Etlex Volume1 PDF

ETHIOPIANLEGALINFORMATIONCONSORTIUM
EtLex, Volume 1
SelectedFederalCassationDecisions,and
EthiopianLawIndex(19952012)

EliasN.Stebek,Editor

JLSRIPublications
PublishedbyJusticeandLegalSystemsResearchInstitute(JLSRI)
AddisAbabaEthiopia
December2013

Founding Members of the Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium
Menberetshehai Tadesse, PhD (Director General, JLSRI)
Chairperson of the Consortium
Elias N. Stebek, PhD (Mizan Law Review, St. Marys University)
Coordinator for Legislation and Case Translations
Mesenbet Assefa, LL.M, PhD Candidate, AAU School of Law
Coordinator for Secondary Sources
Maereg G. Gidey, LL.M (JLSRI)
Consortium Secretary and Project Coordinator
____________
Members of the Working Group

Bantayehu Demile, Deborah Haddis, Hanna Arayaselassie, Hermella Getachew,
Luladay Berhanu, Mesfin Eshetu, Sintayehu Mitiku
EtLex Volume 1
Selected Federal Cassation Decisions, and Ethiopian Law Index (1995-2012)
First Published in 2013
Copyright: Justice and Legal Systems Research Institute 2013
All intellectual property rights reserved except as specified herein.
JLSRI grants permission for copies of the content in the volume to be made, in
whole or in part, by notfor-profit organizations and individuals, provided the use
is for educational, informational and non-commercial purposes only, and provided
that any such copy includes this statement in its entirety and also acknowledges
its source.
ISBN 978-99944-997-3-1
Acknowledgments
We thank the House of Peoples Representatives for providing us with the
soft copies of the proclamations and regulations indexed in this volume.
Moreover, we are grateful for the case translators whose names are
mentioned at the end of each abridged translation.
It is with gratitude that we express our appreciation for the African
Online Law Library Project initiated by African Innovation Foundation
and its implementing partner, Globethics, because it was under this
project that the case translations were done which ultimately led to the
publication of this volume by JLSRI.
iiEtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium
Contents
Contents ....................................................................................................................................................... iii
Foreword ...................................................................................................................................................... ix
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. x
Part One
Selected Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions
1. Agency
Atsebeha Wolday et.al v. Zuriyash Asegid, 73291 (13: 2012) 559-562 ............ 2
Nigisty Emnet v.Tewodros Tekle, 72337 (13: 2012) 549-552 ................................ 5
Beshah Kifle v. Atsede Dube, 50985 (13: 2012) 544-540 .................................. 10
Yonas Hiluf v. Estifanos et al, 38721 (12: 2012) 555-560 ......... 14
Habtu W. v. Meselu D.& Amakelech G/H., 50440 (10: 2010) 329- 331 ........... 19
2. Banking and Insurance
Nasir Abajabirs spouse and heirs v. CBE, 68708 (13: 2011) 464-466 ........... 24
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. CBE, 38572 (10: 2009) 289-291.............. 28
Ethiopian Insurance Corp. v. Beyan Oumar, 42139 (9: 2009) 118 -119...... 31
Eth. Ins. Corp. v. Benshangul-G. Ed. Bureau, 24703 (7: 2007) 225-228 ............ 33
Eth. Insurance Corp. v. v. Ferhan Ahmed et al, 23363 (6: 2008) 33-36 ........ 36
3. Business-related
Ethiopian Ins. Corp. -v.- Bale Rural Dev. Ent., 47004 (13: 2012) 392-398 . 40
Africa Insurance (SC) v. Dashen Bank (SC), 40186 (13: 2012) 402-416....... 43
Aster A. v. Amsale & Tibebe, 39608 (10: 2010) 335-337................................... 47
Meseret Hailu v. Zewdu Bireda, 33954 (9: 2008) 133-135 ........................................ 50
Tekle Wakjira v. Shonata Gubu, 19258 (7: 2007) 308-313................................... 53
4. Civil Procedure
Mistir Solomon v. Fikadu Kasahun et al, 74890 (14: 2013) 131-133........... 58
Gota Ejeta v. Ato Mudesir Redi, 72017 (14: 2012) 121-124 ..................................... 61
Apeno Engineering Constr. v. Tiruneh Y., 63699 (12: 2010) 375-376 ........... 63
African Insurance S.C. v. CBE, 57360 (12: 2011) 369-370........................................ 66
Tirhas Fishaye v. Zenebech Berihun, 43821 (9: 2010) 295-300........................... 68
December2013iii

5. Contracts
Negussie H. & Mamitu v. Huressa D. & Lelise, 72463 (13: 2012) 209-210 .... 74
Abrha B. v. Birkinesh H., 71927 (13: 2012) 215-217 .................................................... 77
Dashen Printers & Trading v. Fisseha Yihun, 71375 (13: 2012) 203-205......... 80
Andarge I. v. Zehra M., 64397 (13: 2012) 200-202 ....................................................... 83
Ethio-Telecom v. G. Ginaho, 61331 (13: 2012) 175-178 ........................................ 85
Birkinesh Birru v. Kifle Habdeta, 25912 (5: 2008) 343-345 ................................. 88
6. Contracts related to Immovable Property

Shiferaw Dejene et al v. Sisay Abebu, 78398 (14: 2012) 51-54 ........................91
Alganesh A. v. Gebru E. & Workitu E., 36887 (13: 2008) 233-235................. 95
Yohannes T. v. Amarech M., 58157 (12: 2011) 107-110 ....................................... 98
Meseret Bekele v.. Elza Somonella, 57356 (12: 2011) 98-100 .......................... 102
Alehegn G/hiwot v. Etenesh Bekele et al, 39803 (8: 2009) 369-371 ........... 105
Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa et al, 33295 (7: 2008) 51-57...................... 108
7. Criminal Law
Tesfaye T. v. Prosecutor of Federal EAC, 73514 (14: 2012) 240-244 ....... 112
Wudima A. v. SNNPR Public Prosecutor, 66856 (13: 2012) 296-298 ......... 117
Tesfaye A. v. Public Prosecutor, 48617 (10: 2010) 208-209.............................. 120
Fasil B. v. Oromia Reg. St., Pub. Pros., 42703 (9: 2009) 22-25........................ 123
Jemila M. v. Public Prosecutor, 381613 (9: 2009) 11-13.......................................127
Seid Y. v. Amhara Region Ethics & AC., 34077 (7: 2008) 287-291 ....... 130
Asnake B. v. Public Prosecutor, 31734 (7: 2007) 283-286 .................................. 134
8. Customs and Taxes
TeshoAB PLC v. ERCA, 71070 (14: 2012) 175-177................................................. 137
Habesha Cultural Centre v. ERCA, 74753 (13: 2011) 514-516............................. 140
Abebe G. v. Arada Sub-city Revenue Office, 69921 (13: 2012) 521-524........ 144
A. Adventist M School v. ... Revenues Office, 66474 (13: 2011) 506-510 ...... 147
ERCA v. Adale S. & Phromisis PLC, 57100 (11: 2011) 348-350.........................153
9. Family Law
Dereje M. v. Frehiwot P., 74451 (14: 2013) 160-162 ................................................ 157
Yeromwork et al v. Asegid, 54827 (11: 2011) 129-131......................................... 160
Gebreselassie Amare -v.- Abrehet Techane, 46608 (11: 2010) 6-7................. 162
Seniya v. Belaynesh & Sherif, 43988 (11: 2007) 107-109.................................... 164
ivEtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium
Poster v. Veno & Letitiya, 44101 (10: 2010) 44-47.................................................. 167

Fantanesh et al v. Molla, 42682 (10: 2009) 8-9............................................................ 170
Zenebetch v. Birkinesh, 42648 (10: 2009) 19-20 ....................................................... 172
10. Intellectual Property
ARTMFF v. Elias Asegahegn, 78856 (14: 2013) 269-274...................................175
Samuel H. et al v. Simret A. et al, 68369 (13: 2011) 576-581 .......................... 180
Ethio Cement v. IP office, 57179 (12: 2011) 544 -548............................................ 185
Artistic Printing Press v. Getahun Shiberu, 44520 (10: 2010) 339-341 ...... 190
Mulu H. v. Zemenai Printing Press PLC, 42253 (9: 2009) 149-151............. 193
11. Judgment Execution
Wegagen Bank v. Selamawit T. et al, 81616 (14: 2013) 265-267.................198
Rakeb M. v. Federal Prosecutor, 79860 (14: 2012) 261-264 ............................ 200
Seida Debele v. Sherif Shikur, 73041 (13: 2012) 596 -597................................... 204
Lulseged A et al. v. Flora Eco & FELU, 70378 (13: 2012) 585-587.............. 207
Atatu K. v. Steps at Educational PLC., 59301 (11: 2011) 451-453 ...................... 209
Mohammed Ismael v. Mohammed Ahmed, 32143 (8: 2008) 382-383........... 213
12. Jurisdiction
Wasihun M.s spouse & heirs v. AGH, 43511 (14: 2013) 211-215...................216
Weldai Zeru et al v. ERCA, 51790 (12: 2011) 482-485............................................ 221
Eth. Electric Power Corp. v. Dragados Const., 42928 (10: 2010) 262-263...... 224
Nigist H. v. Legessie A, 37339 (9: 2009) 101- 103........................................................ 226
Office of the Patriarchate v. Mezgebu B., 34440 (9: 2008) 85-86........................ 229
Assefa B. v. Military Prosecutor, 33368 (9: 2008) 89-91............................................ 232
13. Labour Law
Wesene Medical Service v. K. A., 77134 (14: 2012) 5-7...........................................235
World Vision Ethiopia v. Mezemir M., 79105 (13: 2012) 94-96.......................... 239
Mitiku H. v. Mesfin T., 67201 (13: 2012) 64-65.............................................................. 241
SOS Childrens Village v. Kebede Kumsa et al, 38435 (8: 2009) 169-170...... 244
Addis Ababa Restaurant v. Yewibdar T., 37256 (8: 2008) 116-118.................... 246
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia v. Alemayehu W, 33314 (6: 2008) 355-360...... 249
14. Property Law
Frehiwot M. G. v. Mebrahtu G. & & Desta W., 81081 (14: 2013) 191-194....252
Kirkos Sub-City W. 6 Ad. v. Alemtsehay W., 67691 (13: 2011) 460-462........ 255
December2013v

Taitu Kebedes Heirs v. Tirunesh et al, 67011 (13: 2012) 450-452..................... 258
Genet S. v. Kirkos Sub-City K. 17/18 Ad. et al, 64014 (13: 2012) 437-440.... 261
Heria M. v. Shemsu Y., 60720 (11: 2011) 289-292 ...................................................... 265
Rahel Sinetsehay v. Mesfin Tamrat, 55081 (11: 2010) 256-257.............................. 269
Abadit L. v. Zalambesa T. Ad. & Berhane Z., 48217 (11: 2010) 249-251........ 271
Samuel T. v. Ayisha A. et al, 43081 (10: 2010) 232-234........................................... 274
15. Successions
Leul K. v. Seble K., 73247 (14: 2013) 175- 177..............................................................278
Daniel T. & Tsion T. v. Asalefe T. ..., 58338 (11: 2011) 135-138........................ 281
Hanna T. v. Taemu D., 57114 (11: 2011) 66-67............................................................ 284
Robel Negusises Tutor, Tarikua Abebe, 49851 (10: 2010) 68-69........................ 286
Amare R. v. Solomon K., 43069 (10: 2010) 70-73 ....................................................... 289
Tewodros M. v. G/Hiwot T., 40510 (8: 2009) 269-271.............................................. 292
16. Torts (Non-contractual Liability)
Ethiotelecom v. Nigussie Tefera, 77238 (14: 2012) 203-206...................................296
Alemnesh Ermo v. Alem Mesfin, 74111 (13: 2012) 495-497................................. 300
Govt Housing Ag. v. Tsehaye Z. & Sultan K., 54518 (11: 2011) 419-421..... 303
Ayele Admasu v. Ajebu Shume, 42962 (10: 2010) 244-245................................... 306
Ethiopian Roads Authority v. Temegnehu E., 38457 (9: 2009) 79-81................. 309
Ministry of Agri. and Rural Devpt v. Alsha, 32144 (5: 2008) 156-157................ 311
17. Miscellaneous
Wegagen Bank v. ERCA, 81215 (14: 2013) 290-294...............................................314
Getachew D. & Fantu T. v. Rukiya K., 68573 (13: 2012) 623-625................. 319
Getnet Yenew v. Iyob Binyam, 60392 (11: 2011) 557 -559................................ 322
Bahir Dar CAS v. BD Textile (3 resp.), 54567 (11: 2011) 522-524................ 325
Berhane Tessema v. Tamrat Kidane et al, 42824 (11: 2009) 539 -541........ 328
Mukmil Mohammed v. Miftah Kekir, 38794 (9: 2009) 173-175........................ 331
viEtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium
Part Two
Index of Proclamations and Regulations (1995-2012)
Index 1:
Index of Proclamations: Constitution, Codes of Law and State Organs
1. Constitution ........................................................................................................................336
2. Codes of Law .....................................................................................................................336
Codes of law
Amendment to codes of law
3. FDRE, Flag, Emblem and Holidays .........................................................................336
4. Executive Organs .............................................................................................................336
5. Legislative Organs ...........................................................................................................337
6. Judicial Organs .................................................................................................................337
7. Various Organs .................................................................................................................337
8. City Charters ......................................................................................................................338
9. Defense and Police............................................................................................................339
10. Fund Establishment ......................................................................................................339
11. Budget, Fiscal Year: Ethiopian Calendar (1995-2005 Eth. Calendar)..............339
Index 2
Index of Proclamations: Themes and organs
1. Agriculture and Rural Development .........................................................................340
2. Banking and Insurance ...................................................................................................340
3. Business related ................................................................................................................341
4. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure .....................................................................342
5. Customs and Taxes .........................................................................................................343
6. Education .............................................................................................................................343
7. Electoral Law ....................................................................................................................344
8. Environmental Law .........................................................................................................344
9. Health ...................................................................................................................................345
10. Human Rights .................................................................................................................345
11. Intellectual Property .....................................................................................................345
12. Investment ........................................................................................................................345
13. Labour Law, Civil Service and Pensions .............................................................346
14. Land Law and Urban Planning ................................................................................346
15. Media Law .......................................................................................................................346
16. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events and Immigration ...........................347
17. Societies and Foundations ..........................................................................................347
18. Professional Services:
Advocates, Auditors, Medical Practitioners, Consultants .........................347
19. Utilities: Electricity, Telecommunication ............................................................347
20. Miscellaneous .................................................................................................................347
December2013vii

Index 3
Index of Proclamations: Agreements
1. African and Sub-regional ..............................................................................................348
2. Air Transport Agreements ............................................................................................348
3. Avoidance of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion Agreements ................349
4. Co-operation, Trade, Investment Promotion & Protection Agreements.....350
5. Peace and Security ...........................................................................................................353
6. Other agreements and conventions ...........................................................................354
7. Loan and Financing, 2012 ............................................................................................354
Index 4
Index of Regulations: Themes, Sectors and Institutions
1. Agriculture and Rural Development ..........................................................................356
2. Banking and Insurance ...................................................................................................356
3. Business related ................................................................................................................356
Mining
Registration and Licensing
Trade and Industry
Transport
Others
4. Criminal Law .....................................................................................................................357
5. Education ............................................................................................................................357
6. Environmental Law .........................................................................................................358
7. Health ...................................................................................................................................358
8. Intellectual Property ........................................................................................................358
9. Investment ..........................................................................................................................358
10. Labour Law, Civil Service, Pensions .....................................................................359
11. Media Law .......................................................................................................................359
12. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events, Immigration .................................359
13. Professional Services:
Advocates, Auditors, Medical Practitioners, Consultants........................359
14. Societies and Foundations ..........................................................................................359
15. Utilities ..............................................................................................................................359
Electricity
Telecommunications
16. Water resources and water works ...........................................................................360
17. Miscellaneous .................................................................................................................360
18. Various organs and institutions ................................................................................361
Index 5
List of Proclamations (Amharic) ............................................................................................363
Index 6
List of Regulations (Amharic) ..................................................................................................383
viiiEtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium
Foreword
Access to justice is a right enshrined in major international human rights

instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights, International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. This right is enshrined in the FDRE
Constitution and various legal and policy documents including the Growth and
Transformation Plan and the National Justice System Reform Program. One of
the pillars of access to justice is making legal information accessible.
To this end, the Justice and Legal Systems Research Institute, the School
of Law of Addis Ababa University and Mizan Law Review of St. Mary's
University have formed a Consortium and have been working in partnership
with the African Law Library (ALL). The objective of the initiative is to
provide online access to legal texts and secondary literature on African law
and governance. The Consortium is wholeheartedly engaged in various efforts
toward making legal information accessible. We are thus working towards
making available legislation, court decisions and secondary literature, audios,
videos and a range of texts on legal and justice related issues of Ethiopia.
After the initial tasks were accomplished, this initiative was launched at a
workshop on August 22, 2013 during which stakeholders provided very useful
feedback and pledged to participate in the pursuits of enhancing the
accessibility of legal information in Ethiopia.
The publication of this book is an outgrowth of two of the tasks that have
been accomplished under this initiative, i.e. thematic indexing of legislation
(1995-2012) and the translation of one hundred Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Decisions. This is indeed a significant contribution in the
enhancement of easy and effective accessibility of legal information. Thus,
EtLex Volume 1 adds value and capacity to the ongoing national efforts to
enhance access to legal information.
Even if the publication of this book was not part of the African Law
Library project, it has benefited from the tasks that have been accomplished by
the Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium. The indexing of laws done as
part of the project and the case translations indeed constitute the foundation
for the publication of this volume. Thus, I would like to express my
appreciation to the African Innovation Foundation and its implementing
partner Globethics.net, for initiating the African Law Library project, and I
thank all those who participated in the preparation of this book.
Menberetsehai Tadesse (PhD),
Assistant Professor of Law
Director General, JLSRI
December2013ix

Introduction
As legislation is the primary source of Ethiopian law, its indexing significantly

reduces duplicity of efforts to identify relevant proclamations and regulations
on a given theme or legal issue. Moreover, it makes it easier to identify the
proclamations and regulations that have been repealed or amended. EtLex
Volume 1 covers the proclamations and regulations enacted since Proclamation
No. 1/1995, i.e. the FDRE Constitution. A descending order is used in listing
indexes 1 to 4 so that more recent legislation can gain priority in sequence.
However, Indexes 5 and 6 use an ascending sequence as they are meant to
facilitate reference to Amharic titles and numbers of the proclamations and
regulations.
Indexing legislation is a continuous process. The take-off phase is thus
modest, and we are optimistic that more can be done in EtLexs future
volumes. A case in point is the need to widen the scope of the indexes
included herein by incorporating laws enacted prior to 1995 which are still
operative. The content of the indexing can also include directives. Another
domain of focus in future publications of EtLex can include the applicability
status of proclamations, regulations and the provisions therein.
The indexing in this volume is largely thematic. Index 1 embodies the
FDRE Constitution, Codes of Law, laws dealing with state organs and various
public institutions, etc. while Index 2 presents various themes and a list of
proclamations relevant to the themes and organs. Agreements and conventions
ratified by Ethiopia are mostly included in Index 3, while some are classified
under the thematic Index 2, as in the case of international instruments on
environmental law. Future volumes of EtLex can enhance the integration of
international instruments ratified by Ethiopia under the thematic index because
they form an integral part of Ethiopias legal regime. Relatively similar
thematic indexing is used for regulations under Index 4.
The last two indexes include list of proclamations (Index 5), and
regulations (Index 6) in Amharic. They are meant to enable readers of EtLex
Volume 1 to easily identify the exact Amharic wording of the title of
proclamations and regulations. They also enable readers to identify the year of
enactment in Ethiopian Calendar. In principle, Geez numerals should have
been used. However, utility has taken precedence as most readers might find it
convenient to read the numerals they frequently use.
In addition to facilitating access to legislation, EtLex aims at availing
access to abridged translations of the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division. Even if Ethiopia does not pursue the common law
tradition, the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division are
xEtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium
binding on all courts with regard to interpretation. The decisions of this Court
do not of course create case precedent (in its common law conception) because
the decisions cannot be cited as case law or legal principles. Yet, the
interpretation of legal provisions in this court as applied to specific legal issues
in a given fact situation should to be pursued in all courts.
The decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division fall
between case law and non-binding judgments that may only have a persuasive
function. This volume thus includes federal cassation decisions which can be
considered as part of the Ethiopian legal regime with regard to the
interpretation of legal provisions. Such binding interpretations apply to legal
issues specifically (and not incidentally) analyzed in the decisions of the Court
provided that the fact situation is similar to the one which was the basis of the
federal cassation decision.
One hundred translated cases are published in this volume. Some parts of
the decisions (other than the parts that deal with analysis and reasoning are)
abridged wherever necessary. The cases are mostly selected by the translators,
except a few cases that were identified and assigned to translators. The terms
of reference that were provided to the translators were the potential for the
frequency of the issues at courts, and the level of analysis in the case.
Wherever possible, translators were encouraged to give attention to more
recent cassation decisions.
The chapter titles under which the case translations are classified are
largely based on the categories used in the fourteen volumes of the decisions
of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. However, minor changes
are made in the classification of the chapters as in the case of the chapter on
successions. Alphabetical sequence is used for the chapters. The volumes and
page numbers in which the original decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division are published (online) are indicated at the end of every
translation.
We would like to appreciate the online accessibility of the fourteen
volumes of the cassation decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division. Moreover, the positive contribution of various websites, databases
and portals in enhancing the accessibility of these volumes is indeed
commendable.
Elias N. Stebek (PhD), Associate Professor
Chief Editor, Mizan Law Review
St. Marys University
December2013xi

PartOne

SelectedFederalSupreme
CourtCassationDivision
Decisions
1. Agency
File Year Vol. Pages

No.
1 Atsebeha Wolday et.al v. Zuriyash 73291 2012 13 559 - 562

Asegid
2 Nigisty Emnet v.Tewodros Tekle 72337 2012 13 549-552
3 Seshah Kifle v. Atsede Dube 50985 2012 13 544-540
4 Yonas Hiluf v. Estifanos et al 38721 2010 12 555-560
5 Habtu Woldu v. Meselu Desta & 50440 2010 10 329- 331

Amakelech G/Hiwot
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter1:Agency1
Atsbeha Welday -v.- Zuriash Asegid

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 73291 (July 11, 2012)
Holding of the court:
- A contract made by a person who has no valid power of attorney
(agency) at the time of making of the contract has no legal effect.
- In contracts that require registration, it is the date of registration and
not the date written on the document that is regarded as the date of the
contract.
- A contract of agency terminates upon the death of the principal, and
Article 2232(2) does not allow concluding a contract on behalf of the
deceased principal.
Articles 2232(1), 1204(2), 2005(2), 2232(1) and 2015(a) of the Civil
Code and 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution.
______________
Cassation File No. 73291
Hamle 4, 2004 EC (July 11, 2012)
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

Adane Negussie
Petitioners: (1) Atsbeha Welday (2) Kibatu Gidey
Respondent: Zuriash Asegid
The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case started at the Assosa Zone High Court of the Benishangul Gumuz
Regional State. The current respondent was the plaintiff.
The plaintiff stated that her daughter Dinke Mekonnen appointed Atsbeha
Welday as her agent on Hamle 13, 1996 E.C. (July 19, 2004) to administer her
house located in Asosa Zone, Kurmuk Wereda. Since Dinke Mekonnen died
on Hamle 29, 1998 E.C. (August 5, 2005), the agency contract also terminated
on the same day [owing to the death of the principal]. After Dinkes death, the
petitioners lived in the house for two years and they were not willing to leave
the house. The current respondent (i.e. plaintiff at the lower court) requested
that the petitioners should leave the house and claimed payment of Birr 2,000
2EtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortiumDecember2013
(two thousand) per month as house rent. The petitioners (former respondents)
argued that the first petitioner sold the house to the second petitioner on Sene
20, 1997 E.C. (June 27, 2005) while he was W/ro Dinke Mekonnens agent
empowered to sell and exchange the house. After hearing the litigation of both
sides, the High Court rejected the respondents (i.e. current petitioners) claim
and decided that the first petitioner sold the house on June 27, 2005 (Sene 20,
1997 E.C.) and the sale contract was authenticated by the Regions Justice
Bureau.
The respondent appealed against the High Courts decision. The Regional
Supreme Court rejected the appeal by invoking Article 337 of the Civil
Procedure Code.
The respondent lodged her petition to the Regional Supreme Court
Cassation Division. The Cassation Division found that the first petitioner sold
the house, authenticated the contract and delivered the house to the second
respondent in 2001 E.C and 2003 E.C. which was after the death of W/ro
Dinke. So it decided by majority that since the agency contract had terminated
upon the death of W/ro Dinke, the house should be returned to the respondent.
On October 4, 2011 (Meskerem 23, 2004 E.C.), the petitioners lodged a
petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division stating that the
second petitioner bought the house for Birr 4,000 (four thousand) and has
spent more than Birr 400,000 (four hundred thousand) on the house. They
argued that the decision to invalidate the contract of sale is inappropriate since
it will be difficult to reinstate the parties to their former position. They claimed
that the decision is based on fundamental error of law and sought its reversal.
The respondent in her written response submitted on December 23, 2011
(Tahisas 13, 2004) stated that the first petitioner sold the house to the second
petitioner in bad faith and with full knowledge of the death of the principal
(W/ro Dinke) and termination of the agency contract. She argued that the
decision of the Regional Cassation Division to invalidate the sale contract did
not contain error of law.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the decision
of the Regional Cassation Bench. We have examined whether the first
petitioner sold the house to the second petitioner after the death of the
principal (and the termination of the agency contract). Pursuant to Article
2232(1) of the Civil Code, a contact of agency shall terminate upon the death
of the principal or where he/she is declared absent or becomes incapable or is
adjudicated bankrupt. The facts of the case show that the first petitioner (the
agent) sold the house to the second petitioner after the death of the principal or
after the termination of the agency contract as envisaged under Article 2232(1)
of the Civil Code.

The cumulative reading of 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution and 1204(2),

2005(2) and 2232(1) of the Civil Code show that ownership can be transferred
to another person only by the owner or by the person who has a valid special
agency. The petitioners had the sales contract registered at the Regions
Justice Bureau in [2002] E.C. This shows that the transfer of ownership was
made by the person who did not have valid power of agency. Therefore, the
transfer has no legal effect. The decision of the Regional Cassation Division to
invalidate the contract of sale is thus based on these legal provisions and has
no error of law.
The minority opinion in the Regional Cassation Division explained that
the registration of the sale contract at the Regional Justice Bureau is covered
by Article 2232(2) of the Civil Code. The petitioners also argued that the sale
was made on June 27, 2005 (Sene 20, 1997 E.C.) but it was authenticated at
the Regions Justice Bureau in 2002 E.C. However, this argument is not
tenable because the date that should be considered as the date of the contract
between the petitioners (regarding the sale of the house) is not what the parties
have stated on the document. By virtue of Article 2015(a) of the Civil Code,
the date of the contracts registration at the Regions Justice Bureau is
considered as the date of the contract. Moreover, the content of Article
2232(2) and the legislative intent behind it do not allow the agent to sell a
house or continue performing as agent after the death of the principal. We
have not thus accepted the arguments of the petitioners which invoked Article
2232(2).
The contract for the sale of the house is void ab initio (void from the very
beginning) and of no effect. The argument of the second petitioner based on
the interpretation rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
in File No. 47800 is not relevant to this case. We have thus found that the
decision of the Regional Cassation Decision rendered by majority opinion has
no error in law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State Supreme Court
Cassation Division is affirmed.
2. If the second petitioner has a claim against the respondent of any unlawful
enrichment, he has a right to sue and submit his claims under relevant
legal provisions.
...
Signature of five justices
_____________________________________________
Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions
Volume 13, pp. 559-562
Abridged translation: Solomon W/Tensae & Fasil Abebe
Nigisti Emnet -v.- Tewodros Tekle

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 72337 (March 5, 2012)
Holding of the Court:

- There is no legal ground for concluding that evidence submitted by
administrative organ to correct previously submitted evidence can be
regarded as inadmissible on the ground that different documents are
submitted on the same issue.
- Where a contract of agency shows that the power of attorney given to the
agent is a special agency, the fact that the document does not mention
Article 2205 of the Civil Code (which deals with special agency) does not
lead to the conclusion that a special authority is not given.
- An issue raised regarding the admissibility of evidence is an issue of law,
and can thus be entertained by the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court.
Articles 2205, 2005(1), 2179, 2199, 2203 and 2204 of the Civil Code
_____________

Yekatit 26, 2004 E.C (March 5, 2012)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Nigisti Emnet

Respondent: Tewodros Tekle
Judgment
The case concerns a claim for the return of a house. It started in the Afar
National Regional State, Dubti Woreda (District) Court, where the current
respondent was the plaintiff. The respondent in the pleading he submitted to
the Logia Woreda Court stated that the petitioner refused to return the house
located in the city of Logia, given to her by the father of the respondent, the
deceased Ato Tekle Kidane. The petitioner on the other hand contended that
she has sold the property to a third party using her power of attorney that was
given to her by the father of the respondents. The Woreda Court examined the
case and rendered a decision that the petitioner is not required to return the
house, as it was proven that she sold the house according to the power of
attorney given to her by the owner of the house before he left the county.
The respondent brought an appeal against this decision to the Zonal High
Court, which, after further examining the case and hearing additional
evidence, held that the case should have been adjudicated only upon payment
of court fee. The court decided that the case should be remanded to the lower
court so that it shall be seen after payment of court fee.
The respondent brought an appeal to the Regional Supreme Court. The
Court found that the remanding of the case by the Zonal High Court is
procedurally incorrect and that there is a law of procedure that allows it to
change the issue of the case and examine it itself. The Regional Supreme
Court found different issues have been raised on the contract of agency and on
the documents attesting the sale of property. It also found that the contents of
the contract allow the petitioner only to perform acts of management on the
house but not to sell or exchange it. The Regional Supreme Court thus
reversed the decision of the Zonal High Court and rejected the petitioners
appeal.
The Supreme Court rendered this decision stating that the documents
produced as evidence are not reliable. While the document attesting the power
of agency dated Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) was verified by the
Regional Justice Bureau, the organ which is alleged to have registered the
contract of agency, it again wrote another letter stating that it was registered in
the relevant dossier thereby replacing a prior letter given by the office. When
oredered by the court to verify the same issue, the Bureau had previously
replied that the document could not be found. The Court stated that examining
the contents of the power of attorney submitted by the petitioner only allows
acts of management, and does not enable her to sell or exchange the house
under litigation. This cassation petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division is thus brought against this decision.
This court examined whether the power of attorney given to the
respondent goes beyond acts of management and whether it allows her to sell
the house. It ordered the joinder of the respondent. The latter then submitted a
statement of defense stating that the case could not be seen by the Cassation
Division as the petition is based on a substantive issue [rather than
fundamental error in law].
This court has examined the argument of the respondent that this cassation
petition is inadmissible because it involves a substantive issue and the act of
weighing of evidence which is outside the power given to the court by law.
Although the Cassation Division is entrusted with the responsibility of
remedying an error of law as per Article 80(39)(a) and Article 10 of
Proclamation No. 25/1996, and not that of examining the substance of the case
or weighing of evidence, it has the authority to entertain this case because the
admissibility of evidence is a question of law that falls under the scope of its
mandate. The Cassation Division thus rejected the contention of the respondent.
Moreover, this court holds that there is no legal ground for rejecting letters
submitted by an administrative office retracting a previous letter written on the
same subject-matter. It further holds that the main issue would be verifying
which of the letters are correct and admitting the correct one as evidence.
In the case at hand, the contract of agency document and the contract of
sale have been proven by the letters written the second time by the relevant
administrative office. The respondent did not contest the authenticity of these
documents; nor did the courts which examined the substantive issues of this
case contest them. Thus, on top of the unsound reasoning based on which the
Supreme Court rejected the documents as evidence, the conclusion that it
reached on the contract of agency is not tenable under the law. The document
brought as evidence for the contract of agency allegedly concluded on
Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) shows that the father of the respondent
assigned the petitioner to do acts of management and send the proceeds of the
sale of the house to him.
The statement of the Supreme Court that, the power of agency given to the
petitioner as per Article 2203 and 2204 of the Civil Code is to do acts of
management on the property and not the sale or exchange of the house is not
acceptable because it omitted part of the contract of agency which gives
authority for the sale and exchange of the house, in addition to performing acts
of management. In fact the contract of agency while listing the kinds of
activities the petitioner can carry out cites Article 2199 of the Civil Code. It is
stipulated under Article 2205 of the Civil Code that the power to sell and
exchange an immovable property requires special agency. While Sub-article 1
of this provision states that if the agent is called upon to perform acts other
than acts of management, special authority shall be required, Sub-article 2
stipulates that the agent can sell or mortgage a property if he/she has a special
authority.
The decision of the Supreme Court was given without having due regard
to the powers of the agent listed under the contract of agency, in addition to its
assumption that the power of agency given to the petitioner is general agency
as the provision cited was Article 2199 of the Civil Code. Thus, there is no

legal provision which warrants the conclusion that special agency does not
exist unless Article 2205 of the Civil Code dealing with special agency is
mentioned. The contract of agency shows that the agent is given the power to
sell an immovable property, and this fact proves the existence of special
agency.
The key issue is that the tasks given to the agent are listed in a clear
manner in the contract of agency, and not that the relevant provisions are
mentioned. In a situation where the contents of the document are clear,
invalidating the document on the ground that the relevant provisions of the law
are not mentioned by the principal and/or the agent would be against the
intention of the contracting parties, and would be against the rules of
interpretation of contracts. Hence, this court holds that the decision of the
Appellate Division of the Afar Regional State Supreme Court did not take into
account Articles 2179, 2205 and 2005(1) of the Civil Code, and has thus
committed a fundamental error of law.
Because the agent sold the house with the power lawfully given to her, this
court examined the kind of remedy that would be available for the respondent.
It is proven that the respondent is the lawful heir of the principal. Moreover,
the petitioner has not, during the litigation at the Cassation Division nor in the
lower courts, raised the issue of having given the money acquired from the
sale of the house to the respondent or other heirs of the deceased. Rather, in
the statement of defense submitted to the Cassation Division, the petitioner has
clearly stated that, apart from giving the proceeds from the sale of the house,
she should not be required to return the house to the respondent. This court
holds that there is no legal ground based on which the respondent can claim
the possession of house. However, he can request his share of the money
acquired from the sale of the house as an heir of the principal. The court has
rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decision of the Afar Regional State Supreme Court File No 2310
rendered on Nehassie 12, 2003 (August 18, 2011) stating that the petitioner
does not have the power to sell the house apart from performing acts of
management is reversed according to Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code.
2. There is no legal ground to deny the admissibility of the contract of
agency which attests the power of agency given to the petitioner on
Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) by the father of the respondent, and
the contents of the document show that it authorizes the petitioner to sell
the house which was sold accordingly. The petitioner is not thus obliged to
return the house.
3. The petitioner shall give the respondent the proceeds from the sale of the
house, as per the latters right of succession.

_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 549-552
Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey

Seshah Kifle & Setugn Bekele v. Atsede Dube & Azalech Dube
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 50985 (November 15, 2011)
Holding of the court

- Contract of agency should be interpreted narrowly.
- The power of agency envisaged under Article 58 of the Civil Procedure
Code and Article 2204 confers administrative power, and it does not
include the mandate to transfer a house to a third person.
- Sale or pledge of immovable property requires special power of agency.
Articles 2181(3), 2204 and 2205 of the Civil Code
Cassation File No.50985

Hedar 05, 2004 E.C (November 15, 2011)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu , Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,
Adane Negussie
Petitioners: (1) Seshah Kifle; (2) Setugn Bekele

Respondents: (1) Atsede Dube; (2) Azalech Dube
Judgment
The petitioners brought this case to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Bench stating there is fundamental error of law in the Oromia Supreme Court
Cassation Bench decision. The subject-matter of the dispute was that the first
petitioner who is the first respondents child and second respondents brother
did not have special agency to sell, exchange or transfer immovable property.
The respondents stated that the first petitioner only had the power to
administer the house in Metehara; nevertheless, he sold the house to the
second petitioner.
The respondents requested the court to invalidate of the contract. The
second petitioner, on the other hand, argued that he bought the house from a
person who had the authority to sell it. He also stated that he incurred Birr
150,000 (one hundred and fifty thousand) to improve the property after
purchasing it. He thus requested that his ownership be confirmed by the court,
and in the alternative demanded that the respondents be held jointly and
severally liable for the refund of the money. The East Showa Zone High Court
after hearing the arguments from both parties and examining the evidence
decided that the house was sold in accordance with the power of agency given
to the first petitioner and there is no ground to invalidate the contract.
The respondents dissatisfied with this decision appealed to the Regional
Supreme Court but the court rejected the appeal. The respondents then brought
their case before the Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench. The court
decided that the respondents did not give a special power of agency that
allows selling the house and that the contract of sale between the first and
second petitioners is of no effect. The court also decided that unless the first
petitioner wants to sue the second petitioner he could not bring cross claim
against the respondents.
In a cassation petition submitted on December 15, 2009 to the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Bench, the petitioners stated that the Oromia
Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench has not addressed the argument
submitted to it. They argued that the power of agency the respondents gave to
the first petitioner included the power to represent them, and transfer property
in their name when needed. The petitioners contended that the first petitioner
concluded the contract of sale in accordance with this power of agency and the
Courts decision to invalidate the contract has a fundamental error of law.
Even if the contract is invalidated, the omission of a holding with regard to the
money invested (by the second petitioner) on the property constitutes error in
law.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the power of agency given
to the first petitioner is not a special agency that empowers him to sell
immovable property, but only allows him to follow up formalities in the
transfer of property on their behalf. They argued that the decision of Regions
Cassation Bench in this regard has no legal error and that the second
petitioners claim to be paid Birr 150,000 has no legal ground.
The issues considered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
were: whether the decision of the lower court that invalidated the contract
between the first and second petitioners is appropriate; whether the lower
courts have failed to render a decision on the second petitioners counterclaim;
and whether the Regions Supreme Court Cassation Division decision that the
second petitioner can only sue the first petitioner and not the respondents is
appropriate.

With regard to the first issue, the court examined the content of the
contract of agency concluded between the two parties on March 22, 1993. The
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division found that the power of agency
envisaged in the contract falls under Article 58 of the Civil Procedure Code
and Article 2204 of the Civil Code that confers administrative power on the
Agent, and does not include he power of transferring the house to a third
person. The Court noted that sale or pledge of immovable property requires
special agency. This court decided that the power of agency given to the
petitioner did not specifically confer special agency which allows the agent to
transfer ownership of immovable property or pledge it to a third party.
Special agency conferred based on Article 2205 should specify each task
to be performed by the agent. The phrase to conclude a contract on our
behalf should be interpreted as a mandate to perform the acts of management
stated under Article 2204, and cannot include the act of selling or exchanging
immovable property. It is to be noted that Article 2181(3) of the Civil Code
requires a contract of agency to be interpreted narrowly, and the power given
by the respondents to the first respondent should be interpreted as solely
referring to acts connected with management in the transfer of ownership on
behalf of the respondents, but not sale or exchange of immovable property on
their behalf. We have thus found that the decision of the Regional Supreme
Court Cassation Division which invalidated the contract has no error in law.
The second issue under consideration is the second petitioners
counterclaim for an award of Birr 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousand) in the
event that the contract for the sale of the house is declared invalid. We have
noted that the Zone High Court did not render its decision hearing the parties
and examining the evidence as per Articles 246, 247 and 248 of the Civil
Procedure Code. The Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench has not also
given a decision on the failure of the Zones High Court and the Regional
Supreme Court Appellate Division to render a decision on the counterclaim..
With regard to the third issue, the Oromia Region Supreme Court
Cassation Division is empowered, under Article 80(3)(b) of the FDRE
Constitution, to render a decision on cases decided in the Region that involve
fundamental error of law. In the case under consideration, the second
petitioners counterclaim has not been addressed in the Zonal High Court and
the Regions Supreme Court Appellate Bench. The Oromia Regional Supreme
Court Cassation Division had incidentally handled the issue of the second
petitioners counterclaim and decided that the second petitioner can only file
suit against the first petitioner and not against the respondents. This is not in
conformity with Article 80(3)(b) of the FDRE Constitution and involves a
fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench decision is varied.
2. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Benchs decision which
invalidates the contract of sale of the house concluded by the first
petitioner (acting as the agent of the respondents) with the second
petitioners on June 18, 2002 is affirmed.
3. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Benchs decision which
rejected the second petitioners counterclaim against the respondents is
reversed.
4. The case is remanded to the East Showa Zone High Court so that it can
hear testimony and entertain evidence to examine other factual and legal
arguments and to give decision on the matter as per Article 341(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code with regard to the second petitioners counterclaim
against the respondents, and on the first instance opposition of the
respondents regarding the counterclaim.
5. The injunction order given by this Court on January 27, 2010 on the
property is lifted.
...
Signature of five judges
__________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 544-548
Abridged translation: Tsedey Girma & Fasil Abebe

Yonas Hilluf -v.- Estifanos Kidane et al
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38721 (December 6, 2010)

- In a power of attorney, it is the principal who can raise an argument for
the invalidation of the activity undertaken with the power of agency.
- There is no legal ground based on which the heirs of the principal can
challenge the activities carried out by the agent within the limits of his
power of attorney.
Article 2189(1)& (2) of the Civil Code
______________

Hidar 27, 2003 E.C (December 6, 2010)

Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Berhanu Amenew, Tsegaye Asmamaw,
Ali Mohammed, Sultam Abatemam
Petitioner: Yonas Hiluf
Respondents: 1. Estifanos Kidane
2. Helen Kidane
3. Azeb Kidane
4. Aster Kidane
Judgment
The litigation started when the first respondent in a suit dated Tir 21, 1995
(January 29, 2003) filed a case at the Federal First Instance Court stating that
the current petitioner (defendant in the lower court) was a tenant, and refused
to vacate House No 383 located at Woreda 21, Kebele 10. He stated that the
house was the property of the parents of the first, second, third and fourth
respondents (heirs), and that the petitioner is unwilling to vacate that house
claiming that he has bought it. The plaintiff requested the court to give an
order for the return of the house, and for payment of rent starting from the date
the case was filed.
The defendant (now petitioner) on the other hand requested for the
intervention of other children of the deceased, Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat. He
had also submitted preliminary and other objections, and stated that he bought
the house from the plaintiffs (first respondents) sister. He argued that
requesting him to vacate the house should not be brought against him while
the contract is still valid. He further argued that such contracts require
registration only for the purpose of third parties and not for the contracting
parties. He contended that the plaintiff (first respondent) cannot request the
invalidation of the contract.
The court after examining the case, decided that the defendant (current
petitioner) should return the house to the first respondent, stating that the
agreement for the sale of the house entered into with the agent of the deceased
on Megabit 27, 1991 EC (April 5, 1999) does not fulfil the requirements of
Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code, and hence it is considered as a mere draft
contract. The petitioner (defendant in the lower court) appealed to the High
Court challenging this decision.
Dissatisfied with decision, the second, third and fourth respondents filed
an appeal to the High Court. They objected the decision rendered by the
Federal First Instance Court on Tir 4, 1997 (January 12, 2005). The appeal
dated Yekatit 15, 1997 (February 22, 2005), stated that the decision of the
Federal First Instance Court transfers the property (on which they have a right)
without them being a party to the case, and thus it should be revoked. They
argued that the fourth respondent sold the house registered in the name of their
father, with a power of attorney he got from the latter before he died on Hamle
1, 1991 (July 8, 1999). The second, third and fourth respondents also invoked
period of limitation and form of the contract in the application they submitted,
which the court rejected arguing that the period of limitation argument could
not be raised as it was not brought by the defendant (petitioner). It also
rejected the other points of objection and confirmed its own decision delivered
on Tir 4, 1997 (January 12, 2005), by stating that the agreement entered into
with the fourth respondent, who is the agent of the deceased is not done
according to the form authorized by the law.
The High Court, which examined the case joining the appeals brought by
the petitioner and the second, third and fourth respondents in File No 37810,
reversed the decision of the Federal First Instance Court stating that the first
respondent cannot raise the form of contract as an issue, as the fourth
respondent sold the house on Megabit 27, 1991 (April 5, 1999) while his
father was alive, with the power of attorney given to him by his deceased
father who died on Hamle 1, 1991 (July 8, 1999).

The first respondent brought an appeal against this decision to the

Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The court adjourned the
case for Hamle 10, 2000 (July 17, 2008) to hear the appellant (first respondent)
and the second, third and fourth respondents. On this date, the attorney of the
petitioner submitted a statement of defense. As the second, third and fourth
respondents were not present, the Court could not hear their litigation. Thus, it
adjourned the case for Tahsas 3, 2000 (December 13, 2007), on which date the
second, third and fourth respondents requested the Court to dismiss the case as
the appellant was not present. After examining the case, the court reversed the
decision of the High Court and sustained the decision of the First Instance
Court stating that the contract of sale does not conform to the requirements of
the law.
In a petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division,
dated Sene 23, 2000 (June 30, 2008), the petitioner stated that the decision of
the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court which ordered him to
transfer the house to the first respondent has a fundamental error of law. On
the one hand, the Court dismissed the appeal of the first respondent as he was
not present during the hearing of the appeal, and discharged the second, third
and third respondents. As the High Court rendered its decision after having
joined the cases, the petitioner further argued that, the decision of the Supreme
Court that the contract of sale does not fulfil the requirements of the law
contradicts with its declaration that the appeal of the first respondent is
dismissed.
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined the
issue whether the decision of the Federal Supreme Court was correct in
reversing the decision of the High Court, and noted the following:
1. The father of the respondents, Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat, gave a
special power of attorney to the fourth respondent as per Article 2205
(1) of the Civil Code so that the latter can sell an immovable property
registered under the principals name. Accordingly, the fourth
respondent sold the house to the petitioner based on this power of
attorney while Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat was alive. As per article
2189(1), the contract of sale concluded by the fourth respondent within
the limits of the power given to him is considered as an agreement
concluded by the deceased. According to Article 2189(2) of the Civil
Code, any claim for the repudiation of an activity conducted by a
person acting with the power of attorney given to him/her can only be
brought by the principal (the person who gave the power of attorney).
Thus, if the agreement concluded by the fourth respondent on Megabit
21, 1991 (March 30, 1999) has a defect in relation to authority or form,
these issues could have been raised by the principal Ato Kidane
Tesfahawariat. As the latter did not use such power while he was alive,
there is no legal ground for the heirs to challenge the activities
undertaken by the agent acting within the power of agency given to
her. Thus, the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the
Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court ordering the
invalidation of the sale and transfer of the house to the first respondent
has a fundamental error of law because it failed to take into account
the fact that the deceased did not challenge the agreement while he
was alive.
2. The petitioner submitted a statement of defense on Hamle 10, 1999
(July 17, 2007) when the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was
hearing the appeal brought by the first respondent to challenge the
decision of the High Court. The Appellate Division adjourned the case
to hear the parties for Tahsas 3, 2000 E.C. (December 13, 2007) as the
first respondent (the then appellant) was not present. During the time,
the Appellate Division gave an order for the dismissal of the case,
based on the request of the second, third and fourth respondents. The
petitioner, (who was respondent), gave a written statement of defense
contesting the appeal brought by the appellant (first respondent).
According to Article 32(2) and Article 73 of the Civil Procedure Code, if
the appellant is not present during the hearing of the appeal and if the
written or oral statements of defense given by the respondents do not
support the appeal, the court shall cancel the appeal and dismiss the case.
However, in the case at hand, even though the written statement of defense
brought by the petitioner (the then respondent) refutes the first
respondents appeal, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal brought
by the first respondent against the second, third and fourth respondents.
Reversing the decision of the High Court based on the statement of
defense submitted by the petitioner is not in line with the spirit of Articles
32(2) and 73 of the Civil Procedure Code. For the petitioner, this decision
has the effect of cancelling the decision of the High Court rendered on the
same issue, and for the second, third and fourth respondents, the rejection
of the appeal of the first respondent has the effect of sustaining the
decision of the High Court. There is thus a fundamental error of law.
Accordingly, the court rendered the following decree.

Decree
1. The decision of the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court is
reversed.
2. The decision of the Federal High Court is sustained with a change in its
reasoning.
3. The petitioner does not have an obligation to return the house to the 1st
respondent
...
________________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 555-560
Habtu Woldu -v.- Meselu Desta
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 50440 (May 24, 2010)

The principal can request invalidation of the sale contract made by the
agent on the ground of conflict of interest, and the agent has the duty to
avoid conflict of interest.
______________

May 24, 2010 (Ginbot 16, 2002 E.C)
Justices: Hirut Melese, Teshager Gebreselassie, Taffesse Yirga,

Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Habtu Weldu
Respondents: (1) Meselu Desta; (2) Amakelech Gebrehiwot
The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment
Judgment
The case started at Mekelle Woreda Court of Tigray Regional State. The
petitioner was a plaintiff. He claimed that he appointed the first respondent to
manage, sell, and exchange the house which is registered in his name and
located in Mekele town Kedamay Weyan Kebele Cooperative Association,
House Number C/116. He stated that the first respondent acted beyond the
scope of agency granted to her and donated the house and transferred its
ownership title to her mother, the second respondent. The petitioner requested
the court to invalidate the donation contract and to transfer the ownership title
on the house from the second respondent to himself.
In response, the first respondent replied that she made the contract of sale
with the second respondent within the scope of agency and it was not contract
of donation, but a contract of sale. She added that the contract had to be made
according to the provisions of the Memorandum of Association of the
cooperative and the Commercial Code and not pursuant to the Civil Code. She
stated that she acted within the scope of her authority and the contract was
made in line with the law, thereby requesting the suit to be rejected.
The second respondent stated that the petitioner had no right to sue
because does not possess an authenticated ownership title on the house. The
house is transferred by contract of sale and not by donation. She argued that
the house could be sold in accordance with the cooperative association's
Memorandum of Association and the Commercial Code, but not according to
Article 1723 of the Civil Code. She added that the house is registered in her
name and that the contract should not be invalidated. In case the contract is
invalidated, she requested that she should be entitled to receive penalty fee of
Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) from the petitioner.
The third respondent at the lower court, which was Kedamay Weyan
House Construction Cooperative Association, responded that there was no
contract of sale or donation. It stated that the first respondent in line with the
decision of the cooperative associations general assembly and sale procedures
transferred the house to the second respondent after having filled the form for
the transfer of title and by showing evidence that she was unmarried.
After hearing the litigation, the lower court rendered a judgment. It
decided that there is conflict of interest between the role of the first respondent
as agent, and her act of selling the house to her mother (the second
respondent) which indirectly makes the first respondent a beneficiary of the
transaction. The Court found that the contract did not fulfil the legal
requirements for the sale of immovable property. It decided that the contract
should be invalidated and the ownership title should be transferred from the
second respondent to the petitioner.
The respondents appealed to the Tigray Regional State High Court but the
Court rejected their appeal. The respondents lodged their petition to the Tigray
Regional State Supreme Court Cassation Division. The cassation bench after
hearing the litigation of both parties rendered a judgment. It noted that the
petitioners argument is that the first respondent acted beyond the scope of her
mandate in transferring the house to the second respondent by donation, and
found that the decision of the lower courts to invalidate the contract of sale
was not in line with Article 182(2) of the Civil Procedure Code because it
went outside the statement of claim. It reversed the decision of the lower
courts and confirmed the contract of sale.
The petition to this Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is lodged

against this judgment. The petitioner stated that the act of the first respondent
to sell the house to her mother involves conflict of interest which warrants the
invalidation of the contract. He contended that the decision of the Regions
Cassation Division based only on the type of the contract without considering
the existence of conflict of interest has fundamental error of law.
This court has considered the facts in the litigation as follows. The
petitioner states that the transfer is made through a donation contract. During
the oral litigation at the lower courts, the petitioner had also contended that
even if the transfer is considered to have been made by sale contract, there is
conflict of interest. According to the petitioner, the conclusion of the Tigray
Regional State Supreme Court Cassation Division that the lower courts have
rendered a decision on issues not raised in the litigation is erroneous.
This court has examined whether there is a conflict of interest. Pursuant to
Article 2187(1) of the Civil Code, a contract may be cancelled at the request
of the principal where there is a conflict of interest between the principal and
the agent and where the third party entered into the contract knew or should
have known the conflict. In the case at hand, the first respondent in her
capacity as an agent sold the petitioners house to her mother. According to
Articles 2208 and 2209 of the Civil Code, the agent should act in strict good
faith towards his principal and shall act in the exclusive interest of the
principal. The agent should make sure that the interest of the principal is not
jeopardized.
Furthermore the provisions prohibit the agent to act in matters involving
his own interest, interests of his friends or close relatives without giving prior
notice and getting confirmation from the principal. In this case, the petitioner
appointed the first respondent as his agent to manage, sell and exchange the
house. The respondent bears the duty to respect the interest of the petitioner.
The first respondent sold the house to her mother. We understand from the
litigation in the lower court that the first respondent did not show whether she
gave prior notice to the petitioner before she sold the house. The first
respondent has also failed to show that she sold the house at the market price
and that the petitioners interest is not jeopardized. Moreover, the second
respondent knew or should have known the existence of interest conflict. The
petitioner can thus request invalidation of the sale contract made by the first
respondent on the ground of conflict of interest.
It was not shown in the litigation at the lower court whether the first
respondent has paid (to the petitioner) the money obtained from the house
sold. If payment was made, the first respondent has the right to sue and request
the amount from the petitioner. Likewise, the second respondent has the right

to require from the first respondent the return of the money paid to buy the
house and additional costs, if any.
There is no legal ground to reverse the decision of the lower court which
invalidated the contract of sale and decided that the house should be registered
in the name of the petitioner.
Decree
1. The judgment rendered by the Tigray Regional State Supreme court
Cassation Bench, File No.32155 on Tikimt 17, 2002 E.C. (October 27,
2009) is reversed.
2. The decision of Mekele Wereda Court, File No. 0065 on Sene 5, 2001
E.C. (June 12, 2009) and the order rendered by Tigray Regional State
High Court, File No. 07667 on Sene 8, 2001 E.C. (June 15, 2009) are
affirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 329-331
Abridged translation: Solomon W/Tensae
2. Banking and Insurance

No.
1 Nasir Abajabirs spouse and heirs 68708 2011 13 464-466

v. Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
2 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. 38572 2009 10 289-291

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
3 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. 42139 2009 9 118 - 119

Beyan Oumar

Benshangul-Gumuz Education
Bureau

Ferhan Ahmed et al
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter2:Banking&Insurance23
Nasir Abajabir Abajefars spouse & heirs -v.- Commercial Bank of

Ethiopia

Auction undertaken by bank according to the foreclosure law may not be
cancelled by court order; however, violation of legal procedures while
undertaking the auction may entail tort liability against the bank.
Article 2143 of the Civil Code,
Property Mortgaged or Pledged under Banks Proclamation No. 97/1998
_______________

Tahsas 05, 2004 E. C (December 15, 2011)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Spouse and Heirs of Ato Nasir Abajabir Abajefar

1. W/ro Liya Tamirat
2. Firawul Nasir Abajabir
3. Farome Nasir Abajabir
Respondent: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
The court has rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case relates to a claim for compensation of damages initiated at the
Federal High Court by the testator of the current petitioners, against the
current respondent. The statement of claim states that when the collateral for
the loan contracts entered into on Sene 1, 1992 (June 8, 2000) and Hidar 22,
1993 (December 1, 2000), was auctioned the respondent had deliberately left
out parts of the collateral that should have been included. It also states that the
procedures undertaken were not appropriate, and the plaintiff claimed
compensation of Birr 1,280,556.70 (one million two hundred eighty thousand
five hundred fifty six birr and 70 cents) plus interest against the defendant
(current respondent).
In its preliminary objections, the respondent contested the admissibility of
the suit based on Article 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code and invoked
period of limitation because the suit was filed three and a half years after the
foreclosure. The lower court, found that the plaintiff did not contest the
auction as such, but rather contested that parts of the collateral have unduly
been left out from the auction, and it rejected this claim stating that it should
have been instituted within two months from the date of the auction as
required under Art 447(1) of the Civil Code.. The plaintiffs appeal to the
Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench was also rejected based on Art 337 of
the Civil Procedure Code. This cassation petition is instituted in objecting to
the decision of the lower courts.
The petitioners state that they did not seek cancellation of the auction; they
contested the exclusion of parts of the collateral and the transfer of property at
reduced price. They had sought compensation from the respondent for the loss
incurred. In this regard, the lower courts have cited an irrelevant provision, i.e.
Article Art. 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code and decided that the two
months period of limitation has elapsed.
arguments of both parties and the decisions of the lower courts.
There was a contract of loan between the testator of the petitioners and the
respondent, and the loan was taken at different times. However, because the
testator could not discharge his loan, the respondent (based on Proclamation
No.97/1998) has sold the property under foreclosure in an auction. The
borrower filed a suit on Ginbot 05, 2002 (May 13, 2010), contesting the
exclusion of part of the collateral during the foreclosure in addition to which
the foreclosure was alleged to have been undervalued. This court has also
learnt that the plaintiff at the lower court did not seek the cancellation or
invalidation of the auction undertaken.
Banks are allowed to sell property under foreclosure according to the legal
procedures embodied in Proclamation No.97/1998, Proclamation No.98/1998
and Proclamation No.216/2000. According to Article 6 of Proclamation No.
97/1998, the auction shall be conducted as specified in Articles 394- 449 of
the Civil Procedure Code. Article 7 of the same proclamation holds the bank
liable if it fails to undertake the auction in accordance with the law. However,
the petitioner has not based its claim on such reasoning, but has rather
contested the undue exclusion of part of the collateral.
This issue falls under Articles 2027 and 2028 of the Civil Code. The
property to be sold at auction should, inter alia, be proclaimed as required

under Article 423(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and Art 6 of Proclamation
No.97/1998. Where a person illegally causes damage, he incurs tort liability
according to Articles 2027, 2028 and 2035 of the Civil Code. Therefore failure
to follow the legal procedures required under Proclamation No. 97/1998
renders the bank at fault and this entails liability to compensate for the damage
incurred according to Article 7 of Proclamation No.97/1998.
When this provision is considered in light of Article 2037 of the Civil
Code, the claim for damage shall be instituted within two years according to
Art 2143(1) of the Civil Code. The period of limitation of two months
provided under Article 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code is only relevant for
petitions which seek the cancellation and invalidation of foreclosure, but not
for claims that involve compensation for the damage sustained. This is
because bank foreclosures are not conducted based on the procedures
embodied in Articles 194-449 of the Civil Procedure Code, but rather pursue
the provisions of Proclamation No.97/1998, Proclamation No.98/1998 and
Proclamation No. 216/2000.
Even if bank foreclosure is not subject to court cancellation, an auction
conducted by disregarding the legal procedures may bring tort liability against
a bank as stipulated in Proclamation No. 97/1998. Therefore, the decisions of
the lower courts against the compensation claimed by the testator of
petitioners based on Article 447(1), involve a fundamental error of law. The
issue whether the period of limitation has elapsed according to the relevant
provision of Art 2143(1) of the Civil Code needs to be considered.
The testator of the petitioners instituted his statement of claim on Ginbot
05, 2002 (May 13, 2010) and the auction, alleged to have excluded part of the
collateral, was conducted on Tahsas 20, 1999 (Dec 29, 2006). Accordingly,
the period of limitation of two years has elapsed and thus this court concurs
with the results in the decrees of the lower courts. Therefore, the following
decree is rendered.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High court, File No 92618 on Tikimit 26,
2003 (Nov 5,2010), and affirmed by the appellate Division of the Federal
Supreme Court under File 64130 Yekatit 28,2003 (March 7,2011) , are
affirmed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code after
having altered the reasoning of the lower courts according Art. 342 of the
Civil Procedure Code.
2. The period of limitation for statement of claim for damages against the
respondent has expired according to Art. 2143(1) of the Civil Code.

_______________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 464-466
Abridged translation: Sisay Luche & G. Habteyes

Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38572 (October 27, 2009)

If the pledge that is given for a loan is insured and becomes subject to an
accident, the creditor can request the insurer to pay compensation even if
the money loaned is lesser in amount than the value of the pledged
property.
Article 2858 of the Civil Code, Article 678 of the Commercial Code
_____________
Tikimt 17, 2002 E.C (October 27, 2009)

Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga,
Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation

Judgment
The case is brought because the petitioner submitted its petition dated Sene 9,
2000 (June 16, 2008) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
claiming that the judgment rendered by the Federal First Instance Court and
confirmed by the Civil Bench of the Federal Supreme court has a fundamental
error of law.
The current respondent was the plaintiff in the Federal First Instance
Court. It held as a pledge the truck owned by Ato Hassan Abdela Plate No. 3-
16015 and trailer number 3-03383 for the Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand)
Ato Hagos Tedla borrowed from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia Nifas Silk
Branch. The Respondent and the debtor Hagos Tedla agreed that the pledge be
insured, and the truck was insured with the defendant, the Ethiopian Insurance
Corporation West Main Branch, with an estimated value of Birr 350,000
(three hundred fifty thousand), and they have accordingly been paying
premium.

The truck, insured by the petitioner, encountered an accident on Hidar 28,

1988 E.C (December 8, 1995) and was alleged to be completely destroyed. A
suit was filed for the payment of the value of the damaged truck because the
plaintiff (current petitioner) refused to pay the estimated value of the vehicle
i.e. 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). The petitioner (the defendant in
the lower court) argued that the respondent is not entitled to bring the suit as
they did not have a contractual agreement. Moreover, it contested liability
because technical evidence is not brought to prove that the car was damaged
due to failure of the steering wheel. It further argued that if it has to pay, the
amount should only involve the loan given by the respondent to Hagos Tedla,
i.e. Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand). The lower court rejected petitioners
arguments and decided that the damage amounting to Birr 350,000 (three
hundred fifty thousand) caused due to the total destruction of the pledge
should be paid to the respondent with an interest rate of nine percent starting
from Hidar 8,1998 E.C (November 17, 2005).
The Ethiopian Insurance Corporation was dissatisfied with the decision of
the Federal First Instance Court, and brought an appeal to the Federal High
Court. The latter reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the
case to the First Instance Court, stating that the amount of damage sustained is
not verified in addition to raising other related issues. The respondent brought
an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court against this decision and the Court
reversed the decision of the High Court confirming the decision of the Federal
First Instance Court.
The petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court, by
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation contests the decision of the Federal Supreme
Court arguing that the respondent was allowed to bring the suit and litigate
without verifying whether it has recovered the amount it lent, and that this is
against the fundamental principles and objectives of Insurance. It further
argued that, the respondents claim of interest and profit is inappropriate
because the amount lent is Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand). Accordingly, it
requested for the reversal of the decisions arguing that, the decisions of the
lower court and the Civil bench of the Appellate Division of the Federal
Supreme Court are not in conformity with the relevant civil and commercial
laws, and hence have a fundamental error of law.
The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the amount due for the
damage it sustained as a result of delayed settlement of debt, interest accrued
and other cost is Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). The respondent
further argued that it entered into an insurance contract with the petitioner and
paid premiums not only for the Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand) it lent to
the borrower but also to the vehicle held as a pledge, whose price equals Birr
350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). Thus it argued that the decisions of the

Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal First
Instance Court do not have an error of law. It thus contended that the amount
requested does not exceed the insurance coverage stated in the insurance
contract.
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has found the
argument of the petitioner unacceptable after having observed that the
petitioner has not submitted evidence which proves its argument that the
vehicle is not completely destroyed. The respondent has taken as a pledge a
car worth Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand) when it provided the
loan to the debtor who is the owner of the truck. By virtue of Article 2858 (1)
of the Civil Code, the right of the respondent on the collateral includes the
amount of the loan that remains to be paid, the interest that accrues due to the
non-performance of the loan agreement and other expenses not paid.
The respondent has made it clear to the lower court that it is entitled to
receive from the debtor Birr 350,000 which covers the amount of the money
lent, interest and other payments. It is also established that there is property
held as a pledge to secure the payment of debt. The respondent knowing that
the property it held as a pledge is movable and exposed to danger bought an
insurance coverage worth Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). It did
so to increase its chance of recovering the money that it lent, the interest
thereof and other payments.
Hence, this court has confirmed the decisions of the lower court and the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and has found that that the petitioner
is liable to pay to the respondent Birr 350,000 with an interest to be calculated
starting from Hidar 8, 1988 E.C (November 18, 1995) as per Article 678 of the
Commercial Code and the insurance contract. The court has thus rendered the
following decree according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Decree
The decisions of the appellate division of the Federal Supreme Court and the
Federal First Instance Court are affirmed.
_______________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 289-291
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Beyan Oumar


The insurer does not have an obligation to pay compensation to a
passenger injured while boarding an insured vehicle destined for
carriage of goods.
______________

Sene 30, 2001 E.C (July 7, 2009)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellesse,
Belachew Anshiso, Sultam Abatemam
Respondent: Beyan Oumar
Judgment
The case concerns litigation regarding the payment of compensation. It started
in the Oromia Regional State, West Harerge Zone High Court, where the
current respondent was the plaintiff. Ethiopian Insurance Corporation filed a
suit against the owner and the driver of the vehicle alleged to have caused the
damage. The petitioner became part of the litigation because it was ordered to
join the case because of its insurance contract with the defendant. In its
statement of defense, the petitioner presented a preliminary objection and
substantive arguments.
The Zone High Court found the defendant and the petitioner liable for the
damage caused, and decided that they pay damages. The Regional Supreme
Court which adjudicated the appeal confirmed the decision of the High Court.
This petition is lodged to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
contesting the decision of the Regional Supreme Court.
In a petition dated 14 Tahsas 2001 (December 23, 2008), the petitioner
stated the fundamental error of law allegedly committed by the lower courts.

