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JOSE M.

KATIGBAK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAI HING CO., defendant.
PO SUN and PO CHING, intervenors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-29917 December 29, 1928

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY. The power of attorney given by the principal
authorized the agent to sell any kind of realty that "might belong" .to the principal. The use of the subjunctive
"pertenezcan" (might belong) and not the indicative "pertenecen" (belong) means that the authority given by the
principal referred not only to the property he had at the time the power was conferred, but also to such as he
might afterwards have during the time it was in force.

ID.; ID.; POWER OF ATTORNEY NOT RECORDED IN REGISTRY OF DEEDS. While it is true that a power of
attorney not recorded in the registry of deeds is ineffective in order that an agent or attorney-in-fact may validly
perform acts in the name of his principal, and that any act performed by the agent by virtue of said power with
respect to the land is ineffective against a third person who, in good faith, may have acquired a right thereto, it
does, however, bind the principal to acknowledge the acts performed by his attorney-in-fact regarding said
property. (Sec. 50, Act No. 496.)

FACTS:
Gabino Barreto Po Ejap was the owner of the land in litigation with the improvements thereon with a Torrens title
which was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank, to secure the payment of the sum of P60,000 with 7% interest
per annum.

Po Tecsi executed a general power of attorney in favor of his brother Po Ejap, empowering and authorizing him
to perform on his behalf and as lawful agent, among other acts, the following: "To buy, sell or barter, assign or
admit in acquittance, or in any other manner to acquire or convey all sorts of property, real and personal,
businesses and industries, credits, rights and action belonging to me, for whatever prices and under the
conditions which he may stipulate, paying and receiving payment in cash or in installments, and to execute the
proper instruments with the formalities provided by the law."

Po Tecsi executed an instrument acknowledging an indebtedness to Po Ejap in the sum of P68,000. A second
mortgage was executed on the aforesaid land with its improvements, in favor of Antonio M. H. Limjenco for the
sum of P140,000 and interest at 10% per annum.

Po Ejap sold to his brother Po Tecsi for the sum of P10,000 the land with its improvements, subject to the same
encumbrances. Po Ejap, making use of the power conferred on him by his brother, sold absolutely and forever to
Jose M. Katigbak, the property for the sum of P10,000, mentioning in the instrument executed to that end only
the mortgage lien of P60,000 in favor of the PNB, and without recording either his power of attorney or the sale in
the proper certificate of title. Notwithstanding said sale Po Tecsi remained in possession of said property.

Po Tecsi leased a part of said land to Uy Chia for a period of 5 years which contract was recorded in the proper
certificate of title.

Po Tecsi wrote to his brother Po Ejap complaining that he had been after him so much for the forwarding of the
rents of the property and explaining his precarious financial condition, telling him that he did not collect the rents
for himself, and promising to remit the balance after having paid all expenses of repairs and cleaning up, together
with the vouchers, so he could not blame him for anything.

Po Tecsi (?), answering his brother, wrote to the latter telling him that in October 1925, he had sent him a draft for
the sum of P2,000, and was therefore surprised that he claimed said rent. In said reply Po Tecsi also told his
brother that if he wanted to lease the property in question to Smith Bell & Co., he should not do so without first
consulting him, because if someone offered him a higher rent he wanted to exercise his right to lease it.

The mortgage on the land in favor of Antonio M. H. Limjenco was cancelled and recorded on the proper certificate
of title.
Po Sun Suy, Po Tecsi's son, was appointed administrator after the death of his father. He submitted an inventory
in which he included the land in discussion as one of the properties left by his father, and obtaining the transfer of
the certificate of title in his name as said administrator. He submitted to Po Ejap a liquidation of accounts showing
the rents collected on the property up to that month.

Po Sun Yao alias Po Sun Suy, told Po Ejap that times were bad, because the price of hemp had slumped, and
the plantations had suffered damages, and begged him to let him pay the rent later.

On the other hand, Po Ejap executed an instrument in favor of his son Po Sun Boo, assigning to him all his rights
and actions in the credit of P68,000 against Po Tecsi.

