[G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996.
] (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16,
with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition 1 defined and penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to
Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of
them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around
the barangays of Caibiran. 2
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion
where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became
suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the
government agents, fled.
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC,"
after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a
49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who
issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon,
SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. 4
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was
still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed
inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that
this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up. 5 Accused-appellant's claim
was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining
which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves. 6
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of
firearm under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporalmaximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having
found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to
suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. 7 It found
that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm from him and
that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's
submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay
Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and
Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions. 8
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:
"I.The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
II.The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in
the imposition of the maximum penalty against the accused-appellant."
9 and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade
This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati 10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and
to possess the same.
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting
the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained
that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant
but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense."
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence
for being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the
accused-appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12
where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search
be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by
the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments
are hardly tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's
group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit 13 and
that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers
were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around
the barangays of Caibiran. 14
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals
15 where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended
the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought
about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation.
There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nio told accused-appellant not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agent. 16 The peace officers did not know that he had committed,
or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the
report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that
the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be
effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-
appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances,
the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
firearm as evidence.
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second
element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees
with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that
accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. 17
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon
the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense
must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 18
In People v. Tiozon, 19 this Court said:
"It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged
with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to
possess the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions
of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the
burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a
negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if 'it is an essential
ingredient of the offense charged,' the burden of proof was with the prosecution in
this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense
charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient
of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against
appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681)
specifically alleged that he had no 'license or permit to possess' the .45 caliber
pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not
merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar
adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with
'having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the
qualifications required to be a voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack
of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime charged and
should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil.
564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he
had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain
patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical
Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held
that if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting
without the qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view of
the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such
circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence
obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree
that there was not even aprima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of
the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as
follows:
'The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better
means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making
the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who
alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge
thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this
is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a
business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the
prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge
of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-
existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the
defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the
want of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject
matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or
knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of
the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.' (6 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8)."
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on this
question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling: 20
"We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of
the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the
accused in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative
element provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite
recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the
elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of
evidence all the elements it has thus alleged."
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant
admitted before Police Officer Nio at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or
license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. 21 In other words, the prosecution
relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove the second element.
Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the corresponding license?
Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the accused-appellant can take the place
of any evidentiary means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the
pleading and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the
mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." 22 In other words, it is a
"statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other
facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." 23
From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4
of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case does not require proof."
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It
merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a
license.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution
was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of
appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact
alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words,
such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to
carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned." 24
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends
upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control
of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." 25
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National
Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed
for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered
immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT
@ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ateneo Legal Aid Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the morning of August 8, 1995, the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, dispatched the team of SP04
Dionisio Cloribel, SP02 Paguidopon and SPO1 Pamplona to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, after the latter received an information from his informer that an alleged marijuana pusher will
be passing at that place anytime that morning. At around 9:30, a "trisikad" carrying Nasario Molina and
Gregorio Mula passed by. SPO1 Paguidopon then pointed at Nasario and Gregorio as the pushers. The team
then immediately boarded the vehicle, overtook the "trisikad" and then requested it to stop. Mula then
handed the black bag, which he was holding to Molina. After introducing himself as police officer, Pamplona
requested Molina to open the bag. Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona however
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed the marijuana leaves inside.
For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana, accused-Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula
were found by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City guilty of violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced them to death.
The court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, were valid because accused-
appellants were caught in flagrant delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.
Hence, this automatic review.
In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the Supreme Court held that the accused-appellants
manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad,
accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting
officers that accused appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrant delicto arrest. Moreover, it could not be said that
accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Thus, the Court held that the arrest of accused-appellants did not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate
freedom and liberty depend. 1
For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in
their possession 946.9 grams of dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them. 6 Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1
Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed
at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City. 7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-
appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested. 8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M.
of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would
wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. 10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook
the "trisikad." 11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants
were accosted. 12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was
holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 13 Molina
replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." 14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers. 15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. 17 A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants,
but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence
from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their
counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act
7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to
be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24
of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the
entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for
the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action
as the case may be.
SO ORDERED. 19
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend: EICScD
 I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic),
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT,
NOT DEATH. 20
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal
of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. 21
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 22
Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions
of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. 23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). 25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just
been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). 27
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because
accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. 28 This brings us to
the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San, 29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore,
must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, 30
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin, 31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, 32 the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . . . [while]
holding . . . [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances
sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of
the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also,
in People v. Encinada, 33 the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a
motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes
'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' 35 In declaring the
warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. 36
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving
very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no g-round, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
 alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by
from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is
visible to Yu. 37 thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of
arresting officer. 38 Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to 96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy",
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly detained for other
allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a offenses. No costs.
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the SO ORDERED.
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. cCDAHE Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest.
What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to
note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer
while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a
closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted
that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the
arrest, to wit
"Q:When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and
how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to
another person?
A:Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and
Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of
Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula
and the thin one is Nazario Molina" 39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1 Pamplona could not have
learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly
conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the
arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguipodon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications,
merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before
the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on
the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless
arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any
suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or
fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances." 40 EN BANC

Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and [G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997.]
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 41
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin and Martinez Law Offices for petitioner.
SYNOPSIS
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand grenade, without
first securing the necessary license and permit from the proper authorities. On arraignment, petitioner,
assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court a quo found
petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under the said law and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of not less than seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as
minimum and not more than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Unable to accept conviction, petitioner filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent court erred in
affirming the findings of the trial court that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and legal.
The Supreme Court finds the petition impressed with merit. For purposes of determining appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account.
Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to the
Court and not the Court of Appeals. Hence, the challenged decision immediately fall in jurisdictional
grounds. Additionally, the Court is convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with
moral certainty. First, serious doubts surrounds the story of police office Yu that a grenade was found in and
seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify in court the grenade he allegedly seized.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier he was with the group about
to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against common experience that
petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to the police officers. Lastly, even assuming that
petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation police officer Serapio, such
admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. Verily, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a
lawful arrest. In view thereof, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside for lack of
jurisdiction and on ground of reasonable doubt.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, 2 as follows: LLjur
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess
and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or
permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," 4 while
the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of
arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. 5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu,
the arresting officer; Josefino C. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the
grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted
at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "[t]their eyes . . . moving very fast." 6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As
the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner
and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of
Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized
petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2
others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased
petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further
admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw
them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting
suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he
allegedly recovered from petitioner. 9
Josefino C. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan
were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two
suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent
counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions
even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"),
there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter,
Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned
over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Unit for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was inadmissible in
evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things,
the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19
March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then
affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the
specimen. During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he "found that [the] major components
consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive
and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he
forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided
at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to
stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession.
However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was
accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and
shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into
petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me."