The court examined the case in light of the petitioners claim that the damage
was caused by the respondents fault and that the vehicle was involved in an
activity which was not covered by the insurance contract, and thus it should
not be liable to pay the damage.
From the litigation in the lower court, this Court noted that the truck, Plate
No. 3-29779 A.A has insurance coverage. The respondent alleges that he
sustained damage while he was travelling in the vehicle. The petitioner argued
that it gave insurance coverage to a vehicle destined for transportation of
goods and not transportation of people, and hence contended that it should not
be liable for a claim that falls outside its contractual obligation. The respondent
did not contest the substantive argument brought by the petitioner.
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court noted that the
insurance policy does not cover the harm caused to individuals who were
travelling in the vehicle destined for carrying of goods, and that the respondent
did not sustain the injury as a pedestrian. It thus found that the lower court has
committed a fundamental error of law in holding the petitioner liable.
Accordingly, it has rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Oromia Regional State, West Hararge Zone
High Court, File No.- 08797 on Meskerem 26,2001 E.C (October 6, 2008)
and the order given by the Regional Supreme Court in File No.-71528 on
Hidar 25, 2001 E.C (December 4, 2008) regarding the petitioner are
reversed in accordance with Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The decision of the lower court on the first and second plaintiffs in the
initial suit is confirmed.
3. There is no legal or contractual basis according to which the petitioner will
be liable for the damage caused to the respondent.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 118-119
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Benshangul Gumuz

Regional State Education Bureau
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 24703 (April 16, 2007)

- Special provisions of the Commercial Code that deal with the formation
of insurance contracts prevail over the general provisions of the Civil
Code.
- Insurance contract exists between the parties according to the Commercial
Code if the insured signs on the proposal form which constitutes an offer
followed by the corresponding signature of the insurer on the insurance
policy.
Articles 651, 654 and 657 Commercial Code;
Articles 1725 and 1727 of the Civil Code.
_____________

Miazia 9, 2000 E.C (April 16, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga,
Medhin Kiros, Sultan Abatemam

Respondent: Benshangul Gumuz Regional State Education Bureau
The court has rendered the following judgment
Judgment
This case started at the Asosa Zone High Court. The current petitioner
(plaintiff at the High Court) instituted a claim against the respondent due to
unpaid insurance premium of Birr 55,068.56 (fifty five thousand sixty eight
birr and fifty six cents). Summons was served to the respondent, but it failed
to appear and the case was adjudicated ex parte. On the basis of the claim and
the evidence submitted by the petitioner, the High Court decided that there is
no contract of insurance between the parties thereby rejecting the claim
submitted by the plaintiff (current petitioner).

The petitioner appealed to the Federal Higher Court. However, the Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court invoking Article 337 of the Civil
Procedure Code.
This cassation petition is submitted against the decision of the lower
courts. The issue that needs to be resolved is whether there is contract of
insurance. As the case relates to unpaid insurance premium based on the
insurance contract concluded between the parties, the special law that governs
insurance embodied in the Commercial Code of Ethiopia is applicable.
Like any other contract, an insurance contract, involves offer and
acceptance between the contracting parties. When a person submits a proposal
form to the insurer, the act constitutes an offer, and acceptance is deemed to
have been made when the insurer signs on the insurance policy. Thereupon, a
legally binding contract of insurance exists between the parties as stipulated
under Articles 651, 654 and 657 of the Commercial Code
The respondent expressed its interest to insure its vehicles by sending a
letter, sealed and signed by its authorized officer, to the petitioner. This shows
that the respondent made an offer. The petitioner thereafter signed an
insurance policy, according to the provisions stated above, and it is clear that
an insurance contract is formed between the parties.
Even if Articles 1725 and 1727 of the Civil Code state that a contract of
insurance is one of the contracts that need to be made in a written form, signed
by the parties and witnessed by two persons, the insurance relations between
the current parties is governed by the special law in the Commercial Code. In
accordance with the principle of legal interpretation, the special law prevails
over the general law whenever there is contradiction between the two.
The insurer who prepares the insurance policy is required to sign on it
according to Article 657 of the Commercial Code, while this provision does
not require the insured to sign on the insurance policy. Therefore, if the
insured signs on the proposal form which constitutes an offer, followed by the
corresponding signature of the insurer on the insurance policy, an insurance
contract exists between the parties according to the Commercial Code. The
decision of the lower courts that an insurance contract does not exist between
the parties thus involves fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Asosa Higher Court, File No 528 dated Tahsas 30,
1996. E.C (January 9, 2004.) and Federal High Court File No. 31510 dated
Yekatit 6, 1998 E.C (February 13, 2006) constitute a fundamental error of
law, and are thus reversed.
2. There is contract of insurance in accordance with the Commercial Code,

and the respondent has not contested the amount claimed by the petitioner.
Therefore, the respondent shall pay to the petitioner the amount stated in
the suit, i.e. Birr 55,068.56 (fifty five thousand sixty eight birr and fifty six
cents) plus 9% interest rate to be computed from the date of the suit.
...
Signatures of five justices
_________________________________________________
Volume: 7, pp 225-228
Abridged translation: Sisay Luche & G. Habteyes

Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Ferhan Ahmed el al

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 23363 (June 3, 2008)

An insurer's liability shall not exceed the amount specified in the policy.
Article 665(2) of the Commercial Code
_____________
Ginbot 26, 2000 E.C. (June 3, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Mesfin Equbeyonas,
Taffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros

Respondents: 1. Ferhan Ahmed
2. Ayeded Yusuf
3. Abdulwehad Atiye
The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
This case began at the Jijiga Zone High Court of the Somali Region. The
current respondents were plaintiffs at the lower court. They filed a suit against
the Ministry of Defense 103rd Ground Force and Ato G/Egziabeher G/Hiwot.
When the second defendant was driving in an area known as Hodele, he
encountered an off-road collision with a vehicle owned by the first plaintiff
and destroyed it. The plaintiff demanded for a compensation of Birr 219,000
(two hundred nineteen thousand). The son of the second plaintiff who was in
the car of the first plaintiff at the time of the accident died. He had two under-
age children. The second plaintiff demanded Birr 65,520 (sixty five thousand
five hundred and twenty) for raising the children until they reach majority and
Birr 74,000 (seventy four thousand) as compensation, i.e. a total of Birr
139,520. The third plaintiff suffered bodily injury during the accident and
demanded for a compensation of Birr 140,000 (one hundred forty thousand).
When the plaintiffs brought the case, the defendants explained that the
vehicle that caused the accident was insured by the Ethiopian Insurance
Corporation. Consequently, they requested that the Corporation be made party
to the suit under Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Ethiopian
Insurance Corporation appeared before the court, presented its objections and
defended itself.
The first preliminary objection raised by the Ethiopian Insurance
Corporation is that the court does not have jurisdiction. This is so because in
instances where one of the parties is an organ of the federal government and
when the amount claimed exceeds Birr 500,000 (five hundred thousand), the
case falls under the jurisdiction of a federal court.
With regard to the merits of the case, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation
argued that its obligation is to cover damages caused by the vehicle on
properties of third parties up to Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) and up to
Birr 30,000 (thirty thousand) for harm caused on human beings. It argued that
in the case under consideration it shall only pay Birr 160,000 (one hundred
sixty thousand) and not the total amount claimed by the plaintiffs. This
amount covers Birr 100,000 for the damage caused on the car of the first
plaintiff, and Birr 30,000 for each for the two individuals, making a total of
Birr 60,000 for the harm caused to the victims.
The Jijiga Zone High Court examined the case, overlooked the preliminary
objection raised by the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation and rendered the
following decision. First, the Corporation shall pay Birr 217,000 to the first
plaintiff for the vehicle that was completely destroyed which was the price of
the vehicle. Secondly, for the second plaintiff whose son was killed during the
accident, it should pay Birr 91,520 and Birr 60,000 for the third plaintiff for
the bodily injury he suffered during the accident.
The Corporation, then appealed to the Federal High Court which examined
the case, heard the argument of both parties and confirmed the decision of the
lower court. The case is brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court as a petition against this decision. .
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has heard both sides The
case involves two issues. The first is whether the Jijiga High Court had
jurisdiction over the matter. The second is, if it indeed fell under its
jurisdiction, whether its decision regarding the compensations is appropriate.
The court has examined both issues.
The preliminary objection is that the court does not have jurisdiction
because in instances where one of the parties is an organ of the federal

government and when the amount claimed exceeds 500,000 Birr, the case falls
under the jurisdiction of federal courts.
However, Article 78(2) of the FDRE Constitution provides that the
jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and of the First-Instance Courts are
delegated to the State courts if such courts are not established in the states.
Moreover, the claim in the case has not exceeded Birr 500,000. Therefore the
petition that the Jijiga High Court had no jurisdiction is rejected.
Regarding the compensation that should be paid by the current petitioner,
it is stated in Article 665(2) of the Commercial Code that the insurer's liability
shall not exceed the amount specified in the policy. The court has observed
that the Corporation has insured the first defendant in the lower court for
damages on properties of third parties up to Birr 100,000 and that the
maximum amount payable for harm caused to human beings is up to Birr
30,000. Accordingly, this court has found that there is a fundamental error of
the law in the decisions of the lower courts that they did not take into account
the amount of coverage stated in the insurance policy.
Decree
The decisions of the lower courts are varied in accordance with Article 348(1)
of the Civil Procedure Code. As per the policy, the Ethiopian Insurance
Corporation shall pay Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) to the first
respondent. The second and third respondents are entitled to receive Birr
30,000 (thirty thousand) each. The total amount to be paid by the petitioner
shall be Birr 160,000.
...
__________________________________________________
Volume: 6, pp 33-36
Abridged translation: Selam Abraham
3. Business-related

No.
1 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation - 47004 2012 13 392-398

v.- Bale Rural Development
Enterprise
2 Africa Insurance (S.C) v. Dashen 40186 2012 13 402-416

Bank (S.C)
3 Aster A. v. Amsale & Tibebe 39608 2010 10 335-337
4 Meseret Hailu v. Zewdu Bireda 33954 2008 9 133-135
5 Tekle Wakjira v. Shonata Gubu 19258 2007 7 308-313
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter3:Businessrelated39
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Bale Rural Development

Enterprise
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, File No. 47004 (March 20, 2012)
Holding of the Court

Performance bonds are regulated under the Civil Code of Ethiopias
suretyship contract provisions (Arts. 1920-1951) and not under the
provisions relating to insurance contracts in the Commercial Code of
Ethiopia. Accordingly, a right to bring an action based on claims relating
to performance bonds can only be barred after the expiry of ten years as
provided for in the Civil Code of Ethiopia.
Articles 657(1), 674 of the Commercial Code; Art. 2(2) of the Stamp Duty
Proclamation No.110/1998;
Art 2(18) of Proclamation No.57/1996;
Art 2(20) of Proclamation No.648/2009;
Articles 1719(2), 1720, 1725(b), 1727, 1848, 1922(1)&(2), of the Civil
Code;
Art. 1(1) of NBE Directive No. 23/2002 EC; and
Art. 1(3) of NBE Directive No. 24/2004 EC.
______________

Megabit 11, 2004 EC (March 20, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation (EIC)
Respondent: Bale Rural Development Enterprise
The Court has rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The issue relates to the category of law which regulates performance bond.
Insurance contracts are regulated under Articles 654-712 of the Commercial
Code. These provisions stipulate that insurance contracts should not only be in
written form but shall also be executed through a document called policy.
Furthermore, it is stated that insurance contracts will be effective when signed
and that insurance business mainly involves collecting premiums in order to
compensate the insured whenever a risk or loss materializes. Generally, as per
Article 654(1) of the Commercial Code, insurance contract refers to a contract
whereby the insurer, by charging premiums, would pay a certain amount of
money to the beneficiary upon the materialization of a certain risk.
On the other hand, surety contracts are regulated under Arts.1920-1951 of
the Civil Code. By contrast, thus, surety contract may be gratuitous, and that
the surety can intervene as such even without the knowledge of the debtor.
This shows that suretyship does not necessarily involve a relationship based
on financial benefit. Hence, a surety contract is a contract whereby a third
party extends security to the creditor by undertaking to discharge any
obligation by the debtor where the latter is proven to have totally or partially
failed to perform his obligations. A contract of guarantee includes several
instruments of which financial guarantee bond is one. As defined under the
National Bank of Ethiopias Directives No. 23/2002 EC and No. 24/2004 EC
(Arts.1(1) and 1(3) respectively), Financial Guarantee Bond shall mean an
obligation undertaken by an insurance company to pay for the lending bank or
another creditor or supplier all outstanding claims arising from the non-
payment by debtor or debtors.
Thus, this instrument is far from possessing any of the basic characters of
insurance policy. It is, therefore, proper to conclude that the period of
limitation applicable to claims arising out of such an instrument should be
Civil Code provisions relevant to surety and not the Commercial Code
provisions on insurance contracts.
It should be noted that insurance policies require an insurable interest of
the insured party on what is insured. In the case at hand, the main reason for
the respondents need for the Performance Bond is to compensate for any loss
eventuated by the Contractor (Axum Construction Company) in the event of
any failure in the performance of its obligations under the road construction
contract, which, under Article 6 thereof, requires the Contractor to procure a
Performance Bond up to an amount ETB 1,101,890. From this, it is
understandable that the Contractor is simply obligated to the respondent by not
performing its contractual obligations and, thus, the respondent does not have
any insurable interest on the payment or non-payment of the obligation
assumed under the performance bond by the petitioner.
Therefore, the contract that had been entered into between Axum
Construction Company and the petitioner cannot be an insurance contract. Nor
can it be argued that the respondent is a beneficiary of an insurance policy.
Thus, the performance bond is what the respondent has issued to jointly and

severally commit itself to pay the amount of money stated in the instrument if
the Contractor fails to discharge its obligations under the contract.
Thus, the attributes of the performance bond that was issued by the
petitioner are not that of an insurance contract but a joint guarantee to pay the
amount stated in the instrument. It is, therefore, regulated under Articles 1920
ff of the Civil Code, and in effect, Art.1845 of the Civil Code shall apply with
regard to the period of limitation.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal File No. 410054
rendered on Megabit 30, 2001 EC (April 8, 2009) is confirmed.
2. Performance Bond is not an insurance contract, but a contract of
suretyship regulated under the Civil Code provisions of 1920 ff.
3. The ruling that the case brought by the respondent against the petitioner
was within the ten-year period of limitation is affirmed.
...
_________________________________________
Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
Volume: 13, pp. 392 - 398
Abridged Translation: Tecle Hagos Bahta
Africa Insurance (S.C) -v.- Dashen Bank (S.C)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Civil File No. 40186 (6 March 2012)

- Financial guarantee bond issued by an insurance company cannot be held
inconsistent with the objectives of the company if it was issued before it
was expressly prohibited by the National Bank of Ethiopia.
- Restrictions in the ordinary powers of a manager cannot be effective
unless they are expressly entered and registered in the registry.
- The nature of financial guarantee bond is peculiar in that it need not
comply with the formality requirements under Arts.1922 ff as it is fully
prepared by the insurance companies under the license granted to them
for the purpose of carrying on the issuance of bonds.
- The period of limitation applicable to the transaction on the issuance of
financial guarantee bond is the ten-year period embodied in Art.1845 of
the Civil Code.
Constitution (F.D.R.E): Art. 80(3)(a)
Civil Code: Articles 1719(2), 1720, 1725 (a)&(b), 1727(b), 1808(2), 1845,
1922(1) & (2), 1924,1930
Commercial Code: Articles 34, 35, 109(1)(f), 121(h), 363(1), 348(3), 657(1),
674(1)
Art. 10 of the Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 25/1996;
Licensing and Supervision of Insurance Business Proclamation No.
86/1994; Art.2(2) of the Stamp Duty Proclamation No.110/1998;
Art. 1(1) of NBE Directive No.23/2002 (EC);
Art. 1(3) of NBE Directive No. 24/2004 EC;
______________

Yekatit 27, 2004 EC (6 March 2012)

Justices: Mesfin Equbeyonas, Amare Amogne, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Africa Insurance (S.C)
Respondent: Dashen Bank (S.C)
Judgment
There are five issues which need the courts attention:
1. Whether the issuance of a financial guarantee bond by an insurance
company is inconsistent with the activities that an insurance company in
Ethiopia is permitted to carry on, with the purpose of its establishment,
and with the objectives of its existence and registration;
2. Whether a manager of an insurance company possesses the power to issue
financial guarantee bonds;
3. Should the issuance of a financial guarantee bond comply with the
formality requirements provided under the Civil Code provisions
[Arts.1920ff]?
4. Whether legal action for non-performance under a financial guarantee
bond is barred within 2 years as per Art. 1808(2) or whether Article 1845
of the Civil Code is applicable;
5. Is the petitioner liable for the obligations it undertook under the financial
guarantee bond? If so, to what extent?
With regard to the first issue, the Licensing and Supervision of Insurance
Business Proclamation No. 86/1994 provides that insurance activities are not
limited to what are described thereon, and it stipulates that other insurance
activities, as they could be defined from time to time, will be part of the
insurance companys business. As defined under NBE Directives No. 24/2004
(EC) and 23/2002 (EC), Financial guarantee bond shall mean an obligation
undertaken by an insurance company to pay for the lending bank or another
creditor or supplier all outstanding claims arising from the non-payment by
debtor or debtors.
While the afore-said Directives prohibit insurance companies from issuing

henceforth any financial guarantee bond under any name whatsoever, it does,
however, confirm that what have been issued prior to the date of coming into
effect of the Directives remain valid instruments. Thus, it is unacceptable to
claim that the issuance of the instrument was contrary to the petitioner
companys objectives and it cannot be proved that such act was contradictory
to the activities that insurance companies carry on.
Secondly, reductions or restrictions to the ordinary powers of a manager
cannot be effective unless they are expressly entered and registered in the
registry. This can easily be observed from the content and structure of Articles
36 and 121(f) of the Commercial Code. It has been proven that there is no
such record in the case at hand. Therefore, there is no reason why the manager
cannot be held responsible for the issuance of the financial guarantee bonds
under whose name and signature they were issued.
Thirdly, the petitioner contended that the financial guarantee bond is like
any surety contract and, thus, should comply with the formality requirements
stipulated under Articles 1922(2)&(3), 1727, and 1725(a) of the Civil Code;
i.e., it should have been attested by two witnesses and signed by the
respondent. Nevertheless, unlike any ordinary surety contract, it is not
prepared by the contracting parties. It is rather prepared by the insurance
company which is permitted to do the same thereby committing itself to pay
any debt owed by a third party as stated under National Bank of Ethiopia
Directives No.23/2002 EC cum No. 24/2004 EC.
Fourthly, it is established that what has been issued by the petitioner is not
a contract of insurance. The period of limitation that would be relevant for this
case is that period provided for under Art.1845 of the Civil Code and it is also
submitted that the legal action for the financial guarantee bond is barred
simultaneously at the time when the action for the principal debt by the lender
(respondent) against the original debtor is barred by period of limitation. Thus,
the ruling by the lower courts that the action for the financial guarantee bond
is not barred by period of limitation is proper. Hence Article 674(1) of the
Commercial Code is not relevant to this case.
Finally, the petitioner is liable under the financial guarantee bond up to the
amount of outstanding debt that has not been paid by the principal debtor to
the respondent. The petitioners argument submitted to this Cassation Bench
that the borrower [Grace PLC] has committed fraudulent practices was not
raised in the lower courts and is not in conformity with Article 329(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code. Nor is it consistent with the powers granted to the
Cassation Bench under Article 80(3) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10
of Proclamation No.25/1996.

Decree
1. The decisions rendered by the Federal High Court on Yekatit 29, 1998
E.C. (March 8, 2006), under Civil File No. 41632 and by the Federal
Supreme Court on Hamle 30, 2000 (August 6, 2008) under Civil Appeal
File No. 24055 respectively are affirmed with variation on the reasoning
thereof.
2. The injunction order granted by this Bench is lifted.
...
_________________________________________
Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
Volume: 13, pp. 402- 416
Abridged Translation: Tecle Hagos Bahta
Aster A. -v.- Amsale B. & Tibebe T.

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 39608 (February 18, 2010)
Managers have the responsibility to administer in good faith the finances
of the business organization they are in charge of. If they fail to do so,
they will be individually and severally liable
Article 530 of the Commercial Code
_____________

Yekatit 11, 2002 E.C. (February 18, 2010)

Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,
Petitioner: Aster A.
Respondents: 1. Amsale B.;
2. Tibebe T.
Judgment
This case is related with the responsibility of managers of business
organizations for fault toward shareholders of a private limited company. The
case was first brought to the Federal High Court. The current respondents
were the plaintiffs in the lower court and the defendants were the current
petitioner and another individual called Dr. Alehegn M. The respondents, in
their pleadings, stated that they agreed to buy shares worth Birr 150,000 (one
hundred fifty thousand) and gave American Dollars directly and through other
people to the defendants at the lower court. They had also given them money
for buying a computer and for putting an advertisement on a newspaper. At
that time Dr. Alehegn M. was the manager and the current petitioner was
appointed by him to manage the business starting from Tahsas 24, 1999 Eth.
Cal (January 2, 2007). They also stated that the defendants at the lower court
claimed to have established the business.
Although they claimed that the initial capital of the business was Birr
1,100,000 (one million one hundred thousand), they refused to issue receipts
in the name of the organization. Then, the business went bankrupt and it was
decided to dissolve it. The respondents further added that the defendants at the
lower court (i.e. the current petitioner and Dr. Alehegn) did not start the
business in good faith. They only used its name to collect money from people.
The respondents thus requested for their money to be returned with interest.
The total amount they requested for was 912,733 Birr. The first defendant
at the lower court in his rebuttal argued that the plaintiffs (current respondents)
contributed the money ten years ago. So, the period of limitation has lapsed.
Moreover, he argued that he did not receive any money directly or indirectly
from the plaintiffs. He explained that they gave their money during the time
the current petitioner was in charge. The petitioner on her side argued that the
suit should not have joined her with the other defendant (at the lower court)
and if that was not done the court would not have had jurisdiction. Moreover,
since ten years have passed since the money was given, the period of
limitation has lapsed.
She also argued that the money should have been demanded when the
organization was up for dissolution and that it should not be raised again. The
current respondents only produced two cheques as evidence to prove that they
have given money. She also argued that she put the money she received into
the account of the organization. She did not keep it for herself. So, she
requested for the charges to be dropped as she is a victim like all the other
members who are not held liable for more than what they have contributed, as
it is a private limited company. Nothing more should be demanded from her
just because she was a manager.
The lower court examined the case, rejected the preliminary objections
and rendered a decision. It decided that the defendants (at the lower court) did
not fulfil their responsibilities. So, according to Article 530 of the Commercial
Code, they were held individually and severally liable. It decided that they
should pay Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) plus 9% interest from the
date it was given. The current petitioner and the other defendant at the lower
court appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. However, the court confirmed
the decision of the lower court.
Dissatisfied by these decisions, the current petitioner has appealed to the
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. This court has examined the
files of both cases together.
This Court has checked all the above facts and proved that they are true.
Moreover, the court has discovered that the companys accountant who took
care of the finances of the business could not find documents that show the
incomes and expenses of the business. The business has never been audited
and it never had a bank account. It does not have any document to show all the
expenses it incurred. Moreover, although the business was never functional,
88.83% of the capital was spent in the name of salary, rent and per diem.
These facts show that the managers did not fulfil their responsibilities in good
faith as managers in accordance with the Memorandum of Association of the
Private Limited Company. Therefore, they should be held individually and
severally liable according to Article 530 of the Commercial Code. On the
other hand, the respondents (plaintiffs at the lower court) are claiming an
amount more than the Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) they have paid as
share contributions. However, the claim, other than the Birr 300,000, is not
backed by evidence. This court has thus affirmed the decision made by the
lower courts.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Federal High Court, File Number 44250 dated Ginbot
27, 1999 E.C. (June 4, 2007) and the Supreme Court, File No. 31907 on
Hamle 9 2000 E.C. (July 16, 2008) are affirmed.
2. The injunction order granted in this file on Tir 7, 2001 E.C. (January 15,
2009) is lifted.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume: 10, pp 335-337

Meseret Hailu -v.- Zewdu Bireda

Claiming half of a business organization during dissolution of marriage by
divorce does not refer only to corporeal movables, but also applies to the
incorporeal elements such as the right to rent out business premises. Such
request does not amount to a claim of ownership of the business premises
which is under state ownership.
Article 124,127 and 145 of the Commercial Code

_____________

Tikimt 20, 2001 E.C. (October 30, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Meseret Hailu
Respondent: Zewdu Bireda
The case was adjourned for investigation. The court has examined the case
and it has rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case came before this court as a cassation petition stating that there is a
fundamental error of law in the decisions rendered by the Federal First
Instance Court and the Federal High Court. The issue of the case is the
partition of the common property of the spouses after the termination of their
marriage by divorce. The petitioner is claiming half of two boutique shops
worth about Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) located in Merkato. She has
also claimed half of other property in addition to these two shops.
After hearing the parties, the Federal First Instance Court decided that the
clothes and shoes in the shops should be divided between the parties.
However, it rejected the petitioners request for the division of the business
organizations stating that they cannot be part of common property as the shops
or the places belong to the Agency for Government Houses. The petitioner,
then, appealed to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court rejected the
appeal stating there was no error of law or fact in the decision rendered by the
Federal First Instance Court. The petitioner finally submitted a petition to the
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, contending that there is an error of
law in the decisions of the lower courts. She also stated that her requests of
partition of other properties that were supported by evidence have been
ignored.
The court has received arguments of the respondent to examine the
validity of the decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court, and
examine whether the businesses conducted in the shops rented from the
Agency for Government Houses are common property. The respondent argued
that the decision of the First Instance Court has no error of law because the
business organization was his private property before and after marriage. He
also argued that the right he has as lessee to the place was his private right. It
was noted by this court that the business organization was rebuilt by common
property after the shops were destroyed by fire.
After examining the case, this Court has identified that the petitioner is not
requesting for the partition of the places that are owned by the government. It
is clearly stated in the judgment rendered by the First Instance Court that the
petitioner is requesting for division of the business organization along with the
clothes and shoes worth about Birr 100,000. Accordingly, this Court has
observed that the petitioner did not ask for the lower court to allow her half of
the merchandise in the shops and half of the shops as separate components of
the common property.
The petitioner requested for the partition of the business organization in
the two shops located in Merakto. Article 124 of the Commercial Code states
that a business is an incorporeal movable consisting of all movable property
brought together. This Court has found that the decision rendered by the First
Instance Court is inappropriate because it has overlooked this provision and
decided that the merchandise in the shops be divided leaving out the right to
rent the premises of the shops that are publicly owned.
The lower court regarded the business organization and the merchandise in
the shops separately. By virtue of Article 127 of the Commercial Code, a
business organization, among other things, consists mainly of a good will.
Sub-article 2(c) of the same provision states that a business may consist of the
right to lease the premises in which the trade is carried on. Therefore, we have
found a fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower court that denied
the petitioner her right to the business organization along with her right to rent
the premises of the business organization by stating that they belong to the
Agency for Government Houses. The lower court rejected the petitioners
request not because the business organization is the private property of the
respondent, but by stating that the places belong to Agency for Government
Houses. The argument of the respondent before this court that the business
organization is his private property is not acceptable as well.
Although the petitioner requested for the partition of the business as a
whole according to Articles 124 and 127 of the Commercial Code, the lower
court has overlooked these provisions and Article 145 of the Commercial
Code in rejecting her request stating that she has claimed properties owned by
the Agency for Government Houses. Thus, this Court has found that the
judgment rendered by the lower court has a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the lower court which states that the petitioner cannot
claim the business organization in the two shops is reversed.
2. The petitioner shall have half of the business run in the two shops located
in Merkato including the right to rent the premises.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume: 9, pp 133-135
Tekle Wakjira et al -v.- Shonata Gubu


Members of a private limited company should pay up their contributions
upon the establishment of the company.
Articles 516, 517 and 521(1) (b) of the Commercial Code;
Article 348 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code
_____________

Hamle 12 1999 E.C. (July 19, 2007)

Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Aseged Gashaw, Teshager G/Selassie,
Taffesse Yirga, Birhanu Amenew
Petitioners: 1. Tekle Wakjira

2. Tilahun Bobas
3. Habib Mohamed
Respondent: Shonata Gubu
Judgment
This case relates to the time and the manner in which a member of a private
limited company should pay up the amount he has agreed to contribute during
establishment.
The petitioners and the respondent have established a private limited
company with a capital of Birr 800,000 (eight hundred thousand). Each had
agreed to contribute Birr 200,000 (two hundred thousand), out of which the
current respondent has not paid up Birr 74,838.80 (seventy four thousand eight
hundred thirty eight birr and eighty cents). Nonetheless, the company has been
functioning. When the other members asked the respondent to pay the
remaining contribution, he said he would give it to them from his share of the
profit and that he never agreed to pay up the money upon their request. This
caused the conflict between the members.
The respondent reiterated this argument during the litigation at Gedio

Zone High Court. After examining the case, the court decided in his favour
stating that the respondent never agreed to pay up his contribution in a specific
time and there is no proof showing he has received any notice to this effect.
Thus, the court decided there is no reason for him to promptly pay the
outstanding contribution.
The petitioners, then, appealed to the SNNPR Supreme Court. The
appellate court examined the case and observed that the respondent has not
paid the remaining Birr 74,838.80, and that he had consented to make the
contribution through an agreement that has neither been terminated nor
invalidated. Therefore, the court decided that the respondent should promptly
pay up the money.
Displeased with this decision, the current petitioner brought the case to the
Cassation Division of the Regions Supreme Court claiming fundamental error
of law in the decision of the court. The Regions Cassation Division examined
the case and rendered the following decision.
Article 338(1) of the Commercial Code states that [s]hares subscribed in
cash shall be paid up upon subscription as to one fourth of their par value or a
greater amount if so provided in the memorandum of association and, where
appropriate, as to the whole of the premium; [t]hey may only be registered
shares until they are fully paid. Moreover, sub-Article 2 of the same
provision provides that [p]ayment of the balance may be spread over a period
of five years from the date of registration of the company. Article 342 states
the effect of a shareholders failure to pay his contribution at the due date.
Therefore, according to Articles 338(1) and 342 of the Commercial Code, the
options that result from the failure of a shareholder to fully pay up
contribution are:
- retention of the shares not paid up in the name of the company;
- sale of unpaid up shares by auction;
- liability for compensation if failure to pay-up shares entails bankruptcy
and suspension of shareholder votes.
The Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division stated that this list is
exhaustive and found that there is no legal ground to force the member to pay
up his share of the contribution. It thus reversed the decision of the SNNPR
Supreme court which required the respondent to pay up the remaining share
contribution of Birr 74, 838.80.
Petition has been brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme
Court stating that the decision of the Regional Supreme Courts Cassation
Division has fundamental error of law. The respondent, on the other hand, has
argued that there is no error of law in the decision given by the Cassation
Division of the Regional Supreme Court.
This Court has examined the case and it has observed the establishment of
the company, the amount of the capital, the amount of the contribution and the
amount of money that has not been paid up. Articles 516 and 517 of the
Commercial Code clearly state that each member shall fully pay his
contribution in money or in kind. The company is said to be established when
the Memorandum of Association that sets up the company is signed by all the
members or by persons acting on their behalf and is authenticated. Article
517(g) states that one of the terms that should be shown on a Memorandum of
Association is a statement that the capital is fully paid up. Moreover, Article
521(1) of the Commercial Code lists the terms that should be shown on a share
register.
The Amharic version of Article 521(1)(b) embodies some indication that
the contribution may be made before or after the establishment of the
company. However, the English translation reads the value of all contributions
made by the members. From the joint reading of the two versions, it can be
observed that the contribution shall be made before the establishment of the
company. These provisions show that the member shall make the contribution
before the establishment and that Article 338(1) which deals with the time of
paying up for shares does not apply to this. The members should have made
sure that all the contributions were made before the establishment.
However, the fact that they failed to do so does not negate the
establishment of the company, and this issue has not been raised. Moreover,
although there is no indication as to when and how the member would pay his
contribution in the Memorandum of Association, it is observed that the
respondent admits that he still owes the money and that he will make the
payment. The issue at hand is that the respondent seeks to make the payment
from his share of the profit through time and that he cannot be forced to make
prompt payment. However, as mentioned earlier, a member should pay his
share of the contribution before the establishment of the company. Therefore,
the respondents argument to pay this money from his share of the profit does
not have any legal ground.
The Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Regional Supreme court based on Articles 338 and 342 of the
Commercial Code. These provisions, however, deal with share companies.
Although share companies and private limited companies are both business
organizations, they are very different in their establishment, scope of liability
and their scope of business undertaking. The time of paying up of shares
bought from a share company and the time for making contributions for a
private limited company are provided in different parts of the Commercial

Code. There is no legal provision that renders the provisions dealing with the
time of paying up for share in share companies applicable to private limited
companies as well. Therefore, there is a fundamental error of law in the decree
rendered by the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court.
Decree
1. The respondent should pay up the outstanding capital contribution of Birr
74, 838.80 as agreed upon the establishment of the company.
2. The decision of the Gedio Zone High Court, File Number 22/92 rendered
on of Hidar 24, 1995 E.C. (December 3, 2002) and the decision of the
Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court, File Number 5648
dated Tahsas 26, 1997 E.C. (January 4, 2005) are reversed in accordance
with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
3. The decree rendered by the SNNPR Supreme Court File Number 3694 on
Tahsas 29, 1996 E.C. (January 8, 2004) is affirmed.
.
_________________________________________________
Volume: 7, pp 308-313
4. Civil Procedure

No.
1 Mistir Solomon v. Fekadu 74890 2013 14 131-133

Kasahun and others
2 Gota Ejeta v. Ato Mudesir Redi 72017 2012 14 121-124
3 Apeno Engineering Construction v. 63699 2010 12 375-376

Tiruneh Yemer
4 African Insurance S.C. v. CBE 57360 2011 12 369-370
5 Tirhas Fishaye v. Zenebech Berihun 43821 2010 9 295-300
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter4:CivilProcedure57
Mistir Solomon -v.- Fekadu Kasahun et al


The validity of evidence adduced to prove a contested issue has to be
litigated and decided by the court which entertains the main suit.
_____________

Tir 30, 2005 E.C. (February 7, 2013)

Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Mistir Solomon

Respondents: 1. Fekadu Kasahun,
2. Ali Kasahun,
3. Mulualem Kasahun,
4. Belay Kasahun and
5. Abate Kasahun

Judgment
This case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The petitioner brought a
civil action against the respondents claiming that property (a house and a car)
registered in the name of her late father and which she is entitled to inherit is
found in the possession of the respondents. When the respondents were asked
to surrender the property, they claimed to have a right over it because the
petitioners father has donated it to their mother and they are their mothers
heirs. However, the petitioner argued that the donation contract was not
signed by her father and was not legally valid. She contended that it does not
therefore bestow any right on the respondents and pleaded for the property to
be handed over to her together with the rental benefits it has yielded.
The Federal First Instance Court decided that the jurisdiction to examine
the validity of the contested contract lies with another court. The court stated
that the petitioner who challenges the contract has not actually presented a
court decision which invalidated the contract, nor has he requested the court to
do the same. Therefore, the Federal First Instance Court declined to consider
the suit brought by the petitioner stating that it is not appropriate and does not
have legal ground.
Upon appeal, the Federal High Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court, in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.
This petition against the Federal High Courts decision is submitted to the
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The parties have presented their
arguments on the issue whether the lower courts decision is appropriate in
dismissing the petitioners claim against the donation merely because she did
not have the donation invalidated by another court.
As can be understood from the case, the petitioner instituted the suit at the
Federal First Instance Court taking into consideration the estimate value of the
contested house and car. This is in conformity with Article 14(1) of
Proclamation No. 25/1996 which confers such jurisdiction on the court, and as
a result, is in line with the requirements stated under Articles 16, 9 and
231(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. The lower court has not found fault on
the part of the petitioner with regard to jurisdiction. Nor have the respondents
contested the jurisdiction of the lower court.
If a suit is brought before a court which has material jurisdiction to
entertain a case and the legality of a documentary evidence is contested, the
court, has to allow the parties to argue on the matter and analyse the document
applying the relevant law. The arguments on this document produced to prove
a contested issue at the trial stage shall be in accordance with Articles 246,
247 and 248 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no procedure which allows
for evidence (adduced to prove an issue) to be separately litigated in another
court. There is also no procedure which imposes a duty on the petitioner to
specifically request the invalidation of the donation contract in her suit, since
such decision on the document has to be made in the light of the rules of
evidence in the decision-making process.
The Cassation Division has decided to reverse the decision of the lower
courts which found that the validity of the donation contract should be
litigated in another court which has jurisdiction and not in the court where the
petitioner filed her first suit.

Decree
1. The ruling of the Federal First Instance Court rendered in File Number
34398 on July 14, 2011 and the ruling of the Federal High Court
confirming the ruling of the First Instance Court in File Number 115381 on
November 28, 2011 are reversed.
2. The validity of the contested donation contract should be determined at the
appropriate stage of the proceedings by taking the relevant law into
consideration. The Cassation Division has thus remanded the case to the
Federal First Instance Court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code so that the court shall re-open the file and render the
appropriate decision.
_______________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 131 133.
Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit
Gota Ejeta -v.- Musedir Redi


If the winner of an auction conducted as part of judgment execution fails
to execute his obligation as buyer, and where the property is out for a
second auction as a result, the winner of the first auction (defaulting
purchaser) is obliged to pay the difference (loss on resale) if the price
obtained during the second auction is less than the one offered by the
winner of the first auction.
Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code
_______________
20 Tikimt 2005 E.C. (October 30, 2012)

Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,
Adane Negussie, Mekonnen G/Hiwot
Petitioner: Gota Ejeta
Respondent: Musedir Redi
Judgment
The property of the current petitioner, Diddis Pharmacy, located in Addis
Ababa was offered for auction, based on a court order, so that the proceeds can
be used to pay his debt. Accordingly, bidders were invited and the current
respondent won the auction at Birr 1,000,000 (one million).
However, the respondent failed to pay the purchase price, as a result of
which a second auction was conducted and Ato Abdu Mohammed won the
auction with Birr 1,000,000 (one million). The second winner also failed to
pay the purchase price. Thus, the property was auctioned for the third time and
it was sold for Birr 265,000.00 (two hundred sixty five thousand).
This case was brought by the petitioner contesting the decision of the
appellate courts at various levels which held that only the winner in the second
auction is liable for paying the difference between the highest bid /purchase
price/ offered in the first and second auction, and the price with which the
property was sold in the third auction. The petitioner argued that, according to
Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code, winners of the two auctions should
have been jointly and severally liable for paying the difference, as both of
them defaulted to pay the purchase price and caused the property to be sold at
a lower price.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division examined the issue
whether both winners of the first and second auctions, or only the winner in
the second auction (who won the auction bidding to pay the same price as the
winner in the first one), should be liable to pay the difference in the purchase
price, where the property was finally sold for a lower price in the third auction.
Even though Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code does not give a direct
answer in this regard, the Cassation Division noted that the purpose of this
provision is to make sure that the judgment debtor receives as compensation,
the difference in the purchase price, when the winner in an auction defaults to
pay the pledged amount and the property was sold for a smaller price in
another auction.
The Cassation Division further noted that, even though the current
respondent, by failing to pay the purchase price after winning the first auction
caused a second auction to be held, he did not cause damage to the judgment
debtor, as the amount with which he won the auction is equal to the amount
offered by the winner in the second auction i.e Birr one million. Thus, the
Cassation Division found that there is no fundamental error in law in the
decision of the appellate courts which held that the current respondent, does
not have joint and several liability with the winner in the second auction, who
should only be directly responsible for the third auction which resulted the
property being sold at a difference of Birr 735,000.00 (seven hundred thirty
five).
Decree
1. The Decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal File No. 69945
rendered on Hamle 8, 2003 EC (July 15, 2011) is affirmed.
2. The decision that the current respondent should not be jointly and severally
liable for paying the difference in the purchase price which resulted during
the various auctions is found appropriate.
3. The injunction order granted by this cassation bench on 17 Tikimt 2004
EC (28 October 28, 2011) is lifted.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 121 124.
Apeno Engineering Construction Enterprise v. Tiruneh Yimer

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 63699 (July 22, 2011)

A pleading that lacks clarity with regard to the claims shall not be
accepted, and a judicial decision cannot be rendered thereupon unless the
pleading is amended by the parties themselves or by order of the court.
Art. 91(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

______________
Hamle 15, 2003 E.C. (July 22, 2011)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Apeno Engineering Con. Enterprise

Respondent: Tiruneh Yimer
Judgment
The present respondent brought legal action in the First Instance Court of
Gambela City Administration claiming that the defendant (the present
petitioner) owes him payments which are not settled since his employment as
a guard was terminated due to illness.
The defendant (the present petitioner), on its part, responded that the
plaintiff (the present respondent) was employed as a guard in the enterprise
from Tahsas 2001 E.C. (December 2008) to Tikimt 2002 (October 2009) for
11 months, but he terminated his contract himself as a result of which the
enterprise paid severance pay. It argued that there is no outstanding payment it
owes to Ato Tiruneh. The court, satisfied by the evidence produced for the
payment of the severance pay, decided that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
other additional payment since he did not (in his statement of claim)
specifically state other payments owed to him [if any] by the enterprise.
An appeal was brought to the Gambella Vicinity (Zuria) High Court and
the court decided that since the employment for one year is proved, the

employee is entitled to get other payments such as overtime payment, annual

leave payment and payments for public holidays since no evidence is
produced to prove that these payments have been made to the employee.
A cassation petition is brought to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division against the decision of the Gambella Vicinity (Zuria) High Court.
The petitioner contends that the decision rendered was based on the present
respondents vague claims for various payments and is against the principles
and procedures of pleading and production of evidence under the Ethiopian
Civil Procedure Code. The respondent has failed to appear at the Cassation
Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The case is thus adjudicated in his
absence and the court has examined the validity of the decision of the lower
courts.
Since a labour dispute is a civil case by its nature, it has to be governed by
the Civil Procedure Code. Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code is the
relevant provision in this regard. Under Article 222 (1)(f) of the Code, it is
clearly stated that the facts constituting the cause of action must be specified.
Moreover, Article 80(2) of the Code, requires the plaintiff to clearly and
concisely state all the material facts and claims in detail in the pleading. In the
present case, however, the present respondent has generally claimed to be paid
a certain amount of money instead of listing them out specifically in
accordance with the requirements of the law, and it is against the laws of
procedure to have the other party to defend the case based on such kind of
unclear and general claim.
A pleading which is not clear can be subject to compulsory or voluntary
amendment as per Article 91(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Nevertheless,
this has not been done. The lower court (Gambella City First Instance court)
has committed a fundamental error of law and disregarded the basic principles
of pleading and production of evidence in civil litigation in deciding the case
in favour of the present respondent without determining the specific time for
which the present respondent claims payments of annual leave, public holidays
and overtime. The decision is rendered without any evidence which proves the
entitlement of the present respondent to these payments.
Decree
1. The decision of Gambella City Zuria High Court dated of October 20,
2010 (Tikimt 10, 2003 E.C.) is reversed as per Art. 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. The decision of Gambela City Administration First Instance Court in File
No. 03436 on July 6, 2010 (Sene 28, 2002 EC) is confirmed in accordance
3. The petitioner is not required to make annual leave, public holiday and
overtime payments to the present respondent.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 375-376.
Abridged translation: Aron Degol

African Insurance S.C. -v.- Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 57360 (July 22, 2011)

- There must be a good cause to invoke a leave to appeal out of time.
- Courts can, within the meaning of the law, determine the reasons that
qualify as good cause for failure to file a memorandum of appeal
within the prescribed time.
- Lapse of time for appeal due to the pleaders fault does not constitute
good cause for permitting leave to appeal out of time.
Arts. 323 (2), 325, 326 (1)&(2) of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia
________________

Hamle 15, 2003 E.C. (July 22, 2011)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufsa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: African Insurance S.C.
Judgment
The case relates to a courts authority to permit leave to appeal out of time.
The appellant (the present respondent) has made an application for leave to
appeal out of time to the Federal Supreme Court appellate division. The
appellant stated that the reason why the time for appeal lapsed is due the
negligence of its former pleader who failed to observe the time limit for
appeal. The court summoned the respondent (the present petitioner), heard the
case and ruled that the leave to appeal out of time is accepted because the
time for appeal lapsed due to the failure of the appellants former pleader
against whom a disciplinary measure has been taken.
A petition is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
against this ruling of the Federal Supreme Court appellate division. At the
lower courts, the appellant (the present respondent) had applied for leave to
appeal out of time due to failure to lodge the appeal within the prescribed
period of time under Article 323(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. An
application for leave to appeal out of time must be made in accordance with
Article 325 of the same Code and the application is examined pursuant to Art.
326 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code.
According to Art. 326 (1), if the court to which the application is made is
satisfied that the applicant was prevented to appeal within the time prescribed
for good cause, the leave to appeal out of time will be granted and the
applicant will be ordered to file the memorandum of appeal within ten days of
such an order. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has noted that
there is no clear standard stated in the law regarding the reasons that qualify as
good cause. The standards are thus left for judicial interpretation. However,
Article 326 (2) clearly provides that where the failure to appeal in time is due
to the default of the appellants pleader good cause shall not be deemed to
exist within the meaning of Art. 326 (1).
In the present case, the respondent stated its reason for failure to appeal in
time as being the default of its former pleader, and this court is aware of the
fact that the Federal Supreme Court granted the leave based on the reason that
the pleader failed to perform his duties with due diligence and honestly.
However, the law is clear in this regard, and lack of honesty or breach of
professional ethics does not constitute good cause within the meaning of Art.
326 (1); and should not be considered as an issue.
Perhaps, it may become an issue between the present respondent and the
pleader to determine the scope, extent and effect of liability, but, it cannot be a
justification to allow leave to appeal out of time. Courts should always
adjudicate cases brought before them based on provisions of the law. A
decision rendered in total deviation from the clear wordings of the provision of
the law is not acceptable and constitutes a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Appellate File No. 54164
dated Ginbot 11, 2002 EC (May 18, 2010) is reversed in accordance with
Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The respondents request for leave to appeal out of time is rejected based
on Article 326(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 369-370.
Abridged translation: Aron Degol

Tirhas F. - v- Zenebech B.
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 66856 (January 13, 2010)
- The application for review of judgement made by the petitioner should
not be dismissed merely because she has lodged an appeal and a decision
has been rendered by the appellate court.
- The previous decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Bench on this issue has been changed.
Articles 6 (1)(a) & (b) of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia
______________

Tir 5, 2002 E.C. (January 13, 2010)
Justices: Tegene Getahun , Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu,

Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yiga, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: W/o Tirhas Fishaye
Respondent: W/o Zenebech Berihun
The court has rendered the following judgement.

Judgement
The issue in this case is based on Art. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. The
plaintiff who initially filed the case at Arsi Zone High Court is the current
respondent. She brought the case seeking a declaratory judgment that the
father of her two children is her late husband. The case was decided in her
favour. The litigation continued until the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division. After having gone through all this process, the current petitioner has
asked for review of Judgment.
The petitioner accused the respondent of providing the court with false
evidence and hence has brought her case to the attention of the Arsi Zone High
Court to review its former judgement in light of the new finding. After hearing
what respondent, the court decided to reject the complaint stating that this case
had already gone to the level of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division. Petition was brought to the Oromia State Supreme Court Cassation
Bench which decided that no fundamental error of law had been committed.
The current petitioner has submitted a petition to this Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Bench against this decision.
In her petition dated Yekatit 19, 2001 EC (February 26, 2009) the
petitioner contended that the lower courts have wrongly interpreted the law
and committed a fundamental error of law. She stated that, if the judgment is
reviewed in light of the newly discovered evidence, the judgement would not
be made in favour of the respondent.
The respondent, on the other hand, argued that according to Article 6 of
the Civil Procedure Code, an application for review of judgment can only be
made before an appeal has been made. She also stated that the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division has, in Cassation File No. 16624, made a
binding interpretation of the law that this provision is inapplicable if an appeal
has been made. The respondent further contended that the newly found
evidence that the petitioner claims to have obtained does not criminally
implicate her, and asked the court to drop the petition.
Any analysis with regard to the first issue, i.e., whether an application for
a review of judgment could be made after an appeal is lodged requires
examining the spirit of the law. Article 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is not a
provision that can be applied to a new case. It is a procedure for the review of
judgment after a case has been brought to court and final judgment is
rendered. The party applying for review of judgement is a person who was
party to the original case from the beginning. Hence, he/she will be treated
differently from a person filing for opposition as provided for on Article 358
of the Civil Procedure Code. Furthermore, the application for review of
judgement is not made to the appellate court but to the court that made the
judgment which shows the unique nature of the provision. Article 6(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Art. 5, any party considering himself
aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal lies, but from which
no appeal has been preferred, or by a decree or order from which no
appeal lies, may, on payment of the prescribed court fee, apply for a
review of judgment to the court which gave it where:
(a) subsequently to the judgement he discovers new and important matter,
such as forgery, perjury or bribery which after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge at the time of the giving of the
judgment; and

(b) had such matter been known at the time of the giving of the judgment,
it would have materially affected the substance of the decree or order
the review of which is sought.
The elements embodied in Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(b) show that if an original
judgement upon which an appeal had been made was based on false evidence,
then it is not lawful. This leads to the conclusion that Article 6 is meant to stop
the execution of such a judgment since the sole purpose of justice is to bring
out the truth.
Evidence plays a big role in the process of finding out the truth in courts of
law. Hence, in addition to its mode of presentation, the mode of acquisition of
evidence must be legal.
Procedural law puts forth the mode of presentation of evidence as well as
the time limit for presenting evidence. As a rule, evidence should be presented
by a party who stands to gain from it as provided for in Articles 223 and 234
of the Civil Procedure Code. However, in the pursuit of truth, the court can of
its own motion summon additional evidence as provided for in Article 264 of
the Civil Procedure Code and other laws. Although there is, for example, a
time limit to produce evidence as stated under Article 137 of the Civil
Procedure Code, there could be instances, by virtue of Article 256, where
evidence may be presented to the court even if the time for its submission has
passed. We can also see that the appellate court may hear evidence that was
not presented to the first court as provided under Art 345.
In light of these provisions, we can observe that evidence has a key role in
finding out the truth, and there are procedural rules and exceptional
circumstances outside of the ordinary rules that govern the submission of
evidence. This is done to make sure that the judgement passed is based only
on the truth.
The case brought before us involves a request for a review of judgement
claiming that the previous judgment is made based on false evidence. This
implies that the judgement rendered is not based on the truth.
The argument raised by the respondent that the time has passed to ask for
review of judgement does not seem to take this into consideration. On the
other hand, the point raised by the petitioner necessitates examining the truth.
Hence, before we arrive at a conclusive interpretation of the law, we need to
consider two perspectives in relation with this legislation.
The first perspective leads to the belief that as long as the legal arguments
and the mode of submission of evidence are according to the law the outcome
will always lead to the truth.
The second perspective could be divided into two. One could be to

interpret and apply the law literally. If we take the phrase from which no
appeal has been preferred in Art. 6(1) and give it a literal translation, it
implies that one can only make an application for judgement review before
making an appeal. But this provision should be interpreted in line with other
phrases in Art. 6(1) (a)&(b) and in light of the general aim of the Civil
Procedure Code as a whole.
The other factor that should be taken into consideration is whether there is
any rationale to require that review of judgment should be brought before
making an appeal. If one makes an application for review of judgment while
an appellate court is adjudicating the case, it would mean that the case is being
adjudicated by two courts at the same time. This would only be a waste of
time, energy and resources in addition to complicating matters further.
We have found it reasonable to interpret Art. 6(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure
Code in a way that helps to bring out the truth. Whether one has made an
appeal or not, review of judgment should be allowed if there is sufficient
evidence to make the judges believe that the evidence was false, or a crime
had been committed in relation with the evidence thereby derailing to the
previous judgement.
The next issue that needs a decision in this case relates to the interpretation
rendered by this court on the same issue in Cassation File No. 16624, i.e.
whether the analysis and interpretation pursued by this court in File No. 16624
is in conformity with the interpretation of Art. 6(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure
Code. The reason why it was found necessary to revise this decision is that
there are recurring requests for review of judgement, usually after appeal, and
the reason which is frequently invoked in this regard is the need to have the
truth revealed. Therefore, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Proc. No.
454/2005 we have changed the previous interpretation of Article 6 of the Civil
Procedure Code and have made the interpretation given to the provision in the
present case a binding interpretation. Hence, we have not accepted the
argument of the respondent on the basis of this courts interpretation in
Cassation File No. 16624. We have thus accepted the petitioners request for
review of judgement and have made the following decree.
Decree
1. The judgement given by the High Court of Arsi Zone in Case No. 01789
on Hidar 5, 2001 E.C. (November 14, 2008) and the Oromia Supreme
Court in Case No. 70413 on Tahsas 14, 2001 E.C (December 23, 2008) are
reversed in accordance with Art 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The interpretation of law regarding review of judgments given under

Cassation File No. 16624 is changed.
3. The petitioners request for review of judgement should be entertained in
accordance with Art. 6 of Civil Procedure Code.
4. This case is remanded to the High Court of Arsi Zone so that it can look
into the matter and review the judgment if it finds it necessary to do so.
Signature of seven justices
_______________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 295 300
Abridged translation: Deborah Haddis & Fasil Abebe
5. Contracts

No.
1 Negussie H. & Mamitu L. v. 72463 2012 13 209-210

Huressa D. & Lelise R.
2 Abrha B. v. Birkinesh H. 71927 2012 13 215-217
3 Dashen Printers and Trading PLC v. 71375 2012 13 203-205

Fisseha Yihun
4 Andarge I. v. Zehra M. 64397 2012 13 200-202
5 Ethio-Telecom v. G. Ginaho 61331 2012 13 175-178
6 Birkinesh Birru v. Kifle Habdeta 25912 2008 5 343-345
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter5:Contracts73
Negussie H. & Mamitu L. v. Huressa D. & Lelise R.


A person who gives his immovable property as security in a contract of
antichresis (woledagid) can reclaim his property anytime upon payment
of his debt even after the end of the period stated in the contract.
Civil Code Arts. 3124, 3128(2), 3117-3130, 1845
____________

Megabit 26, 2004 E.C. (April 4, 2012)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Negussie Haile and Mamitu Leta
Respondents: Huressa Debel and Lelise Raya
Judgment
In the petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, the
petitioners requested that the decisions of Finfine Vicinity (Finfine Zuria)
High Court and Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Division contain a
fundamental error of law. The case started at Wolmera Woreda Court, and
involves antichresis (woledagid). On Meskerem 28, [1983] EC (October 8,
1990), the petitioners concluded a contract of antichresis with the respondents,
and they delivered House No. 777 and two rooms as security for a loan of Birr
2,500 (two thousand five hundred) payable in one year. The petitioners stated
that their creditors invoked period of limitation and refused to receive the
return of the money owed to the latter and return the immovable property. The
petitioners as plaintiffs in the initial suit claimed that the creditors should
receive the debt owed to them and return the immovable property under their
possession.
The Wolmera Woreda Court decided that the claim is not barred by period
of limitation and decided that the respondents should receive the debt owed to
them and return the immovable property. Upon appeal, the Finfine Vicinity
(Finfine Zuria) High Court [reversed the Woreda Courts decision and]
decided that the respondents had agreed to pay their debt on Meskerem 28,
1984 (October 9, 1991) and is therefore barred by period of limitation. The
petition submitted to Oromia Region Supreme Court Cassation Division
against this decision was rejected. The petitioners had argued that the High
Courts decision involves a fundamental error in law because it has not
considered the special nature of the contract and is contrary to Article 3128(2)
of the Civil Code. The respondents, on the other hand, invoked Article 1845 of
the Civil Code and contended that the plaintiffs have not paid their debt within
one year in accordance with their contractual obligation, and raising such a
claim after sixteen years is barred by a period of limitation under Article 1845
of the Civil Code.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the issue
whether the claim of the petitioners is barred by period of limitation. As
stipulated under Article 3117 of the Civil Code, antichresis is a contract
whereby the debtor undertakes to deliver an immovable to his creditor as a
security for the performance of his obligations. The effect of the contract of
antichresis is stated in Article 3124 of the Civil Code [regarding the relief of
the creditor from payment of rent to the person who creates the antichresis,
and the creditors corresponding duty not to require interest on the loan].
Article 3128(2) provides that [u]nless otherwise agreed, the [debtor1] may
at any time terminate the antichresis by performing the obligation secured by
the antichresis. The phrase unless otherwise agreed should have been
interpreted by the Zones High Court based on the spirit and objective of the
provision. In this provision, the phrase unless otherwise agreed shows that
the petitioners delivered their immovable property as security to the loan
payable on Meskerem 28, 1984 EC, and that they cannot claim the return of
their property before that date by paying back the loan. This does not,
however, mean that the petitioners cannot claim the return of their property
any time after the lapse of the date stated in the contract of antichresis. There
is no legal provision that allows creditors to acquire ownership of a house
which they have held as security. Article 3128(1) only applies to creditors who
may opt not to use the house and its benefit thereof so that such creditor can at
any time renounce the antichresis.
1
The word creditor in Article 3128(2) in the English version is a mistranslation, and the
binding Amharic version reads baleidaw, i.e. the debtor.

Articles 3117 to 3130 of the Civil Code are specific provisions that define
the nature of the contract of antichresis and deal with the effects of the
contract and its termination. Article 1845 is a provision on contracts in
general, and does not apply to this case for which the law has created special
rules. Therefore, the decision rendered by the Oromia Region Supreme Court
Cassation Division contains a fundamental error of law in holding that the
claim of the petitioners is barred by the period of limitation of ten years.
Decree
1. The decisions of Finfine Vicinity High Court and Oromia Region Supreme
Court Cassation Division decision are reversed.
2. The claim of the petitioners shall not be barred by period of limitation.
3. The decision rendered by Wolmera Woreda Court is affirmed.
4. The petitioners have the right to take delivery of the house from the
respondents upon payment of Birr 2500 (Two thousand five hundred).
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 209 210.
Abridged translation: EN Stebek
Abrha B. -v.- Birkinesh H.


Where signature signed on a contract is disclaimed and cannot also be
verified by forensic investigation, witnesses or other evidence can be used
for the authentication of the signature.
Civil Code Article 2472, 2008
_______________
Miazia 10, 2004 E.C. (April 18, 2012)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Sellasie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Abra B.
Respondent: Birkinesh H.
We have examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment
The petitioner claims that the Tigray Region Supreme Court and the Regional
States Supreme Court Cassation Division have made fundamental error in
oflaw. The case started at Mekele Worda Court, Kedamawi Woyane Chilot
and the case involves contract of loan.
The statement of claim initially filed at the Woreda Court states that the
respondent took a loan of Birr 12,000 (twelve thousand) in a contract
concluded on Ginbot 7, 1993 EC (May 15, 2001), agreed to pay her debt until
Yekatit 1994 EC (February 2002), and further agreed to pay a penalty of Birr
8,000 (eight thousand) if she fails to pay within the time agreed. The plaintiff
requested for the payment of Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) plus interest for
the delay in payment because the respondent has not made the payment within
the time agreed in the contract.
The respondent (defendant at the lower court) disclaimed the signature in
the contract and stated that she has not taken the loan. The court ordered
forensic investigation of the signature on the document and the report from the
investigation stated that it could not be verified that the signature is the
defendants. The Woreda Court rejected the statement of claim. Upon appeal,
the High Court reversed the decision and referred the case to the Woreda
Court instructing it to hear witnesses on the veracity of the signature and
render decision.
The witnesses testified that they were present when the respondent took
the loan and that they have signed on the contract. The Woreda Court decided
that the respondent should pay the loan, i.e Birr 12,000 plus the penalty Birr
8,000 as agreed upon in the contract because she failed to pay the loan within
the time agreed. It also decided that the respondent should pay interest until
she fully pays the aggregate amount of Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand).
Upon the respondents appeal, the High Court confirmed the decision of
the Woreda Court with some variation with regard to the payment of interest
which was not accepted.
However, the Regions Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the
Woreda and High Courts stating that hearing witnesses to prove the existence
of loan violates Article 2472 of the Civil Code. The petitioner submitted a
petition to the Regions Supreme Court Cassation Division which affirmed the
decision of the Supreme Court.
The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division,
dated Nehassie 9, 2003 EC (August 15, 2011) states that the evidence
submitted to prove the loan is documentary evidence. As a result of the
respondents denial of her signature and the difficulty in proving her signature
through forensic investigation, it was appropriate to use witnesses to whether
the respondent had signed on the contract of loan. The respondent has also
submitted her arguments in support of the decision of the Regionals Supreme
Court and Cassation Division.
We have examined the case. A document dated May 15, 2001 was
presented to the lower court showing that a loan of Birr 12,000 was signed by
the contracting parties. The requirement of Article 2472(1) is thus satisfied
because the contract is made in writing. However, the respondent has
disclaimed the signature based on Article 2008 of the Civil Code. Even if
forensic investigation was made, the signature could not be verified by police
forensic laboratory. The witnesses who have signed on the contract are thus
duly heard to authenticate whether the signature was signed by the respondent
during the conclusion of the contract.
Where a signature is disclaimed, the first option is forensic investigation.
If it cannot be verified through forensic investigation, it can be observed from
the general principles of the law of evidence that the signature can be
authenticated by witnesses who were present when the contract was signed.
Under Ethiopian law, there is no specific legal provision which forbids

authentication of a signature by witnesses or other evidence. On the other
hand, the jurisprudence of courts that has developed over a long period of time
shows that signature can be authenticated by witnesses or other evidence when
the signature is disclaimed and cannot also be verified by forensic
investigation. Therefore, the Tigray Regions Supreme Court and the Regional
Supreme Courts Cassation Division have committed a fundamental error in
law by not making a distinction between the submission of a contract in
writing as required under Article 2472(1) of the Civil Code, and the issue of
authentication if a signature on the contract is disclaimed. This fails to
consider the content and basic objective of Article 2472(1).
On the other hand, the Woreda Court and the Zone High Court have duly
proved that the respondent has signed on the contract, but they have erred in
deciding that the respondent should pay Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) which
includes the principal loan of Birr 12,000 and the additional penalty of Birr
8,000 an amount which is neither a loan nor repayment as envisaged under
Article 2472(3). We have thus decided that part of the decisions of the Woreda
and High Courts have fundamental error in law.
Decree
1. The decisions of Tigray Region Supreme Court Appellate Division and the
Supreme Courts Cassation Division are reversed.
2. Kedamawi Woyane Woreda Courts and Mekele City High Courts
decisions are varied.
3. The respondent shall pay Birr 12,000 (twelve thousand) to the petitioner
plus an interest of 9% (nine percent) to be computed since the suit was
instituted at the Woreda Court.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 215 217.

