2015 PreBar Notes in Constitutional Law

2015 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive geographical,
economic, political entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.
- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands.
- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and
Scarborough Shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/or consider as part
of the regime of islands.
- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the
custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan.
- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan
Dao. Found in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a
triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150
square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ
- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands
is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to
Palawan.
- RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS.
- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the
process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from the main
archipelago and classifying them instead as regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines. The
national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within
600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.
- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands or naturally formed areas of land
surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. The principle forces claimant states over a
certain territory to maintain peace in the area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of
these islands. The islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.-
- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the
KGI and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the
length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number
of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
- Constitutional issues:
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of
Paris vs. RA 9552
- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of overflight
- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)

- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
2015 Prebar Review Notes in Constitutional Law
by Judge Estela Alma Singco
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power of a nation within its
territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power are within
the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the
foreign State to which the premises belong.
- Kalayaan Island Group

a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
f) RA 3046 (demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State)
g) RA 5446 (reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo
h) RA 9552
- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
- Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its
authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760,
July 29, 2003; Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008)
- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).
Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of
the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now
comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better
delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent
of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise
of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs.
Villarosa, May 10, 2005).
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro

Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)
Tests of valid delegation:

1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order
to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing to do
is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to prevent the
delegation from running riot.
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- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs.
Angara, May 2, 1997]
- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs. Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6,
2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of
customary law (Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or
conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice
on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8, 2010- At this time, we are not prepared
to declare that these Yogyarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlines in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Xxx Using even the most liberal lenses, these
Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at
best - de lege refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amounts to no more than well-meaning desires, without support of either State practice or opinio juris.
- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted principles of International Law, the provisions of a
treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police
power of the State.
- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law
of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a
statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]
- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.
- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of
the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like
ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
- Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014- Conception refers to the moment of fertilization and
the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. Xxx Only those contraceptives that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited.xxx ection 7 of RH law which excludes parental consent in cases where
a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had miscarriage is anti-family and violates Section
12 of Art. II. Also, Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
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- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right
that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies, among
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed in
the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)
- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987
constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
of an imperium in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise
dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments.
- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.
- An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. Xxx In
international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence. Xxx The concept of Association is not recognized under
the 1987 constitution.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013- Citizenship is not a
matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded
by the State to its citizens, It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones flag and
country.
- Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007- Naturalization signifies the act of formally
adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her the privileges of a citizen . Xxx
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant
to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino.
Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective
renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.
- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons citizenship may be done through a direct action for
its nullity.
- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement
under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the
documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register
the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any.
- Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. CA
625- election within reasonable time is 3 years from reaching the age of majority
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in
the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.
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- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat
vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parents
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity].
- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones application for repatriation. Supra.
- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before
he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino.
- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens repatriated and unmarried children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated.
- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of
candidacy, the person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance
contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. It should suffice if,
upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship.
- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-
born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino
mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public
office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office
in the Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do not
apply to him.
- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one
reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2)
of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.
- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of
LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.
- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act
No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the
law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also
a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship
decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-
acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to
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seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are
not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007-
Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the
requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.
- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5.
Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall,
of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of
the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of
Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was
more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep.
Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and
shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with,
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate
child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by
itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.
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- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial
or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same.
- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as
a material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to
aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the
trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the
law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question
the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition of permanent resident
status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The green card
status in the USA is a renunciation on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.
- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013- The act of using a foreign
passport is not one of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
Xxx The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens citizenship issue to attack.
ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)
- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo,
among others the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996).
- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is synonymous to domicile. An
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile. Domicile means an individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one
residence or domicile at any given time.
- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring
"duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189
(election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
- Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is synonymous to domicile, not necessarily with a
persons home address. A man may have several places of residence but has only one domicile. Or he may be a
nomad or travelling salesman with no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile for him.
- There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of originthat is, a child follows the domicile of the parents; 2)
domicile by operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a person of legal age.
- Domicile of choice imports not only the intention to reside in one fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
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when absent for business or pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return. Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10,
2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question of fact. One intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus revertendi).
- Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a persons domicile: First, everyone must always have one
of the three kinds of domicile; second, once established, a domicile remains the same until a new one is acquired;
and third, a person can have only one domicile at any given time.
- Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired the domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who,
according to generally-accepted principles of law, are presumed to be Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro,
Iloilo. After she married an American and moved to and worked in the United States, she lost her domicile of origin
and followed the domicile of her husband in America. When she and her husband moved back for good here after
the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new domicile of choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired it
depends, on her clear intention, conduct and physical presence in the new location.
- In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held that the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitutions
residence qualification requirement. The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos made an honest mistake in
writing seven months residence in her certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period less than the
constitutional requirement of not less than one year for that position.
- Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held that residency is not dependent on citizenship
because even a foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.
- More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may
choose to reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the reacquisition of citizenship under the Dual Citizenship
Law.
- Said the Supreme Court: [I]n order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur: 1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, 2) an intention to remain there, and 3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
- Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of
Australian citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an
intent to change domicile for good.
- Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the use of an American passport after a renunciation
of American citizenship effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies one who reacquired citizenship under
the Dual Citizenship Law from being elected to a public office.
- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition of permanent resident status
abroad constitutes abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is
a renunciation of ones status as a resident of the Philippines.
- But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine
domicile?
- A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay in the Philippines. After he does that, his
occasional absence from the recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing him from the domicile for as
long as he manifests animus manendi et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections for President, V-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases
on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding
of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of certificates of
canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
- Non delegation of legislative power
- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court
finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;"
8
"justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"
"standardization and regulation of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation