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other
police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a "stop and frisk,"
where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information." 15 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed,
however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been
"premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers
"[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time,
place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different directions
as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited
search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest,
and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of
bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found
petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE
(1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30)
YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No.
15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST."
2.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT
WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions
provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search
was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its
decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that
petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the
police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from
petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in
evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as
petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade
and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s]
lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a
series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an
offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being
a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is
simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact
that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner
and his companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a
reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence
and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first
wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while
maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but
moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in
agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a
situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the
practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind,
and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied
upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that
someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited
article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a
check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving
intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically
notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to
observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police
officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had]
personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days
before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following
errors:
1.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID
AND LEGAL.
2.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless
arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to
commit a crime," as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner
of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and
that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by
the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not
the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal
therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The
term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of
Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's decision to this Court, yet
the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the
appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and
consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief
for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee
and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish
petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from
petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to
him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander
was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and
identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police
officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later or on 19 March
1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade
seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the
grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade
examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from
petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence
so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them,
then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as
police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in
proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been
close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation
by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation
of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was
present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and
to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner
were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures
refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5.Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure
of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief
discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry; thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in
the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted
to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's
credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest
and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that
petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A")
expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions
were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination: cdrep
QAnd what were they doing?
AThey were merely standing.
QYou are sure of that?
AYes, sir.
QAnd when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion?
ANone, sir.
QNeither did you see them create commotion?
ANone, sir. 42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as
noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. 43
EN BANC
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. [G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998.]

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA,
15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant.
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention,
unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause. Sison Salomon Gonong Miranda & Associates for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was apprehended by members of the Cavite PNP transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a
traveling bag and a carton box weighing 28 kilograms. The PNP officers alleged that they acted on a tip-off
by an informant that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of
marijuana.
Appellant during the trial disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He admitted coming all the way
from Baguio and proceeded to Dasmarias, Cavite, but denied carrying any luggage with him. The trial
culminated in a verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a decision of the trial court which imposed the
extreme penalty of death on appellant.
All errors assigned by the appellant, i.e. insufficiency of evidence, unlawful warrantless search and seizure,
and failure of prosecution to establish that the 28 marijuana bricks confiscated from him were the same
marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court, did not impress the Court.
The reversible error or the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the
penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian
hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua
and death. aDcHIS
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which
case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned
or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that
case was also in excess of the of quantity provided in Section 20.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 27, 1994 for violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:
cdasia
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of
Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver
twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited
drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the public interest. 1
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant
who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. 2 Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which
culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the
extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 3
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of
June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio
Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command
based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.
That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at
about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in
Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the
same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a
passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place. 4
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial
that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some
pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had
earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio
City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay
Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed
of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci,
the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she
reportedly worked as a supervisor, 5 although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any
document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the
evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable
the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can
be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in
nature.
1.Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient
evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered,
transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the
alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of
the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses
against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the
hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as
follows:
SEC. 4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various modes
of commission 6 being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs
as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its
punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any
of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving
away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged therein
and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The
governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided
by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or
more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing
the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be
dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. 7 In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly
establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the
illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's
asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been
produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order
to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the
State against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of
appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and
cannot be faulted as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations
of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both
testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could
be dispensed with by the prosecution, 8 more so where what he would have corroborated are the
narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.
Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and
preserve their invaluable services to the police. 9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in
court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course. 10 Finally, appellant could very well
have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court
below, 11 but which remedy was not availed of by him.
2.Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless
search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding
day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of
appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure
the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the
marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. 12 Evidence secured on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1)
customs searches; 13 (2) searches of moving vehicles, 14 (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; 15 (4)
consented searches; 16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18
have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for
time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While
there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by
name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be
delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset
know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance
wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being
brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming
that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make
preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the
coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had
to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at
midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their
leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the
time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin
and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover,
experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are
vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional
spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the
courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to
adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing
them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers. prcd
3.On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence
obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as
a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense. 19 On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the
instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). 20 These instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while
largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is
understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet,
and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 21
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of
filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized.
In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher
degree or quantum, 22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the
American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to
merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings
complained of, 23 or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a
reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime. 24
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under
discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the
quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. 25
It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the
investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." 26 It
should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as
legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag
and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man
even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly,
they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show
them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection
by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they
brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not
elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the
ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion
since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage.
It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the
constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search,
were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of
the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The
search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the
requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the
officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents
of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the
traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had
caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have
the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly
or impliedly. 27 Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search
should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law, 28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. 29
4.Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately
establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in
court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted
that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of
marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. The
articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the
marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such,
were the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who
categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant
appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily
answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can
therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio
City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which
had tested positive as being Indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in
violation of the law is beyond doubt. LLjur
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed
to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police
authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 30 which defines
certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the
arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or
admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and
more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the
prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object
evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.
5.The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia
that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of
Indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries
with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion
perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the
rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which
case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned
or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of
that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation
thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of
Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said
section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 32
While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do
not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single
indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation,
obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case,
there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63
of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal Case
No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 91107. June 19, 1991.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *
defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the
accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988
as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada
to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon
trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May
1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards
the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The
bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each
bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his
passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal
effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal
search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him
by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to
take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to
take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged
the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with
the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense. LibLex
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to
raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's
Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying
ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for proper disposition under
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 425, as amended.
SO ORDERED." 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues
that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a
peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
"SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. LLphil
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts
of each case. 9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because
of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. 12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused
came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time
to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the
traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was
acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities.
It was held that when faced with on-the spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there
was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only
when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers,
when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide
his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities,
to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that
was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in
requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said
bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy FIRST DIVISION
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming [G.R. No. 89139. August 2, 1990.]
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Rudy G. Agravante for petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant. SYLLABUS

SO ORDERED. 1.REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; SEC. 5, RULE
113 THEREOF. From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be
effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; NOT INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search and
seizure of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argued that when the two policemen approached the
petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. We disagree. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that
he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances
did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN ARREST; CASE AT BAR.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs.
de Villa. As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering
that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove
to be useless, futile and much too late.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence
Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him
to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke (tear
gas) grenade 3 a and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to
do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and
trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion
Temporal, and to pay the costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the
government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said
items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City." 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the
petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search
and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence against him. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argues that under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is
further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
"SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)"
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace
officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed
it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually
committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to
the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We
disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the
buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant. llcd
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs.
de Villa, 7 as follows:
 "Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped
and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints,
without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable
the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against
unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes
a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation
to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied)."
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering
that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only
after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:
". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in
the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured."
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General: cdphil
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk"
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a
spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion
of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated
that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer
approached the men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply.