Dashen Printers and Trading PLC -v.- Fisseha Yihun


Where specific form is not prescribed by the law, contracts may be made
orally, by signs normally in use or by conduct which shows an unequivocal
intention to enter into contractual obligations.
Article 1681(1) of the Civil Code;
_____________
Tir 16, 2004 E.C. (January 25, 2012)

Adane Nigussie
Petitioner: Dashen Printers and Trading PLC
Respondent: Fisseha Yihun
Judgment
The current petitioner was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court. Its
statement of claim stated that it had printed 300 books based on a contract
with the respondent in which the latter had agreed to pay Birr 50,000 (fifty
thousand). Advance payment of Birr 25,000 (twenty five thousand) was paid,
and the respondent did not pay the remaining amount after the petitioner
completed it tasks. The petitioner requested that the payment should also
include interest because the payment is overdue for over a year.
The respondent has died and summons was posted at the residence of the
deceased so that heirs could appear for the trial. The case was tried in the
absence of the respondents heirs, and the First Instance Court decided that all
documents submitted to the court are prepared by the plaintiff. It dismissed the
suit on the ground that the existence of binding contractual obligations has not
been sufficiently establsished.
The Federal High court confirmed the decision after an appeal was
submitted to it. The court stated that the appeal is rejected in accordance with
Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code without the need to summon the
respondent.
The petitioner has requested the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division to correct the error in the decisions of the Federal First Instance
Court and the order of the Federal High Court. The major argument presented
by the petitioner is that contracts for printing services can be made orally, and
the decisions of the lower courts which dismissed the case owing to the non-
submission of a written contract is not appropriate.
The Cassation Division has sent summons to the heirs of the deceased, but
they did not appear even if they had received the summons. The case was thus
examined in their absence.
The issue examined by the Cassation Division is whether the ruling of the
lower courts is appropriate in dismissing the petitioners claims on the ground
that it has not produced evidence which proves the existence of a binding
contractual obligation.
The documents submitted by the petitioner to the First Instance Court are
advance payment receipts, receipts from the respondent and the proforma
invoice given to the respondent. A written contract has not been submitted
other than these documents. Failure to produce a written contract does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that a contract has not been formed. Article
1681(1) of the Civil Code provides that [o]ffer and acceptance may be made
orally or in writing or by signs normally in use or by a conduct such that, in
the circumstance of the case, there is no doubt as to the party's agreement.
This does not, however, mean that all contracts can be made orally, by signs
normally in use or by conduct which unequivocally show a contracting partys
agreement. For example, Article 1725 of the Civil Code requires contracts for
a long period of time, contracts of guarantee, insurance and other contracts in
respect to which a specific form is prescribed should be made in writing.
In the case under consideration, the law does not require contracts of
printing services to be in writing. The contract in dispute involves printing 300
(three hundred) copies of a book and this does not entail a contractual
obligation which continues over a long period of time which could have
rendered a written form necessary for its formation. The lower courts should
have thus examined the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner and
could have also examined whether the contract was concluded in the forms
stated earlier (in accordance with Article 264(2) of the Civil Procedure Code).
Although the petitioner did not produce witnesses, the courts could itself
have summoned witnesses, if necessary. However, the courts have failed to

pursue these procedures and have committed a fundamental error of law in

dismissing the petitioners claims. The following decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 69348 (dated
Miaza 26, 2003 EC, i.e. May 4, 2011) and the order given by the Federal
High Court, File No. 110517 (on Sene 23, 2003 EC, i.e. June 30, 2011)
are reversed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance
with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, and it shall examine
whether the petitioner has printed 300 copies of the book by appointing a
court commissioner (mitik dagna) to the printing press in accordance with
Article 272 of the Civil Procedure Code and render a decision based on the
procs-verbal of the inspection submitted to the court by the commissioner
(mitik dagna).
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 203 205.
Andarge I. -v.- Zehra M.


- Article 2472 which requires a loan exceeding Birr 500 to be made in
writing or by a confession made in court or by oath taken in court
shall not apply to payments outside loans.
- Failure to appear after summons does not constitute admission of the
claims in a suit, but merely allows a hearing ex parte.
Civil Code, Article 2472
______________
Tir 1, 2004 E.C. (January 10, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Andarge I.
Respondent: Zehara M.
Judgment
The case involves the petitioners claim that the respondent received money
from him to buy for him a TV set and LCD and that she has neither bought the
items nor returned the money. The case was initially brought to Addis Ketema
Sub-city Kebele 10/11/12 Social Court in Addis Ababa by the current
petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court). The statement of claim dated
Meskerem 17, 2001 E.C. (September 27, 2008) states that the respondent
came to the petitioners house and promised to buy for him a 21 inch Sony TV
set with LCD at a price of Birr 4,750 (four thousand seven hundred and fifty)
and that he gave the money to the respondent in the presence of witnesses. He
claimed that she should either deliver the items or return the money along with
the cost incurred due to the litigation.
The respondent (defendant at the lower court) was unwilling to receive
summons as confirmed by the petitioners oath taken in court and the case was
heard in her absence. The court decided that the respondents failure to appear
can be regarded as admission of the claim and required the respondent to pay
the amount stated in the suit plus the expenses incurred due to litigation.
The respondent appealed to the Citys First Instance Court, but the
decision was affirmed. She further lodged a cassation petition to Addis Ababa
City Cassation Chilot which cited Article 2472(1)(2) of the Civil Code and
decided that loan that exceeds Birr 500 (five hundred) can be proved only in
writing or by a confession made or oath taken in court. The Cassation Division
of Addis Ababa City Administration, by a majority opinion, ruled that this
requirement can be applied to similar monetary claims (other than loans)
which exceed Birr 500 (five hundred). It thus reversed the decisions of the
lower courts and relieved the respondent from the claims of the petitioner.
Petition is lodged to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
against this decision. The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of
both parties in light of the issues of the case and the relevant provisions. The
issue is whether the amount, i.e. Birr 4,750, which the petitioner claims to
have given for the purchase of a TV and LCD can be proved by witnesses, or
whether it must be proved only by providing a written contract.
The respondent did not receive the money as a loan, but under the promise
that she will buy a TV and an LCD for the petitioner. In the absence of
arguments by the parties which involve the issue of loan, it is a fundamental
error in law to invoke Article 2472 of the Civil Code and decide that claims
beyond Birr 500 cannot be proved by witnesses. We have found that the
minority opinion of the Addis Ababa City Cassation Division was valid in this
regard. The lower court has committed a fundamental error of law in
considering the respondents refusal to receive summons as admission of the
statement of claim, because the court should have merely ordered for a hearing
in the absence of the respondent and could have ultimately arrived at a
decision based on evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
Decree
1. The decisions of Addis Ababa City Cassation Division, Addis Ababa City
First Instance Court and Addis Ketema Sub-city Kebele 10/11/12 are
2. An ex parte hearing does not constitute admission, and the case is referred
to the social court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code so that it can render a decision after having examined the petitioners
witnesses and other relevant evidence.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 200 202.
Ethio-Telecom -v.- G. Ginaho

Article 2024 of the Civil Code which provides for presumption of
payment not claimed within two years shall not apply to telephone service
bills.
Civil Code, Articles 2022, 2023, 2024(f), 2025, 2026

_____________

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa
Petitioner: Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation

Respondent: G. Ginaho
The file is examined and we have rendered the following judgment.

Judgment
The case started based on the statement of claim filed at the Addis Ababa City
First Instance Court by the current petitioner as plaintiff. Ethio-telecom
requested that telephone bills of Birr 5,873.20 be paid by the respondent for
the telephone services he obtained through phone number 200778 that was
installed based on a contract dated Tir 10, 1998 EC (January 18, 2006).
The Federal Instance Court rejected the request stating that telephone bills
are debts incurred every month and such debts are, in accordance with Article
2024(f) of the Civil Code, presumed to have been paid if they are not claimed
within two years. The petitioners appeal to the Federal High Court was also
rejected based on Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. This petition is
submitted against the decisions of the lower courts.
The petition states that the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent is contractual and Article 2024 [f] is not relevant to the case. The
petitioner requested that the respondent should pay the amount stated in the
suit.
The major issue that needs interpretation is whether Article 2024(f) is
relevant for telephone bills. It is thus necessary to carefully examine the
provision.
Generally speaking, Article 2024 relates to legal presumptions. With
regard to its features it must be interpreted in the context of Articles 2025 and
2026 which show that it is a legal presumption which is not feely rebuttable,
but rebuttable in a limited way. Article 2024 enumerates various debts that are
deemed to have been paid if they are not claimed within two years since they
fell due thereby giving rise to the presumption. The provision does not
specifically refer to telephone bills.
The provision that is invoked by the respondent and accepted by the lower
courts is the presumption of payment stated under Article 2014(f). The
provision titled Presumption of payment after two years provides that
interest on loans and generally any sum payable annually or at shorter
periodical intervals shall be deemed to have been paid where two years have
elapsed since they fell due.
Article 2024(f) refers to interest on loans or interest on any sum payable
annually or at shorter intervals. The content and structure of Article 2024(f)
indicate that the provision is applicable on interest on the loan and not on the
principal loan. If the legislature had intended to make reference to the principal
as well, the reading of the provisions would have been loan and interest. In
this regard, this Cassation Division has, in accordance with Article 2(1) of
Proclamation No. 454/2005 rendered a binding interpretation in File No.
29181 and File No. 35758. Thus Article 2024(f) applies to interest and not the
principal loan. Moreover, telephone service bills are not loans and the
provision is not relevant to the case.
The other provision that deals with presumption of payment is Article
2023 which provides for the presumption upon the expiry of six months. The
provision specifies the circumstances in which such presumption of payment
is made. Telephone service bills are not included in this provision. Nor does
this case fall under Article 2022 of the Civil Code because this provision
refers to a creditor who gives receipt for a given period, without making any
reservation thereby leading to the presumption that the dues for the previous
periods are deemed to have been collected. The respondent has not submitted
arguments or evidence which can render this provision relevant to the case.
Telephone service bills are not loans, and they do not share characteristics
of loans. The bills are paid in return to the petitioners services and it is based
on a contract. The claim submitted by the petitioner is payment for the services
it has rendered for a certain period in accordance with the terms of the
contract. The lower courts decree does not show whether the respondent has
appeared in court and submitted statement of defence. The lower court should
have examined the merits of the evidence produced by the petitioner based on
the contract to determine the validity of the telephone service bills, but has
instead rendered a decree on the basis of a legal provision which is not
relevant to the case. This constitutes a fundamental error of law because the
lower courts have unduly applied Article 2024(f) for claims of telephone
service bills. The court has thus rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court rendered on Miazia 7,
2002 EC (April 16, 2010), File No. 163107 and its confirmation by the
Federal High Court on Hamle 22, 2002 EC (July 28, 2010), File No.
95515 are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. Unless a telephone service bill is barred by a receipt given to the
respondent which refers to a later period as stipulated under Article 2022
of the Civil Code, it shall not be covered under Article 2024(f).
3. The case is remanded to the lower court in accordance to Article 343(1) of
the Civil Procedure Code so that it can decide whether the respondent
should pay Birr 5,873.20 after having examined the validity and strength
of the arguments and evidence submitted to the court.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 175 178.

Birkinesh Birru -v.- Kifle Habdeta


A compromise is final and binding. It has the effect of res judicata.
Civil Code, Articles 3308(2), 3312
_____________
Miazia 2, 2000 E.C. (April 10, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Medhin Kiros,
Ali Mohammed, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Birkinesh Birru (Birru Korichos heir)

Respondent: Kifle Habdeta
The file is examined and we have rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case was initially adjudicated by the Federal First Instance Court, File No.
00808, and the court rendered its decision on Pagumen 4, 1995 (September 9,
2003). Appeal was submitted to the Federal High Court which gave an order
in File No. 26283 on Sene 10, 1998 (June 17, 2006). The petition submitted to
the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court contends that there is
fundamental error of law in the decision of the First Instance Court and the
order given by the Federal High Court.
The issue in the dispute is the respondents claim that the petitioner should
deliver the house, in Addis Ababa, Wordea 25, Keble 01, House No. 292
which the latter has sold to him for Birr 4,500 (four thousand five hundred).
The petitioner argued that the case was settled by compromise on 27 Ginbot
1992 EC (June 4, 2000) and there is no legal ground for the respondent to seek
delivery of the house.
The lower court decided that the petitioner has failed to return the advance
payment he had taken for the sale of the house, Birr 760 (seven hundred sixty)
and the penalty payment (yegedeb mekecha) of Birr 2,000 (two thousand). It
decided that he should deliver the house to the respondent. The High Court
affirmed the decision stating that there is no ground of appeal.
The petitioners argument in the Cassation Divisions hearing is that the
lower courts have set aside the compromise settlement and this constitutes a
fundamental error of law. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the
petitioner has not performed the obligations set forth in the compromise and
stated that the decision of the lower court has no error in law.
The fact that this case was settled though compromise on June 4, 2000 is
not contested by the parties. The compromise agreed upon by the parties was
that the petitioner will return advance payment he received from the
respondent, i.e. Birr 760 and will also pay Birr 2,000 as penalty due to the
termination of the contract.
According to Article 3308(2) of the Civil Code, this compromise has the
effect of extinguishing the previous contract of sale of a house. Thus, the
respondent can only claim the payment of the money stated in the
compromise, i.e. Birr 2,760 (two thousand seven hundred sixty) and cannot
claim delivery of the house because compromise has the effect of res judicata
without appeal by virtue of Article 3312 of the Civil Code. Therefore the
decision of the First Instance Court which required the petitioner to deliver the
house to the respondent has not taken the laws cited above into consideration
and involves a fundamental error in law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is reversed.
2. The order rendered by the Federal High Court is reversed.
...
__________________________________________________
Volume 5, pp. 343 345.

6. Contracts related to Immovable Property

No.
1 Shiferaw Dejene et al v. Sisay 78398 2012 14 51-54

Abebu
2 Alganesh Abebe v.. Gebru 36887 2008 13 233-235

Eshetu & Workitu Eshetu
3 Yohannes T. v. Amarech M. 58157 2011 12 107-110
4 Meseret Bekele v.. Elza 57356 2011 12 98-100

Somonella
5 Alehegn Gebrehiwot v. Etenesh 39803 2009 8 369-371

Bekele et al
6 Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa 33295 2008 7 51-57

et al
Shiferaw Dejene et al -v.- Sisay Abebu

- As between those who signed it, a written instrument shall be
conclusive evidence of the agreement therein and of the date it bears,
only if the contract is made in accordance with any special form
expressly prescribed by law.
- If a contract of sale of an immovable property is not registered with
an authorized notary, it cannot be decided that all the terms in the
agreement are incontestable by any testimony.
- If a contract is not made in accordance with the law that deals with
formation of a contract and if the contract does not have a legal effect,
a demand for performance in accordance with that contract is not
acceptable.
Articles 1678(c), 1719(2), 1723 and 2005(1) of the Civil Code
______________
Tikimit 19, 2005 E.C. (October 29, 2012)

Adane Negussie, Mustefa Ahmed
Petitioners: (1) Shiferaw Dejene (2) W/ro Tsehay Tesfaye
Respondent: Sisay Abebu
Judgment
This case is related with contract of sale of a house made between the
petitioner and the respondent. The issue relates to the price of the house and
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationCh.6:Contracts,Immovables91

the admissibility of the written contract as evidence showing the exact amount
of the price of the house.
The case started when the current respondent (as plaintiff in the lower
court) brought an action against the petitioners (defendants at the lower court).
The pleading states that the current respondent and the petitioners entered into
a contract of sale of a house found in Uke town on July 17, 2011. The house
was in the name of the first petitioner. It was claimed that petitioners
(defendants at the lower court) sold the house for Birr 20,000. However, after
they took the money, as per the agreement, it is alleged that they refused to
hand over the house and the documents related to the ownership of the house.
The plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent) sought the performance of
this contractual obligation.
The current petitioners, in their defense, argued that they sold the house
mentioned in the address stated above for 40,000 Birr. They also stated that
they entered into the contract of sale on July17, 2011 in which the buyer had
agreed to make the payment within ten days. However, he has not made any
payment. Therefore, they could not transfer the house and the documents that
are related with the ownership of the house to the buyer who has not
performed his obligation. They requested the plaintiffs claim be rejected by
the court and also sought payment of compensation for the expenses incurred
due to the litigation.
The case was first taken to the Guto Gida First Instance Court of Eastern
Wolega Eastern Zone. The court heard witnesses of both parties to identify the
exact price of the house, and gave its decision on January 26, 2012, File No.
19594. The court stated that both parties have admitted that they have entered
into a contract of sale on July 17, 2011. However, there is disagreement on the
price of the house and whether the payment has been made by the buyer.
However, there is a clear statement in the contract of sale that shows the price
of the house is 20,000 Birr and that this payment has been fully paid. Article
2005(1) of the Civil Code states that a written instrument shall be conclusive
evidence, as between those who signed it, of the agreement therein contained
and of the date it bears. The statement contained in this written instrument can
be challenged by those who signed it only by tendering an oath to the party
who avails himself thereof. Therefore, the court decided that the sellers have
not performed their obligation and that they should give the house and
documents related to the ownership of the house to the buyer. It further
decided that they should pay a fine of Birr 10,000 because they did not
perform their obligation as per the agreement.
The appellate court reversed the decision with regard to the fine and
affirmed the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case based on
similar grounds.
The current petitioners were displeased by the decision rendered by the

Eastern Zone High Court in the appeal and took the case to the regions
Supreme Court. However, the appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court in
accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Then a cassation petition was submitted to the Cassation Division of the
Oromia Supreme Court which decided that the decisions of the lower courts
do not have fundamental error of law. Finally, the case has come to the
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court.
This court has examined the case. According to Article 2005 of the Civil
Code, the written agreement of the parties suffices to show the agreement
made between the parties. Further, it has to be examined whether the contract
is made in accordance with Article 1678(c) and 1719(2) of the Civil Code.
These provisions deal with formation and forms of a contract.
As per Article 1678(c) and 1719 (2) of the Civil Code, one of the special
forms expressly prescribed by law is stated in Article 1723(1) of the Civil
Code. In this provision, it is stated that a contract creating or assigning rights
in ownership or bare ownership on an immovable or an usufruct, servitude or
mortgage of an immovable shall be in writing and registered with a court or a
notary. The requirement of the registration of the contract with a notary is
meant to show the existence a contract of sale, the date of its formation, the
property sold and the price thereof so that potential conflicts can be avoided.
In the case at hand, Article 2005(1) of the Civil Code which provides that
a written instrument shall be conclusive evidence between those who signed it,
cannot apply. When this article is read in conjunction with Articles 1678(c),
1719(2) and 1723(1), it can be observed that the provision does not invariably
apply to all written agreements.
The contract of sale in this case is related with an immovable property.
The contract was not entered into according to Article 1723 of the Civil Code.
Had the contract been registered with a notary, the price of the house and the
issue whether the payment has been made would have determined based on
the terms of the contract, and it could have been decided that no evidence
including the testimony of witnesses is admissible other than the contract as
written evidence. However, the argument based on Article 2005(1) is not
acceptable in this case.
Therefore, this court has decided that this contract of sale was not made in
accordance with Article 1678(c), 1719(2) and 1723 of the Civil Code and that
it does not have any legal effect. Therefore, the current respondent cannot
demand for a forced performance based on this contract of sale.
However, the current petitioners, in the lower court, have argued that they
sold the house for 40,000 Birr and that they do not accept the price stated by

the respondent. Therefore, if the current respondent agrees to pay the price
stated by the petitioners, this decision of the court does not amount to
prohibiting him from demanding the transfer of the house and the documents
related to the ownership of the house. In conclusion, because of these reasons,
Article 2005(1) of the Civil Code cannot apply to the contract of sale entered
into by the parties, and this provision has to be read in light of other provisions
that deal with sale of an immovable property. This court, thus, has found a
fundamental error of law in the decision which considered the contract of sale
of an immovable not registered with a notary as conclusive evidence which
cannot be challenged by witnesses.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Guto Gida First Instance Court of Eastern
Wollega Eastern Zone File No. 19594 on Tir 17, 2004 E.C. (January 26,
2012), the decision of the Zones High Court, File No. 27455 on Yekatit
28, 2004 (March 7, 2012), the decision of the Regions Supreme Court
File No. 139094 on Megabit 11, 2004 E.C. (March 20, 2012) and the
decision of the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court File No.
147416 on Megabit 18, 2004 E.C. (March 27, 2012) are varied.
2. The claim of the current respondent based on the contract of sale of a
house, which was not registered with an authorized notary, is not
acceptable.
3. Nevertheless, if the current respondent agrees to pay the price stated by the
petitioners, this decision of the court does not amount to prohibiting him
from demanding the transfer of the house and the documents related to the
ownership of the house.
...
Concurring Opinion
I, the judge listed as the third justice, agree with the decision made by majority
opinion; however, I do not agree with the interpretation given by reading
Article 1723(1) in conjunction with Article 2005 of the Civil Code. In my
opinion, it would have been better to render the decision after having examined
the educational background of the petitioners and applying Article 1728 (3) of
the Civil Code.

_______________________________________________
Volume: 14, pp. 51-54
Alganesh Abebe -v.- Gebru E. & Workit E.

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 36887 (24 November 2008)

- Where contracting parties admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of
an immovable, such contract binds them even if it is not registered
with a court or notary.
- The interpretation of Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the Civil Code by
this Court in Cassation File No. 21448 does not include parties that
admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house but argue that
such contract is invalid for lack of registration.
Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the Civil Code
______________
Hedar 15, 2001 E.C. (November 24, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw,
Petitioner: Alganesh Abebe

Respondents: (1) Gebru Eshetu Gebre (2) Workit Eshetu Hussen
Judgment
The present petitioner was plaintiff and the present respondents were
defendants when the case was initiated in South Wollo High Court. The
plaintiff submitted that the defendants sold her a house of two rooms on a plot
of land of 500 square metres in Kutaber Town, Kebele 01, for Birr 5,000 (five
thousand). She also stated that the respondents (defendants at the lower court)
have received the total price, and that they have refused to transfer ownership
of the house to her. She requested the lower court to order the defendants to
transfer to her both the possession and ownership of the house as well as rent
arrears for 26 months at a rate of Birr 60 per month.
The defendants contested the jurisdiction of the High Court and stated that
the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Woreda Court. With regard to the
merits of the case, they admitted that they had concluded the contract and
received the price, but argued that they invalidated the contract [because it was
not registered as required by the law] and further stated that the plaintiff is
unwilling to take his money. Since the defendants admitted the conclusion of
the contract, the Court rejected their argument and ordered them to transfer
ownership title to the plaintiff and pay her rent arrears of Birr 1,500 (one
thousand five hundred).
The defendants appealed to the Amhara State Supreme Court. The Court
on Yekatit 5, 2000 E.C. (February 13, 2008), File No. 1051/99, held that the
said contract was invalid because it did not comply with Article 1723(1) of the
Civil Code since it was not registered. The Court decided that the parties
should be reinstated according to Article 1815 of the Civil Code and ordered
the appellants to pay Birr 5,000 (five thousand) to the present petitioner.
The petitioner submitted her petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division on Megabit 29, 2000 E.C. (April 7, 2008) stating that the
decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court has a fundamental error of law.
The petitioner argued that since the defendants have admitted the conclusion
of the contract of sale and the Birr 5000 that they have received as price, the
interpretation of the Amhara State Supreme Court that there was no contract
concluded according to Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code has fundamental
error of law. She submitted that Article 1723(1) does not apply to cases where
parties admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house. The respondents
argued that the judgment of the lower court did not contain any error since the
contract was not registered, and was merely awaiting registration.
This court has examined the issue whether parties, who admit the
conclusion of a contract of sale of a house, can argue that such contract is
invalid for lack of registration according to Article 1723(1).
The respondents have admitted the conclusion of the contract of sale of a
house with the petitioner. But they argued that they invalidated the contract as
it was not registered. The interpretation of Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the
Civil Code by this Court in Cassation File No. 21448 does not include parties
that admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house but argue that such
contract is invalid for lack of registration. According to Article 1723(1), the
main aim of registration is to serve as evidence that a contract of sale of a
house exists. Admitting the conclusion of a contract and receipt of payment
and meanwhile arguing that a contract does not exist is not compatible with
the aim of Article 1723. Therefore, the conclusion of the Amhara State
Supreme Court in this regard involves fundamental error of law. Thus, there is
a valid contract of sale of a house between the petitioner and the respondents.
Decree
1. The judgment of South Wollo High Court, File No. 013132 rendered on 11
Hamle 1999 E.C. (18 July 2007) is affirmed; the judgment of the Amhara
Regional State Supreme Court is reversed in accordance with Article
348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. Since the respondents have admitted the conclusion of the contract of sale
of a house, they cannot argue that the said contract was invalid on the
basis of Article 1723(1) for lack of registration. The interpretation by the
Amhara State Supreme Court in this regard is incorrect. Therefore, the
respondents should deliver the disputed house to the petitioner.
...
______________________________________________________
Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Decisions
Volume 13, pp. 233-235
Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali

Yohannes T. - v. - Amarech M.

- Though parties are free to determine the object of their contract,
contracts which disregard restrictions and prohibitions provided by
law shall be of no effect.
- Individuals cannot create a right of ownership over state/public owned
land for the benefit of another person.
Article 1716 of the Civil Code
_____________
Miazia 6, 2003 E.C. (14 April 2011)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Yohannes Tadesse
Respondent: Amarech Mengesha
Judgment
In the suit he filed with the First Instance Court, petitioner (who was the
plaintiff at the lower court) complained that respondent, in breach of their
boundary mark agreement and having obtained an unlawful certificate of
possession, demolished his fence, destroyed the boundary mark, caused
damage to his property and erected a new fence beyond the area she purchased
from the heirs of Yirgedu Samuel Woldeyes Ambaye et al. He then
requested the court to enjoin respondent to destroy her new fence, to rebuild
petitioners fence she had demolished, and to perform her obligations under
the boundary mark agreement.
In her response to the suit, the respondent maintained that the petitioner
cannot bring legal action as he has no evidence to support his right of
possession; the suit should have been rejected as per Article 5 of the Civil
Procedure Code. She further maintained that she fenced the plot with a
permission issued by the pertinent City Administration Office, denied causing
any damage to property, and requested for dismissal of the suit.
The Court stated that the issuance as well as cancellation of a certificate of
possession is, as per Proclamation No. 361/2003, the mandate of sub-cities and
dismissed the petitioners suit on the ground that he should ask the issuing
authority to cancel the certificate and should not bring the matter to the court.
It also decided that the petitioner should pay Birr 10,000 (ten thousand)
attorney fee to the respondent. The High Court to which the petitioner lodged
an appeal affirmed the decision of the lower court and condemned the
petitioner to pay Birr 6,000 (six thousand) to respondent for costs incurred
during the appellate proceeding.
In his cassation petition, the petitioner stated his objection to the decisions
the lower courts rendered on both the subject matter and payment of attorney
fee and costs. Accordingly, the petitioner argued that although he requested
performance of the contract, the court dismissed the suit misconceiving it as a
request for cancellation of certificate of possession. The petitioner also
challenged the propriety of the decision of the High Court condemning him to
pay costs despite the fact that the First Instance Court had already condemned
him to pay Birr 10,000 (ten thousand).
In her response to the cassation petition, the respondent reiterated her
argument that the petitioners request for cancellation of an allegedly unlawful
certificate should be made to the pertinent Sub-City and denied the existence
of any agreement with petitioner pertaining to land and requested for dismissal
of the petition. We have examined the case along the following issues:
1. Whether or not the contract is enforceable;
2. Whether or not petitioner should pay the attorney fees he is
ordered to pay by the lower courts.
With regard to the first issue, the petitioners claim is based on an agreement
he entered with respondent at Woreda 17 Kebele 14 administration office. In
the agreement, the parties undertook to terminate the court case they had over
their disputed boundary and agreed, instead, their boundary to run straight
along petitioners old fence, and notified the same to the Kebele administration
office.
Although contracting parties have the right to freely determine the object
of their contract, it is provided under Article 1716 of the Civil Code that they
should respect restrictions and prohibitions provided by law. Contracts which
disregard such restrictions and prohibitions are of no effect.
In the case under consideration, the object of the disputed contract
between the petitioner and the respondent is urban land. Article 40(3) of the

FDRE constitution vests the right of ownership of rural and urban land, as well
as of all natural resources exclusively in the state and in the peoples of
Ethiopia. Hence, individuals cannot create right of ownership over state/public
owned land for the benefit of another person.
The dispute between the parties pertains to urban land; hence, the petitioner
should have challenged the respondents alleged unlawful possession of his
land before the pertinent organ of the city administration in accordance with
[Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter] Proclamation No. 361/2003.
To exercise this right, the petitioner should have a certificate evidencing his
possession over the plot allegedly taken over by respondent.
With regard to petitioners claim that respondents certificate of possession
is secured unlawfully, verification of such allegations and cancellation of the
certificate (in the event the allegation is proved to be right) is the mandate of
the issuing authority of the City Administration; this is evident from the legal
interpretation this Cassation Division gave in its decision of Tikemt 14, 2000
E.C (Cassation File No. 22719). This interpretation, according to Article 2(1)
of Proclamation No. 454/2005, is binding on all courts; hence, the decision of
the lower court which was given in full adherence to this binding interpretation
of the Cassation Division has no fundamental error of law.
The second issue pertains to the payment of attorney fees ordered by the
lower courts. Petitioner has been ordered to pay a total of Birr 16,000 attorney
fee, Birr 10,000 by the First Instance Court and Birr 6,000 by the High Court.
Petitioner filed his suit with the First Instance Court on Hedar 24, 2001
E.C to which respondent submitted a reply on Megabit 04, 2001 E.C. The
Court rejected petitioners suit on Sene 24, 2001 E.C stating that it has no
material jurisdiction over the matter. It is evident that respondents attorney
spent a relatively short time attending the case which did not involve much
investigation of evidence as it was decided on material jurisdiction basis.
Likewise, the High Court, following a brief hearing, affirmed the decision of
the lower court invoking Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It is
evident, therefore, that respondents attorney cannot be deemed to have spent
much time in court.
The fee respondents attorney is awarded by the decisions of the lower
courts has been found to be higher in light of the actual professional service he
has rendered. As provided under Article 2635 of the Civil Code, the court may
reduce the remuneration agreed between the parties where it is so excessive as
to be contrary to the etiquette of the profession of the person hiring out his
work. The lower court should, in addressing the issue, have taken this and
other relevant provisions of the Civil Code into account. Their failure to do so
and the resultant determination of excessive remuneration constitute a

Decree
1. The decision the First Instance Court rendered in File No.132135 on Sene
24, 2001 E.C (July 1, 2009) in which it ordered petitioner to pay Birr
10,000 in attorney fee, and the decision the High Court rendered in File
No. 82975 on Nehassie 24, 2002 E.C (August 30, 2010) ordering petitioner
to pay Birr 6,000 in attorney fee, have both been varied; petitioner shall
therefore pay the respondent Birr 2,000 for her expenses in attorney fee.
2. The contract which the petitioners requested to be performed in not
enforceable;
3. The decision of the First Instance Court which rejected the petitioners suit
and the decision of the High Court which confirmed the same have been
found to be appropriate and are thus affirmed.
______________________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 107 110.
Abridged translation: Dr. Dereje Zeleke

Meseret Bekele v. Elza Somonella

A contract of sale of an immovable is invalid unless it is signed by two

witnesses despite its registration with a court or notary.
Articles 1678(c), 1719(2), 1723(1), 1727(1), 1727(2), 1729(1) and

2877 of the Civil Code
_______________
Megabit 22, 2003 E.C. (March 31, 2011)
Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Dagne Melaku, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Meseret Bekele
Respondent: Elza Somonella
The court has examined the case and rendered the following decision.
Judgment
The present respondent was a plaintiff and the present petitioner was a
defendant when the case was initiated at the Federal First Instance Court. The
plaintiff requested the lower court to invalidate a contract of sale of a house in
Dire Dawa (Landholding Certificate No. 1813). The plaintiff (current
respondent) stated that the defendant (current petitioner) had deceived her by
claiming that she can communicate with a spirit (Aulia) that can cure the
plaintiffs husband who was very ill and had made her sign a contract of
donation which was simulated as a contract of sale. She requested for the
invalidation of the contract stating that it is unlawful, and does not fulfil the
requirements of the law.
The defendant (current petitioner) argued that there was no ground for
invalidation because the contract complies with the mandatory requirements
including full consent of the plaintiff and registration requirements. The Court
held that there was no contract since it was not attested by two witnesses as
required under Article 1727(2) of the Civil Code and ordered the plaintiff to
return Birr 23,000 (twenty three thousand) to the defendant. It also ordered the
defendant to return the disputed house to the plaintiff. On appeal by the
defendant, the Federal High Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal First
Instance Court.
The petitioner has submitted a petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division and she argued that the contract was registered and
complied with formal requirements of Articles 1723(1) and 2877 of the Civil
Code as it was made in writing. She contended that the judgments invalidating
the contract by invoking Article 1727(2) for lack of attestation by two
witnesses contain a fundamental error of law. She submitted that the courts
erred in invalidating the contract and reinstating the parties since she has
invested Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) to improve the house.
The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the registering authority
did not witness the conclusion of the contract as it was not signed in public;
She stated that the petitioner used threats by fraudulently claiming that her
spirit (Aulia) has required the respondent to sign the contract. She argued
that the fact that a contract is registered at a notary does not render the
requirement of witnesses irrelevant.
In her counter-statement, the petitioner noted that the sale of the house was
made on Sene 25, 1996 E.C. (July 7, 2004), i.e. more than a year after the
respondents husband died on Tir 13, 1995 E.C. (January 21, 2003), and she
argued that the issue of threats is untrue and is invoked in bad faith.
Based on the arguments of the parties, this court has examined the issue
whether the decisions of the lower courts are appropriate in requiring
reinstatement by holding that the contract is invalid because it is not attested
by two witnesses.
One of the three requirements of a valid contract embodied in Article
1678(c) of the Civil Code is that a special form prescribed by the law be
fulfilled. The petitioner and the respondent concluded a contract of sale of an
immovable. Article 2877 provides that contract of sale of an immovable
should be made in writing. Article 1719(2) requires contracting parties to
observe a special form prescribed by law. Article 1727(1) requires signature of
parties bound by a contract. When a written form is required by law,
signatures of the parties alone are not sufficient to create a valid contract.
Article 1727(2) provides that a written contract has no effect unless it is

attested by two witnesses, who, as per Article 1729(1), are of age and not
judicially interdicted.
When the legislator required a contract of sale of an immovable to be
registered with a court or notary under article 1723(1), it did not intend to
leave out or replace the mandatory stipulations under Articles 1727(2) and
1729(1). It rather intended that an officer in charge ascertains that the three
fundamental elements of contract provided under article 1678(c) are fulfilled.
In particular, such officer should ensure compliance with the formal
requirements under Article 1727. In the case at hand, since the said contract
does not comply with the mandatory special forms provided under Articles
1678(c), 2877 and 1727(2), it should be invalidated. Therefore, the judgments
of the lower courts do not contain error of law.
The petitioner submitted that she has made huge investment on the
improvement of the disputed house. As she did not raise this issue in the lower
courts, it is a new issue of fact. It does not have legal basis since it is raised
contrary to Article 329(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High
Courts are affirmed.
2. The order by this Bench to stay execution of judgment (dated Meskerem 26,
2003 EC, i.e. October 6, 2010) is lifted.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 98-100
Alehegn Gebrehiwot - v.- Emahoy Atinesh Bekele et al


A contract of donation of a house is valid although it is not made before a
court or notary.
Articles 881, 882, 1723(1) and 2443 of the Civil Code

______________

Hamle 2, 2001 E.C. (July 9, 2009)

Petitioner: Alehegn Gebrehiwot
Respondents: Emahoy Atinesh Bekele and three others
Judgement
The case concerns a contract of donation of a house. The petitioner had
obtained judgment from the Federal First Instance Court that confirmed the
donation made in his favour by the late Delelech Bekele regarding House No.
492 located in Yeka Sub-city, Keble 11.12. As heirs of the deceased, the
respondents initiated the case by objecting to the judgment of the Federal First
Instance Court which approved the contract of donation between the petitioner
and the late Delelech Bekele. In their objection submitted (in accordance with
Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code) to the court which rendered the
decision of approval of the donation, the respondents argued that the judgment
affected their rights and that it should be set aside since the contract of
donation was not registered with a court or notary as per Article 1723(1) of the
Civil Code.
The lower court held that the contract of donation was invalid as per
Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code for lack of registration with a court or
notary. It stated that the contract shall be considered as a mere draft by virtue
of Article 1720(2) of the Civil Code. The Court, in accordance with Article
360(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, set aside its previous decision rendered on
26 Megabit 1999 E.C. (07 April 2007) which had approved the contract of
donation, and it stated that the contract is invalid. An appeal by the petitioner
to the Federal High Court was cancelled based on Article 337 of the Civil
Procedure Code.
judgments of the lower courts against Articles 2443, 881 and 882 of the Civil
Code. The Federal First Instance Court held that the donation was invalid
because contracts on immovable property should be registered with a court or
notary as provided under Article 1723(1). According to Article 1723(1),
contracts on immovable property should fulfil two requirements: it should be
made in writing and it should be registered with a court or notary.
The case at hand concerns a contract of donation. A donation relating to an
immovable or a right on an immovable is of no effect unless it is made in the
form governing the making of a public will as per Article 2443 of the Civil
Code. The form of a public will is regulated under Article 881 of the Civil
Code. The contract of donation between the late Delelech Bekele and the
petitioner fulfils these formalities.
Article 1723(1) requires that contract relating to immovable property
should be registered with court or notary whereas Articles 2443 and 881 do
not require contract of donation of immovable property to be registered. In the
event of inconsistency between these provisions, it is necessary to determine
the one which should prevail. Article 1723 is found under the title on
Contracts in General and the chapter on Formation of Contracts. These general
provisions require that any contract relating to immovable property should be
registered with a court or notary. As a special law governing contract of
donation of immovable property, Articles 2443 and 881 do not, however,
require registration. When there is inconsistency between a general and a
special law, the latter prevails over the general law.
The contract of donation concluded between the petitioner and the late
Delelech Bekele was not registered with a court or notary. Such requirement is
not provided under Articles 2443 and 881 of the Civil Code. Therefore, there
is a fundamental error of law in the judgments of the lower courts that set
aside the earlier decision of the Federal First Instance Court and held the
contract of donation invalid by invoking Article 1723 of the Civil Code.
Decree
1. The judgement of the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 35057 on
Sene 10, 2000 E.C. (June 9, 2008) and the order of the Federal High Court
in File No. 68860 on Hamle 10, 2000 E.C. (July 17, 2008) are reversed in
accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Code.
2. The contract concluded between the petitioner and the late Delelech Bekele
is valid since it complies with the requirements of the law.
3. The initial decision of the Federal First Instance Court on Megabit 26, 1999
E.C. (April 7, 2007) which had approved the contract of donation should
not be set aside for reasons stated above.
...
__________________________________________________
Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports
Volume 8, pp. 369-371

Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa et al


Contract of mortgage is of no effect unless it is registered in the register
of immovable property where the concerned immovable is situated.
Articles 1605, 1606, 1607(1), 3052 and 3053 of the Civil Code
_______________

Ginbot 21, 2000 E.C. (May 29, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros,
Ali Mohammed, Tsegaye Asmamaw
Petitioner: Berhane Abebe

Respondents: 1. Markos Terfa
2. Tsehai Menbere
3. Awash International Bank S.C.
4. Addis Ababa Administration Bureau of Works and
Urban Development
Judgement
The case was initiated in the Federal First Instance Court over a house sold by
the second respondent who sold the house to Shiro Gemechu in 1986 E.C.
The first respondent bought the house and obtained power of attorney
authorising him to sell and transfer it. While the ownership title was in the
name of the second respondent, the first respondent sold the house to the
petitioner using the power of attorney. He delivered the house and title deed to
the petitioner upon receipt of Birr 70,000 (seventy thousand) as price. The
petitioner applied for a change of title deed to her name.
Meanwhile, the first respondent mortgaged the house to the third

respondent and borrowed Birr 200,000 (two hundred thousand). The third
respondent registered the mortgage with the fourth respondent. Twenty five
days after the receipt of the loan, the first respondent obtained a substitute title
deed and plan of the house by falsely claiming that he lost them.
The petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court) filed a suit before the Federal
First Instance Court when she learned that her house was mortgaged. The third
respondent argued that it has preferential right over the house since it has
registered the mortgage and requested the court to transfer the ownership to it.
The court rejected the petitioners claim of ownership and preferential rights
over the house. On appeal, the Federal High Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
The petitioner argued before the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court that the judgments of the lower courts involve fundamental
error of law since the mortgage executed based on false documents cannot
give preferential rights to the third respondent while the latter argued that it
has preferential rights according to the Civil Code. This Court examined
whether the contract of mortgage under consideration was registered according
to the law and gives preferential rights.
The third respondent obtained registration of the mortgage in a file opened
in its name since records in the name of the second respondent were said to
have been lost. There are questions that arise in this regard: How could the
fourth respondent register the mortgage in the absence of records of the house?
How can one ascertain that the petitioner did not apply for a change of title
deed into her name?
A mortgage over immovable property is of no effect unless it is registered
according to Article 3052 of the Civil Code. Such mortgage should be
registered in the manner required under Article 3053(1) of Civil Code.
Moreover, Title X of the Civil Code titled Registers of Immovable Property
requires registration of mortgage to fulfil the requirements laid down under
Articles 1605 and 1607.
The third respondent applied for registration in the absence of evidence
that verifies the fulfilment of the requirements under Article 1606 and without
evidence that must have been provided as per Article 1607(1). There was no
title deed and construction plan of the house on the date the mortgage was
registered. The registration was made solely based on the contract of
mortgage.
The mortgage was not duly registered since it was entered in a new file
opened in the name of the third respondent. The registration does not give the
third respondent preferential rights better than the right held by the petitioner

who has all the documents necessary to prove her ownership of the house, and
who possesses and lives in the house. Therefore, the judgments of the lower
courts contain fundamental error of law.
Decree
Court are reversed.
2. The argument of Awash International Bank that it has preferential rights
better than that of the petitioner is not acceptable.
3. The ownership of the house should be transferred to the petitioner.
...
___________________________________________
Volume 7, pp. 51-57

110EtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortiumDecember 2013
7. Criminal Law

No.
1 Tesfaye T. v. Prosecutor of the 73514 2012 14 240-244

Federal Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission
2 Wudima A. v. Southern NNPR 66856 2012 13 296-298

Public Prosecutor
3 Tesfaye A. v. Public Prosecutor 48617 2010 10 208-209
4 Fasil B. v. Oromia Regional 42703 2009 9 22-25

State, Public Prosecutor
5 Jemila M. v. Federal First 38161 2009 9 11-13

Instance Public Prosecutor
6 Seid Y. v. Amhara Reg. Ethics 34077 2008 7 287-291

& Anti-Corr. Comm.
7 Asnake B. v. Public Prosecutor 31734 2007 7 283-286
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter7:Criminallaw111
Tesfaye T. -v.- Prosecutor of the Federal Ethics and Anti-

Corruption Commission

- A court may give decision at any stage of the proceedings regarding the
non-retroactive application of criminal law if judges become aware that
the act for which a person is charged did not constitute a crime when the
act was committed.
- Courts have the obligation to make sure that the charges brought by a
public prosecutor are consistent with the fundamental principles of the
Constitution, the Criminal Code and human rights.
Articles 5(2) and 419 of the Criminal Code;
Article 22(1) of the Constitution; and
Article 15(2) of the ICCPR.
______________
Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Adane Nigussie, Mustefa Ahmed
Petitioner: Tesfaye T.
Respondent: Prosecutor of the Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption
Commission
Judgment
The case started at the Federal High Court. The petitioner was charged with
contravening Article 419(1)(b) of the 2004 Criminal Code which controls the
possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the official
income from ones present or past employment, without giving satisfactory
explanation. The charge alleged that the petitioner worked as a civil servant at
different government offices from 2000-2004 during which he earned a

monthly salary of Birr 420 (four hundred twenty) and Birr 530 (five hundred
thirty). Yet, the public prosecutor alleged, he was found holding Birr
1,167,637.60 (one million one hundred sixty seven thousand six hundred thirty
seven and sixty cents) in three accounts of three different local banks opened
in his name, and has a car registered in his name.
The public prosecutor submitted as evidence income statements collected
from the three different banks to show the amount held by the petitioner.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty and presented documentary evidence to
show that the accounts the prosecutor presented as proof were used by him to
save money received from selling the cement products of a legally registered
company.
The Federal High Court, after examining the arguments of both parties,
passed a decree which stated that the evidence adduced by the petitioner to
show the legitimacy of the money saved in the different bank accounts and the
car registered in his name were unreliable. The court, consequentially, found
him guilty and sentenced him to two years and three months of imprisonment
and imposed a fine of Birr 66,000 (sixty six thousand). In addition, it ruled for
the confiscation of the car and the money kept in the bank accounts.
The petitioner appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. The court affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
This petition against the Federal Supreme Courts decision is submitted to
the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner argued that he
was a public servant from 2000-2004, before the coming into effect of the
Criminal Code invoked by the prosecutor. He contended that the retroactive
application of the law contravenes Article 5 of the Criminal Code which
stipulates the non-retroactive effect of criminal law. He further disputed the
decision of the lower court to confiscate the car, as the car was bought in 2010
and he has proved the money used to buy the car was from a legitimate source.
The respondent contended the argument on the non-retroactive application
of criminal law should have been presented as a preliminary objection at the
lower court, in accordance with Article 130 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
and that there is no law which allows it to be presented before this court. The
respondent further contended that the charge involved a continuous crime
which continued during the time when the petitioner worked as a government
employee. According to the prosecutor, the crime has continued during the
investigation and indictment stages and argued that the petitioners arguments
are not acceptable.

The petitioner responded that he was a civil servant before the Criminal
Code came into force, and it is not thus possible for the crime to continue
being committed until the time of investigation and indictment.
The issues identified by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
are: (1) whether the prosecutors procedural argument (in light of Article 130
of the Criminal Procedure Code) against the petitioners pleading of the non-
retroactive applicability of the Criminal Code is valid; and (2) whether the
decision of the two lower courts regarding the petitioners conviction under
Article 419 is appropriate.
Article 130(1) allows the accused to raise preliminary objections on the
form and contents of the charge, while sub-article (2), in an illustrative
manner, lists down other preliminary objections that may be raised by the
accused. Article 130(3) provides that these objections should be presented
immediately after the accused has been required to do so by the court; or else
they would be barred from being raised at a later stage in the trial. The point
put forward by the petitioner as an objection is not explicitly mentioned under
sub-article (2) although evidence has been adduced which proves that the
petitioner was a public employee before the Criminal Code came into effect.
That criminal law should not be retroactively applied is enshrined, as a
fundamental principle, under Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 5(2) of
the Criminal Code. Hence, if judges find that the crime was committed before
the Criminal Code came into force, they are not barred from making a
determination on the matter at any time during the proceedings. This is in line
with their obligation to enforce human rights as per Article 13 of the
Constitution and the fundamental principles of the Constitution and Criminal
Code which expressely prohibit charging an individual by retroactively
applying the current Criminal Code for an act which did not constitute a crime
during the time of its commission. Therefore, this court has found that the
respondents argument in this regard is unacceptable because a court, at all
levels, can decide whether Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the
Criminal Code have been violated by a charge brought by the public
prosecutor.
Regarding the second issue, the current Criminal Code (Proclamation No.
414/2004) of Ethiopia came into force on the May 9, 2005. The fundamental
principles and details which hold public employees and officials responsible
for corruption are embodied in Articles 402-419 of the Code. These provisions
are applicable on perpetrators who hold public office after the effective date of
the Code. Article 5(2) of the Criminal Code states that an act declared to be a
crime under the Code but not under the repealed law and committed prior to
the coming into effect of this Code is not punishable.
The respondent has clearly indicated on the charge it has brought before
the lower court that the petitioner was a public servant from 2000 to 2004. The
charge shows that the petitioner was not a public employee when the Criminal
Code became effective. The defendant has charged the petitioner alleging that
he was a public servant before the coming into force of the Criminal Code
(May 9, 2005), and during the time he was investigated in 2009, for holding
large amounts of money in three different bank accounts and owning a car the
value of which are not commensurate with his salary as a public employee.
Article 22 of the Constitution stipulates no one shall be held guilty of any
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence at the time it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed on any person than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. Article 15(1) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Ethiopia is a party also states
that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law, at the time which the criminal offence was committed.
Since the petitioner was a public employee before the current Criminal
Code became effective, the criminal law regime that was applicable is the
1957 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia and the 1982 Revised Special
Penal Code of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (Proclamation
No. 214/1982). The contents of the crime found under Article 419 of the
current Criminal Code dealing with possession of unexplained property are not
declared to be a crime in these criminal laws that were in force during the time
when the petitioner was a public servant.
The petitioner was not a public employee when the 2004 Criminal Code
came into force and he was engaged in conducting his own personal business
before the current Criminal Code came into force on May 9, 2005. Therefore
charging him under Article 419 of the Criminal Code is contrary to Article 22
of the Constitution, Article 15(2) of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the Criminal
Code, and violates the right of the petitioner.
The decisions of the High Court and Supreme Court which held the
petitioner guilty of violating Article 419 of the Criminal Code for possessing
money and property that could not be explained in the light of the salary he
earned during his years of public employment, consequently involve
fundamental error of law. The Division has thus reversed the decisions of the
lower and appellate courts in accordance with Article 195(2)(b)(i) of the
Criminal Procedure Code and has decided to acquit the petitioner.

Decree
1. The conviction and penalty imposed by the decisions of the Federal High
Court and Federal Supreme Court are reversed.
2. The petitioner is acquitted unless he is imprisoned for another offence.
3. As the petitioner is acquitted on all charges, the fine stated in the decisions
of the lower and appellate courts, the confiscation of the money found in
bank and confiscation of the car are also reversed.
_____________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 240 244.
Wudima A. -v.- Southern NNPR1 Public Prosecutor


The accused have pursued their criminal activity of robbery to the end but
there was no vehicle to be robbed. Their act on its own shows that they
had reached the point of no return in their pursuits of committing robbery
which makes them liable for attempted robbery.
Articles 27(1), 32(1)(a), and 671(1) of the Criminal Code
_____________

Megabit 26, 2004 E.C. (April 4, 2012)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Nigussie
Petitioner: Wudima A.
Respondent: Southern NNPR Public Prosecutor
The court has rendered the following judgement.
Judgment
The issue in this case is the determination of the stage at which an act can be
considered as criminal attempt.
On Megabit 7 and 8, 2001 E.C., (March 16 and 17, 2009) in the Gurage
Zone SNNPR, the petitioner and the co-offenders were in possession of [a
pistol], masks, battery torch and knife. They waited for vehicles at night with
the intention of robbery. Vehicles did not appear during the evening. As they
were getting back to their village they were arrested based on the information
1
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
obtained and charged with attempt for aggravated robbery. The petitioner has
contested the commission of the act and has pleaded not guilty.
The evidence is based on witnesses and the statements of the defendants
made to the police and then to court in accordance with Articles 27 and 35 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. According to one witness, information was
obtained from a driver about a planned robbery, but no evidence was obtained.
Searches were made on passengers and three persons were found without ID
cards. They said that they are engaged in construction work, and that they are
going back to their village because there was shortage of instruments in their
work place. When they were searched, a [pistol], a knife and mask were
discovered. They had admitted during police investigation about their planned
robbery.
The lower court had examined the defence submitted by the defendants
and convicted the first and second defendants. The petitioner was sentenced to
22 years of rigorous imprisonment.
The petitioner was previously sentenced to 10 years for homicide and
released on parole. The petitioners appeal has not been accepted by the
Regions appellate court, and the present petition which invokes fundamental
error in law is submitted to this Cassation Division.
The issue that is involved in this case is whether the act of the defendants
constitutes criminal attempt.
According to Article 27 of the Criminal Code, whosoever intentionally
begins to commit a crime shall be guilty of criminal attempt even if he does
not pursue or is unable to pursue his criminal activity to its end, or even if he
does not achieve the result necessary for the completion of the crime after
having pursued his criminal activity.
The facts indicate that the defendants had gone to the forest where robbery
was usually being committed; information was obtained and they were
arrested while travelling in public transport. During the search they were
found to be in possession of [a pistol], a knife and a mask. During their
statements, they admitted the commission of the offence and that they passed a
night in the forest after arranging the necessary weapons for robbery, were
waiting for vehicles to be robbed during the night but no vehicle appeared, and
that they were arrested on their way back with all the weapons under their
possession in the course their preparation for robbery.
The petitioner and the co-offenders thus pursued the criminal activity of
robbery to the end but there was no vehicle to be robbed. In other words, the
act committed by the petitioner and his co-offenders on its own shows that
they had reached the point of no return in their pursuits of committing robbery.
Therefore, the decision of the lower court has duly considered all these points
in accordance with the provisions stated in the charge, and there is no error of
law committed by the court.
Decree
The decision of SNPPR Supreme Court under Cassation File Number 33619
on Yekatit 12, 2002 E.C (February 19, 2010) is affirmed in accordance with
Article 195(2)(b)(ii) of the [Criminal] Procedure Code. ...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 296 298.

Tesfaye A. -v.- Public Prosecutor


Courts cannot increase or reduce punishment unless the issue is raised in
the course of litigation.
Article 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
_____________
Sene 18, 2002 E.C. (June 25, 2010)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Birhanu Amenew,
Almaw Wolie
Petitioner: Tesfaye A.
Respondent: Public Prosecutor
The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgement.
Judgment
The case started at the Hawassa Court of First Instance. The current
respondent was the plaintiff in the lower court. The petitioner was charged
with wilful bodily injury in violation of Article 555(b) of the Criminal Code
against his wife on a date not specifically known in the month of Meskerem
2001 Ethiopian Calendar (September 2008) in the evening between 8 to 9 pm.
He is accused of hitting the victim with closed fist punches and causing
physical injury. The accused pleaded not guilty.
The public prosecutor submitted evidence based on the testimony witnesses
and documents. The petitioner also submitted witnesses to show that the
victims loss of teeth is attributable to other reasons. However, the lower court
held that the witnesses have not been able to disprove the public prosecutors
evidence and it convicted the petitioner for grave wilful injury and sentenced
him with two years of rigorous imprisonment or a fine of Birr 500 (five
hundred).
The public prosecutor lodged an appeal stating that the lower court has,
after convicting the accused of grave wilful injury, imposed a sentence of fine
as an alternative which is not stated in the provision under which the accused
is convicted. The appellate court increased the sentence to five years of
rigorous imprisonment. The petition made to the Cassation Division of the
SNNPR Supreme Court was not accepted, and the petitioner has further
submitted this petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division.
The petition dated Hamle 9, 2001 (July 16, 2009) states that the decision
of the lower court involves fundamental error of law. The petitioner invokes
negligence as the mental condition in which the act was committed, and
argues that the High Court raised the sentence to five years of rigorous
imprisonment without a request by the public prosecutor to that effect. The
petitioner requested the decision to be reversed or to be released on probation
(gedeb). The public prosecutor has submitted its response on Tahsas 26, 2002
E.C. (January 4, 2010).
The petitioner was convicted under Article 555(b) of the Criminal Code.
The provision imposes a sentence which may extend up to fifteen years of
rigorous imprisonment or with a minimum of one year of simple imprisonment.
The High Court did not state that it opted to impose simple imprisonment.
Nor did it state whether it has changed its decision of simple imprisonment to
fine [to mitigate the sentence in accordance with Article 179 of the Criminal
Code].
The public prosecutors appeal clearly contested the imposition of fine as
an alternative punishment. Moreover, its reply to this petition merely requests
for the imposition of the appropriate punishment and has not raised an
argument that it had requested for increase in the sentence of imprisonment.
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has thus observed that
the public prosecutor only protested against the alternative imposition of fine
in lieu of imprisonment.
In criminal cases, appeal is lodged based on Article 195 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Sub-article 2(d) of the provision requires an appeal to clearly
state a request on whether the sentence should be reduced or raised where the
issue of sentence is contested. Therefore there is no legal procedure which
allows increase in punishment unless it is requested. If a court does so, it
amounts to rendering judgement on an issue that has not been raised. The
lower courts have committed fundamental error of law in having raised the
sentence from two years to five years in the absence of the public prosecutors

request for the increase of the sentence beyond two years. The following
decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Hawassa High Court and SNNP Supreme Court and
the decree rendered by the SNNP Supreme Court Cassation Bench are
amended.
2. The decision rendered by Hawassa First Instance Court is amended.
3. The sentence to be imposed on the petitioner shall be two years of rigorous
imprisonment.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 10, Ser. No. 80, pp. 208 209.
Fasil B. -v.- Oromia Region Public Prosecutor


In the absence of awareness about and disregard to the harm, or where a
driver could not or should not have foreseen the result, the harm that is
caused by force majeure or accident is not punishable under the criminal
law.
Articles 57(2), 59, 543 (3) of the 2004 Criminal Code
______________
Hamle 22, 2001 E.C. (July 29, 2009)
Justices: Menberetshehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,

Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Fasil B.
Respondent: Oromia Region Public Prosecutor
Judgement
The petitioner was charged with negligent homicide against two victims who
were passengers in an Isuzu minibus. According to the charge, the victims
died when the vehicle overturned as a result of the petitioners negligent
driving in violation of Article 543 (3) of the 2004 Criminal Code. It occurred
on Yekatit 8, 2000 E.C. (February 16, 2008), around 9 am on the Jimma-Addis
Ababa road, Jimma Zone, Sokuru Woreda, Betiro Qumbi Kebele.
The Jimma Zone High Court heard three prosecution witnesses, a traffic
police map, a technical investigation report about the vehicle, and two defence
witnesses.
The prosecution witnesses testified that the vehicle overturned at a curve
on the Jimma-Addis Ababa Road. According to the first prosecution witness,
the accused was driving at a moderate speed while the second witness stated
that he could not assess the speed. The third witness said that the accused was
driving with a speed and arrived at a curve with the same speed as a result of
which the vehicle overturned. Defence witnesses, who were also passengers,
explained that an ox and a herd man unexpectedly entered the road and the
defendant turned the wheels to save them, due to which it slipped and
overturned causing the death of two passengers. One of the defence witnesses
stated that it was a reasonable speed while the second said that the speed was
between 50 to 60 kilometres per hour.
The Jimma High Court stated that the driver could not save the herd man
and the ox that unexpectedly entered the road because he was driving at a
speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour at a curve, and that the victims died as a
result. It held that the defendant has violated Article 543(3) of the Criminal
Code and convicted him of negligent homicide. The defendant was sentenced
to five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Birr 10,000 (ten
thousand).
The defendant appealed to Oromia Supreme Court which affirmed the
conviction but reduced the sentence to three years of rigorous imprisonment
and a fine of Birr 5,000 (five thousand). Cassation petition was lodged to the
Cassation Division of the Oromia Regional State which, by a majority opinion,
held that there is no error of law in the conviction and the sentence.
The arguments raised by the petitioner at the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division is that the incidence is an accident that happened while he
was trying to save the herd man and the ox that unexpectedly got into his way.
He argued that the victims should be considered as having died due to accident
and not due to his negligence. He further argued that Article 543(3) should
apply to pedestrians hit by a vehicle and not to passengers. Both parties have
also made oral arguments on the issue whether the act of the petitioner
constitutes negligence.
The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both sides
including the oral arguments and has related them with the law. It has
analyzed whether the conditions stated in Article 543(3) are fulfilled.
The fact that the vehicle overturned and the victims died as a result is
established. The issue of driving at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour is
also considered and the unexpected darting of a herd man and an ox into the
road are taken into account. It is also proved that the vehicle did not have
technical problems at the time. We need to relate these facts with the law
under which the petitioner is convicted.
According to Article 57(2) [n]o one can be convicted under criminal law
for an act penalized by the law if it was performed or occurred without there
being any guilt on his part, or was caused by force majeure, or occurred by
accident. This shows that for a person to be held criminally liable, the public
prosecutor should prove that the act is committed with criminal intention or
criminal negligence. One cannot be held criminally liable unless the criminal
guilt of the accused is proved, or if the accused proves that the act was caused
by force majeure or by accident. For the case under consideration, the issue
whether the petitioner was negligent is determined under Article 59 of the
Criminal Code. Article 59(1) of the Criminal Code provides:
A person is deemed to have committed a criminal act negligently where he
acts:
(a) by imprudence or in disregard of the possible consequences of his act
while he was aware that his act will cause illegal and punishable
consequences; or
(b) by a criminal lack of foresight or without consideration while he
should or could have been aware that his act may cause illegal and
punishable consequences.
According to this provision, criminal negligence is said to have been
committed where the accused is aware of the possible harm and pursues his
act by disregarding possible consequences believing that it will not occur [Art.
59(1)(a)], or where he acts without foreseeing or considering the possible
harm while he should or could have been aware of the possible harm [Art.
59(1)(b)]. The mental condition of the accused with regard to the relationship
between his act and the harm should be proved for conviction under
negligence. According to Article 59(1(b) [para 2], this is determined by taking
into account the level of the accused persons age, circumstances, experience,
education, occupation and social position.
The petitioner contends that the conditions that constitute negligence are
not fulfilled while the public prosecutor argues otherwise. The judgment of
Jimma Zone High Court which assumed first instance jurisdiction over the
case does not show analysis of the facts and the evidence submitted to it on the
basis of the elements or conditions that constitute criminal negligence.
The statement made by one of the witnesses that the petitioner was driving
at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour is not expert testimony but a
statement of [a passenger] in the vehicle whose estimation can be erroneous.
This cannot thus be considered as reliable evidence in a court of law.
Even if the vehicle was at a speed of 50 to 6o kilometres per hour, it was at
the Jimma-Addis Ababa road where such a speed does not constitute fault. No
evidence is submitted about the speed limit for the place where the accident
occurred. No technical defect of the car is proved that would have required the
petitioner to drive at a speed limit below 60 kms per hour. Therefore no
evidence has been submitted that proves the drivers failure to exercise the
proper care and prudence before the vehicle overturned.