Katigbak sold the property to Po Sun Boo for sum of P10,000. The latter notified Po Sun Suy and Po Ching that
he had purchased the land they occupied and that from that date they were to deal with him concerning the
payment of the rents thereof.

Due to nonpayment of the rent up to the death of Po Tecsi, the present action was brought in the CFI Manila for
the recovery of said rent which amounts to P45,280, against the commercial firm Tai Hing Co., and the members
of said firm, Po Sun Suy and Po Ching, as well.

Po Sun Suy (judicial administrator of the estate of Po Tecsi), filed an intervention praying that judgment be
rendered against Katigbak, declaring him not to be the owner of the property described in the second paragraph
of the complaint and, therefore, not entitled to the rents of the property in question.

Appellants arguments: Po Ejap was not authorized under the power executed by Po Tecsi in his favor to sell
said land, for the reason that said power had been executed before Po Ejap sold said land to his brother Po
Tecsi.

The said power of attorney not having been registered in the registry of deeds, the authority granted therein to sell
realty registered in accordance with the Torrens system is ineffective, and the sale of the property in question
made by Po Ejap in favor of Katigbak by virtue of said power has no more effect than that of a contract to transfer
or sell.

ISSUE:
WON Po Ejap can sold the property (on behalf of Tecsi) under the general power of attorney before Tecsi owned
the property.

HELD;

The power is general and authorizes Po Ejap to sell any kind of realty "belonging" to the principal. The use of the
subjunctive (might belong) and not the indicative (belong), means that Po Tecsi meant not only the property he
had at the time of the execution of the power, but also such as the might afterwards have during the time it was in
force.

Inasmuch as in accordance with section 39 of said Act No. 496, "Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate
of title for value in good faith, shall hold the same free of all incumbrance except noted on said certificate," every
document which in any manner affects the registered land is ineffective unless it is recorded in the registry of
deeds. But such inefficacy only refers to third persons who, in good faith, may have acquired some right to the
registered

While it is true that a power of attorney not recorded in the registry of deeds is ineffective in order than an agent or
attorney-in-fact may validly perform acts in the name of his principal, and that any act performed by the agent by
virtue of said with respect to the land is ineffective against a third person who, in good faith, may have acquired a
right thereto, it does, however, bind the principal to acknowledge the acts performed by his attorney-in-fact
regarding said property.
In the present case, while it is true that the non-registration of the power of attorney executed by Po Tecsi in favor
of his brother Po Ejap prevents the sale made by the latter of the litigated land in favor of Katigbak from being
recorded in the registry of deeds, it is not ineffective to compel Tecsi to acknowledge said sale.

From the fact that said power and sale were not recorded in the registry of deeds, and from the omission of any
mention in the deed of sale of the mortgage lien in favor of Antonio M. H. Limjenco, and the lease of a part of said
land in favor of Uy Chia, the appellants deduce that said sale is fraudulent.

The record contains many indication that Po Tecsi was not unaware of said sale. His several letters complaining
of the pressing demands of his brother Po Ejap to send him the rents of the land, his promises to send them to
him, and the remittance of the same were a tacit acknowledgment that he occupied the land in question no longer
as an owner but only as lessee.

The appellants have tried to explain the remittance of said rents to Po Ejap by Po Tecsi, saying that they were in
payment of a debt which the latter owed the former for certain property which said Po Ejap had sold to Po Tecsi.
But there is nothing in any of said letters to indicate that said rents were sent on account of said debt.

The appellant deny that there has been any contract of lease between Po Tecsi and Po Ejap of the lands in
question, for the reason that there exists no document to evidence it. The evidence is clear that the rents were
payable in advance on the first day of each month. If this is so, then there is no need of a contract to prove the
existence of the lease.

The claim for rents due and unpaid by Po Tecsi, deceased, and proceedings for the settlement of whose estate
have been instituted, should be presented to the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in said intestate
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure and cannot be
collected by an ordinary action.