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him.
Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found
another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed
weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States
Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In
such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order
to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated." 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85177. August 20, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MOISES MASPIL, JR. y WAYWAY and
SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Peter C. Fianza for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This petition is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declare the accuse MOISES MASPIL, JR. y
WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal transportation of marijuana as charged and hereby sentences EACH
of them to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay their proportionate
shares in the costs.
The confiscated marijuana (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-23"; "C", "C-1" to "C-16", "D",
"D-1" to "D-20"; "E", "E-1", to "E-14"; "F", "F-1"; "G", "G-1") are hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the Government and upon the finality of this decision, the
Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs
Board (NBI), through the Chief, PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit No. 1 Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, for disposition in accordance with law." (Rollo, pp.
25-26)
In Criminal Case No. 4263-R, the information filed against the two accused alleged:
"That on or about the 1st day of November, 1986, at Sayangan, Municipality of
Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
each other, and without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly transport and carry in transit from Sinto, Bauko, Mt.
Province to Atok, Benguet One Hundred Eleven Kilos and Nine Grams (111.9 kilos),
more or less, of dried marijuana leaves which are sources of dangerous and
prohibited drugs and from which dangerous and prohibited drugs nay be derived
and manufactured, in violation of the said law." (Rollo, p. 11)
The narration of facts by the trial court is as follows:
"According to Jerry Veleroso, Sgt. Amador Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all
members of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed
in Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on October 30, 1986, they established a
checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along
the Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles proceeding to Baguio City because their
Commanding Officer, Maj. Basilio Cablayan, had been earlier tipped off by some
confidential informers that the herein accused Maspil and Bagking would be
transporting a large volume of marijuana to Baguio City. The informers went along
with the operatives to Sayangan.
"At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives
intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his companion.
Upon inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two (2) plastic sacks (Exhibits "B"
and "D"), one (1) jute sack (Exhibit "C") and three (3) big round tin cans (Exhibits
"E", "F" and "G") which, when opened contained several bundles of suspected
dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", to "B-23"; "C-1" to "C-16"; "D-1" to "D-20";
"E-1" to "E-14"; "F-1" and "G-1").
"Maspil and Bagking were arrested and the suspected marijuana leaves were
confiscated.
"The confiscated items were later on referred to the PC Crime Laboratory, Regional
Unit I, for examination (Exhibit "A"). Forensic Chemist Carlos V. Figuerroa
performed the requested examination and determined that the specimen, with an
aggregate weight of 115.66 kilos, were positive to the standard tests for marijuana.
"The accused admitted that the marijuana dried leaves were indeed confiscated
from the jeep being then driven by Maspil with Bagking as his helper. However,
they claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged to two of their passengers who
loaded them in the jeep as paying cargo for Baguio City without the accused
knowing that they were marijuana.
"The accused declared that on October 31, 1986, at the burned area along
Lakandula Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs. Luisa Mendoza hired the jeep of
Maspil to transport her stock of dried fish and canned goods contained in cartons
to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, because her own vehicle broke down. They left
Baguio City at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon (11:30 in the morning, according
to Bagking) with Mrs. Mendoza, her helper and salesgirls on board the jeep with
Maspil as driver and Bagking as his own helper. They arrived at Abatan at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening.
"After unloading their cargo, Maspil and Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their
dinner before undertaking the trip back to Baguio City. While thus eating, they
were approached by two persons, one of whom they would learn later on to be a
certain Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if they were going to Baguio City and upon
being given an affirmative answer, he said that he would ride with them and that
he has some cargo. Asked what the cargo was, Buteng replied that they were
flowers in closed tin cans and sealed sacks for the commemoration of All Souls Day
in Baguio City. After Buteng had agreed to Maspil's condition that he would pay for
the space to be occupied by his cargo, Buteng himself and his companion loaded
the cargo and fixed them inside Maspil's jeep.
"Maspil and Bagking left Abatan at about 7:00 o'clock that same evening of
October 31. Aside from Buteng and companion they had four other passengers.
These four other passengers alighted at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet.
"Upon reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, Maspil stopped at the Marosan
Restaurant where they intended to take coffee. Their remaining passengers
Buteng and companion alighted and went to the restaurant. However, a soldier
waved at Maspil to drive to where he was, which Maspil did. The soldier secured
Maspil's permission to inspect their cargo after which he grabbed Maspil on the
latter's left shoulder and asked who owned the cargo. Maspil told the soldier that
the cargo belonged to their passengers who went to the restaurant. The soldier
called for his companions and they went to look for Maspil's passengers in the
restaurant. Later on, they returned and placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest
since their cargo turned out to be marijuana.
"Lawrence Balonglong, alias Banawe, a radio reporter of DZWX Bombo Radio who
was invited by Lt. Valeroso to witness the operation, affirmed the unsuccessful
pursuit of the alleged two companions of Maspil and Bagking. He recalled that he
was awakened from his sleep at the town hall in Sayangan after the arrest of
Maspil and Bagking. When he went to the scene, the NARCOM operatives boarded
the jeep of Maspil to chase the two companions of Maspil and Bagking. Balonglong
climbed on top of the jeep with his camera to join the chase. They proceeded
towards the direction of Bontoc but failed to catch anyone. Hence, they returned.
"Thereupon, Maspil and Bagking were taken to the town hall where they were
allegedly maltreated to admit ownership of the confiscated marijuana. At about
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, the soldiers took them away from
Sayangan to be transferred to their station at Baguio City. On their way, particularly
at Km. 32 or 34, they met Mike Maspil, an elder brother of Moises Maspil, and the
soldiers called for him and then Lt. Valeroso and his men mauled him on the road.
 "Mike testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1,
he was informed by a neighbor that his brother Moises was detained at the Atok
Municipal Jail. So he called for Jose Pos-el and James Longages, his driver and
helper, respectively, to go along with him to see Moises. They rode in his jeep. On
the way, they met the group of Lt. Valeroso. For no apparent reason, Lt. Valeroso
boxed and kicked him several times. Thereafter, Lt. Valeroso placed him under
arrest together with his driver and helper. They were all brought to a shoe store on
Gen. Luna Road, Baguio City, together with Moises and Bagking. There, Lt. Valeroso
got his wallet containing P210.00 and Seiko wrist watch but the receipt (Exhibit "3")
was issued by a certain Miss Pingil, a companion of Valeroso. He was released after
nine days. He then went to Lt. Valeroso to claim his wallet, money and watch but
he was told that they were with Miss Pingil. However, when he went to Miss Pingil,
the latter said that the items were with Lt. Valeroso. He sought the assistance of
then Tourism Deputy Minister Honorato Aquino who assigned a lawyer to assist
him. The lawyer advised him to file a case against Lt. Valeroso but because of the
intervening congressional elections, the matter has never been pursued." (Rollo, p.
