
excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the
legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged
legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the
local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits
once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted.
A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was
confronted with a situation that called for correction, and the legislation that was the result
of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly
attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial
of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of
police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature
is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." Thus, to reiterate,
the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing." 11

3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for
the commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar
nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima
facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The
opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its
being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full
agreement. I would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and
therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at
will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the
highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in
the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the
charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present
himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil
court or in a military tribunal, saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk
would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges,
then a candidate would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me
compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the
Constitution. cda

Hence my concurrence.

TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:

Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlao's candidacy and
declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and
concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause
for disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the
discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would
impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the
elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in
effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30
elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from
running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and
from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly
situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is
entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for
the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so
(although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is
barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an
arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to complain that "the aforesaid
provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to
make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 (since no other case of a
former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can ever be cited 2 ). Is there
not here, therefore, a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal
protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if
not identical circumstances? cdasia

Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special
disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments" but the classification (that
would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not
rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing
new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since
they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from
provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice-mayor to
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang
Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other
branches of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective
office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto
S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age
70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor
of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are
disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they
are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of
other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such
retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-
disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge
on such an irrelevant question or whether or not they have received their retirement
benefits.cdrep

The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial
distinction which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification
of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials
who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they
seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The
mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that
he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old like
petitioner who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear
to be most physically fit. Suffice it to cite the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected at 80 as a member
of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age
and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has
ever had."
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. At the most,
a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a
modicum of maturity (now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age
has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elective public office since the right and
will of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter
his age, has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause
which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege
on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of inequality on the other.
The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application
insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his
province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly
treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for
consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the
other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-
article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of
charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of
commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify
him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify
bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and places in the hands of the
military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any
candidate who may not be to their liking through the filing of last-hour charges against
him. LibLex

I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a
judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's
disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction
must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978
Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate
substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of
presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution
protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
 ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a
majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements above referred to in the two
preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be
avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority
seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph
of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for
adjudication under the strict procedural requirements. If this be the case, my above views,
termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action. prLL

(Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, [January 22, 1980], 184 PHIL
|||

369-395)
[G.R. No. 114714. April 21, 1995.]

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES,

INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP
MANAGEMENT, INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP.,
EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS
KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD
SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY, INC., LAINE SHIPPING
AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME
SERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE
AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL.
GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR
MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC.,
TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,
HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR and THE HON. FELICISIMO
JOSON, respondents.

Rexilito B. Bermudez for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PRINCIPLE OF

SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. Well established
in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not
impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law. This is the principle of subordinate legislation which was
discussed by this Court in People vs. Rosenthal, (68 Phil. 328 [1939]) and in Pangasinan
Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, (70 Phil 22 [1940]). That the challenged
resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of
"fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be
disputed.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS;
NOT VIOLATED BY LEGISLATION BASED ON REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety,
dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual
activities.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE IN LABOR CASES; NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS;
WHEN APPLICABLE. The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual
obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to
contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that
may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not
prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of
the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot
be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. Verily,
the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general
well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor
are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary
contracts but are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
ART. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State,
they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold
otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police
power to the contract clause.
4. ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE; CONCEPT. The executive order creating the POEA was
enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which
have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them
under a separate Article. The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart
of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma. Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police
power of the state and requires the extensive use of such power. In Calalang vs. Williams,
(70 Phil. 726 [1940]), this Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on
social justice thus: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION; ATTAINED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY IMMEDIATELY
UPON EFFECTIVITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 797 DECLARING ITS
CREATION. Section 4 of E.O. No. 797 indubitably declares the immediate creation
of the POEA. Thus upon the effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the POEA attained its juridical
personality. The appointment of the third member "who shall be well versed in the field
of overseas employment," provided for in paragraph (b) of the said Section, was not
meant to be a sine qua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the validity of the acts
of the Board. As a matter of fact, in the same paragraph the President is given the
"discretion [to] designate a Deputy Administrator as the third member of the Board."
 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J : p

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of
1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the
standards for its exercise.
(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because
they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of
contracts clauses of the Constitution.
(4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by
the law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the
POEA.
Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January 1994, 1 reads as
follows:
GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01
SERIES OF 1994
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Administration to afford protection to
Filipino overseas contract workers, including seafarers and their families,
promote their interest and safeguard their welfare;
WHEREAS, the Administration under its mandate has the power and function
to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract
workers and ensure compliance therewith; prcd

WHEREAS, the minimum compensation and other benefits in cases of death,

disability and loss or damage to crew's effects provided under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for seafarers which was revised in 1989 are now
becoming very much lesser than the prevailing international standards and those
given to unionized seafarers as provided by their collective bargaining
agreements;
 WHEREAS, the Tripartite Technical Working Group convened for the purpose
of deliberating the compensation and benefits provided under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for seafarers has recommended for the
upgrading of the said compensation and benefits;
WHEREAS, for the interest of Filipino seafarers and their families, there is an
urgent need to improve and realign the minimum compensation and other
benefits provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers
in order to keep them at par with prevailing international standards and those
provided under collective bargaining agreements.
NOW, THEREFORE, the POEA Governing Board, in a meeting duly
convened, hereby resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other
benefits as specified under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
which shall henceforth read as follows:
I. "Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent
to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to
each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four
children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a
declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be
doubled. The employer shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance
coverage for this purpose."
xxx xxx xxx
III. The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted
to US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the seafarer.
IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided
shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel, provided, that
the cause of action occurs after this Resolution takes effect.
V. This Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 1994 2 by POEA
Administrator Felicisimo Joson and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning
agencies, shipowners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed
them that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and
other benefits in Part II, Section C, paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and
Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which
adjustments took effect on 20 March 1994, and that:
 IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits . . . shall apply to
any Filipino seafarer already on-board any vessel, provided, that the
cause of action occurs after the said compensation and benefits take
effect.
The Tripartite Technical Working Group mentioned in the Resolution, which
convened on 7 January 1994, was composed of the following:
1. DA Crescencio M. Siddayao, POEA
2. Dir. Angeles T. Wong, POEA
3. Dir. Jaime P. Jimenez, POEA
4. Dir. Lorna O. Fajardo, POEA
5. OIC Salome Mendoza, POEA
6. Capt. Gregorio Oca, AMOSUP
7. Atty. Romeo Occena, PSU-ALU-TUCP
8. Mr. Vicente Aldanese, FAME
9. Capt. Emmanuel L. Regio, PAMAS
10. Atty. Rexlito Bermudez, COMMA
11. Atty. Alexandro M. Cruje, POEA
12. Mr. Jay Rosauro Baluyot, POEA
13. Ms. Magdalena Sarcos, POEA
14. Atty. Augusto Arreza, FSA 3
In their comment, the public respondents contend that the petition is without
merit and should be dismissed because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution
and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority
or power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA; 4 (b) the "non-appointment" of the third member of the
Governing Board does not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been
functioning "under the advisement of the Tripartite Technical Working Group which
group is incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e., seafarer employers and/or
associations of manning agencies including herein petitioner," for which reason "third
member complement . . . has been substantially represented by said technical working
group"; 5 and (c) the consensus on the increase in the rates of compensation and other
benefits was arrived at after appropriate consultations with the shipowners and the
private sector; the Board therefore soundly exercised its discretion. cdrep

In view of the importance of the issues raised, we gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioners
did, while the public respondents opted to adopt their comment as their memorandum.
 The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contended by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA. 6 The petitioner in that case assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 02 of the POEA (effective 1 February 1984) which prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring
of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. The challenged resolution and
memorandum circular here merely further amended Memorandum Circular No. 02,
which was earlier amended in 1989 per Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1989.
7

In sustaining the rule-making authority of the POEA and in holding against the
claimed infirmity of delegation of legislative power, Eastern first considered the
history of the charter of the POEA and then discussed separately the above
constitutional issues thus:
[T]he petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that
no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA)."
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as
earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially
the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to
the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law
shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more
 frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts
in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
xxx xxx xxx
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filing in" the details which the Congress may not have
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases
without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices." 8

The POEA mandate referred to as providing the reasonable standard for the
exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority is found in the statement of powers and
functions of the said office in paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit:
(a) The Administration shall formulate and undertake in coordination where
necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic program
for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino
 workers taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements, and
to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including seamen. This adjudicatory function shall be
undertaken in appropriate circumstances in consultation with the
Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines. The governing Board
of the Administration, as hereinunder provided, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration.
It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of
laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 9 This is
the principle of subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in People
vs. Rosenthal 10 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission. 11
Thus in Calalang vs. Williams, 12 this Court stated:
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation,"
not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of
the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated
to promote public interest.
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely
further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed
in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed. 13
There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the
Constitution. To support its contention of inequality, the petitioners claim
discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen
and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.
LexLib

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal

protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification.
And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 14 There
can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers
and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular
violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the
social justice provisions of the 1973, Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced
and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article. 15
The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by
the President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice Cecilia Muoz-
Palma. 16 Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the
state and requires the extensive use of such power. 17 In Calalang vs. Williams, 18 this
Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice thus:
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be
asserted in a court of justice; it has no, application to statutes relating to public
 subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not
prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare
of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters
cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them. 19
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect
them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change
from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of
the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public
interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
ARTICLE 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the
State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause.
To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to
subordinate the police power to the contract clause. LLpr

The last issue concerns the contention that without the appointment by the
President of the third member of the governing board, the POEA cannot legally
function and exercise its powers. This contention merits scant consideration. Section 4
of E.O. No. 797 indubitably declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Thus upon
the effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the POEA attained its juridical personality. The
appointment of the third member "who shall be well versed in the field of overseas
employment," provided for in paragraph, (b) of the said Section, was not meant to be
a sine qua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the validity of the acts of the
Board. As a matter of fact, in the same paragraph the President is given the "discretion
[to] designate a Deputy Administrator as the third member of the Board."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
(Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
|||

Administration, G.R. No. 114714, [April 21, 1995], 313 PHIL 592-611)
 [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Prospero Cresceni, Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates, Saguisag & Associates, Balisado
Law Office, and Lazaro Law Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he had the duty
to perform the functions of a Congressman. According to him, his covenant with his
constituents cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraint arising from pending
criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government.
When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five days or more
in a week virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
As such, an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence
of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. The Court
was constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public
office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
Instant motion was denied.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PRIVILEGES ARISING FROM

BEING ELECTED MAY BE ENLARGED OR RESTRICTED BY LAW. True,
election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage,
a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. There is an unfortunate misimpression
in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees
the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law,
not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
2. ID.; ID.; RULING IN AGUINALDO CASE (212 SCRA 768, AT 773) DOES NOT
APPLY IN IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL
LAW; CONFINEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS NOT REMOVAL. Accused-
appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that
"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people," will not extricate him from his
predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND DETENTION; GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE
SENSE AND MAY NOT BE EXTENDED BY INTENDMENT, IMPLICATION OR
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of
the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing
all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. The 1973
Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A
Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by
the concluding portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon
its failure to do so. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session. cEaCTS

5. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT COMPEL ABSENT MEMBERS TO

ATTEND SESSION IF REASONS FOR ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The
accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is
underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . . .. However, the accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
6. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; ALLOWING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
TO ATTEND CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE MEETINGS
WOULD BE A MOCKERY OF THE PURPOSES OF CORRECTION SYSTEM;
EMERGENCY OR COMPELLING TEMPORARY LEAVES FROM IMPRISONMENT
ARE ALLOWED TO ALL PRISONERS AT DISCRETION OF AUTHORITIES OR
UPON COURT ORDERS. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders. What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of
particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez
v. Morfe: . . .
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A DETAINEE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY AS MEMBER THEREOF; CASE AT
BAR. No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room
N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon
City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-
department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building,
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-
appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary
benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a
member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is
presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts. When
the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.

8. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERFORMANCE OF

LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A
PERSON VALIDLY IN PRISON. The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN IS NOT A
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. The
Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. We, therefore, find that election to the
position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AFTER CONVICTION IN
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ACCUSED MAY BE DENIED BAIL AND THUS
SUBJECTED TO INCARCERATION IF THERE IS A RISK OF HIS ABSCONDING;
RATIONALE BEHIND CONFINEMENT; CASE AT BAR. One rationale behind
confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person
charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As
stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal
law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional
Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is
risk of his absconding. The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which
voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was
issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced
because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restraints,
it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
11. WORDS AND PHRASES; IMPRISONMENT, ELABORATED. Imprisonment is
the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the
free exercise of his power of locomotion. More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general
sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court
or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the
personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his
free action according to his own pleasure and will. Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than
mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or
any exterior barrier." It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social
mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of
certain rights.

GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; CONTINUED

INCARCERATION OF ACCUSED IS A VALID CURTAILMENT OF HIS RIGHTS TO
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION. The Bill of
Rights provides All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required. This constitutional provision denying the right to bail
for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is
reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found which
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. In People v. Divina we held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports
that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued
incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of
his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY
IMMUNITY FROM ARREST; GRANT OF ACCUSED'S MOTION TO ALLOW HIM
TO ATTEND LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED
BROADENING THEREOF. Neither may the constitutional provision granting
immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's
motion. The Constitution states that A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend
legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest
bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of
this provision nor the general principles of official immunity support an expanded
interpretation of such privilege.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSCRIBED BY NATURE OR GRAVITY OF OFFENSE
CHARGED; COULD ONLY BE INVOKED FOR RELATIVELY MINOR OFFENSES,
PUNISHABLE AT MOST BY CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES. It was never the
intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress
from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to
include criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or
the gravity of the offense of which the accused is charged. Hence, the commission of
serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital punishment,
does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could
only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by
correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, "when it comes to freedom
from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE; REASON.
The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated rationale for legislative
immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in order.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ACCUSED IS ALREADY MOOT
AND ACADEMIC; REASON. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal process at
which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest.
Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact,
he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICIALS; DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
CANNOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH RE-ELECTED OFFICIAL MAY
HAVE COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM. Accused-appellant's
contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of
the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec, Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v.
Guingona we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to
criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term.
The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal
liability.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. cdtai

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to
balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege
in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of
House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power
of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal
and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed
to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to
ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office,
by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption. cdll

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision
of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; . . ..
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied
only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He
was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully
defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement
that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For
relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is
underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 2 which states, inter alia,
that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted
ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified. cdasia

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning
to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After
conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected
to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office
cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him
to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now
the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to
justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from
its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend
him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center,
Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to
wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to
all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of
particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez
v. Morfe: 5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance
in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated
like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to
it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging
to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual,
would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite
to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is
of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the
House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. dctai

We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of
Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214,
North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.
Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time,
he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." 6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the
people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence
of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. 10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person
to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention
of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure
and will. 13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his
power of locomotion 14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes
the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's
status in society. 16 Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving
the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily,
both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. 17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that
re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police
power of the State. cdtai

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, JJ., concur in the main and
separate opinion.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J ., concurring opinion:

For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who
has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts
of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending appeal before this Court. As a
member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his constituents are
deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration pending appeal of the judgment
of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative functions,
including attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in
holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit. Cdpr

The Bill of Rights provides

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 1 (emphasis supplied)
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina 2 we held that the trial court's
judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong.
Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and
constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of
his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators
provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The Constitution states that
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. 3
I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions
would constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest bestowed by the
Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision
nor the general principles of official immunity support an expanded interpretation of such
privilege.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution 4 limited the privilege from arrests
to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision was taken
from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn based upon the American
Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the words "treason, felony and
breach of the peace" have been construed to include all indictable offenses. 5 Thus, under
the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrests.
Under the 1973 6 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege was broadened to include arrests
for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the
privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress immunity from arrest remained
the same to ensure that they are not prevented from performing their legislative duties.
7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members
to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike
arrests, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of
Congress from discharging their legislative functions. 8
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to the
vigorous and effective performance of official functions. Members of Congress, in
particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion and judgment in enacting laws
responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded in the exercise of their
legislative functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to vindicate the
wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question their official acts before
the courts. 9
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a
member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the
widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still
circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offense of which the accused is charged.
Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or
with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A
member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor
offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe,
10 "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same." dctai

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by

reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above-stated rationale for legislative
immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the
applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal process at
which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest.
Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact,
he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate
and that such an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the
police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 11 Aguinaldo v. Santos 12 and
in Salalima v. Guingona 13 we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot
apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous
term. 14 The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his
penal liability.
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the
Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of our criminal
laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows
that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express
constitutional grant.cdphil

I vote to deny the motion.

(People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76 (Resolution), [February 3, 2000], 381 PHIL
|||

690-713)
[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director of the National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila,
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon
City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T . David for
petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor
C . Padua for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY CONTEST

LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR. It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby (Lewis vs.
U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda vs. U.S., 10
F. 2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d.
444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the document, papers, and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporation adverted to, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. Two points
must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None
of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in the case at bar do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code", as alleged in aforementioned applications without
reference to any determine provision of said laws or coders.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the victims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision Sec. 1, par. 3 Art.
III, Const.) to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such is the seriousness of the
irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court, by providing in
its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The grave violation of the Constitution made in
the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: "Books of accounts,
Financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers, showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transaction were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURES. Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also
to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To
be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and only
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of crime. But when this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE ILLEGAL SEARCH
WARRANT OR MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS NO EXCUSE.
The theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed by agents of the party in power, for certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which
the minority usually but understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority,
one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility
of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose
benefit the illegality had been committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. The doctrine adopted in the
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants for the search of 3
residences of petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
the searches and seizures therein made are illegal.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C .J : p

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned
in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants,
if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
 ". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the
other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore,
that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only
the corporation whose property was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co.
vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that
"a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may
be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true
no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed". 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions of the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open
to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
 enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of
words', valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties, so too, 'without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At
the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen,
had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy
be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced
to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoinment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by
removing the incentive to disregard it.' . . .
"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim
of any police officer who, in the name of law enforceable itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoinment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."
(Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance
of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral
effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning,
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House
No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution
as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized
in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion
of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United
States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has been advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other
words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to
suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then,
too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and motion
for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from
the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore prescribed by, and in violation of, Paragraph 3 of Section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and
is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly
declared null and void; the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared
illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the search warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves
"the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity
of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegality of
the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political
and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law - not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All
the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and
roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumenti, have no legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences,
to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic illegality
of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are void
and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference
can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a
determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality
of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted
to this Court, the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression
and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than
their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return
of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure,
may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing"; (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of
premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely
and exclusively against the "aggrieved person", gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three,
all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were
named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of
the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants.
But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also
the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control
of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of
Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were
actually made, in the "office/house warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of
the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return
and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961) (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president); United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United
States, 8F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but
belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir.
1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was
held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his
office, his hotel room or his automobile:
"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature
and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his homes, or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer,
or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of
the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveillance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court
 over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt
the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here or do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable." Hoffa vs. U.S. 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966) See also U.S. vs.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searches gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized,
the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their
proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and
need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.; Room
304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street);
maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMS, USTC); had made
improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore
independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and effects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent
of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standards of the then prevailing
circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We
are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the
law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law, which, more than almost any other
branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,'
'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards." See also Chapman vs. United States,354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must
own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In
Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a bookkeeper for several corporations
from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their
return. In United States vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y.
1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression as to
him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of
an illegal search:
"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, either his own
or the corporation's, was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized articles and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted." (emphasis supplied)
Time was when only a person who had property interest in either the place searched or the
articles seized had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule.
But in MacDonald vs. United States, 336 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson, joined
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter
of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion". This view finally became the official
view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S.
Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully
searched, but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as
well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged
to include "anyone legitimately on premises where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a
corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and
suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1961), supra. The court concluded that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had
an adequate interest in the premises searched (just in the case at bar). A postal inspector
had unlawfully searched the corporation's premises and had seized most of the
corporation's books and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a 'person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that appellant should not
have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure
of the corporation's books and records, merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory
interest in the invaded premises . . ." Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651.
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir.
1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place
of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had
a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano
considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving
defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move
to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers
were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed
against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that.
"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal
rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search
and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a
third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them." Schwimmer vs. United.
States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said
person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp.
191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y. ). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files
and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the
records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in
the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's)
"control and management". The papers turned out to be private, personal and business
papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which
Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at
bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones
vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631;
Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that.
"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed
solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as
having violated the law was Birrell. The first "search warrant described the
records as having been used in committing a violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . .' The
second search warrant was captioned: 'United States of America vs. Lowell M.
Birrell. (p. 198)
"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to
move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones." (p. 199)
 "If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched." See also Jeffers vs. United States. 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States
did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the
case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were
seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were
"PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still
both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the
case at bar, the petitioners' connection with the premises raided is much closer than in
Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless of whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the
word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent
that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The
uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and
other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which were the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a)
personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were unlawfully seized, be it
their family residences, offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or controlled
and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search warrants
and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants, and (b) purely
corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the
determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are
personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have
clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President
and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void
search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition
were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal
searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal
in origin or nature.

||| (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, [June 19, 1967], 126 PHIL 738-766)
[A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293. May 9, 1995.]