and management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau
of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177.
- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.
- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue
delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of
the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate
to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the legislative policy.
- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be
subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act
of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either
or both chambers.
- The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-making authority in implementing and executing
constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers vested in the Executive that
are self-executory.
- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted
to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the Legislature which cannot be
usurped by the former.
- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested
exclusively in Congress.
- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or
like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners
for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends
only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To
stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it
were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups
- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs.
COMELEC, March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and
RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:
only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have
a seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional
9
representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their
total number of votes.
- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The
two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-
list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-
party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party
or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party
can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table
3 above.
- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
10
- ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013- In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections those that did not satisfy these
two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are
not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.
- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no specific provision in the Constitution that
fixes 250,000 minimum population that must compose legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least
a representative with nothing mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly situated.
- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In this case, there is no official record that the
population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus,
the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate
(1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic,
attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic
powerlessness.
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has been historically disadvantaged and
discriminated against because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence perpetrated
against members of the LGBT community by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that
the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of
the sectors lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory
treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.
- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) The history of the provision granting
Senators and Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense.
11
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.
- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecnoming of a member thereof
(Osmea vs. Pendatun).
- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post
despite his election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors. PNRC is a private organization merely performing public functions, and that the
PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC
Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress.
NRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization
that does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly
serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it
does not mean all the members. The base in computing majority is normally the total membership of the
body, within the coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply means the greater number or more
than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between
Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate President
shall be elected by the majority it does not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority . The
defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the minority.
- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the
allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of
showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House of Representatives is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of
his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement and to be
allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action and movement.
- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of congress from the
consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for
relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension
spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-
taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has
jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also
have himself inducted into office.
- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs.
COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests
relating to his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.
- RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. - clearly under law and jurisprudence, it is
the State thru its reps. Designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter how
complete and exclusive, does not carry with it authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. (Aug. 23, 2011).
- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the congressional elections, the remedy of
those who may assail ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file before the
12
HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the 2 nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.
- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2 nd
Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue
was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.
- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the
canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition
of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-
proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of the
House of Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns.
To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to
be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically
noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass,
COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral
Tribunal has jurisdiction.
- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a
showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of congressional election contests are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution.
- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties bu|
continues until the case is terminated.
- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions
of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.
- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506, respectively, February 11, 2010- Since
party-list nominees are considered as elected members of the House, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications.
- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act)
vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the
qualifications of each nominee and that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELECs
First Division and COMELEC En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the proper party to submit
CIBACs Certificate of Nomination instead of Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As
provided in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also possesses the authority to resolve intra-
party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and
register political parties. The power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by
the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers, the Court declared
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act
on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member
of the Senate.
13
- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is authorized to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not include
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political party must have at least
two senators to be able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number
less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA,
their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that
they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the
House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties
in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of
judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before
petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that appropriations bills
original exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments.
- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of individual menbers of Congress to propose and
identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature and is also recognized that
individual members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to
be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project
(LAMP vs. DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November 19, 2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Legislature, although its usage would evolve in
reference to certain funds of the Executive. Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in
the rules within which it operates. Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle
of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto the legislators the power of appropriation by giving
them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriation bills, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process denied the President the power to veto items;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs
of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system
has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again insofar as it has conferred to the President the power
to appropriate funds intended by law for energy related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as
well as other public funds under the broad classification of priority infrastructure development projects, it
has once transgressed the principle of non delegability.
- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014- the transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under
section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) there is law
authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the heads
of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be
transferred are saving generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. The following
were declared unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of the savings of the executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence
of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant GAA (Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).
- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to spend funds made available by Congress.xxx
there was no instance of executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment is prohibited by the GAA, unless
there will be an unmanageable government budget deficit.
- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the
corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign
14
loans, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior appropriation from
Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must appropriate by law the
loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the
executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the
repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the
loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation
- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An
investigation that seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but in
aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate
the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable
controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).
- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No.
174105, April 2, 2009).
- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the
mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint.
- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to punish contempt is based on the
principle of self-preservation as the branch of government vested with the legislative power, independently of
the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Except only when the
Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is
overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.
- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to withhold information
requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the
President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in
carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In
this jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of
Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and
the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the President is ultimately
responsible for military and national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security
secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by virtue of the Presidents control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy
relations of the State. The Presidents role as chief implementer of the States foreign policy is reinforced by
the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive
diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies
have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the President
with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the
Presidents communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of
publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the
President policy issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus
depriving the President of candid advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national
security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power
to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege on one hand and the other competing
constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have
to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive
15
privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been
decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since
there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. xxx
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive.
For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made
may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The
communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN)
project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and
approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of
the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules.
- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide
latitude given to the Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and would not fault the Senate for
approving the resolution on the very same day that it was submitted. The court also held that the petitioners
were invited as resource persons at the inquiry, and as such, they do not have the constitutional right to
counsel.
- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340,
October 17, 2006- The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights
of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent
legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the
dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation
- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to
the broad power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.
- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance
of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
- Varieties of Executive Privilege

