Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 35

p-REES 2: Module 2-B

Advanced Train Operations PTC and CBTC

p-REES 2: Module 2-B Advanced Train Operations PTC and CBTC © APTA and AREMA - 2015

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

Train Control Basic Objectives

B A
B
A

Efficiently transport passengers / freight from point A to point B enforcing :

Safety (Safety management)

Train schedules (Traffic management)

whatever the conditions:

Traffic density

Perturbations and failures

management) whatever the conditions: ∙ Traffic density ∙ Perturbations and failures © APTA and AREMA -

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

management) whatever the conditions: ∙ Traffic density ∙ Perturbations and failures © APTA and AREMA -

2

Why is there a need for train control

Environmental conditions, the mass of the train, and increasing speeds make it more and more difficult to operate safely without the assistance of technology.

to operate safely without the assistance of technology. Braking distance: • If a car can stop

Braking distance:

If a car can stop in

75m (dry weather) at

90kph,

a high speed train like the ALSTOM TGV will

take 3200m at

300kph…

weather) at 90kph, • a high speed train like the ALSTOM TGV will take 3200m at

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

3

Train Control Signaling

Signaling is fail-safe:

A fail-safe device is one that, in the event of failure, responds in a way that will cause no harm to other devices or danger to personnel”

Safety is ensured but there is a compromise between:

System “fail-safe” capability

Operating procedures (especially in case of signaling override and manual operation)

Safety measures are usually detrimental to traffic

performances, and must be balanced against system reliability

and availability.

to traffic performances, and must be balanced against system reliability and availability. © APTA and AREMA

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

4

Why Communications Based Train Control (CBTC)

and Positive Train Control (PTC)?

Traditional systems in North America have been based on block signaling systems designed 30 - 100 years ago

Technology for ETCS (European Train Control System functionally similar to PTC) has been available since the 1990’s in Europe

CBTC Technology was first deployed in Asia in the early 2000’s

CBTC and PTC systems can offer improvements over block signaling:

Equivalent or better safety

Improved performance

Increased reliability

or better safety Improved performance Increased reliability Higher system throughput & capacity Improved schedule

Higher system throughput & capacity

Improved schedule adherence & reduced variability in system performance

& capacity Improved schedule adherence & reduced variability in system performance © APTA and AREMA -

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

5

Line capacity and Safe Braking Distance

Line capacity is the maximum number of trains that can be transported on a line past a fixed point during a set time period.

A signaling system influences capacity by regulating

Dwell time in stations

Minimum train separation required for safety

The minimum train separation is dictated by the safe braking distance of a train

e.g. the distance needed to safely stop prior to a safety hazard

Rolling stock acceleration and braking performance Maximum authorized train speed Train detection granularity Driver
Rolling stock acceleration and braking performance
Maximum authorized train speed
Train detection granularity
Driver reaction time
train speed Train detection granularity Driver reaction time © APTA and AREMA - 2015 Safe braking

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

Safe

braking

distance

6

Block Signaling

Block Signaling without Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
Block Signaling
without
Automatic Train
Protection (ATP)

Movement authorities communicated via signals to driver

Subject to human error / variability

Safe breaking distances designed to worst case scenario not current conditions

Movement authorities communicated via frequency pulse modulated signals through

 

track circuit blocks

Fail-safe, onboard computers stop train within safety zone

Safe distance between two trains will be the worst case braking distance based speed

Block Signaling with cab signal and ATP
Block Signaling
with cab signal
and ATP
Braking speed curve SPEED CODE Code 40/00 mph Code O mph 00/00 Stopping point Speed
Braking speed curve
SPEED CODE
Code 40/00 mph
Code O mph
00/00
Stopping point
Speed Code transmission
Track Circuit
Track Circuit
Track Circuit
© APTA and AREMA - 2015
7

Distance to Go and Positive Train Control

 

Movement authorities communicated based on track conditions ahead and civil speed restrictions

Distance to Go

Fail-safe

Permits precision stopping

Eliminates overlap block behind each train

Positive Train Control
Positive Train
Control

Mandated by Law to reliably and functionally prevent:

Train-to-train collisions

Over speed derailments, including enforcement of:

Civil engineering speed restrictions, slow orders, speed restrictions over switches

Incursions into established work zone limits without appropriate authority

The movement of a train through a main line switch in the improper position

Distance to Go braking speed curve 60 mph Target speed and distance Stopping point transmission
Distance to Go braking speed curve
60 mph
Target speed and distance
Stopping point
transmission
Track Circuit
Track Circuit
Track Circuit
transmission Track Circuit Track Circuit Track Circuit © APTA and AREMA - 2015 8 Reference: United

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

8

Reference: United States of America. Federal Railway Administration. January 5, 2011. U.S. Code Title 49: Transportation. Subpart IPositive Train Control Systems

ACSES PTC on the North East Corridor

ACSES - Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System
ACSES - Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System

Enforces stops, permanent and temporary speed limits.