GIL V. MANLAVI, complainant, vs. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z.

GACOTT, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, City of Puerto
Princesa, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND

SEIZURE; IN CASE OF ILLEGAL FISHING, VALID ONLY UPON THE
DETERMINATION THAT FISH WERE CAUGHT THROUGH THE USE OF
EXPLOSIVES. The complainant admitted that the search was conducted in the
absence of a warrant. The search warrant produce by the complainant was issued after the
search and seizure took place. Moreover, complainant cannot justify the warrantless
search and seizure by invoking Circular No. 130 ( s. 1967) of the Office of the President.
The circular pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught through the use of
explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of Fisheries or
his representatives, who can take a sample of the fish (not to exceed one kilo) for testing
if the fish were indeed caught through the use of explosives. It is only upon the
determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives when the seizures
of the entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the fish
caught shall be made, which shall be paid to the accused should he be subsequently
acquitted in the criminal case filed against him.
2. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY; DUTY OF INVESTIGATING FISCAL; RULE DOES
NOT APPLY IN A CASE WHERE THE INFORMATION IS ALREADY FILED
BEFORE THE PROPER COURT. Section 4, Rule 112 of the new Rules on Criminal
Procedure applies to the conduct of the preliminary investigation, which is within the
control of the public prosecutor. It has no application in a case where the information is
already filed before the proper court. In fact, the epigraph of Rule 112 is "Duty of
investigation fiscal."
3. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO QUASH; MAY BE FILED ON ANY GROUND BEFORE
ARRAIGNMENT; EXCEPTION. In the case at bench, the accused moved for the
quashal of the criminal cases after their arraignment. As a general rule, an accused can
move for the quashal of the information on any ground before arraignment (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 1). However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as
where there is no offense charged (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 8; Cruz, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145 [1991]), for what controls is not the designation of
the offense charged in the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of
the offense (People v. Aczon, 225 SCRA 237 [1993]). Any ambiguity in the information
shall be resolved in favor of the accused (People v. Bondoy, 222 SCRA 216 [1993]). llcd

4. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; ACTS PERTAINING TO HIS JUDICIAL

CAPACITY, NOT SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY POWER; EXCEPTION. Well-
settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith (Abiera v. Maceda, 233 SCRA 520 [1994]).

DECISION

QUIASON, J : p

This is an administrative complaint filed against respondent, the presiding

judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City.
I
Complainant, a senior police officer, charged respondent with partiality,
miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 (Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended
for Illegal Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish). The cases
were consolidated for trial.
The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the
evidence of the prosecution was the product of a warrantless and illegal search and
seizure. Respondent granted the motion in the Order dated July 9, 1992, citing the
admission of the prosecution that the search and seizure was not covered by a search
warrant, and that the search warrant presented in court was issued after the fact. LibLex

Complainant contended that the confiscation of the fish in the absence of a

search warrant was allowed under Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the
President.
The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9211 on the ground that the
information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish caught by
explosives for its failure to allege the element "for profit."
The information in said case reads as follows:
"That on or about the 18th day of January, 1991, at Bgy. Mandaragat, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused conspiring and confederating together with John Doe, Peter
Doe and William Doe whose true identities and present whereabouts are still
 unknown and one Virgilio Laguna, a military officer, which case was forwarded
to the JAGO, did then and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess illegally
caught assorted fish with the use of explosives, weighing more or less Eight
(8,000) Thousand Kilos."
In his comment, the City Prosecutor admitted the omission in the information
of the phrase "for profit" but he claimed that said omission was a mere technicality.
In his Order dated June 25, 1992, respondent granted the motion on the ground
that the information was fatally defective, because it failed to allege two essential
elements: (1) that the accused had knowledge that the fish were illegally caught with
the use of explosives; and (2) that they intended to dispose of or sell the fish for profit.
The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order arguing: (1) that
the word "knowingly" was substituted with the word "willfully"; and (2) that P.D. No.
704 punishes the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of
illegally caught fish or aquatic products. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
LexLib

II
In his comment, respondent denied the charges against him and asserted that
his orders were supported by law and evidence. He moved for the dismissal of the
instant complaint.
As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210, complainant himself admitted
that the search and seizure was conducted in the absence of a warrant. The search
warrant produced by the complainant was issued after the search and seizure took
place.
Moreover, complainant cannot justify the warrantless search and seizure by
invoking Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President. The circular
pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught through the use of
explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of
Fisheries or his representatives, who can only take a sample of the fish (not to exceed
one kilo) for testing if the fish were indeed caught through the use of explosives. It is
only upon the determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives
when the seizure of the entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the
value of the fish caught shall be made, which shall be paid to the accused should he be
subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed against him.
We note that the arresting officers failed to show compliance with the
procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoke.
As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9211, respondent erred in holding
that the information was defective in not alleging that the offense was committed
"knowingly." The element of knowledge was encompassed within the word
"willfully" used by the prosecutor.
 However, the information suffers from infirmity for failure to allege the
element "for profit." Section 33 (Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended, provides: LexLib

". . . It shall likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in,
sell or in any manner dispose of, for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products
which have been illegally caught, taken or gathered (Italics supplied).
It is true that the provision prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in,
selling or disposing of illegally caught fish and aquatic products, but said acts must
not only be done "knowingly" but also "for profit," an essential element of the
offense.
Complainant's argument that a quashal of the complaint or information
cannot be done without the prior written approval of the provincial prosecutor is
misplaced.
Complainant invokes Section 4, Rule 112 of the New Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
fiscal without the prior written approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor."
xxx xxx xxx
Said provision applies to the conduct of the preliminary investigation, which is
within the control of the public prosecutor. It has no application in a case where the
information is already filed before the proper court. In fact, the epigraph of Rule 112
is "Duty of investigating fiscal."
In the case at bench, the accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases
after their arraignment. As a general rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the
information on any ground before arraignment (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117,
Sec. 1). However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no
offense charged (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 8; Cruz, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 194 SCRA 145 [1991]), for what controls is not the designation of the
offense charged in the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of
the offense (People v. Aczon, 225 SCRA 237 [1993]). Any ambiguity in the
information shall be resolved in favor of the accused (People v. Bondoy, 222 SCRA
216 [1993]). llcd

Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith (Abiera v. Maceda, 233 SCRA 520 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

 SO ORDERED.
||| (Manlavi v. Gacott, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293, [May 9, 1995], 313 PHIL 738-744)
[G.R. Nos. 112708-09. March 29, 1996.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY TRADING
CORPORATION and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION,
respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF

CAUSE OF ACTION; NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
DEEMED WAIVED FOR FAILURE TO INVOKE AT PROPER TIME. A direct
action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is
premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of
action. However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the
principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly seven
(7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the
proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate
stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written
formal offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v.
Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: "Failure to observe the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We
have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance
with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground
for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived
and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel by
laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the
PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG
should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or
sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency extended by the
Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches
or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a
proper time.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SUSPEND PERIOD TO SUBMIT WRITTEN FORMAL
OFFER OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, AND FAILURE THEREFOR IS DEEMED
A WAIVER; INCORPORATION IN JUDGMENT THE RESOLUTION OF MOTION
TO DISMISS, PROPER. The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating
in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should
have been resolved first and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the light of
the "peculiarities" of this case where there was nothing left for the parties to do but to await
the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of the
PCGG's written formal offer of documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within
the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. That the 20-day
period was not suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with
petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period suspended by a motion
to dismiss is the period to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the filing of
a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension. PCGG filing of a
motion to dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay the running of the period for filing
its written formal offer of evidence as agreed upon and ordered in open court could not
have the effect of suspending the period. Without express leave of court, PCGG could not
improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend the running of the period agreed upon.
PCGG is deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence and to have its evidence
rested on the basis of the evidence on record.
3. POLITICAL LAW; RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; SEQUESTRATION
ORDER AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER NULLIFIED FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SUFFICIENT PRIMA
FACIE FACTUAL FOUNDATION. The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in
SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII. The Sandiganbayan voided the
sequestration order issued against SIPALAY " for lack of sufficient prima facie factual
foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG
witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be
raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN'S exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the
three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice,
for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no
documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence were offered
by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that "The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the
testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due
appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires
that the offer of testimonial evidence "must be made at the time the witness is called to
testify." With respect to documents, however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph)
provides a different time for their offer. Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack
on its admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty.
Alonte's testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the
PCGG does not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista's supervening death in the course of
her cross-examination, the controlling case is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the Court
allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before his cross-examination, to remain in
the record. If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-
examination, with more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of
the witness' death (as in Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Dr. Doromal was
basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming
from Malacaang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony
essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration
order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to
repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence.
And it must be emphasized at this point that mere identification of documents and the
marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents not
formally offered. Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered,
however decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie evidence/s
case does not exist at all. That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself worthless.
The same can be said of deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly
immersed in the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the
documents she referred to were totally unrelated to the sequestration order issued against
SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED.
Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY.
4. ID.; ID.; PCGG MADE USE OF AN UNAUTHORIZED AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT TO EFFECT
SEQUESTRATION. The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a
search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the
body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all
bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in
Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search
and seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in
pursuit of its mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of
E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the PCGG; and the Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v.
PCGG" simplified these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority
to issue a search and seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is
derivable from subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the
simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified
once and for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze
orders and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and
receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an active
and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or search
and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is allowed to issue in
discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly in this
context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
[COCOFED] v. PCGG" and being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acid test for validity as provided by the
prevailing constitution under which it was issued the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION
which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution. Supporting jurisprudence
thus outline the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of even one
will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND
SEIZURE ORDER is so constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner
Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish probable cause. This is so
because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and
circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents she identified
but which were never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never
testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge to bolster the PCGG'S claim that
ALLIED was in possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her
testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated suspicion. And the
rule is that search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the
first place. Only a "judge" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is
neither. Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be
searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY REFERS TO "all bank documents" which
is too all embracing, the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining
to all business transactions of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such
tenor of seizure warrant is not a particular description, thus contravening the explicit
command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized.
Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally
objectionable and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity.

5. ID.; ID.; SUIT AGAINST SEQUESTERED ENTITY SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN

SANDIGANBAYAN WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD AS FAILURE THEREOF
AUTOMATICALLY LIFTS SEQUESTRATION ORDER; SUIT AGAINST
STOCKHOLDERS IS NOT SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION. The last key
issue involves another constitutional imperative i.e., that the corresponding suit/s
against a sequestered entity/ties should be brought in the proper court, the Sandiganbayan,
within the prescribed period failure of which automatically lifts the sequestration order
or orders issued. At the fore is Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution was ratified on February 2,1987. Counting six (6) months therefrom,
August 2,1987 was the constitutional deadline for the PCGG to file the corresponding
judicial action/proceeding against entities it sequestered prior to February 2,1987. Among
such entities were SIPALAY and ALLIED. The PCGG admittedly did not file any direct
complaint either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the SANDIGANBAYAN between
February 2,and August 2 of 1987. But within such period, the PCGG filed before the
SANDIGANBAYAN a civil case against Lucio Tan and others docketed as CC No. 0005.
It did not name SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants. SIPALAY and ALLIED were
impleaded as defendants in CC No. 0005 for the first time only after the lapse of more than
four (4) years from the filing of the original complaint in July of 1987, under an amended
complaint filed by the PCGG in September of 1991. In PCGG v. INTERCO, the Supreme
Court made a distinction between the juridical personalities of a corporation and its
stockholders, ruling that if a corporation is not impleaded, it cannot be deemed to have
been sued in an action against its stockholders. Petitioner Sipalay Trading was not
specifically impleaded therein as party-defendant, if at all, the latter has been included
therein as part of principal defendant's ill-gotten assets. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court, '(P)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.' Sipalay Trading has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from its stockholders. Any civil charge filed against
principal defendant Lucio C. Tan and/or his dummies is not deemed a suit against the
former. Neither does mere inclusion in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal
defendant's ill-gotten wealth suffice to comply with the constitutional injunction.
Impleading a party means bringing the suit against it. Listing or annexing it to the
complaint, on the other hand, implies being the objection of the action. The PCGG
erroneously relies on "Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Philippine Farming Co., Ltd."
where it was ruled to the effect that: This case dealt solely with a defect in the cause of
action stated in the original complaint filed. It did not in any way involve a failure to
implead a party-defendant. In the failure to implead a party in the original complaint, the
Court on at least two occasions said that the rule in "Pangasinan" would not apply to the
party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These are the cases of "Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation" and "Seno, et al. v. Mangubat, et al.
cited by herein SIPALAY and ALLIED in their "Comment." In "Aetna," the amended
complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna Insurance Co. as plaintiff before the then CFI
of Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as defendant for the first time, was filed
beyond the one-year period fixed in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In "Seno," one
Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat was likewise impleaded as defendants for
the first time under an amended complaint filed beyond the ten-year period required under
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within which to bring an action upon a written contract.
And in both cases, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaints against these newly
impleaded defendants by refusing the application of the "Pangasinan" ruling and decreeing
that the amended complaints did not stall the running of the prescription periods provided
under the applicable laws. Bearing once against similar factual features as the "Aetna" and
"Seno" cases, this particular sub-issue should, perforce, be resolved in accordance
therewith. The case of "Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al." 240 SCRA 376 [January 23,
1995] where its "Final Disposition relating to the judicial action/proceeding in
sequestration cases appear to clash with "INTERCO," did not reverse, abandon or supplant
"INTERCO." What the Court did was to explain the two apparently colliding dispositions
by making this a "hairline," but critical, distinction: As in "INTERCO," evidence of the
PCGG is nil to even come up with a prima facie case against SIPALAY (and
ALLIED).This similitude is the one decisive factor that draws the instant case away from
the "Final Dispositions" made by the Court in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case
thus making "INTERCO" as supported by the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, the controlling
precedent. The principle of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for "when the court
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
In answer therefore we hold that the sequestration and the search and seizure issued were
indeed automatically lifted.

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J : p

Save for slight modification of a specific disquisition made by the SANDIGANBAYAN

in its now-assailed judgment dated August 23, 1993, we affirm the same, as well as its
Resolution promulgated on October 7, 1993 denying the Motion For Reconsideration.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and
ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY
and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation
of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by
the parties, this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for
proper disposition, 1 where SIPALAY's petition was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of
ALLIED as S.B. 0100.
Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels
and Resort Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the
PCGG, part of Lucio C. Tan's ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG on July 24, 1986 thus
sequestered these SIPALAY shares under a "Sequestration Order and Supervisory
Committee" which reads:
"24 July 1986
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation
C/O Mr. Lucio C. Tan
Allied Banking Corporation
 Allied Bank Center
Ayala Ave., Makati
Metro Manila
Subject: Sequestration Order and Supervisory Committee
Gentlemen:
By virtue of the powers vested in the Presidential Commission on Good
Government by authority of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, we
hereby sequester the shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation
held by and/or in the name of Sipalay Trading Corporation.
We direct you not to cause any transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, concealment,
or liquidation of the aforementioned shares of stocks without any written
authority from the commission.
xxx xxx xxx
This sequestration order and formation of the Supervisory Committee shall take effect
upon your receipt of this Order.
For your immediate and strict compliance.
Very truly yours,
FOR THE COMMISSION:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
RAMON A. DIAZ QUINTIN S. DOROMAL
Commissioner Commissioner" 2

SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG sought to implement the
sequestration without acting on its motions ". . . To Lift Sequestration Order" and ". . .
For Hearing For Specification Of Charges And For Copies Of Evidence." SIPALAY
maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary substantiation, violative of
due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was
brought against it within the period mandated under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the
Constitution.
Anent ALLIED (S.B. 0100), its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a
"Search and Seizure Order" by agents of the PCGG, the text of which reads:

"The Manager
Allied Banking Corporation
 Valenzuela Branch
Valenzuela, Metro Manila

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

Gentlemen:
By virtue of the powers vested in this Commission by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, you are hereby directed to submit for search and
seizure all bank documents in the abovementioned premises which our
representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being
conducted by this Commission.
Atty. Benjamin Alonte is deputized to head the team that will implement this
Order.
August 13, 1986, Pasig, Metro Manila.
FOR THE COMMISSION:
(Sgd)
RAMON A. DIAZ
Commissioner

(Sgd.)
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
Commissioner" 3

ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing
the order. ALLIED contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is
particularly a general search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites
for its valid issuance.
The petitions were jointly heard by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Briefly, the more salient
events which transpired therein are as follows:
At the presentation of their evidence, PCGG Secretary Ramon Hontiveros appeared as the
lone witness for SIPALAY and ALLIED. He produced and identified excerpts of the
minutes of the PCGG meetings held on March 13, and 12, 1986 4 in response to a subpoena
duces tecum.
For the PCGG's part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former
PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin
Alonte, Director IV, Legal Department of the PCGG who headed the team that served the
search and seizure order on ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified voluminous
documents. Former Commissioner Bautista died midway her cross-examination. The
PCGG almost failed to present Atty. Alonte, had the SANDIGANBAYAN not
reconsidered 5 its Order of March 8, 1993 6 declaring the cases submitted for decision after
the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its repeated
postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alonte's testimony and upon the PCGG's
manifestation that it was no longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN 7 gave
the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1, 1993) within which to submit its formal evidence
in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given the same period (20 days) from receipt of
such written formal offer of evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or
objections thereto, and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for resolution.