As to the rents accrued and unpaid since the death of Po Tecsi, his son Po Sun Suy, as administrator of his
property, having included said property in the inventory of the latter, the same is in custodia legis, and hence, the
rents collected by said administrator of said property are also in custodia legis. The claim then of Jose M.
Katigbak for the rents accrued and unpaid up to the date when said property was sold to Po Sun Boo, as well as
the accrued and unpaid rents from the time the latter acquired it up to the present date, must be presented in the
court taking cognizance of the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Po Tecsi's estate.

SC held that: (1) That Jose M. Katigbak was the absolute owner of the property in controversy, subject to the
encumbrances on the same appearing in the registry of deeds; (2) that his claim for the rents of the property in
litigation accrued and unpaid by Po Tecsi before his death must be presented to the committee on claims and
appraisal appointed in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said Po Tecsi; (3) that the
claim of Jose M. Katigbak for the rents of the said property collected by Po Sun Suy, as administrator of the
porperty of the intestate estate of his father Po Tecsi, must be presented to the court having cognizance of said
intestate proceedings.
PASTOR AMIGO and JUSTINO AMIGO,
vs.
SERAFIN TEVES,
G.R. No. L-6389 November 29, 1954

AGENCY; POWER OF ATTORNEY; BROAD POWERS GRANTED TO AGENT CONSTRUED. Where the
power granted to the agent is so broad that it practically covers the celebration of any contract and the conclusion
of any covenant or stipulation, the agent can act in the same manner and with the same breath and latitude as the
principal could concerning the property

"PACTO DE RETRO" SALES; LEASE COVENANT; LEASE IS MADE OF DELIVERY BY "CONSTITUTUM


POSSESSORIUM"; COVENANT IS GERMANE TO "PACTO DE RETRO" SALES. The lease that a vendor a
retro executes on the property may be considered as a means of delivery or tradition by constitutum
possessorium. It may be said, therefore, that the covenant regarding the lease of the land sold is germane to the
contract of sale with pacto de retro

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the court of origin in the sense
that plaintiffs, now petitioners, should not be made to pay the sum of P100 as attorney's fees.

FACTS:

Macario Amigo and Anacleto Cagalitan executed a power of attorney in favor of their son, Marcelino Amigo,
granting to the latter, among others, the power "to lease, let, bargain, transfer, convey and sell, remise, release,
mortgage and hypothecate, part or any of the properties . . . upon such terms and conditions, and under such
covenants as he shall think fit."

Marcelino Amigo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land for a price of
P3,000 in favor of Serafin Teves stipulating therein that the vendors could repurchase the land within a period of
18 months from the date of the sale. It was also stipulated that vendors would remain in possession of the land as
lessees for a period of 18 months subject to the following terms and conditions: (a) the lessees shall pay P180 as
rent every six months from the date of the agreement; (b) the period of the lease shall terminate on April 30, 1940;
(c) in case of litigation, the lessees shall pay P100 as attorney's fees; and (d) in case of failure to pay any rental
as agreed upon, the lease shall automatically terminate and the right of ownership of vendee shall become
absolute.

Sps. Macario Amigo and Anacleta Cagalitan donated to their sons Justino Amigo and Pastor Amigo several
parcels of land including their right to repurchase the land in litigation. The deed of donation was made in a public
instrument, duly accepted by the donees, and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The vendors-lessees paid the rental corresponding to the first six months, but not for the subsequent semester. In
view of the failure of the lessees to pay the rentals as agreed upon, Serafin Teves, the vendee-lessor, executed
an "Affidavit of Consolidation of Title", and registered said affidavit in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Oriental, who thereafter, issued to Serafin Teves the corresponding transfer of title over the land in
question.

Justino Amigo and Pastor Amigo, as donees, offered to repurchase the land from Serafin Teves by tendering to
him the payment of the redemption price but the latter refused on the ground that the ownership had already been
consolidated in him as purchaser a retro. Hence, before the expiration of the 18th-month period stipulated for the
redemption of the land, the donees instituted the present action.