21-24)
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors in their appeal, to wit:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED MARIJUANA AS
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT PRESENTED FOR
LABORATORY EXAMINATION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WERE ONLY TWO
OCCUPANTS, THE APPELLANTS, IN THE VEHICLE WHERE THE ALLEGED MARIJUANA
WAS CONFISCATED.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW THAT THE
CARGO THEY WERE TRANSPORTING WAS MARIJUANA.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED MARIJUANA.
V QAnd when you saw these persons, what did you do, if any?
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SHIFTING FROM THE PROSECUTION THE BURDEN
OF PROVING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED TO THE APPELLANTS TO
PROVE THEIR INNOCENCE." (Rollo, p. 40)
The main defense of the appellants is their claim that the prohibited drugs belonged to their two passengers
who loaded them in the jeep as paying cargo without the appellants knowing that the cargo was marijuana.
In the second and third assignment of errors, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in not
appreciating their version of the facts.
The appellants state that the trial court's reliance on Sgt. Baillo's testimony that they were the only ones in
the jeep cannot be given credence as Sgt. Baillo's testimony is full of inconsistencies.
The appellants cite Sgt. Baillo's inconsistencies as to the time of the arrest whether morning or afternoon,
the time the checkpoint was removed and the persons who were with him at the time of arrest.
It has been ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not on material points
is not fatal. Moreover, minor inconsistencies are to be expected but must be disregarded if they do not
affect the basic credibility of the evidence as a whole. (People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990)
The defense even state that there were a lot of policemen (T.S.N., December 1, 1987, p. 22) and it was but
natural that there would be confusion on who was there at the time of the arrest.
The trial court gave credence to the positive and categorical statement of Sgt. Baillo that there were only
two occupants, and these were the appellants inside the jeepney at the time (T.S.N., June 30, 1987, p. 18).
We see no cogent reason to reverse this finding of fact.
There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by any reason other than the desire
of the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith and credit to police officers
when the facts and circumstances surrounding then acts sustain the presumption that they have performed
their duties in a regular manner. (Rule 131, Section 5 (m), Rules of Court; People v. Marcos, supra; People v.
Yap and Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 87088-89, May 9, 1990).
The appellants put forward the testimony of Lawrence Balonglong which corroborates and affirms their
stand that there were, indeed, passengers in the jeepney.
However, a close perusal of said testimony reveals no such corroboration. The pertinent portions of
Balonglong's testimony is as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
QWhere were you when these two persons were apprehended?
AI was in the Municipal Hall asleep, sir.
QHow did you know then that these people were apprehended?
AIt is like this, sir, on the night of October 31, I was then asleep and at
around 11:00, I guess, p.m., they awakened me so I went and I
saw these two guys being apprehended by the Narcom
operative.
Court:
QYou saw them being apprehended?
ANo, sir . . . I saw them there.
QAlready apprehended?
AAlready apprehended.
Atty. Fianza:
AWhat I recall is that when I went to the road, where these two guys were
apprehended, the operatives boarded the same jeep and I even
climbed the jeep . . . on top of the jeep holding my camera and
tape recorder and we . . . I don't know . . . they chased,
according to the operatives, they chased two companions of
the two arrested guys." (T.S.N., May 11, 1988, p. 4)
In their brief, the appellants even admit that "he (Balonglong) did not see the passengers" and it was
just his impression that there were other people present. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7)
The appellants maintain that they did not know what was in the cargo. Their main concern was in going back
to Baguio City and they saw no need to question their two passengers on why flowers were being kept in
closed cans and sacks. They were apprehended after midnight. They traversed a lonely and reputedly
dangerous portion of the mountain highway.
The appellants' version is not believable. It is inconceivable that the appellants would not even bother to ask
the names of the strangers who approached them in a restaurant at night wanting to hire their jeepney,
considering that they were familiar with the identity of the passenger, Luisa Mendoza, who hired them to
transport her goods to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet.
It is likewise incredible that the appellants did not show the slightest curiousity as to why flowers were
being kept in closed tin cans and sealed sacks and cellophane. On the other hand, the appellants had clear
knowledge that Luisa Mendoza was transporting cartons containing dried fish and canned goods on the trip
out of Baguio. It is contrary to human experience that the appellants would inquire about the name of the
passenger and the cargo she was loading on their jeep and not doing the same about another who would
transport goods on a midnight trip.
Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness
than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. (People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA
292, 297 [1987]; People v. Aldana, G.R. No. 81817, July 27, 1989; People v. Pascua, G.R. No. 82303,
December 21, 1989).
The appellants further allege that if, indeed they knew about the contents of their cargo, they would have
adopted means to prevent detection or to evade arrest.
At the time the appellants were being motioned by the policemen to come nearer the checkpoint, there was
no way that the appellants could have evaded the arrest without putting their lives in jeopardy. They
decided to just brazen it out with police and insist on their version of the story.
As for the other assigned errors, the appellants in the first assigned error, contend that since there is a
discrepancy of 3.76 between the number of kilos stated in the information (111.9 kilos) and in the report
(115.66 kilos) of the forensic chemist, it is very likely that the marijuana presented as evidence was not the
one confiscated from the appellants or even if they were the same, it could have already been tampered
with. The appellants conclude that the marijuana then, cannot be admitted as evidence.
The marijuana examined by the forensic chemist, which was contained in three big round tin cans, two jute
sacks (there was really only one jute sack colored light green which was confiscated but since one of the
plastic sacks [green] appeared to be tattered, some of its contents were transferred to a white jute sack),
(T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 5) and two plastic bags colored yellow and green (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 3), was
positively identified to be the same as those confiscated from the appellants. This is very clear from the
testimony of Lt. Valeroso who stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
QWhen you went down, where were these two suspects, as you said?
AThey were sitted (sic) at the front seat.
QFront seat of what?
AThe jeep, sir.
QAnd did you ask or see what was inside the jeep?
AYes.
QAnd what were those?
AIt was all suspected marijuana dried leaves contained in three big cans,
one sack colored green, two sacks colored yellow and green."
(Italics supplied, T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 4)
Lt. Valeroso further testified that Exhibits "B" (yellow plastic bag), "C" light green jute sack, "D" (green
plastic bag), "E" (one big can), "F" (second can), "G" (third can) were, indeed, the same articles which
he saw at the back of the jeepney of the appellants. (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 5)
One of the appellants, Moises Maspil, even admitted that the articles identified by Lt. Valeroso in his
testimony were indeed, the same articles confiscated from their jeepney at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet.
(T.S.N., February 24, 1988, pp. 34-35)
Moreover, the words "more or less" following the weight in kilos of the marijuana in the questioned
information declare that the number of kilos stated therein is just an approximation. It can therefore be a
little lighter or heavier. The slight discrepancy is not material.
Another ground stated by the appellants for the inadmissibility in evidence of the confiscated marijuana is
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant.
In the case of Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989, the Court held that:
"xxx xxx xxx
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation
to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community."
The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was information that a sizeable volume of
marijuana will be transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein there will be a lot of
people going to and from Baguio City (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 6). In fact, during the three day
(October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there were also other drug related
arrests made aside from that of the two appellants.