The petitioner could not turn to the right side because there was a gorge.
Nor did he want to kill the herd man and the ox, and rightly so. The driver had
no option but to swerve to the left. Rather, the petitioner would have
committed a grave offence had he ran over the person in front of the vehicle
without attempting to save him. The question that arises in the determination
of negligence is whether the driver was aware [as envisaged under Art.
59(1)(a)] that this act would cause the overturning of the vehicle and the death
of the victims. If this issue is answered in the negative, the second question
would be whether he should or could have been aware that the option he has
taken could cause the death of the victims [as stipulated under Art. 59(1)(b)].
The public prosecutor has not submitted evidence that proves the existence
of these conditions. Swerving to the left or the right in order to save life does
not usually overturn a vehicle. Therefore the petitioner could not be aware of
the possibility that the vehicle would overturn. Therefore the event was caused
by accident which resulted from the unexpected entry of the herd man and an
ox into the road and not by the negligent act of the petitioner. Causing another
persons death is punishable. However, criminal guilt, i.e. criminal intention or
negligence should be proved.
The lower courts have not examined the distinction between criminal
negligence and accident. We have thus found that the decisions of Jimma
Zone High Court, Oromia Supreme Court and Oromia Supreme Courts
Cassaation Division should be reversed.
Decree
1. The decisions of Jimma Zone High Court (File No. 10769 on Tikimt 18,
2001 E.C. /October 28, 2008), Oromia Supreme Court (File No. 71726 on
Tikimt 26, 2001 E.C. /05 November 2008) and Oromia Supreme Court
Cassation Division (File No. 70164) are reversed.
2. The petitioner is acquitted of the charge filed under Article 543(3) of the
Criminal Code.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 22 25
Jemila M. -v.- Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor


A crime is deemed to be committed when its legal, material and moral
elements are cumulatively present. The petitioners did not generally
exercise authority which they do not possess or which they may not
lawfully exercise.
Unlawful enforcement of right: Articles 23(2), 32(1)(a) and 436(c) of the
Criminal Code
______________

Petitioner: Jemila M. et al
Respondent: Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor

Judgment
The cassation petition dated Ginbot 26, 2000 EC (June 3, 2008) submits that
there is a fundamental error of law in the decision rendered by the lower court.
The case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The current petitioners
were charged with unlawful enforcement of right under Article 32(1)(a) and
436[a] of the Criminal Code. Mohammed H. was deported from Ethiopia in
1998 (during the Ethio-Eritrean War) after which Zerfe Tilahun who was
working as his maid kept the house for him. On Hamle 21, 1997 EC (July 28,
2005), the petitioners took out the possessions of Zerfe from the house and put
them in the compound [thereby taking possession of the house].
The lower court found the petitioners guilty of violating the provision
cited in the charge by stating that they have not disproved the charge and
evidence against them. A fine of Birr 800 (eight hundred) was imposed on the
current petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the Federal High Court which
examined the case; it changed the provision under which they were punished,
but affirmed the payment of fine.
The petition is lodged against the decisions of the Federal First Instance
Court and the Federal High Court.
The petition states that the act of the petitioners does not fulfil the
elements of the provision under which they are found guilty. The respondent
on the other hand contends that the act of the petitioners satisfies the elements
of the offence and that the conviction should be affirmed.
The issue examined by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is
whether the act of the petitioners fulfils the elements of the offence?
The provisions under which the petitioners were convicted at the Federal
First Instance Court are Articles 32(1)(a) and 436[a] of the Criminal Code.
The Federal High Court confirmed the punishment after finding them guilty
under a different sub-article of the same provision, i.e. Article 436(c)
According to Article 436(c) of the Criminal Code a person is said to have
arbitrarily exercised a right which he does not possess or which he may not
lawfully exercise.
In the case at hand, it is proved that Zerfe was in charge of keeping the
house [in her capacity as the former maid of the owner], and that the first
petitioner is the daughter of the owner of the house while the second petitioner
was present during the act because he has power of attorney from the first
petitioner. The first petitioner did not generally exercise an authority which
she does not possess or which she may not lawfully exercise because she has
rights over the house.
By virtue of Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code an offence is said to be
committed when all its legal, material and moral ingredients are present. In the
case under consideration, however, the constitutive elements of the provision
under which the petitioners are found guilty are not fulfilled. The lower courts
have committed a fundamental error in law in their decisions because they
have not taken into account the elements of Articles 23(2) and 436(c) of the
Criminal Code. We have thus rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 35370 rendered
on Tir 21, 2000 E.C. (January 30, 2008) and the decision of the Federal
High Court, File No. 64237 rendered on Megabit 25, 2000 E.C. (April 3,
2008) are reversed in accordance with Article 195(2)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
2. The act of the petitioners does not constitute an offence.
...
____________________________________________________
Volume 9, p. 11-13

Seid Y. -v.- Amhara Region Ethics and Anti-Corruption

Commission

The law which is more favourable to the accused than the one in force at
the time of the commission of the crime shall be applicable, and the issue
of bail shall be determined based on the sentence which can likely be
imposed according to the new Criminal Code.
Articles 5, 6, 23 and 407 of the 2004 Criminal Code;
Article 22(2) of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution;
Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence
Proclamation No. 434/2005;
Special Criminal Code Proclamation No. 214/1982
_____________
Megabit 9, 2000 E.C. (March 18, 2008)

Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu,
Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga
Petitioner: Seid Y.
Respondent: Amhara Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission
The following judgement is rendered.
Judgement
The case started at the Southern Wollo Zone High Court. The petitioner was
charged with three counts under the Special Criminal Code, Proclamation No.
Proclamation No. 214/1982 which was in force when the act was committed.
[A general provision in the Criminal Code, i.e.,] Article 23 of the 2004
Criminal Code was also cited in the charge.
The petitioner submitted preliminary objections contending that the charge

should be based on the 2004 Criminal Code rather than the Special Criminal
Code, Proclamation No. 214/1982 because the latter is repealed by the new
Criminal Code. He requested for the revision of the charge on the ground that
the new Code should be retroactively applied to his benefit.
The public prosecutor invoked Article 5(1) of the Criminal Code and
argued that the trial of the act which was committed prior to the coming into
force of the current code should be conducted under the repealed law.
After examining the arguments of both parties, the Southern Wollo Zone
High Court passed a decree which stated that the law that existed when the act
was committed is repealed and substituted by the new Criminal Code. The
court held that the relevant provision is Article 407(1) of the 2004 Criminal
Code because it imposes lesser sentence on the accused, and that the public
prosecutor should revise the charge accordingly because the new Code applies
retroactively for the benefit of the accused. The court further noted that this
provision does not deny the right to bail and allowed the defendant to be
released on bail bond of Birr 5,000 (five thousand) during the trial.
The public prosecutor appealed to the Amhara Region Supreme Court.
The court examined the arguments of both parties and decided that although
Article 6 of the Criminal Code allows courts to apply the provisions of the
new Code if they are more favourable to the accused, this only applies at the
stage of conviction and sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the decree of
the High Court which allowed release on bail and required the revision of the
charge. It decided that the defendant (the current petitioner) should stay in
custody during the trial.
This petition against the Amhara Region Supreme Courts decision is
submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The Division has
examined the arguments of both parties and the validity of the interpretation
given to Article 6 of the Criminal Code by the Amhara Region Supreme
Court.
The issue that needs analysis is whether the petitioner is entitled to be
released on bail. It is not contested that the act stated in the charge was
committed before the coming into force of the 2004 Criminal Code.
Accordingly, the charge should be based on the law that was in force during
the commission of the act as stipulated under Article 5 of the Criminal Code.
On the other hand, the new Criminal Code has repealed the law that was in
force during the commission of the offence and this includes the provisions
that deal with corruption which are now stipulated under Articles 407 ff.
Moreover, the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of
Evidence [Proclamation No. 434/2005] provides that release on bail can be

allowed where the sentence of imprisonment that can be imposed is less than
ten years.
The principle of legality requires that the petitioner be charged based on
the law that he was aware of and that was in force during the commission of
the act. Even if, the repealed law, in principle, is not currently in force, the
charge should be made based on the repealed law the accused is aware of. This
is what is reflected in Article 5 of the 2004 Criminal Code.
If the accused is to be charged under the repealed law, he should also be
convicted on the same law. On the other hand, Article 6 of the Criminal Code
and Article 22[2] of the Constitution provide for an exception and allow the
retroactive application of the Code if it advantageous to the accused.
According to the Amhara Region Supreme Court, the exception of
retroactive application should be applicable only for the purpose of sentencing
after the decision of conviction is made based on the repealed law. It has
accordingly rejected the petitioners release on bail because the Criminal Code
shall not be applicable during the trial. In principle, no charge should be made
based on a repealed law, however exceptions may warrant it because the
repealed law was in force during the commission of the act and because the
accused is deemed to have been aware of it. According to the inference that
can be drawn from this, the purpose of applying the repealed law is to
facilitate the defence of the accused during the trial, and it would not have any
other purpose because the sentence is ultimately determined in accordance
with the new law.
The issue whether the accused can be released on bail should be
determined based on the prospective sentencing threshold that will apply if he
is convicted. Even if the petitioner is charged based on a legal provision which
denies release on bail, it can be noted that this law is solely used for the
purpose of facilitating the trial, and thus the issue of bail should be determined
in light of the sentence which can likely be imposed.
As long as the law that applies for the purpose of sentencing is the new
law, failure to release the accused on bail is inconsistent with the intention of
the legislature and obstructs the attainment of the objectives and purpose of
the law.
As the prospective punishment in this case is expected to be based on
Article 407(1) of the 2004 Criminal Code and because the Revised Anti-
Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation [No.
434/2005] allows bail for cases that are punishable with less than ten years of
imprisonment, the Cassation Division has found that the decision of Southern
Wollo Zone High Court in granting bail was appropriate although it should not
have required the charge to be revised and be framed under the 2004 Criminal
Code. The decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court is found to have
committed an error of law in reversing the decree of the lower court that had
allowed bail.
Decree
1. The decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court, File No. 285/99,
rendered on Tikimt 4, 2000 E.C. (October 15, 2007) is reversed because it
has fundamental error in law.
2. The decree of the South Wollo High Court, File No.14168 (Yekatit 9,
1999 E.C, i.e. February 16, 2007 ) which granted release on bail to the
petitioner is affirmed. The South Wollo High Court shall conduct the trial
while the petitioner is released in bail.
...
_____________________________________________
Volume 7, p. 287-291

Asnake B. -v.- Public Prosecutor

There should be a strong ground that justifies the denial of release on bail
by invoking the unlikelihood of the appearance of the accused to the trial.
Article 67(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code;
Article 19(6) of the Constitution
______________

Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Mesfin Equbeyonas, Hirut Mellese,
Teshager G/Selassie, Taffesse Yirga
Petitioner: Asnake B.
Respondent: Public Prosecutor
We have examined the case and rendered the following judgement.
Judgement
The case started at SNNPR Sidama Zone High Court which passed a decree
that did not accept the petitioners request to be released on bail. He had
appealed to the SNNPR Supreme Court but the court affirmed the High
Courts decision. The petitioner submits that that there is a fundamental error
of law in the decisions.
The petitioner is charged with three counts of a criminal charge based on
Articles 13(2), 14(2) and 17(2) of the Special Criminal Code [Proclamation
No. 214/1982]. He submitted his request to be released on bail, but the public
prosecutor contended that the accused has a passport and a visa and his
appearance for the trial is unlikely if he is released on bail. The Sidama Zone
High Court accepted the request of the public prosecutor and denied bail to the
petitioner by invoking Article 67(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
SNNPR Supreme Court also confirmed the High Courts decree regarding
bail.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the

arguments of both parties. The principle of the right to be released on bail is
enshrined in Article 19(6) of the Constitution which further stipulates that
courts can deny bail under the exceptional circumstances expressly stated in
the law. The right to be released on bail is thus the principle, while its denial is
an exception.
In the case under consideration, the denial of bail is not attributed to the
nature of the offence, but is rather based on the assumption that the petitioner
might not comply with the conditions of the bail bond. Where it is unlikely
that the applicant would comply with the conditions of the bail bond, the
application for bail shall not be allowed as stated under Article [67(a)] of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
Even if bail can, according to the Criminal Procedure Code, be denied on
the assumption of the applicants unlikely compliance with the conditions of
the bail bond, there should be adequate ground to arrive at this assumption.
Such assumption should have restricted scope so that it does not lead to the
denial of bail to persons whom the legislature had intended to allow bail. Thus
the provision must be narrowly interpreted so that the law can achieve its
objectives and purpose and in such a manner that the right would not be
curtailed as a result of such interpretation.
The assumption of the Sidama Zone High Court and the SNNPR Supreme
court that the accused may leave the country (in light of the gravity of the
counts he is charged with) is based on the petitioners passport and visa. These
factors can be taken into consideration in relation with the potential for the
petitioners noncompliance to the conditions of the bail bond; however, there
can be measures which can be taken so that the petitioner does not leave the
country. The reasons for the denial of bail are not thus justified.
Order
1. The decree and order rendered by the Sidama Zone High Court, File No.
09054, on June18, 2007 and SNNPR Supreme Court, File No. 18698 on
July 3, 2007 denying the petitioners release on bail are reversed.
2. We have hereby decided that the petitioner be released with a bail bond of
Birr 100,000 by producing a guarantor or depositing the amount in court.
...
___________________________________________
Volume 7, p. 283-286

8. Customs and Taxes

No.
1 TeshoAB PLC v. Ethiopian 71070 2012 14 175-177

Revenue and Customs Authority
2 Habesha Cultural Centre v. 74753 2011 13 514-516

ERCA
3 Abebe G. v. Arada Sub-city 69921 2012 13 521-524

Revenue Office
4 Akaki Adventist Missionary 66474 2011 13 506-510

School v. Akaki-Kaliti Sub-city
Woreda 01 Administration
Revenues Office
5 ERCA v. Ato Adera Seid et.al 57100 2011 11 347-349
TeshoAb PLC -v.- Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority

Holdings of the Court:

- If customs duties and taxes are overcharged as a result of incorrect
commodity classification, tariff setting, valuation or other calculation
mistakes, reimbursement claims shall be considered only if such claims
are submitted within six months after the goods are imported or exported
upon completion of customs formalities.
- Customs formalities are considered to be completed from the time an
importer takes out the imported goods from customs warehouse after
fulfilling the necessary formalities.
Articles 2(17), 66(1) and 66(2) of Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009
______________

Meskerem 21, 2005 E.C (October 1, 2012)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie
Petitioner: TeshoAb PLC

Respondent: Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority
Judgment
This case is brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
challenging the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal
High Court.
The current petitioner in the pleading it submitted to the Federal First
Instance Court (as plaintiff) stated that it paid to the defendant (current
respondent) the tax and customs duty necessary for the importation of 93
bundles of reinforcing steel bars (ferro) from Turkey, which were to be
imported in two phases. In the first round, the petitioner received 36 bundles
of reinforcing steel bars on Tir 28, 2001 E.C (February 5, 2009), and in the
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter8:Customs&taxes137

second round it received 54 bundles on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9,

2009). Out of the total of 93 bundles, three were confirmed to be missing as
shown in a letter written on Nehassie 21, 2001 E.C (August 27, 2009). Their
value was reimbursed to the petitioner by an insurance company. On
Meskerem 30, 2002 E.C (October 10, 2009), the respondent requested that
the declaration be sent out for verification and on Tikimt 11, 2002 E.C
(October 21, 2009) the petitioner claimed to have received proof of the
verification from the respondent.
Based on this, the petitioner brought a suit for the reimbursement of Birr
273,503.92 (two hundred seventy three thousand five hundred three birr and
ninety two cents), which it claimed to have mistakenly paid overcharge. The
respondent, in its defence, inter alia, argued that the suit is barred by a period
of limitation as it was brought six months after the goods were imported into
the country and the petitioner received them after the completion of the
necessary customs formalities.
The Federal First Instance Court decided that the suit is barred by a period
of limitation contending that the petitioner did not bring the suit within six
months from the date it received the second round bundles of reinforcing steel
bars on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009). The Federal High Court to
which the petitioner submitted an appeal from the decision of the First
Instance Court dismissed the appeal based on Article 337 of the Civil
Procedure Code.
In a petition dated Hamle 12, 2003 E.C (July 19, 2011), the petitioner
requested the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court for the reversal
of the decisions of the lower courts arguing that the six months period of
limitation has not passed as the customs formalities are considered completed
starting from Tikimt 11, 2002 (October 21, 2009), the date on which a
declaration was sent out for verification.
In the statement of defence it submitted on Meskerem 22, 2004 E.C.
(October 3, 2011), the respondent argued that the custom formalities are
considered to be completed starting from Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9,
2009), the date on which the goods were released and the petitioner received
them. It thus contended that the decision of the lower courts does not have a
fundamental error of law as the petitioner brought the suit after the lapse of
period of limitation.
In addition to the written arguments of the parties, the Cassation Division
heard oral arguments of the parties on Miazia 22, 2004 E.C (April 30, 2012). It
then examined the issue whether the decision of the lower courts was correct
in declaring that the suit is barred by a period of limitation.
This court noted that according to Article 66(1) of Customs Proclamation

No. 622/2009, reimbursement claims shall be granted if duties and taxes are
overcharged as a result of incorrect commodity classification, tariff setting,
valuation or other calculation mistakes. However, according to Article 66(2),
such claim for reimbursement of duties and taxes shall be considered only if it
is submitted within six months after the goods are imported or exported upon
completion of customs formalities.
In order to determine the period of limitation, the Cassation Division,
looked into the definition of customs formalities under Article 2(17) of
Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009. This provision defines customs
formalities as any customs operations carried out in connection with
importation, exportation and transit of goods from the time of arrival at the
customs port until released from customs control. The Cassation Division
then noted from Articles 66(2) and Articles 2(17) of the Proclamation that
these provisions stipulate as a fundamental matter the date on which the goods
are imported into or exported out of the country after the completion of the
customs formalities.
According to Articles 66(2) and 2(17) of Proclamation No. 622/2009, the
customs formalities for the goods (on which a claim of overcharge is brought)
are considered as completed, from the time the petitioner took them out of the
customs warehouse. The bundles of reinforcing steel bars were taken out of
the customs warehouse on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009) after the
completion of the necessary formalities. Accordingly, the Cassation Division
has observed that the petitioner should have claimed for reimbursement within
6 months from this date and this court has rejected the petition because it is
not in line with the content, spirit and objective of Articles 66(2) and 2(17) of
Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009. The decisions of the lower courts which
barred the request of the petitioner by a period of limitation do not have a
fundamental error of law. Accordingly, the following decree is rendered.
Decree
The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court
are affirmed.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 175 177.

Habesha Cultural Centre and Art Gallery P.L.C et al -v.- Federal

Revenue and Customs Authority Prosecutor

- Payers of Value Added Tax are required to use cash register machine in
the operation of the business activity stated on the business license.
- The business licence of the petitioners is related to the sale of cultural
products and paintings, and the public announcement that referred to
business activities related to gold and silver ornaments does not
expressly include the business activity of the petitioners thereby
rendering it difficult to prove the presence legal and moral elements of
the offence.
Article 55 of VAT Proclamation No. 285/2002;
Article 50(d)(2) of VAT (Amendment) Proclamation No. 609/2008;
Article 5(1)(b) of Obligatory Use of Sales Register Machines Regulation No.
139/2007;
Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code.
______________

Tahsas 17, 2004 E.C. (December 27, 2011)

Adane Nigussie
Petitioners: 1. Habesha Cultural Centre and Paint Gallery P.L.C
2. Ato Bedru Muzeyuin
3. W/t Meskerem Chala
Respondent: Federal Revenue and Customs Authority Prosecutor

Judgment
The case concerns a criminal litigation raised in relation to Value Added Tax
and it started at the Federal First Instance Court where the current respondent
was the plaintiff and brought a charge against the current petitioners. The
content of the charge was the following:
- In contravention of Article 50(d)(2) of Proclamation No. 609/2008 (which
amended Proclamation No. 285/2002), and despite its obligation to use
receipts generated by cash register machines for all business transactions,
the first petitioner sold a necklace for Birr 93.15 (ninety three birr and
fifteen cents), through the third respondent, who is employee of the
company, using a receipt not generated by a cash register machine.
- The second respondent, in contravention of Article 50(d)(2) of Value
Added Tax Proclamation No. 609/2008 (which amended Proclamation No.
285/2002), and in breach of his duty as the manager of the company of the
first respondent, let transactions be made without a cash register machine,
disregarding the obligation of the first respondent to do so.
- The third respondent, while working as a salesperson in the company, sold
the 8.1 gram necklace, in contravention of Article 55 of the VAT
Proclamation, with receipt not generated by a cash register machine.
The current respondents, admitting the act of selling the item mentioned by
using a receipt not generated by a cash register machine, argued that they are
not guilty of the crime stated in the charge. The prosecutor then brought
evidence, and the current petitioners subsequently defended their case by
bringing witnesses and other documents as evidence. The Federal First
Instance Court decided that the petitioners could not disprove the evidence
brought against them. It then found them criminally liable stating that:
- the business license that is being litigated upon concerns the business of
the petitioners;
- the public announcement made on Tikimt 01, 2002 E.C. (October 11,
2019) concerns traders of gold and silver ornaments;
- even though the petitioners have not bought a cash register machine, it was
substantively proven that the transaction carried out on the date stated in
the charge was done with a receipt not generated by a cash register
machine.
The second and third petitioners were sentenced to three months
imprisonment, and a fine of Birr 7,000 was imposed on the first petitioner. The
petitioners lodged an appeal from the decision of the Federal First Instance
Court. However, the Federal High Court confirmed the conviction and
sentence.
The petitioners filed a petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court contending that the public announcement made on Tikimt 1,
2002 E.C (October 11, 2009) does not apply to them, as it concerns business

license holders who undertake business activities related to gold and silver
ornaments, and not holders of business license for the sale of cultural artefacts
and paintings. The respondent on the other hand argued that, even though the
business license of the petitioners is for the sale of cultural products, their
company is engaged in the sale of ornaments and gold. The respondent thus
contended that the public announcement made on Tikimt 1, 2002 E.C
(October 11, 2009) applies to the petitioners.
The Cassation Division has examined the issues whether the decision of
the lower courts is appropriate in finding the petitioners liable and whether the
act alleged to have been committed by them in contravention of the law was
proven by the respondent. It then examined the case in light of the relevant
laws and the substantive issues proven in the lower courts by the prosecutor.
According to Article 23(2) of Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, a person shall be criminally liable when the legal,
material and moral elements of the crime under consideration are cumulatively
fulfilled. The petitioners are charged for having transacted with a receipt not
generated by a cash register machine despite their obligation to do so. In this
regard, the relevant law alleged to have been contravened is Article 5(1) (b) of
the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 139/2007, which states that the
vendor should use the machine exclusively in the operation of the business
covered by the permit. This provision also stipulates that, a time-table which
shows the starting date of the obligation for the different categories of tax
payers will be publicly announced. It can also be discerned from the content of
the provision that the tax payers who are required to use the cash register
machine will be notified of the specific areas of business as well, at the time
they are informed of their obligation to use the cash register machine.
In the case at hand, the petitioners are held criminally liable by applying
the public announcement made on Tikimt 1, 2002 (October 11, 2009) regarding
gold and silver ornaments. However, their business license shows that they are
licensed to undertake business related to the sale of cultural products and
paintings. Thus, the Cassation Division has inferred from the contents and
spirit of Article 5(1(b)) of Regulation No. 139/2007 as well as Article 23(2) of
the Criminal Code that, the public announcement does not apply to the
business activity of the petitioners.
Moreover, considering the fact that the petitioners conducted the sale with
a receipt not generated by the cash register machine, the Cassation Division
has found that the mental element of the petitioners should be seen in light of
how the act was undertaken. This court has thus concluded that the act does
not fulfil the moral element requirements of Article 23(2) of the Criminal
Code. In the absence of the legal and moral elements, the Cassation Division
found that the decision of the lower courts in holding the petitioners criminally
liable has a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The conviction of the petitioners by the Federal First Instance Court and
the sentence thereof in File No. 169689 on Sene 20, 2003 E.C (June 27,
2011), and on Sene 24, 2003 (July 1, 2011) , and the decision of the
Federal High Court in File No. 105743 on Hidar 20, 2004 (November 30,
2011) are reversed.
2. The petitioners are not criminally liable as the elements stated in Article
23(2) of the Criminal Code are not cumulatively fulfilled.
Order
The petitioners shall be released unless they are required to serve a sentence
for another criminal act.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 514 516.

Abebe G/Egziabher -v.- Arada Sub-city Revenue Office Prosecutor


If no records and books of accounts are maintained by the taxpayer, or
if, for any reason, the records and books of accounts are unacceptable
to the tax authority, the latter may assess the tax by estimation.
Articles 69(1) and 71 of Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002
_______________

Tir 2, 2004 E.C (January 11, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Abebe G/Egziabher

Respondent: Arada Sub City Revenue Office Prosecutor
Judgment
This case which invokes fundamental error of law is brought to the Cassation
Division against the decisions of the Addis Ababa City Administration Tax
Appeal Commission, the Addis Ababa City Administration Appellate Court
and the Cassation Division of the Addis Ababa City Administration Appellate
Court,
In the 2000 E.C fiscal year (i.e., July 2007 June 2008), the petitioner
paid Birr 83,507.02 (eighty three thousand five hundred seven birr and two
cents) as business income tax, after submitting books of account which show
gross profit of Birr 472,594.89 (four hundred seventy two thousand five
hundred ninety four birr and eighty nine cents). The respondent, confirmed
from the books of account submitted by the petitioner that the gross income
obtained is Birr 5,647,298.90 (five million six hundred forty seven thousand
two hundred ninety eight birr and ninety cents), and gave the latter a tax
assessment notice for the payment of Birr 303,610.71 (three hundred three
thousand six hundred ten birr and seventy one cents). The respondent argued
that, according to the study and checklist prepared by the Addis Ababa City
Administration Revenue office, the business of importing stationery that the
petitioner is engaged in, generates 15% (fifteen percent) gross profit from the
time the goods are brought in after having gone through customs clearance
formalities.
The petitioner then brought an appeal to the Addis Ababa Tax Appeal
Commission challenging the tax assessment notice given by the respondent.
The Commission confirmed the decision given by the respondent.
Subsequently, the petitioner brought an appeal to the appellate division and
then to the Cassation Bench of the Ababa City Administration Appellate
Court, but it was not accepted.
The petitioner then submitted a petition dated Sene 10, 2003 E.C (June 17,
2011) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court and requested
for the reversal of the decision arguing that the books of account submitted
were accepted by the respondent and do not involve under-invoicing, and thus
the tax decision which is based on a presumed profit from the business of
importing stationery has a fundamental error of law. The respondent on the
other hand, in a response it submitted on Tikimt 14, 2004 E.C (October 25,
2011) argued that it only corrected minor errors on the books of account
submitted by the petitioner as per the provisions of the Income Tax
Proclamation No. 286/2002, and thus the decision does not have a
The Cassation Division has examined the issue whether requiring the
petitioner to pay additional tax based on a guideline and checklist previously
prepared would be appropriate. According to Article 69(1) of the Income Tax
Proclamation No. 286/2002, if no records and books of account are maintained
by the taxpayer, or if, for any reason, the records and books of account are
unacceptable to the tax authority, or if the taxpayer fails to declare his or its
income within the time prescribed by this proclamation, the tax authority may
assess the tax by estimation.
The Cassation Division then noted that the respondent has acknowledged
the receipt of the books of account which show that Birr 5,647,298.90 Birr
was reported by the petitioner as gross annual income. It also noted that the
correction of minor calculation errors is based on a study and a directive
previously issued. This shows that the profit declared by the petitioner for the
year under consideration was smaller than the amount of profit presumed to
have been obtained.
The tax assessment that requires the petitioner to pay an additional income
tax after partially accepting and correcting the books of account, is not thus

contradictory to the basic content, spirit and objective of Article 71 of

Proclamation No. 286/2002, which allows the respondent to totally reject the
books of account and fix the amount of tax by estimation if it finds enough
reason for not accepting the books of account submitted by the petitioner. This
court has further noted that, the stipulation of Article 69 does not restrict the
respondent from correcting errors committed in accounting, when the books of
account submitted by the petitioner are only partially acceptable, having
partial error of calculation.
The Cassation Division has found that correcting the gross profit acquired
by the petitioner through a tax assessment notice and requiring him to pay an
additional income tax based on the directive and the checklist issued to decide
on a gross profit is based on Article 69 of Proclamation No. 286/2002. This
does not thus constitute a fundamental error of law.
Decree
The decisions rendered by the Addis Ababa City Administration Tax Appeal
Commission, the Appellate Court of Addis Ababa City Administration and the
Cassation Division of the Appellate Court are affirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 521 524.
Akaki Adventist School -v.- Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01

Administration Revenues Office

- Akaki Adventist School is an entity separate from the Ethiopian Seventh
Day International Adventist Church; it is not a religious institution
designated for prayers but is rather an institution that offers educational
services.
- Proclamation No. 80/1976 allows exemption of land rent and house taxes
to buildings intended for prayer services and their compounds; it does not
invariably apply to all buildings and business entities owned by religious
institutions.
- The petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the school
is an institution that operates to provide education services without
deriving profits and it has not proved that the school has been operating
differently from other schools established for profit.
Proclamation No. 80/1976;
Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Code.
_____________

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist International Church,

Akaki Missionary School
Respondent: Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01 Administration

Revenues Office Public Prosecutor
Judgment
The case was presented to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division by
the petitioner who brought a cassation petition stating that the decisions passed
by the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance, Appellate and
Cassation benches contain fundamental error of law. The case concerns the
application and enforcement of urban land rent and houses tax. The litigation
began when the Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01 Administration Revenues
Office filed a case at the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance
Court for the enforcement of its tax decision. The suit stated that the petitioner
owed unpaid taxes of Birr 734,110.20 (seven hundred thirty four thousand one
hundred ten birr and twenty cents) for the years between 1968 and 1992 E.C.
and that the Office has given the school a Tax Assessment Notification.
The petitioner argued that it should be exempted from paying urban land
rent and house tax because it is a charitable organization. The trial court
rejected this argument and after the decision was confirmed by both the
Appellate and Cassation benches of the Addis Ababa City Administration, the
case was brought before the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court
which in turn remanded the case back to the trial court for it to properly
investigate and decide on whether the applicant is a charitable organization or
a company established for profit.
As per the instructions given by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Bench in Cassation File Number 42319 on Tir 18, 2002 (January 26, 2010),
the trial court directed the issue to be investigated by the Charities and
Societies Agency. The trial court also looked into the following facts: that the
applicant charges its students monthly, annual as well as registration fees; that
it grows various vegetables for sale, and derives income from poultry, dairy
products, flour mill services, a retail shop and the sale of soft drinks. It
concluded that the school could have been profitable had it not been for its
poor administration and therefore does not meet the criteria to qualify as a
charitable organization. It decided that the school should pay Birr 611,798.20
(six hundred eleven thousand seven hundred ninety eight birr and twenty cents)
to the current respondent.
Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner brought an appeal to the Addis
Ababa Appellate Court and then submitted a cassation petition to the Addis
Ababa Cassation Bench. Both rejected the claim.
In its petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division dated
Megabit 9, 2002 (March 18, 2010), the petitioner claimed that Akaki
Adventist Mission School is not an entity with a separate legal personality
since it was not established through a business license issued from the relevant
authority as per Article 5 of the Commercial Code. Therefore, it argued that
the decision that requires the school to pay tax contains a fundamental error of
law since the organization is exempt from tax as per Article 14 of Proclamation
No. 80/1976. Moreover, the petitioner stated that the courts were wrong in
overlooking the preliminary objection regarding period of limitation raised by
the School and allowing the execution proceeding to continue when it was
brought after 24 years contrary to Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
It further noted that the trial court failed to properly investigate the issue as
directed by this Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench; and that the courts
erred in basing their decision on the evidence presented by the Charities and
Societies Agency while it did not have the authority to give such evidence.
Therefore, the petitioner contended that the decisions of the lower courts
which oblige it to pay tax contain a fundamental error of law because the
institution is a religious entity.
The respondent stated that Akaki Adventist School is an entity separate
from the Ethiopian Seventh Day International Adventist Church and not a
religious institution. The School, obtains a permit from the Ministry of
Education and enrols more than 2000 students charging them school fees for
the education services it provides that are relatively high. It holds an area of
129,051 square meters allocated to it by the Works and Urban Development
Office through a lease contract. The school uses the land under its possession
to produce various products and conducts business deriving a lot of revenue in
addition to school fees from students. The respondent also argued that the
school is not a charitable organization as has been ascertained by the Addis
Ababa Finance and Economic Development Office. The school is located far
from the Seventh Day Adventist Church and it is not meant for prayers but is
rather an institution that offers education services with a permit obtained from
the appropriate governmental office and carrying out other trade activities.
In its counter-response, the petitioner stated that the schools professional
license does not make it a separate entity; and that it is rather established under
the church which was not established for profit. The petitioner also contended
that there is a prayer house in the school compound. Furthermore, the
petitioner argued that since the tax arrears in question have been due for more
than ten years, they are barred by period of limitation.
Given this background and the written pleadings of the parties, we have
looked into the case and investigated the issue of whether the decisions given
by the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance, Appellate and
Supreme courts ordering the applicant to comply with the decision of the
respondent contain fundamental error of law.
In order to decide on the issue, we found it relevant to first look into the
appropriateness of the legal provision on which the petitioner has based its
submission.

The petitioner claims that it should not pay urban land rent and house tax
basing itself on Article 14 of Proclamation No. 80/1976- a proclamation
enacted to enforce urban land rent and house tax payments. This provision
titled Exemption from Rent and Tax, exempts the following from paying
these taxes:
a) public roads, squares, recreation and sport centers, and cemeteries;
b) place of worship , nonprofit-making private schools, hospitals,
charitable institutions;
c) governmental institutions drawing their budgets from the central
treasury;
d) dwelling houses whose annual return value is less than 300 Birr.
Proclamation No. 80/1976 exempts buildings intended for prayer services and
their compounds from land rent and house taxes. The provision does not,
however, apply to all buildings and business entities owned by religious
institutions as can be seen from Article 14(b) that reads prayer houses and
their compounds. Although it was claimed that the Ethiopian Seventh Day
Adventist Church established Akaki Adventist School for non-profit purposes,
the petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the school is an
institution that operates to provide education services without deriving profits.
On the contrary, as the judgment of the trial court clearly shows, the respondent
has proved that using the recognition and permit given to it from the Ministry
of Education, the school has enrolled more than 2,000 (two thousand) students
charging them fees no less than the amount required in private schools
established for profit. The petitioner is also engaged in business activities.
Proclamation No. 80/1976 must be interpreted and applied in conformity
with Article 49 of the FDRE Constitution and the mandate given to the City
Administration under the Addis Ababa City Charter. Charitable organizations
in Addis Ababa that are established for non-profit purposes carry out
charitable activities after having concluded agreements with the Addis Ababa
Finance and Economic Development Office while the Akaki Adventist School
has not entered into such agreement as ascertained in writing and recorded in
the trial courts judgment. Proclamation No. 80/1976 must be read together
with Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009. The latter
proclamation establishes the Charities and Societies Agency and contains
detailed provisions on the registration, and regulation of the operations of
charities and societies. Accordingly, the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court found that it was right for the trial court to request the Agency
for information on whether the school is currently registered as a charity.
The respondent has proved that the applicant charges its students fees,
derives income from other profitable activities and that it is not entitled to
exemption under Article 14(b) of Proclamation No. 80/1976. The petitioner
(Akaki Adventist School) has only shown that it is owned by the Ethiopian
Seventh Day Adventist Church and that it does not have a separate legal
personality. But it failed to prove that the school has been operating any
differently from other schools established for profit.
While the school is carrying out its task of shaping the next generation
with the recognition and permit received from the Ministry of Education and
holds an area of 129,051 square meters in its possession under its own name
(as proved by the title deed from the City Administration), the argument of the
petitioner that it does not have a separate legal personality (but is rather under
the Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist Church) and should be exempt from
taxes, is not supported by the content, spirit and purpose of Article 14(b) of
Proclamation No. 80/1976 nor by the current constitutional structure. We have
hence rejected it. Accordingly, we have found that the decisions of the lower
courts requiring the Akaki Adventist School to pay land rent and house taxes
were correct and do not contain a fundamental error of law.
The second question to be addressed is the amount of land rent and house
taxes that should be paid by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that part of
the amount requested by the respondent was barred by period of limitation and
the trial court, accepting this objection, had reduced the amount to that period
not affected by period of limitation.
The petitioner had relied on Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Code to
raise period of limitation as a ground of objection. This provision, however,
only provides for a period of limitation during execution of judgment. Since
the respondent has applied for execution proceedings before the lapse of 10
years from the date of the assessment notification submitted to the applicant,
we have found that this provision is not applicable.
Article 8 of Proclamation No. 80/1976 stipulates that an institution or
individual who has the obligation to pay land rent and house taxes is required
to do so until Yekatit 30 annually based on the rates stated in the Proclamation
and Legal Notice No. 36/1976. Article 16 of Proclamation No. 80/1976 states
that whoever fails to meet the deadline for these taxes shall pay a fine of 5% of
the monthly rent or tax, subject to the condition that the penalty shall not
exceed 50% of the principal payment. Seen in light of the content, spirit and
purpose of these provisions, the contention of the petitioner that the payment
of these taxes was barred by period of limitation is found to be without a legal
basis and has not been accepted.
To sum up, the argument presented by the petitioner is without legal basis
and support. The decision of Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance
Court was duly confirmed by the City Administration Appellate and Cassation
Benches all of which do not contain a fundamental error of law.

Decree
1. The decisions of Addis Ababa Administration First Instance Court,
Appellate Court and the citys Cassation Division are affirmed.
2. The stay of execution ordered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division is lifted.
.
_______________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 506-510
Abridged Translation: Hanna Araya
Ethiopian Income and Revenue Authority Jimma Branch office

- v.- Adale S. & Phromisis PLC

The tax authority has preferential claim over the property of a tax debtor
unless the property was initially held as security.
Article 80(1) of Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002;
Article 78(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002.
_______________

Ginbot 30, 2003 E.C (June 8, 2011)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Ethiopian Income and Revenue Authority Jimma Branch

Office
Respondents: 1. Adale Seid
2. Phromisis Private Limited Company
Judgment
The case relates to the preferential creditor claim submitted by the Ethiopian
Revenues and Customs authority which started at Jimma Zone High Court,
Oromia Regional State. The current first respondent sued the current second
respondent and became judgment creditor for the latter. The clinic owned by
the second respondent was offered for auction. Following the absence of
buyers after two auctions, the judgment creditor (first respondent) requested to
receive the property. The current petitioner intervened on Tikimit 9, 2002 EC
(October 19, 2010) stating that it has a preferential claim guaranteed according
to Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 because the
judgment-debtor (the current second respondent) owes the petitioner tax

payments of Birr 508,564.67 (Five hundred eight thousand five hundred sixty
four birr and sixty seven cents). The Zonal High Court rejected the petitioners
claim stating that according to Article 78(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002,
such preferential claims apply only where the property is not subject to an
attachment or if it not held as security. The current petitioner lodged an appeal
to the regions Supreme Court which confirmed the decision of the lower court
in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner has
further lodged this petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division.
In a petition dated Sene 8, 2002 EC (June 16, 2011), the petitioner invoked
preferential claim embodied in Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002
next to secured claims of creditors (banks). The petitioner argued that the
decisions rendered by the lower courts involve fundamental error of law as
they were based on Article 78(1) which is not relevant to the issue at hand
because it relates to the recovery of property from third parties.
The respondents submitted their responses on Tahsas 20, 2003 E.C.
(December 29, 2010). The first respondent stated that the petitioner cannot
claim preferential rights because its request was submitted late, after he was
already appointed to temporarily administer the property. The second
respondent also requested the decisions of the lower courts to be reversed.
Based on Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002, the Federal Supreme
Court Cassation Division has examined the issue whether the petitioner has
preferential claim over property held by another creditor. The court has
observed that the first respondent is the creditor of the second respondent and
that his share from the latter (Phromisis PLC) is not contested. On the other
hand, in the judgment execution suit brought by the first respondent against
second respondent, the fact that the property in question is not given as security
is not contested. Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002
provides the following:
From the date on which tax becomes due and payable under this
Proclamation, subject to the prior secured claims of creditors, the
Authority has a preferential claim over all other claims upon the assets of
the person liable to pay the tax until the tax is paid.
As can be clearly understood from this provision, claims can precede that of
the petitioners only if the property was initially held as security.
With regard to the applicability of Article 78(1) of Proclamation No.
286/2002 to the issue at hand, this court has found that, although this provision
is not directly relevant to the issue at hand, it stipulates the procedures to be
followed by the tax authority during enforcement of seizure. Generally, the
preferential claim brought by the petitioner should have been decided in

154EtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortium December2013
accordance with Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002, and not on the
basis of another provision in the proclamation that is not relevant to the issue.
Jimma Zone High Court has thus committed fundamental error of law and the
appellate court has done the same in affirming the decision. The following
decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1. The decisions of Jimma Zone High court, File No. 10/86 dated Tikimt 18,
2002 E.C. (October 28, 2010) and Oromia Region Supreme Court, File
No. 89407 rendered on Tir 9, 2002 E.C (January 17, 2011) are reversed.
2. The petitioner has preferential claim over the first respondent in accordance
with Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002.
_______________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 348-350
Abridged translation: Seble G. Baraki

9. Family law

No.
1 Dereje M. v. Frehiwot P. 74451 2013 14 160-162
2 Yeromwork et al v. Asegid 54827 2011 11 129-131
3 Gebreselassie Amare -v.- 46608 2010 11 6-7

Abrehet Techane
4 Seniya v. Belaynesh & Sherif 43988 2007 11 107-109
5 Poster v. Veno & Leitiya 44101 2010 10 44-47
6 Fantanesh et al v. Molla 42682 2009 10 8-9
7 Zenebetch v. Birkinesh 42648 2009 10 21-22

Dereje M. v.- Frehiwot P.

Men and women should be treated equally during dissolution of marriage
and any common property shall be divided equally. This includes a
condominium house.
Article 35 of the Constitution;
Articles 72, 102 and 103 of Proclamation No. 75/96 EC on the Family
Law of the SNNPR;
Article 2 of Proclamation 454/2005;
The decision of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court File
No. 51893 rendered on 15 July 2010.
_______________

Petitioner: Dereje M.
Respondent: Frehiwot P.
The case was examined and the following judgment was rendered.
Judgment
The case came to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
because the petitioner submitted a petition stating that the decisions made by
the Hawasa First Instance Court and the Hawasa High Court have fundamental
error of law and he requested for the decisions to be reversed. The issue is
related with division of common property in marriage.
The case started with the request of the respondent to share the common
property after their marriage was terminated by divorce. The respondent listed
63 items of property and requested to take her share. One of the items listed
was a condominium house acquired during marriage. The condominium house
was in her name and they both have paid half of the instalment to bank. She
then requested for the house to be given to her after she fully pays the
remaining amount, as it cannot be sold and divided.
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter9:Familylaw157

The petitioner on the other side argued that the house is common property,
and the rights and debts thereof should be shared. He requested for the house
to be rented so that the debt owed to the bank can be paid off while the house
remains shared property. The lower court decided that the amount spent for
paying half of the instalment, furnishing and building the partition should be
calculated, after which the respondent should pay the petitioner half of this
amount and keep the house to herself. The petitioner was displeased with this
decision and appealed to the Hawasa City High Court. The High Court heard
the arguments of both sides and confirmed the decision of the lower court. The
petitioner, then, submitted a petition to the Cassation Division of the SNNPR
Supreme Court. However, the court did not accept the petition.
The petitioner then submitted his petition on November 22, 2011 to this
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. He stated that the
condominium house was acquired during marriage, a fact proven by the lower
court. Thus, as it is part of common property, he argued that the issue should
have been addressed in accordance with Family Law. He contended that the
decision of the lower courts has a fundamental error of law.
The respondent, on March 7, 2012, submitted her response stating that a
condominium house cannot be sold nor exchanged. Moreover, the decision
should be seen in light of Article 35 of the Constitution and the efforts of the
government to empower women. Thus, she argued that the decisions of the
lower courts have no fundamental error of law.
The issue that should be examined is whether the decision of the lower
courts that entitles the respondent to pay half of the expenses incurred and
keep the house is appropriate. The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme
Court has observed that the respondent got the house in her name while she
was married to the petitioner. The lower court has also proved that half of the
instalment that should be made for the house, furnishing expenses and the cost
incurred for building the partition were taken from the income and common
property of the couple while they were married. From this, it can be concluded
that, as per Article 72 of Proclamation No. 75/96 EC of the Family Law of the
SNNPR, the condominium is part of their common property.
It is imperative to see how the rights and responsibilities in the context of
common property are to be shared when marriage is dissolved by divorce.
Sub-Articles 1 and 2 of Article 35 of the Constitution state that women shall,
in the enjoyment of rights and protections provided by the Constitution, have
equal rights with men and that they shall have equal rights with men in
marriage. When the argument of the respondent is seen in light of this
provision, this court has found no legal ground for her request for a special
privilege to take the condominium house when the common property is
divided.

The condominium house, like any other common property, shall be divided
based on the agreement of the husband and wife. If they cannot reach an
agreement and if the property can be divided in kind, they shall divide it
accordingly. However, if neither of these two options can be effected, the
house shall be sold through auction and the debt of the bank shall be paid off.
Then, the couple can divide the remaining money. The decision is in conformity
with the decree that this same Cassation Division of the Supreme Court had
rendered in File No. 51893, on July 15, 2010.
The decisions of the lower court for which entitled the respondent to pay
half the expenses and keep the condominium house to herself do not follow
the spirit and objective of the contents of Articles 72, 102 and 103 of
Proclamation No. 75/96 EC on the Family Law of the SNNPR. Moreover,
these decisions do not go in line with the decision of the Cassation Division of
the Federal Supreme Court in File No. 51893 rendered on July 15, 2010. This
decision is binding in the interpretation of the principle enshrined in Article
35(1) of the Constitution regarding equal treatment of men and women which
includes equality during the dissolution of marriage.
This court has found that the decisions of Hawasa City First Instance
Court, Hawassa City High Court and the Cassation Division of the Regional
Supreme Court are not in line with the above mentioned provisions and the
decision of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 51893.
They are also inconsistent with Article 2 of Proclamation No. 454/2005. Thus,
they have a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Hawassa City First Instance Court, the Hawassa City
High Court and the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme made
regarding the Condominium House are reversed.
2. The condominium house is part of common property. It shall be divided
between them equally if the petitioner and the respondent can reach an
agreement regarding the condominium and on how the remaining debt of
the bank shall be paid. However, if they cannot reach an agreement, they
can divide the house in kind. They should share the debt of the bank and
make the payment. If neither of these two options can be effected, this
court has decided that the house shall be sold at auction and the couple can
divide the money that remains after their bank loan is paid.

_________________________________________________
Volume: 14. pp 160-162

Yeromwork T. et al - v.- Asegid S.

- Property of the child which can be sold by the curator (tutor) is only
movable property, shares and transferable securities;
- The curator (tutor) is not empowered to sell immovable property
belonging to a minor;
- Contract of sale of an immobile property entered into by the curator
(tutor) of a minor is a voidable.
Art. [1266] of the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia;
Art. 294 of the Family Code of Oromia Regional State, Proc. No 69/1995.
______________
Mizia 21, 2003 E.C (April 29, 2011)
Justices : Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Yeromwork Tesfaye, in her own name and on behalf her
wards: Elsi Tesfaye, Fasil Tesfaye and Dereje Tesfaye
Respondent: Asegid Shenegelegn
We have examined the file and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment
The case started at the High Court of South Shewa Zone. The respondent (a
plaintiff at the High Court) requested that the defendant should make delivery
of the house sold to him and transfer its title of ownership. The defendant
(current petitioner) responded that because there was no valid contract, she
would not be compelled to perform the contract. The court examined the case,
found in favour of the defendant and ordered the reinstatement of the parties to
the position they had before the conclusion of the contract.
The respondent lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of Oromia Region.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and decided that
the petitioner should perform the contract. Although cassation petition was
presented to the Cassation Bench of the Supreme Court of Oromia Region, the
Bench dismissed the petition. This petition is submitted to the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division against the decision of the Cassation Bench

of the Oromia Supreme Court. Following this petition filed on Miazia 7, 2002
E.C, (April 15, 2010) we have summoned the respondent and heard the case.
As indicated in the suit, Elsi, Fasil and Dereje did not attain the age of
majority when the suit was instituted and they were represented by their tutor
(curator). The respondent claimed that he concluded a contract of sale with the
tutor (curator) and the children.
The issue that should be framed is whether the contract has legal effect.
The petitioners (defendants in the suit) can only be compelled to perform the
contract where it is possible to say that the contract has legal effect. At the
time of the conclusion of the contract, Elsi, Fasil and Dereje were 12, 14 and
10 years of age respectively.
This means that the contract of sale of the house was entered into by their
tutor (curator). Because the house is the joint property of the petitioners, it
could be sold only when the consent of all is obtained as stipulated in Art.
[1266] of the Civil Code. However, most of the joint owners of the house did
not attain the age of majority at the time of the conclusion of the contract of
sale. Hence, it is appropriate to take into account the protection accorded by
the law to minors.
Chapter 12 of the Oromia Region Family Code, Proclamation No. 69/1995
EC (as amended by Oromia Regional State Proclamation No. 83/1996 EC
contains provisions that deal with minors. As stipulated under Article 294 of
this Proclamation, property of the child which can be sold by the tutor (mogzit)
is only movable property, shares and transferable securities. The tutor (mogzit)
is not thus empowered to sell an immovable property that belongs to a minor.
Hence, the contract of sale of the house cannot be enforceable.
Decree
1. The decision of Oromia Supreme Court rendered under File No. 31454 on
January 26, 2010 and the order of the Cassation Bench of Oromia
Supreme Court made on April 7, 2010 under File No. 100903 are reversed
in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The contract of sale of the house concluded on May 13, 2001 is not
enforceable. The decision of West Shewa Zone rendered under File No.
16777 on Hidar 3, 2001 E.C (November 12, 2008) is affirmed.
_______________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 129-131
Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre

Gebreselassie A. - v. - Abrehet T.
The fact that one of the spouses was registered for a condominium
house before the conclusion of marriage does not make the house the
personal property of such spouse so long as he/she gets the house
during marriage; such house is the common property of the spouses.
Article 62 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE.
_______________

Cassation file, No. 46608
Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Berhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Gebreselassie A.
Respondent: Abrehet T.
Having examined the file, we have rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case involves division of common property of spouses. In her statement of
claim, the respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) stated that the marriage that
she had with the petitioner was dissolved by divorce and claimed the partition
of a one room-house constructed during marriage, household utensils and a
condominium house located in Nifas Silk-Lafto Sub-city, site 2, block No. 29,
house No. B29/48. The petitioner (defendant at the lower court), in his
statement of defence, argued that the one-room house was constructed before
the conclusion of the marriage. He also argued that he got the condominium
house after the dissolution of the marriage by agreement on Tahsas 18, 1999
E.C. (December 27, 2006). The Federal First Instance Court found that the
afore-mentioned one-room house was the personal property of the petitioner;
so were the household utensils. However, the court decided that the
condominium house was common property and the parties have equal rights
and obligations on this house. The petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of

the Federal First Instance Court and lodged an appeal to the Federal High
Court. The Federal High Court, having heard the arguments of both sides,
confirmed the decision of the lower court.
In a cassation petition filed on Sene 8, 2001 E.C (June 15, 2009), the
petitioner stated that he was registered to get a condominium house before he
married the respondent, and that their marriage was dissolved on Hidar 23,
1999 E.C (December 2, 2006) by mutual consent. He argued that he was
registered for condominium before the conclusion of the marriage and he won
the lot after the marriage was dissolved by mutual agreement, and claimed that
the condominium house is his personal property. He thus contended that the
decisions of the lower courts have fundamental error of law in declaring that
the condominium house is common property.
The respondent, on her part, argued that she left the conjugal home not
because their marriage was dissolved by their mutual agreement but because
of the repeated beating inflicted against her by her husband. She further stated
that the condominium house is common property because they got it house
before the dissolution of the marriage and the 10% advance payment was
made from common property,
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the file. It
was proved in the lower courts that the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent was dissolved on Megabit 24, 2000 E.C. (April 2, 2008) and
the spouses got the condominium house before the dissolution of their
marriage. Although the petitioner argued that he was registered for
condominium before the conclusion of the marriage, the condominium house
could not be his personal property as he got the house during marriage.
Therefore, the petitioners argument does not have legal basis in light of
Article 62 (1) of the Revised Family Code. Moreover, we have observed in the
decisions of the lower courts that there is due recognition to the respective
equal rights and obligations of the petitioner and the respondent with regard to
the house. Therefore, we have found no fundamental error of law in the
decisions of the lower courts, and we have confirmed the decisions of the
lower courts pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Decree
Decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court are
affirmed.
________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 6-7

Seniya v.- Belaynesh & Sherif

If a spouse deserts the conjugal home before the marriage is legally
dissolved, such spouse cannot benefit from the presumption of common
property where it is proved that the other spouse acquired the property
during the separation period.
The spouse who did not make any contribution cannot be entitled to take a
share from such property.
Article 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution;
Article 33 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia;
Art. 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution
______________

Meskerem 24, 2000 E.C (October 4, 2007)
Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Seniya Sh. T.

Respondents: 1. Belaynesh M.
2. Sherif A.
Having examined the file, we have made the following judgment.

Judgment
The case involves partition of common property whereby a husband married
to two wives divorced one of his wives. The litigation commenced when the
first respondent (Belaynesh) brought suit against the second respondent
(Sherif) in Guraghe Zone, Mesqan Woreda Court. The first respondent claimed
that she and the second respondent constructed a one room-house roofed with
corrugated iron sheet and they had land close to one hectare. Hence, she
requested the division of their common property. In his statement of defense,

the second respondent stated that he and the first respondent got married in
1988 E.C and lived together up to 1990 E.C. Then she left the conjugal home,
and in 1994 E.C she declared that she had another marital relationship, thereby
dissolving the marriage that existed between them. He also added that they did
not have common property. He stated that the property alleged to be common
by the first respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) was acquired with the
present petitioner (Seniya).
The present petitioner, another wife of the plaintiff, intervened in the
proceeding and claimed that the property under litigation was acquired by her
and the second respondent. Guraghe Zone Mesqan Woreda Court decided that
the rural land was the common property of the petitioner (Seniya) and the
second respondent while the house belonged to the two respondents. The
petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of the court regarding the house and
lodged her appeal to all levels of the courts of the region; but her claims were
not accepted.
The present petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division was
made to get the decision of the lower courts reversed. This court has examined
whether the lower of courts are correct in deciding that the house is common
property of the respondents. This Cassation Bench has investigated the matter
on the basis of the arguments of both sides, the decision of the lower courts
and in light of the pertinent provisions of the law.
The petitioner and the second respondent got married in 1980 E.C and are
still in marital relation. The first respondent and the second respondent got
married in 1988 E.C and lived together up to 1990 E.C. Then the first
respondent deserted her husband up to 1994 E.C and petitioned for divorce as
a result of which the marriage was dissolved.
Regarding land located in Enseno Town, a house with thatched roof was
demolished and the house under litigation was constructed by the petitioner
and the second respondent. The lower court decided that the petitioner was not
entitled to the share of the house under litigation by stating that she did not
prove the circumstance and the time of her possession of the land on which the
house was constructed.
According to the content and spirit of Article 33 of the Civil Procedure
Code, a plaintiff is entitled to institute a suit only when he is able to show that
he has vested interest. The obligation to show vested interest is borne by the
plaintiff, not by the defendant. In the case under consideration, although it was
proved that the first and the second respondents had marital relationship, it has
not been proven that the house was constructed by these respondents. Rather it
was proved that the house was constructed by the petitioner and the second
respondent. Most importantly, the decision of the lower court demonstrates

that the first respondent and the second respondent were married in 1988 E.C
and separated since 1990 E.C. The house under litigation was constructed after
they had separated.
There is the legal presumption that property acquired before the dissolution
of marriage pursuant to the law is common property of the spouses. However,
when a spouse deserts conjugal life before the marriage is legally dissolved,
such spouse cannot benefit from the presumption of common property where
it is proved that the other spouse acquired the property during the period of
separation. The spouse who did not make any contribution cannot be entitled
to take a share from such property as it would be contrary to right of
ownership to property stipulated in Article 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution.
Consequently, it will be contrary to what is embodied in the Constitution
to accept a claim of common property by a spouse, who deserted the conjugal
life even if the marriage was not legally dissolved. Such spouse shall not be
entitled to a share from the property acquired by the other spouse during the
time of separation. Therefore, the decision of the lower courts which declared
that the petitioner is not entitled to a share of the house is not appropriate and
contains a fundamental error of law. We have, therefore, decreed as follows.
Decree
1. The decisions of the lower courts, which declared that the respondents had
the right to divide the house, are reversed pursuant to Art. 348(1) of the
2. It is the petitioner, and not the first respondent, who is entitled to claim a
share in the ownership of the house with the second respondent.
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 107-109

Poster -v.- Veno & Letitiya

- In all actions concerning children undertaken by the public and
private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
and legislative bodies, the primary consideration shall be the best
interest of the child.
- If the adoptive parents treat the adopted child in a manner contrary to
international child conventions and human rights conventions and
where it is proved that the interest and welfare of the child is
jeopardized, it is of no value to allow the adoption agreement to
continue.
Art.9 (4) and Art.36(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
______________

Yekatit 24, 2002 E.C (March 3, 2010)
Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese,

Petitioner: F. Poster
Respondents: 1. D. Veno
2. B. Letitiya
Having examined the file, we have given the following judgment.
Judgment
The case concerns the legal ground upon which an adoption agreement can be
revoked. The case started at the Federal First Instance Court as a Family and
Children Relief Organization called Berhane-Hiwot brought suit against the
present respondents. The respondents had requested to adopt a baby named
Tullu and the organization led by the present petitioner was facilitating the
adoption process in court. As the respondents abandoned their idea of taking
the child, the petitioner requested the court which was examining the adoption
to reject the adoption agreement. However, the court approved the adoption
agreement. As the respondents were not willing to take the child even after the
approval of the adoption agreement, the baby was compelled to stay in a
temporary child care facility administered by the petitioner.
Because the action of the respondents was injurious to the present and
future life of the child, a suit was brought against the respondents so that the
adoption agreement would be revoked in accordance with the Revised Family
Code. The court which handled the case rejected the suit stating that it was not
proved that the actions of the respondents would endanger the life of the child
in the future. The appellate court also confirmed the decision of the first
instance court.
The cassation petition was filed to get the decision of the lower courts
reversed. The decisions of the lower courts have been examined. As stipulated
under Art. 195(1) of the Revised Family Code, an adoption agreement cannot
be revoked if it is approved. However, Article 195(2) provides the grounds
which can lead to the revocation of an adoption agreement. As we can
understand from the spirit of this provision, an adoption agreement can be
revoked where it is proved that the acts of the adopter are contrary to the
provisions of the international child conventions, the provisions of other
human right conventions and the interest and welfare of the child.
Adoption is recognized by law with a view to safeguarding the interest of
children. In order to safeguard the interests of children, international and
regional conventions were adopted and have entered into force. These
conventions include the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Ethiopia ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991 and the African Charter on the
Right and Welfare of the Child on October 2, 2002.
The FDRE Constitution, the Revised Family Code and other laws embody
provisions that deal with the rights and welfare of children. The international,
regional and national legal instruments contain basic principles regarding the
right of the child. One of these is the principle which declares that in all
actions, the primary consideration should be the best interest of the child. The
FDRE Constitution, not only declares that international conventions ratified by
Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land (Art.9(4)), but has also
incorporated a number of human right provisions which should be interpreted
in light of international human right conventions to which the country is a
party. Moreover, the Constitution contains a provision, i.e., Article 36, which
specifically addresses the special problems of children. Sub-Article 2 of this
provision provides that in all actions concerning children undertaken by public
and private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and

legislative bodies, the primary consideration shall be the best interest of the
child.
If the adoptive parents treat the adopted child in a manner contrary to
international child conventions and human rights conventions and where it is
proved that the interest and welfare of the child is jeopardized, it is of no value
to allow the adoption agreement to subsist. The decision of the lower courts
has not considered the spirit of the law, and this Bench has thus found that the
decision contains fundamental error of law. We have rendered the following
decree.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court on Hidar 05,
2001 E.C (November 14, 2008) under File No. 111497 and which was
confirmed by the appellate court on Yekatit 12, 2001 E.C. (February 19,
2009) under File No. 75193, is reversed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of
the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The adoption agreement made on Yekatit 26, 2000 E.C (March 5, 2008)
and its confirmation by the appellate court on Megabit 25, 2000 E.C (April
3, 2008) are revoked.
____________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp.41-43

Fantanesh S. et al v.- Molla D.

- Judicial declaration of paternity may be obtained where the alleged
father and the mother of the child have lived together in continuous
sexual relation, without having legally recognized relation, in the
period regarded by laws as the period of pregnancy;
- Judicial declaration of paternity may be made where one of the
conditions provided in Article 143 of the Revised Family Code is
satisfied.
Article 143 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE
_______________
Tikimit 10, 2002 E.C. (October 20, 2009)

Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie
Petitioners: 1. Fantanesh S.
2. Alemu D.
3. Tigist D.
Respondent: Molla D.
Judgment
The case concerns the establishment of paternal filiation of a child. The basis
of the litigation is the judicial declaration of the Federal First Instance Court
that the respondent was the son of Demissie T. The petitioners intervened
contesting the decision of the court and requested for the annulment of the
declaration of paternity. In their opposition, the petitioners claimed that the
respondent was not the child of the deceased. The Federal First Instance Court,
to which the opposition was filed, summoned the respondent, heard the case
and examined the evidence. Finally, the court found that evidence produced by
the respondent establishes that he was the child of the deceased.
The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was lodged, confirmed the
decision. The petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court was made against these decisions. In the petition filed on Tir

12, 2001 E.C (January 20, 2009), the petitioners claimed that there is
fundamental error of law committed by the lower courts. This court has
summoned the respondent and heard the arguments of both parties in light
with the law to see whether the decision of paternal filiation was appropriate
under Article 143 of the Revised Family Code.
The Federal First Instance Court, which first entertained the case, heard
witnesses and stated in its decision that the deceased was like a father to the
respondent in treating the latter, that the deceased got the respondent enrolled
in a school, and that the deceased made his son live with his family members.
The court further observed in its decision that the petitioners were unable to
introduce evidence which should outweigh the evidence of the respondent.
This Cassation Bench has found that the facts proved by evidence enabled the
First Instance Court to declare that the respondent was the son of the deceased
as per Article 143(e) of the Revised Family Code.
Art. 143 deals with judicial declaration of paternity, and the point of
contention between the petitioners and the respondent is covered by Article
143(d) of the Code. This provision stipulates that judicial declaration of
paternity may be obtained in the case where the alleged father and the mother
of the child have lived together in a continuous sexual relation, without having
a legally recognized relation, in the period regarded by law as the period of
pregnancy. Paternity can be established where any one of the conditions
embodied in sub-Articles (a) to (e) of Article Art. 143 of the Revised Family
Code is satisfied. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that the respondent
was not able to prove that there was a continuous sexual relation between the
mother and the deceased is not acceptable. We have come to the conclusion
that no fundamental error of law was committed by the lower courts.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court under File No.
27622 on Tikimt 1, 2000 E.C. (October 11, 2007) and the decision of the
Federal High Court rendered under File No. 63272 on Hidar 4, 2001 E.C.
(November 13, 2008) are affirmed as per Article 348 (1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. The decision declaring that the respondent is the son of the deceased is
affirmed.

____________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 8-9

Zenebech B. - v.- Birknesh K.


Proof of filiation by possession of status is not conclusive proof; it is rather
presumption of law which is not a compulsory (irrefutable) presumption.
However, the party who opposes the presumption is required to rebut it by
producing contrary proof.
Arts. 154, 155, 156 and 157 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE
_______________

Tahsas 6, 2002 E.C (December 15, 2009)
Justices: Menberetsehai Taddese, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,

Petitioner: Zenebech B.
Respondent: Birknesh K.
Judgment
The case relates to proof of filiation. The present respondent, filed her claim at
the Federal First Instance Court stating that she was born in 1964 E.C from her
father Sergeant Kebede B. and her mother W/ro Berhane H. who were
married. After the death of Kebede, she requested to be declared the daughter
of Kebede B. The petitioner appeared in court and contested the respondents
claim stating that the deceased, Kebede B., and W/ro Berhane H. did not have
a child from their marriage, and she argued that the respondent was the
goddaughter of W/ro Berhane. The court, having heard the testimonies of the
witnesses of both sides, decided that the respondent was the child of Kebede
B. Aggrieved by the decision of the court, the applicant lodged an appeal to
the Federal High Court. The appellate court rejected her appeal.
The cassation petition is lodged against the decision of the appellate court.
The petitioner stated that Kebede B. and Berhane H.did not have any child
during their conjugal life as W/ro Berhane had the problem of infertility. She

further stated that the lower court declared the respondent as the daughter of
the deceased without making an appropriate examination and that the decision
has fundamental error of law.
This Cassation Bench has examined the case. According to the Revised
Family Code, filiation is proved by producing a birth certificate or in the
absence of birth certificate by possession of status as indicated under Articles
154 and 155 of the afore-mentioned law. According to Article 156 of the
Revised Family Code, possession of status exists where a person is treated by
the community as being the child of the person alleged to be the father. If it is
possible to prove the possession of status of such filiation, the court may
presume that such child is the child of the alleged father as stipulated under
Article 157 of the Code.
As can be understood from this legal provision, proof of filiation by
possession of status is not a conclusive proof. It is rather a presumption of the
law. It must also be noted that this presumption is not a compulsory
(irrefutable) presumption. The party who opposes the presumption can rebut it
by producing contrary proof as stipulated under Article 157(2). In the case
under consideration, we have observed that while the witnesses of the
respondent testified that the respondent was born to Kebede B. and W/ro
Berhane H. and that the community considered her as the child of the
deceased, the witnesses of the petitioner were not able to disprove the
testimony of the witnesses of the respondent. Hence, because the respondent
was able to prove filiation by possession of status, it is not possible to say that
the decision of the lower court contains fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, rendered on Ginbot 4,
2000 E.C (May 12, 2008) under File No. 12503 and the order of the
Federal High Court made on Tikimt 13, 2001 E.C (October 23, 2008)
under File No. 68578 are affirmed.
2. We have hereby declared that the respondent is the child of Kebede B..
_______________________________________________
Volume 10, pp 19-20.