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law
to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is executive
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on
16
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
appearance of department heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three
categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.
- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the certification od the
Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may
be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senate to propose
amendments, it cal propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.
- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes the long standing
legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as the
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of
others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the
words used exclusively without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president evolved through case law.
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our
laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the President extends to the
end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the
President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency
of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755-
When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between or among
presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme
Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the
largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged with
17
the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified
by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the
judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount
the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same
shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.
- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to
the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559).
- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her
protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010.
(Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.
- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method
of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent
directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In
fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution are post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The word
contest means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President there can be no contest before a winner is proclaimed.
- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988, August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected
President the second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the second election as President, there
is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.
- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read:
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question whether the claimed temporary inability of
Estrada is a political question beyond the Supreme Courts power of review. The decision that President
Arroyo is the dejure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No.
106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which
may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his
ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible
under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot
be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers
and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC.
11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning
power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means
exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts
falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of
vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not
from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.
18
- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs.
Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution by increasing those officers who
need prior confirmation by the CA.
- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v.
JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII
of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342,
Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April
20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing President
does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then
Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional
Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so.
- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA
does not alter its permanent character. It is effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA,
appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew
the ad-interim appointment.
- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the
President to make such acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting capacity a person not
yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited
time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office. It may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.
- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,"
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a
fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if
the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of department manager such as Director Manager
II of PEZA is not a third level position and does not require presidential appointment.
- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are

prohibited from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425
SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.
- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10,
2001- The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The chief
executive, under our laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.
- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010- The creation of the
Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing
upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to
say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds.
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- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No.
160093, July 31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of
Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under
Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The Presidents power to reorganize the executive
branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which
grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the
President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.
- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly
grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees [is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize
offices outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring functions or agencies
from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The DECS is indisputably a
Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the
Office of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office
of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities
of DECS related to sports development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential power of control over the Executive branch
of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This
constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot
limit or curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that the President
shall have control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt
any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from
the Presidents power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers
in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts
or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs. Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the
President of state of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not
violative of the separation of powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3, 2004- The Presidents authority to
declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out power.
- Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The President does not need any congressional
authority to exercise his calling out power.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-
in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members
of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member
of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to
compel the attendance.
- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President has full discretion to call the military when
in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
There is no equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the
armed forces.
- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President
for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the
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absence of legislation, the President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.
- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of
congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a delegation from Congress.
- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other