But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This case involves a search incident to
a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant. This exception
is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
"SEC. 12.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
and Rule 113, Section 5 (1) which state:
"SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since they
were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April
6, 1990) A crime was actually being committed.
The appellants, however, cite the case of People v. Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In said case, the PC
officers received information that the accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was
carrying marijuana. When the accused-appellant was descending the gangplank, the PC officers detained
him and inspected the bag that he was carrying and found marijuana. The Court ruled that since the
marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence.
There are certain facts of the said case which are not present in the case before us. In the Aminnudin case,
the records showed that there was sufficient time and adequate information for the PC officers to have
obtained a warrant. The officers knew the name of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V Wilcon
9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of the said vessel.
On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact description of the vehicle and no
definite time of the arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling
in the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.
As for the fifth and last assigned error we agree with the Solicitor General that:
"Examination of the testimonies of appellants show that they admit the fact that
the confiscated marijuana was taken from their jeep while they were transporting
it from Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to Baguio City. This being so, the burden of the
 prosecution to prove illegal transportation of prohibited drugs punished under
Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, has been satisfactorily discharged. The rule in
civil as well as in criminal cases is that each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations. The prosecution avers the guilt of the accused who is presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved. Therefore, the prosecution must prove such
guilt by establishing the existence of all elements of the crime charged. But facts
judicially known, presumed, admitted or confessed need not be proved. (Rule 129,
Sec. 4, Rules on Evidence) (Appellee's Brief, p. 26-27)
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellants having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-63630. April 6, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO,
defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
"That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing fully
well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried
marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic)
the same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so." (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated
by the trial court as follows:
"It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late
evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of
the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan,
were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound
located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance
mission was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the
said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the
evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag (Exhibit
G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was
requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but
the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in
a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of
his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as
Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to
deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat.
Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report
(Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on
March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto
Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on
narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to
have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the
marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the
remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp
Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1)
and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-
1)." (At pp. 910, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
"The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot
a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his
uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in the business of
selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his
business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his
business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena
Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo,
Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a
balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able
to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house
up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to
catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able
to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening; that it was a Victory Liner Bus
that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only
bound for San Fernando Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner
Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus
going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he came to know
later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence
certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took
all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him
that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA
member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman, identified by him later
as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived; that Pat.
Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket
saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him; that inside his
pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall
be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he was thereafter
placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with
possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing
to help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he told his wife that
Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to
complain anymore as it would be useless." (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL
EVIDENCE." (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died.
Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra, and pursuant thereto, the Deputy
Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The
latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS
A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED
PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED
FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT." (At pp. 92-93,
Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Section 12.Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
". . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case
therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is
consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:
"Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not
need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v
Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1
kilos of marijuana."
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case
the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening,
approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying.
Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence
since it was seized illegally.
The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not existing in the case before us, which led the
Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein: prLL
"The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo
on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of
its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the
law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was
the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a 'search
warrant was not necessary.' "
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as
carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in
Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make
it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was
never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact
that the marijuana package brought by Patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for
examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman
Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination, and
the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the
letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper
authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the
forensic chemist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly
authenticated, still, we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo
which yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful
and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented
before the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This
Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be
merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960,
September 1, 1989; People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533
[1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the
trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses
both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520,
February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings: LLjur
"The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo
Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clear to show the commission by the accused
of the offense herein charged. These prosecution witnesses have no motive to
fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. The
knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the
official performance of their duties and their (sic) being no showing that they are
prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned patrolmen that what they found in the
possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the
examination findings conducted by Pat. Roberto Quevedo (Exhibit H) and by
Forensic Chemist Marlene Salangad of the PCCL, with station at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
"Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat.
Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory
Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet, otherwise he will be 'salvaged', why
will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the Municipal Building for interrogation
and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the
accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony of the accused
that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill and never returned the same to
him. If the two policemen really got any money from the accused and that the
marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still
produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G)
taken from the accused and which contained the marijuana leaves in question if
the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by the
prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there
is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any
 prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these SO ORDERED.
prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony
of the accused, the former should prevail." (Rollo, p. 13) Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself
through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other
witness was presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone
and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the
prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower
court, is an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt. LibLex
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
"The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1)
kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of
Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that when he confronted
the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the
marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the
marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused and the place he was
arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the accused is not
residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been
clearly established." (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in
court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it
to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that
the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to
be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch
as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of
his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in
People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
"In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of
official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the
Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his
constitutionally protected rights."
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted
a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the
information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the
marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams. Such amount is not a considerable
quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was
arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an
extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the
inferences in this case. LexLib
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but FIRST DIVISION
his actual possession. [G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI,
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended). defendant-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos. Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put
him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough investigation." 5
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted. 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic,
chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was
then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece
of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he
was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 1 6 He
also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged
not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court
also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which
may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees
all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination.
That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time
under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and
up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible
in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the
Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid
because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had
no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was
the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin
was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22
On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.,
who testified as follow:
"QYou mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"AYes, sir.
"QWhen did you receive this intelligence report?
"ATwo days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
"QWere you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
"AYes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from
that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports
of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel
Aminnudin.
"QYou said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with
respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
"AYes, sir.
"QDid you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
"AWell, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
"COURT:
"QPrevious to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive any report regarding the activities of Idel
Aminnudin?
"APrevious to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
"QWhat were those activities?
"APurely marijuana trafficking.
"QFrom whom did you get that information?
"AIt came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe
for security reason and we cannot identify the person.
"QBut you received it from your regular informer?
"AYes, sir.
 "ATTY. LLARIZA:
"QPrevious to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
"AMarijuana, sir.
"QAnd this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana
was received by you many days before you received the intelligence
report in writing?
"ANot a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
"QYou only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days before?
"AYes, sir.
"QYou mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that Aminnudin was
coming?
"ABefore June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on
June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he
was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports
that he has already consummated the act of selling and shipping
marijuana stuff.
"COURT:
"QAnd as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"AYes, sir.
"QIn the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
"AYes, sir.
"QAre you sure of that?
"AOn the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"QSo that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was
coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
"AOnly on the 23rd of June.
"QYou did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
"ANo, more.
"QWhy not?
"ABecause we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
"QIs that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need
a search warrant anymore?
"ASearch warrant is not necessary." 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
"Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly called
"buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise
time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence,
the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a
less evil that some criminal should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea JJ. concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 79965. May 25, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO RODRIGUEZ y COTARIAN,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case
No. T-1374, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425 as amended by B.P. No. 179). LLpr
I Rollo, p. 96).
The Information charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1984, at 3:30 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon,
more or less, at the ground floor of the Tabaco Bus Terminal, Municipality of
Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law or any
government agency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with
deliberate intent to violate the law had in his possession and control dried
Marijuana leaves and seeds, sell, deliver and distribute sticks of Marijuana" (Rollo,
p. 13).