What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as
directed by the SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and
ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after
SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on September 16,
1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY's and ALLIED's
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and
ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President
before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. An "Oppositions" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.
At some earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed a "Motion For The Consolidation Or
Joint Trial" of SIPALAY's and ALLIED's petitions (S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil
Case 0005 a complaint for "Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and
Damages" dated July 17, 1987 likewise filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN by the
PCGG against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and other defendants. 8 The
SANDIGANBAYAN formally denied this motion in an extended Resolution dated July 6,
1993. The PCGG filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" thereof. This motion was deemed
submitted for resolution when no opposition and reply were filed. SIPALAY and ALLIED
then filed a "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision," to which an opposition
and reply were filed.
The PCGG lost in these cases below. The SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed August
23, 1993 Decision 9 voided the orders issued against SIPALAY and ALLIED. The decretal
portion reads:
"In S.B. No. 0095
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse
but to declare, as it hereby declares, the writ of sequestration issued against
petitioner Sipalay Trading Corporation's shares of stock in Maranaw Hotel and
Resorts Corporation as deemed automatically lifted for respondent PCGG's
failure to implead the petitioner within the period mandated under Section 26,
 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The same writ is likewise declared null
and void for having issued without sufficient evidentiary foundation
respondent PCGG having failed to adduce and proffer that quantum of evidence
necessary for its validity without prejudice to the issue of ill-gotten wealth
being attributed to petitioner Sipalay Trading Corporation and/or defendants
Lucio C. Tan, et al. being threshed out and litigated in Civil Case No. 0005.
"In S.B. No. 0100
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Court hereby declares the subject
search and seizure order issued by respondent PCGG directed against petitioner
Allied Banking Corporation's Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 as null and
void ab initio for having been issued without due process and in contravention of
the organic law then in force, the Freedom Constitution, under which mantle, the
Bill of Rights found in the 1973 Constitution was amply protected and enforced.
Consequently, all documents, records and other tangible objections (sic) seized
pursuant thereto are hereby ordered returned to petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation through its duly authorized representative, after proper inventory and
accounting shall have been made within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED."
The resolution of PCGG's motion to dismiss and for reconsideration of the denial of
its motion for consolidation or joint trial, as well as SIPALAY's and ALLIED's
motion to consider the cases submitted for decision, was incorporated in the decision.
And after its motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied in a Resolution
promulgated on October 7, 1993, 10 the PCGG brought the instant petition. A
comment, reply, and rejoinder were subsequently filed.
The key issues, in query form, are:
(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper?
(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than
resolving it as part of the judgment?
(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the
search and seizure order issued against ALLIED correct?
(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for
failure to bring an action in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the
constitutionally prescribed period?
Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion
to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The supporting cases cited by the PCGG in
its petition indeed spell this out, to wit: "Pestanas v. Dyogi," 11 Aboitiz v. Coll. of
Customs," 12 and Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato." 13 And in the case of "Ocampo v.
Buenaventura" 14 likewise cited by PCGG, the Court in essence approves of the filing of a
motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any stage of the
proceedings.
"As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads
(Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting
the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On
the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion
at any stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of
action . . . ."
These principles, at first impression, appear to favor the PCGG. Sections 5 and 6 of
the PCGG Rules and Regulations indeed provide an administrative mechanism for
persons or entities contesting the sequestration orders issued against them.
"Section 5. Who may contest. The person against whom a writ of
sequestration or freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in
writing, either personally or through counsel within five (5) days from the receipt
of the writ of order . . ."
"Section 6. Procedure for Review of writ of order After due hearing or motu
propio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order
unconditionally or subject to such condition as it may deem necessary, taking into
consideration the evidence and circumstances of the case. The resolution of the
Commission may be appealed by the party concerned to the Office of the
President of the Philippines within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof."
Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the sequestration orders
nor an appeal to the Office of the President was made by SIPALAY and ALLIED
before they filed their respective petitions in court. The PCGG's motion to dismiss
was anchored on lack of cause of action, albeit filed beyond the period to answer.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles
aforestated. The SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions were both filed on the third quarter of
1986 (September 16 and August 26, respectively), while the PCGG decided to file its
motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993 (July 7). Nearly seven (7) years came to pass
in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum.
SIPALAY and ALLIED had rested their cases, and the PCGG had finished presenting all
its witnesses, not to mention other various motions and incidents already disposed of by
the SANDIGANBAYAN, with special attention to the numerous postponements granted
the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which prevented an earlier termination of the
proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence
as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Soto v. Janero" 15 has made it
quite clear that:
"Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long
line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
 deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to
dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
court can take cognizance of the case and try it." (Emphasis supplied)
The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion
to dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as "proper time." This
factual scenario largely differs from the "Ocampo" case relied upon by the PCGG. In
that case and the case of "Community Investment & Finance Corp. v. Garcia" 16 cited
therein, the motions to dismiss involved were filed just after the filing of the answer,
and not at some belated time nearing the end of the trial. The parties in those cases
have not presented any testimonial or documentary evidence yet, as the trial proper
has not commenced, and neither does it appear that the movants concerned took close
to seven (7) years before filing their respective motions to dismiss. The PCGG
therefore cannot seek refuge in the "Ocampo" case to justify the marked delay in
filing its motion to dismiss. Such tarried maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel
by laches the definition and effect of which this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Regalado, had the occasion to visit anew in the relatively recent case of
"Olizon v. C.A." 17
"Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could
nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only
proper to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to
assert what it bewailed as the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions' lack of cause of
action. More accurately, the PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived
defect in line with the "Soto" case, 18 for "proper time" cannot mean nor sanction an
unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as seven (7) years. The leniency
extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2,Rules of Court) and by jurisprudence
("Ocampo case") in allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
filed after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up
and validate the onset of laches or the failure to do something which should be
done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time 19 which, in this case, was one of
the PCGG's follies. Indeed, in matters of timeliness, "indecent waste" is just as
reprehensible as "indecent haste".

Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss is
that this case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rules of prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies, and the SANDIGANBAYAN's brief but lucid disquisition on
one exception merits this Court's approval.
 "Two. The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative (sic) remedies does not apply
to petitioners' case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(iii) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice." 20
xxx xxx xxx
". . . there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG's resolution
to the Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG
Rules and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited
indifference towards petitioners' pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and
search and seizure orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore
intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for
seeking relief directly from the courts." 21
The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., "where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine," consisting in the PCGG's being guilty of
estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer therefore
to the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGG's
motion to dismiss was in order.
In respect of the second key issue, the PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for
incorporating in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said
motion should have been resolved first and separately. That would have been unnecessary
and injudicious in the light of the "peculiarities" of this case where the motion was filed
only at the tail end of the trial and when the PCGG has visually presented all its evidence.
At that stage, there was in fact nothing left for the parties to do but to await the forthcoming
judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of the PCGG's written
formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by the court, which the PCGG failed to
do within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. In this
connection, the PCGG's contention that the 20-day period for the submission of its written
formal offer of evidence was suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss has no
merit. The SANDIGANBAYAN's observation on this matter, as espoused by private
respondents SIPALAY and ALLIED, is correct.
"The Court agrees with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only
period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer (Section
4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court) 22 and that where a period is to be suspended by
the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension
(Section 1[b], Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, for instance, provides for the
suspension of the period to file a responsive pleading if a motion for bill of
particulars is filed). 23 Consequently, respondent's (PCGG) filing of a motion to
 dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay or suspend the running of the
period for filing its written formal offer of evidence as agreed upon and
ordered in open court during the hearing on July 1, 1993 could not have the
effect of suspending the period within which it should submit its formal offer of
evidence in writing. Without express leave of court, respondent (PCGG) could
not improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend the running of the period
agreed upon. Respondent (PCGG) should have been prudent enough to seek the
permission of this Court in respect of such matter to avert possible controversy
arising therefrom. More importantly, respondent (PCGG) should not have made
a unilateral presumption of procedural norm." 24
xxx xxx xxx
"In view of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse but to sustain
petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance and declare, as it hereby declares,
that respondent (PCGG) is deemed to have waived presentation of further
evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence on record."
25

Besides, to insist on a prior and separate resolution of the PCGG's motion to dismiss
and the suspension of the 20-day period for the filing of the written formal offer of its
evidence would have needlessly prolonged further the proceedings below
something that certainly does not, and will not, sit well with a "just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding" envisioned by Section
2,Rule 1, of the Rules of Court. The same reasoning likewise justifies dispensing with
a prior determination of the PCGG's "Motion For Reconsideration" of the
SANDIGANBAYAN's Resolution denying consolidation or joint trial of the
SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions with Civil Case 0005, and private respondents'
(SIPALAY and ALLIED) "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision."
Thus, the second key issue should be resolved against the PCGG. The
SANDIGANBAYAN was well-justified in incorporating in its decision the resolution
of the PCGG's motion to dismiss, as well as its motion for reconsideration of the
denial of the motion for consolidation or joint trial and private respondents'
(SIPALAY and ALLIED) motion to consider the cases submitted for decision.
Going now to the third key issue, the sequestration order and the search and seizure order
against SIPALAY and ALLIED, respectively, were nullified by the SANDIGANBAYAN
on the ground of non-compliance with constitutional requirements. Let us examine the
SIPALAY and ALLIED cases separately.
The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article
XVIII. It reads in full:
"Section 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the
ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by
the President, the Congress may extend said period.
 "A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima
facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the
ratification of this Constitution,the corresponding judicial action or proceeding
shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such
ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six
months from the issuance thereof.
"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided."
The SANDIGANBAYAN voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY
"for lack of sufficient prima facie factual foundation, . . ." 26 In so concluding, it only
took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte.
It appears further that the SANDIGANBAYAN particularly zeroed in on
Commissioner Doromal's testimony, considering its observations that: 1) "The
testimony of former PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista has no
probative value and cannot be admitted in evidence in view of said witness' untimely
demise prior to the completion of her cross-examination by petitioner's counsel."
(citing the cases of "Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. CIR, et al." [86 SCRA 27] and
"Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines" [64 SCRA 610]), 28
By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN's
exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The
SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire
evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have
supported the testimonial evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court
29 and jurisprudence 30 decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered." There is no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were
formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since
Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence "must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify". With respect to documents, however, the
same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer, to wit:
"Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by
the court to be done in writing."
The twenty (20)-day period from July 1, 1993, or until July 20, for the submission of
a written formal offer of evidence given by the SANDIGANBAYAN to the PCGG
after the latter's last witness (Atty. Alonte) has testified, was intended precisely to
accommodate any and all documentary evidence even object evidence for that
matter, the PCGG would have wanted to offer. But, as previously discussed under the
second key issue, the PCGG waived such offer when it opted to file a motion to
dismiss sans/in lieu of the written formal offer of evidence within such given period
that expired without interruption. Quite accurately therefore can it be said that due to
 its lapse in procedure, the PCGG brought it upon itself if the existence or non-
existence of "prima facie factual foundation" had to be determined by the
SANDIGANBAYAN only from what can be drawn from the PCGG's testimonial
evidences and from no other. And the Court, in reviewing that court's finding that
no prima facie evidence exists to support the sequestration order, likewise has no
other choice but to be similarly confined thereto.

But whose testimony or testimonies? The question becomes significant inasmuch as the
SANDIGANBAYAN found as inadmissible some of the PCGG witnesses' testimonies.
Dr. Doromal's testimony in reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched
by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony, the
SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the PCGG does not contest. The
PCGG in fact now appears to do away with his testimony considering that the PCGG
neither quoted in, nor annexed to its petition, such testimony or any portion thereof. Atty.
Alonte's testimony therefore can be dispensed with. However, the Court disagrees with the
SANDIGANBAYAN's ruling that Commissioner Bautista's supervening death in the
course of her cross-examination rendered her entire testimony without probative value and
inadmissible. The SANDIGANBAYAN apparently clung to the principle enunciated in the
"Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases, 31 to wit:
"Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-
examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when
cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent.
"The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable
as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution
does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law . . . . Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore,
be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding
the case."
But the "Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases involved different factual features. In those
cases, the witnesses concerned whose testimonies were rightly stricken off the records
either left for abroad or simply failed to appear at the time they were supposed to be
cross-examined by the adverse party. In short, the lack of cross-examination by the
opposing parties therein was occasioned by sudden or unexplained non-appearance,
unlike in this case where no less than the witness Bautista's death prevented the
completion of her cross-examination. The controlling case here is "Fulgado v. C.A., et
 al." 32 where the Court, in allowing the testimony of therein plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado
who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the record, ruled that:
"The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the
procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault during the
entire proceedings was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent
alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of
cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material
loss. And more compellingly so in the instant case where it has become evident
that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but
through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no
responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems
a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct
examination." (Emphasis supplied)
If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-examination,
with more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the
witness' death (as in Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Thus, with the
exception of Atty. Alonte's testimony, Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner
Bautista's testimonies, together with the evidence of SIPALAY and ALLIED, deserve
a second scrutiny in determining the correctness of the SANDIGANBAYAN's finding
of "lack of prima facie factual foundation".
Here then are the highlights of Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner Bautista's
testimonies.

DR. DOROMAL
(DIRECT)
"JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Purpose please?
"ATTY. LEYNES:
The testimony of this witness will cover the fact that at the time of
sequestration there were issued (sic), there were more prima facie
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Dr. Doromal, do you know the petitioner, Sipalay Trading Corporation?
a: Yes, sir.
q: Why do you know Sipalay Trading Corporation?
a: It is one of those companies which we had investigated and eventually issued
a Sequestration Order.
q: Do you you (sic) Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
a: Yes, sir.
q: Why do you know this Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
a: Again it is one of those we had sequestered because of its relation with Sipalay
Trading Corporation?
q: Do you know the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation?
a: Yes, sir.
q: Why do you know it?
a: In the same manner that the material of documents we had, we ended up having
a Sequestration Order on Allied Banking Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Dr. Doromal at that time that the sequestration order which you have just
recognized was issued and which sequestration order was signed by you
and Commissioner Ramon Diaz, what documents if any did you consider?
a: We considered documents which were gotten from Malacaang after the
previous President had left. We had also document (sic) which were
gotten from the U.S. which were given by the States Department to the
PCGG and whatever had been gotten by our operation people.
q: If I show to you some of these documents will you be able to recognize them?
a: Yes, some of them I will be able to recognize.
q: I show to you a set of documents, what relation have these set of documents to
those documents which you have mentioned you and Commissioner Diaz
or the Commission considered when the Sequestration Order dated July
24, 1986 was issued?
Will you please go over these documents?
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness is going over the voluminous documents.
WITNESS:
a: The documents that I have just slipped into here that would have to do with
Sipalay Trading Corporation, this I remember.
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: The question is, what relation has this document to the document you
considered in issuing the Sequestration Order subject matter of this case?
a: This one which I had flipped into this had been considered by the Commission
at the time of the sequestration.
ATTY. LEYNES:
May I request that this document which the witness had identified, these
documents consisted of seventy-six documents and we have earlier
inadvertently marked them as Exhibit A to WWW but if we can have them
marked accordingly as Exhibits 1, 2 to 76 accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Doctor Doromal when you issued, when the Sequestration Order was issued in
the judgment of the Commission, what quantum of evidence do these
documents amount to?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Objection to the question, Your Honors (sic) please. First of all the witness
did not identify all of those documents as he was going over the folder of
documents. He was picking up particular documents in the folder and it is
a question of law.
ATTY. LEYNES:
We are proving that there is more prima facie evidence in the judgment
when he issued the Sequestration Order.
What is the quantum of evidence do these documents represent?
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
For the purpose of issuance thereof?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
With that qualification are you willing to accept that qualification?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Witness may answer:
WITNESS:
a: These documents are more than just prima facie evidence which is the only
thing required of us before issuing the Sequestration Order.
In fact over and above what is needed there are plenty of evidence of these
documents which movant amply justifies our issuing of the Sequestration
Order in the sense that there is just no reason no(r) question that there is a
preponderance of evidence for the sequestration.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That would be all, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
How about this 0095?
ATTY. LEYNES:
In both cases, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Does the document include any reference to the Allied Banking
Corporation?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, Your Honor, but the Sequestration Order was issued by
Commissioner Diaz and Mary Con Bautista.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
With respect to?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Allied Banking Corporation.
May I ask additional questions, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Please proceed.
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Dr. Doromal what if any is your participation in the issuance of the
Sequestration Order or the Search and Seizure Order against Allied
Banking Corporation?
a: All these Sequestration Orders were brought by the Commission in (sic) banc
and we are present with the documents that had been available.
We listen to them and the action is made by the Commission and in the
issuance of the Sequestration Order.
 Then whoever is the Commissioner most involved in that particular
company thus signs or do sign the Sequestration Order.
In this particular case that you mentioned about Allied Banking
Corporation, the two other Commissioners who were there ahead of me
were the ones who signed because they are most familiar with the Allied
Banking Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Specifically what is your participation in the issuance of the sequestration
personally of Allied Banking Corporation?
a: I am one of the most who participated in the discussion when I became a
member and that was April in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: When deliberated upon what documents were considered?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:
a: First of all when this Search and Seizure Order was issued this was during the
time that I was already a member of the PCGG as Commissioner and
when this is brought before the group before the Commission there are
the attached documents that backed up this Search and Seizure Order and
for that matter other items that have to do with the sequestration or
something similar to that so what I am saying the materials that go with
this would indicate the reason for the Search and Seizure Order similar to
the papers that are needed when we issued the Sequestration Order.
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: I will show you again this Exhibit 1, these Exhibits 1 to 76 will you please go
over the same and state before this Honorable court what relation have
these documents to the documents which you mentioned were considered
in the deliberation for the issuance of Search and Seizure Order against
Allied Banking Corporation?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
a: I am looking at some of these documents that have to do with the Allied
Banking Corporation and I recognize some of these and the others I do
not see because some of these are materials which were gathered by other
 groups and their attachments but the others such as this letter, this I
remember.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Dr. Doromal in your recollection what is the reason or the finding of the PCGG
why the Sequestration Order was issued against Sipalay Trading
Corporation or Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
WITNESS:
a: The reason was that in the Maranao Corporation which was the company which
was later on acquired by Sipalay Trading Corporation which was the
holding company it was our judgment that there are enough indications
there that these were acquired because of closeness to the president and
that this was really in fact one of those that had been gotten from DBP,
Development Bank of the Philippines with the idea being that it was, it
could be gotten through the help of the Office of the President and the
President himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: What if any is the finding of PCGG regarding the ownership of Sipalay Trading
Corporation?
a: Sipalay Trading Corporation was holding company and owner. The people in
the ownership is not only Lucio Tan but looks like relatives of Mr. Tan.
q: In your recollection Doctor Doromal, what is the finding or reason of
companies why it issued the Search and Issue (sic) Order against Allied
Banking Corporation?
WITNESS:
a: The Commission wanted to find out documents that would indicate or prove
the relationship between President Marcos and Lucio Tan and one way to
do that is to have access to the papers to the documents that were in the
Allied Banking Corporation.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That would be all, Your Honor." 33