Uses braking profiles for warning and enforcement

Receives intermittent line data from transponders

Radio used for dynamic wayside system status updates

ACSES on the North East Corridor is currently applied as an overlay to a block
ACSES on the North East Corridor is currently applied as an overlay to a
block signaling system with cab signaled speed codes

Train detection (track occupancy logic)

Interlocking logic

Broken rail detection

• Onboard enforcement of “signal” speed.

detection • Onboard enforcement of “signal” speed.
detection • Onboard enforcement of “signal” speed.

http://transportationfortomorrow.com/final_report/volume_3_html/05_field_hearings

/content19ab.htm?name=1106_newyork_presentation_panel2

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

9

Positive Train Control

Transponders
Transponders
Communications Based (220Mhz TDMA Radio)
Communications Based (220Mhz TDMA Radio)
Onboard Controller
Onboard Controller
Central Safety Server
Central Safety Server
Wayside Interface Units
Wayside Interface Units
Interlocking (external system)
Interlocking (external system)
Controller Central Safety Server Wayside Interface Units Interlocking (external system) © APTA and AREMA - 2015

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

10

Architecture Overview

ACSES:

Onboard receives precise location data and civil speed from transponders.

Wayside Interface Units and Safety Server send interlocking status to Onboard via data radio

Onboard enforces

limits and braking profile

Dispatchers may enter specific

speed restrictions

limits and braking profile Dispatchers may enter specific speed restrictions © APTA and AREMA - 2015
limits and braking profile Dispatchers may enter specific speed restrictions © APTA and AREMA - 2015

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

11

Transponder Transmission Subsystem

Positive Location Train Stop Data Target Civil Speed Address of Restriction wayside Data equipment Transponder
Positive
Location
Train Stop
Data
Target
Civil Speed
Address of
Restriction
wayside
Data
equipment
Transponder
Data Target Civil Speed Address of Restriction wayside Data equipment Transponder © APTA and AREMA -
Data Target Civil Speed Address of Restriction wayside Data equipment Transponder © APTA and AREMA -

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

12

Train to Wayside Communication

Train to Wayside Communication © APTA and AREMA - 2015 13
Train to Wayside Communication © APTA and AREMA - 2015 13

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

13

Vital Safety TSR Server to Manage Temporary Speed

Restriction Data:

TSR – Train Speed Restriction
TSR – Train Speed Restriction
Safety TSR Server to Manage Temporary Speed Restriction Data: TSR – Train Speed Restriction © APTA

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

14

PTC Interoperability Issues

PTC Interoperability Issues High need for interoperability between railroads which operate on territories with
High need for interoperability between railroads which operate on territories with diverse PTC solutions
High need for
interoperability
between
railroads which
operate on
territories with
diverse PTC
solutions
which operate on territories with diverse PTC solutions
which operate on territories with diverse PTC solutions

http://nec.amtrak.com/content/nec-and-connecting-commuter-rail-services

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

15

ACSES Technical Challenges on NEC

Implemented as a mandated

safety system,

future system optimizations?

Ongoing

implementation

of new radio

band (900 Mhz to 220 MHz) and communication

system

new radio band (900 Mhz to 220 MHz) and communication system © APTA and AREMA -

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

Evolving the system to

incorporate new

products and advancing technologies

16

From Block Signaling to CBTC Moving Block

SPEED CODE

00/00
00/00

Braking speed curve

Code 40/00 mph

Code O mph

CODE 00/00 Braking speed curve Code 40/00 mph Code O mph Stopping point Speed Code transmission
CODE 00/00 Braking speed curve Code 40/00 mph Code O mph Stopping point Speed Code transmission

Stopping point

Speed Code transmission

Track Circuit Track Circuit
Track Circuit
Track Circuit
point Speed Code transmission Track Circuit Track Circuit 60 mph Track Circuit DISTANCE TO GO Target