On May 7, 1985, appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the information.
On July 8, 1986, the trial court rendered its decision, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
delivering, distributing and selling marijuana. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby issued, sentencing the accused, Pablo Rodriguez
y Cotarian, to the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and
with costs" (Rollo, p. 32).
Hence, this appeal.
II
The facts, as found by the trial court and presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:
"On July 21, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon, the Tabaco Police
Station received a report from an unidentified telephone caller that somebody was
selling marijuana inside the Wonder Dog Circus. Forthwith, Pats. Rogelio Gonzales
and Benito Bongalos proceeded to the Wonder Dog Circus near the public market
of Tabaco, to verify the report. Arriving at the place, they spotted appellant Pablo
Rodriguez and Gregorio Abrera acting suspiciously. Abrera was putting marijuana
inside his pocket (tsn., June 11, 1985, pp. 3-4).
Accordingly, Pats. Gonzales and Bongalos approached appellant and Abrera and,
after introducing themselves as police officers, placed the two under arrest. Pat.
Gonzales found a small pocket containing marijuana (Exhibit "B") inside the right
side pocket of appellant's pants (tsn., June 11, 1985, pp. 4-5). Upon the other hand,
Abrera voluntarily handed over a plastic tea bag containing marijuana (Exhibit "C")
to Pat. Gonzales (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 6, 8). llcd
Appellant and Abrera were then brought to the police station where they, as well
as the items confiscated from them, were turned over to Cpl. Santos Colarina, Chief
Investigator of the Tabaco Police Station (tsn., June 11, 1985, p. 5).
When investigated, Abrera voluntarily admitted having possessed the marijuana
confiscated from him but pointed at appellant as the one who gave him the
marijuana and blamed appellant for it (Exhibit "D"). Even as appellant heard Abrera
making said statements, appellant kept silent and failed to react (tsn., October 15,
1988, p. 41).
Lt. Lorlie Arroyo, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Bagong
Ibalon, Legaspi City, conducted an examination on the items seized from the
appellant and Abrera and found them to be positive of marijuana (tsn., May 7,
1985, pp. 11, 28).
Consequently, appellant was charged with violating Section 4, Article II, of R. A. No.
6425, as amended. Abrera, upon the other hand, was not similarly charged
presumably because he was a user. Any way, it was allegedly the Station
Commander of the Tabaco Police Station who opted not to press charges against
Abrera (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 19-20)" (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 3-5;
On the other hand, appellant gave the following version of the incident:
". . . . On June 21, 1984 at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he and a certain
Rogelio "Lilio" Cardano were at the "Wonder Dog Circus" at the bus terminal of
Tabaco, Albay, as they were selling an amplifier. Suddenly, they were searched by
Patrolman Gonzales and Bongalos, without any warrant, due to alleged
information, that they were selling marijuana (TSN, May 12, 1986, p. 4). But the
policemen did not find any marijuana. Instead, they found in his bag three (3) fifty-
peso bills (P150.00), the price of the amplifier, which was already in the possession
of the buyer, the owner of the circus (TSN, id., p. 5). Pat. Gonzales took the amount
and returned it to the operator of the circus (TSN, id., p. 7). Subsequently, the
accused and Abrera were brought to the Police Station, where the accused was
locked-up and mauled inside the prison cell (TSN., id., p. 5). While in prison, the
accused was approached by Pat. Gonzales who told him that he also had marijuana
for sale at P200.00 which he showed him (TSN, id., p. 6). However, the accused
refused the offer (TSN, id., p. 7). The amplifier was brought to the police station
and returned to the accused by investigator Colarina (TSN, id., pp. 7-8). The
accused was detained for one-and-a-half months, while Abrera was not (TSN, id., p.
6)" (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10). prLL
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of the offense charged. He assigns the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE
CONJECTURAL AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE
MARIJUANA SEIZED BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS WITHOUT WARRANT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON HIS SILENCE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE SWORN STATEMENT OF
GREGORIO ABRERA, WHO DID NOT TAKE THE WITNESS STAND, DESPITE HAVING
BEEN LISTED AS ONE OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE
PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
III
In his brief, the Solicitor General agreed with appellant's posture that the prosecution failed to establish the
act of unlawfully selling, distributing and delivering marijuana as alleged in the Information (Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 7; Rollo p. 96). But he claimed that the prosecution's evidence indubitably established
that appellant, having been caught in flagrante delicto in possession of marijuana committed the crime of
illegal possession of marijuana under Section 8, Article II of R. A. No. 6425, as amended (Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellee, p. 9; Rollo, p. 96).
We agree with the Solicitor General's assertion that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant sold,
distributed and delivered marijuana.
The records show that the two prosecution witnesses did not actually see appellant transact any business
dealing with marijuana. On cross examination, Pat. Gonzales testified as follows:
ATTY. GONZAGA:
 "Q:You mentioned of an investigation. There was actually no selling or transacting "Q:You said that at the premises of the Wonder Dogs circus, you saw the accused
of marijuana. Is that right? acting suspiciously. Is that right?
A:I did not see them actually transacting. However we saw them acting A:Yes, sir.
suspiciously.
Q:But you were actually there?
Q:But you did not see Pablo Rodriguez giving any marijuana to Abrera?
A:Yes, sir.
A:I did not. But when we were getting near them (accused), they started to leave.
(TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 10; emphasis supplied). Q:And you introduced yourselves as members of the INP?

Pat. Gonzales, upon further questioning by the trial court, said that: A:Yes, sir.

COURT: Q:After which, you frisked Pablo Rodriguez?

"Q:But you did not see actually (sic) Rodriguez giving the marijuana to Abrera? A:Yes, sir.

A:No, Your Honor, I did not" (TSN, June 11,1985, p. 10, emphasis supplied). Q:And in fact, you found inside his pocket this Exhibit "B". Is that right?

Pat. Bongalos also could not say whether appellant was selling, distributing or delivering marijuana to A:Yes, sir.
Abrera when he was placed under arrest. Q:You did the investigation per instruction from your police headquarters. Is that
The person, who is in the best position to testify whether appellant sold marijuana or not, was Abrera, as he right?
was the person whom appellant allegedly dealt with. We are placed at a quandary as to why Abrera was not A:Yes, sir.
prosecuted together with appellant nor was he made to testify for the prosecution when he was named as
one of its witnesses. As testified to by the prosecution witnesses, Abrera was not similarly charged with Q:So you acted merely from the information thru the telephone and the suspicious
appellant because Abrera, when investigated, pointed to appellant as the person who gave him the acting of the accused.
marijuana. The reliance made by the police investigator on Abrera's word is simply puzzling.
A:Yes, sir.