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

(DIRECT)
"JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
 Purpose, please.
ATTY. LEYNES:
The testimony of the witness is offered for the purpose of proving that
when the Presidential Commission on Good Government issued the
search and seizure order dated August 13, 1988, the Commission
considered ample evidence in the issuance thereof and also to prove that
defendant Lucio Tan in concert with defendants Ferdinand Marcos and
Imelda Marcos acquired General Bank and Trust Company in violation of
existing rules and for remedial consideration and that later on Genbank
was converted by defendant Lucio Tan and company to Allied Bank of
which defendant Lucio Tan and defendants Ferdinand Marcos owned
beneficially.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Madam Witness, what basis or document, if any did the commission consider
when it issued the search and seizure order?
a: We had several documents in our possession at that time, one of the documents
was a list which have been taken from the office of Imee M. Araneta on
EDSA which contained a listing of the holdings of the late President
Marcos in several corporations and the extent of his participation on these
corporations. And the other, in addition to what have been given by certain
informants, another was an affidavit of Mr. Gapud which he had issued
wherein he had mentioned also the participation of Mr. Marcos in Allied
Banking, I think that affidavit is here and also the fact that deposits were
made from Allied Banking in the accounts of Mr. Marcos in the Security
Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
q: Madam Witness, you mentioned certain documents on the basis of which the
PCGG issued the search and seizure order against Allied Banking
Corporation, I am showing to you a folder containing Exhibit 1 to 18, will
you please go over this document and state which of these documents
were considered by the Commission when it issued the search and seizure
order?
a: These documents marked Exhibits 1 which is a list, which is a letter,
unfortunately I don't see page two of this but this is the document which
we have addressed principally, as far as we know addressed to the late
President Marcos and together with this we have Exhibit 2,another letter
dated March 28, 1977 addressed to the Deputy Governor Mr. Brias about
the intention to purchase General Bank and Trust Company and
subsequently documents Exhibit 3 signed by Carlota Valenzuela, Special
Assistant to the Governor, Exhibit 4 another document marked
 Confidential signed by Mr. Barin reporting on the action taken regarding
Genbank.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
And another document which has been marked as Exhibit 4, 5, 6, 7, these
documents refer to the acquisition by Lucio Tan of the Genbank for the
amount of P500,000.00, the Commission then considered that plus the fact
that the acquisition and transfer of Genbank to the Lucio Tan group was
done in a short time without proper observance of public bidding which
the Commission then considered to be irregular, so this is one of the
documents we look at. Mr. Tan in the acquisition of Genbank had been
given a favored treatment.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
This document dated May 17, 1989 under letterhead Allied Banking
Corporation addressed to His Excellency President Marcos, President and
Prime Minister signed by Lucio Tan. In addition we have a document
which has already been marked as Exhibit 12 which is the affidavit of Mr.
Rolando Gapud dated January 14, this is series of 1987, in this document
Mr. Gapus (sic) has also made an enumeration of deposits made by certain
individuals from certain banks among them Allied Banking Corporation
for the account of Mr. Marcos in the Security Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
Exhibits 13 and 13-a which is a listings (sic) of deposits made and
placements in the bank, in the bank account of Mr. Marcos. In addition,
we have the documents marked up to Exhibits 13-g, h, l, all showing
checks or amounts received from Allied Bank deposited in the Security
Bank and Trust Company. Exhibits up to Exhibit 13-k, l, m, p, t, v, 2,y
and x." 34
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Chairman Bautista, during the last hearing before it was adjourned we were
going over this folder containing Exhibits 1 to 80 and we are indicating
which of these exhibits were considered by the PCGG when it issued the
Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation;
Will you please go over again this folder and indicate to this Exhibit to
whether what was considered by the Presidential Commission on Good
 Government when it issued the Search and Seizure Order against Allied
Banking Corporation.
a: I recall that we had already pointed to the document marked Exhibit 7 in red
which is a letter of Lucio Tan to the Governor Licaros of the Central Bank
and the one marked in red as Exhibit 8 which is the letter to Mr. Gregorio
Licaros signed by T.O. Domingo, the Allied Banking Report which is
marked as Exhibit 9.
xxx xxx xxx
q: Apart from these exhibits which you have just mentioned what other evidence
if any did the Commission consider?
a: There were for instance the verbal information given to us by individuals as
well as the information given to us by Mr. Rolando Gapud verbally.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: What is the finding based on these Exhibits which you mentioned and the
information given by Rolando Gapud which he later on formalized in an
affidavit.
What finding if any with regards to the Allied Banking Corporation did
the Commission arrive that led to the issuance of the Search and Seizure
(sic) Order?
a: The Commission after reviewing al (sic) of these exhibits as with all the
information that had come into its possession had come to the conclusion
that indeed Mr. Lucio Tan was a close associate of the late President
Marcos and they were involved in business associates and transactions
and that the late President had substantial holdings in this corporation in
which Lucio Tan was also involved and therefore the commission would
have to act in accordance to its powers of the sequestration granted under
Executive Order No. 1.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: To what corporation do you refer to when you mentioned Mr. Marcos has
equity in the corporation owned by Lucio Tan?
a: Among them is precisely Allied Banking Corporation, Asia Brewery and
Sipalay Trading Corporation. I mean these are some of the corporations.
q: Chairman Bautista, what is the legal basis or authority by the commission of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government when it issued the
Search and Seizure Order against the Allied Banking Corporation?
 a: The Commission under Executive Order No. 1, the President has been given
specifically the power to sequester business and property owned by the
late President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives and close business
associates and to take possession or take over this business and assets in
order to prevent dissipation of these assets or removal of these assets and
concealment of these assets and also to take over such documents as the
Commission may consider necessary in order that these documents may
be preserved for the purpose of the filing of the case in order to prosecute
or conduct civil action against President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives
and other close business associates that is very clearly stated in Executive
Order No. 1.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. LEYNES:
0100, Your Honor.
q: Chairman Bautista, the Search and Seizure Order issued by PCGG dated
August 13, 1986 against Allied Banking Corporation reads in pertinent
part and I quote:
"You are hereby directed to submit for Search and Seizure all bank
documents in the above mentioned premises which our representatives
may find necessary and relevant to the investigation conducted by the
Commission."
a: Well I think we clearly specify there that we are to seize the bank documents.
It is specifically stated that the Search and Seizure Order refers to bank
documents precisely because of the information that had been given to us
that these documents could be found in the particular place.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
q: Now, Chairman Bautista do you know what happened after the Search and
Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation?
WITNESS:
a: We were not able to seize any document precisely because of the objection
raised and so what happened is that the parties agreed to just seal this place
so that neither of the parties would be able to remove any documents.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That will be all, Your Honor." 35
Dr. Doromal was basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents
purportedly coming from Malacaang, the US State Department and other sources. What
his testimony essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the
sequestration order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these
documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer
thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere identification of
documents and the mankind thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents not formally offered. In "People v. Santito, Jr.", 36 the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Regalado once again, thus said that:
"Even assuming that the same had been identified in court, it would have no
evidentiary value. Identification of documentary evidence must be distinguished
from its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and
is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done
only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has
been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally
offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not
to do so at all." (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however
decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie case does not
exist at all. That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself worthless. The same
can be said of deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed
in the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents
she referred to were totally unrelated to the sequestration order issued against
SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against
ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case
against SIPALAY. And it may well be clarified at this juncture that it is the
immateriality of deceased Commissioner Bautista's testimony that justified the
SANDIGANBAYAN into paying particular attention to Dr. Doromal's testimony in
its search for prima facie evidence not the inadmissibility of her testimony arising
from her death during cross-examination which we have heretofore adjudged to be a
faulty observation. The SANDIGANBAYAN was therefore correct in saying that:
"No direct connection or relationship has been established, at least, as far as the
evidence extant on the records of these cases are concerned, between petitioner
Sipalay Trading's acquisition and ownership of the sequestered shares of stock
and Lucio C. Tan's alleged fraudulent business maneuverings and connivance
with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. These oral testimonies are
practically dependent on the existence of official records of respondent PCGG
which, due to the latter's own doing, have not been formally offered. Hence, these
oral testimonies have no leg to stand on." 37
xxx xxx xxx
"Without credible and competent documentary evidence to fortify the witnesses'
bare allegations as aforestated, it is difficult to sustain a finding of prima facie
case in the proceedings especially taking into account the fact that petitioner
 Sipalay Trading is presumed by law to possess a separate and distinct judicial
personality from its principal stockholders, i.e., Lucio Tan, et al. . . ." 38
The difficulty is easier to grasp when reckoned with the various but uniform
definitions of prima facie case/evidence aside from that given by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, to wit:
"Prima facie evidence has been defined as evidence which, standing alone
unexplained or uncontroverted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed.
It is such as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to establish the fact, and if not
rebutted, remains sufficient for that purpose." 39
xxx xxx xxx
"It is evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted
and overcome by other evidence." 40
xxx xxx xxx
"It is evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, would maintain the
proposition and warrant the conclusion to support which it is introduced." 41
xxx xxx xxx
Prima facie case is such as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence." 42
xxx xxx xxx
"A prima facie case is one which is apparently established by evidence adduced
by plaintiff in support of his case up to the time such evidence stands unexplained
and uncontradicted." 43
xxx xxx xxx
"A prima facie case is one in which the evidence in favor of a proposition is
sufficient to support a finding in its favor, if all the evidence to the contrary is
disregarded." 44
xxx xxx xxx
"A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his
favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima
facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be
overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side." 45
From whatever definition we look at it, Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner
Bautista's testimonies are by no means sufficiently strong evidence to make up a prima
facie case for the PCGG. What gave them colorable weight were the unoffered documents.
But as things stand in the absence of such documentary evidence, they are empty and
crumble on their own even without counter-explanation or contradiction, as anything that
may tend to prove the proposition that the SIPALAY shares in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corporation were/are ill-gotten is just nowhere extractable from these testimonies by and
in themselves. These declarations unfortunately fail to hurdle judicial inspection,
proceeding from the principle that a party's evidence is "of necessity subject to a rigid
scrutiny" when he possesses, but does not produce, documentary evidence which would be
far more satisfactory. 46 We are thus vividly and fittingly reminded of the proverbial words
of Mr. Justice Story that:
"Naked statements must be entitled to little weight when the parties hold better
evidence behind the scenes" 47 and
"A party's nonproduction of a document which courts almost invariably expect
will be produced 'unavoidably throws a suspicion over the cause." 48
Corollary to this is that the presumption is always and inevitably against a litigant
who fails to furnish evidence within his reach, and it is the stronger when the
documents, writings, etc., would be conclusive in establishing his case. 49 This is
indeed an occasion to emphasize once again that the superiority of written evidence,
compared with oral, is so pronounced, obvious and well known, that in most cases the
deliberate and inexcusable withholding of the written evidence, and effort to secure
favorable consideration of oral testimony in the place of it, is an affront to the
intelligence of the court. 50
At best, the bare testimonies of Dr. Doromal and deceased Commissioner Bautista, in the
eyes of the Court, yield nothing but mere uncorroborated speculations or suspicions insofar
as the PCGG attempted to establish the "prima facie factual foundation" that would hold
up the sequestration order against SIPALAY. But a fact cannot be found by mere surmise
or conjecture. 51 Suspicion cannot give probative force to testimony which in itself is
insufficient to establish or to justify an inference of a particular fact, 52 for "the sea of
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."
53 And as it is not the habit of any courts of justice to yield themselves up in matters of
right to mere conjectures and possibilities, 54 courts are not permitted to render verdicts or
judgments upon guesses or surmises. 55
Turning now to the evidence for SIPALAY and ALLIED, it unveiled no "prima facie
factual foundation" either. Former PCGG secretary and lone witness Atty. Hontiveros, in
response to two (2) subpoenas duces tecum 56 requested by counsel for both corporations
57 which required him to bring to the court "all records, including minutes of meeting of
the PCGG, its resolutions, together with all supporting evidence or documents of whatever
nature" in connection with the issuance of the sequestration order against SIPALAY and
the search and seizure order against ALLIED, could only produce the following excerpts
of minutes of two (2) PCGG meetings held on March 13 and March 12, 1986:

"6. Commissioner Daza also informed the Commissioner that upon the
instructions of Minister Salonga, any Commissioner can file or issue a sequestral
order provided the order has the conformity verbal or written of another
Commissioner. These could include any other order or seizure." 58
 xxx xxx xxx
"6. Commissioner Pedro L. Yap before his departure on a mission, reported the
work he had accomplished during the past days. These included numerous 'freeze'
and 'sequestration' orders. He asked that the list of orders should not be
particularized in the minutes." 59
after admittedly spending no less than two (2) months tracing documents to bring to
court:
"ATTY. MENDOZA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I am asking you how many months did it take looking for records?
A: I think more than two months, sir.
Q: And these were the records you found, marked Exhibits A and B?
A: Yes, sir, during the time I devoted to them." 60
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. MENDOZA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: But nonetheless, for two months you tried looking for records corresponding
to the subpoena?
A: Yes, sir." 61
Other than being informative of PCGG internal procedure on how and by whom
sequestration orders in general are issued and of the "accomplishments" of one of its
then commissioners, the excerpts are absolutely unreflective of any deliberation by
PCGG commissioners particularly concerning the sequestration order against
SIPALAY, much less the factual basis for its issuance. They do not even make the
slightest allusion to SIPALAY, or ALLIED. That Atty. Hontiveros devoted two (2)
months for document-searching only to come up with minutes that are as barren as the
testimonial evidences of the PCGG validates indeed the claim of respondent
corporations which may well sum-up the PCGG's case specifically against SIPALAY,
that:
"The only logical conclusion that may be reached by Atty. Hontiveros' inability
to produce PCGG records in regard respondent Sipalay is that there was no
evidence before the PCGG or any of its Commissioners which would tend to
establish that the shares of stock in Maranaw registered in the name of private
respondent Sipalay are ill-gotten." 62
There being no evidence, not even a prima facie one, there was therefore no valid
sequestration of the SIPALAY shares in the Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation. We
hereby re-emphasize the indispensability of prima facie evidence by adverting to the
Court's pronouncement in "Republic v. Sandiganbayan," 63 to wit:
"IV. The issue on the existence of prima facie evidence in support of the issuance
of a sequestration order has likewise been laid to rest in the BASECO case, in this
wise:
'8. Requisites for Validity
What is indispensable is that, again as in the case of attachment
and receivership, there exist a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for
the sequestration, freeze or takeover order, and adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or
nullification.
Both were assured under the executive orders in question and the
rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
a. Prima Facie Evidence as Basis for Orders
Executive Order No. 14 enjoins that there be 'due regard to the
requirements of fairness and due process.' Executive Order No. 2 declares
that with respect to claims on allegedly 'ill-gotten' assets and properties,
'it is the position of the new democratic government that President Marcos
. . . (and other parties affected) be afforded fair opportunity to contest
these claims before appropriate Philippine authorities.' Section 7 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations provides that sequestration or freeze
(and takeover) orders issue upon the authority of at least two
commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of an interested
party, or motu propio when the Commission has reasonable grounds to
believe that the issuance thereof is warranted. A similar requirement is
now found in Section 26, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
requires that a 'sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon
showing of a prima facie case.' (Emphasis in the original text.)"
Notably the PCGG, in what apparently appears to be a desperate attempt to slither its
way out of its failure to show a prima facie case, would now argue that:
". . . it is worth-mentioning the fact that the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION under
which Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A had been issued, categorically
authorized the issuance of writs of sequestration without requiring any finding of
prima facie evidence to support such issuance. Nevertheless the PCGG saw to it
that before any writ of sequestration was issued, the Commissioners carefully
examined and weighed the evidence on hand that would justify such issuance of
sequestration order. The FREEDOM CONSTITUTION provides under Article
II, Section 1, the following:
'SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a
New Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative
power.
 'The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to:
a) . . .
b) . . .
c) . . . and
d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.'
"It is only in the 1987 Constitution that the existence or finding of prima facie
case was required before a sequestration order could be issued. The writ of
sequestration in question was issued long before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution; hence, it was covered by the Freedom Constitution which did not
require the prior finding of prima facie evidence." 64
This argument is clearly without merit in the face of this Court's pronouncement in
the "Baseco" case, 65 that:
"Parenthetically, even if the requirement for a prima facie showing of 'ill-gotten
wealth' were not expressly imposed by some rule or regulation as a condition to
warrant the sequestration or freezing of property contemplated in the executive
orders in question, it would nevertheless be exigible in this jurisdiction in which
the Rule of Law prevails and official acts which are devoid of rational basis in
fact or law, or are whimsical and capricious, are condemned and struck down."
Going now to the case of ALLIED, the principal objection raised regarding the order issued
against it is that the PCGG made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally defective
search warrant to effect the sequestration. The SANDIGANBAYAN saw and declared it
as such. We agree.
There can be no doubt that the order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a
search warrant (full text of which appears in the early part of this decision). Not only is the
order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined
the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for
the purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in the same Executive Order No. 1 66
(particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was
the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuant of its
mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1
enumerates the following powers of the PCGG:
"SECTION 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry
out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any
building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and
 any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment
or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or
dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of
the Marcos administration or by entities or persons close to former President
Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be
disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any
person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise
make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this
order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be material to the
investigation conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties, following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of
Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office agency or instrumentality of
the government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this order."
The Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG" 67 simplified these powers in this wise:
"From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following
powers and authority:
1. To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and
prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives
and associates, and graft and corruption cases assigned by the President to it;
2. Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;
3. Issue 'freeze orders' prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be
ill-gotten from transferring or otherwise disposing of the same;
4. Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;

5. Administer oaths and issue subpoenas in the conduct of investigation;

6. Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties as provided by the rules."
 Neither can it be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and
seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from
subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified
enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and
for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders
and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with:
"As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to
the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or receivership. By
attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may
stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and
not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally or otherwise, pending the
action. By receivership, property, real or personal, which is subject of litigation,
is placed in the possession and control of a receiver appointed by the Court, who
shall conserve it pending final determination of the title or right or possession
over it. All these remedies sequestration, freezing, provisional takeover,
attachment and receivership are provisional, temporary, designed for
particular exigencies, attended by no character or permanency or finality, and
always subject to the control of the issuing court or agency."
Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not
involving an active and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a
search warrant (or search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the
PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore,
ought to be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in
"Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" 68 where the
Court stressed anew that:
"The question of the validity of PCGG sequestration and freeze orders as
provisional measures to collect and conserve the assets believed to be ill-gotten
wealth has been laid to rest in BASECO vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181) where this
Court held that such orders are not confiscatory but only preservative in
character, not designed to effect a confiscation of, but only to conserve properties
believed to be ill-gotten wealth of the ex-president, his family and associates, and
to prevent their concealment, dissipation, or transfer, pending the determination
of their true ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
Being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and
must pass, the acid test for validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under which
it was issued the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision
of the 1973 Constitution (Section 3, Article IV) relating to search warrants, to wit:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
 affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrant's
validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. 69
In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER is also constitutionally defective.
Firstly, as it suffered from the same inherent weakness or emptiness as that which marred
Dr. Doromal's testimony (as earlier discussed extensively), deceased Commissioner
Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish probable cause which has been
consistently defined as:
". . . such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay." 70
This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts
and circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents she
identified but which were never formally offered in evidence in the
SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge
to bolster the PCGG's claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of illegally-
amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving,
or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. 71
Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a "judge"
and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. It is not a judge, as
clarified by the Court in "Baseco," to wit:
"It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus far been said
that the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act as, judge. Its general function
is to conduct investigations in order to collect evidence establishing instances of
'ill-gotten wealth'; issue sequestration, and such orders as may be warranted by
the evidence thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the
 assets of which it takes custody and control and prevent their disappearance, loss
or dissipation; and eventually file and prosecute in the proper court of competent
jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings. It does
not try and decide, or hear and determine, or adjudicate with any character of
finality or compulsion, cases involving the essential issue of whether or not
property should be forfeited and transferred to the State because 'ill-gotten' within
the meaning of the Constitution and the executive orders. This function is
reserved to the designated court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. There can
therefore be no serious regard accorded to the accusation, leveled by BASECO,
that the PCGG plays the perfidious role of prosecutor and judge at the same time."
(Emphasis supplied.)
And the PCGG cannot be considered as "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" because Executive Order No. 1, to reiterate, did not expressly nor
impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants/orders.
Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be
searched/seized from ALLIED. The body thereof, to quote again, reads:
"By virtue of the powers vested in the Commission by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, you are hereby directed to submit for search and
seizure all bank documents in the aforementioned premises which our
representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being
conducted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx"
It expressly refers to "all bank documents" which is too all-embracing, the obvious
intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions
of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant
is not a particular description, 72 thus contravening the explicit command of the
Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized. 73 Being a
general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally
objectionable 74 and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity. 75 We end our
discussion on this matter with the Court's admonition in "People v. Veloso". 76
"A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional
and statutory provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The
proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely
legal, 'for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of
which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such
intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect.' The
warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length
of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it."
The third key issue should therefore be answered in the affirmative, i.e., the
nullification of the sequestration and search and seizure orders was in order.
The last key issue involves another constitutional imperative i.e., that the corresponding
suit or suits against a sequestered entity or entities should be brought in the proper court,
the Sandiganbayan to be precise, 77 within the prescribed period failure of which
automatically lifts the sequestration order or orders issued. Up for determination is whether
under the factual features of the case, there was compliance with this rule as professed by
the PCGG, or non-observance thereof, as argued and declared by respondent corporations
and the SANDIGANBAYAN, respectively. Stress should be given to the fact that the
Court's resolution of this crucial issue would particularly apply to SIPALAY inasmuch as
it involves a sequestration order not to ALLIED against whom was issued a search and
seizure order that we have just heretofore declared as void. Nonetheless, for simplicity's
sake, such resolution can be made to cover ALLIED's case as well. We thus forego with
the distinction in this instance and assume that ALLIED was sequestered via sequestration
order similar to that issued against SIPALAY.