emergency; 2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not
only to war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of
war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence
of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling out powers contemplated under the Constitution
is exclusive to the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that a provincial governor is not
endowed with the power to call upon the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the President is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out powers
under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the President exercises full supervision and
control over the police, a local chief executive, such as a provincial governor, only exercises operational
supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, only the President has full discretion to call the military
when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, the Court stressed.
- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The pardoning power of the President is final and
unappealable.
- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then
issued by President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it extends to all persons who
committed the particular acts described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.
- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the
field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power is exclusive to
the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive
Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is
the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members
of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court
ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
21
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with
foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the
requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations.
While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the
treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it
is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate.
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority
of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME- The power to classify lands as
alienable belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been classified as alienable, may be sold. There
must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by another officer before conveyance can
be executed on behalf of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel vs.
Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on her sole
will. Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.
- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively.
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children);
Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not
proper party).
- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review
and the great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great
branches of the government.
- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24, 2009- Although the courts are without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment
from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not
such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial
review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper
constitutional parameters of power.
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- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance; of
overreaching significance to society or of paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO;
CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA
449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission,
December 7, 2010.
- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that
the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have standing, he must establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the third party cannot assert his
constitutional right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse
the third partys constitutional claim.
- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned with whether the
petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL
ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.
- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the
substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is grave violation
of the constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov.
19, 2013.
- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not preclude the
SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its
EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.
- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have standing to file the suit
simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching
Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a
Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under
the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the
initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong
is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact
doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
23
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. xxx It applies only to
cases where extraordinary circumstances exist and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and
fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no
longer be undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)
- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs principal function is to recommend appointees to
the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the
President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the
Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised
only because the constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the
membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the
list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC,
the Court stressed.
The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its
supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that the most Senior
Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice, should participate in the
deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the
absence of the constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary Act
of 1948, which reads: In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is
first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified.
This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.
- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held that the use of the singular letter a
preceding representative of Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. The word Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering
the language of the subject constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to
extrinsic aids such as the records of the Constitutional Commission.
- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in
response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary.
To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the
private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a vote each, would, as one
former congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution, declared the Court.
- The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member composition serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide
a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It further held that under the doctrine of operative facts
where actions prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity and
fair play, all JBCs prior official acts are valid.
- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as sole representative of
Congress in the JBC and that such is best left to the determination of Congress.
- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In cases where an objection to an applicants
qualification is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of
the duty of the JBC to recommend. The unanimity rule of the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his
right to due process.
- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court en banc determine and decide
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they may extend to the justices, judges,
court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the courts granted power.
- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit
en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom.
- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court-
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.
- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to change the venue of (and authority
to conduct) preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the courts for lack of jurisdiction. The
holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive department and not of the judiciary.
24
- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of change of venue.
- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be
meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010- The Supreme Court has now the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, pactice and procedure in all courts, Viewed from this
perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of
RA 8291 necessarily fails.
WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a persons rights guaranteed and recognized by the
bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated
or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any
of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that
the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government
agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection
may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of
the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private
institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons
authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5)
days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security
or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing
in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
25
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their
safety.
- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition for a writ of amparo is improper remedy to
regain parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was legally put up for adoption.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of
amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate
facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
-(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
-(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
-(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
-(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires that the petition must sufficiently allege the
manner in which the right to privacy is violated or threatened with violation and how such violation, or threats affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Zenarosa Commission was not unlawful act as that violates or threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security as to entitle the petitioner to the writ of habeas data.
- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29, 2014- petitioners have no reasonable expectation
of privacy that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when their daughters shared the incriminating
pictures with their Facebook Friends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activity, it is necessary that the user in this case, the sanctioned students, should manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or limit its visibility.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the plenary legislative power.
The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning there is no intention to
diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires full payment before the State may exercise proprietary
rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental law requires mandatory review by the
Supreme Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere
however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
26
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule making prerogative of
the Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate review by
the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for
automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are
not decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition for review should not
be entertained and the petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the CA decision.
- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate under Section 14, Article
VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e, given due course and after
the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due
course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof.
- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
bases, does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the finding of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the
discretion to decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any
particular case. Further, the Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error committed by
the CA, there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. There is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution
of denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art.
VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where the petition is given due
course, but not where the petition is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal basis for
the dismissal.
- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude the validity of
Memorandum Decision which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or
portions thereof) of the lower court.
ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service Commission of adjudicatory power, or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.
- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to
the civil service.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the responsibility of the establishment,
administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department or agency, the
role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department agency with respect to these qualification standards and
approving them.
- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the
entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further
classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance
is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president with a fixed term of
office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear
provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases decided by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint may be filed directly with
the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to deputize
a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The
Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to
assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
27
- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report, no release policy may not be validly
enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a general rule, are governed by the Civil
Service Law. But a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made. If the GOCC was
established through an original charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and
SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is
excluded from the coverage of the civil service.
- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government refers to any of the various units of the
government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes
and government-owned or controlled corporations,
- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil
service law applies. It is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless
of the nature of employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil
Service Law.
- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the appointment to the positions in the Career
Executive Service may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys security of tenure.
- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right
will have to depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank
or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.
- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to
force resignation constitutes removal.
- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be
so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of
an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the CSC within 15 days.
Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels
aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.
- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by
the Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily confidential. (Read:
Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: (1) President declares the position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the
CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and
appointing authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily confidential.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino Operations Manager is not primarily
confidential
- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement
as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (1) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the proper authority. The
last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997)
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- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the CSC, and for violating the rule
against holding of multiple government positions as well as the concept ex-officio positions.
- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree
receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts
another government position to which another compensation is attached.
- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the
Constitution from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair
and CPLC are incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that
the general rule to hold more than one office is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position/
- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an employee is illegally dismissed, and
his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not
having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.
- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not
effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor.
- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or employee, who has been found
illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to back wages and other monetary
benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the time the
decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back
wages but also to full retirement benefits.
- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil service employee of
administrative charges.
- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the
integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec.
47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is
an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its
integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those
who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the
rules of the service.
- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to
whether government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.
COMELEC
- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without
reappointment applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five or three years.
There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the
prohibition on reappointment can apply.
- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.-
Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.
- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC possesses the power to
conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by
virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it
by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section
29
52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7
- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,
described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:
- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper
exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that
marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass
were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed could by no means
be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of
the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its
objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their
counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its
authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.
- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear
during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed
when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the
various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.
- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required
petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are
not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to
determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. 10
When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The
COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear,
COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:
xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while Section 3, Article X, on local
government, provides:
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for . . . the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.]
[Emphases ours
30
- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call elections,
as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.
- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The COMELEC correctly stated that the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its
authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the
COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is
endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and
honest elections.
- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide
questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC
is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free and orderly
honest elections.
- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010- While the question of party leadership has
implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the
constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such
expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
interfere, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.
- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February 22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act
or omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the
COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no
reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules
of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides
that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable
by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided
by a division. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said
Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in
office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear
and decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as
Special Cases and in compliance with the provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC
are vested with the authority to hear and decide these special cases.
- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness
and the sufficient standard tests.
- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form
of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number
of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have
always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the
appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has
the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
31
- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 Contests involving elections of SK officials do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly order a manual count notwithstanding
the required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing the commission to use an
automated election system, if that is the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally
mandated power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. In
adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in
mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair play.
Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the elections,
should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases.
- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987 constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final orders of a COMELEC Division denying the
affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before the Supreme Court even via a petition for
certiorari.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs
auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls
under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity
directly or indirectly from or through the government are required to submit to post audit.
- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does
not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither
by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and
audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent
private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA
audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only
one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or
publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer may not, without his
consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has no authority to render or
promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and accounting is
lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.
- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COAs power over the settlement of
accounts is different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of
judicial power.
- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper officer to withhold a municipal
treasurers salary and other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld
amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.
- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or unnecessary
expenditures.
- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]- There is nothing in the said provision
that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The
only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary
or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room
for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
32
- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall
always be for a fixed term of seven years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the
appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as this
will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only
be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period,
are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission;
- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment
to the position of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair. Such appointment is not covered
by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further that the vacancy in
the position of Char resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
-
- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits officials and employees of
COA from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity,
except compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs.
Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been
fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term
itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the
elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act
in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever
way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and
given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with
contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where
the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that
terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.
- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in
Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President
is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur.
Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any
contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As
between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the
board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law
provides otherwise.
- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated
or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-
Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)
33
- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of
basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding
to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002,
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
-
- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The preventive suspension of public officials
does not interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government
Code. Preventive suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is one that involves no less than
involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence
that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay
when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the position of SB member, thus,
voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said
office.
- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with
the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall
election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.
- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. T he petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to apply, the local official concerned must
serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if
he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term,
and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule, notwithstanding
the subsequent nullification of his proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood
laws, enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood from P20 million to
P100 million in sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said increased income
requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year
before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under
the LGC of 1991.
- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic
services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a
development authority. It is not a political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).
34
- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant
the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with
metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the
individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts
of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source
(MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009- MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards
and other forms of advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a
private property. MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it
had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.
- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature
of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport
System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals. Even the
MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling
in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion
of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).
- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION
OF APPROVAL FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the 1987constitution provides that
LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. When passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just share
in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the
internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld is declared in contravention of Section 286
of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).
- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local
Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local governments are
empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and
limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept
that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was
withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to
1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be
collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).
- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy,
Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter
exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the
Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as
before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An agency of the
Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;
while an instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations. It had
already become, even if it be conceded to be an agency or instrumentality of the Government, a taxable person
for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of
real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.
- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its facilities and appurtenances are
accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed that
the said port facilities and appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and
35
that the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary
business.
- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed
by local governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport
Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic
travel and transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside
the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved
against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities.
- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However,
when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.
- PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27, 2004- Like the local government
units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the
latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units.
Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President
or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of
the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3,
2002).
- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to
their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the
genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the
consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment proceeding is not required before
the public officer subject of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses
committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003- definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice.
- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice,
Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can
still be impeached.
- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to
reappointed coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will
nor disenfranchisement of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous
precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket
immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.
36
- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that
the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and
former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).
- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction before
inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.
- OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by
law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231, September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA
6770 providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is unconstitutional because it would violate the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over her deputies.
- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office
of the Special Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The inclusion of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the same levels of
constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.
- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively
suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this
exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.
- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel
is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal
laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans
functions and not its jurisdiction.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of
the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of
Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess
full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers
envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive one.
- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.
- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension for the period not more than one
month or a fie equivalent to one months salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and unappelable,
subject to judicial review.
- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The decision of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power
of the Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.
- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.
- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous,
therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS
over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.
R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people
in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987
Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A.
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No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public
officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members
of Congress and the Judiciary.
- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally created by charter or not. What is
decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to perform functions related to government programs
and policies.
- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty required by law
or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272-
Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
0
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that
FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and
public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest
land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily
vested in the State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that
enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is
in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of
the State. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no
irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx
- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers.
Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and
instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by
denying the petition.
- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held
by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples
over their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and environmental
protection.
- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by
virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.
- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain
and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas are also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased and not sold to
private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain which the government could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a law authrizing
such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The
ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which declares that all lands
and waters of the public domain belong to the State
- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be
sold to private corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only sell alienable public land to
Filipino citizens.
- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in
reclamation projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following
the explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain.
There is no prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino
citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire
not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private land.
- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial
property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-
called Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even private
corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or
transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the
38
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by
the public or municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands
become patrimonial property or private property of the government only upon a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable lands, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely requires possession
since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession. The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land it
covers is declared alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline imposed by
the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.
- Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition or
ownership for at leats 30 years or at least since May 8, 1947.
- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by
the State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a
title to the land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of
agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678, April 24, 2009 The classification of lands of the
public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification
comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural lands of the public
domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
- Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The DENR Secretary is empowered by law to
approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While the acquisition and the purchase of real
properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent
acquisition of the said properties from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person or
entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino
citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and
dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes
patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands
under its charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized
by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the
special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land
once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the
foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides
that the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is
the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
39
- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition in the Constitution applies only to
ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees,
plants and growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.
- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the
subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.
- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 Foreign corporations are confined to
technical and financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize the countrys natural resources
by entering into the necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises,
subject to the full control and supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the macro level, through
the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would
enable the government to control the conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain activities
deemed not desirable or beneficial.
- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun,
et al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service contracts in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance as provided by law. The Court said that these
agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State.
- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.;
and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the
full control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are
now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the
State can either directly undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into
agreement with qualified entities.
- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
constitution does not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease granted by the government under
the 1973 constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.
- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 The operation of public utility shall not be
exclusive.
- Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both voting control test and beneficial ownership test must
be applied to determine whether a corporation is a Filipino national.
- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February 23, 2015- a franchise is not required before each
and every public utility may operate. There is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the
operation of toll facilities. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.
- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public
utility has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure
they do not malfunction.
- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A.
No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying
the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that 23 of R.A.
No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the
imposition of local franchise taxes.
- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of
duly issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative
franchises are extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate expression of State policy.
- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the public interest so requires. Franchises
are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted away.
40
- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The constitution is emphatic that the operation of public
utility shall not be exclusive.
- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit
monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so requires.
ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the
law. (Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).
- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited
to violations of civil and political rights only either by government official or private individual.
- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.-
refer to Section 5- perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by law.
- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless,
not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with
law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is
hinged on the existence of resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.
ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)
- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not
an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only intended to refresh and
enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees, and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a
grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center course requirements or take the licensure
examination.
- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution and the members of the academe. The
Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP
opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising its
freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).
- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with
respondnets academic freedom as it does not dictate upon the law professors the subject matter they can teach and
the manner of their instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will
teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention
in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers. The right to freedom expression of members of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice
system.
- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of
San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting
of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the Universitys decision not to confer honors to
petitioner.
- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an
institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine whether these
standards have been met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation,
belongs to the university as the employer alone.
- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this
freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained
in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong: As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure.
- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
41
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed, while it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, such right is
subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students
for admission to its school.
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco,
May 3, 2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an
officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a
tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
- UP vs. Dizon, August 23, 2012- The funds of UP are government funds that public in character. They include
income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives. Hence, the funds, subject of the action could not be validly made the subject of writ of
execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability.
- COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13, 2009- The COA is an unincorporated government
agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary
functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent.
- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a
proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in
nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.
- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which
implements a joint health insurance project of the German and Philippine governments, is not entitled to immunity
from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has
the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or
controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to
be sued,
- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the
initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens
itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its
complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that
case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs.
Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three
of which accordingly abolished.
- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to
vote. They cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of.
- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.
- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership
- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%
- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established by religious groups and mission boards.
42
ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14,
2008- The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President
dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary
powers to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such
plenary authority includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the effective
exercise of principal power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..
- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern
initiatives for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to propose
amendments, the people cannot exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.
- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended
that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature. The essence of amendments directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend
the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is
part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a Constituent Assembly.
- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for amendments, it does not have the final say on
whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly subject to judicial review.
- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary in the ratification of amendments. A
plebiscite may be validly held together with general elections.
- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece meal ratification.
- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.
ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry
into the Philippines only be way of direct exception.
- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The
Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double
speak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.
- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements
that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements
are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from
ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine
Senate and the United States Senate.
43
- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al., Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et
al., No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to
the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.
- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs.
Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in
accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate
with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further
orders by this Court.
ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are
fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate.
However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the
right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local government
unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail,.
- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process
clause of the constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power,
such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code.
- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012-
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him. IN administrative proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process, which simply means having thte opportunity to explain ones side.
- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither
does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of ones residence maybe revoked at anytime.
- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but
a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.
- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever
branch of the government the impress of nullity.
INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:
1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;