10. Intellectual Property

No.
1 Association of Red Terror 78856 2013 14 269-274

Martyrs Friends and Family v.
Elias Asegahegn
2 Samuel Haile et al v. Simret 68369 2011 13 576-581

Ayalew et al
3 Ethio Cement v. IP office 57179 2011 12 544 -548
4 Artistic Printing Press v. 44520 2010 10 339-341

Getahun Shiberu
5 Mulu Hailesellasie v. Zemenai 42253 2009 9 149-151

Printing Press PLC

Red Terror Martyrs Families and Friends Association

-v.- Elias Asegahegn
Publishing and disseminating a three dimensional design on paper without
the permission and consent of the owner constitute an act of copyright
infringement.
Article 34(4) of Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection
Proclamation No. 410/2004
_______________

Tahsas 15, 2005 E.C (December 25, 2012)

Petitioner: Red Terror Martyrs Families and Friends Association
Respondent: Elias Asegahegn
After examining the case, the court has rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case started at the Federal High Court where the current respondent
(plaintiff at the High Court) sued the current petitioner as the first defendant
and Ethiopian Postal Services Enterprise as the second defendant. In a
statement of claim submitted on Yekatit 16, 2002 E.C. (February 24, 2010),
the current respondent stated that the first defendant issued a bid
announcement to gather designs for the construction of a monument to
commemorate victims of the Red Terror, and that after receiving his design in
1990 EC (1998), the first defendant disseminated the design as its own on
mass media without announcing the selection of the design. The suit further
stated that the second defendant (Ethiopian Postal Services Enterprise)
published and sold 60,000 stamps containing the design for three Birr each,
i.e, a total Birr 180,000. The plaintiff (current respondent) claimed in the
lower court a compensation of Birr 100,000 for the design, consequential
damages of Birr 280,000 and moral damages of Birr 150,000.
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationCh.10:IntellectualProperty175

As preliminary objection, the defendants argued that the suit is barred by

period of limitation which was rejected by the Court on Tahsas 12 2003 EC.
(December 21, 2010). They also presented alternative defenses on the issue.
The first defendant claimed to have been founded in 1995 E.C. (2003) and
denied receiving the design that the plaintiff allegedly submitted in 1990 EC
(1998). The first defendant also argued that the evidence submitted in support
of the statement of claim is not valid and the design on the stamps and that of
the plaintiff are different. It also argued that in the absence of contractual or
non-contractual relationship with the plaintiff, the respondents claim is not
acceptable.
On the other hand, the second defendant contended that, the stamps were
published following a request from the first defendant and an authorization
from the Ministry of Transport and Communication without any knowledge
about the bid announcement on its part. It also argued that the design on the
stamp and the one claimed by the plaintiff are different and the compensation
demanded by the plaintiff is exaggerated.
In its judgment, the court observed that Addis Ababa Human Rights
Association for the Prosecution of the Oppression and Massacre Committed
by the Dergue issued the bid announcement to which the plaintiff submitted
his design. It is also noted from a letter written on Hamle 07, 2000 E.C. (July
14, 2008) that the current petitioner received the design and continued
negotiations with the respondent regarding the design. Based on the claims
and evidence presented by the parties, the Federal High Court found that first,
second and third place winners were to be awarded monetary prize after which
the ownership of the designs shall be vested in the Association. The court also
confirmed that while the originality of the plaintiffs design is not contested,
the fact that the first defendant sent three designs to be published, including
that of the plaintiffs, is established. The court disregarded expert testimonies
which regarded the design on the stamp and the one submitted by the plaintiff
as different, i.e. as two and three dimensional, respectively.
Therefore, the court held the first defendant liable of copyright infringement
for altering the plaintiffs design from three dimensional to two dimensional
and sending it to the second defendant to be published on stamps. On the other
hand, the court found the second defendant not liable because it did not select
the plaintiffs design to be published on the stamps and had no obligation to
ensure whether the first defendant had ownership of the design. Therefore, the
court ordered the first defendant to pay the minimum amount (Birr 100,000)
for moral damages stated under Article 34(4) of the Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004. The court took
into consideration the amount of the prize for the winning design (Birr
12,900.00) and the fact that the plaintiff could not have generated profit if the

design was sold to others as the purpose of the design was to commemorate
the Martyrs of the Red Terror. Aggrieved by this decision, the first defendant
lodged an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court which rejected the appeal in
accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The petitioner has further lodged a petition to the Cassation Division of the
Federal Supreme Court. The petition raises the following:
- The rejection of the preliminary objection is not appropriate as the
action brought by the respondent in the lower court was barred by
period of limitation stated under Article 1845 of the Civil Code.
- The decision of the courts that held the petitioner liable for copyright
infringement is not acceptable since it has been proved by expert
witnesses that the design published on the stamps has no relation with
the design that the current respondent claims to have copyright on.
The respondent (plaintiff at the Federal High Court) on the other hand argued
that the period of limitation should be calculated in accordance with Article
2143(1) of the Civil Code applicable to non-contractual obligations rather than
Article 1845 applicable to contracts. In support of this, the respondent argued
that because the claim was based on a legal right and the action was brought
on Yekatit 16, 2002 E.C. (February 23, 2010), the period of limitation which is
2 years has not lapsed from the date of the copyright infringement on Nehassie
20, 2000 E.C. (August 26, 2008). The respondent also contested the claim that
the design on the stamps was two dimensional while his design was three
dimensional by stating that any movable or immovable object becomes two
dimensional when it is put on paper or photographed.
This court has examined the case in the light of the following issues:
- Whether the suit instituted by the current respondent is barred by period of
limitation;
- If the suit is not barred by period of limitation, whether the petitioner is
liable.
With regard to the first issue, the court observed that despite the absence of
clear written agreement, there is a contractual relationship between the parties
following the bid announcement by the petitioner and the submission of the
design by the respondent to the former. In accordance with Article 1681(1) of
the Civil Code, acceptance may be made orally or in writing or by signs
normally in use or by a conduct such that, in the circumstances of the case,
there is no doubt as to the partys agreement.
This court thus rejected the argument concerning the absence of
contractual relationship and it examined the issue of period of limitation in
accordance with Article 1845 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to this provision,

unless otherwise provided by law, actions for the performance of a contract,

actions based on the non-performance of a contract and actions for the
invalidation of a contract shall be barred if not brought within ten years. In the
case under consideration, the period between the respondents submission of
the design to the petitioners previous association and the date on which action
was brought, is over ten years. The court observed that, an important point that
should be addressed here would be determining the beginning point in the
calculation of the period of limitation.
In light of the letter written by the Ministry of Transport and
Communication on Tahsas 02, 2000 E.C. (December 12, 2007) which granted
permission for the publication of the stamps for commemoration day, the
respondent can be assumed to have known about the publication of the stamps
containing his design only after the commemoration day, Ginbot 19, 2000 E.C.
(May 27, 2008). According to a decision rendered by the Federal Supreme
Cassation Division in a similar issue under File No. 67376 on Hamle 30, 2004
E.C. (August 6, 2012), the respondent can demand his right under the contract
only after he came to know that the petitioner has failed to fulfil his obligation
under the contract. The period of limitation does not thus lapse, and this court
has rejected the petitioners preliminary objection.
Concerning the second issue, this court has examined the reasoning in the
Federal High Courts decision which stated that although the petitioner
claimed the design on the stamps to be two dimensional and the respondents
design three dimensional, the design published on the stamps was found to be
the original work of the current respondent. This court has accepted the
decisions of the lower courts which had jurisdiction to examine and render
decisions on the facts of the case. As stipulated under Article 80(3)(a) of the
FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation No. 25/1996, the Cassation
Division can only revise cases which contain fundamental error of law. After
examining the facts and evidence with the issues of the case, this court has
found that the decisions rendered by the Federal High court and Federal
Supreme Court Appellate Bench do not contain fundamental error of law. The
following decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1. The decisions rendered by Federal High Court under File No. 90008 on
Megabit 27, 2003 E.C (April 5, 2011) and the Federal Supreme Court
Appellate Bench under File No. 72497 on Tahsas, 16, 2004 E.C (December
26, 2011) are hereby affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the

2. The decision which holds the petitioner liable to pay Birr 100,000 (one
hundred thousand) for having failed to pay the respondent for his design in
accordance with the contract is found consistent with Article 34(4) of the
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation.
_______________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 269-273

Samuel Hailu & Horizon Printing Press PLC v. Simret Ayalew

et. al.

Copyright law protects original expressions of an author, but not ideas or
information included in a particular work. Disseminating expression of
ideas constitutes copyright infringement while using ones own way of
expressing ideas or information contained in an original work does not.
The right includes both economic and moral rights.
Articles 2(6), 7, 9-19, 13(1) of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004
_______________

Tir 4, 2004 EC (January 13, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioners: 1. Samuel Hailu
2. Horizon Printing Press PLC
Respondents: Simret Ayalew et.al.
The court has examined the case jointly with Cassation File No.70380 and
rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case started at the Federal High Court where the current respondents were
the plaintiff and the current petitioners the defendants. It relates to the right
protected, the right holders, infringement and available remedies under the
copyright law. In the lower court, the current respondents argued that their late
father Aleka Ayalew Tameru was the copyright owner of various religious
works such as literature and sermons which were transmitted in newspapers
and magazines as interviews. They claimed that, while rights emanating from
such works would be transferred to the original owners heirs upon the death
of the right holder, the current first petitioner published these works as a book

entitled Religious Teaching. The book includes expression of condolences

prepared for the sixth month commemoration service of Aleka Ayalew
including the photograph of the deceased is used without permission. The
current second petitioner (second defendant at the lower court) is the printing
press which published the book.
In their statement of claim, the current respondents demanded material
damages of Birr 60,000 for the sale of 3,000 copies of the book and moral
compensation of Birr 100,000 to be paid jointly and severally by the current
petitioners. They also requested for the discontinuation of the printing of the
book and the destruction of the printed ones. The current petitioners had
submitted preliminary objections and defense on the merits of the case.
Among the preliminary objections, the current first petitioner argued that, the
evidence presented does not prove that Aleka Ayalew Tameru was the owner
of the copyright in these works and sole right holder for their distribution. He
also argued that the works in question are not personal works of Aleka Ayalew
but are rather his position on current religious questions which he expressed as
a member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.
Alternatively, the current first petitioner argued that as Aleka Ayalew has
failed to protect these works and also the right to distribute them, he cannot
prevent others from distributing them. He also contended that the works in
question are based on the teachings of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo
Church and the deceased cannot be considered as the author. Moreover, he
contended that the works are not original and should not be protected by law.
The current first petitioner requested the case to be dismissed indicating that
he was only attempting to distribute knowledge initiated by the deceased.
On the other hand, the current second petitioner denied its liability since
Aleka Ayalew was acknowledged as the source of the work. It also contended
that the responsibility to request permission from heirs does not lie with the
printing press since it did not initiate the publishing of the works. Thus, it
requested the case to be dismissed as no evidence is presented proving that the
works included in the book are that of the deceased and it was not aware that
the works were the original works of the deceased.
The High Court after examining the arguments of the parties, found the
second current petitioner not liable while the first current petitioner was held
accountable to pay material and moral damages of Birr 160,000. The court
ordered the first defendant (current first petitioner) to refrain from infringing
the rights of the copyright owners. It also ordered for the destruction of the
printed books.
The current first petitioner dissatisfied by this decision submitted its
appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench. The current respondents

also submitted their appeal to the Appellate Bench against the decision which
found the current second petitioner not liable. The appellate bench dismissed
the appeal of the current first petitioner in accordance with Article 337 of the
Civil Procedure Code and accepted that of the current respondents. After
hearing the arguments of the parties and basing itself on Articles 27, 29 and
2027 of the Civil Code, the appellate bench found the current second petitioner
jointly and severally liable with the current first petitioner as it published the
works including the photograph of the deceased without the permission of the
heirs.
This cassation petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is
brought against this decision. The first petitioner claimed that the decision of
the appellate division of the Federal Supreme Court contains fundamental
error of law as it was given without considering his evidence and also because
the works of the deceased are not original. He also argued it was inappropriate
to consider the work copyrightable where the deceased did not prevent its
dissemination. The second petitioner argued that as a printer, there is no legal
ground holding it liable for a publication requested by a third party. It also
argued that the works of the deceased were not original works. The
respondents presented their response in writing.
In light of the objectives of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004, this court has observed that a work is
considered copyrightable where it is original or different by its nature. A work
is considered original or different by its nature if it is the result of a creative
effort of the individual. The court observed that copyright law protects only
expressions of an author not ideas or information included in a particular
work. The court noted from the reading of the law that disseminating
expression of ideas constitutes copyright infringement while using ones own
way of expressing ideas or information contained in an original work does not.
In accordance with the copyright law, authors are the first owners of
copyright. Under Proclamation No. 410/2004, copyright includes both
economic and moral rights, and the infringement of one of the economic rights
under Article 7 of this Proclamation results in moral damages. The economic
rights which are stipulated under Article 7 of Proclamation No. 410/2004
allow the author or owner, subject to the provisions of Articles 9 to 19 of this
Proclamation, to have the exclusive right to carry out or authorize the acts
stipulated in relation to the work.
From the arguments of the first current petitioner, this court observed in
accordance with Articles 83 and 235 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the
statement inserted in the book that income generated from its sale goes to the
family of the deceased shows the admission of the petitioners that the
deceased, Aleka Ayalew, is the owner of the work. Since the petitioners did

not clearly deny the deceased as the author of the works, this court has
rejected the arguments of the current first petitioner that he was prevented
from presenting his evidence.
The court has further examined whether it is proper to publish the opinion
of the deceased that was made while he was serving the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church. The court observed from the judgment of the lower courts that while
the ideas expressed by the deceased emanate from the teachings of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the expression of these ideas by the deceased
makes them the original works of the deceased.
The fact that the first petitioner published and disseminated the entire
expression of the deceased as a book is not contested, and this constitutes
infringement of rights under Article 7 of Proclamation No. 410/2004. The
argument raised by the petitioners based on Article 13 of the Proclamation
does not satisfy the definition of communication of the work to the public; nor
is it reproduction as envisaged under Articles 2(6) and 2(25). In other words,
dissemination and reproduction of works without permission of a copyright
owner and on the pretext that such act is not prohibited by the right owner
does not fall under Article 13(1).
Under Article 2(6) of Proclamation No. 410/2004, communication of the
work means the transmission by wire or without wire images or sounds or
both of a work, a performance, a sound recording or a broadcast, while
reproduction as stipulated under Article 2(26) means the making of facsimile
copies of the original or a copy of a work by means other than printing such as
photocopying, whether or not they are reduced or enlarged in scale.
The court noted the limitations imposed on the author or owner under
Article 13(1) of Proclamation No. 410/2004 which does not allow the owner
to forbid:
the reproduction in a newspaper or periodical, the broadcasting or
other communication to the public of an article published in a
newspaper or periodical on current economic, political, social or
religious or similar topics unless the ... reproduction or broadcasting or
the communication to the public is expressly reserved on the copies by
the author or owner of copyright or in connection with broadcasting or
other communication to the public of the work.
These do not require the permission of the copyright owner. It can be observed
that the act of publishing the works of the deceased as a book would not have
been necessary had the intention of the petitioners been to disseminate the
teachings of the deceased. This court has also observed that the translation of
the term periodical to Amharic under Article 13(1) is not equivalent to
book. Therefore, the court has rejected the arguments raised by the

petitioners based on Article 13(1) and found that the petitioners have infringed
the original works of the deceased stipulated under Article 7(1)(a),(f) & (i) of
the Proclamation as the work was circulated in the market and read by the
public without permission from the right holder(s).
Such infringement results in moral damage with a compensation of not
less than Birr 100,000 in accordance with Article 34(4) of Proclamation No.
40/2004. Therefore, the first petitioner is held liable to pay a compensation of
Birr 100,000 for moral damage. The court has further noted Articles 27, 29
and 2027 of the Civil Code cited by the Appellate Bench of the Federal
Supreme Court in holding the second petitioner liable, and found the second
petitioner liable as it failed to check whether the first petitioner had the
authority to publish the photograph of the deceased in the book which was
circulated in the market. The following decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1. With regard to the first petitioner, this court has, in accordance with
Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, affirmed the decisions
rendered by the Federal High Court under File No. 88615 on Tikimt 16,
2003 E.C. (October 26, 2010) and the Federal Supreme Court under File
No. 62371 on Yekatit 4, 2003 E.C (February 11, 2011).
2. Regarding the second petitioner, the decision rendered by the Federal
Supreme Court Appellate Bench under File No. 63119 on Miazia 12, 2003
E.C. (April 20, 2011) is hereby affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1)
of the Civil Procedure Code.
3. The decision that renders the petitioners liable to pay the respondents a
total of Birr 160,000 as material and moral compensation, to refrain from
publishing the works of Aleka Ayalew Tameru, and to destroy the books
published is appropriate.
__________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 576-581

Ethio Ceramic PLC -v.- Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office &

Ovorgiga Technology Ltd.

While giving a decision on a request for trademark registration certificate,
the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office should take the necessary
measures so as to avoid confusion on the part of the public, thereby
causing unfair trade competition.
Articles 10 (1), 2(a) & (b) of Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003;
Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006;
Article 6(1) of Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office Establishment
______________

Yekatit 22, 2003 E.C (March 1, 2011)

Petitioner: Ethio Ceramic PLC

Respondents: 1. Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office
2. OvorgigaTechnology Limited
Judgment
This case is brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
challenging the decisions of the Federal High Court.
The second respondent submitted an application in which it requested the
first respondent to register the phrase Ethio Cement written within a frame
surrounded by ten stars as a trademark for its international standard cement
product. The first respondent, before registering the trademark announced it in
Addis Zemen Newspaper dated Megabit 15, 2000 E.C (March 24, 2008)
which requested any interested party to submit its objection. The current
petitioner then submitted an objection arguing that, it is on the process of
having its investment permit issued for the purpose of establishing a cement
factory using the phrase Ethio Cement as a trade name, and that the
trademark proposed for registration by the second respondent will confuse
customers, considering the fact that both companies will produce the same
product, i.e. cement.
Subsequently, the first respondent rejected the objection of the petitioner
as having no legal basis, and registered the trademark requested by the second
respondent stating that:
- Even though the petitioner submitted evidence to prove that it is using the
phrase Ethio Cement as its trade name, it did not get it registered as
trademark;
- As the second respondent brought the phrase Ethio Cement with the
stars surrounding it, it has the right to get the phrase Ethio Cement
registered together with another symbol that is eligible for registration.
The Federal High Court which entertained the appeal of the petitioner from the
decision of the first respondent (i.e. Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office),
rendered a decision confirming that the phrase Ethio Cement written inside a
square and surrounded by ten stars is the property and trademark of the second
respondent, and therefore it shall not be cancelled as it does not affect the
rights and benefits of the petitioner.
The petitioner submitted its petition to the Cassation Division of the
Federal Supreme Court on Sene 10, 2002 E.C (June 17, 2010) and contended
that the phrase Ethio Cement which is registered as the trademark of the
second respondent, is also registered by the relevant bodies as the trade name
of the product it produces. The petitioner further underlined that the first
respondent, in registering the trademark of the second respondent, is granting
it the right to use a trade name which is in the course of being used by the
petitioner for its cement product. This, according to the petitioner, in addition
to confusing customers, also violates the relevant laws and contravenes the
fundamental goals and objectives stated in the Trade Practice Proclamation
No. 329/2003 as well as Article 5 and other provisions of the Trademark
Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006. The petitioner
requested for the reversal of the decision stating that it has fundamental error
of law.
The first respondent in a statement of defence it submitted on Tahsas 13,
2003 (December 22, 2010) explained the justification for its decision and the
difference between a trademark and a trade name. It stated that a trade name
is a name under which a person operates his business and its purpose it to

clearly distinguish the business from other businesses, and it is registered by

the Ministry of Trade or regional Trade Bureaus. A trademark, the first
respondent added, is protected and registered by virtue of Proclamation No.
501/2006, and this responsibility is given to the first respondent by
Proclamation No. 320/2003. The first respondent argued that, even though it is
clearly stipulated in Articles 5(1) and 7(2) of Proclamation No. 501/2006 that
business organizations, by getting their trade names registered as trademarks,
can be owners, this has not been done. The first respondent further contended
that it gave protection to the stars and not to the phrase Ethio Cement and
requested the petition to be rejected as it does not have any legal basis.
In its statement of defence submitted on Tir 30, 2003 (February 7, 2011),
the second respondent argued that trade name and trademark are different. As
the petitioner did not start producing and selling cement, the trademark that it
will put on the cement it will produce is not yet known. Thus, it requested the
court to cancel the petition arguing that the petitioner did not start distributing
products, and that it did not use the trade name of the petitioner as a
trademark.
The Cassation Division then examined the case, holding as an issue
whether the decisions of the first respondent and the Federal High Court are
appropriate. To decide on this issue, the Cassation Division examined the
relevant laws, in particular: Commercial Registration and Business Licensing
Proclamation No. 67/1997, Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003,
Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office Establishment Proclamation No.
320/2003 and Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No.
501/2006.
The court has noted from the evidence submitted by the petitioner to the
first respondent that, the petitioner is a business organization registered under
the trade name of Ethio Cement PLC and that is a cement factory
established to avail its products for local market as per the stipulations of
Article 16 (1) of Proclamation No. 329/2003 which has amended Proclamation
No. 67/1997 and Article 135 (1&2) of the Commercial Code. It can also
export its product to international markets as per Article 32 of the Commercial
Registration and Business Licensing (Amendment) Proclamation No.
328/2003. While the petitioner is protected by the Commercial Code and the
Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003 when undertaking these activities,
it is also required to discharge its obligations stated under this proclamation as
well as other laws.
When the petitioner avails its product to the market, Article 21(3) of
Proclamation 329/2003 requires it to fix explanatory labels; the net weight, the
name and address of the factory or packer as well as the production and expiry
date. Thus, it can be observed from this provision that the petitioner, after

finishing the construction of its company and when it starts production and
distribution of its products, should fix on them the information that the Ethio
Cement PLC is the producer. Even though it has not yet distributed cement
products using its trade name, it has the obligation to fix its trade name and
address on the cement product it makes available to the market.
The Cassation Division also noted from the application submitted by the
second respondent to the first respondent that the work it will be engaged in
relates to the production and distribution of cement, and that it requested the
latter to register the phrase Ethio Cement written inside a square and
surrounded by ten stars as its trade mark and to be the only owner and user
thereto. The court also noted in this regard that, even though the trademark of
the second respondent is written in a square and surrounded by ten stars, it will
be similar with the English version of the trade name of the petitioners
product on which it has the obligation to fix Ethio Cement Private Ltd., as
per Article 21(3(b)) of Proclamation No. 329/2003. This means, the trade
mark which is registered by the first respondent enabling the second
respondent to post it on the cement product (which it produces and distributes)
will be similar to the trade name Ethio Cement which the petitioner is
required by law to fix on the cement it produces.
As stipulated under Article 3(1) of Proclamation No. 329/2003, the
objective of the Trade Practices Proclamation is to secure fair competition
processes through the prevention and elimination of anti-competition and
unfair trade practices. According to Article 10(1) of the same Proclamation,
what is considered as unfair competition is any act or commercial practice that
aims at eliminating competitors through different methods. Arts. 10(2)(a)&(c)
of this proclamation also respectively define unfair trade competition as [a]ny
act that causes, or is likely to cause, confusion with respect to another
enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products or services offered by
such enterprise, and as [a]ny act that misleads or is likely to mislead the
public with respect to an enterprise or its activities, in particular the products
or serves offered by such enterprise.
Likewise, it is indicated in the first paragraph of the preamble of the
Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006 that, the
objective of the proclamation is to protect the reputation and goodwill of
business persons engaged in manufacturing and distribution of goods as well
as rendering services by protecting trademarks to avoid confusion between
similar goods and services. Moreover, it is also clearly indicated in Article
6(1) of Proclamation No. 320/2003 that, the first respondent, before giving
decision on patent and trademark registration certificate applications, has the
obligation to examine content or let the content be examined, and also look
into the fundamental objective and detailed provisions of the Trademark

Registration and Protection Proclamation as well as other relevant laws. Thus,

the Cassation Division noted that, the first respondent, when requested by the
second respondent to register the phrase Ethio Cement as a trademark,
should have been mindful that, the petitioner which is called with the trade
name Ethio Cement has, as per Article 21(3) (b) of Proclamation No.
329/2003, the obligation to put this phrase on the cement product that it
produces; this would have the effect of making available to the public, a
cement product by the second respondent with a phrase Ethio Cement
written in a square and surrounded by ten stars as its trademark, and on the
other hand a cement product on which the trade name of the petitioner Ethio
Cement PLC is written.
When these products are made available to the consumers, they will cause
confusion in violation of the objective of the Trademark Registration and
Protection Proclamation thereby resulting in unfair competition prohibited
under Article 10(2)(b)&(c) of Proclamation No. 329/2003. The Cassation
Division has found that the decision of the first respondent was given without
carefully examining Article 6(1) of Proclamation No. 320/2003, and will not
provide the legal protection that the legislator envisaged to give to the trader
and the consumer.
This Cassation Division has thus found a fundamental error of law in the
decision of the Federal High Court, by confirming the decision which was
given by the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (first respondent), without
having due regard to the content, fundamental objective and goal of the laws
stated above and other relevant laws. The first respondent gave the decision
without examining and taking into account the pertinent legal regime and
provisions as per Article 6(1) of Proclamation 320/2001. The following decree
is thus rendered.
Decree
1. The decisions of the first respondent and the Federal High Court which
allowed the registration of the trademark requested by the second
respondent are reversed.
2. The second respondent cannot be allowed to use the trademark which is
legally protected, unless the phrase Ethio Cement is removed and
substituted by another name.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 544 548.

Artistic Printing Press -v.- Getahun Shibiru

A person who has translated a book shall be considered an author and is
entitled to compensation for moral and material damage.
Articles 2(2), 6(1) and 8 of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection
_______________

Justice: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,

Petitioner: Artistic Printing Press
Respondent: Getahun Shibiru
Judgment
This case involves a claim for compensation based on Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004. The case started at
the Federal High Court and the current respondent Dr. Getahun Shibiru was
the plaintiff. This court has found that the current petitioner and the
respondent entered into an agreement on October 4, 2006 in which the current
petitioner agreed to print 5,000 (five thousand) copies of an Amharic book
titled Yeteseberu Kinfoch (Broken Wings). The book was a translation and
the translator used a pen name - Ritua Emlak. As per the agreement, the
current petitioner received half of the payment for the printing, Birr 14,929.50,
and agreed to deliver the work within three weeks. Before the delivery of this
work, it was discovered that a book titled Yeteseberu Kinfoch (Broken
Wings) was made available in the market by two individuals who then became
second and third defendants in the case presented to the Federal High Court.
The plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent) claimed a compensation
of Birr 160,079.50 for moral and material damage.

The Federal High Court examined the arguments and evidence of both
sides and discharged the two individuals who were selling the book. It further
decided that the current petitioner (Artistic Printing Press) is liable to pay
moral and material damage to the current respondent. Displeased with this
decision, the current petitioner appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. But the
court confirmed the decision of the lower court.
Cassation petition is submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court. This court called the current respondent based on the petition
submitted on March 25, 2009 and heard the arguments of both parties. The
major issue of the case was seen in light of Article 8 of Proclamation No.
410/2004. The issue examined by this court is whether moral rights, including
compensation, apply to translation works.
The fact that the respondent translated the book and gave it to the
petitioner to have it printed is not an issue. It was also proven in the lower
courts that the books were being sold to the public before delivery was made
to the respondent. The major argument raised by the petitioner was that since
the respondent was merely a translator and not an author of the book, he
should not have the right to claim compensation for moral and material
damage. On the other hand, the respondent argued that his copyright is
protected by law and that the decision made by the lower courts in his favor
was appropriate.
The relevant law for this case is Proclamation No. 410/2004. The
preamble of this proclamation recognizes the major role literary, artistic and
similar creative works play in enhancing cultural, social, economic, scientific
and technological development and the need to establish a conducive
environment for such works by giving them legal protection. Literary works
are among such creative works that are given legal recognition under the
Proclamation. Authorship of a novel falls under this category, and the case at
hand is related with this. Thus, the detailed provisions of this proclamation
must be seen in order to decide whether the law gives recognition and
protection to translation works.
The petitioner argued that the respondents work is not protected by law
because the original idea of the book is not his, and that he only translated the
English version of the book. This court thus observed the need to determine
what constitutes an original and creative work in light of the provisions of the
law. The word author is defined in Article 2(2) of the Proclamation as the
person who has intellectually created a work. It can be understood from this
provision that a work would be recognized and be protected by the law when it
is proven that it has been intellectually created. The requirements for getting
legal protection are also listed under Article 6. The relevant provision for the
case at hand is stated under Article 6(1) which states that the author of a work

shall, irrespective of the quality of the work and the purpose, for which the
work may have been created, be entitled to protection, for his work without
any formality and upon its creation where it is original and corporeal.
It is obvious that the petitioner translated the book into Amharic so that the
Amharic speaking society can read it. Language is deeply connected to the
values and customs of a society. Thus, it can be understood that when a book
is translated into a different language, these values and traditions of the society
would be taken into consideration. The work of the respondent should be seen
from this perspective. When the petitioner translated the book from English to
Amharic, he has made an effort to customize the content of the book in such a
way the society would be able to understand and relate it with its own values
and customs. This involves intellectual inputs and competence. Therefore, it
can be concluded that a translation work is a result of the intellect. Moreover,
since the work is done in Amharic, it is different from the English version of
the novel. This makes it an original and tangible work as per the requirement
stated under Article 6(1). Therefore, the petitioners claim against the
copyright protection accorded to the respondents translation does not have a
legal ground. The decisions of the lower courts, thus, have no fundamental
error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File Number 54181 rendered on
Ginbot 25, 2000 EC (June 2, 2008) and the decision of the Federal
Supreme Court, File Number 39233 given on Megabit 7, 2001 EC (March
16, 2009) are affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. The court has not accepted the petition because it does not have legal
ground.
3. The decision that the respondent is entitled to the moral and material
compensation is appropriate.
...
Signatures of Five Justices
__________________________________________________
Volume: 10, pp 339-341

Mulu Haile Selassie v. Zemenawi Printing Press
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 42253 (July15, 2009)

Public display of the original or a copy of a copyrightable work without
the permission or consent of the owner constitutes copyright
infringement.
Articles 1791, 1771(1), 1790, 2090-2123 of the Civil Code;
Article 7 of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Proclamation
No. 410/2004
______________

Hamle 8, 2001 EC (July 15, 2009)

Petitioner: Mulu Haile Selassie
Respondent: Zemenawi Printing Press
The court has examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.
Judgment
The Case started at the Mekelle Zone High Court where the current petitioner
was the plaintiff and the current respondent was the defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that, after entering into a contract with the defendant to publish his
book, an employee of the defendant stole and sold nine books which caused
him damage. The plaintiff invoked Proclamation No. 410/2004 and claimed a
total compensation of Birr 260,000.00 for material and moral damages. On the
other hand, the defendant argued in the Zone High Court that the books that
were stolen are only seven and it should not be liable to pay for the rest. The
defendant also argued that the individual/employee who stole the books should
be joined in the case because a criminal act is a personal matter and the
individual who committed the crime should be liable to pay damages to the
plaintiff.
The High court after examining the arguments and the evidence presented
by the parties ordered the defendant to pay a total of Birr 100,180.00 (one
hundred thousand and one hundred eighty) including the value of the 9 books
each sold for Birr 20 and the minimum amount of moral compensation
stipulated under Article 34(4) of the Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Protection Proclamation No. 410.2004. The defendant lodged an appeal to the
Regions Supreme Court which confirmed the decision of the High court.
The Supreme Court Cassation Division of the Regional State of Tigray
examined the case and reversed the decisions of the Mekelle Zone High Court
and the regions Supreme Court stating that the current respondent could not
have been aware about the criminal act. The regional Cassation Division
ordered the value of the 7 books stolen, i.e., Birr 140.00, to be paid to the
plaintiff.
A petition is lodged against this decision. In the petition submitted to the
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on Tahsas 4, 2001 E.C
(December 13, 2008), the petitioner argued that unawareness about the theft
does not exonerate the respondent from liability to the moral compensation
stipulated under Article 34(4) of Proclamation No. 410/2004. Both parties
presented their arguments on Megabit 2, 2001 E.C (March 11, 2009). The
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the arguments of the
parties in light of the law as follows.
The respondent agreed to print and deliver 5,000 (five thousand) books for
the payment stated in the contract. The court has examined whether the
arguments of the parties should be seen in the light of contractual or non-
contractual obligations. It observed that, according to Article 2027 of the Civil
Code, a person shall be liable for the damage he causes to another due to fault
irrespective of any undertaking/obligation on his part. In the case at hand, the
parties have reached at clear agreements and have a contractual relationship.
In this regard, the court observed that the relationship between the two was not
extra-contractual.
The book which was the subject of the contract was stolen by the
employee of the respondent and circulated in the market before the delivery of
the books to the petitioner and this constitutes non-performance of the
obligation in accordance with the time and place stated in the contract. The
fact that few books (copies) were stolen by the employee of the respondent
shows that there was a breach of contract. In this regard, the court noted that
breach of contract or improper performance of the contract cannot be seen as
extra-contractual. Hence, the analysis made by the courts based on extra-
contractual liability is inappropriate because the books were stolen by the
respondents employee.

This court noted that the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme
Court based its decision on the interpretation of Article 34(5) of Proclamation
No. 410/2004. The phrase which is the basis of the interpretation reads is
not aware or there is no reasonable ground he can be aware. However, this
phrase does not relate to the theft of a book but to the infringement of
protected intellectual property rights. That is, it would be applicable under
circumstances where part of the book is copied or if other similar acts are
committed without the knowledge of the respondent. It does not thus apply to
the issue at hand whereby the obligation was printing the book as per the
contract. Therefore, the court held that the interpretation given to the law by
the Regions Cassation Division was erroneous.
With regard to the argument presented by the respondent as to the nature
of theft and liability thereof, this court noted that such relationship relates to
the employee and the respondent, and is not related with the petitioner. The
court also observed that, according to Article 1791(2), a party who fails to
perform his contractual obligation shall not be released unless he can show
that performance was prevented by force majeure. As the person who stole the
book was the employee of the respondent and not an outsider, the court
observed that the latter cannot claim force majeure under Article 1791(2) of
the Civil Code. Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
observed that, in accordance with Article 1771(1) of the Civil Code, non-
performance of the contract (as stipulated under Article 1791(1) of the Civil
Code) gives the petitioner the right to demand material damages even though
the respondent was not at fault.
Damages may arise from contractual or non-contractual acts and may
include material as well as moral damages in accordance with Articles 1790(2)
and 2090-2123. This court has found that, the intellectual property of the
petitioner was stolen and circulated in the market without his consent in
breach of fundamental principles of contract. The economic right stipulated
under of Article 7(1)(f) of Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection
Proclamation No. 410/2004 prohibits public display of the original or a copy
of the work, and this has been infringed by the respondent as the book was
made available to the public without the consent of the petitioner.
The court observed that, as the public display of a film affects the
economic right of the author/owner, the public display of the original or copies
of the book without the consent of the petitioner infringes the right of the
petitioner stipulated under the law. It also noted that, such infringement results
in moral damages. The minimum amount of compensation for such moral
damage is Birr 100,000 as stipulated under Article 34(4) of Proclamation No.
410/2004. Therefore, the respondent is liable to pay Birr 100,000 for the moral
damage inflicted on the petitioner. Although the analysis given by the Zone

High Court and Supreme Court Appellate Division were erroneous in

categorizing the issue as extra-contractual, this court concurs with their
conclusions. We have, however, found that the decision of the Regions
Supreme Court Cassation Division contains fundamental error of law. The
following decree is thus rendered.
Decree
1) The decision of the Tigray National Regional State Supreme Court
Cassation Division rendered under File No. 25/99 on Hidar 11 2001 EC
(November 20, 2008) is reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the
2) The decision of Mekelle Zone High Court with regard to its conclusion is
confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
The petitioner shall be paid a compensation of Birr 100,140.00 (one
hundred thousand and one hundred forty), i.e., Birr 100,000.00 as
compensation for moral damage and Birr 140.00 for the value of the seven
books.
_______________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 149-151

11. Judgment Execution

No.
1 Wegagen Bank S.C. v. 81616 2013 14 265-267

Selamawit Tilahun et al
2 Rakeb Melese v. Federal 79860 2012 14 261-264

Prosecutor
3 Seida Debele v. Sherif Shikur 73041 2012 13 596 -597
4 Lulseged A et al. v. Flora Eco 70378 2012 13 585-587

& Flora Eco Labour Union
5 Atatu Kebede v. Steps at 59301 2011 11 451-453

Educational PLC
6 Mohammed Ismael v. 32143 2008 8 382-383

Mohammed Ahmed
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationCh.11:JudgmentExecution197
Wegagen Bank S.C. - v.- Selamawit Tilahun et al

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 81616 (23 January 2013)
An application for execution of judgment on property which is already
under an order of injunction is not acceptable. Such application made
being aware of the earlier injunction is not proper.
______________
Tir 15, 2005 E.C. (January 23, 2013)
Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Wegagen Bank S.C
Respondents: 1. Selamawit Tilahun
2. Negasi Berhe
The following judgment is rendered.
Judgment
This case is related with execution of judgment. It began in the Tigray
Regional State Axum Zone Central Court. The current petitioner (as plaintiff
at the Zone Central Court) applied for execution of judgment against the
respondents. It requested for an auction sale of the first respondents vehicle,
Plate Number 3-27506 AA, for the execution of judgment rendered in its
favour. The court, accordingly, ordered for the attachment of the
aforementioned vehicle. However, it received a letter informing it that there is
already an injunction ordered by the Federal First Instance court regarding the
same vehicle, but related with a different case. The court, further, found that
the current petitioner was a party to this other case. As the vehicle cannot be
sold until the first injunction is lifted, the court temporarily closed the file until
the petitioner submits another list of property for the execution of judgment.
Displeased with this decision, the petitioner appealed to the Regions Supreme
Court. However, the appeal was not accepted. The petition is submitted to this
Cassation Division to have the judgment reversed.
The petition submitted on July 19, 2012 states that there is no other party
claiming a preferential right over the vehicle, but the lower court decided that
unless the injunction by the other court is lifted, the vehicle cannot be sold.

The petitioner contended that it was the petitioner, in the first place, that had
the vehicle as a security. However, the lower court decided that the judgment
cannot be executed unless the earlier injunction is lifted. The petitioner
claimed that there is a fundamental error of law.
The respondents were called to give their response and they explained to
the court that they borrowed money from the petitioner and the vehicle was
held as a security. When an individual by the name Dereje Wendimu bought
the car, the current petitioner refused to hand over the documents related with
the ownership of the vehicle. Then it was decided by a Federal First Instance
Court File No. 179925 that as the money borrowed has been returned and thus,
the current petitioner should hand over the documents to the individual who
bought the car. The document was given to the person as per the order of
execution of judgment given by the Federal First Instance Court File No.
195425. Therefore, they requested for the rejection of the petition made in bad
faith. The petitioner also responded to this.
This court has examined whether the decision that the vehicle cannot be
sold unless the first injunction has been lifted is appropriate. The petitioner
does not deny the fact that there was an order of injunction given by the
Federal First Instance Court on the vehicle in a case in which the petitioner
was a party. Thus, this court has found that the petitioner is acting contrary to
procedural law and good faith to acquire a property it lost in accordance with
the law in a decision rendered by an appropriate court of law. In this situation,
there is no legal ground for having this vehicle sold under execution of
judgment. If this is already established, there is no need for the court to check
whether there are other parties that have claim over the property or not.
Moreover, the argument that the petitioner had the car as a security was
not raised in the lower court and it should not be raised in this court. The
petitioner should have raised it at the Federal First Instance Court. This court
has not found fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower courts and
it has given the following decree.
Decree
The decisions Axum Zone Central Court File Number 17188 on May 4, 2012 and
the order of the Regional Supreme Court File Number 52873 on June 26, 2012 are
confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
.
_______________________________________________
Volume 14, pp 265-267

Rakeb M. v. Federal Prosecutor
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 79860 (15 November 2012)

When the defendant is found guilty in a criminal case and if the decision
involves confiscation of property, the innocent spouse can have a
preferential right over half of the common property. In relation to
expenses for the livelihood of the family, courts only have the obligation
to calculate the amount needed for not less than six months.
Article 98(3) (b) and (d) of the Criminal Code
______________
Hidar 6, 2005 E.C. (15 November 2012)
Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Adane Negussie,

Mekonnen G/Hiwot, Teklit Yimsel
Petitioner: Rakeb M.
Respondent: Federal Prosecutor
The following judgment is rendered.

Judgment
This case is related with properties of a convicted person to be confiscated by
the government and the amount and types of expenses that should be reserved
for the livelihood of the offenders family. The issue that initiated this case is
the decision rendered by the Federal High Court on Tahsas 13, 2002 EC
(December 22, 2009) File No. 81406. The decision was made in favour of the
current petitioner.
Getu W. was found guilty in a criminal charge as a third defendant, after
which an application was made for the execution of the judgment listing the
types of property of the convict that were to be confiscated. This request was
made to the Federal First Instance Court and the court summoned the debtor to
defend his case. The current petitioner then submitted her written objection
against the application for the execution of judgment on Sene 09, 2003 EC

(June 16, 2011). The court, then, stated that as the defendant was found guilty
[in an offence that entails confiscation of his property], it was decided that his
property be confiscated. Moreover, the court pointed out that the rights of his
children and third parties were protected.
The Federal First Instance Court held that the current petitioner, (Getus
wife), is entitled to half of the common property of the spouses and that her
share should not be affected by the confiscation. With regard to the children,
the court invoked Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, and stated that the
confiscation shall not affect the amount of foodstuff and the expenses necessary
for the support of the family for a period of six months. This also includes
medical expenses, expenses for education and transportation needed for six
months. Furthermore, the court considered other necessities for their livelihood
until they reach majority such as housing, clothing and food. However, the
expense listed for higher education was rejected because it was not supported
by evidence.
Accordingly the court found that the following should not be subject to
confiscation:
Medical expenses: Birr 1,500 per month; educational expenses of six months
Birr 6,243 for each child; transportation expense for each child, Birr 1,000 and
a total amount of Birr 3,000 for six months; F or clothing and food, Birr 1,500
per month for each child and the total amount was to be calculated until the
children reach majority. The total amount of money to be reserved for the
children was calculated to be Birr 428,286. As Ato Getu has the responsibility
to cover half of this amount, the court decided that Birr 214,143 was to be
deducted from the property of Ato Getu that was going to be confiscated.
The current petitioner was displeased by this decision. She appealed to the
Federal High Court but the appeal was rejected. She has now submitted a
petition to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The petition
contests the courts rejection of her preferential claim to buy her husbands
share in the property to be confiscated. Moreover, she stated that the
calculation that considered only six months in determining the expense for the
childrens medical needs, education and transportation goes against the best
interest of the children.
The petition was examined by the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court in light of Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal Code. This court
has examined whether the rights of the petitioner have been overlooked and
whether the six-month delimitation was proper in the calculation of the
expenses for the childrens medical needs, education and transportation. The
current respondent was then called and both parties have submitted their
arguments.

This court has observed that the lower court recognized the petitioners
entitlement to half of the property that is to be confiscated. The lower court
also decided that half of the expenses for the benefits of the children shall be
deducted from the share that will be confiscated. However, it did not state
anything in reference to the petitioners right to have preferential claim to buy
part of the property that will be confiscated. The lower court calculated the
childrens medical needs, education and transportation needed for six months.
As to their clothing and food, the court calculated the expenses until they
reach majority. It determined Birr 1,500 per month for these necessities.
With regard to the petitioners request for a preferential right to buy the
property, Article 98(3) (d) of the Criminal Code does not clearly state that the
innocent spouse shall have preferential claim to buy the property other than
stating that confiscation due to conviction shall have no effect over the share
of the innocent spouse of the person convicted. The current respondent has
given its opinion in the lower court that it has no objection against the
petitioners request. Thus, since there is no legal ground that prohibits this, the
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has found that it was not
proper for the lower court to overlook the request.
In relation to the expense for the childrens education, medical needs and
transportation, the lower court decided that the request was exaggerated and it
determined an amount it found appropriate. Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal
Code states that confiscation shall not affect such amount of foodstuffs and of
money as are necessary for the support of the family of the [offender] for a
period of not less than six months or for such longer period as the Court,
having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and for reasons to be
given in its judgment, considers just. It can be understood from the content
and spirit of this provision that the amount of foodstuffs and of money
necessary for the support of the family of the offender for a period of not less
than six months shall not be affected by confiscation and there could be
instances where the period can be longer than six months.
Thus, it is clear that the court can neither reduce the period nor allow
deduction (from the property that is to be confiscated) for longer than six
months. It cannot also allow deduction for purposes that are not expressly
stated in the law. The main objective of the provision is to protect innocent
family members of the convicted person, rehabilitate the offender and to deter
others from committing similar crimes. These go in line with the objectives
provided under Articles 1 and 87 of the Criminal Code. Thus, Article 98(3)(d)
determines the period as six months, and this does not take into consideration
the long term needs of the convicted persons family.
With regard to the complaint of the petitioner that the amount calculated
for six months is inadequate, this court has found that the issue falls under the

power of the lower courts and that it does not fall under this courts
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 80(3) (a) of the FDRE Constitution and
Article 10 of the Proclamation No. 25/1996. The request thus falls outside this
courts function whose mandate is to look into whether there exists a
fundamental error of law in court decisions.
In relation to the childrens best interest in the realms of education and
medical needs, this court has found the request stated in the petition
unacceptable because the lower court has, in accordance with the law,
determined an amount they would need for six months. No evidence was
presented supporting the claim that their needs are in jeopardy after the lapse
of the six months.
Therefore, there is no fundamental error of law in the lower courts
decision which considered only six months in calculating the expenses for the
childrens medical needs and education. The court has rendered the following
decree.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 175740 rendered
on Hamle 20, 2003 EC (July 27, 2011) and confirmed by the decision of
the Federal High Court File Number 115859 on Megabit 21, 2004 EC
(March 30, 2012) is amended in accordance with Article 348(1) of the
2. The preferential claim of the petitioner to buy the property half of which
she owns as common property shall be protected as the respondent has no
objection on the matter.
3. With regard to expenses for the childrens medical needs, education and
transportation, this court has, in light of Article 98(3)(d), found no
fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower court that calculated
the amount for the period of six months.
_________________________________________________
Volume 14, pp 261-264

Seida Debele -v.- Sherif Shekur


After a judgement regarding common property of a husband and a wife,
the court that executes the partition of this property cannot close the file
simply because the property does not have a title deed.
Articles 225(2), 423, 392(1) and 371(1) of the Civil Procedure Code
_____________
Sene 22, 2004 E.C. (June 29, 2012)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Seida Debele
Respondent: Sherif Shikur

Judgment
The case started at the Federal First Instance Court, and relates to execution of
a judgement which involved the partition of a house between the petitioner
and the respondent placed on 800 square meters land. The parties have
indicated different demarcations of the area and the land does not have a title
deed. Owing to these factors and taking into consideration the statements of
the Land Administration Authority and the Kebele [the lowest administrative
organ of the government] on the difficulty of partitioning or selling the
property, the court closed the file stating that the execution of the judgement
could not proceed. Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
Federal High Court which confirmed the decision of the lower court.
This petition against the Federal High Courts decision is submitted to the
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner claims that the
decision of the lower courts to close the file has fundamental error of law and
should be corrected by this Division stating that her pleading was filed to

execute the judgement rendered for the partition of the common property
obtained during the marriage she had with the respondent.
issue without the presence of the respondent, because the petitioner declared
under oath that the former declined to receive the summons taken by her.
As examined by this Division, a judgement has been rendered that the
house which was found difficult for partitioning is common property of the
parties. It is understood from the arguments made by the petitioner at the
lower court and this Division that the land and the house have been in the
possession of the parties for a long time. The lower court decided to close the
execution file stating that the house and land can neither be sold by auction
nor be partitioned between the parties in accordance with the judgement, based
on the statements it received from the Land Administration Authority and the
Kebele that the property does not have title deeds.
It has been stated under Article 378 of the Civil Procedure Code that
[w]here the holder of a decree wishes to execute it, he shall apply to the court
which passed such decree to issue process for its execution. The court is then
expected to take the response of the judgement-debtor and pass appropriate
order as per Article 386 of the same Code.
As can be understood from the readings of Articles 225(2) and 423 of the
Civil Procedure Code, the property of the petitioner and the respondent on
which judgement is passed shall be partitioned equally, or where that is found
to be difficult, it shall be sold so that the money can be divided equally among
the parties. Even if the property does not have a title deed, special markers and
adjacent features which help to demarcate the area covered by an immovable
property may be taken into account, so as to give order for the judgement-
debtor and judgement-creditor to divide the property equally among
themselves, and where this is not possible, for the property to be sold through
auction.
According to Article 392(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, a court which
examines judgement execution has the power and obligation to proceed with
the execution of the decree in a manner required by the nature of the relief
granted. Accordingly, the act of the Federal First Instance Court contradicts
with the powers of the court accorded under Articles 371(1) and 392(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code because it has unduly closed the execution file stating
that administrative organs of the state have written to it that the common
property of the petitioner and respondent, which are subjects of the execution,
do not have title deeds. Moreover, the order of the Federal High Court which
confirmed the lower courts decision, without correcting it, has fundamental
error of law.

Decree
Court are reversed.
with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that the court can, as
per Article 392(1), re-examine the matter and pass the necessary order to
execute the judgement.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 596 597

Leulseged Atlabachew et al -v.- Flora Eco Power Plc & Flora Eco
Power Labour Union

- An auction marred by material irregularity can be set aside.
- Article 435 is the relevant provision that can be invoked to set aside
sale of movable property, whereas Article 445 applies if an auction
that involves immovable property is marred by material irregularity.
Articles 435 and 445 of Civil Procedure Code
_____________

Tir 4, 2004 E.C (January 13, 2012)
Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Leulseged Atlabachew et al
Respondents: 1. Flora Eco-power Plc.
2. Flora Eco-power Employees Association
Judgment
This case involves execution of a decree, and began in east Harerge Zone High
Court. The petitioners bought motor vehicles and machinery of the first
respondent when the sale was put on auction. But, the sale is set aside and the
petitioners are ordered to return back the property by the court since the
auction is found by the court to have been marred by irregularities. The
petitioners lodged an appeal to the Oromia Supreme Court. But, their appeal to
the regular bench of Oromia Supreme Court and their petition to the Oromia
Supreme Court Cassation Bench were rejected.
They have brought their petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division stating that they bought the motor vehicles properly at the auction.
The petitioners contested that the lower court has erred in setting aside the sale
without giving them the chance to respond to the case. They further argued
that the court erred by applying Article 445 Civil Procedure Code rather than
Art 435, and that it is an error to set aside the sale without the issuance of an
order with regard to the money the petitioners have paid for the sale.

The respondents argued that the sale was conducted without ascertaining
the value of the property and without proper publication. They contended that
the lower courts have proved that the property was bought by the judgment
creditor indirectly through the petitioners. The respondents argued that the
lower courts have duly set aside the sale and there is no error of law. The
applicants have attached their counter reply.
This court has investigated the case by framing the issue whether the
setting aside of the auction by the lower courts was appropriate based on
Article 435 of the Civil Procedure Code. This provision stipulates that no
irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale of movable property shall
vitiate the sale. But if damage is sustained, legal action for compensation on
the person liable can be brought. On the other hand, based on the gravity of
the irregularity, the sale can be set aside and the buyer may be forced to return
the property. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that sale of movable
property by auction cannot be set aside is not tenable in light of the law and
fairness.
The decisions of the lower courts are thus based on Article 435 of the Civil
Procedure Code and they do not have fundamental error of law. In fact, the
lower courts should not have cited Art 445 of the Civil Procedure Code which
is applicable for sale of immovable property. But, this does not alter the
validity of the conclusion because setting aside the auction was appropriate. In
connection with a similar case, the judgment creditors had brought a petition
to this bench and the decisions of lower courts were confirmed in File No.
64628. In the case at hand, material irregularity was proved in the auction in a
manner that warrants the setting aside of the sale by the lower courts.
Therefore, no fundamental error of law is made by the lower courts.
Decree
1. The decision of Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench rendered in File
No. 124624, the decision of Oromia Supreme Court regular bench and the
decision of East Harerge Zonal High Court are affirmed in accordance
2. The lower courts have duly concluded that an auction which is marred by
material irregularity can be set aside.
_______________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 585-587
Abridged translation: Yoseph Aemero

Atatu Kebede -v.-Steps at Educational PLC


- Execution of judgement shall be in accordance with the decree
rendered originally by the court. Accordingly, execution should be
guided by the decree unless the latter is changed by an appeal or
unless other legal grounds (expressly stated in the law) warrant non-
execution.
- The execution of a decree cannot be changed or revoked by merely
alleging that the decision is erroneous.
Articles 378 and 386 of the Civil Procedure Code
_______________

Ginbot 4, 2003 E.C (May 12, 2011)
Justices: Hagos Woldu, AlmawWolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Atatu Kebede
Respondent: Steps at Educational PLC

Judgment
The case started in the Federal Instance Court where the current petitioner was
the plaintiff in a suit filed against Steps School. In her statement of claim, the
petitioner stated that she had a contract of employment to teach at Steps
School starting from Meskerem 1998 EC (September 2005) earning a monthly
salary of Birr 1,050.00 (one thousand fifty). She stated that she worked at the
school until she was unlawfully dismissed by the current respondent on Tikimt
23, 2002 EC (November 2, 2009), and claimed payments she is entitled to
receive because of such dismissal.
In its statement of defence, the current respondent raised a preliminary
objection arguing that the suit should be amended and be brought against Steps
at Educational PLC, as Steps School was the name of another legal person
during the time stated as the petitioners period of employment, and that the
petitioner was not an employee at Steps School. As a substantive argument, the
respondent (defendant at the lower court) argued that the School has ceased
operating and thus will only provide a response concerning its respective
responsibility. The Federal First Instance Court decided that the requested
payments should be made to the petitioner stating that the petitioner started
working with one of the spouses, while the married couple had the school as
common property, and should not be deprived of her rights even if the
common property was divided among the husband and wife as a result of their
divorce. The court found the dismissal as unlawful and stated that the spouse
did not contest the fact that the petitioner was dismissed.
The respondent then brought an appeal to the Federal High Court
challenging the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. The Federal High
Court, after hearing the litigation of the parties, reversed the decision of the
lower court stating that the business license of Steps at Educational School is
cancelled, and that the respondent should not have been the only party to the
suit because the managers and shareholders of the school should have been
included.
The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
seeks the decision of the Federal High Court to be reversed on the ground that
it has unduly reversed the decision of the Federal First Instance court by
having erroneously considered the two schools as one, while in fact Steps
School in which the petitioner was employed is different from Steps at
Educational School which is now dissolved. The Cassation Division found
that the petition can be adjudicated even if the respondents business licence is
revoked.
As the respondent did not receive the summons, the suit was heard ex-
parte. The Cassation Division then examined the decision in the light of what
was substantively proven at the lower court and the relevant law.
The person who was sued as the alleged owner of Step School argued that
the petitioner filed the suit against Steps School, while the suit should not have
been brought against this school, as the petitioner started working with the
School named Steps at Educational PLC, which was common property of the
spouses until it was divided among them as a result of a divorce proceeding.
The lower court proved that, even after the property was divided among
the husband and wife, the petitioner continued working as a teacher with Steps
School, which was the property of the wife (Madam Push Palata), and that it
ordered payments to be made to the petitioner, and it was proved that this
school did not contest the fact that it dismissed the petitioner.

The decision of the lower court was sustained by the other courts and an
application for execution of judgement was submitted based on which an
execution file was opened under File No. 16902. An order of decree execution
was also given to the judgment debtor Steps School. The Federal High Court,
to which an appeal was brought from the order for the execution of the decree
given by the Federal First Instance Court, reversed the decision of the lower
court after hearing the litigation of the petitioner and the appellant (current
respondent) Steps at Educational PLC. The Federal High Court relieved the
respondent from liability stating that one should not be liable merely because
he was the manager of the school which has ceased operating due to the
cancellation of its business license.
The Cassation Division has further noted from the litigation of the parties
that the institution mentioned by the appellant at the High Court (current
respondent) and the institution which was held liable by the First Instance
Court in its order for execution of judgment are different.
By virtue of Article 378 and the subsequent provisions of the Civil
Procedure Code, execution of judgment shall be in accordance with the decree
rendered originally by the court. Accordingly, execution should be guided by
the decree unless the latter is changed on appeal or unless other legal grounds
warrant non-execution as per Article 386 of the Civil Procedure Code. The
execution of a decree cannot thus be changed or revoked by merely alleging
that the decision is erroneous. Rather, such measures require having the court
decision (which is the basis of the execution order) changed through
appeal/cassation procedure by a court of law.
In the case at hand, the Federal High Court reversed the order of the lower
court stating that the manager should not be held solely responsible on behalf
of an institution which has stopped working. The Cassation Division noted
that this decision of the High Court departs from the main decree which
should have been executed, and it observed that this issue was raised and
rejected during the litigation.
Moreover, as the decree of the Federal First Instance Court was not
changed in the upper court in accordance with the relevant procedure, the
decision of the Federal High Court did not pursue the appropriate procedures
with regard to the manner in which a decree is executed, as it, in an execution
file, reversed the decision of the lower court rendered after adjudication. This
Cassation Division has thus found that the decision of the Federal High Court
has fundamental error of law.

Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File No. 93697, Sene 24, 2002
E.C (July 1, 2010) is reversed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code.
2. The execution order given by the Federal First Instance Court, File No.
16902, is affirmed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Thus, as per Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, this case is
remanded to the First Instance Court so that it can continue with executing
the decision as part of the main judgment.
...
________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 451 453.

Mohammed Ismail - v.- Mohammed Ahmed

- Opposition is filed to oppose a judgment already given before the court of
rendition by the person who is not a party to the suit but who could or
should have been made a party.
- Objection to attachment can be submitted to the court which directs the
execution process, but any objection or claim which is designedly or
unnecessarily delayed is not acceptable
Articles 358 and 418 of the Civil Procedure Code
_______________
Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,
Teshager G/Selasie, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Mohammed Ismail
Respondent: Mohammed Ahmed
Judgment
This execution process began in Somali Regional State Jijiga High Court
where the petitioner as a judgment creditor brought execution proceedings
against the respondent (judgment debtor). The respondents house was put on
auction but no one appeared during the bid to buy the house. Therefore, the
court ordered that the house be delivered to the petitioner with a view to
executing the decree. The respondent appealed to the higher court but his
appeal was dismissed and the respondent was ordered by the court which
rendered the decision to deliver the house to the petitioner.
However, the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division decided that the
house should not be delivered to the petitioner stating that the respondent and
other six persons have submitted opposition in accordance with Article 358 of
the Civil Procedure Code.
A cassation petition is brought to this bench against the decision of the
Regions Supreme Court Cassation Division. Summon was issued for the
respondent but failed to appear and the hearing was conducted ex parte. The
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined whether the
Regional States Cassation Bench has erred under Art 358 of Civil Procedure
Code when it reversed the decision of the delivery of the house.
The respondent is judgment-debtor for a sum of money owed to the
petitioner. He failed to pay the debt and execution order is given on his house.
He appealed to the Regional Supreme Court and got a reversal order. But the
order of the regular bench of the Regional Supreme Court was reversed by the
Cassation Bench of the same court and the execution process was underway.
The respondent then brought an opposition based on Art 358 of Civil
Procedure Code to the Regional States Cassation Bench. It is on the basis of
this opposition that the Regional States Cassation Bench issued another order.
An opposition under Art 358 is lodged to oppose a judgment already given
and it can be filed only by a person who was not a party to the litigation. The
respondent was a party to the litigation and is judgment-debtor. Therefore, he
shall not be entitled to bring opposition under the law.
With regard to the other persons who brought the opposition by stating that
the house is their joint property through inheritance, they could have lodged
their opposition to Jijiga High Court which initially adjudicated the case.
Article 418 of the Civil Procedure Code allows such objections if the objection
was not designedly or unnecessarily delayed. In this case, the objection is
lodged to the regional Cassation Bench rather than regional High Court which
is in charge of the execution process. On the other hand, the parties who filed
the objection to the execution did not present their opposition while the case
was being examined at Jijiga High Court, the regional Supreme Court and the
Regions Supreme Court Cassation Bench. They remained silent for a long
time. An opposition which is designedly or unnecessarily delayed is not
acceptable. Therefore, the Somali Regional State Supreme Court Cassation
Bench has made fundamental error of law by investigating an opposition
which is brought in the context of design and unnecessary delay contrary to
Art 418(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Somali Regional State Supreme Court
Cassation Bench in File No. M.G.12/99 on June 27, 2007 is reversed.
2. The case is remanded to the Jijiga Zonal High Court to continue the
execution process in accordance with order given on Sene 26, 1998 (July
3, 2006) in File No. 15/95.
_______________________________________________
Volume 8, pp. 382-383
Abridged translation: Yoseph Aemero

12. Jurisdiction

No.
1 Wasihun Mekonnens spouse 43511 2013 14 211-215

& heirs v. Agency for
Government Houses
2 Weldai Zeru et al (71 plaintiffs) 51790 2011 12 482-485

v. Ethiopian Revenues and
Customs Authority
3 Ethiopian Electric Power Corp. v. 42928 2010 10 262-263

Dragados Const.
4 Nigist H. v. Legessie A. 37339 2009 9 101- 103
5 Office of the Patriarchate v. 34440 2008 9 85-86

Mezgebu Belayneh
6 Assefa B. v. Military Prosecutor 33368 2008 9 89-91
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter12:Jurisdiction215

Wasihun Mekonnens Spouse and Heirs -v.- Agency for
Government Houses

Executive bodies that have quasi judicial power shall not disregard the
right to be heard in a suit. The decisions of the House of Federation are
always final and they should be observed by the concerned parties.
Articles 62 (1) and 37 of the Constitution;
Articles 3(1) and 56(1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001;
Articles 8 and 9 of Proclamation No. 87/1986 E.C.;
Articles 337, 338 and 339 of the Civil Procedure Code
______________

Tikimt 23, 2005 E.C. (November 2, 2012)

Adane Negussie, Teklit Yimsel
Petitioners: Heirs and wife of the deceased Ato Wasihun Mekonnen
1. W/tsadiq Deme
2. Meseret Wasihun
3. Tesfaye Wasihun
4. Abebe Wasihun
5. Fasika Wasihun
6. Yeshimebet Wasihun
7. Teshome Wasihun
8. Hana Wasihun
Respondent: Agency for Government Houses
After having examined the case, the following judgment is rendered.

Judgment
The case involves a request for the return of a business premise which began
at the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. On October 24, 1995, the father of the
current second to eighth petitioners stated that House No. 703 located in Addis
Ababa, Wereda 7, Kebelle 34 was his business premise which was illegally
confiscated by the Derg Government. He had submitted the document that
proved his ownership of the property and many other documents to prove that
the premise was confiscated unlawfully.
The petition was submitted to the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. The
Rented Houses Administration (currently renamed Agency of Government
Houses) responded that the house is state-owned. However, there was no
evidence that can show how it ended up being public property. After
examining the case and hearing both sides, the Ethiopian Privatization Agency
decided on January 23, 2001, File No. 20/12/497/9987/93 that the business
premise shall be returned to the father of the current petitioners.
The Rented Houses Agency appealed to the Board of the Privatization
Agency. The Board reversed the decision of the Ethiopian Privatization
Agency. The current petitioners then brought the case to the Cassation
Division of the Supreme Court. However, before the case reached this bench,
it was decided [upon preliminary screening of admissible cassation petitions]
that the decision of the Board was an administrative one and that the court
does not have jurisdiction to decide whether or not the decision had a
fundamental error of law. The case was closed on April 29, 2009.
The current petitioners, then, took the case to the Council of Constitutional
Inquiry stating that the case raises a constitutional matter. However, their
petition was not accepted. They further took the case to the FDRE House of
Federation. The House examined the case and unanimously decided that since
the Board of Privatization Agency has quasi judicial power, the Cassation
Division of the Federal Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to see the case
according to Article 37 and 80(3) (a) of the Constitution, Arts. 2(3) and 5(3) of
Proclamation No 110/1987 E.C., and Art. 8(5) of Proclamation 87/1986 E.C.
The case was presented to this bench to determine whether the procedures
followed by the Board of Privatization Agency to reach at its decision, on the
case brought to it as per Article 8(5) of Proclamation No. 87/1986 E.C., was
appropriate. The respondent was summoned and in its argument, it was stated
that the court does not have jurisdiction over the matter. It also added that the
procedure followed by the Board was correct and there was no legal ground
for the business premise to be returned to the petitioners. Thus, it requested for
the petition to be turned down. The petitioners have, then, submitted their
counter-reply strengthening their petition.

This court has examined the case in light of the relevant provisions of the
law and based on the arguments of both sides. This court has found that the
major issues of the case are the following:
1. Whether this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the matter;
2. If so, whether the procedure followed by the Board of the
Privatization Agency to render its decision on November 7, 2008
was appropriate.
Regarding the First Issue:

The decision of the Board of Privatization Agency was made on November 7,
2008. The petitioners submitted their petition to the Cassation Division of the
Federal Supreme Court on February16, 2009. However, the case was rejected
stating that this court does not have jurisdiction over the matter to determine
whether the decision has a fundamental error of law, as it is an administrative
decision. The case finally reached the House of Federation that returned the
case to this court deciding that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the matter.
According to Article 62(1) of the Constitution, the House of Federation is
the organ that has the power to interpret the Constitution. Article 3(1) of
Proclamation No. 251/2001 on the Consolidation of the House of Federation
and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities further confirms the
power of the House to Interpret the Constitution.
Article 56(1) of this proclamation states that decisions of the House on
matters submitted to it shall be final and Article 56(2) requires the concerned
parties to observe and execute decisions of the House. According to this power
given to it, the House examined the case presented to it and decided that the
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to
handle the case. According to Article 56 of Proclamation No. 251/2001, this
decision is final and should be observed by all the parties concerned.
Therefore, this court has found that the objection of the respondent that the
court does not have jurisdiction does not go in line with the decision of the
House and Article 56 of Proclamation No. 251/2001.
Regarding the Second Issue:
It has been gathered from the case that the Board of the Privatization Agency
reversed the decision of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency without giving the
current petitioners the chance to present their arguments and evidence. On the
other hand, the current respondent is arguing that this action of the Board was
in line with the directives of the Board that were enacted according to
Proclamation 87/1986 EC.