We have held that ". . ., when a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best evidence of
Pat. Bongalos also admitted that he did not personally know whether appellant was in possession of the
which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is
prohibited drug. He testified as follows:
withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose (Ching
Sui Yong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 187 [1990]). FISCAL VILLAMIN: (Continuing)
The sworn statement executed by Abrera, (Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person who gave him a "Q:For what was he investigated of?
tinfoil of marijuana is inadmissible in evidence and has no probative value. The failure of the prosecution to
present Abrera in court although he was named as one of the prosecution witnesses deprived the accused A:For the possession of marijuana.
the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. ". . . [C]ross-examination is an indispensable instrument of Q:Why do you know that he was in possession of marijuana?
criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm" A:Because from (sic) the information received thru a telephone call that a person
(People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991]). with a knapsack was in possession of marijuana" (TSN, October 15,
1985, p. 11; Emphasis supplied).
Having held that appellant is not guilty of the offense charged under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, we shall now dwell on the question whether appellant is guilty of possession of marijuana under There is no evidence to show that appellant was committing any crime at the time of his arrest.
Section 8, Article I of the same Act. cdrep
The testimony of Pat. Gonzales on the arrest of appellant is reproduced as follows:
After a careful review of the records and transcript of stenographic notes, we find that appellant should
FISCAL VILLAMIN:
likewise be acquitted of the offense of possession of marijuana.
(DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of appellant itself was also made without a "Q:How did you effect the apprehension?
warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there was a crime committed in the
presence of the arresting officers. A:While we were approaching the accused we saw them putting something inside a
bag.
The arresting officers went to the "Wonder Dog Circus" to verify a telephone call that a person with a
knapsack had marijuana in his possession. Pat. Gonzales admitted that they arrested appellant because he Q:What did you do then?
acted suspiciously. A:We apprehended them.
Part of his testimony is reproduced as follows: Q:Whom did you apprehend?
ATTY. GONZAGA: A:Pablo Rodriguez and Abrera.
(CROSS EXAMINATION) Q:What procedure did you observe in arresting Rodriguez?
 A:Furnished with the necessary information, we arrested the accused while he was
transacting marijuana.
Q:While making the arrest, what did you do?
A:I asked the accused what he was placing inside his pocket, and I found out that it
was marijuana" (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 4; Underscoring supplied).
To the question of the defense counsel as to whether he saw appellant selling marijuana, Pat. Gonzales
answered:
"I did not see them actually transacting. However, we saw them acting
suspiciously" (TSN, June 11, 1985; p. 10). cdll
To the same question of the trial court, Pat. Gonzales answered:
"No, Your Honor, I did not" (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 10).
The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal
belonging except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest (People v. De la Cruz,
184 SCRA 416 [1990]).
"If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest
without warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious
enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is
illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being 'the fruit of the poisonous tree'" (Guazon v. De
Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990]; People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]; U. S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917]; U.
S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 [1912]. In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial
suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding" (Nolasco v. Pao, 147 SCRA 509 [1987];
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]). llcd
The marijuana supposedly confiscated from appellant is therefore inadmissible in evidence for having been
taken in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Appellant is ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. llcd
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 87059. June 22, 1992.]
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y
TEJAS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Violeta C. Drilon counsel de oficio for accused-appellant.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly
of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads
that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was
therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly
received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless
lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1
they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away
but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos,
had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division. LLpr
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T.
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery
to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made
no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that
the weapon had been "planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B and C and admitted over
the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because
of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized
as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also
effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in
Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1).The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution.
This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in
case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will the wrong be repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His
reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person
may without a warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when
he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or
is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's
acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that
an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What
offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have
been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason
to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street
at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was
all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because
of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who
were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime. LLpr
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus
and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the
seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain
marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the
ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other
than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no
less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even
acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it.
All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared
at the police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the
policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed
that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in is presence or within
his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That
a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis
supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his
illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial
evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only
in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the
constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no
expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-
zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized. LLpr
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998.]
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January
16, 1995 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting
petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records of the case reveal that herein petitioner
was caught in possession of and under his custody twelve plastic cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams
containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana which is a prohibited drug. In his appeal before the Supreme
Court, petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him because (1) the pieces
of evidence seized were inadmissible; (2) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent
over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation
and to compulsory process; and (4) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not
properly identified. CIScaA
The Supreme Court finds that there was no compelling reason to reverse the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts. In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more
credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in
testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent
to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill
motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail. Furthermore, the
defense of alibi set up by petitioner deserved scant consideration. He simply contended that he was in his
house sleeping at the time of the incident. Lastly, the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence because he was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers. However, as for the other ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence,
the same are inadmissible in evidence considering that the said bags were seized at petitioner's house after
his arrest, hence, do not fall under the exceptions provided under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. In view thereof, the instant petition is denied and the challenged decision is affirmed with
modification as to the penalty.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January
16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting
petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. aisadc
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
"That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines the said accused,
not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed
flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is prohibited drug.
Contrary to law." 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14,
1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and
Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence
where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police
headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner
posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the
articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for
examination tested positive for marijuana, with total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner that on said evening, he was sleeping in house and was awakened only when
the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro,
and when they could not find the latter, he was brought to the police station for investigation and later
indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version of the
prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the
accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8,
Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine
of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared fortified in favor of government and shall be turned over
to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the following:
(a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the constitutional right
of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was
irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to
reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a
better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of
the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was
motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him
such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of
regularity of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty which provides:
". . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the
buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities
who where motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal
vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the
absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of
 regularity in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed." 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended
that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the
scene of the crime of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover,
the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence
was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant in court cast a
reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution
to produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to
establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of
the policemen who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified
him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
"We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants.
There is no compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that
the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution, was
straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if
credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient
to convict." 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a.when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx."
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-
bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade
of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing
over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes
of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same inadmissible
in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the
ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora
Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
"As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial
court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the
arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside
the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed
with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a
lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach
or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly
outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner
portion of his house was within his reach or control."
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental
to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision,
the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousands pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, with took effect on December 31, 1993, the
imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659, Section 20, and as interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of
marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory
provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty
imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1)
day six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum of TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97143. October 2, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO FIGUEROA, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. cdlex
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Arturo Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in an
information that read:
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ARTURO FlGUEROA of the
crime of Illegal Possession of the Firearm and Ammunition, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of November 1989 at San Francisco Subdivision,
Brgy. San Juan, Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control one
(1) pistol cal. 45 with defaced serial number with one magazine and seven (7) live
ammunitions for the said firearm without first having obtained the necessary
permit or license from competent authority to possess the same." 1
When arraigned, the accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty"; thereupon, trial ensued.
It would appear that on 10 November 1989, at around seven o'clock in the morning,
Captain Lodivino Rosario, the Executive Officer of the 215th PC Company, and his men arrived at the
residence of accused Arturo Figueroa at Barangay San Juan, San Francisco Subdivision, General Trias,
Cavite, to serve a warrant for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, in
Criminal Case No. 411 and Criminal Case No. 412 (for the crime of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions
and for Violation of Section 16, Art. III, Republic Act 6425). While serving the warrant of arrest, the
officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus
the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his
brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a
magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with
"shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted by the PC
team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items.
