Case 1

Merida v people,158182 June 12,2008

MERIDA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008
Ponente: Carpio
FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705for
"cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private
complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the felled
narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar
Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a
pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under
Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in
the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his
extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based
on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. YES.
2) W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. YES.
RATIO:
1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by
specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases.
However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases
concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person
from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development
who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who
claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any
rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a
complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
2) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority. The court also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by the forest products term
in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705
for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private complainant
Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the fell narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought
the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the
narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on
a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the
lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the
narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Ruling:
Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a
complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction
from trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity
and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who
reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who
claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules,
from filing a complaint ]before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The
court also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by the forest products term in PD 705, as the
law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.
Case 2
Mamongan v judge omipon, mtj-93-874,march 14, 1995
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, respondent.

Facts:
Augustus Momongan is the Regional Director of DENR in Tacloban City, while the respondent
Judge Omipon is the incumbent Judge of MCTC of Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte. At around 10:00
of November 14, 1992 the police officer of Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte apprehended a truck
loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck was owned by Basilio Cabig drived by Dionisio Golpe. After
the apprehension and confiscation, a preliminary investigation was done to determine whether there is a
probable cause to engender the owner of the truck and the driver guilty on the violation of PD 705.
Despite of the presence of prima facie evidence the respondent Judge ordered the release of the truck
apprehended. Mr.Cabig was charged against PD 705 but Mr. Golpe the driver was not included in the
complaint.
The Regional Director Momongan filed an instant complaint against the judge alleging that the
release order was a violation of PD 705 Sections 68 and 68-A respectively, and Administrative Order No.
59.Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the
non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the
same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office.
Respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that
Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of
hollow blocks, and the loading of the timber in the car is due to the request of his friend Cabig.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the crime of illegal logging. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, ordered the release of the truck owned by Golpe.

Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in releasing the truck used to transport an illegal lumber
despite of prima facie evidence for violation of PD 705 as amended by EO 277.

Ruling:
No, The court found that the respondent order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr.
Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable. According to the RPC, Every penalty imposed for the commission of a
felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which
it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the
property of a third person not liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the
illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted because
the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for
respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all
conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR
Secretary. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for
reinvestigation and motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done
as manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12.
Case 3
Aquino v people, gr 165448, july 27,2009
Case 4
Mustang lumber inc v ca, 104988, june 18,1996
MUSTANG LUMBER V. CA
G.R. No. 104988
June 18, 1996
Ponente: Davide, Jr.

FACTS: A consolidation of three cases. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in a lumber dealer
registered with the Bureau of Forest Development. Respondents are DENR Sec. Factoran and Atty.
Robles of the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the DENR.
Acting based on an information, the SAID team went to the lumberyard of petitioner and based
on a search warrant, were able to execute an administrative seizure of different kinds of lumber, to which
the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the documents such as corresponding certificate of lumber
origin and auxiliary invoices which shall prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Robles then
submitted a memorandum report to Factoran, ordering the cancellation of petitioners Dealers Permit,
filing of criminal charges, and confiscation of the trucks and lumbers. Lower court ruled in favor of
respondents, stating that possession of lumber without permit or authority is not a crime.

ISSUE: W/N a lumber cannot be considered timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal
logging under Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. NO.

RATIO:While PD 705 explicitly provides that timber is included in the term forest products, the term
lumber is found in paragraph (aa) of Section 3 which states that the latter is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the law uses the word lumber in its plain and common usage, and in the
absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, it shall be interpreted as such. Hence, it is safe to conclude
that the law makes no distinction whether the forest product is processed or not. Therefore, Judge Teresita
Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.
Case 5
Taupa v people, 184098, nov 25, 2008
Case 6
Monghe v people, 170308, march 7,2008
Case 7
Tigoy v ca, 144640, june 26,2006
TIGOY V. CA
G.R. No. 144640
June 26, 2006
Ponente: Azcuna

FACTS: On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City
since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his
intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City.
A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo. Petitioner Tigoy and a
certain Sumagang were then employed as truck drivers of Ong.
Due to a dispatch, policemen apprehended the trucks driven by Tigoy, based on a suspicion that
hot items were loaded therein. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber
beneath the cement bags in both trucks, and upon inquiry, the drivers could not produce any permit for the
lumber. Thereafter the Forester of the DENR named Dingal investigated and then charged petitioner with
violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for illegal possession of lumber without permit.

ISSUE: W/N Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without permit. YES.