Petitioners contention: While the attorney-in-fact, Marcelino Amigo, had the power to execute a deed of sale
with right to repurchase under the power of attorney granted to him, however, the covenant of lease contained in
said deed whereby the vendors agreed to remain in possession of the land as lessees is not germane to said
power of attorney and, therefore, Marcelino Amigo acted in excess of his powers as such attorney-in-fact. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, committed an error in not declaring said covenant of lease ultra vires and null and
void.
CA Ruling: The powers granted to Marcelino Amigo in the power of Attorney executed in his favor by his
principals, found that such powers are broad enough to justify the execution of any contract concerning the lands
covered by the authority even if this be a contract of lease.
It even went further: even in the supposition that the power to take the land under lease is not included within the
authority granted, petitioners cannot now impugn the validity of the lease covenant because such right devolves
upon the principals, who are the only one who can claim that their agent has exceeded the authority granted to
him, and because said principals had tacitly ratified the act done by said agent.

ISSUE:
WON the lease covenant contained in the deed of sale with pacto de retro executed by Marcelino Amigo as
attorney-in-fact in favor of Serafin Teves is not germane to, nor within the purview of, the powers granted to said
attorney-in-fact and, therefore, is ultra vires and null and void.

HELD:

We find no plausible reason to disturb this findings of the Court of Appeals. It is in consonance with the evidence
presented and with the conclusions that should be drawn from said evidence. This can be shown from a mere
examination of the power of attorney. A cursory reading thereof would at once reveal that the power granted to
the agent is so broad that it practically covers the celebration of any contract and the conclusion of any covenant
or stipulation. Thus, among the powers granted are: to bargain, contract, agree for, purchase, receive, and keep
lands, tenements, hereditaments, and accept the seizing and possessing of all lands," or "to lease, let,
bargain, transfer, convey and sell, remise, release, mortgage and hypothecate . . . upon such terms and
conditions, and under such covenants as he shall think fit." (Emphasis supplied).

When the power of attorney says that the agent can enter into any contract concerning the land, or can sell the
land under any term or condition and covenant he may think fit, it undoubtedly means that he can act in the same
manner and with the same breath and latitude as the principal could concerning the property. The fact that the
agent has acted in accordance with the wish of his principals can be inferred from their attitude in donating to the
herein petitioners the right to redeem the land under the terms and conditions appearing in the deed of sale
executed by their agent.

On the other hand, SC find nothing unusual in the lease covenant embodied in the deed of sale for such is
common in contracts involving sales of land with pacto de retro. The lease that a vendor executes on the property
may be considered as a means of delivery or tradition by constitutum possessorium. Where the vendor a retro
continues to occupy the land as lessee, by fiction of law, the possession is deemed to be constituted in the
vendee by virtue of this mode of tradition. We may say therefore that this covenant regarding the lease of the land
sold is germane to the contract of sale with pacto de retro.

While the lease covenant may be onerous or may work hardship on the vendor because of its clause providing for
the automatic termination of the period of redemption, however, the same is not contrary to law, morals, or public
order, which may serve as basis for its nullification. Rather than obnoxious are oppressive, it is a clause common
in a sale with pacto de retro, and as such it received the sanction of our courts.

Petitioners also contend that as the assessed value of the land in 1938, when the contract was celebrated, was
P4,280, the selling price of P3,000 agreed upon is considered as not written, and petitioners should be allowed to
exercise the right to repurchase on equitable considerations. And in support of this contention, counsel presented
evidence to show that the market price of the land in 1940, the year the period of redemption was supposed to
expire was 14 times more than the money paid for it by respondent such that, if that should be taken as basis, the
value of the land would be P43,004.50.

While this contention may have some basis when considered with reference to an absolute contract of sale, it
loses weight when applied to a contract of sale with pacto de retro, where the price is usually less than in absolute
sale for the reason that in a sale with pacto de retro, the vendor expects to re-acquire or redeem the property
sold. Another flaw we find is that all the evidence presented refers to sales which were executed in 1940 and
1941 and none was presented pertaining to 1938, or its neighborhood, when the contract in question was entered
into. And the main reason we find for not entertaining this claim is that it involves a question of fact and as the
Court of Appeals has found that the price paid for the land is not unreasonable as to justify the nullification of the
sale, such finding, in appeal by certiorari, is final and conclusive upon this Court.