The accused, besides assailing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution,
questioned the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and rounds of ammunition which, he claims,
were discovered and taken during warrantless search.
On 30 October 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused Arturo Figueroa
guilty.
From the judgment, the decretal portion of which reads
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
(life imprisonment) and to pay the costs.
"The firearm and ammunitions are confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.
"Capt. Lodivino Rosario, Executive Officer, 215th PC Coy, is hereby ordered to
return to Arturo Figueroa the motorcycle with Motor Engine No. KIE 073574 taken
from the house of the Figueroas on November 10. 1989." 2
this appeal is interposed by Arturo Figueroa (a) reiterating his argument against the admissibility
against him of evidence seized following a warrantless search and (b) challenging anew the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.
The appeal cannot be sustained. cdll
The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While we might
concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with
consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that
the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 3
A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and
seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest 4 and so, in People vs. Musa, 5 this Court
elaborated; thus
"The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence."
Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony given by witnesses for
the prosecution despite what he claims to be inconsistencies in their declarations. Appellant
particularly calls attention to the assertion of prosecution witness Sgt. Atas, to the effect that
appellant was with a companion inside a room when arrested and that the seized firearm was found
under the cushion of the bed, against the statement of Capt. Rosario, another prosecution witness,
that appellant was alone when arrested and that the gun was found under appellant's bed. We do not
consider these discrepancies to be so major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned
testimony. It is not unnatural for witnesses of the same incident to somehow perceive differently and
to thereby vary in their respective accounts of the event. 6 The contradiction of witnesses on minor
details is nothing unusual and should be expected. 7 We see no cogent reason for not according due
respect to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses.
Finally, it is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up." The conduct of the appellant
following his arrest would belie this allegation. Appellant himself admitted that he failed to complain
about this matter when he was apprehended. Neither did he report the so-called "planting of the gun"
to the police authorities nor did he bring it up before the Metropolitan Trial Judge when he appeared
for preliminary investigation. In fact, it would seem that the only time appellant mentioned the alleged
"frame-up" was when he testified at the trial of this case. No plausible reason was given by appellant
that would have prompted police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime against him. Absent a
strong showing to the contrary, we must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty. 8
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. LexLibris
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 80508. January 30, 1990.]
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN
BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA
LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA
RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,
BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO,
FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA
ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA,
ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN
and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS
GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro
Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bonafide residents of Metro Manila and
taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or general
interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and
order in their communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests
and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the
action. prcd
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1.March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets,
Tondo, Manila.
2.June 19, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San
Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3.July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4.August 11 to 13, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma
Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5.August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco
Street, Tondo, Manila.
6.August 28, 1987 at 10:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila.
7.August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo,
Manila.
8.October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9.October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10.October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport,
Pasay City.
11.November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12.November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed
by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7)
persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500)
allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is
alleged that the following were committed:
"1.Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant or warrant of
arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes whole barangay
or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards.
"2.These raiders rudely rouse residents form their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some
in the process), and then ordering the residents within to come out of their
respective residences.
"3.The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men
are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other
imagined marks.
"4.While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the
raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way into each and
every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to conduct search of
the said houses without civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
"5.In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack
their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without total regard for their
value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders'
illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.
"6.Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing
frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.
"7.All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take
them to detention centers where they are any warrants of arrest duly issued by a
judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some
hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
"8.In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the
period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other
instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after a few days of
arbitrary detention.
"9.The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal operations.
"10.Many have also reported incidents of 'on-the-spot beatings', maulings and
maltreatment.
"11.Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to
mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information." (Rollo,
pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their Memorandum
after the petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of
the Constitution which provides:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied by
the respondents.)
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. . . . ."
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature described by
the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such
drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such
actions. llcd
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by
the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming
communist activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual
liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions
are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of
influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the
least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing
features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986], the Court stated:
"One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left
alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back
through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power.
Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he
surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord
and all the forces of the Crown.
"That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes.
Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of
authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right
after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more
now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
"That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of article IV of the 1973
Constitution:
"SEC. 3.The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals
(164 SCR 650, 660-661 [1988]):
"This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have
explained in the case of People vs. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
"'It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who
is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (ibid, p. 74.)"
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952])
emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend a sense of
justice. The court ruled:
"Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present case,
we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was
obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods
too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."
It is significant that it is not the police action per se which is impermissible and which should be prohibited.
Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend even hardened
sensibilities." In Breithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use
of evidence, in this case blood samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was nothing
brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
"Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive'
in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protective
eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood
was taken, but the absence of conscious consent, without more, does not
necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right; and certainly the
rest was administered here would not be considered offensive by even the most
delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole
community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven by common
experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. . . . ."
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far outweighed by the
value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police action. LexLib
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of the
exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their
truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter of
course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no
place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners are a complete
lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
"This is a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human rights. Not
only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded
with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations,
witnessed and recorded the events that transpired relative thereto. (After
Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the
alleged victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
"In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo,
President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate disregard for human rights
as 'total lies.' Here are excerpts from her strongest speech yet in support of the
military:
"'All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights
have been shown up to be total lies.
"' . . . To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with
every assurance that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share
the blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you
the final victory that I am certain will be ours.
"'You and I will see this through together.
"'I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
"'We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for
it is still a long way to lasting peace. . . . . The dangers and hardships to
our men in the field are great enough as it is without having them
distracted by this worthless carping at their backs.
"'Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic
development to pull out the roots and military operations to slash
the growth of the insurgency.
"'The answer to terror is force now.
"'Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our
economic and social initiatives bear fruit. . . . . Now that the extreme
Right has been defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the
war against the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch
our backs against attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27,
1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis ours.)'
"Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can be said
that petitioners misrepresent as human nights violations the military and police
zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in peace and safety." (Rollo, pp. 36-
38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists of
allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives
covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo
Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the
several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as
a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice.
Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in
addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged
and none of those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local and foreign
correspondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other
words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of media. The sight of hooded
men allegedly being used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been good television copy. If
true, this was probably effected away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General
contends, the allegation is a "complete lie." LLjur
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another aspect of the problem and
illustrates quite clearly why those directly affected by human rights violations should be the ones to
institute court actions and why evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before
petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat
areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or
rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly
what happened in the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week
of December, 1989.
The aerial target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or
criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment
to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused
from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal
zoning' could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not
encroach upon the rights of the individual.
It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation
drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the
alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled
areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. LibLex
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim
complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is
basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second
hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the
military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The
rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights.
They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that
occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they
should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is
necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring
together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads
of affected agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can
be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration
officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted:
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and
could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on
walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo
marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts
which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay
City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring
parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice,
the Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP for the drawing up and
enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush
out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the
police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.