At the fore once again in Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically
the second and third paragraphs:
"Section 26.
xxx xxx xxx
"A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima
facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the
ratification of this Constitution,the corresponding judicial action or proceeding
shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such
ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six
months from the issuance thereof.
"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided."
And here are the relevant and undisputable facts: The 1987 Constitution was ratified
on February 2,1987. Counting six (6) months therefrom, August 2,1987 was the
constitutional deadline for the PCGG to file the corresponding judicial
action/proceeding against entity or entities it sequestered prior to February 2,1987.
Among such entity or entities were SIPALAY and ALLIED, the dates of their
sequestration as appearing from the corresponding orders issued against them are July
14, 1986 and August 13, 1986, respectively. The PCGG admittedly did not file any
direct complaint either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the
SANDIGANBAYAN between February 2 and August 2 of 1987. But within such
period, specifically on July 17, 1987, the PCGG filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN
a civil case against Lucio Tan and others, for "Revision, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages", docketed as CC No. 0005. 78 The original complaint in
CC No. 0005 did not name SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants, as it enumerated
only natural persons, except for one, 79 as such. SIPALAY and ALLIED were
impleaded as defendants in CC No. 0005 for the first time only after the lapse of more
than four (4) years from the filing of the original complaint in July of 1987, under an
amended complaint filed by the PCGG in September of 1991.
Given this factual backdrop, two propositions are being bruited by the PCGG:
1) that the July 17, 1987 original complaint against Lucio C. Tan, et al. (CC
No. 0005) is the judicial action required by the 1987 Constitution to justify the
continued sequestration of SIPALAY (and ALLIED), and
2) even assuming arguendo that such original complaint was defective for not
naming therein SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants, still there was faithful
compliance with the constitutional mandate, since the September, 1991 amended
complaint impleading SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants even when filed
beyond the August 2,1987 deadline retroacted to July 17, 1987 which, thus, cured
the defect.
Both propositions have to be rejected.
As to the first, the SANDIGANBAYAN correctly struck it down by following
the doctrine laid down in "PCGG v. International Copra Export Corporation, Interco
Manufacturing Corporation and Sandiganbayan" 80 ("INTERCO" case, for short). We
thus quote with approval the pertinent disquisitions, to wit:
". . . On not a few occasions, the Court has sustained the merit and logic of
motions seeking the lifting of writs of sequestration for respondent PCGG's
failure to institute the corresponding judicial action or proceeding against
corporations which, either through sheer oversight or gross neglect, have not been
expressly impleaded in the various civil complaints filed before this Court. The
case of 'PCGG v. International Copra Export Corporation, et al.' (INTERCO
case) is illuminating on this point. Therein, the Supreme Court made a distinction
between the judicial personalities of a corporation and its stockholders, ruling that
if a corporation is not impleaded, it cannot be deemed to have been sued in an
action against its stockholders.
"A perusal of the original complaint in Civil Case No. 0005, which was
concededly filed within the six-month period provided for under the organic law,
reveals that petitioner Sipalay Trading was not specifically impleaded therein as
party-defendant, either in a nominal or principal capacity. If at all, the latter has
been included therein as part of principal defendant's ill-gotten assets. Under Rule
3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, '(P)arties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.'
"It bears emphasis along this vein that, as implied from INTERCO, petitioner
Sipalay Trading has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders. As such, any civil charge filed against principal defendant Lucio C.
Tan and/or his dummies or agents is not deemed a suit against the former. Neither
does mere inclusion in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal defendant's
 ill-gotten wealth suffice to comply with the constitutional injunction. Impleading
a party means bringing the suit against it. Listing or annexing it to the complaint,
on the other hand, implies being the object of the action.
xxx xxx xxx
"It must be stated with equal respect that the phrase 'judicial action or proceeding',
within the meaning of the organic law, is subject to the ordinary rules of
procedure and is subordinate to the requirements of due process. Failure to
implead petitioner corporation in the action within the constitutional period is,
therefore, patently transgressive of the constitutional mandate against deprivation
of life, liberty and property without due process of law." 81
To fortify this ruling, we need only to point out the similarity in factual antecedents
obtaining in "INTERCO" and the instant case. In "INTERCO", no judicial action or
proceeding was instituted by the PCGG directly against respondent corporations
therein (International Copra Export and International Manufacturing) which it
sequestered on June 10, 1987 purportedly upon a prima facie finding that certain
shares of stocks in those corporations are beneficially owned but were acquired with
ill-gotten wealth by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., within six (6) months from the date of
their sequestration i.e., between June 10, 1987 and December 10, 1987. And the
PCGG in "INTERCO" likewise filed a complaint before the SANDIGANBAYAN on
July 31, 1987 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., among others (Civil Case No. 0033)
without, however, impleading respondent corporations as parties-defendants. The
Court in "INTERCO" rejected the PCGG's contention that the July 31, 1987 complaint
against Cojuangco, Jr., et al. was substantial compliance with the requirement under
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, by upholding very fundamental
principles in corporation law:
"In this jurisdiction, a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate
from its stockholders. Thus, a suit against any of the stockholders is not ipso facto
a suit against the corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
"There is likewise no merit to petitioner's argument that the doctrine which
justifies the 'piercing of the veil of corporate fiction' is applicable to the case at
bar. The Sandiganbayan correctly found the record bereft of sufficient basis from
which to conclude that private respondents' respective corporate identities have
been used to defeat public convenience, protect fraudulent schemes, or evade
obligations and liabilities under statutes. Whether or not Enrique Luy, a major
stockholder of private respondents, acted as a dummy of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
and whether or not the shareholders of Enrique Luy are beneficially owned by
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., are matters still to be established in Civil Case No. 0033.
But as far as private respondents are concerned, inclusion of their major
stockholder in Civil Case No. 0033 does not detract from, nor excuse, petitioner's
failure to file the proper judicial action against them in compliance with the
constitutional requirement under Section 26 of Article XVIII."
And following the rule, elsewise stated, that cases circumstanced identically should be
resolved consistently, adherence to the ruling of the Court in "INTERCO" is necessary
and inescapable.
Regarding its second proposition, the PCGG erroneously relies on "Pangasinan
Transportation Co. v. Philippine Farming Co., Ltd." 82 where it was ruled to the effect
that:
"Where the original complaint states a cause of action, but does it imperfectly,
and afterward an amended complaint is filed, correcting the defect, the plea of
statute of limitations will relate to the time of filing the original complaint."
The "Pangasinan" case dealt solely with a defect in the cause of action stated in the
original complaint filed by therein petitioner Pangasinan Transport against its
competitor, respondent Philippine Farming before the Public Service Commission for
illegal reduction of rates i.e., non-specification of the acts constituting the offense.
It did not in any way involve a failure to implead a party-defendant which is an
entirely different thing from a defective cause of action. The scope of the retroactive
and curative effect of an amended complaint as declared in "Pangasinan" therefore
ought not be broadened so as to cover infirmities in the original complaint other than
amendable imperfections in a cause of action. In fact, insofar as the failure to implead
a party or parties in the original complaint is specifically concerned, the Court on at
least two occasions said that the rule in "Pangasinan" would not apply to the party
impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These are the cases of "Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation" 83 and "Seno, et al. v. Mangubat, et
al." 84 cited by herein SIPALAY and ALLIED in their "Comment". In "Aetna", the
amended complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna Insurance Co. as plaintiff before
the then CFI of Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as defendant for the
first time, was filed beyond the one-year period fixed in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. In "Seno", one Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat were likewise
impleaded as defendants for the first time under an amended complaint filed beyond
the ten-year period required under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within which
to bring an action upon a written contract. And in both cases, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaints against these newly impleaded defendants by refusing the
application of the "Pangasinan" ruling and decreeing that the amended complaints did
not stall the running of the prescription periods provided under the applicable laws.
Bearing once again similar factual features as the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, this
particular sub-issue should, perforce, be resolved in accordance therewith.

This Court is, of course, fully aware of that very recent case of "Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.," 240 SCRA 376 [January 23, 1995], where its "Final
Dispositions" relating to the judicial action/proceeding in sequestration cases appear
to clash with "INTERCO". In resolving what appeared to be the "crucial question"
involved in that 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case, to wit:
 "DOES INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE PCGG BEFORE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF
CORPORATIONS BEING 'DUMMIES' OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ONE
OR ANOTHER OF THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN AND USED AS
INSTRUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION, OR AS BEING DEPOSITARIES OR
PRODUCTS, OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; OR THE ANNEXING TO SAID
COMPLAINTS OF A LIST OF SAID FIRMS, BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY
IMPLEADING THEM AS DEFENDANTS, SATISFY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A
SEIZURE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
1, s. 1986, THE CORRESPONDING 'JUDICIAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING'
SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN
SECTION 26, ARTICLE XVIII, OF THE (1987) CONSTITUTION?"
the Court made these conclusions:
"It is thus both needful and timely to pronounce that:
1) Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its terms or any fair
interpretation thereof, require that corporations or business enterprises alleged to
be repositories of 'ill-gotten wealth', as the term is used in said provision, be
actually and formally impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order
to maintain in effect existing sequestrations thereof;
2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or
allege said corporations or enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the
fruits of ill-gotten wealth without more, come within the meaning of the phrase
'corresponding judicial action or proceeding' contemplated by the constitutional
provision referred to; the more so, that normally, said corporations, as
distinguished from their stockholders or members, are not generally suable for
the latter's illegal or criminal actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested
by them in the former.
3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be necessary and proper
so that judgment may comprehensively and effectively be rendered in the actions,
amendment of the complaints to implead them as defendants may, under existing
rules of procedure, be done at any time during the pendency of the actions thereby
initiated, and even during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court a
procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by the
constitutional time limits to the filing of the corresponding complaints 'for' i.e.,
with regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection with, or concerning
orders or sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover."
These fresh pronouncements, however did not reverse, abandon or supplant "INTERCO".
What the Court did was to explain the two apparently colliding dispositions by making this
"hairline", but critical, distinction:
"XVI. The "Interco" and "PJI" Rulings
 "This Court is not unmindful of the fact that its Resolution of July 26, 1991 on
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 92755 (PCGG vs. Interco)
appears to sustain the proposition that actual impleading in the recovery action of
a corporation under sequestration for being a repository of illegally-acquired
wealth, is necessary and requisite for such proposed or pending seizure to come
under the protective umbrella of the Constitution. But Interco is to be
differentiated from the cases now under review in that in the former, as already
elsewhere herein made clear, there was a lack of proof, even of the prima facie
kind, that Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. owned any stock in Interco, the evidence on
record being in fact that said corporation had been organized as a family
corporation of the Luys.
"So, too, this Court's judgment in the so-called 'PJI Case' (Republic of the
Philippines [PCGG] v. Sandiganbayan and Rosario Olivares) may not be
regarded as on all fours with the cases under consideration. The PJI Case involved
the shares of stock in the name of eight (8) natural persons which had never been
sequestered at all. What happened was that the PCGG simply arrogated unto itself
the right to vote those unsequestered shares on the bare claim that the eight (8)
registered owners thereof were 'dummies' of Benjamin Romualdez, the real
owner of the shares; and all that the PCGG had done as predicate for that act of
appropriation of the stock, was to include all the shares of PJI in a list (Annex A)
appended to its complaint in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0035, describing them as
among the properties illegally acquired by Romualdez. Unfortunately, as in
Interco, the PCGG failed to substantiate by competent evidence its theory of
clandestine ownership of Romualdez; and since moreover, there had been no
sequestration of the alleged dummies' shares of stock, it was undoubtedly correct
for the Sandiganbayan to grant the latter's motion for them to be recognized and
declared as the true owners of the stock in question, which judgment this Court
subsequently pronounced to be free from grave abuse of discretion." 85
We need only to recall at this juncture that, as in "INTERCO", evidence of the PCGG
is nil to even come up with a prima facie case against SIPALAY (and ALLIED). This
similitude is the one decisive factor that draws the instant case away from the "Final
Dispositions" made by the Court in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case
thus making "INTERCO", as supported by the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, the
controlling precedent. The principle of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for
"when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts
are substantially the same." 86 And it is in this light that Mr. Justice Padilla's lone
"Dissent" in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case becomes meaningfully
relevant, to wit:
". . . failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a
list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due
process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate
personality without a hearing.
 "In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits of ill-gotten
wealth, it should be remembered that in most of these cases the stocks involved
constitute a substantial if not controlling interest in the corporations. The basic
tenets of fair play demand that these corporations be impleaded as defendants
since a judgment in favor of the government will undoubtedly substantially and
decisively affect the corporations as distinct entities. The judgment could strip
them of everything without being previously heard as they are not parties to the
action in which the judgment is rendered.
". . . Holding that the 'corresponding judicial action or proceeding' contemplated
by the Constitution is any action concerning or involving the corporation under
sequestration is oversimplifying the solution, the result of which is antagonistic
to the principles of justice and fair play.
". . . the actions contemplated by the Constitution should be those which include
the corporation not as a mere annex to the complaint but as defendant. This is
the minimum requirement of the due process guarantee. Short of being
impleaded, the corporation has no standing in the judicial action. It cannot
adequately defend itself. It may not even be heard.
"On the . . . opinion that alternatively the corporations can be impleaded as
defendants by amendment of the complaint, Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution would appear to preclude this procedure, for allowing amendment
of the complaint to implead therefore unimpleaded corporations would in effect
allow complaints against the corporations to be filed beyond the periods fixed by
said Section 26.
"Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in her separate opinion in Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Corporation, Inc. v. PCGG (150 SCRA 181, 253) correctly
stated what should be the rule, thus:
'Sequestration is an extraordinary, harsh and severe remedy. It
should be confined to its lawful parameters and exercised, with due
regard, in the words of its enabling laws, to the requirements of fairness,
due process and Justice'. (Emphasis supplied)
"While government efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth should have
support from all its branches, eagerness and zeal should not be allowed to run
berserk, overriding in the process the very principles that it is sworn to uphold. In
our legal system, the ends do not always justify the means. Wrongs are never
corrected by committing other wrongs, and as above-discussed the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth does not and should never justify unreasonable intrusions into
constitutionally forbidden grounds . . ."
In answer therefore to the last key issue, we hold that the sequestration and the search
and seizure orders issued were indeed automatically lifted.
Finally, the PCGG in its "Reply" raises as "additional issue" the bias and partiality of the
now-assailed decision's ponente and Chairman of the SANDIGANBAYAN's SECOND
DIVISION, Justice Romeo Escareal. To bolster this charge, the PCGG harps on alleged
prejudicial acts committed by Justice Escareal affecting CC No. 0005 the case filed
against Lucio C. Tan, and the instant case (S.B. Nos. 0095 against SIPALAY and 0100
against ALLIED).
This issue deserves no merit at all. Firstly, the PCGG's complaints against Justice Escareal's
purported bias and partiality in CC No. 0005 have no bearing whatsoever to the instant
case. That should be ventilated and passed upon there, not her. And secondly, SIPALAY
and ALLIED in their "Rejoinder" meritoriously parried the PCGG's accusation by arguing
that:
"1.02. Petitioner apparently overlooks that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate
court which sits in divisions composed of three (3) members each. The unanimous
vote of all the three (3) members of a division is required for the rendition of a
judgment (See Section 1(b), Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan).
The Decision and Resolution subject of the present appeal, though penned by
Justice Romeo Escareal, the Chairman of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan, were concurred in by the two (2) other members of the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division. Such being the case, petitioner's fears of bias
or partiality on the part of Justice Romeo Escareal cannot affect the questioned
Decision and Resolution rendered by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). As
held by this Honorable Court in Mirriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Hon. Justice
Francis Garchitorena, Et Al. (G.R. No. 109226, December 2,1993):

'Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into

consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three
justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division. (P.D. 1606, Sec. 5).
The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless
petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena (Paredes vs. Gopenco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969]).' "
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, [March 29, 1996], 325 PHIL 762-
|||

839)
[G.R. No. L-69803. October 8, 1985.]

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C.

TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal Quezon City;
 HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL.
JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A.V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and
Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus proceedings will
be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of
NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO. LLpr

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-

ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 before Special
Military Commission No. 1, and also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case
No. MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by
respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been
issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied
by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search
was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on August 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied
for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month
of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high
ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the
MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80-84 for Rebellion" (the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE). Judge Pao's Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was
submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus,
were examined under oath by Judge Pao, but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been
submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the
premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the
National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources
intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th, the following may be
stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the
searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a
portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August
10th, 4 the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the
premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was
present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by
the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and
TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL,
for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion.
"(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before
Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL,
praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The
Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431
documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila
Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court." 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pao to comment on the
Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the
inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the
seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against
respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned
to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the
Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently
not aware of the Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the
(1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the
Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of
respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
respondents or their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained
under the Search Warrant. prcd

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject
of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for
lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents,
represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised
cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the
quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as
follows:
 "Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to
the public, and support money from foreign or local sources."
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description
which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a
definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
"Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement."
6

"The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were
described as `subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials.' Such description hardly
provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be
lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than,
the description found in the search warrants in `Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff'
which this Court declared null and void for being too general." 7

"In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the
seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles
for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and
even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are
legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a
general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable." 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by
the applicant for Search Warrant.
"Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by
Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno, and the Court would like to know if you
affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
 (The deposition is read)
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for
search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so
many suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New
People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic
Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines . . .
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive
books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the
public and support money from foreign and local sources." 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause"
required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.
10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are
leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the
personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from
the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue, 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a
Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action
to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already
questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even
during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming
that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore,
while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the
Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE
and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not
conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a
Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is
initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding,
and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to
exclude evidence unlawfully obtained. LexLib

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the
articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered
returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a
warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
"Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search
warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of
an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a
search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be
decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application
of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent
of the place or premises which may be searched". 12 "What must be considered is the
balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime
against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable
period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that
the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion
that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for possible
introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object
to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No. 1 to return to her any all
irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent
Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made permanent, the
personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible
introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-l, pending before Special Military
Commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their
relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents
and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's
decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate
expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive
on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain
language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify. cdrep

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and
cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has held
that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of
the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of
the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in
aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA
388, 393-394).
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque's)
arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched,
even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional
proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in
the dissenting portion of his separate opinion, Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting
CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void
warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search
of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and
incident to his arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a
place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at
11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To
hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to
sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

I vote to grant the petition in toto.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued
by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio-
Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and
constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to
be used by the military. In either case his action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by
the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case
No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice
Cuevas, for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by the
provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with
Justice Cuevas' statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their
owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents." What are
subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion of law, not
of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent
to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. Thus copies of
Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also
seized from a physician who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything
to the petitioners.
LLpr

CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search Warrant
No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. It does not
specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized
thereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate
that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, must be particularly
described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution).
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the
basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with
an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense."
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under
the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and
circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless
search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be
seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense." Hence
"An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime
or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping
or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . ." (In Re Moreno vs.
Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169).
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the
place where the suspect was arrested. cdphil

"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person

lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other
things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. U.S.
267 US 122, 158. . . . But the right does not extend to other places. Frank
Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest
was made. When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended and the
defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot be
 sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199."
(Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 30).
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception
to the general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to
the arrest.
"The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident
to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is
said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the
arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an
arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search
is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL." (Papani vs.
U.S., 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall
St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6, 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after
the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as
respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-
ROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place
from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record, But what
appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest
and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore,
that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a
lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A
VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of
the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are
therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the
things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and properties the
possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot be returned to their owners
notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984)
citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized by the
government agents which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the law can and
must be retained by the government.
||| (Nolasco v. Pao, G.R. No. L-69803, [October 8, 1985], 223 PHIL 363-383)
[G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
 [G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990.]

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN.

RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO
T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT.
COL. REX D. PIAD, T/ SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD
DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

[G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA,
petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL., HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 85727. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:

DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM,
COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 86332. July 9, 1990.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

NARCISO B. NAZARENO, ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE
STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No.
85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons
named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and
are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. LexLib

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations
filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in
law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit en offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7."
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without
warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to
a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions
for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified,
and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in
court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in
order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the
Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in
the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before,
or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of
this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando
Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the
hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated
inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case
was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. cdphil

Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for
habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic
and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an
accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural,it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.
Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes
of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest
of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion,
is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
 rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled
by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is
of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continue cannot be less justified. . . ." 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the
conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
"In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains
that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29,
when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he
pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty
pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in
bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ
of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who
arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are
not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
and after a trial free from error."
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted
that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other
members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the
National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in
possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.LLpr

The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes,
a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents
about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples
Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong",
a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez,
Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato
Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission
(NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance
and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National
Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of
the search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1 ) Colt M1 6A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK 8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transceiver SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1 ) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or authority to possess
the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was
brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a
written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive
committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When
accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the
CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato
Constantino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also
admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez,
Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August
11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August
11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but
jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia",
at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of
Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988).
They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying
themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was
granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the
house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found
ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and
subversive documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of
live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a
fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation.
Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to
her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the
said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest
after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of
Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo
Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and
academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution. LLjur
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and or
members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not
controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5
As officers and/ or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified
for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of
Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly
members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of
Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried
firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13
August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military
agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their
permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce
any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their
possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for
Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1)
magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "KaTed", and Ramon Casiple
as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the
military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were
forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after
which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were
unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null
and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30
August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had
filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because
there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit. The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their
person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null
and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer
or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations
filed against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
"This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that
based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed
against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
 IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is
justified under the Rules, since she had with her an unlicensed ammunition when she was
arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence
and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a
search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course
of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents
and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya.
As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess
the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested
and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her
arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because
she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque
claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found
in their possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by
the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid
claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that
would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has
been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of
glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say,
"there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners
are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P15,000.00 on each on their heads.' " 6 On
the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement. LexLib

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

". . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave
St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's
residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the
military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads
provided by former members of the underground subversive organizations. That
raid produced positive results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the
residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment,
firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that
other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a
'stake-out' operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind
the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's arrest,
petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously
and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person
were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show.
Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constantino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come
to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the
military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went
to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?.
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect
her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with
Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity
of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from
Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under
the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering
that at the time of petitioners' arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.
 Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from
which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving
utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.".
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their
mutual aid and protection. cdll

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he
was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened
by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his
jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When
he asked for the warrant of arrest arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily
lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria
Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt,
Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same
morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said
respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General
Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police
Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty.
7

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of
the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial
warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in
that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press
Club.
"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators
to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to
give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water
and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-
 isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced
the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988." 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him,
but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at
a gathering of drivers and sympathizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at
hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na
si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na." 10 (emphasis supplied).
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of
Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of
a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas
corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we
find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained.
The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December
1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and
Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the
killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing
of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked
up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning.
Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing
of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731. cdphil

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas
corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail
filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are based
upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest
of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113,
Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the
killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in
People vs. Ancheta: 12
"The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime,
does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of
a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein."
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed
in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
"Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment." (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners' plea for the Court to re-examine and, thereafter,
abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or
an order of commitment is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14
The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past
dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present
democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights
of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is
only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities
file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective
mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom
and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon
express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears
expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is
not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of
habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process,
judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case,
but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas
corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from
the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the
due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the
Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future
cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should
be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition. LLpr

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727
(Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered
reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that
subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at
any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion
of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing
the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even
when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of
subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos
regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge
my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past
dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given
every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged
honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy
we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting against. I
submit that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Habeas
Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning certain statements made by
the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states categorically that:
"the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority
here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there made
the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope
and meaning of such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the
specific offenses which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has in effect
included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion
in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a
warrant of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting to sedition"
is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of speech 1 and that
consequently it is important constantly to distinguish between speech which is protected
by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press and speech which may
constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.
Precisely because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as
criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally
guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense"
narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R. No. 81567
(Umil, et al. v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court below for "double murder, etc." and found
guilty of the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando
Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun. llcd

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of petitioner
Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 (b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly necessary, considering that the
petitioner had already been charged in a valid information filed with the competent court,
which court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and considering further
that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of
"continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and
possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue is raised squarely and is
unavoidable.
Cortes, J., concurs.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful under the Rules
of Court, which reads:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
 while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 1
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested." 3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of
Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion the offense for which he was
supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest subversion was the logical crime with which
he should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of the slay
of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act,
because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested while in the act of shooting [them]
.. [n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a
day after the said shooting incident." 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in case of
subversion in the absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act.
"Subversion," as the term is known in law, means "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts
affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and or its successor or of any subversive association as defined in
sections two and three hereof . . ." 6 Logically, the military could not have known that
Dural, at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because he was
not performing any overt act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification"
before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the underground army. Under these
circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing subversion when he was
arrested, assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest. llcd

"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the [accused]," 7
indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was
lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in flagranti
(first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the peace officer has "personal knowledge"
that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the
act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do not think
that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and
simply, it is hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language, it may
be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and
evident. What I think we have here is purely and simply, the military taking the law in its
hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the majority
has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has accorded the
military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for
the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army" 9 is
furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is indeed a
member of the Communist Party's military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed,
and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has been
convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: "The
writ may be granted upon a judgment already final." 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its historic
office. 12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested his desire to
stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly become moot
and academic. I am not convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as
moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra
has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he
should prefer to stay in jail than go scotfree.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a public interest.
In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in view of its
far-reaching importance to the nation, I do not see how we should act differently, perhaps
even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who think and believe
differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking officers of
the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the majority, Buenaobra and Roque
are bound by their admissions. 15
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of the military. The fact that
it has not been controverted, in my view, does not justify the couple's arrest without a
warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military, this very Court has, to all
intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession
of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Aonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be contrary
to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and
that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are,
like Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the
majority's strong language (that Aonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the
majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in
judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would
have set to naught the presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy. prcd

G.R. No. 83162

With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the same
conclusion. There was no basis at the outset to say that Ocaya was probably guilty
of illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a warrantless arrest must be
predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed or having been
committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition
conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is
still possible under a supposed democracy.
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest. For the
life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in one's own home and held
moments later without a warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered in a
press conference at the National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was, however,
arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it eludes me how
an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)
of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court, Espiritu's
detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an information is an
authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an information means "an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed
with the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held the fatal shooting of Romulo
Bunye II was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only on December
28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to
Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno, under these circumstances,
could have been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the
circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The
crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as doctrines that
have lost their luster:
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a continuing
offense;
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile; 20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the fundamental rights
of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities' handling of the petitioners' cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution. Two
reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process of law. ("The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which require the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter] . .
." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions
[the existence of a state of emergency]), the President takes absolute command, for the very
life of the Nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave
peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can
only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the President
will not fail them." 23 Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a
certain extent, the exercise of emergency powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness of Garcia-
Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still
doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution. LLjur

The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed down, the
Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has significantly
whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint or
information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the time
prescribed by law . . .
 17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute
a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained
would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained
under subsisting process issued by a competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) informed of their
right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the military that
the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Aonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and that they have supposedly confessed to be in
fact members of the outlawed organization. The question that has not been answered is
whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless
arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because
as we held in one case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and
entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28

According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of the Ilagan doctrine is

not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong
in the volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based
lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . .
. and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 ) without any preliminary
investigation (examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a
warrant). As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an
information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination). 32 It forms part
and parcel of due process of law. 33
I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt and
untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a warrant and thereafter taken
into custody. The question that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid,
amid the accused's charges that the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant
under oath. We held that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded,
and the case had entered the trial stage. prcd

The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit that in that
event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of arrests and
detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at
"EDSA", and many years before it, although with much fewer of us, we valiantly
challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties
and trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored its honored
institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and
freedom. I feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen,
what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of
struggle against tyranny. cdll

It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of Philippine

law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an impression that does not
surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias
on my part forged by years of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle
for freedom and justice toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this
dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to
posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but
opinions we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
(Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 84581-82, 84583-84, 83162, 85727, 86332, [July 9,
|||

1990], 265 PHIL 325-365)

[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF

COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE; A PERSON BY CONTRACTING
MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS
EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. Indeed the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the
documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return
them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's
only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that
case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney,
Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice
or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty.
Felix, Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix,
Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional
Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7."
On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on
a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date
which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit
the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon
as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him
in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and,
therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the
same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not constitute a violation
of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case
establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court
was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually
lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 63-69)
[G.R. No. 143384. February 4, 2005.]

DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC., respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 March 2000 and its Resolution dated 22 May 2000, which reversed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 15 December 1997
2 and that of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 September 1993, 3 which both found the
dismissal from service of Dr. Ernesto I. Maquiling (Dr. Maquiling) illegal.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On 16 April 1968, petitioner Dr. Maquiling was employed by respondent Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). On 8 June 1991, Dr. Maquiling, then earning a monthly
salary of thirteen thousand nine hundred pesos (P13,900.00) was dismissed from service
as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for twenty-three (23) years. Dr.
Maquiling filed a complaint against PTS for reinstatement or, in the alternative, for
payment of full backwages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as well as moral damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). 4
The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi. After PTS failed to
appear despite having requested for several postponements, Dr. Maquiling was allowed
to present his evidence ex parte consisting of his testimony on direct examination and
documentary proof. On 31 August 1992, Dr. Maquiling moved for submission of the case
for resolution, which motion was granted. 5
The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo dated 2 April 1991 from the
PTS OIC-Executive Director Andres B. Soriano (Soriano) directing him to submit within
five (5) days from notice a written explanation on the following matters: ADaSEH

1. The delayed GSIS remittances;

2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial statement for
1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection with the Dale
Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial
statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra. 6
Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory letter dated 11 April 1991 inviting attention to
PTS Finance Manager's Report. On 15 April 1991, Dr. Maquiling had a thirty (30)
minute conversation with Soriano at the latter's instance. No further related proceedings
were undertaken before Dr. Maquiling received a letter-notice dated 8 June 1991
informing him that the PTS Executive Committee approved Soriano's findings and
recommendations calling for his dismissal effective immediately, without any retirement
benefits. 7
Despite Soriano's instruction for him not to report for work, Dr. Maquiling manifested,
through a letter to the OIC-Executive Director, his intention to continue performing his
duties as Deputy Executive Director. Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work at the
PTS daily. In the meantime, he elevated his case to the PTS Board of Directors through a
memorandum dated 28 June 1991 which sought to point out the illegality of his dismissal
from office and prayed for a resolution upholding his position. 8
On 17 July 1991, Dr. Maquiling, protesting non-payment of his salary for the period of
15 July 1991, wrote the OIC Finance Department and formally demanded the release of
his earned wages. PTS reacted through Soriano by informing Dr. Maquiling that there are
no wages forthcoming inasmuch as the latter's service had been terminated for cause
since 7 June 1991. 9
In an effort to exhaust the remedies within PTS, Dr. Maquiling wrote the President of
PTS a letter dated 5 August 1991 saying, among others: my counsels agree with me that
if your Board does not act on my 28 June 1991 Memorandum within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this letter, such omission will mean a confirmation of Soriano's notice of
my alleged termination from the service a dismissal which is referable to the proper
outside forum." 10
Receiving no response from the PTS, Dr. Maquiling stopped reporting for work at the
PTS in the last week of September 1991. Then, on 10 October 1991, Dr. Maquiling filed
his complaint with the Labor Arbiter.
After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate Dr. Maquiling to the position of Deputy
Executive Director or its equivalent in rank and pay, without loss of seniority rights
inclusive of all benefits attached to said position at the time of his dismissal, and to pay
Dr. Maquiling backwages computed from the time of his dismissal on 7 June 1991 until
his actual reinstatement but not to exceed three (3) years at the rate of thirteen thousand
nine hundred pesos (P13,900.00) per month or three hundred seventy-eight thousand
seven hundred seventy-five pesos (P378,775.00). 11 He likewise ordered PTS to pay Dr.
Maquiling five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages and one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay attorney's fees
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due the complainant.
Upon appeal by PTS to the NLRC, the Commission upheld the decision of the labor
arbiter and dismissed the appeal. 12 However, PTS appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by ordering the
dismissal of the complaint and declaring that his dismissal from employment as legal and
valid. It, however, ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling the amount of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) as damages or indemnity for violation of his right to procedural due process
and separation pay in the amount of one hundred fifty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty
pesos (P159,850.00) in the interest of social justice. 13 Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Dr. Maquiling argues that the appellate court should have applied the case of Serrano v.
NLRC 14 which was decided on 27 January 2000 since the assailed decision of the
appellate court was promulgated subsequently on 28 March 2000. He avers that PTS
must pay him full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on 7 June
1991 up to the time the decision becomes final. 15 In addition to backwages, he also prays
that he be awarded separation pay for every year of service, at the rate of one month pay
for every year of service, 16 as well as thirteenth month pay, sick leave and vacation leave
and all monetary benefits including moral damages and attorney's fees. 17 Further, Dr.
Maquiling points out that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion by changing
the rules on pleadings before the administrative body since it considered the position
paper of PTS though unverified. 18 PTS should have considered the twenty-three (23)
years of service of petitioner 19 and should not have ruled that the dismissal from service
of Dr. Maquiling was for just cause. 20 He further contends that the appellate court did
not show any degree of clarity of causal connection between Dr. Maquiling's acts and the
supposed damage to PTS. 21
Moreover, Dr. Maquiling raised in his petition that the appellate court, which agreed with
the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing are wanting, erred in adopting an abandoned doctrine by merely imposing a fine
of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) against PTS and in disregarding the present doctrine
on termination of employment and monetary benefits accorded by law to Dr. Maquiling,
and in concluding with grave abuse of discretion that the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling, who
had served PTS for twenty-three (23) years, was for just cause. 22
In its Comment 23 dated 9 October 2000, PTS contends that the dismissal of Dr.
Maquiling was based on a just cause, supported as it was by the evidence, law and
jurisprudence. The termination of Dr. Maquiling's employment was allegedly due to loss
of trust and confidence. 24 It avers that for gross mismanagement, for acts inimical to the
interest of PTS, and also for reason that PTS has lost its trust and confidence in him, PTS
terminated his services without any retirement benefit. 25
PTS, however, alleges that it complied with the two-notice rule required for termination
of employment. According to PTS, the first notice was sent by Soriano to Dr. Maquiling
by means of confidential memorandum 26 dated 2 April 1991 requiring him to explain in
writing, within five days from notice, the matters stated therein. Dr. Maquiling honored
the first notice by submitting on 11 April 1991 a written reply to Soriano. The second
notice which allegedly informed Dr. Maquiling of the decision to terminate his
employment, stating reasons therefor, was sent to him by Soriano on 8 June 1991. 27
A review of the factual milieu of the instant labor controversy and the jurisprudence on
the subject leads us to modify the assailed decision of the appellate court.
We agree with the appellate court that Dr. Maquiling was dismissed from employment
for just cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence. The records reveal that he was
Deputy Executive Director of PTS, a responsible position, at the time of his dismissal.
The following defines the extent of the power and responsibility attached to the position
he occupied:
1. Directs, supervises, coordinates, and controls the general administrative,
finance and regional operations of PTS.
2. Formulates and executes plans and policies for operations activities under his
charge.
3. Signs corresponden[ce] and other documents relative to operational activities
under his charge, within specified limits.

4. Authorizes the hiring, promotion, transfer and termination of all PTS

personnel below the supervisory level in accordance with the policies
prescribed by the Board of Directors. CaDEAT

5. Reports regularly to the Executive Director on the individual operations and

activities of departments and branches under his charge.
6. Executes and administers directives issued by the Executive Director.
7. Assists the Executive Director in the preparation of the [annual] budget and
operational plan of the Society.
8. Prepares and submits reports required by the Board of Directors, government
entities and other interested parties.
9. Performs related functions as may be assigned by the Executive Director. 28
PTS imputes the delayed GSIS remittances to Dr. Maquiling's failure to follow his duties
as prescribed by law. The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling was aware of the problem
but he failed to give priority thereto. This non-remittance was partially brought about by
a Guideline on the Releasing of Checks he issued, which placed the GSIS account as a
last priority. 29 The security of workers' compensation was undermined by his act which
patently transgressed the constitutional injunction that workers should be afforded full
protection in their employment. Subsumed in said mandate is the protection of the right
to workmen's compensation to which a lowly worker may be entitled. To rule otherwise
would frustrate the policy that the State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt
employees' compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event
of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and
medical or related benefits. 30
On the other hand, we are inclined to attribute the P7.3 million deficit in PTS' 1990
financial statements to Dr. Maquiling's failure to consider the realities of the financial
condition of the institution. Dr. Maquiling even aggravated such omission by insisting on
the salary increase of both managerial and non-managerial personnel despite the financial
conundrum that puzzles the future fiscal stability of PTS. The records show that he made
representations during the Board meeting that sufficient funds existed to meet the salary
upgrading despite the presence of financial strains. 31 Such a course of action falls short
of his responsibility to safeguard the financial stability of the institution he leads. Said
responsibility cannot be outweighed by any magnanimous motive for the institutional
existence will be rendered illusory if the very foundation of its financial stability will be
ignored. We are solicitous of the primordial goal sought to be achieved by Dr. Maquiling
but the wisdom of the timing is questionable.
The renewal of the Ultra Clean contract with the PTS for janitorial services also evinces a
bad managerial move on the part of Dr. Maquiling. By reason of the contract, PTS was
dragged into a labor controversy for illegal dismissal which eventually made it liable for
backwages and differentials to employees of Ultra Clean. 32 Worse is the renewal of the
said contract despite the unsatisfactory performance of Ultra Clean without the approval
of the Board or the Executive Committee or any subsequent request for its ratification.
The unnecessary expending of funds in the administration and operation of PTS is
evidently an act of mismanagement which could bring PTS to severe financial distress.
These acts if committed by a responsible officer wither the trust and confidence lodged in
him by his superior and may serve as a valid and sufficient basis to impose disciplinary
sanctions to an erring employee which may even result to dismissal from employment if
the gravity of the offense warrants as in the instant case.
Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of managerial from that of rank-
and-file personnel insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence
is concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence
as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in
question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will
not suffice. 33 But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for
believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his
dismissal. 34
After careful perusal of the factual backdrop of the case, we rule that Dr. Maquiling was
indeed validly dismissed for just cause. However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe
procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling.
Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee who is the
subject of an investigation for acts which may warrant his eventual dismissal from
employment. The notices required before an employee may be validly dismissed are: (a)
a written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for termination and
giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or
conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut evidence presented
against him/her; and (c) written notice of termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify termination. 35 The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of
due process in cases of employee's dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the
proposed dismissal; upon the other hand the requirement of hearing affords the employee
an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend
himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. 36
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be
conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his
dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement of the charges of
malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his employment if
the charges are proven to be true.
This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to avail all defenses and exhaust all
remedies to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at stake is his very life
and limb his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard the notice as a
warning without any disastrous consequence to be anticipated. Absent such statement, the
first notice falls short of the requirement of due process. One's work is everything, thus, it
is not too exacting to impose this strict requirement on the part of the employer before the
dismissal process be validly effected. This is in consonance with the rule that all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. 37
It is worthy to note that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all agree
in concluding that procedural due process in the instant case was not observed. As
revealed by the evidence on record, a confidential memorandum FN dated 2 April 1991
was sent to Dr. Maquiling by Soriano requiring him to explain in writing the matters
contained therein. The text of the memorandum reads as follows: cHEATI

02 April 1991
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING
Pursuant to the directive of the Board of Directors issued in its meeting on
March 25, 1991, you are hereby instructed to report and explain in writing to
this office, within five (5) days from notice hereof, on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial statement for
1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection with the Dale
Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial
statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.
 For immediate compliance.