60 mph

Track Circuit

DISTANCE TO GO

Target speed and distance transmission

DISTANCE TO GO Target speed and distance transmission Distance to Go braking speed curve Stopping point

Distance to Go braking speed curve

Stopping point

Distance to Go braking speed curve Stopping point Gain Track Circuit Track Circuit Track Circuit Movement
Distance to Go braking speed curve Stopping point Gain Track Circuit Track Circuit Track Circuit Movement

Gain

Distance to Go braking speed curve Stopping point Gain Track Circuit Track Circuit Track Circuit Movement
Distance to Go braking speed curve Stopping point Gain Track Circuit Track Circuit Track Circuit Movement

Track Circuit

Track Circuit

Track Circuit

Movement Authority Stopping point Protection Envelope
Movement Authority
Stopping point
Protection Envelope

Additional Gain © APTA and AREMA - 2015

17

80 mph

Protection Envelope Additional Gain © APTA and AREMA - 2015 17 80 mph CBTC MOVING BLOCK

CBTC MOVING BLOCK

Moving Block braking speed curve

Communication Based Train Control

Communication Based Train Control
Communication
Based Train
Control

Per IEEE: System shall provide

high-resolution train location determination, independent of track circuits

continuous, high-capacity, bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications

Automatic Train Protection (ATP) functions shall provide fail-safe protection against Collisions, excessive speed, and other hazardous conditions

Automatic Train Operation (ATO) functions shall control basic operations within the protection

limits imposed by ATP.

Movement Authority precision is increased by absolute train detection envelope

Safe braking distance is based on current train speed and location

CBTC MOVING BLOCK

Moving Block braking speed curve

Movement Authority
Movement Authority

Stopping point

80 mph

braking speed curve Movement Authority Stopping point 80 mph Protection Envelope © APTA and AREMA -

Protection Envelope

Movement Authority Stopping point 80 mph Protection Envelope © APTA and AREMA - 2015 18 Reference:

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

point 80 mph Protection Envelope © APTA and AREMA - 2015 18 Reference: IEEE Standard for

18

Reference: IEEE Standard for Communications- Based Train Control (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements. IEEE Std. 1474.1, Page 1-28, 2005

© APTA and AREMA - 2015 19

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

19

ALSTOM URBALIS TM More than 25% of radio based CBTC deployments worldwide

A leader’s experience in radio CBTC :

Today, Operators trust URBALIS radio CBTC for 49 metro lines spanning driverless or manned systems, new lines or signaling renovation.

trust URBALIS radio CBTC for 49 metro lines spanning driverless or manned systems, new lines or

20

trust URBALIS radio CBTC for 49 metro lines spanning driverless or manned systems, new lines or

Automatic Train Protection ATP

Maximum Warning Emergency speed curve Brake curve 120 km/h
Maximum
Warning
Emergency
speed
curve
Brake curve
120 km/h
Warning Emergency speed curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Manual Driving) ATP = Supervision of
Warning Emergency speed curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Manual Driving) ATP = Supervision of
Warning Emergency speed curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Manual Driving) ATP = Supervision of
Train Speed (Manual Driving)
Train Speed
(Manual Driving)
curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Manual Driving) ATP = Supervision of Train Speed If
ATP = Supervision of Train Speed If Train Speed >Emergency Brake Speed, then Emergency Brake
ATP = Supervision of Train Speed
If Train Speed
>Emergency Brake Speed,
then Emergency Brake = ON
Else If Train Speed
> Warning Speed
then Warning Sound = ON
End

0 km/h

Brake = ON Else If Train Speed > Warning Speed then Warning Sound = ON End

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

21

Automatic Train Operation ATO

Maximum Warning Emergency speed curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Auto Driving)
Maximum
Warning
Emergency
speed
curve
Brake curve
120 km/h
Train Speed
(Auto Driving)
curve Brake curve 120 km/h Train Speed (Auto Driving) 0 km/h ATO = Drives the Train

0 km/h

ATO = Drives the Train Traction and Braking of the train is not managed by
ATO = Drives the Train
Traction and Braking of the train is
not managed by the driver, but by the
ATO train equipment (Automatic Pilot)
driver, but by the ATO train equipment (Automatic Pilot) ATO: reduces system reliability while allowing for