Article 8 of Proclamation 87/1986 EC, the legislation that deals with the
establishment of the Privatization Agency, provides the powers and duties of
the Board. According to Article 8(5) of this proclamation, the Board can
accept appeals against the decisions of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency.
This provision does not show any procedural step the Board should follow in
making its decisions. Nonetheless, Article 9(4) of the same proclamation
provides that the Board can enact its own procedures regarding meetings of
the Board. On the other hand, it has been decided by this court in File No.
63627 that as the Board has quasi judicial power, its decisions should be
enforced. According to Article 2(1) of Proclamation No. 454/1997, this
interpretation has mandatory precedence over interpretation of laws. Here, it
should be noted that since the Board has quasi judicial power, it should follow
the procedures of the law in making its decisions.
However, there is no specific procedural law designed for guiding organs
with quasi judicial power in making their decisions. Nevertheless, they are still
required to respect the Right to Access Justice, the right to be heard and the
right to be treated equally that are enshrined in the Constitution. One other
right protected by the Constitution is the right to defend oneself and present
evidence. If a person is not given the chance to defend himself, his right to
access justice stated under Article 37 of the Constitution is not protected.
Therefore, the right to be heard should be protected in the process of making
decisions. It can be understood from the spirit and content of the Constitution
and other related legislation such as the Civil Procedure Code, that the right to
be heard should be protected starting from the initial point until the case
reaches the final decision-making judicial organ. Moreover, the spirit and
content of Articles 337, 338 and 339 of the Civil Procedure Code and other
provisions dealing with evidence show that appellate judicial bodies, either
regular courts or bodies with quasi judicial power, shall not make any decision
without ensuring that the right to be heard is protected.
Coming to the case at hand, the fact that the Board of Privatization Agency
reached its decision in the absence of the parties is not challenged by the
respondent. The respondent argues that Articles 8(1) to 8(6) and Articles 9(1)
to 9(4)(3) of the executive directive of the board provide detailed procedures
dealing with registration of petitions, examination and decision-making.
Therefore, since it has its own special procedural rules, it cannot be concluded
that there is a fundamental error of law in the decision of the Board merely
because it did not follow the procedural rules of regular courts.
This directive should be based on Article 9 of Proclamation No. 87/1986
EC that deals with meetings of the Board. Under the English version of sub-
Article 4 of this provision, it is stated that the Board may determine its own
rules of procedure. However, the Amharic version of the provision states that

the Board may determine its own rules of procedure for its meetings. From
this provision, it can be understood that the Proclamation does not deal with
hearing of cases and the rights of parties to be heard. Article 9(4) deals with
procedures of meetings of the Board.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the directive was enacted by an
authorized body to allow the Board to disregard the right to be heard during an
appeal. Even if, it can be said that the directive was enacted by an appropriate
organ, it can be understood from the content and spirit of the directive that it
was not meant to curb the right to be heard. It was simply a means to let the
Board devise its own work management. Any other procedural rule
contravenes Article 37 of the Constitution. Moreover, it would erode the basic
foundation of the right to access justice and the right to be heard that are
enshrined in the International Conventions Ethiopia is signatory to. Here, it is
obvious that the Board of the Agency made its decisions without having
regard to the right of the parties to be heard. This, of course, goes against the
rules stated in the Civil Procedure Code and this clearly qualifies as a
fundamental error of law. This court, according to the powers given to it by
Article 80(3) (a) of the Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation 25/1996,
has decided that the decision of the Board has a fundamental error of law.
Thus, the following decree has been delivered.
Decree
1. The decision of the Board of Privatization Agency made on November 7,
2008 that House No. 703 located in Addis Ababa, Wereda 7, Kebelle 34,
should not be returned to the father of the current petitioners, Ato Wasihun
Mekonnen, is reversed because it violates the right of the petitioner to be
heard.
2. The case is remanded to the Board of the Privatization Agency as per
Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall review the
decision made on Tir 15, 1993 E.C. (January 23, 2001) File No.
20/N2/497/9987/93 in the presence of the petitioners and determine
whether or not the decision was appropriate.
.
_____________________________________________
Volume: 14, pp. 211-215

Weldai Zeru et al v.- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority
- Courts have no jurisdiction over administrative matters which have been
finally decided by administrative organs as determined by the law.
- A dismissed employee of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority
has no right to be reinstated by the decision of any judicial organ.
Articles 37(1) and 79(1) of the Constitution;
Article 19(1) (b) of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority
Establishment Proclamation No. 587/2008;
Articles 37(1) and 37(2) of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority
Employees Administration Council of Ministers Regulation No 155/2008;
______________

Ginbot 16, 2003 E.C. (May 24, 2011)

Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Weldai Zeru et al
The Court has consolidated this file with File Numbers 51789, 51792, 51794,
51798, 53301, 53460 and 57247 since they involve similar issues of law.
Judgment
The petitioners initiated the case at the Administrative Tribunal of the Federal
Civil Service Agency due to their dismissal. The legal provision invoked by
the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority for their dismissal is Article
37(1) of (the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Employee
Administration) Council of Ministers Regulation No 155/2008. They
complained that the respondent failed to assign them according to its new
business process re-engineering but paid them salary for 11 months and
unlawfully dismissed them. They requested the Tribunal to order the
respondent to re-instate them. Alternatively, they requested the Tribunal to
ensure that their right to be heard be respected by requiring the respondent to
provide the reasons for their dismissal.
The respondent argued before the Administrative Tribunal that the
dismissal of the petitioners was appropriate because it was based on Article
19(1)(b) of Proclamation No. 587/2008 and Article 37(1) of Regulation No.
155/2008. The Tribunal dismissed the case by majority vote. The petitioners
appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Division was also dismissed.
The petitioners argued before this Court that their dismissal from work by
the respondent violates their right of access to justice guaranteed in the
Constitution of the FDRE, and that the decision of the lower courts contains
basic error of law. In principle, Article 37(1) of the Constitution provides that
everyone has the right to bring a justiciable matter to, and to obtain a decision
or judgement by, a court of law or any other competent body with judicial
power. It is also clear from this provision that courts have jurisdiction to
determine matters which have not been given to other organs by law.
Ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain or determine matters
that have been settled by administrative decisions or that should have been
submitted for determination to administrative organs. Laws that give power to
some administrative organs to determine certain matters should be respected.
Since judicial power is granted by law, interpretation should be made within
the purview of that law. Article 4 of the Civil Procedure Code also shows that
courts have no jurisdiction over matters expressly barred by other laws. A
cumulative reading of Articles 79(1) and 37 of the Constitution reveals that
courts have power to entertain and determine only justiciable matter.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 587/2008 establishes the Ethiopian
Revenues and Customs Authority. Article 19(1)(b) of the Proclamation reads
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation
No. 515/2007 the administration of the employees of the Authority shall be
governed by regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers. Based on the
Proclamation, the Council of Ministers issued Regulation No. 155/2008.
Article 37(1) of the Regulation empowers the Director to dismiss any
employee who is suspected of corruption and who has lost the Directors
confidence without following regular disciplinary procedures. An employee
dismissed according to this procedure does not have a right to be reinstated by
decision of any judicial body as per Article 37(2).

According to the principle of separation of powers, the legislative branch

of a government has the power to make laws. Laws enacted by a legislature
are called primary legislation while laws enacted by appropriate organs are
called subsidiary legislation. When it considers necessary to implement
primary legislation, a legislature may give the power to issue detailed
subsidiary legislation to an appropriate organ for technical, economic and
social reasons. This practice is clear since it is supported by laws and reasons.
The Council of Ministers issued Regulation No. 155/2008 based on the
power entrusted to it by the legislature. Article 37 of the Regulation shows that
reinstatement of a dismissed employee or the right to be heard under such
circumstances is not a justiciable matter. The petitioners were dismissed
according to the system put in place by the legislature. Their request to be
reinstated or to be heard is not justiciable.
According to the content and spirit of Article 19(1)(b) of Proclamation No.
587/2008 and Article 37(1) and (2) of the Council of Ministers Regulation No.
155/2008, the majority decision of the Administrative Tribunal that the
petitioners request to be reinstated or to be heard was not justiciable respects
executive prerogative. Therefore, it does not contain a fundamental error of
law.
Decree
The decision of the Federal Civil Service Administrative Tribunal has been
affirmed.
...
_______________________________________________
Volume 12, pp. 482-485
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation v.- Dragados Construction

A company incorporated according to foreign law is liable before
Ethiopian courts for torts it commits although it is not established or
registered in Ethiopia.
Articles 11(2)(a) of the Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996;
______________

Ginbot 16, 2003 E.C. (January 20, 2010)

Petitioner: Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation
Respondent: Dragados Construction
Judgment
The case relates to extra-contractual liability and it was initiated at the Federal
First Instance Court. The petitioner sued the respondent and claimed
compensation of Birr 25,569.85 (twenty five thousand five hundred sixty nine
Birr and eighty five cents) for causing damage to its property while
constructing road in Addis Ababa. In its preliminary objection, the respondent
submitted that it was a foreign company incorporated according to Greek law
and its address was Athens; and that it is not registered in Ethiopia. It argued
that the lower court had no jurisdiction since the suit involved questions of
private international law, i.e. the area of the law that deals with the issue of the
law that is applicable to the case and the court that has jurisdiction. The Court
accepted the respondents preliminary objection and dismissed the case. On

appeal, the Federal High Court dismissed the case as per Article 337 of the
The petitioner argued before this Court that the decisions of the lower
courts have incorrectly invoked Article 11(2)(a) of Proclamation No. 25/1996,
and contain a basic error of law as the respondent caused the damage while
carrying out its activities in Ethiopia. It argued that suits concerning damage to
property should to be filed according to the laws of and in the courts of the
country where the damage has taken place.
It is clear from the records that the suit was based on provisions of extra-
contractual liability. This court has observed that the respondent caused the
damage while working in Ethiopia and that the suit was filed in the court of
the place where the property was situated and where the damage was caused.
Thus, the suit should be filed in a court of the place where the property was
situated and damage was caused since it concerns damage to property. The
amount of the claim and material jurisdiction based on that amount should be
taken into consideration. This is clearly indicated under Article 27(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code. Therefore the decision of the First Instance Court that
disclaimed jurisdiction by incorrectly relying on Article 11(2)(a) of
Proclamation No. 25/1996 and dismissed the petitioners claim, and the
appellate decision of the Federal High Court contain fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court affirmed by the Federal
High Court on appeal is reversed according to Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court according to
Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code since it has jurisdiction. It
should accept the claim of the petitioner, hear the remaining arguments of
the parties and render appropriate judgment.
.
_________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 262-263
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationCh.12:Jurisdiction225
Nigist H. v.- Legesse A.

The Federal High Court has jurisdiction over suits concerning partition
of property situated outside Ethiopia upon divorce.
Article 37 of the Constitution;
Article 4 of Proclamation No. 25/1996.
______________

Tir 28, 2001 E.C. (February 5, 2009)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Tsegaye Asmamaw,
Belachew Anshiso, Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Nigist H.
Respondent: Legesse A.
Judgement
The petitioner was a plaintiff when a suit for divorce and division of common
property was initiated at the Federal First Instance Court. The parties had
common property in Ethiopia and in the United States. The Court heard
arguments of both sides and divided the property situated in Ethiopia between
them. It held that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over property
situated in the United States.
The petitioner submitted her claim for division of common property in the
United States to the Federal High Court while the respondent objected to this
claim. The Federal High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it did not
involve issues of private international law; and that there was no procedure for
separately entertaining the division of property found in the United States. The

petitioners appeal to the Federal Supreme Court was dismissed according to

The petitioner argued before this Court that the Federal High Courts
decision in dismissing her claim for the division of a saving of $9,713.12 (nine
thousand seven hundred and thirteen USD and twelve cents) which was
common property in the United States contains a basic error of law because it
involved issues of private international law. She also argued that the matter
has not been finally decided as both courts disclaimed jurisdiction. In his
reply, the respondent argued that the petitioner did not follow appropriate
procedures since she filed new suit in the Federal High Court instead of
appealing against the decision of the Federal Instance Court. He further
submitted that the decisions of the lower courts do not contain a basic error of
law since the petitioner filed a suit on a matter that has been finally decided.
Based on the arguments of the parties presented above, this Court has
framed the following issues.
1. Whether the matter been finally decided;
2. Whether it is appropriate for the lower courts to adjudicate the
petitioners claim and request.
With regard to the first issue, the Federal First Instance Court heard the
arguments of the parties regarding the property situated in Ethiopia and it
decided that the common property in Ethiopia should be divided between
petitioner and the respondent, whereas it held that the claim for the division of
common property situated in the United States involves issues of private
international law for which it does not have jurisdiction thereby sending the
file to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court dismissed the
petitioners claim on the ground that there was no procedure for entertaining
the matter that had been partially decided by the lower court since the
petitioner instituted a new suit based on its jurisdiction according to
Proclamation No. 25/1996. The matter that relates to the partition of the
property in the United States has not been decided because both courts
disclaimed jurisdiction.
Regarding the second issue, both courts left the petitioners claim for
division of common property undecided by disclaiming jurisdiction.
According to Article 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, [e]veryone has the right of access to justice by bringing
a justiciable matter to a court of law or any other competent body with judicial
power. The petitioner has a constitutional right to bring her claim for division
of common property situated abroad and to obtain justice. However, by
disclaiming jurisdiction, the lower courts made decisions that violate this
constitutional right of the petitioner.
Although the Federal High Court decided that the suit involves issues of
private international law, it rejected the petitioners claim stating that the issue
of common property has been adjudicated, albeit wrongly, at the Federal First
Instance Court. This decision of the Federal High Court contains error since it
is contrary to the power vested in the court by virtue of Article 4 of
Proclamation No. 25/1996 and it violates the petitioners right of access to
justice guaranteed by the Constitution. This decision of the Federal High Court
and its confirmation by the Federal Supreme Courts Appellate Division thus
contain a basic error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court is reversed.
2. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court is reversed.
3. The case is remanded to the Federal High Court according to Article 341(1)
of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall decide the matter after
adjudication by examining the claim and evidence of the petitioner and the
reply and evidence of the respondent.
_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 101-103

Office of the Patriarchate v.- Mezgebu Belayneh

As teaching of qinie is a direct spiritual service, it cannot be
adjudicated in labour benches.
Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003
______________


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie,
Tsegaye Asmamaw, Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Supreme Office of the Patriarchate

Respondent: Megabi Mistir Mezgebu Belayneh
Judgment
The petitioner was a defendant in a case filed by the current respondent who
was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court. The plaintiff had been a
teacher of qinie and aquaquam since 1957 E.C. (1965) in South Wollo until 7
July 1994 when he was transferred to Addis Ababa by the decision of the
respondent. He requested the lower court to order the respondent to pay him
salary which was interrupted since 7 July 1994 together with the cost incurred
due to litigation. In its preliminary objection, the petitioner (defendant at the
lower court) argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction and that the claim
was barred by period of limitation. It also argued that the plaintiff (current
respondent) had been giving service in another Church in Addis Ababa and he
had been paid. It stated that another person (who receives payment for the
task) has been assigned to the respondents previous position. The lower court
held that the plaintiff should be paid salary. On appeal, the Federal High Court
confirmed the judgment.
The petitioner argued before this Court that the lower courts did not have
jurisdiction and that the respondents claim was barred by a period of
limitation since it was made after 12 years. In his reply, the respondent argued
that the lower courts have jurisdiction and that his claim was not barred by
limitation since he did not request payment of arrears. This court has
examined whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
matter.
The petitioner argued that the matter should not be entertained by an organ
hearing labour disputes since the respondent was providing spiritual service as
a qinie teacher. The lower court rejected this argument on the ground that the
respondents service cannot be considered as direct spiritual service related to
the religious institution although the respondent did not argue that his service
was not spiritual and was not related to the religious institution. The fact that
the respondent was providing spiritual service as a qinie teacher was not a fact
in issue. Therefore, the conclusion of the lower court was not based on the
arguments of the parties.
In its decision of May 12, 2006 rendered on cassation File No 18419, this
Court divided employees of religious institutions into two and determined the
application of the Labour Proclamation thereto. The Labour Proclamation does
not apply to disputes between a religious institution and its employees such as
priest, kahin and deacon who provide services that are directly related to the
religious organisation and that cannot be disassociated from the religion. The
conclusion of the Cassation Division was based on the reasoning that
individuals who provide spiritual services should fulfil the special criteria in
the religion since their services emanate from the religion or from the belief
followed by the religious institution and are inseparably linked to the religion.
The respondent was able to be employed as a qinie teacher because he
fulfilled the special criteria provided by the petitioners belief and it is clear
that the nature of the respondents service has direct relationship with spiritual
services. By assimilating services of a qinie teacher to services rendered by an
accountant, property administrator, statistical worker, etc and holding that
qinie teaching is not considered as a direct spiritual service is inappropriate.
As long as the respondent provides direct spiritual services, his dispute
with the petitioner should not be determined by an organ that hears labour
disputes. Rather, such dispute should be resolved according to dispute
resolution mechanisms of the religious institution as per the judgment of this
Division in the File cited stated above, i.e. File No. 18419. Therefore, the
decisions of the lower courts contain a fundamental error of law.

Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court confirmed by the Federal
High Court has been reversed according to Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
2. The respondents claim should be entertained according to dispute resolution
mechanisms of the religious institution. There is no legal basis on which an
organ hearing labour disputes entertains this case.
..
_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 85-86
Assefa Belay Zegeye - v.- Military Prosecutor

Military courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases concerning members
of the defence force who are on duty.
Articles 26, 27 and 28 of Proclamation No. 27/1996;
Articles 2(9) and 26(1) of Proclamation No. 343/2003.
______________

Hidar 9, 2001 E.C. (November 18, 2008)

Teshager G/Selassie, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Assefa B.
Respondent: Military Prosecutor
Judgement
The present petitioner was a defendant in a criminal case based on Articles
386 and 642 of the 1957 Penal Code when the case was initiated in the
Primary Military Court. The Court found the petitioner guilty as charged and
sentenced him to six years of rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and
sentence were confirmed by the Appellate Military Court.
The issue before this Court was whether the suit against the petitioner falls
under the jurisdiction of military courts. This requires examining the source of
a certain courts jurisdiction and the consequence of a court decision in a case
that does not fall within its jurisdiction.
As courts are established by law, their jurisdiction emanates from that law.
Any court has the responsibility to ascertain its jurisdiction before adjudicating
a case. A decision of a court rendered without having jurisdiction does not
have a legal basis.
In the present case, the military courts are established by the law which
determines their jurisdiction. Proclamation No. 27/1996 establishes a Primary
Military Court and an Appellate Military Court and states their jurisdiction
under Articles 26, 27 and 28. Article 26 provides that the military courts have
jurisdiction over persons accused of military offences enumerated in the 1957
Penal Code (Articles 296-331, inclusive); any offence committed by a
member of the Defence Forces on combat duty; civilians deployed with
members of the Defence Forces on combat duty abroad; and offences
committed by prisoners-of-war. Moreover, Article 28 provides that all the
charges should be brought before the military courts where one of the several
offences an accused person is charged with comes under the jurisdiction of a
military court.
The petitioner relied on Article 26(1) and argued that the military courts
do not have jurisdiction over his case. When this sub-Article is considered
separately, it refers to only Articles 296-331 of the Penal Code and it does not
include Articles 386 and 642 which are the basis of the charge against the
petitioner. As a result, the argument of the petitioner appears to be valid.
However, the provisions of sub-Articles (2), (3), and (4) show that the
jurisdiction of the military courts is broader than what is indicated under sub-
Article (1). For instance, the provision of sub-article (2) extends jurisdiction
of the military courts to any offence committed by a member of the Defence
Forces on combat duty without prejudice to sub-Article (1). That is why the
argument of the petitioner is not tenable.
On the other hand, since the Proclamation does not define the word
combat and because the petitioner was charged with crimes related to
financial administration, whether the petitioner committed the crime while on
combat duty within the meaning of Article 26(2) is contentious.
Article 2 on interpretation and Article 26 on jurisdiction of the military
courts are among the provisions of Proclamation No. 27/1996 that have been
amended by Proclamation No. 343/2003. Article 2(9) of Proclamation No.
343/2003 defines combat as all military duties performed by a member of
the Defence Force from the time of employment until discharged from
service. Article 26(2) has also been amended as per the meaning given to the
word combat under Article 2(9) of Proclamation No. 343/2003. As a result,
the jurisdiction of the military courts has expanded by the amendment. It is
clear that the amendment was intended to bring all crimes committed by
members of the Defence Forces within the jurisdiction of the military courts.
The petitioner was a member of the Defence Forces when he was said to
have committed the crime. This means that he was on combat duty according
to Article 2(9) of Proclamation No. 343/2003. Although the crimes said to
have been committed by the petitioner do not fall under the provisions of the
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationCh.12:Jurisdiction233
Penal Code indicated under Article 26(1) of the Proclamation, they fall within
the jurisdiction of the military courts since they were committed during the
time of his employment and while he was carrying out combat duty. In sum,
the military courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. Therefore, the
decision which is the subject of this petition does not contain fundamental
error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Appellate Military Court is affirmed according to
Article 195(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. The argument of the petitioner is not tenable since the military courts have
jurisdiction over the case
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 89-91
13. Labour Law

No.
1 Wesene Medical Service PLC v. 77134 2012 14 5-7

K. A.
2 World Vision Ethiopia v. 79105 2012 13 94-96

Mezemir M.
3 Mitiku H. v.Mesfin T. 67201 2012 13 64-65
4 SOS Childrens Village v. 38435 2009 8 169-170

Kebede Kumsa et al
5 Addis Ababa Restaurant v. 37256 2008 8 116-118

Yewibdar T.
6 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia v. 33314 2008 6 355-360

Alemayehu Woldie
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter13:LabourLaw235
Wesene Medical Service PLC -v.- Kibrewesen A.

When an employee endangers the goodwill, profit and survival of the
employer, the measure that should be taken must be examined in light of
the specific demands and features of the profession of the employee and
the spirit and objectives of the Labour Law.
Article 27(1)(f) and (h) of Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003
______________
Petitioner: Wesen Medical Services PLC
Respondent: K.A.
Judgment
The respondent, Dr. K. A., was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court
and claimed that his contract of employment was unlawfully terminated by the
petitioner and he sought compensation. The petitioner, on the other hand,
argued that the contract was terminated on lawful grounds as the respondent
was repeatedly tardy and constantly in disagreement with patients. The
Federal First Instance Court heard both parties and witnesses who testified that
the respondent has divulged confidential information of patients to third
parties. The witnesses also stated that he is not in good terms with patients and
that patients usually ask for a refund because he comes in late. The respondent
did not rebut these testimonies. So, the court decided that the termination was
lawful.
The respondent, then, appealed to the Federal High Court. The court heard
both sides and decided that the decision of the lower court based on the
interpretation of sub-Articles (a) and (b) of Article 27(1) of the Labour
Proclamation No. 377/2003 that deal with damages caused due to an
employees tardiness was wrong. Furthermore, it reversed the decision of the
lower court stating that the termination of the contract of employment was
unlawful because violation of discipline in the medical profession is not a
ground for terminating that contract under the proclamation.

This petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme

Court on February 9, 2012 states that the respondent has caused damage to the
goodwill and profit of the organization. The respondent has the responsibility
to abide by professional ethics. However, even though it was proven that he
was violating these ethical rules, it was decided by the lower courts that the
termination of the contract of employment was unlawful. Thus, the petitioner
argued that there is a fundamental error of law in this decision.
The respondent in his response submitted on 27 June 2012 argued that the
grounds raised by the petitioner are not sufficient for termination of the
contract of employment without notice.
This court has examined whether the decision rendered by the Federal
High Court has a fundamental error of law. This court has found that it has
been proven in the lower courts that the respondent has gone against the ethics
of the medical profession by revealing confidential information of patients to
third parties. Moreover, there were testimonies that the respondent has
verbally abused patients and had conflicts with them.
A colleague of the respondent testified that he divulged confidential
information of patients to unauthorized third parties. She added that around the
time of the termination of his contract of employment, she heard him telling
third parties that a certain lady was living with HIV/AIDS and he was even
calling her name. Patients of the respondent, while he was an employee of the
petitioner, also testified that he mistreated and insulted them. They also added
that they stopped going to the petitioners medical services. The credibility
and weight of these testimonies were examined by the lower court.
In spite of such testimony, the appellate court found the decision of the
lower court to be wrong, stating that the lower courts finding about the
damage caused by the respondent on the goodwill and profit of the petitioner
was based on insufficient evidence. The appellate court did not question the
credibility and weight of these testimonies. However, it overruled the decision
of the lower court stating that these testimonies were not sufficient to show
that the termination of the contract of employment was lawful.
The fact that the respondent has not contested the credibility and weight of
the testimonies given against his misconduct, and whether these faults are
sufficient grounds to terminate the contract of employment must be evaluated
in light of the type of services the petitioner provides and its responsibilities
along with the damages caused by the respondent.
According to Article 13(1) and (2) of the Proclamation No 377/2003,
every worker has the obligation to perform in person the work specified in the
contract of employment and to follow instructions given by the employer

based on the terms of the contract and work rules. It can also be understood
from Article 11(1) of Regulation No. 174/1986 E.C. of the Council of
Ministers that the respondent should perform his duties in accordance with
rules of professional ethics, respecting patients and keeping confidential
information. If he does not do so and if he continues to work for the petitioner,
the petitioners license may be suspended or revoked. In addition to these, it
can be gathered from Articles 399 and 400 of the Criminal Code that the
respondents act of disclosing patients confidential information to third
parties results in criminal liability.
It can be understood from the above mentioned Regulation No. 174/1986
E.C. that the acts of the respondent which are proven have negatively affected
the goodwill of the petitioner, made it less competitive in the market and it
could have resulted in the suspension or cancellation of its license. Therefore,
according to Article 27 (1)(f) of the Labour Proclamation, the respondent is
responsible for causing quarrels with his patients at the work place, violating
the medical professions ethical code and jeopardizing the goodwill, profit and
survival of the petitioners medical services.
Article 27 (1)(h) of Proclamation No 377/2003, the respondents disregard
of his professional ethical responsibilities, the utmost ethical expectations and
unique features of the medical profession and the damages caused or that
could have been caused on the petitioner must be carefully examined. The case
must be examined in light of the objective of the Labour Law, its contents and
all other legislation enacted to regulate licensing of medical services.
This court has found that the respondents violations fall under Article
27(1)(f)&(h) of Proclamation No 377/2003 and the contract of employment
can be terminated without notice. In spite of this, however, the Federal High
Court decided that the respondents violations are not sufficient to cause the
termination of the contract based on this provision. This court has thus found
that the decision of the Federal High Court has a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court is reversed.
2. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is affirmed.
3. The court has decided that the petitioners termination of the contract of
employment of the respondent is lawful.
.
_________________________________________________
Volume: 14, pp 5-7.

World Vision Ethiopia -v.- Mezemir M.

Assault committed by a workmate residing in a living quarter assigned by
the employer shall not be interpreted as falling outside violence at
workplace even where it is performed outside working hours.
Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Articles 4, 27(1)(f), 97
______________
Hamle 3, 2004 E.C. (July 10, 2012)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie,
Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie
Petitioner: World Vision Ethiopia
Respondent: Mezemir M.
Judgment
The issue analyzed in this case is the meaning and spatial scope that should be
attached to violence at work place.
The petitioner dismissed the respondent for serious misconduct that the
latter was alleged to have committed at the place of work. The respondent
instituted a court action before the Federal First Instance Court claiming that
he has been unlawfully dismissed and requested for reinstatement together
with back pay. The present petitioner replied that the respondent was
summarily dismissed because of the sexual harassment, brawls and quarrels he
committed against a female workmate at the camp where the employer has
established as its employees residence, and argued that the measure taken
against the respondent is lawful. The court, after hearing the litigation and the
examining the evidence of the disputing parties upheld the measure taken by
the petitioner and affirmed the dismissal.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, the present respondent
lodged an appeal before the Federal High Court. The Court reversed the
decision of the lower court and awarded reinstatement with six months back
pay to the respondent. The reasoning of the Federal High Court was that
although the misconduct was indeed committed, it was committed outside the
workplace and working hours, and did not satisfy the requirement of the law
for summary dismissal.
The petitioner subsequently filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division against the decision of the High Court. While affirming the
decision of the First Instance Court and reversing the holding of the Federal
High Court, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme analyzed the case
as follows:
It has been verified from the files of the lower court that the respondent
was responsible for quarrels and brawls against a fellow employee at a camp
where employees resided. The decision of the High Court emanated from its
interpretation that since the victim was assaulted during the night and at the
dormitory allocated for employees, the act did not satisfy the requirement of
Article 27(1)(f) of Proclamation No.377/2003.
However, it must be noted that where an employee is held responsible for
brawls or quarrels during the time of work or in a place where he performs the
orders of the employer, he shall be liable for dismissal without notice. It is
believed that the objective of this provision is to ensure industrial peace and
productivity. Thus, the concept place of work should be interpreted in line
with such an objective.
In the case before us, it is proved that the respondent assaulted an
employee of the petitioner and this is admitted by the respondent. Based on the
relevant provision of the law, this act entails responsibility for quarrels.
Considering an assault committed by an employee against a workmate while
residing in a living quarter assigned by the employer as an act that falls outside
of the definition violence at workplace would be contrary to the purpose and
intent of the law. As a result, the Federal High Court has committed a
fundamental error of law in its decision rendering a decision in the present
case.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File No.116083 is reversed
pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court in File No.74140 is
affirmed.
3. The measure of termination taken by the petitioner is lawful.
....
____________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 94-96
Abridged translation: Mehari Redae

Mitiku H. -v.- Mesfin T.

The employer shall not be liable for intentionally self-inflicted injury at
the workplace. Injury incurred due to the violation of safety regulations
by intoxication in such a manner that the employee cannot control himself
shall be considered as intentionally self-inflicted and the employer shall
be exonerated from liability.
Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Articles 96(1), 96(2)(a)(b),
______________

Yekatit 26, 2004 E.C. (March 3, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Mitiku H.
Respondent: Mesfin T.
Judgement
The issue in the present case is the scope of liability of the employer for an
employment injury sustained by the employee at a place and time of work.
The respondent brought an action against the petitioner before the
Hawassa First Instance Court alleging that he sustained employment injury
while at work and claimed compensation from the employer for bodily harm.
The present petitioner contended that since the respondent reported for
duty in a state of intoxication and sustained an injury as a result of it, the
employer is exonerated from liability as per Article 96(2)(b) of Labour
Proclamation No.377/2003. The court accepted this contention and denied
compensation to the plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent). The latter
took the case on appeal. However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
He then took the case to the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme
Court arguing that there is fundamental error of law committed by the lower
courts which needs to be rectified. The Regional Cassation Division cited the
extra-contractual liability provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Code and held the
present petitioner liable to compensate the employee.
The petitioner submitted his petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division stating that the Regional Cassation Division erred in
applying extra-contractual provisions of the law in order to hold the employer
liable while the relationship between the disputing parties was contractual.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has observed from the
facts verified by the lower courts that the present respondent reported for duty
in the morning but left the premises as soon as the manager (owner) of the
enterprise was not around. He again came back to the premises after a while.
By realizing that the respondent was in a state of intoxication from the way he
spoke and walked, the petitioner instructed him to go out of the premises and
banned him from working. Despite the instruction of the petitioner, the
respondent continued working and sustained injury instantly.
Based on the facts of the case and the relevant law, an employer is, in
principle, liable irrespective of fault, for employment injuries sustained by his
employee(s). Nevertheless, it has also been stated that the employer shall not
be liable for any injury intentionally inflicted by the injured worker himself.
According to Article 96(2) of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, non-
obedience of express safety instructions or non-observance of the provisions
of accident prevention or reporting for work in a state of intoxication that
prevents him from regulating his body or understanding is deemed to be
intentional infliction of injury upon oneself.
At the time of the injury, it was shown that the respondent was intoxicated;
as a result of this he was instructed to leave the premises. However, he failed
to comply with the instruction of the employer and resumed working and
sustained the injury. Under these circumstances the decisions of the lower
courts that relieved the employer from liability are in accordance with the
letters and spirit of the law and there is no fundamental error of law. Rather,
there is fundamental error of law in the decision of the Cassation Division of
the Regional Supreme Court which held the petitioner liable for the injury.
The court has thus rendered the following decree.

Decree
1. The decision of the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division of the
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State in File
No.51342 is reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code.
2. The decisions of the Hawassa First Instance Court and Hawassa High
Court are affirmed.
3. As the injury sustained by the respondent in the present case is not an
employment injury, the employer shall not be liable for the injury.
...
__________________________________________________

SOS Childrens Village -v.- Kebede Kumsa et al

Outsourcing certain tasks and the termination of job positions can be a
legal ground to terminate contract of employment.
Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Article 28
______________

Petitioner: SOS Childrens Village
Respondents: Kebede Kumsa et al
The Court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
This case was initiated by the present respondents before the Federal First
Instance Court. The respondents (plaintiffs at the lower court) stated that the
petitioner unlawfully terminated their contract of employment on the pretext
that the service has been outsourced to be provided by another company. They
requested the court to award reinstatement, and alternatively they claimed for
compensation and other benefits associated with unlawful termination.
The petitioner (defendant at the lower court) in its reply to the suit
contended that the security service of the enterprise has been outsourced to a
third party (i.e. Trust PLC) on a contractual arrangement; and it stated that the
termination is lawful because their job positions were, as a result, cancelled on
justified grounds.
The Federal First Instance Court, after examining the facts of the case in
light of the law, held that the termination was unlawful and awarded the
respondents six months wage in the form of compensation. Although the
petitioner lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court against the decision of
the lower court, the appellate court affirmed the previous decision. The
petitioner then filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench

contending that the lower courts committed fundamental error of law that
should be rectified by the Cassation Bench. The Cassation Bench has
examined the petition.
It has been admitted by the respondents that their contract of employment
was terminated because their jobs were outsourced to a third party. It is
provided under Article 28 of the Labour Proclamation that an employer is
allowed to terminate a contract of employment with notice where a decision
has been taken to alter the work methods or introduce new technology with a
view to raise productivity
From the files of the lower courts, the Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court noted that the reason why the lower courts held the termination
unlawful was that the petitioner did not show the cancellation of the job
positions which were held by the employees and, in effect, the courts
considered Article 28 inapplicable to the case at hand.
The Cassation Bench, however, observed that where a certain job is
transferred to another company, the tasks of the employees (whose service is
outsourced) are to be handled by the new service provider. Hence, this implies
that the job positions of such employees are cancelled. The employer should
have provided notice to the employees, but it was found that this requirement
has not been complied with. Nevertheless, this cannot make the termination
unlawful; it will rather entitle the employees to compensation in lieu of notice.
Although outsourcing may seem to infringe the rights of the employees, it
is a lawful act under the Labour Proclamation. Therefore, the decision of the
lower courts which held the termination unlawful and that entitled the
employees to the compensation stated above has fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is reversed pursuant to
2. It is held that the termination of employment is lawful.
3. Respondents shall be awarded payment in lieu the petitioners failure to
give notice, and the period of notice shall be proportionate to their length
of service as stipulated under Article 35 of Proclamation No.377/2003.
4. As the payment claimed for unutilized leave was not objected by the
petitioner, it is affirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 8, pp. 169-170

Addis Ababa Restaurant -v.- Yewubdar T.


In spite of an employees acquittal in a criminal charge, he/she may be
transferred to a different job assignment as long as the employers level of
trust on the employee is adversely affected. This measure does not
conflict with the object and purpose of the law.
Proclamation No. 377/2003, Article 15
______________

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Teffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw,
Petitioner: Addis Ababa Restaurant

Respondent: Yewubdar T.
The Court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.
Judgement
The suit initially submitted to the Federal First Instance Court involved the
effect of subsequent criminal acquittal on previous disciplinary dismissal. The
case was initiated by the present respondent with a view to obtaining
reinstatement and back pay for alleged unlawful termination of her contract of
employment by petitioner.
The following facts were proved. The respondent was an employee of the
petitioner in a job position of a cashier. But her employment was terminated
due to a criminal action instituted against her in connection with an alleged
misappropriation of money. However, the public prosecutor withdrew the
criminal charge against her and the petitioner reinstated her to employment but
assigned her to another position. She then filed a suit at the Federal First
Instance Court to obtain an order requiring the petitioner to reinstate her as a
cashier and for back pay.
In its reply, the petitioner argued that the reason for her termination was
misappropriation of cash which she has partly repaid, and noted that it is
difficult to assign her as a cashier again. The petitioner stated that the
respondent would have deserved termination but she was reinstated taking her
family responsibilities into consideration. The petitioner (defendant at the
lower court) also contested the respondents claim for back pay as she did not
render service to the employer while her employment was terminated.
The First Instance Court held that the employers measure in changing the
respondents job position was modification of contract and that the employer
cannot unilaterally modify a contract of employment. It thus ordered the
petitioner to reinstate her to a position of a cashier with four months salary in
the form of back pay. Although the petitioner lodged an appeal before the
Federal High Court, the appellate court also affirmed the lower ruling.
Finally, the petitioner filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division stating that the lower courts have committed a fundamental
error of law in interpreting the provisions of the labour law.
The Cassation Division has examined the case. The lower courts record
shows that the respondent was employed in 1991 in a job position of a cashier
at the petitioners enterprise. She was alleged to have misappropriated Birr
4,219 (four thousand two hundred nineteen) out of which she has paid back
Birr 1,950 (one thousand nine hundred fifty) but failed to pay the remaining
balance. She was thus suspended from job and a criminal action was brought
against her. However, she was acquitted from the criminal proceedings. It was
as a result of the acquittal that she claimed reinstatement and back pay.
The Cassation Division framed the issue whether an employee entitled to
reinstatement and back pay where misappropriation of money was verified but
criminal prosecution was dropped by the public prosecutor.
This Cassation Division observed that a criminal charge and legal actions
based on the labour law have different contents and goals. While criminal
liability addresses state and societal concerns, a disciplinary measure is an
internal and administrative measure. In addition to their differences in purpose
and goal, the level of evidence required to prove a criminal charge is different
from the standard of proof required under labour law. Conviction under
criminal charge requires evidence that proves the case beyond reasonable
doubt. However, less convincing evidence is sufficient to succeed in a
disciplinary action based on the labour law. Thus it is highly likely that a
person who is acquitted from a criminal charge may still be held liable for
breach of discipline.
In the case at hand, the lower court has verified that the respondent
admitted to have repaid a certain amount of money. Although the petitioner

did not assign her in her previous job position, it has reinstated her in another
job position. The reason why the lower courts nullified the petitioners
measure was that such a change in the contract of employment does not meet
the requirements of Art.15 of Proclamation No. 377/2003. Nevertheless, the
cause for the change of job position is that the respondent has breached the
trust placed in her while she was serving in the previous position. It should be
borne in mind that it is a managerial prerogative to assign employees in a
position that fits them. Hence, the petitioners measure in the present case is
not in conflict with the object and purpose of the law.
The respondent did not contest the allegation of misappropriation, but
rather argued that she was acquitted from the criminal charge. Hence the
allegation that the petitioners property was misappropriated is [impliedly]
admitted. Thus, the petitioner should not be compelled to reinstate the
respondent to her previous job position under these circumstances as long as it
does not have trust on the employee.
Therefore, the holding of the lower court that regarded the petitioners
measure as unlawful emanated from the failure to examine the litigation of the
parties and by unduly citing Article 15 of Proclamation No. 377/2003. As the
ruling of the lower courts was against the sprit and purpose of the law, it is
held that it contains a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High
Court are reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The respondent shall not be reinstated in the job position of a cashier.
...
__________________________________________________
Volume 8, pp. 116-118

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia - v.- Alemayehu Woldie et al
Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 33314 (05 June 2008)
Where a factory is taken over by a bank due to default in the payment of
loan, the law does not entail obligation on the bank to retain the contract
with the employees where the bank does not intend or desire to resume
production, but opts to sell it out with a view to recovering the debt.
Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Proclamation No. 97/1998;
Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, Article 16.
______________
Ginbot 28, 2000 E.C. (June 5, 2008)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Tegene Getaneh, Teffesse Yirga,
Medhin Kiros, Sultan Abatemam
Petitioner: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
Respondent: Alemayehu Woldie et al
Judgement
The litigation commenced with an action instituted by respondents against the
petitioner and the former owner of Birale Edible Oil Factory before the Federal
First Instance Court alleging that the latter unlawfully terminated their contract
of employment and they requested for compensation and other entitlements
associated with unlawful termination.
The former owner replied that since the factory was mortgaged property
taken over by the Bank because of default in loan payment, there was no legal
reason to make him liable as he is no longer the owner of the factory.
The Bank also contended that the reason why it took over ownership of the
factory was not in order to produce and sell edible oil, but to sell it with a view
to recovering the debt. Therefore, it argued that it should not be required to
retain the contract with the employees.
The Federal First Instance Court dropped the suit against the former owner
of the factory. The Court, however, held the Bank responsible by citing Article
16 of Proclamation No.377/2003 which provides that change of ownership of
the enterprise does not have the effect of modifying a contract of employment.
Although the Bank lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court against the
decision of the lower court, the appellate court affirmed the lower courts
decision as per Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.
On the basis of the existing procedural rules, the Bank brought the case to
the attention of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench with a view to
rectifying an alleged fundamental error of law committed by the lower courts.
The Cassation Bench framed an issue as to whether the Bank which took-over
the Factory in order to recover its loans can be compelled to inherit the claims
of the employees.
According to Article 16 of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, change
of transfer of ownership shall not have the effect of modifying the contract of
employment, and the Cassation Bench found that this requirement applies
when the new owner sustains the operation of the enterprise. However, in the
case at hand, the Bank has no intention and desire to resume the production of
edible oil and the sale of the same. Hence, Article 16 of the Labour
Proclamation is not relevant to the present case. Consequently, the decisions
of the lower courts are not tenable.
Decree
Court are reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The obligation envisaged under Article 16 of Proclamation No. 377/2003
cannot be imposed on the Bank and the claims of the employees cannot be
accepted because the Bank took possession of the factory to sell it in order
to recover unpaid loan and not to resume the factorys operation.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 6, pp. 355-360

14. Property Law

No.
1 Frehiwot M. G. v. Mebrahtu G. 81081 2013 14 191-194

& & Desta W.
2 Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 6 67691 2011 13 460-462

Admin. v. Alemtsehay W.
3 Taitu Kebedes Heirs v. Tirunesh 67011 2012 13 450-452

et al
4 Genet S. v. Kirkos Sub-City Keb. 64014 2012 13 437-440

17/18 Admin. et al
5 Heria M. v. Shemsu Y. 60720 2011 11 289-292
6 Rahel Sinetsehay v. Mesfin 55081 2010 11 256-257

Tamrat.
7 Abadit L. v. Zalambesa Town 48217 2010 11 249-251

Admin. & Berhane Z.
8 Samuel T. v. Ayisha A. et al 43081 2010 10 232-234
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter14:PropertyLaw251
Frehiwot M. G. -v.- Mebrahtu G. & Desta W.


- A person who possesses another persons property using it for some
time and incurs expenses necessary to prevent the loss or deterioration
of the property, can request reimbursement from the owner only if it
can be proved that the expense incurred is absolutely necessary and is
done in good faith.
- Where this has not been done, judges may reduce or refuse to grant
the reimbursement requested.
Articles 2168, 2169, 2171(1) and 2172(1) of the Civil Code
______________
Tir 13, 2005 E.C. (January 21, 2013)

Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa,
Mustefa Ahmed
Petitioner: Frehiwot M.
Respondent: Mebrahtu G/Medhin & Desta Woldegabir
Judgment
The case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The current petitioner was
the plaintiff in the lower court. The petitioner brought a suit against the two
respondents alleging that when the latter went to the United States, the former
took out a renovation and improvement permit to refurbish the house owned
by the respondents in which she was living. She claimed to have spent a total
of 265,815.92 (two hundred sixty five thousand eight hundred fifteen birr and
ninety two cents), indicating the reasons for each expenditure. She pleaded for
the ownership of the house to be transferred to her to offset the expense she
has incurred and owed by the respondents.
The respondents argued that the petitioners cost reimbursement request
does not have legal ground and that the cost is exaggerated. After considering
and examining the arguments of both sides, the court found that the
respondents had legal right over the house during the time of the renovation
and that the petitioner did the renovation knowing that she had to give back
the house to them. The Federal First Instance Court indicated that the
necessity of having the renovation done was not supported by evidence and
stated that it is inappropriate to pass a decision that requires the respondents to
indemnify the total cost of the renovation. The Court cited Articles 2169, 2170
and 2174 of the Civil Code, and stated the need to apply the principle of
equity, and passed a decree which required the respondents to pay 15,000
(fifteen thousand birr) to the petitioner.
Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner appealed to the Federal High
Court. The court upheld the decision of the lower court. This petition against
the Federal High Courts decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division. The petitioner argued that the renovation has been proved
and the amount spent is verified by two bodies, to be 42,338.80 (forty two
thousand three hundred thirty eight birr and eighty cents) and 63,942.43 (sixty
three thousand nine hundred forty two birr and forty three cents) respectively.
One of these organs that estimated the renovation is a government organ, and
it is wrong for the lower court to only award Birr 15,000 (fifteen thousand)
based on equity without at least taking the lower cost estimate into
consideration. Hence she requested for the decision of the lower court to be
reversed and a decision to be made in her favour as per the claim she made at
the First Instance Court.
The Federal First Instance Court did not accept the cost-reimbursement
request of the petitioner because she incurred cost for renovation of the house
knowing that the house was to be returned to the respondents and she did not
produce evidence to prove the necessity of the renovation. The court found
that the petitioner did not prove that the house would have sustained damage
had the renovation not been done and did not show that she made it in good
faith to keep the integrity of the house from being damaged. The Federal High
Court confirmed the decision of the lower court.
Article 2169 of the Civil Code stipulates that [t]he person who is required
to make restitution shall be entitled to the reimbursement of the expenses he
has incurred in preventing the loss or deterioration of the property, unless the
expenses were not useful .... Likewise, Article 2171(1) provides that [w]here
expenses incurred on the property have increased its value, the person required
to make restitution shall be entitled to their reimbursement. If, however, it
has been proved that this expense is incurred as a result of bad faith or where
equity so requires, judges may reduce or refuse any indemnity, in accordance
with Article 2172(1).

This provision outlines the criteria that are used to determine whether the
expense incurred is in bad faith. The criteria include examining whether the
person who claims indemnity knows or ought to have known that he is
required to return the property at the time when the expense was incurred or
the need to apply equity. In the light of these provisions, if an individual uses
another persons property which is in his possession and during this time
incurs expense to prevent the loss or deterioration of the property, he can
request for the expense to be reimbursed by the owner of the property if the
expense is necessary and is incurred in good faith. But, these Articles show
that if the expense is proved to have been sustained as a result of bad faith,
judges can reduce or totally refuse the reimbursement requested.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has found the issues
identified by the lower courts to be acceptable as per the power granted to it
under Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of
Proclamation 25/1996 [Federal Courts Proclamation]. This Division has
examined the issues based on the contents and spirit of Articles 2169, 2171
and 2172 of the Civil Code. Accordingly the expense incurred by the
petitioner has not been found to warrant full reimbursement. The fact that the
lower court decided to award Birr 15,000 (fifteen thousand) even without
taking the lower expense estimates presented before it by the two institutions
requested to do so, cannot be said to be beyond the power the court granted
under Articles 2171 and 2172 of the Civil Code. Hence the Division has not
found fundamental error of law in the decree of the lower courts. This court
has thus rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and Federal High Court
are affirmed, according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The decisions rendered do not have fundamental error of law because they
have taken into consideration the petitioners failure to prove good faith
and the absolute necessity of the renovation as stipulated under Articles
2169, 2171 and 2172 of the Civil Code.
_________________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 191-194.
Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 06 Administration -v.- Alemtsehay W.


A house owners act of giving notice to a lessee (tenant) requesting the
termination of the contract falls under the law of contracts, and this
cannot be regarded as causing interference in the possession of another
person which entails the legal remedy of possessory action by the lessee.
Articles 1149(1) and 2966(1) of the Civil Code
______________

Tahsas16, 2004 E.C. (December 26, 2011)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 06 Administration

Respondent: Alemtsehay W.
We have examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.
Judgment
The case is presented to this Cassation Division because the petitioner submits
that there is basic error of law in the decision of Addis Ababa Administration
Appellate Court Cassation Bench regarding possessory action.
The case was first brought by the current respondent (plaintiff at the lower
court) to Addis Ababa Administration First Instance Court who filed
possessory action against the petitioner. The respondent lives in Kirkos Sub-
City Kebele 10, House No. 059 which is publicly owned. The petitioner
(defendant at the lower court) gave the respondent written notice requiring her
to deliver the house stating that she owns another house in the name of her
husband. She contended that the Kebele has not ascertained whether she is
married, and demanded for the cessation of the interference thereby objecting
the petitioners act of giving her notice to deliver the house.
In its reply at the First Instance Court, the petitioner argued that the notice
is appropriate because its relationship with Alemtsehay is contractual, and that
she has a house in Keble 02 Nefas Silk Lafto Sub-city in the name of Kiflu I.
with whom she lives in wedlock and who is the father of her two children.
The First Instance Court rejected the possessory action of the current
respondent for cessation of interference and decided that the notice is
appropriate.
The respondent appealed to Addis Ababa Administration Appellate Court
which confirmed the lower courts decision. She further filed a petition to the
Citys Cassation Bench which reversed the decisions of the lower courts on
the ground that the petitioner has not proved whether she has concluded
marriage with Kiflu I.
The issue examined by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is
whether the decision which held that the petitioner has caused interference is
appropriate.
The fact that respondent lives in House No. 059 based on the contract she
has concluded with the petitioner has not been contested. The propriety of the
notice given to the respondent to terminate the contract and the issue whether
the petitioner will be bound by the terms of the contract are determined on the
basis of the contract and the relevant legal provisions.
As stipulated under Article 1149(1) of the Civil Code, one is said to have
interfered in another persons possession only if the latters possession is
deprived or interfered. The notice given by the owner of the house requesting
the lessee to leave the house shows intention to terminate a contract in
accordance with Article 2966(1) of the Civil Code and this cannot be regarded
as an act of interference in possession. The act rather falls under a contractual
relationship between the lessor and the lessee.
The relief sought by the respondent in the pleading submitted to the Addis
Ababa Administration First Instance Court did not contest the legality of the
petitioners measures to terminate the contract. Nor has the respondent
requested for a relief requiring the petitioner to be bound by the contract.
Instead, the respondent challenged the notice on the ground that it constitutes
interference in possession.
The lower court has infringed Article 182(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
in examining whether the contract can be terminated while it should have
rendered a decision based on the issue whether there is interference of
possession. The Citys Cassation Division has also erred because it rendered a
decision based on the issue whether the notice given was appropriate, while it
should have confined its decision to the question whether there is interference
in possession. Therefore, we have found that Addis Ababa courts have made
fundamental error of law in having rendered decisions regarding the validity

of the notice, which relates to an issue outside the relief sought by the
respondent.
Decree
1. The decisions of Addis Ababa First Instance Court, Addis Ababa
Administration Appellate Court and the Citys Cassation Division are
reversed.
2. The petitioner has not interfered in the possession of the respondent.
3. This decision does not deny the respondent of her right to submit her
claims to the relevant authority based on the contract.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 460 462.

Taitu Kebedes Heirs v. Tirunesh et al

The issuance of ownership certificates for immovable property should be
in conformity with the proper legal procedures. Their revocation should
also pursue legal procedures
Articles 1191-1198 of the Civil Code;
Articles 246-248 of the Civil Procedure Code
____________
Megabit 11, 2004 E.C. (March 20, 2012)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,
Nega Dufesa
Petitioners: Taitu Kebedes Heirs:
1. Hilina Fekadu
2. Mekdes Fekadu
Respondents: 1. Tirunesh Haile
2. Tewodros Mekonnen,
3. Arada Sub-City Kebele 03/09 Administration
The court has examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.
Judgment
The case involves title deeds of an immovable and it started at the Federal
First Instance Court with the petitioners as plaintiffs. The statement of claim
stated that the mother of the petitioners (Taitu Kebede) inherited House No.
615 located in Addis Ababa, Arada Sub-city, Keble 03/09, from their
grandfather (Wondtegegn Belayneh). According to the petitioners, the house
falls under the category of house allowed to be retained by the owner
(yetefekede bet) [which means a house that has not been nationalized under
Proclamation No. 47/1975], and they requested for declaratory judgment about
their status as heirs of their deceased mother Taitu Kebede.
Taitu, the deceased, had earlier submitted her claim of ownership to the
Federal First Instance Court. Although her request was rejected by the lower
court, the Federal Supreme Court (File No. 11399) had on Yekatit 4, 1996
(February 12, 2004) decided that Taitu is entitled to own the house. She was
given land holding certificate (yebota karta) No. 03/09/0673 on Meskerem 12,
1998 (September 22, 2005) and has been paying taxes for the house and the
land.
The petition states that the third respondent (i.e. the Keble Administration)
is still unlawfully obtaining the proceeds from rent from the first and second
respondents. The latter are not willing to leave the house despite repeated
notice. The petitioners requested that the first and the second respondents
should either deliver the house to them or pay house rent.
In its reply to the petition, the third respondent argued that the house was
nationalized based on Proclamation No. 47/1975 and stated that the petitioners
have no right over the house.
The Federal First Instance Court decided that the claim for the house is
based on the title deed that was given in 2005, and the request of the plaintiffs
(current petitioners) is not acceptable because the landholding certificate was
revoked on Megabit 12, 2002 E.C. (March 21, 2010). The appeal submitted to
the Federal High Court has also been rejected.
The petition is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
which has examined the arguments of both parties along with the issues
involved and the relevant laws. The Cassation Division has examined whether
the lower courts have erred in solely basing their decisions on the revocation
of the landholding certificate.
It can be noted from the lower courts decision that Taitu could on the one
hand be considered as the owner of the house based on the landholding title
certificate provided to her in 2005, while on the other hand the court rejected
her claim over the house because the relevant Administration revoked the
landholding title certificate on 21 March 2010 while the parties were under
litigation.
According to Article 1195 of the Civil Code, the issuance of title
certificate relating to an immovable by administrative authorities gives
presumption of ownership in favour of the person who holds the title
certificate. However, this presumption is rebuttable based on Article 1196 of
the Civil Code by proof to the contrary where a title certificate was not issued
[in accordance with the law or without authority]. Moreover, the relevant
administrative office that fails to duly perform its responsibility in this regard
incurs liability in accordance with Article 1198 of the Civil Code.
These provisions show that although the issuance of landholding title
certificate entails presumption of ownership of an immovable, the presumption
is not conclusive evidence. It is rather rebuttable by contrary evidence and can

be evaluated against such evidence. The procedures and rules that should be
pursued in providing title deeds should apply mutatis mutandis to the
procedures and rules of their revocation, and this can be noted from the
objectives, content and spirit of Articles 1195 to 1198 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, the dismissal of the case by the lower courts merely because the
relevant administrative authority revoked the title certificate while the case is
under litigation is not appropriate. The lower courts should have evaluated the
evidence produced by both parties and they have thus erred in rejecting the
claim of the petitioners solely based on the revocation of title certificate, and
this is not consistent with the objectives and content of the Civil Code
provisions indicated earlier.
The other argument that is raised by the petitioners is that the house which
belonged to their grandparent Wondtegegn Belayneh is a house chosen and
retained by the owner (yemircha bet) and was not nationalized. The third
respondent on the contrary argues otherwise.
The lower courts have not framed this issue and have failed to examine the
facts thereof. They should have pursued the binding interpretation in [Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division] File No. 24627 in which it was decided
that the issue whether a house was nationalized or not can be decided upon by
courts where the issue is presented to them.
We have therefore found the decisions of the lower courts unacceptable as
they are rendered without framing and examining the issues that are relevant
to the adjudication of the case in accordance with Articles 246 to 248 of the
The courts have arrived at decisions without framing and analyzing the
pertinent issues and have thus made fundamental error of law. We have
therefore rendered the following decree.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the High Court are
2. The Federal First Instance Court is instructed to frame the relevant issues
in accordance with the analysis made in this judgment and examine the
evidence of both parties. The case is, in accordance with Article 343(1),
remanded to the Federal First Instance Court for trial
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 450 452.
Genet Seyoum v. Kirkos Sub-City Kebele 17/18 Administration et al


After judicial decision by a lower court based on title certificate, the
revocation of title certificate by the administrative authority during an
appellate litigation cannot lead to the immediate dismissal of the case.
The party against whom the landholding certificate is revoked can contest
the legality of the action, and courts can examine the validity and legality
of the administrative act.
Articles 1195, 1195, 1206 of the Civil Code; Article 40 (1) (2) of the
FDRE Constitution;
Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code
_____________

Yekatit 28, 2004 E.C. (March 7, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Genet Seyoum
Respondents: 1. Kirkos Sub-City Kebele 17/18 Administration

2. Amelework Mulate
3. Bahre W/Giorgis
We have examined the case and rendered the following Judgement.
Judgment
The case involves the request of the petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court) for
the return of her house based on her claim which was initially brought to the
Federal First Instance Court.
Dr. Genets statement of claim states that she was a political refugee
outside Ethiopia while the Dergue was in power, that she has obtained title
deed for her house located in Kirkos Sub-City in 1985 EC (1993) under No.
15/31238 from the Ministry of Urban Development and Houses. She contested
the first respondents act of giving numbers 268, 269 and 270 to her house and
renting it to three persons including the second and third respondents.
Moreover, the statement of claim submits that the first respondent collects rent
from the houses and is unwilling to deliver it to her. The first respondent had
submitted a preliminary objection mainly by arguing that the house was
nationalized in accordance with [Proclamation No. 47/1975] and requested for
the dismissal of the case.
The Federal First Instance Court rejected the preliminary objections,
examined the merits of the case, and decided that the petitioner is the owner of
the house thereby ordering the respondents to deliver the house to the
petitioner. The respondents appealed to the Federal High Court and the first
respondent submitted additional evidence. The court reversed the lower
courts decision stating that the title deed which was submitted by the
petitioner as evidence for her claims has been revoked. The petitioners appeal
to the Federal Supreme Court was also rejected.
This petition is submitted against these decisions. The petitioner stated that
the Federal High Court has not taken Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure
Code into account when it admitted evidence and she requested that this error
of law be corrected. The Cassation Division has examined the issue whether it
was proper for the title deed to be revoked while the parties were under
litigation. The petitioner argued that she has neither received a house in
replacement nor has she received compensation which is the modus operandi
in relation with houses that are nationalized.
When a plaintiff institutes a statement of claim in accordance with Article
222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the law, i.e. Article 223 of the same Code
requires the submission of the list of witnesses and documentary evidence, and
the original and authenticated copies of the documents. Article 234 imposes
the same requirements for the respondent. With regard to documents, in
particular, Article 137(3) of the Civil Procedure Code requires the litigating
parties to annex them before the date of trial. It provides that no document
shall be received unless it is annexed with the pleading. The exception to this
rule is the courts recognition of serious and adequate cause envisaged under
The other possibility is that the court may of its own motion or on the
application of any of the parties admit additional evidence based on Articles
345 and 145(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
As stated above, the Federal High Court rejected the petitioners right over
the house based on the additional evidence of the first respondent that it has
admitted based on Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. It stated that
the admission of the new evidence is necessary for proper adjudication.
However, the decision does not indicate whether the petitioner was given the
opportunity to contest the validity of the revocation of the title deed after the
judgment of the First Instance Court.
A person who has a title certificate issued by an administrative authority is
presumed to be the owner by virtue of Article 1195 of the Civil Code. Reading
this provision in conjunction with Article 1196 indicates that the presumption
is not conclusive. In other words, the issuance of title certificate cannot be
regarded as conclusive evidence. The presumption embodied in Article 1195
is a rebuttable legal presumption under the circumstances stated in Article
1196.
On the other hand, if the revocation of the title certificate is contested,
decision should be given after examining whether the revocation is lawful, and
the mere claim that the title certificate is revoked does not render it valid
unless the issue is argued upon. The security of property rights enshrined in
Articles 40(1) and 40(2) of the Constitution will be violated if it is held that
the person whose holding certificate is revoked by an administrative organ
does not have judicial recourse.
Petitory action by an owner based on Article 1206 of the Civil Code
should not be set aside without adequate scrutiny and the plaintiff should be
allowed to submit arguments. The Civil Procedure Code entrusts courts with
the responsibility of finding out truth by pursuing appropriate procedures in
the admission of evidence. This shows that judicial decisions should be given
through due process, in the absence of which the judgement does not become
tenable at law.
In the case under consideration, the admission of additional evidence on
the revocation of the petitioners title certificate on Yekatit 16, 2001 E.C.
(February 23, 2009) does not in principle violate Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil
Procedure Code. However, concluding that the petitioner does not own the
house without examining the legality of the revocation and the evidence
regarding the ownership of the house is found to have error of law because it
has not pursued the Civil Procedure Code provisions as shown earlier and has
not considered the content and spirit of Articles 1195 and 1196 of the Civil
Code.
The decisions of the lower courts should thus be reversed, and the legality
of the revocation of the petitioners title deed and the issue regarding who
owns the house should be examined, thereby rendering it necessary to remand
the case to the lower court. Accordingly the following decree is rendered.

Decree
1. The order of the Federal Supreme Court (File No. 58891, dated October
22, 2010 and the decision of the Federal High Court (File No. 78798),
dated March 31, 2010 are reversed based on Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code.
with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it can examine the
petitioners title deed, the legality of the first respondents act of
revocation of title deed on 16 Yekatit 2001 E.C. (February 23, 2009), and
the issue of who owns the house by allowing the parties to present their
respective evidence and arguments.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 437 440.
Heria M. -v.- Shemsu Y.

- Sale of immovable property without valid title of ownership shall not be
protected irrespective of the buyers good faith and even if the sale is
made at the notary by using fraudulent documents presented by the seller.
- Buyer of an immovable from a person whom he knows is not authorized
to sell it cannot be considered as having good faith, and has no ground for
legal protection.
Articles 1195, 1196, 2882-2884 of the Civil Code
______________
Ginbot 15, 2003 E.C. (May 23, 2011)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Heria Mohammed Girgibo

Respondent: Shemsu Y.
Judgment
The case involves sale of a house by misrepresenting identity of names and a
forged document. The current petitioner obtained judgment from the Federal
First Instance Court after which the current respondent filed an opposition to
the judgement [before its execution] in accordance with Article 358 of the
The respondent has obtained landholding certificate and is in possession of
the house based on sale of House No. 1413 in Woreda 25, Keble 04. The sale
was made at the notary on Hamle 25, 1998 EC (August 1, 2006). The
respondent knew that the petitioner is the judgment creditor regarding the
house only after he saw the notice posted at the gate on Ginbot 3, 2001 EC
(May 11, 2009). He requested that the court decision issued on Miazia 8,
1995 EC (April 16, 2003) be revoked and his ownership be confirmed.
In her reply to the respondents opposition to judgment, the current

petitioner stated that the respondent cannot oppose the judgment noting that
her ownership is established by court of law. The petitioner stated that the
house was sold to Mudi Y. by Heria M. I. [who used her namesake]. The
petitioner argued that Mudi Y. (who also had obtained landholding certificate)
should have given the house to the petitioner according to court decisions
rather than selling it to the respondent. She contended that valid title cannot
emerge from Heria M. I.s sale who does not have ownership rights, and then
from Mudi Y. who had no valid title.
The lower court decided that the respondent bought the house from Mudi
Y. and a landholding certificate is issued in his name. It set aside its former
decision that had confirmed the petitioners ownership by citing Article 360(2)
of the Civil Procedure Code and stating that unless the administrative
authority which issued landholding certificate cancels the certificates validity,
the respondent should be considered owner of the house. The Federal High
court did not accept the petitioners appeal and confirmed the lower courts
decision after examining the arguments of both parties.
In a petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
on Meskerem 20, 2003 (September 30, 2010), the petitioner stated that the
lower courts have erred in deciding in favour of the respondent merely
because he produced a title certificate which is obtained through a chain of
two sales without valid titles. She indicated that the house belongs to her and
the respondent has bought the house from a person who does not have valid
title, and that the courts have erred in failing to consider Articles 1195 and
1196 of the Civil Code while rendering decisions.
The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both parties and
observed the following:
On Miazia 8, 1987 EC (April 16, 1995), the petitioner filed a suit against (1)
Mudi Y., (2) Lieutenant Sisay M., (3) Siga Meda Terara Residential Houses
Cooperative, (4) Kemal H., and (5) Heria M. I. The Federal First Instance
Court examined the evidence from both sides and decided that Mudi took
possession of the house from a person [Heria M. I.] who does not have valid
title and that the sale was conducted by using forged document. It found that
the contract of sale between Heria M. I. and Mudi Y. is void and ordered Mudi
Y. to return the house to the petitioner [former plaintiff].
The respondents appealed to the Federal High Court individually. Mudi
Y.s appeal (File No. 20831) was rejected on Hamle 2, 1995 EC (July 9,
2003). The appeal submitted by Kemal and Heria M. I. was accepted by the
Federal High Court (File No. 21687) on Megabit 5, 1999 EC (March 14,
2007), but was later reversed upon the petitioners appeal to the Federal

Supreme Court which referred the case to the Federal High Court in File No.
29978 (on Sene 11, 2000 EC, i.e. June 18, 2008). On Megabit 23, 2001 EC
(April 1, 2009) the Federal High Court confirmed the decision that was
originally rendered by the Federal First Instance Court. The petition of Kemal
H. and Heria M. I. submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
was rejected on Gibot 10, 2001 EC (May 18, 2009), File No. 45100.
The respondents argument is that he has in good faith bought the house
based on a contract of sale made at the notary [Documents Authentication and
Registration Office] and that he has obtained landholding certificate. He does
not claim to have built the house, nor does he contest the ownership that the
petitioner has over the house.
It is proved that Mudi Y. bought the house from Kemal H. and Heria M. I.
who used forged documents. Mudi Y. obtained a landholding certificate in his
name and sold the house to the respondent based on a contract concluded at
the notary.
Article 1195 of the Civil Code stipulates that a person who receives title
deed from the relevant authority shall be presumed as the owner of immovable
property. When such a person sells the property to another person, the sale
cannot be regarded as illegal. However, the legal presumption embodied in
Article 1195 of the Civil Code is not conclusive evidence because it can be
rebutted by any other evidence that can prove the existence of the conditions
stated under Article 1196. Even if a person who produces landholding
certificate from the relevant authority is presumed to be the owner of a house,
Article 1196 clearly shows that the presumption can be refuted if it can be
proved that the title certificate was given outside the rules, procedures and
authority thereof.
Mudi took possession of the house and passed it over to the current
respondent after having bought it from persons without valid title who used
forged documents as indicated by court decisions at various levels. There is
thus no legal ground to consider the sale made by Mudi to the respondent as
valid. The fact that the respondent has concluded the contract at the notary
cannot legalize a contract which is initially unlawful. A contract relating to an
immovable shall not be granted legal protection merely on the ground of good
faith.
Where a person without valid title sells property with warranty to the
buyer, the rightful owner has recourse against the seller as embodied in
Articles 2282-2284 of the Civil Code. Mudi was aware that he does not have a
valid title over the house since Hamle 2, 1995 EC (July 9, 2003), and it was
with this awareness that he sold the house on Hamle 25, 1998 EC (August 1,
2006). He has not also given warranty to the buyer. There is no legal ground

to accept the validity of the sale made to the respondent by the seller who sold
the property after having known the court decisions against various persons
who had court litigation with the petitioner. In sum, the mere fact that the sale
of the house under dispute is made at the notary and that the respondent is now
in possession of landholding certificate shall not render the contract valid as
long as the seller did not have valid title at the time of sale. We have thus
found that the [Federal High Courts] decision which rejected the petitioners
claims involves error in law. We have accordingly rendered the following
decree:
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court on Tikimt 10,
2002 E.C., i.e. October 20, 2010 (File No. 04917) and confirmed by the
Federal High Court on Sene 29, 2002, i.e. July 6, 2010 (File No. 88537)
are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code.
2. The respondent does not have legal right over the house in dispute. The
petitioner is the owner of the house.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 289 292.