(SGD.) ATTY. ANDRES B. SORIANO

OIC-Executive Director
On 11 April 1991, Dr. Maquiling submitted his written reply. The second notice which
informs Dr. Maquiling of the decision to terminate his employment was sent to him on 8
June 1991. It must be noted that the first notice dated 2 April 1991 is a mere instruction
to explain the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any
investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will warrant his dismissal from
service if found guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the
requirement of law that an employee must be afforded the benefit of the two-notice rule
in dismissal cases that will allow the employee to substantiate the charges specified in the
notice with full knowledge at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may result
in his dismissal or suspension from employment.
Dr. Maquiling invokes our ruling in Serrano as basis for appropriate relief. The Serrano
ruling awarded full backwages and separation pay to the employee who was dismissed
for just cause but without the observance of the procedural due process requirement.
However, in Agabon v. NLRC, 38 this Court modified the Serrano ruling and awarded
nominal damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) including holiday
pay, service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay to the petitioners in the said case.
This case clarified the criticisms and answered the questions created by the Serrano
ruling.
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for just cause but
statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the
procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the
employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of
due process. 39

Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The
indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss
now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be
in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case,
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
40

The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant
circumstances. 41 Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it
proper to fix it at thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). We believe this form of damages
would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights
of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this right
granted to employees under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. 42
It may be also argued that actual or compensatory damages may be recovered in
employment termination cases. Actual or compensatory damages are not available as a
matter of right to an employee dismissed for just cause but denied statutory due process.
The award must be based on clear factual and legal bases and correspond to such
pecuniary loss suffered by the employee as duly proven. Evidently, there is less degree of
discretion to award actual or compensatory damages. aDSHIC

In the instant case, the records fail to show that Dr. Maquiling suffered pecuniary loss by
reason of his dismissal from service. It must be noted that he was dismissed for just cause
but the procedural aspect of dismissal was not complied with. Such non-compliance did
not automatically result to any pecuniary loss. Any such loss must be proved by Dr.
Maquiling to be entitled to an award for actual damages. Besides, the two-notice rule was
not at all disregarded although it was observed defectively by PTS. Thus, actual damages
may not be awarded.
Neither will an award for moral damages nor exemplary damages prosper. The instant
controversy fails to show that the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith,
fraud, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, or that
the employer committed an act oppressive to labor to warrant an award for moral
damages. Exemplary damages may avail if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner to warrant an award for exemplary damages. Hence,
Dr. Maquiling shall only be entitled to an award for nominal damages.
On the other hand, Dr. Maquiling argues that PTS should have considered his twenty-
three (23) years of service in the institution before he was dismissed from service. Such
ratiocination is not quite convincing. The jurisprudential law 43 is not bereft of cases
which disregarded length of service of an employee for breach of trust and confidence.
Although length of service may be considered in reaching a decision in employment
termination cases, the same alone is not controlling for other considerations must be
taken into account such as the nature of the position he was holding, performance of an
employee, quality of work, character and work attitude. Worth stressing is the fact that
Dr. Maquiling is holding a managerial position being a Deputy Executive Director.
Hence, trust and confidence is an essential factor in determining his eligibility to continue
holding his position. The crucial nature of his position in PTS is exacting as to such
qualification which cannot be outweighed by any length of service he earned.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
March 2000 is hereby MODIFIED pursuant to the Agabon ruling as the latest
jurisprudential rule on the matter. For the dismissal from employment of Dr. Maquiling
with a just cause but without observing procedural due process, PTS is ORDERED to pay
Dr. Maquiling nominal damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). No
costs.aDcEIH

SO ORDERED.
(Maquiling v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society Inc., G.R. No. 143384, [February 4,
|||

2005], 491 PHIL 43-62)

[G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004.]

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS

PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND
CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH DIVISION) AND
RAMON LABO, JR., respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals, dated 07 January 1992, and the Resolution, 2 dated 29 September 1992,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated 14 June 1990, which
dismissed herein private respondent's claim for damages.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
During the time material to this case, petitioner Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the
president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which
publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in
Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was also, at that time, the
business manager of said newsweekly. Petitioner Cecille Afable (Afable) was Baguio
Midland Courier's editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column "In and
Out of Baguio."
On the other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty
candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 local elections. 3 Prior to this, in 1984,
private respondent had already embarked on a political career by running for a seat in the
former Batasang Pambansa during which time he appointed a certain Benedicto Carantes
(Carantes) as his campaign manager. It appears that as part of the campaign propaganda
for private respondent in the 1984 local elections, political ads appeared in the various
issues of Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia were printed by Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., on his behalf.
Apart from his political endeavors, private respondent was also an active member of the
civic group Lions Club having been elected governor of said organization in 1984, 1986,
and 1988.
Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series
of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio City.
Quoted hereunder are excerpts from said articles, as well as the respective dates when they
were published in the Baguio Midland Courier
January 3, 1988
. . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the most imponderables about him,
people would ask, "Can he read and write?" Why is he always talking about his
Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanese Senator or a barrio kapitan? Is it
true that he will send P18 million aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an
advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not
yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will
accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old accounts first. 4
January 10, 1988 cda

I heard that the "Dumpty in the egg" is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some
real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo, because he has not also paid
their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions he should settle
his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he
wins several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and
Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio. 5
Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afable's column were tainted
with malice, private respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel
against herein petitioners. In a resolution, dated 26 December 1988, the Department
of Justice dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of evidence 6 while the
civil suit was raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City.
In the complaint for damages, private respondent alleged that in her 03 January 1988 and
10 January 1988 columns, petitioner Afable made it appear that he (private respondent)
could not comply with his financial obligations; that Yuko Narukawa Labo (Narukawa
Labo), his co-plaintiff in the case before the trial court, was accused of misrepresenting her
social status to the general public thereby subjecting her to public ridicule; that the subject
articles were written solely for the purpose of destroying his reputation, integrity, and
personality as well as that of Ms. Narukawa Labo; and that said articles were false, untrue,
libelous, and published with evil intent. Private respondent and Ms. Narukawa Labo,
therefore, prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorney's
fees, and costs of litigation.
Prior to filing their respective answers, petitioners filed separate motions to dismiss 7 upon
the ground that there was failure to comply with Section 6 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1508,8 otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which required the
referral of certain disputes to the barangay conciliation process before they are filed in
court. Petitioner Hamada also claimed that the complaint stated no cause of action.
On 05 April 1988, private respondent and Ms. Narukawa Labo filed a motion with leave
of court to amend and admit attached amended complaint. 9 Impleaded in the amended
complaint 10 was the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., as the publisher of the
Baguio Midland Courier.
In its Order, dated 12 April 1988, 11 the trial court denied petitioners' motions to dismiss.
According to the trial court, as one of the parties to this case was a corporation, P.D. No.
1508 was not applicable as said statute pertained only to actions involving natural persons.
In the same order, the trial court granted private respondent and Ms. Narukawa Labo's
motion to admit their amended complaint and directed the petitioners to file their answers.
In their answer, 12 petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada denied that petitioner
Afable's 03 and 10 January 1988 articles were libelous. They also claimed that per their
company's records, private respondent still owed them a certain sum of money for the
political ads and campaign paraphernalia printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co.,
Inc., during private respondent's 1984 campaign, and that the 03 January 1988 column did
not accuse Ms. Narukawa Labo of misrepresenting herself before the public. Moreover,
they asserted that petitioner Afable's write-ups were fair comments on facts and reports
that were of public interest as private respondent was a mayoralty candidate at that time.
Finally, petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada interposed counterclaims for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
In her answer, 13 petitioner Afable also denied that the quoted portions of her 03 and 10
January 1988 column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of malice and "at most
contained valid and timely doubts." 14 She also contended that the contents of her column
were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press and
that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. Petitioner Afable likewise
sought counterclaims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
During the pre-trial of the case on 31 March 1989, the parties agreed to limit the issues to
the following: (1) whether the published items were libelous, false and malicious; (2)
whether plaintiffs below were entitled to damages; and (3) whether petitioners (defendants
therein) were entitled to damages as claimed in their respective counterclaims.
On 17 July 1989, private respondent's counsel manifested before the trial court that Ms.
Narukawa Labo would no longer testify in support of the allegations in the amended
complaint as far as they pertain to her. 15 In addition, the 03 January 1988 article was no
longer offered in evidence by the private respondent's counsel thus, the trial court
interpreted this development to mean that the same ceased to be a part of this suit. The
court a quo thereafter proceeded with the trial of the case taking into consideration only
the 10 January 1988 column.
In the trial that ensued, private respondent testified that he felt that the phrase "dumpty in
the egg" referred to him, interpreting the same to mean someone who is a failure in his
business undertakings. 16 Private respondent asserted that such allegation was baseless as
he was successful in his various endeavors abroad. With regard to the remainder of the
article, private respondent insisted that petitioner Afable made it appear to the public that
he owed P27,000 in unpaid medical expenses while in truth, he could not remember having
been hospitalized. 17
Subsequently, private respondent presented Dr. Pedro Rovillos, his fellow Lions Club
member, who testified that he understood the term "dumpty in the egg" to mean "a zero or
a big lie." 18 He further testified that the 10 January 1988 article painted private respondent
as a "balasubas" 19 due to the latter's alleged failure to pay his medical expenses.
On the other hand, the petitioners presented Ms. Sylvia Lambino (Lambino), Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc.'s, bookkeeper and accountant, as their first witness.
According to Lambino, Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., sent several statements
of accounts and demand letters to private respondent pertaining to his unpaid obligations
amounting to P27,415 which he incurred during his campaign for the Batasang Pambansa
in 1984. 20 She further testified that despite the repeated demands to private respondent,
the aforementioned obligations remained unpaid. 21
Thereafter, petitioner Hamada himself took the witness stand. In his testimony, petitioner
Hamada stated that as the president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and
Publishing Co., Inc., and as the business manager of the Baguio Midland Courier, he only
dealt with the business and advertising aspects of their newspaper business and that the
contents of the articles appearing in the pages of the Baguio Midland Courier were
overseen by the rest of the staff. 22 In addition, petitioner Hamada also corroborated the
earlier testimony of Lambino with respect to the outstanding obligations of private
respondent. DaTICc

On 20 December 1989, Carantes took the witness stand for the petitioners. Carantes
testified that he was appointed as private respondent's campaign manager when the latter
ran for assemblyman in Batasang Pambansa in 1984 and that in his capacity as campaign
manager, 23 he hired the services of a certain Noli Balatero to oversee the printing of
campaign paraphernalia and publication of political advertisements of private respondent.
24 Carantes further testified that the P27,415 indebtedness to Baguio Printing and
Publishing Co., Inc., had remained unpaid because the campaign funds private respondent
entrusted to him were already fully exhausted. Besides, according to Carantes, the
campaign materials printed by the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., and political
advertisements published in Baguio Midland Courier were no longer covered by the
agreement he had with Balatero. However, these materials were printed and published upon
the instructions of one Atty. Conrado Bueno who acted as private respondent's "unofficial
campaign manager" during the said election. Carantes thus concluded that private
respondent was supposed to pay for these campaign materials and advertisements before
or after the 1984 election.
For her part, petitioner Afable acknowledged having written the 10 January 1988 article
but denied that the same was malicious and intended to destroy private respondent's
reputation and integrity; that the phrase "dumpty in the egg" referred to Horato Aquino
who was among the candidates for the 1988 local elections in Baguio City; and that the
P27,000 pertained to private respondent's unpaid obligation to Baguio Printing and
Publishing Co., Inc., the exact amount of which was P27,415.
In its decision, dated 14 June 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
According to the trial court, the article in question was privileged and constituted fair
comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation, and honesty
of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective office at that time.
This decision of the trial court was, however, reversed by the appellate court in a decision,
dated 07 January 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Construed in the light of the facts and the principles on the matter, and under the
plain language of the applicable law, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to
prove by preponderance of evidence that the defendants were GUILTY of
committing libel on the person of the complainant Ramon Labo, Jr. and should
be liable to pay damages. The decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs as
follows:
1) The amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
2) The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) The amount of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees plus costs of litigation. 25
In brushing aside the conclusion reached by the trial court, the Court of Appeals noted that
private respondent was, at the time the article in question was published, not a public
official but a private citizen seeking an elective office and petitioner Afable's article was
intended to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation and to make him appear in the eyes
of the public as unfit for public office.
The appellate court also declared that the malicious nature of the article may be deduced
from the fact that it was published in the Baguio Midland Courier a few days before the
scheduled local elections and from the style and tone of writing employed by petitioner
Afable. According to the Court of Appeals, while the entire article was composed of ten
paragraphs and referred to several unnamed personalities, it was only in the disputed
paragraph where a specific individual was named herein private respondent. The
appellate court therefore concluded that the phrase "dumpty in the egg" could only refer to
private respondent and the claimed P27,000 indebtedness is imputable solely to him.
Petitioners thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration 26 of the
aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals but these were denied through a resolution
27 of the appellate court, dated 29 September 1992. Thus, petitioners now come before us
raising the following issues:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT "THERE IS GOOD REASON AND REASONABLE
GROUND TO ASSUME THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE LIBELOUS
ARTICLES WAS A MANIFESTATION OF THE SPOUSES' (DEFENDANTS
OSEO HAMADA and CECILLE AFABLE) THINKING ON THE MERIT OR
DEMERIT OF CANDIDATES FOR BAGUIO CITY MAYOR FOR THE
JANUARY 18, 1988 ELECTIONS" SINCE THEY ARE NOT SPOUSES NOR
RELATED TO ONE ANOTHER.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT RAMON LABO, JR. WAS
THE ONE REFERRED TO AS THE DUMPTY IN THE EGG."
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PORTION OF THE SUBJECT ARTICLE WHICH
STATES THAT "SINCE HE IS DONATING MILLIONS HE SHOULD
SETTLE HIS SMALL DEBTS LIKE THE REPORTEDLY INSIGNIFICANT
AMOUNT OF P27,000.00" REFERS TO AN INDEBTEDNESS OF LABO TO
THE REAL DOCTORS AND NOT TO THE BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER.
TaCDAH

IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS MALICE WHEN THE DEFENDANT-
APPELL(ANT) CECILLE AFABLE INVITED PUBLIC ATTENTION ON
LABO'S PRIVATE LIFE BEING A CANDIDATE FOR THE HIGHEST
PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE CITY OF BAGUIO OR THAT THE DEFENDANTS
"WERE ACTUALLY NOT MOTIVATED BY GOOD AND JUSTIFIABLE
ENDS" IN PUBLISHING SAID ARTICLES ABOUT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF MERIT. 28
In a manifestation dated 10 November 1993, we were informed of the death of petitioner
Hamada. In our resolution of 08 December 1993, we resolved to substitute the estate of
Oseo C. Hamada, for the deceased petitioner Hamada. 29
 The Court's Ruling
We shall first address the contention of petitioners with regard to alleged errors of facts
committed by the Court of Appeals. While we adhere to the principle that findings of fact
of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon us, 30 such adherence has not
prevented this Court from setting aside the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when
circumstances so warrant. In the recent case of The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals and Sun Brothers & Company, 31 this Court had the occasion to
enumerate the exceptions to the general rule as regards the conclusiveness of the findings
of fact of the appellate court, to wit: "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion." 32
In the case at bar, except for numbers (1), (6), (9), and (10), all of the above exceptions are
present.
First. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondent was the only
candidate named in petitioner Afable's column on 10 January 1988, said article actually
dealt with the other named candidates for the 1988 local elections in Baguio City and
Benguet. A perusal of said article would likewise reveal that it contained not only the
opinion of petitioner Afable regarding private respondent but also her take on the other
issues involving the other candidates. It would be grave error to impute malice on the
subject article based upon a finding that private respondent was unduly singled out by
petitioner Afable in her column. In this regard, we dismiss the following conclusion of the
appellate court:
. . . Malice may also be inferred from the style and tone of the publication. The
entire column on "In and Out of Baguio" on January 10 was composed of ten
paragraphs and each paragraph featured or referred to a single person without
knowing the person; however, in the second paragraph which mentions the non-
payment of P27,000.00, the complainant [private respondent herein] was
specifically mentioned in name; hence, no amount of reasoning would erase the
fact that the dumpty in the egg was referring to Labo. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
Second. From the abovequoted portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling, it is daylight clear
that the appellate court assumed that since the name of private respondent and the phrase
"dumpty in the egg" appeared in the same paragraph, the epithet referred only to the former.
We cannot, however, subscribe to such simplistic deduction. A perusal of the paragraph in
question easily reveals that the person alluded to by petitioner Afable in her use of "dumpty
in the egg" was someone who was campaigning for a certain Atty. Reynaldo Cortes one
of the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City at that time. If, indeed, "dumpty in the egg"
referred to private respondent, it follows that he campaigned for his own opponent during
the 1988 local elections. Although such gracious attitude on the part of private respondent
towards his political opponent would have been commendable, nevertheless, the same is
totally contrary to human experience. On this score, we uphold the following argument of
petitioners:

Clearly, the private respondent was hallucinating when he claims himself as the
person referred to as the "Dumpty in the egg." Otherwise, he would be the one
making a mockery out of himself for campaigning against himself and in favor of
his political opponent. Had he done that, it is doubtful whether he could have won
as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections, which he actually did. 34
Third. In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise highlighted the fact that
petitioners Hamada and Afable were husband and wife and went on to conclude, albeit
erroneously, that "(t)here is good reason and reasonable ground to assume that the
publication of the libelous article was a manifestation of the spouses' thinking on the merit
or demerit of candidates for Baguio City mayor for the 18 January 1988 elections." 35
Again, we disagree in this conclusion of the appellate court. The records of this case clearly
establish the fact that petitioners Hamada and Afable were siblings and not spouses in that
during his testimony on 19 December 1989, petitioner Hamada referred to petitioner Afable
as his sister. 36 The Court of Appeals' supposition, therefore, that the article subject of this
petition reflected the stance of the "husband and wife team" of the petitioners utterly lacks
factual support. CcTHaD

Having addressed the factual issues of this case, we shall now proceed to discuss its
substantive question of whether the 10 January 1988 article of petitioner Afable was
defamatory.
It is a basic precept that in cases involving claims for damages arising out of alleged
defamatory articles, it is essential that the alleged victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. 37 It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent
or if the publication contains matters of descriptions or reference to facts and circumstances
from which others reading the article may know the plaintiff was intended, or if extraneous
circumstances point to him such that persons knowing him could and did understand that
he was the person referred to. 38
In the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 39 this Court declared that "[i]t is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed,
but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication." 40 Plainly, private respondent has the bounden duty to present before
the court evidence that a third person could easily identify him as the person libeled. In this
case, private respondent has utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.
To be sure, private respondent's lone witness, Dr. Rovillos, was able to offer his own
understanding of what the phrase "dumpty in the egg" meant. 41 However, during his cross-
examination, he failed to sufficiently explain before the court a quo how he arrived at the
conclusion that the term referred to private respondent, thus:
Q Now, you said you read this first sentence that says: "I heard that the Dumpty
in the egg is campaigning for Cortes." Then you gave us what you thought
was the meaning of "Dumpty in the egg." You did not tell us, however,
whether you thought that was Ramon Labo or somebody else. Could you
tell us, Doctor, when you heard that, you understood that to be Ramon
Labo?
A That is what I understand.
Q You understood that to be Ramon Labo because a dumpty in the egg means a
big zero. Why? You consider Labo a big zero that is why you understood
him to be referred to when Cecille C. Afable said "dumpty in the egg?"
A That is what I understand.
Q You also said a "dumpty in the egg" is a big lie. You consider Ramon Labo a
big lie that you also thought he was referred to as "dumpty in the egg?"
A No, sir.
Q In fact, Ramon Labo, in your assessment, is the exact opposite of a dumpty [in]
the egg?
A That I cannot answer.
A So, from your honest perception, some this this Labo (sic) is a big zero or a
big lie that is why you cannot say he is the exact opposite?
A Maybe. 42
This Court finds Dr. Rovillos's proposition as to what "dumpty in the egg" meant is
insufficient to support any finding of liability on the part of the petitioners as he was unable
to offer an iota of justification for his conclusion that it pertained to private respondent.
The Court of Appeals also maintained that petitioners could not invoke "public interest" in
their defense. It ruled that "[a]n abuse of the freedom of speech and the press should not be
tolerated and encouraged if the article published transcends the limit of decent, fair and
impartial news reporting and instead becomes a bludgeon or a scalpel to brow beat or slice
into shreds a private citizen, of his rights to his good name." 43
We do not agree.
Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January
1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from the
mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution.
Indeed, as early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano, 44 this Court had recognized
the public's right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates
for public office.
Subsequently, in the leading case of New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 45 the US Supreme
Court expounded on this principle, viz:
. . . It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character
and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state
and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so
great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons
whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of
individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be
great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to
private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged. HcaDTE

xxx xxx xxx

In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any
one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or
go remediless. The privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes
matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office. 46
Plainly, the rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment
being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based
upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. 47 The principle, therefore, does
not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy the persons of candidates for
public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general
public with publications tainted with express or actual malice. In the latter case, the remedy
of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the author's
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. While
the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, 48
nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption. The
burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein.
49