RATIO: There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest
products without the required legal documents.Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting
lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of
their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting
the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know
about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement
in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the
trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement, however, the court is unconvinced because Tigoy
refused to stop at a checkpoint and when accosted, even offered grease money to the policemen. In
offenses considered as mala prohibita, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is
done knowingly and consciously.

Case 8
People v que, 120365, dec 17,1996
PEOPLE V. QUE
G.R. No. 120365
December 17, 1996
Ponente: Puno

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD
705.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will
pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on
patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the
truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said
truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs, but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a
permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which
penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not
indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws
and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O. YES.

Held: Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give
life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Thus Ques
possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section
68 of P.D. 705.
Also, the court rejected Ques argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest
products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or
removal of such forest products is legal. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the
DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial
because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents as malum prohibitum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant

Issue:
Whether the appellants activities consist an offense
Facts:
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the PTF went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck
with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the
8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No.
PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession,
control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chain saw lumber (Species of
Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total
amount of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper
authorities Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces
of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and
Elpidio Sabal The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area
covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his
hauling services
Ruling:
Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the RFC. When the
police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to
possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the
lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there
is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but
could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen
by merely looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:
a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without licence and
b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in the second
offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.

Case 9
Dagudad v pedaranda, am rtj-06-2017, june 19,2007

Case 10
Calub v ca, gr 115634, april 27,2000
CALUB V. CA
G.R. No. 115634
April 27, 2000
Ponente: Quisumbing

FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda
and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub,
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda,
for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code).
Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery of possession to them via replevin.
Upon petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere seizure
of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O.
No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court,
such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the
confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that
purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that
matter, added the appellate court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate
court said. Additionally, respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined
in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure
to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their
findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the
procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the
vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the
appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis

ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. YES.

RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent
documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the
involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note
further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon
and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of
the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second
time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written
notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for
a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and
hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not
be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise

Case 11
Factoran v ca, gr 93540, dec 13,1999
FACTORAN V. CA
G.R. No. 93540
December 13, 1999
Ponente: De Leon, Jr.

FACTS: On August 9, 1988, 2 police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, carrying
narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special
Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner
Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the
documentation of the narra lumber. Due to the failure of respondents to show the required documents,
petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the
confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. Private respondents neither asked for
reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, these items
were then forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public
auction on March 20, 1989.
Respondents then filed for preliminary injunction and replevin, to which the trial court acceded. Petitioner
then refused to obey the writ of seizure and filed a counterbond, to which the court denied because of lack
of service to the respondents. Court of appeals affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE: WON respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on the writ
of replevin. NO.

RATIO: Firstly, herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the
Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. However, petitioners waived this ground for
failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful
detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily
established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case
at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing
is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ,
replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the
function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Lastly, Sec. 80
of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the
seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to
criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in
Section 68-A