Rahel S. -v.- Mesfin T.


The act of a judgment debtor who transfers property to his child who
cannot be presumed to have earned it through labour, creativity, enterprise
or capital is not legally tenable. Such fraudulent alienation of property is
meant to evade execution of judgment and its validity can be challenged.
Articles [1995 and 1996(1)] of the Civil Code;
Article 40(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
_____________


Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Rahel S.
Respondent: Mesfin T.
Judgment
The petitioner claimed that there is fundamental error of law that should be
corrected in the order rendered by the Federal First Instance Court and the
Federal High Court. The petitioner, a judgment creditor, has requested that the
respondents house be sold to settle the debt he owes her. The house is
transferred to and registered in his daughters name. The petitioner requested
that the judgment debtor has done this transfer of title to evade execution of
the judgement on the property and demanded that the house be sold to settle
the debt.
The First Instance Courts order stated that the execution of judgement is
requested on a house not registered under the debtors name but under the
name of Maramawit Mesfin. Moreover, the Federal High Court dismissed the
petitioners appeal by invoking Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Rahel S. brought her petition to this Cassation Division requesting that the
judgment debtor has transferred his property to his daughter who is a minor,
and she sought the error of law to be examined and corrected. The respondent
argued that the house belongs to Maramawit Mesfin, and stated that it can be
verified by a contract and various receipts.
The Order of the lower court shows that the ownership title of the house
was transferred to the respondents daughter when there were efforts to
recover the debt. The girl in whose name the house is registered is a child.
According to Article 40(2) of the Constitution, a person becomes an owner
of property produced by his labour, creativity, enterprise or capital. The mere
fact that the house that was registered under the name of the respondent and
his wife Alem Z. has now been registered under their daughters name does
not lead to the conclusion that their daughter becomes an owner. This rather
shows the respondents attempt to evade payment of debt by transferring the
house to his daughter.
Ethiopian law does not allow a judgement debtor to evade the execution of
his debt by transferring property to his child who is a minor and then act in the
capacity of a guardian and a tutor to administer, sell and exchange the same
property. It can be observed from Articles [1995 and 1996] of the Civil Code
that a creditor can challenge the validity of acts to execute debts where the
debtor, in fraud of the creditor's rights, alienates property. We have thus found
fundamental error of law in the decisions which should not have dismissed the
petitioners request that the transfer of the house to the respondents minor
child, Maramawit is fraudulent as it has the objective of evading the execution
of debt.
Decree
1. The orders of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court
are reversed.
2. The case is referred to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with
Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall execute the
respondents debt through auction sale of the house that was previously
registered under the names of the respondent and his wife, and which is
currently registered under the name of Maramawit.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 256 257.
Abadit L. v. Zalambesa Town Administration & Berhane Z.


A statement of claim about improper revocation of landholding and
ownership of a house can be adjudicated in courts. It shall not be
considered as a purely administrative function outside the jurisdiction of
courts.
Articles 37 and 79(b) of the FDRE Constitution;
______________


Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Abadit Lemlem

Respondents: 1. Zalanbesa Town Administration;
2. Berhane Zerefe

Judgment
The case started with the current petitioner as plaintiff regarding her claim
over a house. She was allocated land at Zalanbesa Town and she built a house
with the money she received from the Zalanbesa Town Administration and her
own money. Her statement of claim shows that the land and the house were
registered in her name, and she contested the first respondents act of taking
her house and giving it to the second respondent.
The first respondent submitted preliminary objections and a statement of
defence on the merits of the case. The preliminary objections stated that the
petitioner was given the land and monetary support to build the house because
her house was destroyed due to the [Ethio-Eritrean] war. This was based on
the governments administrative decision so that persons under such
circumstances could be given land and monetary support for building their
houses. The preliminary objections noted that the termination of her
entitlement was an administrative decision which should not be adjudicated by
a court. With regard to the merits of the case, the first respondent stated that
the petitioners request to the Administration was not accepted because it
discovered reasons which do not entitle the petitioner to get land and monetary
support. The second respondent also replied that he has received the property
based on the decision of a public administrative organ and he asked for the
dismissal of the petitioners request.
The court that initially adjudicated the case decided that the house should
be returned to the petitioner. The second respondent appealed to the Tigray
Supreme Court which reversed the lower courts decision by stating that the
case should be examined and decided administratively and that it does not fall
under the jurisdiction of courts. Abadits petition to Tigray Supreme Court
Cassation Division was also rejected. A petition is brought to the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division against this decision.
Due to the destruction of their houses as a result of the war, 969 (nine
hundred and sixty nine) dwellers were living in plastic tents. The rehabilitation
scheme designed by a committee of various organs established by the
government devised criteria regarding persons who deserve assistance. It was
decided that each person will be given land and Birr 25,000 (twenty five
thousand) in three instalments. It was confirmed that the petitioner was
displaced due to the war, was living in plastic tent, and was given landholding
certificate. She has built a house by using the Birr 7,500 (seven thousand five
hundred) which she received as the first instalment of monetary support, plus
her own Birr 7,000 (seven thousand). The house was nearly complete except
roofing.
In principle, adjudication at the federal or regional levels is the power of
courts as enshrined in Article 79(b) of the Constitution of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Yet, Article 37 of the Constitution shows
that the power of courts in this regard is not absolute. The joint reading of
Articles 79(b) and 37 of the Constitution shows that courts have jurisdiction
only where a case involves justiciable matter.
According to Article 37(1) of the Constitution, Everyone has the right to
bring a justiciable matter to courts, and to obtain a decision or judgement by
court of law or any other competent body with judicial power. The phrase or
any other competent body with judicial power in Article 37(1) of the
Constitution and the stipulation in Article 4 of he Civil Procedure Code show
that any justiciable matter can be adjudicated by courts unless it is expressly
stated as the function of another organ.
The petitioners claim is that her house and landholding is unduly taken
away from her and she is claiming that her property right be respected. There
is no law which forbids such cases to be adjudicated by courts. No organ is
expressly entrusted with the task of adjudicating the case. Therefore it is not a
case that should be administratively decided; it is rather a justiciable matter
which should be decided by court. We have found fundamental error of law in
the reversal of the lower courts decision by the appellate court which
considered the case as an administrative matter. We have thus decided the
following.
Decree
1. The decision of Tigray Region Supreme Court Appellate Division (File
No, 23281 dated Ginbot 14 2000 E.C.: May 22, 2008) that was confirmed
by a majority opinion of the Tigray Supreme Court Cassation Division
File No. 25845 dated Tir 28, 2001 E.C. (February 5, 2009) are reversed in
accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The petitioners request regarding the improper takeover of her house and
landholding is an issue that should be decided by courts and cannot be
settled by administrative decision.
3. As the case can be adjudicated in court, it is remanded to Tigray Region
Supreme Court Appellate Division in accordance with Article 343(1) of
the Civil Procedure Code so that it can render its decision by examining
whether the Zone Courts decision on the merits of the case had related the
evidence produced by both parties with the relevant laws.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 249 251.

Samuel T. - v. - Ayisha A. et al
Possessory action by a person not residing in the house or by a
person who is not in actual control thereof is inadmissible.
Articles 1206 and 1149 of the Civil Code
________________

Ginbot 6, 2002 E.C. (May 14, 2010)

Justices: Hirut Mellsse, Teshager G/Selassie, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Samuel Tonoro
Respondents: Ayisha Argessa et al
Judgment
The case was commenced by a suit respondents filed with the lower court
requesting an injunction against petitioner who allegedly obstructed them from
renovating the house which had been under their possession since 1957 E.C.
In his reply to the suit, the petitioner argued that the house belongs not to the
respondents but to the parents of his spouse who, upon going abroad,
authorized his spouse to administer the house as agent; that the house was first
rented to the spouse of first respondent whom petitioner allowed to live in the
house for free until he died in 1995 E.C. Petitioner further argued that the
house has never been in the possession of respondents and he has not caused
any nuisance.
The Woreda Court stated the fact that the first respondents actual control
over the house has been established by the testimony of witnesses and ruled
that the petitioner shall cease the interference. The petitioner appealed against
the decision but the appeal was rejected by the Kembata and Tembaro Zone
High Court; likewise, his petition to the Cassation Division of the SNNPR
Supreme Court was rejected.
In his cassation petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation

Division, the petitioner argued that the legal action brought by the first
respondent more than 15 years after she had left the area should have been
barred. Petitioner also reiterated that sufficient documentary evidence has been
adduced to prove the fact that the house belonged to the parents of his spouse
who authorized her to administer the house when they travelled abroad. He
pointed out that the respondents had never lived in the house and requested for
reversal of the decisions of the lower courts. The cassation petition was
accepted with a view to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute
should be handled by the competent court or, should this be overruled, to
determine the propriety of the ruling that petitioner has interfered with the
possession of respondents.
In the suit they brought against the petitioner in the lower court,
respondents alleged that petitioner interfered with their possession by
obstructing the renovation of a house. They also stated that they have been in
actual possession since 1957 E.C. Petitioner, on his part, argued that the
house belongs to the parents of his spouse; that respondents lived in another
place, and the house has never been under their possession.
It is evident from Article 1149 of the Civil Code that a person whose
possession is interfered with or who is deprived of his possession may require
the cessation of the interference or restoration of the thing. Accordingly, the
respondents who have brought action alleging interference by the petitioner
have to prove that the property interfered with is under their possession and
their possession has actually been interfered with.
Possession, as defined under Article 1140 of the Civil Code, consists in the
actual control which a person exercises over a thing; hence, respondents bear
the burden of proving the fact that they have been in actual control of the
disputed house. In the course of the proceeding, we have come to realize that
the spouse of first respondent had been living in the house until 1995 E.C., and
the house was not in the possession of the respondents thereafter as it was
rather held by another person (holder). Respondents have also admitted this
fact in their response to the cassation petition; the same fact has been affirmed
by the witnesses who testified before the appellate court that first respondent,
who resided in Alaba city, occasionally came to check out the house. All this
shows that respondents neither lived in the house nor exercised actual control
over it; hence, they had no right to bring legal action under Article 1149.
We have thus found out that the issue in the dispute pertains to who the
owner of the disputed house is, thus requiring a petitory action, rather than
interference with possession. The decisions of the lower courts are thus found
to involve fundamental error of law; hence, the following decree has been
rendered:

Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Woreda Court in File No. 00928 on Yekatit
28, 2000 E.C (March 7, 2008), the decision of the Kembata Tembaro Zone
High Court (File No. 02325) rendered on Hamle 17, 2000 E.C, (July 24,
2008) and the decree issued by the SNNPR Supreme Court Cassation
Division (File No. 23840) on Hidar 23, 2001 (December 2, 2009) have all
been reversed.
2. The possessory action brought by respondents is inadmissible.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 232 234.
Abridged translation: Dr. Dereje Zeleke
15. Successions
File
No. Year Vol. Pages
1 Leul K.v. Seble K. 73247 2013 14 175- 177
2 Daniel T. & Tsion T. v. Asalefe 58338 2011 11 135-138

T. (Child), Tutor: Tamirat B.
3 Hanna T.v. Taemu D. 57114 2011 11 66-67
4 Tutor of Robel Neguse, W/ro 49851 2010 10 68-69

Tarikua Abebe
5 Amare R.v. Solomon K. 43069 2010 10 70-73
6 Tewodros M. v. G/Hiwot T. 40510 2009 8 269-271
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter15:Successions277
Leul K. -v.- Seble K. et al

An action can be instituted to have a certificate of heir annulled if it is
issued on a property over which a person does not have a right.
Article 998(1) of the Civil Code
______________
Tir 14, 2005 E.C. (22 January 2013)

Petitioner: Leul K.
Respondent: Seble K. and others
Judgment
This case started at the Tigray Woreda Court when the current petitioner
together with Michael K. and Alem G. ascertained the property making up the
inheritance from the deceased, Bashay K., and claimed the transfer the estate
to the heirs. The respondents filed an opposition as per Article 358 of the Civil
Procedure Code arguing the evidence obtained by the petitioner, in a manner
not clear to them, incorporates a house used for business located at Adigrat
and placed on 43 square meter area, and which has been given to them by
donation. They stated that this house is inappropriately transferred to the heirs.
The current petitioner and the other heirs responded to the opposition
stating that the issue has been decided in a litigation that had gone up to the
regional Cassation Division and it was proved that the deceased and the
mother of the respondents were not married. They further argued that thirteen
of the deceaseds heirs are listed in the certificate of heir, and contested the
respondents claim of donation on the ground that it is untrue and unregistered
at the notary. The petitioner recalled the litigation between heirs of the
deceased and the mother of the respondents and stated that it has been proved
that she does not have a right on the land and house and that this decision has
not been reversed.

The Woreda Court examined the arguments and evidence of both sides
and found that the contested house was given as a donation to the respondents
in on Megabit 26, 1964 E.C. (April 4, 1972) and this was confirmed by the
Family Council on Tir 8, 1972 E.C. (January 17, 1980). The Court further
observed that the donation was authenticated by a court and that this has been
confirmed by the Tigray Regional State Supreme Court. Hence, the Court
decided that the contested house shall be given to the respondents and it
annulled part of the certificate of heir that makes reference to the house. The
current petitioner and the other heirs appealed to the Adigrat Central Court
which reversed the decree of the lower court on the ground that it is
inappropriate to annul the certificate of heir as long as the contested house is
registered in the name of the deceased, and noted that the certificate of heir
obtained by the petitioner and other heirs does not bar the respondents from
exercising their right under the donation. The court added that the respondents
could bring a suit on the property to protect their right. Afterwards, the current
respondents brought their petition before the Regions Supreme Court which
reversed the decision of the High Court and confirmed the decree of the
Woreda Court. The cassation petition to the Regions Cassation Division was
not accepted.
This petition is as a result brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal
Supreme Court. The petitioner stated that there is fundamental error of law in
the decision of the lower courts. The Division has examined the relevant law
and the decision of the lower court that led to this petition. Accordingly, the
Division has framed the issue whether it was inappropriate for the lower court
not to consider the petitioners opposition that the issue has been heard and
decided upon by another court.
As can be learned from the proceedings, the respondents requested for the
annulment of certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner and other heirs on a
house with an area of 43 square meters located at Adigrat. They claimed that
their deceased father, Bashay K., has given it to them in the form of donation
in 1972, and that the donation was authenticated in conformity with the law.
Even if the petitioner claimed to have litigated over the property with the
mother of the respondents, courts having jurisdiction to see the matter have
rejected the argument finding that the court case involving the mother of the
respondents is over a property other than the one contested in this case and
that even if it can be said that the litigation was made it does not concern the
respondents. The lower courts also found that the petitioner brought a suit to
have the 1972 donation contract invalidated, but the Regions Supreme Court
decided against the invalidation request, and the donation has been
authenticated in 1980 in line with the law.

As can be understood from the contents of Article 998 of the Civil Code, if
it is proved that an heir has without a valid right obtained a certificate of heir,
the court may annul the certificate it issued. According to Article 5(1) of the
Civil Procedure Code, a court shall not try a suit or issue where the matter
which is directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially
in issue in a former suit between the same parties and has received a final
decision. When the issue is viewed in the light of these provisions, the
petitioner has not received a final decision on the litigation related to the
contested house with the mother of the respondents.
Moreover, it is proved that the deceased made donation to his children,
who are the respondents. The decision that the mother of the respondents does
not have a right on the property does not annul the legal argument raised by
the respondents. On the contrary, it can be understood from the contents and
spirit of Article 998(1) of the Civil Code that the donation made in favour of
the respondents has been authenticated by courts at different times and this
proves the right of the respondents on the contested property. This entitlement
of the respondents is a valid ground for annulling the certificate of heir
obtained by the petitioner and other heirs.
Therefore, the petitioners argument that he has taken delivery of the
house in accordance with a decision made in 1984 E.C. (1992) is not in
congruence with the litigation process and content. This issue was not also
brought in a clear manner before the lower courts, and raising it as a new issue
at this Division is contrary to Article 329(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. This
Cassation Division has not found the argument acceptable. We have not thus
found fundamental error of law in the decision of the courts.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Tigray Regional Supreme Courts Appellate
Division and which has been affirmed by the Regions Cassation Division
is confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure
Code.
2. There is no fundamental error of law in the decision which nullifies the
certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner on the contested house that is
being used for business.
_________________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 171-173.

Daniel T. & Tsion T. -v.- Asalefe T. (Child), Tutor: Tamrat B.


- A small amount of disposition made in favor of an heir at law amounts to
a disinhersion, and in such a case the heir shall be entitled to a partition of
the estate along with the legatee by universal title;
- posing a serious problem in my life does not suffice as a reason to
disinherit an heir.
- An heir at law disinherited without sufficient legal reason or by omission
shall have equal share in the estate as the legatee by universal title
Article 912, 938, 939, 915, 1014, 1123 of the Civil Code
_____________
Cassation Case No.58338

Miazia 06, 2003 E.C. (April 14, 2011)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioners: Daniel T. & Tsion T.

Respondent: Asalefe Tsigie (Child); Tutor/curator: Tamrat Birru
The court examined the case and rendered the following judgment.
Judgment
The case started when the respondent Tamrat Birru, tutor of Asalefe T.
submitted application to the Addis Ababa City First Instance Court asking the
court to declare Asalefe T. legatee of the deceased Ato Tsigie Z., based of the
latters will made on Hamle 7, 1998 E.C. (July 14, 2006). After the court gave
declaratory judgment accepting the application, the petitioners filed an
application as per Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code requesting that the
status of legatee given to the respondent be cancelled.
They stated that the deceased, in his will, has disinherited them by entitling
each them to only Birr 5 (five) alleging that they have posed serious problems
in his life. The petitioners requested to be declared heirs of the deceased and
stated that they have been disinherited without reason. The court ruled that the
will made by the deceased has disinherited the petitioners without sufficient
reason. Thus the court entitled the petitioners to have equal share in the
inheritance with the respondents.
The respondents dissatisfied with this decision appealed to Addis Ababa
City Appellate court. The court after examining the case decided that the
deceased in his will has only reduced the shares of the petitioners (plaintiffs at
the lower court), but has not disinherited them. It reversed the decision given
by the First Instance Court and upheld the will. The petitioners dissatisfied by
the decision of the court brought their case to the Cassation Bench of the
Addis Ababa City Court. The Citys Cassation Bench after hearing both
parties affirmed the decision of Addis Ababa City Appellate Court.
The petition to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court is
made against these decisions which upheld the will of the deceased. The
petitioners claim that there is fundamental error of law committed by the
lowers courts. The petitioners argued that the will of the deceased entitled
each of them to only Five Birr out of the whole estate which is worth over Birr
600,000 (six hundred thousand), in effect disinheriting the first degree heirs.
The petitioners stated that the interpretation of the deceaseds will as a reduced
share in inheritance rather than disherison fails to take into account Articles
938, 939 and 1123 of the Civil Code and they sought reversal of the decisions
given by Addis Ababa Appellate Court and the Citys Cassation Bench
This Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has noted that the
issues to be considered are whether the deceased Tsigie Z. has, in the will he
made on July 14, 2006, disinherited the petitioners and what should be the
consequence thereof. As stipulated under Articles 938 and 939 of the Civil
Code, a parent cannot expressly or by omission disinherit his heirs at law
without sufficient and legitimate reason. If a parent disinherits his/her heirs at
law without sufficient and legitimate reason or by omission as envisaged
under Article 915 of the Civil Code, the heirs at law shall have equal share of
the inheritance. This court found that the Five Birr given to the petitioners out
of the estate of the deceased estimated at six hundred thousand Birr cannot be
considered as a case of reduced share of legacy but as an act of disinheriting
the petitioners.
The Court further noted that the reason of the disherison which reads
posing a serious problem in my life lacks clarity. By taking this statement as
true, based on Article 938[2&3] of the Civil Code, the court has examined
whether this reason falls under the grounds that justify disinheriting an heir at
law as stipulated under Article 938[2] of the Civil Code. The court reasoned
that posing a serious problem in a persons life (behiywote lai kefitegna
chigir silefeterubign) can have several degrees of gravity and manifestations,

and is insufficient as a legitimate reason for disinheriting.
The court held that the will made by the deceased shall not be invalid on
the ground of formalities. Yet, the money allocated for the petitioners amounts
to disherison in light of the value of the inheritance, and such an amount
cannot be regarded as receipt of a share in inheritance and falls under lesion as
envisaged in Article 1123 of the Civil Code. Therefore the legacy cannot be
regarded as legacy by singular title, but as legacy by universal title which has,
in effect, disinherited the petitioners without a legitimate reason. The remedy
does not thus lie in Article 1014(e) which applies to cases of legacy by
singular title, but rather warrants the application of Articles 938, 939 and 915
of the Civil Code so that the petitioners will be entitled to equal share in the
legacy with the legatee by universal title, i.e. the respondent.
Therefore the decisions of the Addis Ababa City Appellate Court and the
Citys Cassation Bench contain fundamental error of law because they related
the issue with reduced share in inheritance without taking into consideration
the disinheritance effect of the will in light of the value of the deceaseds estate.
Decree
1. The decision of Addis Ababa Appellate Court, File No. 12988 rendered on
Megabit 17, 2002 E.C. (March 26, 2010) and its confirmation by the Addis
Ababa City Cassation Bench File No. 13364 on Ginbot 19, 2002 E.C. (May
27, 2010) are amended in accordance with Art. 348 of the Civil Procedure
Code
2. The Addis Ababa City First Instance Court decision, File No. 137/02,
rendered on Yekatit 26, 2002 E.C. (March 5, 2010), is affirmed as per
Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code
3. The will of the deceased made on July 14, 2006 has, in effect, disinherited
the petitioners without sufficient and legitimate reason and shall not thus
be applicable. Since the will has only made the respondent an heir, he shall
divide the property of the deceased equally with the other heirs, i.e., the
petitioners.
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 135-138
Abridged translation: Tsedey Girma & G. Habteyes

Hanna T.e v.-. Taemu D.

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 57114 (Ginbot 3, 2003)
Period of limitation shall run from the date an heir, who is a minor,
reaches the age majority, or from the time he/she starts to exercise rights.
________________
Ginbot 3, 2003 E.C (May 11, 2011)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammad, Nega Dufesa,
Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Hanna T.
Respondent: Taemu D.
Judgment
The case started at the Federal First Instance Court where the petitioner, and
Dawit T., a brother of the current petitioner, were the plaintiffs. They brought
a suit claiming partition of inheritance. The respondent, Taemu, in her
statement of defense argued that the case is barred by a period of limitation, as
ten years have passed since the death of the father of the plaintiffs. However,
the respondent had withdrawn the preliminary objection of period of limitation
which she had invoked against Dawit T. as she was his guardian/tutor who
brought him up. The Court after examining the case rejected the claims of the
current petitioner stating that the suit is barred by a period of limitation.
An appeal was brought to the Federal High Court from the decision, but
the court affirmed the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. This
petition is thus brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme
Court from this decision of the Federal High Court.
The Cassation Division has examined the petition dated Sene 10, 2002
(June 17, 2010) after calling upon and hearing the respondent. It then
examined the propriety of enforcing the period of limitation on the petitioner,
given the substantively proven fact that the respondent is the step mother of
the petitioner. In its examination of the matter, the Cassation Division noted
that it was only Dawit Tsegaye, brother of the petitioner, and not the petitioner
herself, who was under the guardianship of the respondent. It can however be
understood from the decision of the First Instance Court that the petitioner,
same as her brother (Dawit T.), was also a minor.
One of the reasons that led the First Instance Court to decide that the
period of limitation objection raised by the respondent is applicable only on
the petitioner was because guardians and tutors are required to have a minors
rights protected on time. With regard to the petitioner, the Court took the date
on which her father died for the purpose of counting the period of limitation.
However, the Court did not indicate as to when the petitioner was emancipated.
Moreover, even though the respondent, invoked the 10 years period of
limitation citing Article 1845 of the Civil Code, she has failed to establish that
the petitioner has let the period of limitation lapse after she reached the age of
majority, i.e. after her emancipation from minority.
The Cassation Division observed that there is no reason why the period of
limitation which is said to be inapplicable on Dawit T. would not be applicable
on the petitioner. Moreover, the Cassation Division has found no legal ground
that supports the argument that the guardians/tutors of the petitioner should
have protected the rights of the petitioner. This court has further observed that
the main issue that should be underscored is that the petitioner is her fathers
heir and that she seeks to secure her right of succession. The period of
limitation should run from the time she reached the age of majority, the time
during which she can start to exercise her right. This Court has thus found the
decision of the lower courts as having fundamental error of law. Accordingly,
the following decree is rendered.
Decree
1. The orders given by the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 14168 on
Megabit 24, 2001 (April 2, 2009) and by the Federal First Instance Court
on File No. 79963 on Ginbot 17, 2002 (May 25, 2010) are amended in
2. The request of the petitioner for liquidation of succession is not barred by
a period of limitation. Hence, it shall be seen with the pleading of Dawit
T..

_________________________________________________
Robel Negussies Tutor, Tarikua Abebe

- In a will that is authenticated by an appropriate official of the
Document Registration and Authentication office, it is mandatory
for the name and signature of the notary to be put as one of the
witnesses where there is only one witness other than the official at
the notary present during the authentication.
- If there are two witnesses during the will that is authenticated, it is
not mandatory for the name of the official to be put along with the
other witnesses as long as the fact that the will was done before an
appropriate official is confirmed by a signature of the official and a
stamp of the Office
______________

Miazia 4, 2002 E.C. (April 12, 2010)
Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed,
Petitioner: Robel Negussies Tutor, Tarikua Abebe
Respondent: None
Judgment
The case came before this Court by a petition written on Tikimt 16, 2002 E.C.
(26 October 2009). The petitioner stated that the decisions rendered by the
Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court, the Citys Appellate
Court and the Cassation Division have fundamental error of law.
The case was first seen at the Addis Ababa First Instance City Court and
the petitioner stated that W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye Desta, the grandmother of
Robel Neguse, has made a will stating that the heir to her house (Address:
Addis Ababa, Kebelle 01, House No. 872) is Robel Neguse. The will has been
signed by two witnesses in front of an appropriate official of the Document
Authentication and Registration Office and it was authenticated on the
Meskerem 27, 2001 E.C. (October 7, 2008). The Office registered the will
and kept one copy for itself and gave another to the beneficiary of the will.
Then, Robel Neguse submitted application to the Addis Ababa First Instance
City Court for certificate of heir which shows that he is the heir of the late
W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye. Two witnesses have also testified at the court and
they have stated that the deceased made his will at the Document
Authentication and Registration Office.
The Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court examined the
will and the testimony and decided that the formalities under Article 881 of
the Civil Code have not been fulfilled. Moreover, the name of the official of
the Document and Authentication and Registration office has not been
mentioned as a witness and that it has not been signed. This falls short of the
formality stated under Article 882 of the Civil Code.
The petitioner argued that the deceased W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye had her
will authenticated at the Will Department of the FDRE Ministry of Justice
Document Authentication and Registration Office Addis Ketama Branch and
the official at the department has given a signed proof showing this. It has
been proven by the official at the Will Department of this office showing that
the will has been signed by two witnesses in front of the appropriate official
on a working day. She argued that the decision that the will does not fulfill the
formalities under 882 of the Civil Code has a fundamental error in the
interpretation of the law. The decision in addition to nullifying the value of the
will of the deceased, it is against the best interest of the child. She thus
requested for the correction of the error and for the will to be recognized.
There was no defendant in both lower courts.
This court has examined the files and has observed that the deceased W/ro
Tesfanesh Ambaye appeared before the Document Authentication and
Registration on 7 October 2008 and her will was done in the presence of two
witnesses in front of an appropriate official of the Office. The will was signed
forthwith by the deceased and by the witnesses. Then an appropriate official of
the Office authenticated the will with his signature and a stamp of the office.
This should be evaluated based on Article 882 of the Civil Code. Article 882
of the Civil Code states that a public will shall be valid where it is made in
the presence of two witnesses one of whom is a registrar or a notary acting in
the discharge of his duties.
The Addis Ababa City Administration Court decided that the name of the
official of the office should have been put as one of the witnesses. The court

stated that even though the will was done before the appropriate official, since
his name was not put as one of the witnesses, the will would not have any
legal value.
Such interpretation does not comply with the spirit and objective of the
law. The proof of the will shows that the will was done before an appropriate
official of the Office and that after the will was read out loud the deceased and
the two witnesses signed on it. The appropriate official, who was overseeing
the whole process then authenticated the will with his signature, put a stamp
on it, numbered it, kept one copy for the Office and gave another copy to the
deceased. This fulfills the formalities under Article 882 of the Civil Code and
ensures that the will is actually the last word of the deceased.
Therefore, it generally is not mandatory for the name of the official to be
put along with the other witnesses as long as the fact that the will was done
before an appropriate official is confirmed by a signature of the official and a
stamp of the Office. The name of the official has to be put as one of the
witnesses only if there is only one other witness beside him. In the case at
hand, there are two other witnesses in addition to the official. Therefore, this
court has decided that the decision made by the lower court based on Article
882 has a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decisions of the Addis Ababa City Administration Court, the Citys
Appellate Bench and the Citys Cassation Division are reversed.
2. The will made on in writing October 7, 2008 by Tesfanesh Ambaye in
favour of Robel Neguse fulfils the formalities under Article 882 of the
Civil Code. Accordingly, the will shall have legal effect.
_______________________________________________
Volume: 10, pp 68-69
Amare R. -v.- Solomon K.

A legatee by universal title and an heir-at-law should divide the property
equally if the will that gives the property to the legatee is a universal will
and where the heirs at law have not been disinherited based on legally
acceptable grounds.
Articles 911(1), 912(1), 939(3) and 915(1/) of the Civil Code
_____________
Miazia 6, 2002 E.C. (April 14, 2010)
Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wollie,

Ali Mohammed,
Petitioner: Amare Reta
Respondent: Solomon K.
Judgment
This case was brought before the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme
Court because the petitioner claimed that there is a fundamental error of law in
the decision of the lower court which held that the heir-at-law and the legatee
should divide the property among themselves.
The current petitioner is now in possession of a house located in Akaki
Sub City, Kebelle 01 in accordance with a will written on Ginbot 23, 1992 EC
(May 31, 2000) by the deceased Kassaye K.. The current respondent, at the
lower court, requested for a judgment stating that the current petitioner should
leave the house to him. The lower court, after examining the arguments and
the evidence, recognized the fact that the deceased disinherited his son without
giving sufficient reason and gave his property to the petitioner. Therefore, in
accordance with Article 939(3) of the Civil Code, it decided that the property
should be equally divided between the heir-at-law and the legatee. An appeal
was submitted to the Federal High court, but the court confirmed the earlier
decision.
The petitioner, then, brought the case to this court on Tahsas 9, 2001 E.C.
(December 18, 2008) stating that there is a fundamental error of law in these
decisions. The main content of the petition is that the property given to the
legatee is only one house, not the whole property of the deceased. He
contended that the lower court wrongly interpreted Article 939(3) and
considered him as a legatee by universal title, and he requested for the reversal
of the decisions of the lower courts.
This Court has examined the petition and summoned the respondent to
examine whether the decisions of the lower courts based on Articles 939 and
852 were appropriate. In his defense submitted to the court on Nehassie 15,
2001 E.C. (August 21, 2009), the respondent argued that the heirs-at-law were
disinherited contrary the law and that the deceased did not have any other
property besides the house mentioned. So, he requested for the decision of the
lower courts to be confirmed.
This court has examined the case based on the arguments and analyzed the
law in relation to the issue at hand. The petitioner claims that he should be the
sole owner of the house he has obtained by virtue of the will while the
respondent seeks to be regarded as an heir. The respondent is requesting for
the confirmation of the decision of the lower court so that he can share the
property with the legatee.
The major issue that needs the decision of this court is whether the will
written in favor of the petitioner is a legacy by universal title or a legacy by
singular title. The petitioner, in this regard, argues that he was given only the
house by the will, while the respondent contends that the house was the only
property the deceased had.
The will written by the deceased dated May 31, 2002 states that he has left
his house along with its roof, walls and soil to his God-son Ato Amare R.
because his children did not visit him. The will further reads, if there is
anything in the house that his wife claims, it belongs to her, and she should
have it. There is also a one-room house left for his wife W/ro Enat M. which
has been confiscated by the government. It has also been stated that the wife
can use the house until she passes away, after which it will pass onto Ato
Amare R..
It can be recognized from the will that the deceased has put everything he
owned in the will. Article 911(1) of the Civil Code provides that where the
testator has used expressions like my heirs or my property or my
immovable property, in order to give meaning to such words, he shall be
deemed to have envisaged the position at the time of his death. Moreover,
Article 912(1) states that a legacy by universal title is a disposition whereby
the testator calls one or more persons to receive the full ownership or the bare
ownership of one whole or of a portion of the property.
Therefore the lower courts have not erred in finding that the petitioner is a
legatee by universal title.
There is no argument as to whether the respondent is an heir-at-law. The
Court has also seen from the files that the petitioner has received property
from the deceased as a legatee by universal title. On the other hand, there is no
legally acceptable ground for disinheriting the children of the deceased. The
lower court, after examining these facts, gave its decision based on Article
939(3) of the Civil Code and ruled that the heir-at-law and the legatee should
equally divide the property among themselves. For this to take place, the
requirements under Article 915(1) of the Civil Code should be fulfilled. As
mentioned above, the petitioner is a legatee while the respondent is heir of the
deceased entitled for intestate succession. If this is the case, the division of the
property would be in accordance with Article 939(3) of the Civil Code.
Therefore, the decision of the lower court which was based on these
provisions was in accordance with the spirit of the law and there is no
sufficient ground to say there is a fundamental error of law.
Decree
The decision of Federal First Instance Court, File Number 09965 on Miazia
10, 2000 EC (April 18, 2008) and the decision of the Federal High Court, File
Number 68488 are affirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume: 10, pp 70-71
Tewodros M. -v.- G/Hiwot T.


Estimation of price done for the purpose of division of an inheritance
among heirs should take into account the market price of the inherited
property, not the construction cost.
______________
Sene 23, 2001 E.C (June 30, 2009)

Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammad, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese,
Petitioner: Tewodros M.
Respondents: G/Hiwot T.
Judgment
The case started at the Federal First Instance court where the current petitioner
was the plaintiff. The petitioner brought a suit against the respondent claiming
a share in the property he is entitled to inherit from his deceased mother. The
Court, after receiving the estimation of the price of the property from the Land
Development Administration Office, decided that the petitioner shall get as his
share, one-fourth out of the total value of the property. The petitioner
dissatisfied with the decision of the Court brought an appeal to the Federal
High Court. After hearing the litigation and having the price of the property
estimated by the Land Development Administration Office for the second
time, the Federal High Court decided that the petitioner shall get one fourth of
the total value of the house as his share. The current petition is brought from
this decision.
Based on the petition submitted by the petitioner on Meskerem 5, 2001
(September 15, 2008), the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court,
examined the case after summoning the respondent. The Cassation Division

decided to entertain the petition with a view to examining the appropriateness

of the decision which apportions one-fourth of the value of the house to the
petitioner.
As indicated above, the petitioner requested his share of the inheritance
devolving from his deceased mother. It is made clear in the litigation that the
property on which a division was requested is an urban house, a common
property acquired during the marriage between the petitioners mother and the
respondent. The petitioner has established that while he was born from another
father, his mother has given birth to three children in her marriage with the
respondent. Accordingly, the Cassation Division noted that it is half of the
house that remains after the respondent takes his half, not the total value of the
property. The remaining half will thus be divided among the four children of
the deceased.
The Cassation Division further noted that the petitioner, during the
litigation in lower courts, brought an objection only on the price estimation of
the house. However, in his petition submitted to the Cassation Division, he
raised an objection arguing that he should get his share after the house is sold
by auction. In this regard, the Cassation Division observed that, as half of the
share of the house belongs to the respondent, three-fourth of the remaining
half belongs to the other three siblings of the petitioner. This court has found
that selling the house by auction so that the petitioner can get one fourth of his
deceased mothers share would not be appropriate or just, as it will adversely
affect the respondent and his children. Thus, we have rejected this request
because it is found unjust and was not also raised at the lower court.
In this regard, given the fact that the price estimation made by the Land
Development Administration was not based on market price, the Cassation
Division found it important to examine whether the partition of the inheritance
based on the price estimation done only by taking into account the construction
cost of the house could be regarded as just.
The Cassation Division maintained that, in allocating half of the house
among the four children of the deceased, all of them should be treated equally
and the rights of each child shall be ensured. To this end, this Court has
observed that the price estimation of the house used by the lower courts only
takes construction cost into account rather than the market price that the house
had at the time. The construction cost of the house only includes expenses for
buying the necessary building materials and paying the workers involved in its
construction. The market price, on the other hand, indicates the price at which
the house would be sold if it was made available for sale. In order to estimate
the market value of the house various factors such as location and the market
situation at the time will be taken into account.

This gives a better opportunity in making an estimation of the current

value of the house under consideration instead of merely estimating the
amount spent for constructing the house. Hence, this Cassation Division has
found that equal rights of the parties will be better ensured if the price
estimation of the house is calculated based on the market price. This court thus
holds that the decision of the lower courts needs to be amended.
Decree
1. The order given by the Federal First Instance Court on File No. 01411/99
on Tir 23, 2001 (January 31, 2009) and the decision of the Federal High
Court, File No 0172/2000 are amended as per Article 348(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code
2. The petitioner shall get his share (i.e. one-fourth of his deceased mothers
share from the house) after the price estimation is made based on the
market price at the time the petitioners claim for its division was brought
to the lower court.
__________________________________________________
Volume 8, pp. 269-271

16. Torts (Non-contractual Liability)
File
No. Year Vol. Pages
1 Ethiotelecom v. Nigussie Tefera 77238 2012 14 203-206
2 Alemnesh Ermo v. Alem Mesfin 74111 2012 13 495-497
3 Government Housing Agency v. 54518 2011 11 419 -421

Tsehaye Zemuy and Sultan
Kahsay
4 Ayele Admasu v. Ajebu Shume 42962 2010 10 244-245
5 Ethiopian Roads Authority v. 38457 2009 9 79-81

Temegnehu E.
6 Ministry of Agri. and Rural 32144 2008 5 156-157

Devpt v. Alsha
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter16:Torts295
Ethiotelecom -v.- Negussie Tefera

An administrative body shall ensure whether there are telecommunications
or electric power cables prior to the issuance of construction license, and
any person who acquires license shall guarantee that no damage shall
occur on telecommunications or electric cables. Thus, anyone who
negligently causes damage while carrying out construction will be held
liable.
Article 3(3), Protection of Telecommunication and Electric Power
Networks Proclamation No. 464/2005;
_______________

Petitioner: Ethiotelecom
Respondent: Negussie Tefera

Judgment
The case started in South-West Shewa Zone High Court where the current
petitioner was the plaintiff. He claimed that the defendant (current respondent)
caused damage amounting to Birr 48,998.72 to the optical fibre cable, property
of the petitioner, while digging the land under his possession, on Yekatit 10,
2001 E.C (February 17, 2009) at 10:30 a.m, and causing the cable from Addis
Ababa to Jimma to be severed, knowing that it is buried in the ground at the
depth of half a meter. The petitioner further stated that, the defendant refused
to pay the 48,998.72 Birr (forty eight thousand nine hundred ninety eight birr
and seventy two cents) (inclusive of VAT) required of him. The petitioner
claimed that the defendant had written a letter dated Megabit 08, 2001 (March
17, 2009) admitting liability for the damage caused and requesting to

reimburse the cost incurred in the maintenance, transport as well remuneration

paid to professionals and labourers.
In his statement of defence, the defendant (current respondent), argued that
the Woliso City Administration while allocating the 1,888 square meters of
land to him and when it provided him with the plan in 1997 E.C as per Article
3(3) of Proclamation No. 464/2005, did not inform him that there is an optical
fibre cable buried in the land. He further argued that, there is no sign put by
the plaintiff to this effect, and the cable is buried more than 150 meters from
the main road, while this distance should not have been more than 15 meters.
He argued that the letter written to the plaintiff was not a statement of
admission of liability but was written in good faith as the damage was
unintentionally caused to state property. The defendant also raised an
alternative argument for the reduction of the amount of compensation. He
contended that he is not liable for the damage, but in case the court finds
enough reason to decide otherwise, the amount of damage claimed is
exaggerated.
The High Court requested the City Administration to confirm whether it
had informed the defendant that there is an optical fibre cable buried in the
ground, to which the latter responded to the negative arguing that the plan of
Ethiotelecom was not delivered to it. The court then found that it cannot be
maintained that the defendant had prior knowledge of this fact, as the plan
given to him does not show the existence of a cable buried in the land.
Regarding the alleged letter of admission of the defendant, the High Court
noted that the content of the letter does not show an admission of liability,
stating that he is not expected to know whether there was a buried cable, as the
location is 150 meters from the main road. The Court further stated that the
defendant proposed to pay the amount incurred for the maintenance of the
cable as well as the money paid to the professionals and labourers, with the
intention of reimbursing the expenses incurred. Moreover, the Court, found
that the defendants contention of the amount claimed by the plaintiff does not
amount to an admission of guilt, and it rejected the claim of the plaintiff
(current petitioner).
The Oromia Regional Supreme Court to which an appeal was brought
affirmed the decision of the High Court. The petitioner then brought this
petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court alleging that
the lower courts have committed a fundamental error of law. The petitioner
stated that, as per Article 3(3) of Protection of Telecommunications and
Electric Power Networks Proclamation No. 464/2005, it is the responsibility of
the Woliso City Administration and the respondent (who requested for a
construction permit) to check whether there is a telecommunication cable. It

further argued that Art. 23(1) of Telecommunications Proclamation No.

49/1996 requires the City Administration and the respondent to obtain the
prior consent of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the court has
unduly rejected the suit by stating that what the respondent stated in the letter
does not amount to admission, while the latter had admitted that he has
negligently caused damage and that he is willing to pay a reduced amount.
The respondent on the other hand, argued that the City Administration did
not inform him that there is a cable buried in the land given to him, and the
petitioners argument which alleges that the respondent should have known is
not acceptable. He further stated that what he admitted about the damage
during the litigation conducted in the lower courts was not admission of
liability.
The Cassation Division after hearing the litigation has identified two
issues, i.e. whether the respondent is liable for the damage caused, and if the
respondent is liable, the amount that should be paid as compensation.
This court has examined the first issue in the light of Proclamation No.
464/2005, issued to protect telecommunication and electric networks.
According to Article 3(3) of the Proclamation, Federal and City Administration
bodies are required to make sure that damage will not be caused to a
telecommunication or electric network before giving a construction permit,
and the applicant for a construction permit should do the same before
undertaking the construction. Article 4 of the Proclamation states that, anyone
who causes damage to a telecommunication or electric network, intentionally
or negligently, is punishable. The Cassation Division noted that the respondent
caused the damage by negligently digging the ground contravening its
obligation of making sure that damage will not be caused to a
telecommunication network.
Furthermore, Article 2027(1) of the Civil Code states that irrespective of
any undertaking on his part, a person shall be liable for the damage he causes
to another by fault. If a person, intentionally or negligently commits a fault
causing damage to another, he shall be liable for the damage caused, without
there being a prior contractual relationship between them. Article 2035(1) also
renders a person liable if he/she infringes any specific and explicit provision of
the law, decree or administrative regulation. Despite these stipulations
embodied in the Proclamation and the Civil Code, the lower courts decided
that the respondent is not liable stating that the City Administration did not
inform him about the existence of the cable and because the petitioner did not
put any sign on the place where the damage occurred. The lower court further
stated lack of proof to show that the current respondent committed the fault
knowingly, despite the fact that the respondent has not denied causing the

damage. The decision of the lower courts in relation to the first issue is not
thus acceptable.
Regarding the second issue, i.e. amount of the damage, Article 2028 of the
Civil Code provides that anyone who caused damage to another by fault has to
make it good. Moreover, Articles 2090(1) and 2091 of the Civil Code stipulate
that the damages due by the person legally declared to be liable shall be equal
to the damage caused to the victim by the act giving rise to the liability. In this
regard, the Cassation Division found it important to examine the reasons
submitted by the respondent and the evidence he has produced to support his
argument that the amount of compensation claimed by the petitioner is
exaggerated.
The Cassation Division then observed that the decision of the lower courts
relieved the respondent from liability although he did not deny causing
damage to the property of the petitioner. This is not in conformity with Article
3(3) of Proclamation No. 464/2005 which stipulates that anyone who seeks a
construction permit shall, before carrying out the construction, make sure that
damage will not be caused to telecommunication and electric networks. This
court has further found that the lower courts have failed to note Articles
2027(1), 2028 and 2035 of the Civil Code based on which a non contractual
liability may arise. Therefore the decisions of the lower courts have
Decree
1. The decision of the South West Shewa Zone High Court, File No. 21371
delivered on Tahsat 07, 2003 E.C. (December 16, 2010), and the decision
of the Federal Supreme Court, File No. 112894 rendered on Hedar 28,
2004 E.C. (December 8, 2011), are reversed as per Article 348(1) of the
2. The Respondent is liable for the damage caused. Thus, according to
Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, the case is returned to the
South West Shewa Zone High Court, so that it shall assess and decide on
the amount of damage based on the litigation of the parties, examining the
evidence, and if necessary hearing an independent expert.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 203 206.

Alemnesh Ermo -v.- Alem Mesfin


- An employment agency is duty-bound to make sure that the
dignity and security of workers sent abroad are respected.
- An employment agency which fails to observe its obligations shall
pay compensation to workers who sustain damage in the hands of
their employers abroad.
Employment Exchange Services Proclamation No. 632/2009
______________

Hamle 4, 2004 E.C (July 11, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Alemnesh Ermo
Respondent: Alem Mesfin
The following judgment has been rendered.

Judgment
The case involves compensation for damage. The respondent was a plaintiff at
the Federal First Instance Court. The plaintiff alleged that she was sent to
Beirut by the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) by paying Birr 8,000
(eight thousand) and she was dropped from the third floor by her employer as
a result of which she sustained 30% permanent damage on her leg. The
plaintiff stated that her employer was not willing to pay her salary for six
months amounting to US Dollars 600 (six hundred). She also claimed the
expenses she has incurred for food, medical and transportation. She argued
that the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) is responsible for the damage
and must pay Birr 130 (one hundred and thirty) per month for 33 years which
amounts to a total compensation of Birr 200,430 (two hundred thousand four
hundred and thirty birr).
The defendant (current petitioner) contended that she did not receive Birr
8,000 from the plaintiff, and she alternatively argued that if at all this sum was
paid, it was non-refundable. She stated that all salaries were paid to the
plaintiff by her employer and the six-month salary stated in the pleading was
transferred via Western Union to Ato Ayalneh Genna on behalf of the plaintiff
(current respondent). The petitioner also argued that she did everything
appropriate to ensure the security of the plaintiff, and stated that no evidence
was adduced which proves that the plaintiff was dropped by her employer.
The petitioner also argued that the plaintiff sustained the damage on account
of cancer.
The Federal First Instance Court decided that the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff could not establish that she sustained that damage because she was
dropped from the third floor by her employer. However, the court decided that
the applicant should reimburse the Birr 8,000 she took from the respondent as
the petitioner should not have taken any sum from the respondent as per
Employment Exchange Services Proclamation 632/2009. The court also
required the petitioner to pay salary to the respondent for five months since the
respondent had worked for 11 months while the salary paid to the respondent
was only for six months.
As the respondent was aggrieved by the decision of the court, she lodged
her appeal to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court accepted her
appeal, summoned the other party and heard the case. Then the appellate court
found in favor of the appellant and decided that she was entitled to Birr
154,440 (one hundred fifty four thousand four hundred and forty) for material
compensation and Birr 1,000 (one thousand) as moral compensation.
According to the appellate court, the fact that the appellant was dropped from
a third floor by her employer in Beirut was proved. It was also observed by
the appellate court that the respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) was on
wheelchair. The Federal High Court further stated that the documentary
evidence adduced by the appellant and the medical evidence received from
Back Lion Hospital together with the testimony from the respondent (Alem
Mesfin) demonstrates that she has sustained 30% total disability.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Federal Hight court, the petitioner
(defendant at the lower court) appealed to the Federal Supreme Court.
However, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to Article
337 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitin to the Cassation Bench of the
Federal Supreme Court was filed against the decision of the Federal Supreme
Court. The Cassation Bench has examined the case in light of the issues
framed and the relevant legal provisions.

As it is possible to understand from the overall reading of Proclamation

No. 632/2009, an employment agency is duty-bound to make sure the dignity
and security of workers sent aboard are respected. In the lower courts, the
petitioner did not argue that she was not liable; rather she argued that she did
everything possible to ensure the protection of the security of the respondent.
Hence, the argument raised by the petitioner against her liability for injury
caused by the employer of the respondent is not acceptable.
As far as payment of compensation is concerned, the decision of the
Federal High Court and its confirmation by the Federal Supreme Court is
appropriate and acceptable. We have found that no fundamental error of law
was committed by the lower courts.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal High Court on Hamle 6, 2003 E.C. (July 13,
2011) under File No. 3953 and that of the Federal Supreme Court made on
Tikimit 22, 2004 E.C. (November 2, 2011) under File No. 72389 are
confirmed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The decisions of the Federal High Court and the Federal Supreme Court
which declared that the petitioner is responsible for the permanent bodily
harm caused to the respondent are appropriate.
3. The injunction order made by this Bench on Tahsas 2, 2004 E.C
(December 12, 2011) is lifted.
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 495-497

Government Housing Agency -v.- Tsehaye Zemuy & Sultan Kahsay


In a non-contractual relationship, Article 2024 of the Civil Code is not
applicable where a claim of payment is made for the period a property is
used by another person.
Articles 2024 and 2162 of the Civil Code
_______________
Yekatit 14, 2003 E.C (February 21, 2011)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Dagne Melaku, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Agency for Government Houses
Respondents: 1. Tsehaye Zemuy
2. Sultan Kahsay
Judgment
The case started at the Federal First Instance Court where the current
petitioner was the plaintiff and brought a suit against the current respondents
alleging that they have unduly enriched themselves by using a house, property
of the Agency for Government Houses, without having a proper rental
agreement and in disregard of the relevant rental regulations. The Agency
claimed to be indemnified with an amount commensurate with the benefit they
have unduly obtained.
In their statement of defence, the respondents (defendants at the lower
court) submitted preliminary objection stating the suit should not be
entertained because the petitioner does not have the right to sue them as there
is no contractual relationship between them and because it is brought after the
lapse of the period of limitation. With regard to the merits of the case the
respondents requested for the dismissal of the case arguing that they became
possessors of the house by buying the business from the previous tenant.
The First Instance Court which adjudicated the case, after hearing the
litigation of the parties, dismissed the suit arguing that, according to Article
2024(d) of the Civil Code, the rental is deemed to have been paid as two years
have elapsed since it fell due and the suit was not brought within this time.
The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was brought by the petitioner
from the decision of the Federal Instance Court, also dismissed the appeal
stating that the decision of the lower court does not have an error.
Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a petition dated Megabit 16, 2002
E.C. (March 25, 2010) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court
challenging the decision of the lower courts. The Cassation Division framed
the issue whether the decision of the lower courts which presumed rent to have
been paid as per Article 2024(d) of the Civil Code is appropriate; i.e. whether
the decision of the lower courts is based on valid interpretation of the law.
The Cassation Division noted that the non existence of a prior rental
agreement between the petitioner and the respondents is not disputed by both
parties. The petitioner did not sue the respondents alleging that they did not
perform their contractual obligation; nor did it state that they failed to pay rent
as per their agreement. Rather, the petitioner alleged that the respondents have
unduly enriched themselves by unlawfully occupying the house, and claimed
the amount of money it would have gained had the respondents lawfully
rented the house. On the other hand, the respondents also did not argue that
they did not use the house; they argued that they did not have a contractual
relationship with the petitioner. Thus, the Cassation Division noted that the
litigation has nothing to do with the payment of rent.
Article 2024 of the Civil Code which the lower courts cited as a pertinent
provision to the case at hand lists the instances in respect of which
presumption of payment is made. In this regard, Article 2024(d) states that
debts due in respect of rents for houses are deemed to have been paid where
two years have elapsed since they fell due. In light of this provision and the
arguments of the parties, the Cassation Division noted that Article 2024 is not
the right provision that should be used to decide on the case at hand. Even
though the two parties do not have a contractual relationship, as the
respondents have been using the house without paying rent, it is established
that the petitioner has the legal ground to bring suit against them.
The provision that governs this relationship is found in parts of the Civil
Code that deal with extra-contractual liability and unlawful enrichment. It is
stated under Article 2162 that, [w]hosoever has derived gain from the work
or property of another without just cause shall indemnify the person at whose
expense he has enriched himself to the extent to which he has benefited from
his work or property.
The respondents did not raise an argument that they did not use the house.
They also did not oppose the amount of money claimed by the petitioner
which was calculated as per the directive of the Agency for Government
Houses, issued to determine the rate when business premises are transferred to
another party through a business sale agreement. What the petitioner requested
is thus the income it would have gained from the house, as the house has been
occupied by the respondents. Therefore, the Cassation Division has found the
respondents liable to pay the amount of money the petitioner would have
gained had it rented the house as per the directive. We have thus found that
the decisions of the lower courts failed to give due regard to this fact thereby
having fundamental error of law. Accordingly, the following decree is
rendered.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court rendered on Hamle 24,
2001 E.C (July 31, 2009), File No. 130183 and the order given by the
Federal High Court, Tir 18, 2002 E.C (January 26, 2010) in File No.
84627 are reversed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The respondents shall be jointly and severally liable for petitioners claim
of Birr 138,122.19 (one hundred thirty eight one hundred twenty two birr
and ninety cents).
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 419 421.

Ayele Admasu -v.- Ajebu Shume

Where it was proved that the working capacity of a victim is reduced, a
fair compensation is to be fixed even if it is difficult to determine the
compensation equivalent to such damage; the amount of compensation
shall be determined on the basis of equity; denying compensation alleging
that the petitioner did not have any income before the occurrence of the
damage is a fundamental error of law.
Articles 2025, 2066, 2081, 2090, 2091, 2092, and 2102(1) of the 1960
Civil Code of Ethiopia
_______________

Tahsas 28, 2002 E.C (January 6, 2010)
Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga,

Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,
Petitioner: Ayele Admasu
Respondent: Ajebu Shume
Judgment
The case pertains to compensation. The petitioner filed a case to the Federal
First instance Court claiming a compensation of Birr 50,000 (fifty thousand)
alleging that he sustained bodily injury as he was knocked down by the
vehicle owned by the respondent. In his statement of defense, the respondent
argued that the amount of compensation claimed by the respondent was
exaggerated. The court, having examined the arguments of both sides,
dismissed the claim of the petitioner stating that he was unable to prove that he
had income before the occurrence of the accident.
The petitioner lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court, but the
appellate court dismissed his appeal. The present petition to the Cassation
Division of the Federal Supreme Court was submitted against this decision.
This court has, in light of the relevant law, examined the legality of the denial
of compensation by the appellate court although it was proved that the

petitioner sustained bodily injury.
It was proved that the vehicle belonging to the respondent knocked down
and caused bodily injury to the petitioner. The respondent did not deny that his
vehicle caused the injury. At stipulated in Art. 2081(1) of the Civil Code, the
owner of the vehicle is responsible for any harm caused by his vehicle. Even if
the respondent has not committed fault, he shall be responsible for the damage
caused to the petitioner by the mere fact he is the owner of the vehicle which
caused the injury.
The lower court accepted that the respondent is responsible for the injury.
What was, however, arguable was whether the petitioner is entitled to
compensation. The lower court decided that although the petitioner sustained
bodily injury, he was not entitled to compensation as he was not able to prove
that he was earning income before the occurrence of the accident. This
decision of the court leads to the conclusion that an individual is entitled to
compensation as a result of bodily injury only when he/she proves that he was
earning income before the injury and that such income was lost as a result of
the injury. This conclusion shall mean denial of compensation, irrespective of
the degree of the bodily injury, unless loss of pecuniary interest is shown.
Therefore, this Cassation Bench has examined the issue as to when
compensation is to be paid in such situation.
By virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution, [e]very person has the
inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of persons and liberty.
Article 16 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that every person has the right
to be protected against bodily harm. As the Constitution is the supreme law
of the country it protects the security of individuals. Without prejudice to the
fact that infringement of this law entails criminal liability, the victim has the
right to get compensation for bodily harm. The provisions of the Civil Code
dealing with compensation are among those provisions of law which are
instrumental to ensure the protection of human rights enshrined in the
Constitution.
Accordingly, where a person, owing to his fault, causes harm on another
person, he shall be responsible to the harm and is duty-bound to pay
compensation as stipulated in Article 2028 of the Civil Code. Therefore, as a
matter of principle, a person is obliged to pay compensation where he commits
fault although there are certain exceptional circumstances whereby a person
shall be strictly liable as per Articles 2066 ff. One of these exceptional
situations is the fact that the owner of a vehicle is strictly liable to a damage
caused by his vehicle as provided in Article 2081(1) of the Civil Code.

Therefore, an individual who is responsible for the bodily injury of a person is

duty-bound to pay compensation thereof.
The next issue relates to the amount of compensation. As provided in
Articles 2090 and 2091 of the Civil Code, the person who is liable to pay
compensation is required to pay an amount which is equivalent to the amount
of damage. Moreover, Art. 2092 provides that future damage which is certain
to occur shall be compensated without waiting for its materialization. In the
case at hand, we have realized that the petitioner sustained 18% bodily harm.
The lower court observed that the petitioner has sustained injury even if it
decided that he is not entitled to compensation as he did not prove that he was
earning income before the occurrence of the injury. Although it was not
medically proved that the petitioner sustained total permanent disability, it was
proved that his working capacity is reduced by 18%. Fair compensation should
thus be fixed equitably as provided in Article 2102(1) of the Civil Code even
if it is difficult to fix equivalent compensation to such harm,. Hence, as it was
proved that the petitioner has lost 18% of his working capacity, the amount of
compensation should be determined on the basis of equity. Therefore, denial
of compensation to the petitioner because he did not have any income before
the occurrence of the damage is a fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision made by the Federal First Instance Court under file No.
107806 on Miazia 24, 2000 E.C (May 2, 2008 ) and the decision made by
the Federal High Court under File No. 68949 on Tikimit 28, 2001 E.C
(November 7, 2008) are hereby reversed.
2. Because the petitioner has sustained 18% bodily harm, it is equitably
decided that the respondent shall pay Birr 30,000 (thirty thousand) to the
petitioner.
_________________________________________________
Volume 10, pp. 244-245
Ethiopian Roads Authority -v.- Temegnehu Endashaw


- Where damage or harm occurs while using a vehicle or property, its
owner cannot be held responsible if the victim was using the property
without giving any benefit to the owner;
- Under such circumstance, the owner cannot be held liable unless
he/she/it commits fault.
Articles 2081(1) and 2089(1) of the Civil Code of Ethiopia
______________
Sene 2, 2001 E.C (June 9, 2009)
Petitioner: Ethiopian Roads Authority
Respondent: Temegnehu Endashaw
Judgment
The case involves the issue of compensation caused by a car accident. The
respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) sued the petitioner stating that he
sustained physical injury on his leg because the vehicle in which he was
travelling overturned while it was driven by the petitioners driver. Hence, he
claimed compensation.
In its statement of defense, the petitioner argued that the vehicle was not
meant to give commercial public transportation services. As the plaintiff was
in the vehicle inappropriately and without the purpose of giving any service to
the petitioner (defendant at the lower court), the petitioner argued that it is not
legally liable to such individual.
The court which entertained the suit decided that the defendant was liable
to pay compensation to the plaintiff. The Federal High Court, to which an
appeal was lodged, confirmed the decision of the lower court. The petition to
the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court was brought against this
decision.
On the basis of the petition filed on Sene 9, 2000 E.C (June 16, 2008), the
respondent was summoned and the Cassation Bench has examined whether the
petitioner is liable to the respondent in light of Article 2089(1) of the Civil
Code. Accordingly, we have examined this issue in light of the arguments of
both sides, the decisions of the lower court against which petition was filed
and the relevant provisions of the law. The legal provision which needs to be
examined is Article 2089(1) of the Civil Code which is found under Title 13 of
the Civil Code and that deals with extra-contractual liability and unlawful
enrichment. During the proceedings in the lower courts, it was proved that the
respondent sustained the injury not because he was knocked down by the
vehicle belonging to the petitioner, but because the car in which he was a
passenger was overturned.
The vehicle was meant for the use of the office and not for commercial
transportation services. The petitioner was not aware of the fact that the
respondent was in the vehicle. The petitioner derived no benefit from the
respondent. If these facts are proved, the next issue to be entertained is
whether there is any legal ground that makes the petitioner liable to the
respondent. According to Article 2081(1) of the Civil Code, the owner of a
vehicle shall be responsible to damage caused by his vehicle. However,
Article 2089 stipulates the exception in which the owner of a car cannot be
held liable. According to this provision, the owner of an object, which caused
the damage, cannot be held responsible in the event that the victim made use
of the property without giving any benefit to the owner.
As we have seen above, the respondent made use of the vehicle without
giving any benefit to the petitioner. Moreover, it was not alleged that the
petitioner committed fault. Therefore, there is no legal ground which makes
the petitioner liable. This court has thus found that the decision of the lower
courts contain fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the High Court of Sheka Zone on the Hidar 12, 2002
E.C. (Nov. 21, 2009) under File No. 03066 and the decision of the Federal
High Court on Miazia 14, 2000 E.C. (April 22, 2008) under File No. 63179
are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The petitioner is not responsible for the injury sustained by the respondent.

_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp.77-78
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development -v.- Alsha Siraj

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 32144 (April 1, 2008)
- Moral compensation is awarded to victims where it is expressly provided
by the law; and it shall not exceed Birr 1,000 (one thousand) [unless a
specific law provides otherwise];
- Where the law has determined the ceiling of the amount of compensation,
it is not possible to go beyond the legal limit;
- The basis for the calculation of material compensation shall be the net
salary of the deceased.
Articles 2105 and 2116 of the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia
_______________
Megabit 23, 2000 E.C. (April 1, 2008)
Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse
Yirga, Medhin Kiros
Petitioner: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Respondent: Alsha Siraj
Judgment
The respondent W/ro Alsha was plaintiff at the lower court and she sued the
petitioner alleging that a vehicle belonging to the petitioner knocked down and
killed her husband. She claimed compensation for herself and on behalf of her
two minor children. In its statement of defense, the petitioner pleaded that it
was not liable to pay compensation, and alternatively it pleaded that if it is to
be held liable, the amount claimed by the plaintiff was exaggerated. The court
decided that the petitioner should pay compensation of Birr 61,275.90 (sixty
one thousand two hundred seventy five and ninety cents) to the respondent and
her children as compensation to the damage sustained by them as the result of
the death of her husband, Birr 2,000 (two thousand) for funeral expenses and a
monument, and Birr 1,000 (one thousand) as moral compensation for each, i.e.
the respondent and her two minor children. An appeal lodged to the Federal
High Court against the decision of the lower court was rejected. A petition is
brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court against the
decision of the High Court.