In the present case, private respondent was unable to prove that petitioner Afable's column
was tainted with actual malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence that, indeed,
private respondent incurred an obligation which had remained unpaid until the time the
questioned article was published. While counsel for private respondent persistently harped
at the difference between the P27,000 which appeared in petitioner Afable's column and
the P27,415 actual indebtedness of private respondent to Baguio Printing and Publishing
Co., Inc., the minuscule difference in the amount fails to establish reckless disregard for
truth on the part of petitioners. As held by this Court in the Borjal case
 Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy
or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with
good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.
There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment.
Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and
effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. 50
Lastly, we hold that petitioner Afable's article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of
public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for the
top elective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private respondent assured
his would be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, petitioner
Afable's column with respect to private respondent's indebtedness provided the public with
information as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst
to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the
electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the
application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but
public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
07 January 1992, and its Resolution, dated 29 September 1992, denying reconsideration
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the trial court's Decision of 14 June 1990 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
(Baguio Midland Courier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107566, [November 25, 2004],
|||

486 PHIL 223-244)

[G.R. No. L-12592. March 8, 1918.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS

ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Kincaid & Perkins for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS;

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORY. Freedom of speech as cherished
in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. It
was among the reforms sine quibus non insisted upon by the Filipino People.
The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its bill of
rights, zealously guarded these basic rights. A reform so sacred to the people
of these Islands and won at so dear a cost should now be protected and
carried forward.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Constitution of the United States and the
State constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and
the right of assembly and petition. Beginning with the President's Instructions
to the Commission of April 7, 1900, these gruaranties were made effective in
the Philippines. They are now part and parcel of the Organic Law of the
Constitution of the Philippines Islands.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. These paragraphs
in the Philippine Bill of Rights carry with them all the applicable English and
American jurisprudence.
4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The interests of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary for
free speech. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their
officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a
despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
6. ID.; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The
right to assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means
a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply
without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the Government
for a redness of grievances.
7. ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND
PETITION; PRIVILEGE. The doctrine of privileged communications rests
upon public policy, "which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, through, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer." (Abboth vs. National
Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. Qualified privilege which
may be lost by proof of malice. "A communication made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs.
Rush, 5 E. & B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E.
C. L., 344.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Even when the statements are found to be false,
if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by
the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if
a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake
as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error
would not take the case out of the privilege.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MALICE. In the usual libel case, malice can be
presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. the
onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. A privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications.
12. ID.; ID.; ID. Previous decisions of this court concerning libel
reviewed and distinguished.
13. ID.; ID.; ID. A petition, prepared and signed at an assembly of
numerous citizens including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of
the peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was
presented through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive
Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The
judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-
General that the justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of
first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice
of the peace of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the
petitioners, now become the defendants, charging that portions of the petition
presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court found
thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a
nominal fine. On a review of the evidence, we find that express malice was
not proved by the prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the
petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the
petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper
functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for
an hones endeavor to improve the public service, they should rather be
commended for their good citizenship.
 DECISION

MALCOLM, J : p

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the

defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of
the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal
also submits the larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should take
in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic
prerogatives of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition.
For a better understanding, the facts in the present appeal are first narrated in
the order of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the
rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally,
judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the
Province of Pampanga assembled, the prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking
for his removal. Crossfield & O'Brien submitted this petition and these
affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted
by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently owners (now
the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the formation as
libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace
were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano
de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would
draw up the complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she
paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her
two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which
was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the
peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the
peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount,
Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he
had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in
order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against
four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house,
where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was
thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first
instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper
action and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the
charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and
counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable
Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby,
recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from
his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in it is ordered that the
proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of
first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were
introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and is councilors
of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim
of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace,
had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance
ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him of
the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-
General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants,
was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:

"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the

municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P.I., the said accused, voluntarily,
illegally, and criminality and with malicious intent to prejudice and
defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote,
signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
following:
" 'That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of
this town of Macabebe, an account of the conduct observed by him
heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is
found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfit, eminently
immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy of
the office.
 " 'That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear
and positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating
which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less
serious, but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake
of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of your Honor
and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
" 'That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the
peace of this town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights
and interest solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Right, and
justice in this town will not be administered in accordance with law.
" 'Than on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of
his bad conduct as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some
respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present
an administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before
the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made
against him various charges which were true and certain and of different
characters.
" 'That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice
of the peace, far from changing his bad and despicable conduct, which
has roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently
performed the acts above-mentioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith
attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his mistaken
valor and heroism.'
"All of this has been written and published by the accused with
the deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor and reputation of
the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to
law."
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition
mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits
upon which based and the concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary,
through the office of Crossfield & O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the
exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel
Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-
second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the
handing down of the decision, filed on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new
trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by
then counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the
entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed
making the following assignments of error:
"1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted
defendants for a new trial.
"2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire
the objection inadvertently interposed by their counsel to the admission
in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation
in this case arose.
"3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution
to the introducing in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon
which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
"4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous
statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
"5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the
burden was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous
statements were true and free from malice.
"6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
"7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants,
except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings,
administrative and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter of fact
counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to
the admission of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the
signatures were not identified and that the same was immaterial, which
objection was partially sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this
curious situation by reason of which the attorney for the defense attempted to
destroy through his objection the very foundation for the justification of his
clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not
indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated:
The administrative proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the
information, the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution
cannot be understood without knowledge of interior action. Nothing more
unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by
themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all
knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the accused.
The records in question are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground
that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of
the administrative proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should
have been had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
"a case may be reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial,"
or because of the right of this court to call in such records as are sufficiently
incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the
case, or finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial proceedings
supplemental to the basis action, we examine the record as because us,
containing not alone the trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial
giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can not complain for it was the
prosecution which tried to incorporated Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain
principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in
seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine
Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain
misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their
proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set
down the freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was
consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos"
(The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms
sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said:
"The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must
begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting
Filipino delegates."
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad"
and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people
demanded." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution,
the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously
guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition
that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear as
one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Net comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The
Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the
right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition.
We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna
Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the Second Philippine
Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
 The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for
the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar
to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the American
people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the proposition never to
be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel
of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippines Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not
threadbare verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs.
U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And
what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included
are the following:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too
thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can
the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism
does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than
the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising
superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government
public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See
the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L.R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour
vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the
hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to
assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official.
On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to
assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act
of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to
inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak
of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free
government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App.
Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public
policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'" (Abbott vs.
National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima
facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by
Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.],
846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or
conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having
some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be
false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge
is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a
self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and
of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is
social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believe he is acting
in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not
defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom
the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out
of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845],
3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See white vs.
Nicholls [1845], How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163;
Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. L., 72; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability,
vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc.
pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to
the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition,
having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be
construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this
case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might
also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of
the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him
in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have
present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the
press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and
thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which
were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him
of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner
of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And
finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable
attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this
connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by
the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General
upon the recommendation of a judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-
General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the
Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in
such matters. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in
connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of
Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject
to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was
privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established
in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of
public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and
not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs.
Sedano [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U.
S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on
the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio
Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos
case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present
instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less
jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements,
with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to
persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point
to which we invite special attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31
Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
 We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in
our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to
improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de
officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.
I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-
General is entirely correct when he says that this case is substantially
identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13 Phil.
Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is
sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that the doctrine of the
prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been abandoned
by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the more efficient
administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so many words.
(Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras
[1912], 23 Phi. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalva [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and
U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)

1
2

||| (U.S. v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, [March 8, 1918], 37 PHIL 731-746)
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. June 14, 2011.]

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF

THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO
GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.
 [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. June 14, 2011.]

RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT

COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57
PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN,
MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS
CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE
SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND
MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO
COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE "TRIAL OF
THE DECADE" TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL
AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION

[A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.]

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE

LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO
MASSACRE TRIAL

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J : p

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media

practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted
as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent
history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre"
spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against
197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-
10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan,
Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are
being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists
of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc.,
relatives of the victims, 1 individual journalists 2 from various media entities, and
members of the academe 3 filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices
(e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast
coverage and the use of devices. 4 The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-
5-SC.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines 5 (NPC) and Alyansa
ng Filipinong Mamamahayag 6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition
praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to
focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases
and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient
number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television
monitors outside the court. 7 The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 8 addressed to
Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who have petitioned [this
Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed
"earnest hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such
a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and
humaneness, such a petition merits." 9 The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-
11-7-SC. AHCaES

By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, 10 the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-
7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.

Meanwhile, various groups 11 also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and
statements bearing on these matters.

The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a
Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No.
10-11-7-SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and
NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011.
Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio
coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling
in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's
Libel Case 12 and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada
13 which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand
when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted
intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being
frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that
under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of
media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for
each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January
12, 2010 letter 14 to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over
media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-
Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be brought to
the Court's attention through appropriate motion." 15 Hence, the present petitions which
assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and
public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances,
right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be
issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a live
broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be
enumerated shortly. IaEASH

Putt's Law 16 states that "technology is dominated by two types of people: those
who understand what they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not
understand." Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the
experts' gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or
risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced
with the same task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet
certainly complementary rights.
The indication of "serious risks" posed by live media coverage to the accused's
right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and
Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public
information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now,
inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in
the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by
safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not
compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and
allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial
proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a
workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the
same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous
cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm "[a] trial of any kind or in any
court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a
means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
 pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our
judicial proceedings are formulated." The observation that "[m]assive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the
constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum" stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well
as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that
the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served
and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes
shall be limited and restricted as above indicated. 17 SHTaID

The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that
"[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other
hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial." The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances
but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and
apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of
September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual
recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:
. . . (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof
as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119,
21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be
regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the
audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall
 be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as
may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before
the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the
former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions
are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and
shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof
shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. 19
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas 20 which Aquino and Estrada heavily
cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the
possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily
schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of
evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of
the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence 21 and statistical figures revealing that
as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia, allow television coverage with
varying degrees of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of
United Kingdom's Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast. 22 The
International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.
23

On the media coverage's influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out
thatAquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained
conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly
supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the
particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the
right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr. 24 and Estrada v. Desierto, 25 that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is
not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. caSDCA

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of
an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As
pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue,
for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the
judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier
cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private
complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On
public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings. 26 (underscoring supplied) IaHAcT

Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may
observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the
proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot
be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much
interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the
impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the
prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number
of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward
addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made
both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television
broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting
that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and
that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry
out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the
guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until
promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be
allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the
trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court.
No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or
downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or
employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or
beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the
equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones
and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be
unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall
coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and
equipment. ISAcHD

(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the
media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance
shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and
the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera
equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media
entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome
snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or
egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical
glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media
entities' facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either
via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from
one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed
or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual
recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous
and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court 27 applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion,
prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there
are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security
 of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of
corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of
the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no
commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the day's proceedings
are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going
proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except
brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them
at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice
rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the
finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes,
which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt
power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and
the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law. TSADaI

(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the
grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design
and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and
administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of
the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines.
The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein
requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in
the field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court
(i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and
allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed
in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in
distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable
context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof
 that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance
of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of
the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines
herein outlined.
SO ORDERED.
(In re Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC, 10-11-7-SC (Resolution), [June 14,
|||

2011], 667 PHIL 128-143)

[A.M. No. 1120-MJ. May 5, 1976.]

DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE

RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent Municipal Judge was administratively charged with abuse of authority in

refusing to allow the employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order situation of the municipality. In his answer, respondent
claimed that he merely imposed restrictions on the matter of examination, inspection, or
copying of his court records for fear that the right might be abused and the dirty hands of
partisan politics might again be at play.
During the preliminary hearing of the case,. the Municipality Mayor moved to dismiss the
complaint to preserve the harmony and cooperation among the officials of the municipality
but the inquest Judge denied the motion. After the formal investigation, the investigating
Judge recommended respondent's exoneration.
The Supreme Court finding respondent to have acted properly, exonerated him.
Complaint dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC OFFICE; PUBLIC RECORDS; ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS. In a

democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance, hence, the people's right of free access to public records is predicated on their
right to acquire information on matters of public concern.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS AVAILABLE TO COMPEL PUBLIC OFFICERS TO
ALLOW INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS IN THEIR CUSTODY. Mandamus
would lie to compel a public official to allow an interested party access to the records in
his custody. Thus, predicating the right to examine public records on statutory provisions
and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated
that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to determine the manner in which persons
desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such
power does not carry with it the authority to prohibit.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESS FREEDOM; ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS PART OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. Public's right of access to
public records is not merely predicated on statutory right but on the constitutional right of
the press to have access to information as the essence of press freedom (Concurring opinion
of Justice Briones in Sabido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS, NOW A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT; PHILOSOPHY THEREFOR. The New Constitution now expressly recognizes
that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are
expressly granted to access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation
of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access
to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow
of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCESS RESTRICTIONS PERMISSIBLE. Restriction on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to
control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending
danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J : p

In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,

Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with
abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to
refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public
documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other
persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection
of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person
requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or
fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
In his Answer, the respondent significantly observed:
"Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the
right. For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play. Some
of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the declaration of Martial Law
and years after the election still bore the stigma of partisan politics as shown in
the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
"Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth mentioning,
that the padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting
papers and matchsticks.
"Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited-exercise of
the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal.
Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. The
undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community
and the preservation of our democratic principles.
"Be that as it may, a request of this magnitude cannot be immediately granted
without adequate deliberation and upon advisement, especially so in this case
where the undersigned doubts the propriety of such request. Hence, it is believed
that authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court, through the
Executive Judge, for the formulation of guidelines and policies on this matter."
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and
report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caiza
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among
officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but
after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent. Pertinent
portion of his report reads as follows: LLphil

". . . When this case was heard, complainant Dominador Baldoza informed the
Court that he is aware of the motion to dismiss filed by Mayor Corazon A. Caiza
and that he is in conformity with the dismissal of the administrative charge against
Judge Rodolfo Dimaano, The Court asked him if he could prove his case and he
said he can. So, the Court denied his oral motion to dismiss and required him to
present his evidence. Complainant only manifested to the Court that he has no
oral evidence. The only evidence he has are the exchanged communication which
 were all in writing and attached to the record between him and the respondent.
The Court asked the respondent what he has to say on the documentary evidence
of the complainant. He manifested that all his answers to the complaint are all
embodied in his answers filed with the Court.
"A careful perusal, scrutiny, and study of the communications between the
complainant and the respondent, together with the answers filed by the latter,
reveal that there is no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the respondent.
The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
the respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.
Complainant admitted that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by
the respondent when he went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose
mentioned in his communication. He also agreed that he is amenable to such rules
and conditions which the respondent may impose. Under these conditions,
therefore, the Court finds that the respondent has not committed any abuse of
authority.
"The complainant was warned to be more cautious in filing any administrative
charge against any public official especially, members of the judiciary,
considering that an administrative charge against a member of the judiciary may
expose the latter to public ridicule and scandal thereby minimizing if not
eradicating public trust and confidence."
After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the respondent did not act
arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under certain conditions and
under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated
on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly
in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, 1 this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the
Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office.
Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree
by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of
Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect,
examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not
carry with it authority to prohibit. Citing with approval People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T.
Co. vs. Railly, 2 this Court said:

"The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, to his (register of deeds')

discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the office are required to be
preserved for the accommodation of these persons. It is not his duty to permit the
office to be thronged needlessly with persons examining its books of papers, but
it is his duty to regulate, govern, and control his office in such a manner as to
permit the statutory advantages to be enjoyed-by other persons not employed by
 him as largely and extensibly as that consistently can be done . . . What the law
expects and requires from him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial
judgment, by which all persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and
conducting themselves in an orderly manner, shall be secured their lawful rights
and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in which the relator
has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches,
abstracts, or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.'
"Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful,
or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects
of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that
the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records,
it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called
upon to devise a remedy. As to the moral or material injury which the publication
might inflict on other parties, that is the publisher's responsibility and lookout.
The publication is made subject to the consequences of the law." LexLib

The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on statutory grounds
merely but on the constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the
essence of press freedom. 3
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information
on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as
well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations
imposed by law. 4 The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-
making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both
its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases." 5 However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by
law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted
upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order. 6
WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
||| (Baldoza v. Dimaano, A.M. No. 1120-MJ (Resolution), [May 5, 1976], 163 PHIL 15-21)
[G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989.]
 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION TO GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING. While the Constitution and the Labor Code are
silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. Government
employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within
the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ARE PART
THEREOF AND COVERED BY MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. SSS
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes.
4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180; ALLOWS
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY LAW.
E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, allows negotiation where the terms and conditions of
employment involved are not among those fixed by law.
5. ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT
ARE GOVERNED BY LAW; EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE
CHANGES. Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise
of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
6. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; STRIKES; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO
RESTRAIN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE STAGED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES; REASONS. An injunction may be issued to restrain it. It is futile for
the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself
provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly,
E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN
INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN SAID STRIKE; REASON. The Public Sector Labor-
Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that
has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT PROPER
WHERE COURT CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF IMPRUDENCE OR
OVERZEALOUSNESS AS IT PROCEEDED WITH CAUTION. The lower Court
cannot be accused of imprudence or zealousness, for after issuing a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service,
the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.
9. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; WHEN REMEDY OF PETITIONER.
Petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the
execution of the order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board if it has already become
final.

DECISION

CORTES, J : p

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can
enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and
order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not
employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that
the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and
that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00,
and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and
allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-24].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the
meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-
222]. On July 22, 1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83-86]. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94],
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated
October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9, 1988 promulgated its decision on the
referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals'
decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29, 1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to
recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial
of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-143]. Hence, the instant petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6, 1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of
strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and
to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply
filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the
National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees
of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor
Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed
by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are
government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the
Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from
continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred is finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the strike are as
follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS
and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to
work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim.
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that
the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees,
including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly
confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it
provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically,
the Bill of Rights also provides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding
the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[t]he
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we
proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they
also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about
organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will
remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form
associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done because
the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act
875, workers, including those from the government-owned and controlled, are
allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice-President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we
approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee
on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow anybody in the
government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed
Forces will go on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us?
So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I
repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.
[Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the
Labor Code (PAD. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to
be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose
of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does
not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That
this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions
and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the
right of employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code
to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations
for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in
1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of
all government employees, including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now
Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government
employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil
Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government
employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for
the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is
provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes
in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior
to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees . . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service."
The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating
the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it furnishes
the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government
employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the
Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor
Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly
given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the
terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position
paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the
Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated
that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of
all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests
 as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in
National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134
SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the
rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not
among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof,
except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between
duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement
of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and
cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved
after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures,
the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-
Management] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided
under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being
prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The
Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276].
More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with
jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16].
Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the
SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law
authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since
it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute,
resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the
strike is appropriate.
LibLex

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it
had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated
in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld
bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a
writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its
agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their
supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated
May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively
suspended and who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative
cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe
benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that
petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the
execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court
dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners'
"Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,
1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 (Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279,
|||

[July 28, 1989], 256 PHIL 1079-1091)