ATO: reduces system reliability while allowing for power consumption optimization

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

22

Communication Based Train Control

Transponders
Transponders
Communications Based (2.4, 5.8, 4.9 Ghz)
Communications Based (2.4, 5.8, 4.9 Ghz)
Onboard Controller
Onboard Controller
Centralized Zone Controller
Centralized Zone Controller
Wayside Interlocking Control
Wayside Interlocking Control
Centralized Interlocking processor
Centralized Interlocking processor
Centralized Zone Controller Wayside Interlocking Control Centralized Interlocking processor © APTA and AREMA - 2015 23

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

23

CBTC General Architecture

Maintenance ATS & SCADA ATC Interlocking PIS & Security Zone Controller Controller DCS – GIGABIT
Maintenance
ATS & SCADA
ATC
Interlocking
PIS & Security
Zone Controller
Controller
DCS – GIGABIT NETWORKS
RADIOS
ATC
Onboard
Controller
PIS & Security
Interlocking I/O
Onboard Controller PIS & Security Interlocking I/O PIS & Security Station • ATS: Automatic Train
PIS & Security
PIS & Security
Station
Station

ATS: Automatic Train Supervision

PIS: Passenger Information System

© APTA and AREMA SCADA: - 2015 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

ATC: Automatic Train Control

Zone Controller Moving Block Operation

Movement Authority
Movement Authority

Direction of traffic

Train speed Automatic protection A Movement Authority ATC Zone Controller Train Y … Train B
Train speed
Automatic protection
A
Movement Authority
ATC
Zone Controller
Train Y
Train B
Train A
Train X

Automatic protection

B
B

Braking curve

Location
Location

The Zone Controller calculates Movement Authority based on train location and track database and transmits it to the trains

Trackside beacons contain static location information

• Trackside beacons contain static location information • Onboard controller calculates braking curve and precise

Onboard controller calculates braking curve and precise location

In between beacons odometers and high performance slip/slide algorithms are used to calculate location

25

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

Interlocking: the logic and the track product

information

Signal Switch Machine - Track - Circuits Interlocking I/O Conditions “IN”
Signal
Switch Machine
-
Track
-
Circuits
Interlocking I/O
Conditions “IN”

- track circuit occupancy

Interlocking Controller
Interlocking
Controller
“IN” - track circuit occupancy Interlocking Controller Interlocking (Logic) Conditions “out” switch machine

Interlocking

(Logic)

Conditions “out”

switch machine move

signal changes

-
-

switch position

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

26

Control Center for decision support

ATS & SCADA PIS & Security
ATS & SCADA
PIS & Security
Passenger information Energy, Ventilation, Ancillaries Security (CCTV,…) Signalling Train interface Mass transit
Passenger information
Energy, Ventilation, Ancillaries
Security (CCTV,…)
Signalling
Train interface
Mass transit
Suburban
Ancillaries Security (CCTV,…) Signalling Train interface Mass transit Suburban © APTA and AREMA - 2015 27

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

27

Security and Information

ATS & SCADA PIS & Security
ATS & SCADA
PIS & Security
Integrated Security and Passenger Information Center Visual travel information or emergency messages through
Integrated Security and
Passenger Information
Center
Visual travel
information
or emergency
messages through
displays
Audio & visual
information or
emergency messages
through WiFi
communication
People and assets
protection through
intrusion detection &
access control
Event detection,
monitoring
through video
surveillance
Fire Detection
Audio travel
information
or emergency
messages
through public
address
Emergency call
point/intercom
Audio & visual
information or
emergency
messages
through kiosk
call point/intercom Audio & visual information or emergency messages through kiosk © APTA and AREMA -

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

28

Security and Information – Trainborne PIS & Security Audio Announcement Video Surveillance Passenger Information
Security and Information – Trainborne
PIS & Security
Audio Announcement
Video Surveillance
Passenger Information
Passenger Emergency Intercom
Infotainment/Advertisement
Internet
Passenger Information Passenger Emergency Intercom Infotainment/Advertisement Internet © APTA and AREMA - 2015 29