Case 12
Mamanteo et al v deputy sheriff manuel magumun, am-98-1264, jul 28,1999
[A.M. No. P-98-1264. July 28, 1999]
BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, FLORENTINO B. TRINIDAD, BONIFACIO MANGANIP and
EDGAR S. SALLIDAO, complainants, vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN,
[1]
respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
What should the sheriff do when he is informed by the defendant in a replevin that the property to be
seized is in custodia legis and in fact already forfeited in favor of the government by order of another
government agency?
This question assumes importance in light of the charges of grave misconduct filed by complainants
Basilio P. Mamanteo, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources (PENR) Officer; Florentino B.
Trinidad, Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENR) Officer; and Bonifacio Manganip and
Edgar S. Sallidao, both DENR forestry employees stationed in Tabuk, Kalinga, against Deputy Sheriff
Manuel M. Magumun of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Tabuk,
Kalinga, tasked with the enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with
Plate No. PJC-321 loaded with narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles
and cartons. Confronted by the forestry employees, Villamor Martinez, driver of the van, could not
produce any legal permit authorizing him to transport the narra lumber. Hence, after issuing seizure
receipts, the vehicle and its load of narra flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry employees.
On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was filed before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation of Sec. 78 of P.D. 705 [2] as amended, and
implemented by DENR Administrative Order 59. [3] On 24 July 1996, after due notice and opportunity to
be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by the DENR Regional Office
pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority to administratively order the confiscation and forfeiture of lumber
possessed without permit including its conveyance.
Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its agent Aimardo V. Interior,
filed a case for recovery of personal property and damages with application for writ of replevin with the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against herein complainants. The trial court issued a
warrant of seizure of personal property directing its sheriff to take hold of the van and its contents.
On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff Jacinto Contapay of
RTC-Br. 1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and agents of the Philippine National Police, went to the office of the DENR
in Tabuk, Kalinga, to enforce the warrant issued by the trial court but the forestry employees and officials
refused to release the van on the ground that it had already been forfeited in favor of the government and
was now in custodia legis. Despite this explanation, on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
accompanied this time by Sheriff John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tabuk, Kalinga,
and twenty (20) other persons, took the van without permission of the employees and officials of the
DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse of the five-day period prescribed by law for filing an
opposition to the writ, the vehicle was delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.
In his comment, Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his ministerial duty to execute the
warrant in accordance with its mandate and his duties as sheriff under the Rules of Court and the Manual
for Clerks of Court.[4] He conceded that he was informed by the forestry employees and officials of the
forfeiture of the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure but he reasoned that it was not within his
discretion to withhold the implementation of the warrant. [5] The execution of a warrant of seizure on a
vehicle allegedly forfeited in favor of the government was a question of law too technical for him to
resolve[6] and faced with such a dilemma he opted to follow the order of the court and execute the warrant
in accordance with its mandate.
On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very
literal interpretation of Sec. 4, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court as amended. [7] The OCA noted that while
Rule 60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed by the defendant in
the replevin that the personal property to be seized has been forfeited in favor of the government and is
already in custodia legis, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property
subject of the warrant of seizure. [8] The appropriate action should have been for respondent to inform his
judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure
to be observed.[9] For such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun
be penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at the very least.[10]
We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject of the warrant of
seizure had already been confiscated by another government agency and forfeited in favor of the
government.However, the novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion and justify
his insistence on taking the property subject of the warrant without waiting for instructions from his
judge. A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled
to the possession of the attached property, [11] much less does he have any discretion to decide which
agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
[12]
However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where there
is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where the plaintiff has shown by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of the property; that the property is wrongfully detained by
the defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, [13] then the executing officer has no other
recourse but to execute the warrant or writ expeditiously.
In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property had been
impounded due to violation of forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had already been issued by the
DENR. Moreover, he was advised that the proper remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal
the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR. [14] The prudent recourse then for respondent was to
desist from executing the warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead,
Deputy Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue haste as
evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of seizure on the DENR
officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A warrant could be returned within a period of
not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the executing officer.
[15]
Within this time frame, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge and thereafter
execute the warrant judiciously and with more certainty.
True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and
expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all
times conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and act above suspicion. [16] There must be no room
for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired with any
of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is the front line
representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.
As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to
retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, [17] tax assessment,
attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings
could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs,
as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because
in serving the courts writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to
err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. [18]
WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found guilty of grave
misconduct and, as recommended, is fined P5,000.00 for arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure
of personal property and for ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where
the personal property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government for
violation of forestry laws.Respondent is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a
more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Case 13
Paat v ca, gr 111107, jan 10,1997
PAAT V. CA
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997
Ponente: Torres, Jr.

FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then appealed.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of
the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA
affirmed upon petitioners appeal.

ISSUES:
1. W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of
an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705.
NO.
2. W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. YES.

RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him
following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through
the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in
the resolution of their case.
Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the
Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the
matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should not
have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the introduction of
Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now
from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be
imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code .

Case 14
Alvarez v pikop, gr 162243, nov 29,2006, MR gr no. 162246, dec 3,2009
ALVAREZ V. PICOP
G.R. No. 162243
December 3, 2009
Ponente: Chico-Nazario

FACTS: PICOP (Paper Industries Corp of the Phil) filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA (Integrated forest management agreement). In
the middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings
with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for
Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged
writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. Lower
court ruled in favor of respondents, CA affirmed, but upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed the
judgment of the CA. Now PICOP files a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled to the IFMA by way of mandamus and due to the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution in relation to Document 1969. NO, Document 1969 is not a contact, but a mere
collateral undertaking pursuant to the TLA.

RATIO: An examination of the Presidential Warranty (Doc. 1969) at once reveals that it simply reassures
PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and
guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic
sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut,
collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources,
such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot be
considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking
which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license. The ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying.
Also, PICOP failed to secure NCIP Cerification based on R.A. 8371 and Sanggunian consultation
and approval for environmentally critical projects based on the Local Government Code.