2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in
such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23, 2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of
due pocess of law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not when the government agency is
engaged in the performance of quasi legislative or administrative functions.
- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they were denied due process during the NBI
Investigation. The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The NBI has no
judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting any relief to any party, it cannot even determine
probable cause.
- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, January 21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires
the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Equal Protection of the Law
44
- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is
on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its
earlier application to equal protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for
the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
what is essentially condemnable act- accessing the computer system of another without right. It is universally
condemned act.
- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is
but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is not reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the
latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.
- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause
of the constitution. It was granted a franchise , subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures
- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-
is a gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec.
2.
- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs.
Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.
- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The confiscated items having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search. xxx
Evidence obtained due to warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a
barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code.
- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified only when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches and seizures:
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent
and established until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration
for verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or
constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20,
2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
11. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is
a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon reasonable suspicion that a person may have been
45
engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires probable cause that a suspect committed a criminal
offense;
12. Armed conflict (war time);
13. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No. 129756-58, January 28, 2000);
14. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was
allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
15. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the exercise of military powers of the President
(Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
16. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881,
December 18, 2000).
WARRANTLESS ARREST
- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a corollary, neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense. xxx In this case, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
-
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:
The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of the
commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.
- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has
been lawfully arrested without warrant.
- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officer.
- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of immediacy between the time of the offense
was committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest
and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it
is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the
arresting officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the
crime.
- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the government and agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law.
- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose
of carrying out a final finding of violation of law.
- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest
against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.
- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one offense.
- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS
TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be seized must be described
in precise and minute detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable certainty or particularity as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.
- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be arrested but only if it is absolutely
necessary to do so. You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.
Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-
46
- Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be left alone, and (b) the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has impermissibly intruded
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether the expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25,
2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In
the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who
are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to
the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his
rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from
liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones
irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17, 2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of
the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office and
persons accused of crimes. However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as
random drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and employees of public and
private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.
- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let alone is not an absolute right where
the person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character.
- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a lawful
order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the freedom of expression.
- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob
him of his right without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within
which national candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on television and radio, it unduly
restricted and constrained the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people.
- RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only
the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of
their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the contents
thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges
from six months to six years.
- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept,
and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between members of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and
47
recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
Section 4- Freedom of expression-
- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v.
Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By way of a summary. The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.
B.P. No. 880
SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--