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

29

Data Communication System

Complete redundancy for robust availability

ATC Interlocking Zone Controller Controller ATS & SCADA PIS & Security Switch Router Backbone Redundant
ATC
Interlocking
Zone Controller
Controller
ATS & SCADA
PIS & Security
Switch Router
Backbone
Redundant Backbone Transmission Network
Station 2
Station 1
Redundant
Optical
Access Point
fiber
400m to 1600m (*)
AP
AP
AP
AP
AP
AP
AP
AP
AP
Double Radio Cell
Station
Double Radio Cell
Double
Radio cell
AP AP AP AP AP AP AP Double Radio Cell Station Double Radio Cell Double Radio
AP AP AP AP AP AP AP Double Radio Cell Station Double Radio Cell Double Radio
AP AP AP AP AP AP AP Double Radio Cell Station Double Radio Cell Double Radio
AP AP AP AP AP AP AP Double Radio Cell Station Double Radio Cell Double Radio

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

30

Innovation in CBTC: Increasing the simplicity of the

system through train-oriented architectures

“Wayside-centric” CBTC system

ATS
ATS
Route request Block status, overlap Interlocking release…
Route request
Block
status,
overlap
Interlocking
release…
Train
Train

Train movement

Zone Controller
Zone Controller

Location

EoA

Object Controller
Object Controller

“Train-centric” CBTC system

ATS
ATS
Train Infrastructure Controller
Train
Infrastructure
Controller
CBTC system ATS Train Infrastructure Controller Train movement Location Track resource request / release

Train movement

Location

Track resource request / release

Train movement Location Track resource request / release Several information paths and models to be reconciled

Several information paths and models to be reconciled

One consistent information path

- No need to synchronize Interlocking and ATC

- Design can be focused on headway, flexible operation, and robustness performance.

and ATC - Design can be focused on headway, flexible operation, and robustness performance. © APTA

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

31

System Optimization

“Wayside-centric” CBTC system

MA Following Preceding Vehicle Vehicle
MA
Following
Preceding
Vehicle
Vehicle

“Train-centric”

CBTC system

Location request

MA
MA

Location report & commitment

Following Preceding Vehicle Vehicle
Following
Preceding
Vehicle
Vehicle
& commitment Following Preceding Vehicle Vehicle End of Authority Locatio n report ATC Zone Controller
& commitment Following Preceding Vehicle Vehicle End of Authority Locatio n report ATC Zone Controller

End of

Authority

Locatio

n

report

ATC Zone Controller
ATC
Zone Controller

Cyclic communication with ATC Zone Controller

Train-to-Train communication

From System Theory

A technical system throughout its life tends to

become more reliable, simple, and effective moving towards a more Ideal state:

Transfer functions to the working element

which produces the final action

Ideal state: • Transfer functions to the working element which produces the final action © APTA

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

32

Conclusions

Advanced train control design and deployment requires a

multidiscipline effort to successfully balance safety, performance, and system reliability.

The increasing complexity of train control systems requires

an engineering community that can create holistic solutions

that match the magnitude of the challenges presented by the transportation industry.

Transportation solutions are a means of improving the

quality of life of people living in high density urban centers.

are a means of improving the quality of life of people living in high density urban

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

33

THANK YOU

THANK YOU © APTA and AREMA - 2015

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

Copyright Restrictions and Disclaimer

Presentation Author

Nicholas Columbare

Solution Director Strategy and Solution Portfolio

ALSTOM 1025 John Street West Henrietta, N.Y., 14586

585-279-1465

Nicholas.Columbare@ALSTOM.com

It is the author’s intention that the information contained in this file be used for non-commercial, educational purposes with as few restrictions as possible. However, there are some necessary constraints on its use as described below.

The materials used in this file have come from a variety of sources and have been assembled here for personal use by the author for educational purposes. The copyright for some of the images and graphics used in this presentation may be held by others. Users may not change or delete any author attribution, copyright notice, trademark or other legend. Users of

this material may not further reproduce this material without permission from the copyright owner. It is the responsibility of

the user to obtain such permissions as necessary. You may not, without prior consent from the copyright owner, modify, copy, publish, display, transmit, adapt or in any way exploit the content of this file. Additional restrictions may apply to specific images or graphics as indicated herein.

The contents of this file are provided on an "as is" basis and without warranties of any kind, either express or implied. The author makes no warranties or representations, including any warranties of title, noninfringement of copyright or other rights, nor does the author make any warranties or representation regarding the correctness, accuracy or reliability of the content or other material in the file.

the correctness, accuracy or reliability of the content or other material in the file. © APTA

© APTA and AREMA - 2015

35