A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by
law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(b) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of
such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended
activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
(c) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(d) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(e) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building.
-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days
from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit,
said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall
be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on
the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal
bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or,
in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental
rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to
heightened scrutiny.
48
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or
unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to
the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and
present danger standard.
- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP which should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It
found that Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of
a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued
permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereto,
- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election surveys are covered by the protection to freedom
of expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as regards to a candidates
popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voters
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period.The prohibition imposed by
Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the freedom of
expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period; and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may either be content-based (the subject of
the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated with
speech, such as the time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show
that the government has a compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction,
on the other hand, need only show an important government interest, as long as it leaves open alternative channels
of communication.
- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
NTC in warning television stations against playing the Garci tapes under pain of revocation of their licenses, were
content-based restrictions and should be subjected to the clear and present and danger test.
- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The
immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of the government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.
- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American
law.
- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.
- A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A
litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct.
In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it
refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
49
- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.
No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and
concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute
is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not
before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigant.
- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.
- American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.
- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in
examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in
analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment
punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases,
were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may
be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by
the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed
to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out
or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-vis Section 4(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit
the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even if unsolicited commercial
ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of his right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate forms of expression.
- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey
would be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election day
projections, but also for long term research.
- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner the power to screen, review and
examine all television programs, emphasizing the phrase all television programs. Thus, when the law says all
television programs, the word all covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word
or expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the
MTRCB over which it has power of review.
- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court
said that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his
utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a G rating for
general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating
Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction.
50
- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is identifiable although it
is not necessary that he be named. It must also be shown that a third party could identify him as the object of the
libelous article. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:
1. private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceeding which are not confidential in nature including any statement made therein
or act performed by public officer.
- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those which are not actionable or even if author
acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged
(those containing defamatory imputations which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true reports without any
comments/remarks).
- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.
Section 5- Freedom of Religion-
- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 - members of Jehovahs witnesses may
validly refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of
their religious beliefs.
- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated when it will bring about
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain
catholic tenets and dogmas does not constitute clear and present danger.
- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally
applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. For the purpose of
defraying cost of registration.
- Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving the
Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State
has in effect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that moral
disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party list system. Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political process,
LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. As such, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The Court
also found that there was a transgression of AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by
reason of the COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political party
and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that the COMELEC order to remove the
tarpaulin did not violate freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of the catholic church.
- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates
the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers
a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The expulsion/excommunication of members of
a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of
said institution/organization.
Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-
- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to
SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to
travel.
51
- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The persons right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused should be
permitted to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts discretion. (Yap vs. CA,
GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).
- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO. MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular
No. 49-2003- does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court
[personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule.
Section 7- Right to Information
- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section 17, Art. XI has classified the information
disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from
the right to know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence,
there is a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law. xxx While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate
the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested parties, such discretion does not
carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public
office is a public trust.
- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC
- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated.
Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector
- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15- Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code,
validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form an integral part of the Right
to Association.
Section 9- Expropriation
- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the
State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there
is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure
projects.
- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67,
inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects.
- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303- There are at least two crucial differences
between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the government is required to
make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation,
the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the BIR,
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29, 2012- When the State exercises the power of
eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional provision which governs is Section
4 Article XIII of the constitution which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision
also imposes upon the State the obligation of paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
governments agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full price if the taken property.
52
- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the
property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we struck down as void the
DAR administrative circular46 that provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit in cash or in
bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the governments
payment of just compensation.
- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the Court determined that the legal interest should be
12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the part of the government.
Had the finality of the judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the
time the RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed from the time
that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the property.
- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was
deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12%
interest p.a. from the time of taking.
- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often ruled by this Court, the award of interest is
imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of
the owner. However, when there is no delay in the payment of just compensation, the Supreme Courthas not
hesitated in deleting the imposition of interest thereon for the same is justified only in cases where delay has been
sufficiently established.
- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin elements of just compensation and public
purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the
notion of fee simple title. The simple fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is
forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the
expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged
or least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an
expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the
first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for
the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to
oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The
government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor
the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play
- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to prove the commitment of the
government to allow them to repurchase their land.
- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through expropriation proceedings may take
private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party as long as there is
public purpose to the taking.
- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a
law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint, and not the earlier taking.
- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of
eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution
authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by
the LWUA.
- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power.
This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of
governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty
53
of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of
just compensation.
- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to judicial review (City of
Manila vs. Chinese Community).
- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation
proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise held in trust then no
compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).
- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).
- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court
said that the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that
the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition
amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just compensation.
- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp.,
GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by
senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public
use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from private
establishments concerned.
- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the end, public interest is
served (Ardona vs. Reyes).
- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized housing is for public use.
- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the
public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the declared areas for priority
development, zonal improvement program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been
acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs.
Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).
Section 10- Non-impairment clause
- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions entered or perfected even prior
to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the States power of taxation save only
where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)
- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123
SCRA 135)
- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No. 195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA
8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for
the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose
owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights
- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.
- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay based organizatios in the nature of watch groups,
as in the case of bantay bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Banting and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, section 12
of the constitution. The Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor it can be considered a formal
arrest, by the very nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time
the procedure is conducted.
- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
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- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. Indeed counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.
- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in evidence.
- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.
- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court sustained the admissibility of the sworn
statements of the other accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP were administrative and
not custodial in nature.
- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
Section 13- Bail
- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later convicted of non-capital and which he
appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).
- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is not available in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty,
adopting the practice of not granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Govt. of
USA vs. Purganan, September 24, 2002).
- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007 Potential extraditee
may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Section 14- Rights of accused
1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard
- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19, 2001).
- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659
due to the failure of the information to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348
SCRA 476).
- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal
proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The
extraditees right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court- it is only
then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377,
2000).
-
- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11, 2014- the burden of demonstrating political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence.
3. Right to public trial
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs.
Estrada, June 29, 2001).
- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The
impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
55
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC
VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines outlined therein.
-
- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy trial maybe waived except when otherwise
expressly provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the
failure of the petitioner to assert his right, he is considered to have waived it.
4. Right to face to face confrontation
- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not
necessarily render the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it
would be a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA
696).
Section 16- Speedy disposition
- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary investigation with the Office of the
Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted for political reasons,
it is held that there was violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition
extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).
Section 17- Against Self-incrimination
- The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal in
nature (like forfeiture of property or dismissal from employment) and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal
proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).
- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice medical profession
(Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners).
- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination is
extended in an administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings.
The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party of not.
- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte
vs. Vasquez).
- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the
admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court decision on
the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the
Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
- The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that the right
against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission
of guilt and that it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the Court held that although
accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
- Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27
February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the
accused without the presence of counsel. In that case, the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right
against self-incrimination. It further stated that the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination
to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised
56
Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas
Section 19- Death penalty
- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had
deemed it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).
Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt
- The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment
for non payment of debt
-
- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from
a criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against
imprisonment.
Section 21- Double Jeopardy
- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy (Re
MR in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).
- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a series of events prompted the
Senate to declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor was the impeachment
proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of
double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).
- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of
one year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years.
- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the following must be established: 1)
the provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court
after notice to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a
subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).
- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of conviction. It merely approved the
agreement between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs.
Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
-
- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and
Article 353 of RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
Same with charging the offender under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography
constitute double jeopardy.
- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the
accused with different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not
proscribed; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder
- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law
on jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).
- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates
prospectively since its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.
- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court doctrines pursuant to the maxim
legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).
- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively.
(PP vs. Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).
- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto
was tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court
held no ex-post facto law was involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of DNA typing involved the
57
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas, an ex-post
facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)
-
58

2015 PreBar Notes in Constitutional Law

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2015 PreBar Notes in Constitutional Law

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2015 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)

- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Kalayaan Island Group

- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro

Tests of valid delegation:

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989

- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)

- Non delegation of legislative power

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;

Equal Protection of the Law

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

Section 4- Freedom of expression-

B.P. No. 880

SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--

-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.

- A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-

Section 7- Right to Information

- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.

Section 13- Bail

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

3. Right to public trial

4. Right to face to face confrontation

Section 16- Speedy disposition

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Section 19- Death penalty

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

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