Following the petition on Hamle 24, 1999 E.C. (July 31, 2007), this court
summoned the respondent and heard the case. We have examined the way the
amount of compensation was calculated and moral compensation was fixed.
The respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) stated the interests affected
due to the death of her husband. This court has observed from the file that the
basis for the calculation of the amount of compensation was the salary of the
deceased. The Federal First Instance Court determined the amount of
compensation on the basis of the gross monthly salary of the deceased, i.e.
Birr (eight hundred ninety five). The petitioner did not contest the amount of
the deceaseds salary, but argued that it was not proper to determine the
amount of compensation on the basis of the gross salary of the deceased
without deducting legally recognized deductible sums from the gross salary.
However, the lower courts calculated the amount of compensation without
taking this reality into account. Hence, this Cassation Division has observed
that the lower courts committed error in this regard.
With regard to moral compensation, the amount of compensation to the
respondent and her two minor children was Birr 3,000 (three thousand). This
compensation was awarded based on the amount of Birr 1,000 stipulated under
Article 2116 of the Civil Code and it was taken as compensation to be given to
the respondent and her two children individually. This Cassation Bench has,
however, observed that, moral compensation is, according to Article 2105 of
the Civil Code, awarded to victims only where it is expressly provided by law.
With regard to the amount of moral compensation, Article 2116 of the Civil
Code provides that it shall, in no event, exceed Birr 1000 (one thousand). As
the law has determined the ceiling, it is not thus possible to go beyond the
legal limit. The decisions rendered by the lower courts regarding the amount
of moral compensation thus have fundamental error of law.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court on Ginbot 23,1999 E.C.
(May 31, 2007) under File No. 05585 and confirmed by the Federal High
Court on Hamle 9, 1999 E.C (July 16, 2007) under File No. 5689 are
varied in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The amount of material compensation shall be calculated based on the net
salary of the deceased by subtracting legally recognized deductible sums.
3. The amount of moral compensation shall be Birr 1,000 (one thousand).
_________________________________________________
Volume 5, pp. 156-157.

17. Miscellaneous

No.
1 Wegagen Bank v. Ethiopian 81215 2013 14 290-294

Revenues & Customs Authority
2 Getachew Deyas & Fantu 68573 2012 13 623-625

Tesfaye v. Rukiya Kedir
3 Getnet Yenew v. Iyob Binyam 60392 2011 11 557 -559
4 Bahir Dar City Administration 54567 2011 11 522-524

Service v. Bahir Dar Textile
Factory (Three respondents)
5 Berhane Tessema v. Tamrat 42824 2009 11 539 -541

Kidane et al
6 Mukmil Mohammed v. Miftah 38794 2009 9 173-175

Kekir
SelectedFSCCassationDecisions,AbridgedTranslationChapter17:Miscellaneous313
Wegagen Bank -v.- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority


The bank with which a vehicle is pledged shall have priority right to
recover the loan from its pledge where the debtor, after having pledged
the vehicle with the bank commits customs offence which led to a judicial
decision for the confiscation of the vehicle.
Civil Code, Articles 2628, 2857(1), 3059
Art. 3, Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Proclamation No.
97/1998
Criminal Code, Article 98(1)
Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009, Article 91(2)
_________________
Tir 3, 2005 E.C. (January 11, 2013)
Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Reta Tolosa, Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Wegagen Bank

The court has rendered the following judgment after having examined the
case.
Judgment
The legal issue in this case is whether priority right is accorded to a bank with
which a vehicle is pledged for loan, or whether the confiscation of the pledged
vehicle as a result of customs offence committed by the debtor (while using
the pledged vehicle) should be implemented irrespective of the pledge.
The case started at Mekele City Central Court on Miazia 01, 2002 E.C.
(April 9, 2010). The petitioner (plaintiff in the lower court) stated that the
Isuzu truck Plate No. 3-29644, owned by Berhe H. A. is pledged with the bank
for a loan of Birr 90,000 (ninety thousand). As the debtor is in default of

paying Birr 2,905 per month, the petitioner is entitled to recover the loan from
the sale of the vehicle by virtue of the Foreclosure Law. However, the
respondent (defendant in the lower court) claimed to have confiscated the
vehicle due to the customs offence of contraband. The petitioner (pledgee)
thus requested the lower court that it should have priority of debt recovery
from the pledge.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division had previously decided
that the vehicle shall be confiscated, and the respondent argued that the
petitioner does not have any right over it. The respondent contended that the
petitioner cannot invoke claims because final judgment is given over the issue
of confiscation.
During the litigation at Mekele City Central Court, the petitioner contested
the respondents arguments on the ground that its priority right on the pledge
should be respected as it is a different from the theme of the judgment of the
Federal Supreme Court with regard to confiscation.
Mekele City Central Court dismissed the petitioners claim by invoking
Articles 32(2) and 244(2)(b)&(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, and it stated
that there is final decision of confiscation rendered by the Federal Supreme
Court Cassation Division. The petitioners appeal to Tigray Regional State
Supreme Court was not accepted.
This petition is submitted against these decisions. The petitioner states that
the vehicle is pledged property and it cannot be subject to confiscation as a
result of a criminal offence committed after the pledge. The petitioner
contended that the application of res judicata without the fulfilment of the
requirements thereof and the failure to apply the relevant provisions of the law
that apply to pledge constitute fundamental error of law.
This Cassation Division has examined whether it was appropriate to reject
the priority claim of the petitioner due to the judgment of confiscation of the
vehicle.
The respondent argued that the issue of priority claims apply only in civil
cases and shall not be applicable to criminal cases, and it stated that the
petitioner resorted to this claim after its initial attempt to institute a suit at
Maichew High Court was rejected in accordance with Article 418 of the Civil
Procedure Code.
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has observed that Berhe
pledged his vehicle, Plate No. 3-29644 with the petitioner for the loan of Birr
90,000 based on a contract dated Meskerem 02, 1997 E.C. (September 12,
2004). This court has also noted that the pledge is registered at Addis Ababa
Transport Authority. Thereafter, Berhe used the vehicle for contraband on

Yekatit 24, 2001 E.C. (March 3, 2009) as a result of which the Prosecutor
instituted a criminal charge at the Tigray Regional Southern Zone. The
litigation continued until a decision was rendered by the Federal Supreme
Court Cassation Division on Ginbot 05, 2003 E.C. (May13, 2011) in File No.
48628 which affirmed the sentence of three years of simple imprisonment and
fine of Birr 5,000. Moreover, the court varied the lower courts decision and
gave final decree regarding the confiscation of the vehicle.
While the litigation of the criminal case was underway at the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division, the petitioner had, on Tikimt 16, 2002
E.C. (October 26, 2009), requested to intervene in the litigation. The core
argument of the petitioner was that the vehicle in question was pledged
property before the commission of the offence. The respondent, on the other
hand, argued against the petitioners claim on procedural grounds, without,
however, denying that the vehicle is pledged property.
The legal issue that needs to be resolved is the manner in which the
creditor of loan secured by pledged property can enforce its right where final
court decision is rendered regarding the confiscation of the vehicle due to an
offence committed after the pledge.
As stipulated under Articles 2828, 2857(1) and 3059, a pledgee or
mortgagee has priority in loan recovery. Article 3 of Proclamation No.
97/1998 further allows banks to foreclose any property pledged or mortgaged
as security to loan by giving a notice 30 days before the foreclosure.
Moreover, Article 2857(1) of the Civil Code entitles the pledgee to be paid out
of the proceeds from the sale of the pledge before all other creditors. These
provisions thus show that the petitioner has priority in recovering its claims
from pledged property.
On the other hand, Article 98 of the Criminal Code does not deal with the
situation in which the property that is subject to confiscation was, prior to the
commission of the offence, pledged as security. Nor does the law that is used
as a special legislation regarding customs offences, i.e. Proclamation No.
622/2009 (or other proclamations enacted prior to it) deal with this issue. As
long as the laws that are directly relevant to the issue are not clear, principles
of statutory interpretation require reference to other laws with a view to
examining how they deal with the issue.
With regard to labour relations, Article 167 of Proclamation No. 377/2003
provides that Any claim of payment of a worker arising from employment
relationship shall have priority over other payments or debts. Workers shall
thus have priority over both secure creditors (that are in a similar position as
the petitioner) or ordinary creditors. The legislature has clearly given due
priority to the claims of workers for whom such payments are crucial for the
fulfillment of basic needs. Another area of the law that can inform our analysis
on priority claims relates to Article 80 of the Income Tax Proclamation No.
286/2002 which entitles the Tax Authority to have priority to other debts other
than the priority claims from secured creditors.
Even if the issue of priority in claims is not expressly articulated in the
Criminal Code, it becomes necessary to resolve the issue under consideration
by interpreting the objective of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article
91(2) of Proclamation No. 622/2009 and the rationale of the laws applicable to
pledged property.
The purpose of a contract of pledge is to secure business transactions and
criminal law aims at securing the peace and security of the public. These rights
extend to legal persons including banks. The function of the Ethiopian
Revenues and Customs Authority is generally to put in place appropriate tax
collection systems and this can be observed from the content and spirit of the
Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Establishment Proclamation No.
587/2008 and other tax laws.
As Article 80 of Proclamation No. 286/2002 provides that secured
creditors shall be paid prior to the Tax Authority, this principle should not be
altered where the Authority obtains judgment that enables the state to collect
the proceeds of confiscated property due to tax and customs offences. In other
words, secured creditors should not lose their priority merely because the
revenue emanates from confiscation of property in accordance with the law.
The petitioner is thus entitled to priority claims because the status of the
vehicle as pledged property has not been contested and the pledge was made
before the commission of the offence. The lower courts should have resolved
the issue from this perspective and they have erred in rejecting the claim of the
petitioner by citing legal provisions that do not have relevance to the issue
under consideration.
The other issue that should be considered is the manner in which the
respondents rights can be addressed. The law envisages that the vehicle used
by the offender during the commission of contraband offences shall be subject
to confiscation. After the debt owed to the pledgee is paid, any remaining
amount from the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle shall thus be paid to the
respondent. In case, however, all the proceeds from the sale of the pledge are
paid to the pledgee, the respondent should have recourse to other property
owned by the debtor worth the value of the vehicle that was subject to
confiscation. This is because the offender should not benefit from his criminal
act.
Therefore it is found that the balance from the sale of the vehicle after
payment is made to the petitioner should be considered as the proceeds of

confiscation. In the event that no proceeds are left after the debt owed to the
pledgee is paid, the execution of judgment for the confiscation shall apply to
other property of the offender to the extent of the value of the vehicle that
shall be determined based on its price on the date of the confiscation
judgment.
The pledgee, i.e. the petitioner, shall have priority to be paid from the sale
of the vehicle, and the rejection of this claim by the lower courts contains
Decree
1. The decisions of the lower courts are reversed in accordance with Article
2. The Isuzu truck Plate No. 3-29644 owned by Berhe H. was a pledge prior
to the commission of the offence by its owner, and the debt owed to the
pledgee shall have priority in payment. If this amount is less than the
proceeds to be obtained from the sale of the truck, the remaining amount
shall be confiscated, and if there is no remaining amount from the sale, this
decision of confiscation shall be executed on the offenders private property
the amount of which shall be determined based on the price of the vehicle
that existed on the date of the confiscation decree.
. ..
_____________________________________________
Volume 14, pp. 290 294.
Getachew Deyas & Fantu Tesfaye v. Rukiya Kedir


The interpretation in the decision of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation
Division shall not retroactively apply to cases that were decided based the
Cassation Divisions earlier interpretation even where the Division has
changed its interpretation in a later case.
Proclamation No. 454/2005, Article 2
______________

Megabit 12, 2004 E.C. (March 21, 2012)

Adane Negussie
Petitioner: Getachew Deyas & Fentu Tesfaye
Respondents: Rukia Kedir
Judgment
This cassation case involves the applicability and interpretation of Article 2
of Proclamation No. 454/2005 (Federal courts Proclamation Re-amendment
Proclamation). The present petitioners were sellers in a contract of sale of a
house on Tir 24, 1999 E.C. (February 2, 2006) and they were litigating
parties in File No. 05508 over the issue whether the contract should be
invalidated. Adama Zone Liyu Zone High Court decided that contract of
sale of immovables which is not made at a notary or court shall not be
valid, and decided that this contract is invalid by citing the decision of the
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 21448.
After the decision of the High Court, the current petitioner has filed a
suit at Adama Liyu Zone High Court requesting that the parties be
reinstated in the position which would have existed had the contract not
been made.
The buyer of the house (present respondent) argued that the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division has rendered a decision in File No.
36887, on Tahsas 10, 2001 EC (December 20, 2008). The court (on May
27, 2010, File No. 06799) reiterated its earlier position that the decision
was rendered based on the FSC Cassation Divisions decision (File No.
21448) on a similar issue. It stated that decision has been rendered over the
issue under consideration and the only issue that can be litigated upon is
the issue of reinstatement. The court decided that the contract was found to
be invalid during the earlier litigation, and the request for the validity of the
contract cannot be raised by invoking a different interpretation rendered by
the FSC Cassation Division in File No. 36887.
However, Oromia Supreme Court reversed the decision upon appeal by
stating that even if the lower courts decision was correct when it was
rendered, the decision of the FSC Cassation Division on Tahsas 18, 2001
(December 28, 2008) states that such contracts are valid as long as the
contract is not denied by the parties. The Supreme Court held that as long
as the FSC Cassation Division has changed its interpretation, lower court
interpretations of the issue should also be changed, thereby deciding that
the contract for the sale of the house should not be invalidated. Oromia
Supreme Court Cassation Division confirmed the Supreme Courts
decision.
We have examined the case. According to Article 90(3) of the FDRE
Constitution and Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 25/1996,
the purpose of enabling the FSC Cassation Division decisions to have
binding effect in interpretation is to enhance consistency in the judicial
interpretation of laws. Articles 2 ff of Proclamation No. 454/2005 thus bind
lower courts to pursue the interpretation rendered by the FSC Cassation
Division on similar issues. This binding interpretation applies on courts
where the FSC Cassation Division has rendered a decision on the
interpretation of a similar issue. Adama Liyu Zone High Court has
accordingly pursued the interpretation of the FSC Cassation Divsion based
on Article 2 of Proclamation No. 25/1996.
Where the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division renders an
interpretation which is different from its earlier decision, the latter
interpretation only applies to cases that are filed after the decision or that
have not yet been decided at courts of first instance. Proclamation No.
454/2005 does not allow courts to re-adjudicate cases that have already
been decided based on the previous binding interpretation of the FSC
Cassation Division. The purpose of the law is to render consistency to
320EtLex,Volume1EthiopianLegalInformationConsortiumNovember2013
judicial interpretation where an issue is decided by the FSC Cassation

Division, and it is not meant to allow revisiting cases that have been
decided after the exhaustion of all adjudication procedures. This disturbs
stability and exposes litigants to an unpredictable judicial system. We have
thus found that the decisions of Oromia Supreme Court Appellate Bench
and the Regions Cassation Division have fundamental errors of law in the
application of Proclamation No. 454/2005.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Oromia Supreme Court Appellate Bench
File No. 106340 dated Tir 10, 2003 EC (October 19, 2010) and
confirmed by the Regions Supreme Court Cassation Division File No.
124793 (on Megabit 19, 2003 EC, i.e. March 28, 2011) is reversed.
2. The decision of Oromia Liyu Zone High Courts decision, File No.
06799 dated Ginbot 19, 2002 EC (May 27, 2010) is confirmed.
3. The decision rendered by Adama Liyu Zone on Sene 23, 2003 EC
(June 30, 2011) File No. 05508 was given in accordance with Article 2
of Proclamation No. 454/2005 and should be considered as the final
judgment because there is no valid procedure which allows re-
adjudication and review. ...
_________________________________________________
Volume 13, pp. 623-625

Getnet Yenew -v.- Iyob Binyam

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 60392 (4 January 2011)
The period of limitation that bars possessory action for the cessation of
interference shall run from the date the petitioner receives possession of
landholding title and not from the starting date of the interference which
is contested.
Civil Code, Articles 1140, 1149, 1146(1), 1144(2)
______________
Tahsas 26, 2003 E.C. (January 4, 2011)

Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Birhanu Amenew,
Petitioner: Getnet Yanew
Respondent: Iyob Binyam
Judgment
The case started with the petitioners possessory action for the cessation of
interference which was accepted by the lower court. The appellate court,
however, reversed the decision stating that possessory action is barred by
period of limitation. This petition is submitted against the appellate courts
decision.
The case was initially adjudicated by Dire Dawa First Instance Court
which required the Dire Daw Urban Land Administration Authority to submit
evidence about the landholding rights over the land contested. Thereupon the
Court decided that the respondent has interfered in the possession of the
petitioner.
The appellate court stated that the respondent built the fence in 1987 EC
(1994/95) on the contested land while the possessory action was submitted to
court on Tir 14, 2002 EC (January 22, 2010). It decided in favour of the
respondent by stating that the suit is barred by period of limitation in
accordance with Article 1149(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, it stated that by
virtue of Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, the party that actually controls the
property contested shall be preferred in possessory disputes.
The petition to this Cassation Division is submitted against this decision.
This court required the respondent to respond to the petition so that the
Cassation Division can examine the validity of the decision of the appellate
court by setting aside the landholding certificate submitted by the petitioner.
The respondent submitted his reply dated Hedar 29, 2003 (December 8,
2010). He argued that the contested 52 (fifty two) square meters have been
under his possession since 1987 EC (1994/95), and the petitioners claim of
interference in possession relates to land that is not under the petitioners
possession.
The Cassation Division has duly examined the facts briefly stated above
based on the issue in dispute and the relevant legal provisions.
It can be observed from the evidence submitted to and accepted by the
lower courts that the petitioner has a landholding certificate dated Megabit 10,
2000 EC (March 18, 2008) over the contested land. The fact that the area of
land stated in the landholding certificate is 180 (one hundred and eighty)
square meters out of which 52 (fifty two) square meters are under the
respondents possession are also facts established by the lower courts.
Even though the respondent argues that he is in possession of the land
since 1987 EC (1994/95), the Kebele Administration has verified that the
respondents construction of fence was unlawful, i.e. done without permit.
The decision of the appellate court which cites Articles 1140 and 1144(2)
of the Civil Code thus amounts to giving protection to the respondents
unlawful possession.
It should be noted that the objective of the Civil Code provisions is to
protect lawful possessions and not to encourage unlawful acts. As can be
observed from the stipulation under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code, secret
or dubious possession shall give rise to no right.
We have thus found that the legal provision that is invoked by the
appellate court to reverse the lower courts decision has not taken the facts that
are established by the lower court.
Moreover, the period of limitation of two years stated under Article
1149(2) has not lapsed because the landholding certificate was issued to the
petitioner on March 18, 2008 and the petitioner has filed the suit on January
22, 2010.
Therefore, the petitioner has a better right than the respondent because his
possessory action is based on the landholding certificate obtained from the
relevant authority and the period of limitation should run from the date on

which he obtained the landholding certificate and not from the date of the
respondents unlawful possession.
We have thus found that the appellate courts decision should be rectified
because it has not related the law with the facts established by the lower court.
Decree
1. The decision of Dire Dawa Appellate Court, File No. 00514/2002, dated
Hamle 27, 2002 EC (August 3, 2010) is reversed in accordance with
2. The decision of Dire Dawa First Instance Court, File No. 01098 dated
Sene 28, 2002 (July 5, 2010) is confirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 557 559
Bahir Dar City Service Office -v.- Bahir Dar Textile Factory et al

Where property under court injunction to restrain sale is found to have
been sold, the judgment creditor shall have recourse, and the failure to
respect the injunction (igid) entails liability.
Civil Code, Articles 2028, 2035, 2126.
_______________
Yekatit 10, 2003 E.C. (17 February 2011)

Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Dagne Melaku, Teshager G/Selassie,
Petitioner: Bahir Dar City Service Office

Respondents: 1. Bahir Dar Textile Factory
2. Roman Gebru
3. Maru Alamirew
Judgment
The case relates to the remedy available to a judgment creditor where property
under suspension of sale (igid) is found to have been sold. The case started
based on the statement of claim submitted to the lower court by the current
first respondent against the current petitioner. The current second and third
respondents were made parties to the suit upon the request of the present
petitioner after it received the statement of claim.
The initial plaintiff (i.e. the present first respondent) filed a suit which
states that Berhanu T. was employed as a cashier from 1988 EC to 1994 EC
and he has misappropriated Birr 28,794.70 (twenty eight thousand seven
hundred ninety four birr and seventy cents). The statement of claim further
states that Western Gojam Administration Zone High Court had held Berhanu
T. liable for the amount stated in the suit plus interest and had granted a
temporary injunction to restrain sale and exchange of Berhanus house as
security for the judgment creditor. The suit indicates that Bahir Dar City
Service (Municipality) Office has violated the Courts injunction of sale and
requested that it should be liable to pay the amount that was secured by the
injunction.
The present petitioner admits the injunction that was ordered by the court,
and argued that it is not liable for the mistake stated in the suit because it
occurred due to the fault of two employees whom it requested to be joined in
the suit as respondents. The second and third respondents who were included
in the suit argued against the liability raised in the suit.
The lower court decided that the present petitioner is liable to pay the
amount that was secured by the judgment and found that the second and third
respondents are not liable. The petitioners appeal to the Amhara Region
Supreme Court and its cassation petition to the Regions Supreme Court
Cassation Bench were not accepted.
The petitioner has further lodged a petition to the Federal Supreme Court
Cassation Division. The core theme of the petition is that the second and third
respondents, and not the petitioner should have been held liable. It further
complained against the decisions of the lower court regarding the amount that
it was made liable to pay, by stating that the liability should have been only for
the amount obtained from the sale of the house and not the entire debt for
which Birhanu was made liable for misappropriation, i.e Birr 28,794.70.
The judgment debtor has sold the house that had secured his debt and
which was under injunction. The judgment creditor had submitted the
injunction order for the suspension of sale to the present petitioner, in spite of
which the latter failed to suspend the sale. The petitioner does not deny the
receipt of the injunction, but rather argues that the liability solely goes to the
second and third respondents. The decision of the lower courts found the
petitioner liable on the ground that it has allowed the sale of the house in
violation of the injunction, and that it has not proved the fault of the second
and third respondents.
By virtue of the content and spirit of Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE
Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation No. 25/1996, this cassation bench
does not address issues of fact, and the decisions of the lower courts regarding
the petitioners failure to prove the fault of the second and third respondents
cannot be re-examined by this bench. In light of its failure to prove the fault
of the second and third respondents, there is no ground for the petitioner not to
shoulder liability. This is because the violation of the injunction to restrain
sale constitutes infringement of clearly stipulated rules and procedures which
entail liability in accordance with Articles 2028, 2035 and 2126 of the Civil
Code. The decision of the lower court has not thus made error of law in
rendering the petitioner liable.
The other argument submitted by the petitioner relates to the amount of

liability, and the petitioner contends that the liability should extend only to the
amount received as proceeds of the sale of the house and not the whole
amount for which the judgment debtor was liable. However, as the sale was
not sold by auction, it cannot be ascertained whether the house was sold at its
real market value. Thus the petitioner has no valid ground to contest the
amount of liability. We have rendered the following decision because there is
no valid ground which shows fundamental error of law.
Decree
The decision rendered in this case is confirmed in accordance with Article
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 522-524

Berhane Tessema v. Tamirat Kidane et al

Excessive noise pollution is said to occur when it causes nuisance. The
claim for its cessation is not barred by period of limitation. The remedy
cannot be sought from the licensing authority.
Civil Code, Articles 1225, 1226, 1149;
Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proc. No. 67/1997
______________

Petitioner: Berhane Tessema
Respondents: 1. Tamirat Ayane
2. Kolfe Keraniyo Sub-City Trade and Industry
Development Bureau
Judgment
The case involves the issue of nuisance embodied in Article 1225 of the Civil
Code and it started at the Federal First Instance Court. The present petitioner
was the plaintiff. In a statement of claim dated Yekatit 28, 2000 EC (March
7, 2008), the petitioner stated that he owns a house adjacent to the first
respondent, and that the latter is causing nuisance due to the excessive noise
caused by metal works welding machine. He further requested that the second
respondent revoke the business licence it has given to the first respondent
because such activity should only be conducted in an industrial zone.
The first respondent contended that the claim should be barred by a
limitation period of two years and that the noise created by the welding
machine is not excessive. The second respondent also argued that the issuance
of the licence was appropriate.
The Federal First Instance Court decided that the claim is barred by a
period of limitation of two years. It also held the licence can only be revoked
by the entity that is authorized for its issuance, and not by a court thereby
rejecting the petitioners claims. This decision was confirmed by the Federal
High Court, and the petition to this cassation bench is made against these
decisions.
The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
dated Tir 18, 2001 EC (January 26, 2009) states that the nuisance had ceased
due to the intervention of community police (denb askbari) and the statement
of claim [dated March 7, 2008] was submitted as soon as the nuisance
restarted. The first respondent on the other hand contended that new issues
cannot be raised at the Cassation Bench and that the claim is barred by period
of limitation.
The Cassation Bench has examined the arguments raised by both parties in
light of the relevant legal provisions and the issues involved the case. The
petitioner and the first respondent are neighbours and the latter is found to be
undertaking mental works welding since 1993 Ethiopian Calendar, i.e. 2000.
Article 1225 of the Civil Code which deals with abuse of ownership
against good neighbourly behaviour is different from Article 1149 which
addresses the issue of the cessation of interference. Article 1225 embodies
restriction on ownership right even when it is exercised on ones own
property; it requires that the external manifestations of an owners acts should
not disturb or adversely affect a neighbour or another owner. The reading of
Article 1225 in conjunction with Article 1226 and the subsequent provisions
requires an owner to use his rights within the limits set forth by the law in such
a manner that his lawful use of property does not cause nuisance or damage.
Therefore, the period of limitation that applies to Article 1149 is not relevant
in this case.
In the case under consideration, the nature of the arguments show that the
petitioner is not requesting cessation of interference [as envisaged under
Article 1149 of the Civil Code] but the cessation of the nuisance caused by the
machine. The noise from the machine is bound to continue as long as the
business undertaking continues. In other words, the lapse of time does not bar
suits against nuisance. The key issue is proving nuisance due to the noise. The
major objective of Article 1225 to protect the use rights of neighbours. There
is no legal stipulation which allows the continuity of noise pollution [merely
because it existed for a certain period of time].
Adjudication procedures do not allow decisions that emanate from mere
focus on legal provisions cited by litigating parties where such provisions are
not relevant for the issues in the case. The task of identifying the relevant
provisions that should constitute the basis of judgments is the role of courts.
Therefore, there is fundamental error of law in the lower courts decision that

the petitioners request against the first respondents act is barred by

limitation. The court has erroneously based its decision on a legal provision
that applies for interference in possession while the provisions that are
applicable to this case are Articles 1225 and 1226 of the Civil Code.
With regard to the second respondent, the lower court has found that the
respondent is not authorized to determine the modes of urban land use, but to
merely issue licences where the legal requirements are met, and suspend or
revoke them in the event of defects based on Commercial Registration and
Business Licensing Proclamation. The petition submitted to this Cassation
Division deals with the lower courts decision which invoked period of limitation.
However, the petition does not indicate the error of law in the decision of the
lower court with regard to the second respondent.
The Cassation Division has observed from Article 10 of the Commercial
Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 67/1997 that the
proclamation does not provide for the revocation of a business licence by the
authority that is entrusted with its issuance in the event of nuisance caused to
another person. Therefore, we have found no error of law in the decision of the
lower court with regard to the second respondent. We have thus rendered the
following decree.
Decree
1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court (File No. 69348) dated
Sene 26, 2000 (July 3, 2008) and confirmed by the Federal High Court
(File No. 69348) on Hedar 24, 2001 (December 3, 2008) are amended in
2. As there is no legal ground to bar the petitioners claims by period of
limitation against, the case is referred to the Federal First Instance Court in
accordance with Article 341(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that the
court can, based on Article 1225 of the Civil Code render its decision by
examining whether the noise created by the first respondents welding
activity causes nuisance at the petitioners house, and whether the
respondent has made efforts to control the noise.
3. The decision of the lower court with regard to the second respondent is
confirmed.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 11, pp. 539 541
Mukmil Mohammed -v.- Miftah Kedir


The parties have agreed on an alternative dispute settlement mechanism,
and their agreement shows that the scheme they have opted to undertake
is arbitration whose decision is binding.
Civil Code, Articles 3318, 3324, 3325 3346 1731; Civil Procedure Code
Articles 315,319, 350, 357
_______________
Megabit 24, 2001 E.C. (April 3, 2009)

Justices: Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Almaw Wolie,
Ali Mohammed
Petitioner: Mukmil Mohammed
Respondent: Miftah Kedir
Judgment
The case relates to the petitioners application for execution of arbitral award
submitted to the Federal First Instance Court. The application dated Tahsas 3,
1994 EC (December 12, 2001) stated that the plaintiff (present petitioner) and
respondent had business relations and that they had assigned arbitrators who
passed an arbitral award dated Hedar 8, 1990 (November 17, 1997). The
petitioners request to the Federal First Instance Court was that the court
execute the arbitral award of Birr 170,122.75 (one hundred seventy thousand
one hundred twenty two birr and seventy five cents) which the respondent has
failed to pay.
The arbitral award debtor, i.e. the present respondent had contested the
petitioners request stating that there was merely conciliation, and not
arbitration, and that if the conciliation is regarded as agreement, he has not
given an undertaking in writing to confirm the compromise. He further stated
that it was not legally valid to consider that the compromise made on Tikimt
23, 1990 EC (November 2, 1997) for an amicable settlement would lead to
arbitration. After having examined the arguments and the evidence submitted
by both parties, the Federal First Instance Court rejected the application for
execution by stating that the agreement of the parties constitutes conciliation
and that it does not indicate the written undertaking of the parties to confirm
the compromise as required under Article 3322(2) of the Civil Code. The
Federal High Court confirmed the decision, and this petition to the Federal
Cassation Division is submitted against these decisions.
The cassation petition dated Sene 25, 2000 (July 2, 2008) states that the
lower court has made fundamental error of law in considering an arbitral
award as a compromise. The petitioner argues that the agreement made by the
parties on Tikimt 23, 1990 (November 2, 1997) is arbitral submission and the
decision of the arbitrators based on the evidence submitted by both parties
cannot be considered as conciliation even if did not strictly pursue court
procedures. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has further
allowed oral arguments to be made by both parties.
The issue examined by the Cassation Bench is whether the lower courts
rejection of the application for execution is valid.
As the facts established in the course of the litigation indicate, agreement
was made between the parties on November 2, 1997 and decision was
awarded by arbitrators on November 12, 1997. The lower court accepted the
existence of the November 2nd agreement between the parties, and the decision
of the arbitrators on 17th November, but it stated that the decision rendered
was not arbitration but conciliation which does not fulfil Article 3322(2) of the
Civil Code.
Conciliation, mediation, arbitration and negotiation are generally
considered as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The lower court has
considered conciliation and arbitration in its legal reasoning, and it is
necessary to look into their interpretation and application pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code.
The dispute resolution process of conciliation involves negotiation and
compromise by the parties in the presence of a third party [referred to as the
conciliator] who shall not interfere in the compromise beyond observation as
stipulated under Articles 3318-3324 of the Civil Code. In arbitration, on the
other hand, the parties present their cases to a third party after which the
arbitrator renders decision. Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code and Articles
315-319, 350-357 of the Civil Procedure Code regulate the process and the
application of arbitration. This indicates that arbitral submissions based on the
law can be executed. Particular reference to Articles 3325-3346 indicates that
arbitral submissions can be considered as special contracts.
Article 3325 defines arbitration. As contracts are agreements to create,

vary and extinguish obligations the elements that must be fulfilled for the
formation of a valid contract are also application to arbitral submission. The
fulfilment of the conditions of capacity of contracting parties and the
requirement of lawful object and the form required by the law are the factors
that determine the existence of arbitral submission. The initial step in
arbitration is the conclusion of a valid arbitral submission.
Article of the 3345 of the Civil Code stipulates that the procedures of the
arbitration shall be in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code and this
constitutes the process after the arbitrator starts hearing the arguments of both
sides subsequent to the conclusion of valid arbitral submission. This shows
that the rights of the disputing parties to hearing, submission of evidence and
examination of the other partys evidence should be respected and the
arbitrator should as much as possible conduct the hearing under the procedures
applicable to ordinary courts. However, the spirit of same provision indicates
that the procedures applicable to ordinary courts may not be rigidly
implemented.
As long as the arbitral award is not altered as a result of appeal based on
Articles 350 ff of the Civil Procedure Code, it can be executed same as
decisions of ordinary courts. Therefore an arbitral award rendered by an
arbitrator [which is not altered by an appeal] is final. Moreover the reading of
Article 3325 in conjunction with Article 1731 of the Civil Code indicate that a
valid arbitral submission which is formed shall bind the contracting parties as
law.
In the case under consideration, the respondent does not deny the
conclusion of arbitral submission, and this is confirmed by the lower court.
The arbitral submission concluded on Tikimt 23, 1990 (November 2, 1997)
shows the formation of council of arbitrators and it states that the parties are
willing to be bound by the decision of the arbitrators. The arbitral award given
on November 17, 1997 is based on this arbitral submission and it states that
the arbitrators have identified the shares of each party in the property and
money under dispute. The lower court has considered the document signed on
November 2, 1997 as a compromise by citing Article 3322(2) and also stating
that witnesses have testified that it was a compromise.
However, the content of the agreement concluded between the parties on
November 2, 1997 shows that it does not fall under Articles 3318-3324, but
rather falls under Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code. In light of Article 317
of the Civil Procedure Code which does not require arbitrators to rigidly
follow court procedures, the decision rendered on November 17, 1997 by
bringing the parties into terms and by examining the case is arbitration.

In the arbitral submission dated November 2, 1997, the petitioner and the
respondent have agreed that they will accept the arbitral award and have given
mandate to the arbitrators to render decision. The lower court has committed
fundamental error of law in considering this as conciliation and not as
arbitration thereby deciding that the respondent is not bound to pay the amount
stated. This decision has failed to relate the content of the evidence submitted
to the lower court with Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code and Articles 315-
319 and 350-357 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Decree
1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court File No. 00136
dated Meskerem 30, 2000 EC (October 10, 2007) and which is confirmed
by the Federal High Court File No. 60538 (on Miazia 09, 2000, i.e. April
17, 2008) is reversed.
2. The respondent shall pay the amount (i.e. Birr 170,122.75) as decided by
the arbitrators.
...
_________________________________________________
Volume 9, pp. 173-175

PartTwo

IndexofProclamationsand
Regulations
(19952012)
PartTwo:IndexofProclamationsandRegulations(19952012)335
Index1
Constitution,CodesofLawandStateOrgans
1,Constitution
001/1995 ConstitutionoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopia
RepealedConstitutions
1987People'sDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaConstitution
1955RevisedConstitutionoftheEmpireofEthiopia
1931ConstitutionoftheEmpireofEthiopia
2.CodesofLaw
414/2004 CriminalCodeoftheFDRE
213/2000 RevisedFamilyCode
52/1965 CivilProcedureCode(DecreeNo.52/1965)
185/1961 CriminalProcedureCode
166/1960 CommercialCode
165/1960 CivilCode
164/1960 MaritimeCode
AmendmentstoCodesofLaw
639/2009 CivilCode(amendment)
141/1998 PenalCode(amendment)
065/1997 CivilCode(amendment)
3.FDRE,Flag,EmblemandHolidays
673/2010 EthiopianNationalAnthem
654/2009 Flag
048/1996 FlagandEmblem(amendment)
029/1996 PublicHolidaysandRestDay(amendment)
016/1996 FlagandEmblem
002/1995 DeclarationofEstablishmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopia
4.ExecutiveOrgans
691/2010 DefinitionofPowersandDutiesoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDRE
642/2009 DefinitionofPowersandDutiesoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDRE(amendment)
411/2004 AProclamationtoAmendtheReorganizationoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDRE
380/2004 AProclamationtoAmendtheReorganizationoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDRE
256/2001 ReorganizationoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDREofEthiopia
255/2001 AdministrationofthePresidentoftheFDRE
006/1995 Security,ImmigrationandRefugeeAffairsAuthorityEstablishment
004/2005 DefinitionofPowersandDutiesoftheExecutiveOrgansoftheFDRE
5.Legislativeorgans
556/2007 EstablishmentoftheSecretariatoftheHouseofFederation
519/2007 TheSecretariatoftheHouseofPeoplesRepresentativesEstablishment
(amendment)
503/2006 TheProclamationtoRepealtheAmendedProclamationoftheHouseof
People'sRepresentativesWorkingProceduresandMembers'CodeofConduct
470/2005 HouseofPeople'sRepresentativesWorkingProcedure
271/2002 HouseofPeople'sRepresentativesLegislativeProcedure,CommitteesStructure
263/2002 andWorking
RecessandTimeinSessionoftheHouseofPeople'sRepresentatives
253/2001 (amendment)
EstablishmentoftheSecretariatoftheHouseofPeople'sRepresentatives
251/2001 ConsolidationoftheHouseofFederationandtheDefinitionofitsPowersand
088/1997 Responsibilities
LossofMandateofMembersofHouseofPeople'sRepresentatives
033/1996 HouseofPeople'sRepresentativesProcedure(amendment)
032/1996 RecessandTimeinSessionoftheHouseofPeople'sRepresentatives
014/1995 HouseofPeople'sRepresentativesLegislativeProcedure
013/1995 EstablishmentoftheSecretariatoftheHouseofFederation
003/1995 FederalNegaritGazetaEstablishment
6.JudicialOrgans
684/2010 AmendedFederalJudicialAdministrationCouncilEstablishment
454/2005 FederalCourtsProclamationReamendment
434/2005 FederalCourtsProclamation(reamendment)
322/2003 TheFederalHighCourtEstablishment
321/2003 FederalCourts(amendment)
188/1999 FederalCourtsofShariaConsolidation
025/1996 FederalCourtsEstablishment
024/1996 FederalJudicialAdministrationCouncilEstablishment
7.Variousorgans
692/2010 SportsCommissionEstablishment
669/2010 OfficeoftheAuditorGeneralEstablishment(amendment)
649/2009 TheEthiopianFederalGovernmentProcurementandPropertyAdministration
593/2008 TransferofRightsandObligationsofDisasterPreventionandPreparedness
CommissiontotheMinistryofAgricultureandRuralDevelopment
555/2007 AgencyforGovernmentHousesEstablishment
535/2007 NationalLotteryAdministrationReestablishment
534/2007 RiverBasinCouncilsandAuthorities
510/2007 NationalLotteryAdministrationEstablishment
478/2005 AnInquiryCommissiontoInvestigatetheDisorderOccurredinAddisAbabaand
inSomePartsoftheCountry
459/2005 PalaceAdministrationEstablishment
449/2005 CensusCommissionReestablishment

442/2005 CentralStatisticsAuthorityEstablishment
413/2004 QualityandStandardsAuthorityofEthiopiaEstablishment(amendment)
412/2004 PrivatizationandPublicEnterprisesSupervisingAuthority
383/2004 AProclamationtoAmendtheDisasterPreventionandPreparedness
CommissionEstablishmentProclamation
364/2003 TheJusticeSectorPersonnelTrainingCenterEstablishment
360/2003 EthiopianInformationandCommunicationTechnologyDevelopmentAuthority
Establishment
277/2002 PublicEnterprisesSupervisingAuthority
274/2002 CooperativesCommissionEstablishment
257/2001 EthiopianNationalSecurityCouncil
250/2001 CouncilofConstitutionalInquiry
212/2000 NationalDisasterPreventionandPreparednessFundEstablishment
209/2000 ResearchandConservationofCulturalHeritage
208/2000 BoardofTrusteeforPublicEnterprisesEstablishment
194/2000 GeologicalSurveyofEthiopiaEstablishment
180/1999 CensusCommissionEstablishment
179/1999 EthiopianNationalArchivesandLibrary
173/1999 PreshipmentInspectionSchemeEstablishment
151/1999 EthiopianFilmCorporationDissolution
133/1998 AgencyfortheAdministrationofRentedHousesEstablishment(amendment)
129/1998 AwashBasinWaterResourcesAdministrationAgencyEstablishment
102/1998 QualityandStandardsAuthorityofEthiopiaEstablishment
084/1997 CensusCommissionEstablishment
082/1997 NationalPetroleumReserveDepotsAdministration
068/1997 OfficeoftheFederalAuditorGeneralEstablishment
057/1996 FederalGovernmentofEthiopiaFinancialAdministration
052/1996 EthiopianPrivatizationAgencyEstablishment
051/1996 OfficefortheSaleofGovernmentOwnedHousesEstablishment
050/1996 EstablishmentoftheBoardofTrusteeforPrivatizedPublicEnterprise
(amendment)
047/1996 BasicMetalsEngineeringIndustryAgencyEstablishment
017/1996 EstablishmentoftheBoardofTrusteeforPrivatizedPublicEnterprise
012/1995 SportsCommissionEstablishment
011/1995 TourismCommissionEstablishment
010/1995 DisasterPreventionandPreparednessCommissionEstablishment
008/1995 FederalCivilServiceCommissionEstablishment
8.CityCharters
536/2007 TheProclamationtoAmendtheDireDawaAdministrationCharter(amendment)
514/2007 TheProclamationtoAmendtheDireDawaAdministrationCharter(amendment)
483/2006 TheDireDawaAdministrationCharter(amended)
416/2004 TheDireDawaAdministrationCharter
408/2004 AddisAbabaGovernmentRevisedCharter
361/2003 AddisAbabaCityGovernmentRevisedCharter
311/2003 AddisAbabaCityGovernmentRevisedCharter
087/1997 AddisAbabaCityGovernmentCharter
9.DefenseandPolice
343/2003 DefenseForces(amendment)
327/2003 EstablishmentoftheNationalReserveForce
313/2003 FederalPoliceCommission
207/2000 FederalPolice
123/1998 DefenseForces(amendment)
027/1996 DefenseForces
10.FundEstablishment
708/2011 EthiopianWomen'sDevelopmentFundDissolution
589/2008 RoadDevelopmentProjectsRevolvingFundEstablishment
581/2008 WaterResourcesDevelopmentFundEstablishmentandAdministration
(amendment)
521/2007 EthiopianSocialRehabilitationandDevelopmentFundDissolution
415/2004 SugarIndustryDevelopmentFundEstablishment
342/2003 FuelPriceStabilizationFundEstablishment(amendment)
317/2003 RuralElectrificationFundEstablishment
268/2002 WaterResourcesDevelopmentFundEstablishment
247/2001 FuelPriceStabilizationFundEstablishment
240/2001 EthiopianWomen'sDevelopmentFundEstablishment
066/1997 RoadFundEstablishment
019/1996 EthiopianSocialRehabilitationandDevelopmentFundEstablishment
11.Budget,FiscalYear:EthiopianCalendar(19952005EthiopianCalendar)
766/2012 2005FiscalYearBudget
738/2012 2004E.C.FiscalYearFederalGovernmentSupplementaryBudget
719/2011 2004FiscalYearFederalGovernmentBudget
704/2011 2003FiscalYearFederalGovernmentSupplementaryBudget
672/2010 2002FiscalYearFederalGovernmentSupplementaryBudget
647/2009 2002(E.C.)FiscalYearFederalGovernmentBudget
579/2008 2000FiscalYearSupplementaryBudget
469/2005 1998[2005]FiscalYearBudget
419/2004 FederalBudget
418/2004 TheProclamationtoRatifytheBudgetfortheInquiryCommissionto
InvestigatetheIncidentOccurredinGambellaRegionalState
onDecember03,2003

Index2
ThematicIndexofProclamations(19952012)
ThemesandOrgans
1.AgricultureandRuralDevelopment
782/2012 Seed
660/2009 ApicultureResourcesDevelopmentandProtection
488/2006 EthiopianOrganicAgricultureSystem
315/2003 FisheriesDevelopmentandUtilization
267/2002 AnimalDiseasesPreventionandControl
238/2001 EthiopianAgriculturalSampleEnumeration
206/2000 Seed
_____________________________________________________
330/2003 TheInternationalTreatyonPlantGeneticResourcesforFoodandAgriculture
Institutions
504/2006 EthiopianSugarDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment
390/2004 AgriculturalMechanizationServicesCorporationEstablishmentProclamation
Repeal
382/2004 AProclamationtoAmendtheEthiopianAgriculturalResearchOrganization
Establishment
288/2002 NationalAgriculturalInputAuthorityEstablishment
269/2002 EthiopianRuralEnergyDevelopmentandPromotionCenterEstablishment
198/2000 Animal,AnimalProductsandByProductsMarketsDevelopmentAuthority
Establishment(amendment)
145/1998 NationalFertilizerIndustryAgencyEstablishment
122/1998 NationalSeedIndustryAgencyEstablishment(amendment)
117/1998 Animal,AnimalProductsandByProductsMarketsDevelopmentAuthority
Establishment
079/1997 EthiopianAgriculturalResearchOrganization
041/1996 NationalFertilizerIndustryAgencyEstablishment
2.BankingandInsurance
746/2012 InsuranceBusiness
626/2009 MicroFinancingBusiness
592/2008 BankingBusiness
559/2008 VehicleInsuranceAgainstThirdPartyRisks
306/2002 TransferofDoubtfulBankDebttotheGovernment(amendment)
216/2000 PropertyMortgagedorPledgedwithBanks(amendment)
193/2000 PropertyMortgagedorPledgedwithBanks
097/1998 PropertyMortgagedorPledgedwithBanks
040/1996 LicensingandSupervisionofMicroFinancingInstitutions
591/2008 TheNationalBankofEthiopiaEstablishment(asamended)

3.Businessrelated
A.EthiopiaCommodityExchange
665/2010 EthiopiaCommodityExchange(amendment)
550/2007 EthiopiaCommodityExchange
B.Mining
678/2010 MiningOperations
118/1998 Mining(amendment)
022/1996 Mining(amendment)
C.RegistrationandLicensing
731/2012 CommercialRegistrationandBusinessLicensing(amendment)
686/2010 CommercialRegistrationandBusinessLicensing
113/1998 AuthorizationofaSpecialTimeLimitforBusinessLicenseRenewal
067/1997 CommercialRegistrationandBusinessLicensing
D.TradePracticeandConsumerProtection
685/2010 TradePracticeandConsumers'Protection
329/2003 TradePractice
E.Transport
681/2010 VehiclesIdentification,InspectionandRegistration
616/2008 CivilAviation
600/2008 Driver'sQualificationCertification
548/2007 MultimodalTransportofGoods
547/2007 ProclamationtoAmendCarriageofGoodsbyLand
468/2005 Transport
743/2012 RevisedAfricanMaritimeTransportCharter
121/1998 AfricanMaritimeTransportCharter
F.Others
651/2009 TransactionofPreciousMinerals
624/2009 EthiopianBuilding
602/2008 CoffeeQualityControlandMarketing
588/2008 ProclamationtoDefinetheLiabilityoftheDryPorttotheConsignee
457/2005 RawHideandSkinMarketingSystem
440/2005 TheGrantingofExclusiveAgencyonCertainExportSectorsforaLimited
PeriodofTime
372/2003 TheProclamationtoProvideforaWarehouseReceiptSystem
182/1999 PrivatizationofPublicEnterprises(amendment)
146/1998 PrivatizationofPublicEnterprises
137/1998 FertilizerManufacturingandTrade
104/1998 PrivateEmploymentAgency
103/1998 CapitalGoodsLeasingBusiness
098/1998 BusinessMortgage


G.Instituitons
341/2003 ChambersofCommerceandSectoralAssociationEstablishment
273/2002 EthiopianCivilAviationAuthorityReestablishment
181/1999 TransferoftheMonopolyRightoftheNationalTobaccoEnterprisetothe
NationalTobaccoEnterprise(Ethiopia)ShareCompany
177/1999 RegistrationandControlofConstructionMachinery
132/1998 EthiopianExportPromotionAgencyEstablishment
080/1997 EthiopianRoadsAuthorityReestablishment
042/1996 EthiopianRoadAuthorityReestablishment
034/1996 SmallScaleIndustriesandHandicraftsDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment
028/1996 ProclamationRepealingSmallScaleIndustriesandHandicraftsDevelopment
AgencyEstablishmentProclamation
4.CriminalLawandCriminalProcedure
780/2012 PreventionandSuppressionofMoneyLaunderingandtheFinancingof
Terrorism
761/2012 TelecomFraudOffence
699/2010 ProtectionofWitnessesandWhistleblowersofCriminalOffences
657/2009 PreventionandSuppressionofMoneyLaunderingandtheFinancingof
Terrorism
652/2009 AntiTerrorism
434/2005 RevisedAntiCorruptionSpecialProcedureandRulesofEvidence
432/2004 EthiopianAviationSecurity
414/2004 TheCriminalCodeoftheFDRE
395/2004 ProcedureofPardon
384/2004 VagrancyControl
239/2001 AntiCorruptionSpecialProcedureandRulesofEvidence(amendment)
236/2001 AntiCorruptionSpecialProcedureandRulesofEvidence
031/1996 OffencesagainsttheSafetyofAviation
737/2012 ProtocoltoPrevent,SuppressandPunishTraffickinginPersonsEspecially
WomenandChildren
736/2012 ProtocolagainsttheSmugglingofMigrantsbyLand,SeaandAir
735/2012 ProtocolAgainsttheIllicitManufacturingofandTraffickinginFirearms,their
PartsandComponentsandAmmunition
734/2012 InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionoftheFinancingofTerrorism
733/2012 IGADConventiononExtradition
732/2012 IGADConventiononMutualLegalAssistanceinCriminalMatters
614/2008 TheProtocoltotheOAUConventiononthePreventionandCombatingof
Terrorism
545/2007 TheAfricanUnionConventiononPreventingandCombatingCorruption
Ratification
544/2007 UnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruptionRatification
526/2007 TheConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime
302/2002 OAUConventiononthePreventionandCombatingofTerrorism(1999)
Institutions
235/2001 FederalEthicsandAntiCorruptionCommissionEstablishment
365/2003 FederalPrisonsCommissionEstablishment
433/2005 RevisedFederalEthicsandAntiCorruptionCommission
5.CustomsandTaxes
768/2012 ExportTradeDutyIncentiveSchemes
767/2012 ChatExciseTax
693/2010 IncomeTax(amendment)
622/2009 Customs
612/2008 StampDuty(amendment)
611/2008 TurnoverTax(Amendment)
610/2008 ExciseTax(amendment)
609/2008 VAT(amendment)
570/2008 ExciseTax(amendment)
567/2008 RawandSemiprocessedHidesandSkinsExportTax
543/2007 RevisedExportTradeDutyIncentiveSchemeEstablishment
308/2002 TurnoverTax
307/2002 ExciseTax
287/2002 TaxonCoffeeExportedfromEthiopia(amendment)
286/2002 IncomeTax
285/2002 VAT
249/2001 ExportTradeDutyIncentiveSchemeEstablishment
237/2001 SalesandExciseTax(amendment)
226/2000 PetroleumOperationsIncomeTax(amendment)
125/1998 TheCustomsAuthority(amendment)
110/1998 StampDuty
099/1998 TaxonCoffeeExportedfromEthiopia
077/1997 SalesandExciseTax(Amendment)
023/1996 MiningIncomeTax(amendment)
540/2007 AgreementofCustomsCooperationandAntiSmugglingandIllicitTrafficking
betweentheMemberStatesoftheSana'aForum
Institutions
587/2008 EthiopianRevenuesandCustomsAuthorityEstablishment
368/2003 ReestablishmentandModernizationofCustomsAuthority(amendment)
367/2003 TheReestablishmentoftheFederalInlandRevenueAuthority
233/2001 FederalTaxAppealTribunalEstablishment
061/1997 FederalInlandRevenueAuthorityEstablishment
060/1997 TheReestablishmentandModernizationofCustomsAuthority
6.Education
650/2009 HigherEducation
391/2004 TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining
351/2003 HigherEducation
217/2000 StrengtheningoftheManagementandAdministrationofSchools(amendment)


160/1999 EducationMaterialsProductionandDistributionAgencyEstablishment
ProclamationRepealing
7.Electorallaw
662/2009 ProclamationontheElectoralCodeofConductforPoliticalParties
573/2008 TheRevisedPoliticalPartiesRegistration
532/2007 TheAmendedElectoralLawofEthiopia
438/2005 ProclamationtoMakeElectoralLawofEthiopiaConformwiththeConstitution
oftheFDRE(amendment)
187/1999 AProclamationtoMaketheElectoralLawofEthiopiaConformwiththe
ConstitutionoftheFDRE(amendment)
613/2008 TheAfricanCharteronDemocracy,ElectionandGovernance
8.EnvironmentalLaw
655/2009 Biosafety
542/2007 ForestDevelopment,Conservation,andUtilization
541/2007 DevelopmentConservationandUtilizationofWildlife
513/2007 SolidWasteManagement
300/2002 EnvironmentalPollutionControl
299/2002 EnvironmentalImpactAssessment
197/2000 EthiopianWaterResourcesManagement
753/2012 NagoyaProtocolonAccesstoGeneticResourcesandtheFairandEquitable
SharingoftheBenefitsArisingfromtheirUtilizationRatification
656/2009 MontrealProtocolAmendments
635/2009 AfricanEurasianMigratoryWaterBirdsAgreement
634/2009 ConventionoftheMigratorySpeciesofWildAnimals
629/2009 TheConventionontheLiabilityandCompensationforDamageinConnection
withtheCarriageofHazardousandNoxiousSubstancesbySea
620/2009 TheCivilLiabilityforBunkerOilPollutionDamageConvention
439/2005 KyotoProtoco
362/2003 CartagenaProtocolonBiosafety
357/2003 BaselProtocol
356/2003 BaselConventionAmendment
355/2003 BamakoConvention
279/2002 StockholmConventiononPersistentOrganicPollutants
278/2002 RotterdamConvention
192/2000 BaselConventionontheControloftheTransboundaryMovementsof
HazardousWastesandTheirDisposal
081/1997 UnitedNationsConventiontoCombatDesertificationinThoseCountries
ExperiencingSeriousDroughtandorDesertification,ParticularlyinAfrica
Instituitons
575/2008 EthiopianWildlifeDevelopmentandConservationAuthorityEstablishment
381/2004 AProclamationtoAmendtheInstituteofBiodiversityConservationand
ResearchInstitute
295/2002 EnvironmentalProtectionAuthorityEstablishment
167/1999 InstituteofBiodiversityConservationandResearchEstablishment(amendment)
120/1998 InstituteofBiodiversityConservationandResearchEstablishment
009/1995 EnvironmentalProtectionAuthorityEstablishment
9.Health
674/2010 PesticideRegistrationandControl
661/2009 Food,MedicineandHealthCareAdministrationandControl
571/2008 RadiationProtection
200/2000 PublicHealth
Instituitons
553/2007 DrugFundandPharmaceuticalsSupplyAgencyEstablishment
276/2002 NationalHIV/AIDSPreventionandControlandHIV/AIDSPreventionand
ControlOfficeEstablishment
176/1999 DrugAdministrationandControl
026/1996 NationalResearchInstituteofHealthEstablishment
10.HumanRghts
676/2010 ConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilityRatification
336/2003 ConventiononForcedorCompulsoryLaborRatification
335/2003 ConventionConcerningProhibitionandImmediateActionfortheElimination
oftheWorstFormsofChildLaborRatification
283/2002 AfricanCharterontheRightsandWelfareoftheChildRatification
114/1998 AccessiontoAfricanHumanandPeoples'RightsCharterRatification
100/1998 AmendmenttotheConventionontheRightsoftheChildRatification
Instituitons
211/2000 InstitutionoftheOmbudsmanEstablishment
210/2000 EthiopianHumanRightsCommissionEstablishment
11.IntellectualProperty
501/2006 TradeMarkRegistrationandProtection
482/2006 AccesstoGeneticResourcesandCommunityKnowledge
481/2006 PlantBreeders'Right
410/2004 CopyrightandNeighboringRightsProtection
601/2008 ConventionfortheProtectionandPromotionoftheDiversityofCultural
Expressions
484/2006 ConventionfortheSafeguardingoftheIntangibleCulturalHeritage
090/1997 TheConventionEstablishingtheWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization
AccessionRatification
Instituiton
320/2003 EthiopianIntellectualPropertyOfficeEstablishment
12.Investment
769/2012 Investment
375/2003 Investment(amendment)
280/2002 Investment
037/1996 Investment

13.LabourLaw,CivilService,Pensions
715/2011 PrivateOrganizationsPension
714/2011 PublicServants'Pension
633/2009 PublicServants'Pensions(asamended)
568/2008 RighttoEmploymentofPersonswithDisability
515/2007 FederalCivilServants
494/2006 Labor(amendment)
466/2005 Labor(amendment)
424/2004 PublicServants'Pensions(amendment)
377/2003 Labor
345/2003 PublicServants'Pensions
262/2002 FederalCivilServants
190/1999 PublicServants'Pension(amendment)
709/2011 TripartiteConsultation(InternationalLaborStandards)Convention
128/1998 ConstitutionoftheILOInstrumentofAmendment
152/1999 ILOConventions
Institutions
495/2006 SocialSecurityAuthorityReestablishment
038/1996 SocialSecurityAuthorityEstablishment
14.LandLawandUrbanPlanning
721/2011 UrbanLandsLeaseHolding
574/2008 UrbanPlanning
456/2005 FDRERuralLandAdministrationandLandUseProclamation
455/2005 ExpropriationofLandholdingsforPublicPurposesandPaymentof
Compensation
401/2004 AppropriationofLandforGovernmentWorks
272/2002 ReenactmentofUrbanLandsLeaseHolding
089/1997 FederalRuralLandAdministration
Institutions
558/2007 ProclamationtoRepealtheFederalUrbanPlanningInstituteEstablishment
450/2005 FederalUrbanPlanningInstituteEstablishment
15.Medialaw
759/2012 Advertisement
590/2008 FreedomoftheMassMediaandAccesstoInformation
533/2007 BroadcastingService
178/1999 Broadcasting
Institutions
075/1997 EthiopianPressAgencyEstablishment(amendment)
074/1997 EthiopianNewsAgencyEstablishment(amendment)
073/1997 EthiopianRadioandTelevisionAgencyEstablishment(amendment)

16.Nationality,RegistrationofVitalEventsandImmigration
760/2012 RegistrationofVitalEventsandNationalIdentityCard
409/2004 Refugee
378/2003 EthiopianNationality
354/2003 Immigration
270/2002 ProvidingForeignNationalsofEthiopianOriginwithCertainRightstobe
ExercisedintheirCountryofOrigin
17.SocietiesandFoundations
781/2012 MelesFoundationEstablishment
621/2009 CharitiesandSocieties
402/2004 CooperativeSocieties(amendment)
153/1999 RevisedCharteroftheEthiopianRedCrossSociety
147/1998 CooperativeSocieties
18.ProfessionalServices:Advocates,Auditors,MedicalPractitioners,Consultants
218/2000 MedicalPractitionersRegistration(repealing)
199/2000 FederalCourtsAdvocates'LicensingandRegistration
19.Utilities:Electricity,Telecommunication
A.Electricity
086/1997 Electricity
043/1996 CharterofEthiopianElectricLightandPowerAuthority(amendment)
B.Telecommunication
464/2005 ProtectionofTelecommunicationandElectricPowerNetworks
281/2002 Telecommunication(amendment)
049/1996 Telecommunication
707/2011 AfricanTelecommunicationUnionConstitutionandConvention
20.Miscellaneous
718/2011 NationalPaymentSystem
690/2010 SocialHealthInsurance
668/2010 DisclosureandRegistrationofAssets
653/2009 RightsandBenefitsofOutgoingHeadsofStateandGovernment,Senior
GovernmentOfficials,MembersofParliamentandJudges
648/2009 TheFederalGovernmentofEthiopiaFinancialAdministration
632/2009 EmploymentExchangeServices
572/2008 PeriodofLimitationforSubmissionofRestitutionClaimsandtheRepossession
ofPublicPropertiesTakenThroughUnlawfulRestitutions
531/2007 SpecialGovernmentBond
467/2005 AuthenticationandRegistrationofDocuments(amendment)
430/2005 DeterminingProceduresforPublicProcurementandEstablishingIts
SupervisoryAgency
398/2004 InquiryCommissiontoInvestigatetheConflictOccurredinGambelaRegional
StateonDecember13,2003Establishment
370/2003 Condominium
359/2003 SystemfortheInterventionoftheFederalGovernmentintheRegions
334/2003 AuthenticationandRegistrationofDocuments

Index3
AgreementsnotclassifiedunderThemesandOrgans
1.AfricanandSubregional
713/2011 CharterfortheCulturalRenaissanceofAfrica
710/2011 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheGovernmentofthe
RepublicofGabonConcerningtheAbolitionofVisasforHoldersofDiplomatic
andServicePassports
618/2008 AdditionalProtocoltotheOAUGeneralConventiononPrivilegesand
Immunity
617/2008 AgreementfortheEstablishmentoftheAfricanRehabilitationInstitute
607/2008 TheInterAfricanConventionEstablishinganAfricanTechnicalCooperation
Program
606/2008 ConventionoftheAfricanEnergyCommission
605/2008 ConventionfortheEstablishmentoftheAfricanCenterforFertilizer
Development
565/2008 AfricanNuclearWeaponFreeZoneTreaty(PelindabaTreaty)
429/2004 TheSubRegionalNairobiProtocolforPrevention,ControlandReductionof
SmallArmsandLightWeaponsintheGreatLakesRegionandHornofAfrica
396/2004 ProtocolfortheInterParliamentaryUnionofIGADMemberStates
394/2004 TheProtocolRelatingtotheFundforCooperation,Compensationand
DevelopmentoftheCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica
(COMESA)
333/2003 RatificationoftheProtocolRelatingtotheEstablishmentofthePeaceand
SecurityCounciloftheAfricanUnion
332/2003 RatificationoftheProtocoltotheTreatyEstablishingtheAfricanCommunity
RelatingtothePanAfricanParliament
297/2002 ProtocolontheEstablishmentofaConflictEarlyWarningandResponse
MechanismforIGADMemberStates
232/2001 AfricanUnionEstablishmentAgreement
225/2000 PeaceAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheGovernment
oftheStateofEritrea
139/1998 AgreementfortheAmendmentoftheAgreementwiththeRepublicof
DjiboutiRegardingtheRailwayLineLaidbetweenDjboutiandAddisAbaba
366/2003 InterGovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentEstablishmentAgreement
2.AirTransportAgreements
640/2009 BilateralAirTransportServicesAgreementwiththeGovernmentofthe
RepublicofTunisia
HongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionofthePeople'sRepublicofChina
ConcerningAirServices
527/2007 GovernmentofEquatorialGuineaAirTransportServicesAgreement
500/2006 TheGovernmentoftheUSAAirTransportServicesAgreement
499/2006 TheGovernmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofNigeriaBilateralAir
TransportServicesAgreement
399/2004 GovernmentofBurkinaFasoAirTransportServicesAgreement
393/2004 GovernmentoftheKingdomofSaudiArabiaAirTransportServicesAgreement
392/2004 TheRepublicofYemenBilateralAirServicesAgreement
337/2003 TheSwissFederalCouncilAirTransportAgreement
157/1999 StateofKuwaitAirTransportServicesAgreement
108/1998 TheRepublicofDjboutiAirTransportServiceAgreement
101/1998 TheRepublicofSouthAfricaAirTransportServiceAgreement
063/1997 TheGovernmentofJapanAirTransportAgreement
3.AvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandFiscalEvasionAgreements
774/2012 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheGovernmentof
GreatBritainandNorthernIrelandfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationand
thePreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatification
RepublicofSeychellesfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthe
PreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatification
750/2012 AgreementbetweentheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandtheArab
RepublicofEgyptfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionof
FiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatification
749/2012 AgreementbetweentheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandthe
PeoplesRepublicofChinafortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthe
PreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatification
RepublicofIndiafortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionof
FiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatification
RepublicofSudanfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionof
FiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeRatificationProclamation
585/2008 AgreementbetweentheFDREandtheCzechRepublicfortheAvoidanceof
DoubleTaxationandthePreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxeson
Income
584/2008 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheGovernmentof
FrenchRepublicfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionof
FiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncome
508/2006 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheRepublicofTunisia
fortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationwithRespecttoTaxesonIncome
507/2006 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandPeople'sDemocratic
RepublicofAlgeriafortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePrevention
ofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeandonCapital
505/2006 ConventionbetweentheGovernmentofFDREandtheStateofIsraelforthe
AvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandPreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespectto
TaxesonIncome
486/2006 ConventionbetweentheGovernmentofFDREandRomaniafortheAvoidance
ofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxes
onIncomeandonCapital
480/2005 AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheRepublicofTurkey
fortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationwithRespecttoTaxesonIncome

RepublicofSouthAfricafortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthe
PreventionofFiscalEvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncome
296/2002 AgreementfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationwithRespecttoTaxeson
IncomewiththeGovernmentoftheRepublicofYemen
223/2000 AgreementwiththeGovernmentoftheRussianFederationfortheAvoidance
ofDoubleTaxationwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeandCapital
095/1998 ConventionfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationwithRespecttoTaxeson
IncomeandthePreventionofFiscalEvasionwiththeGovernmentofthe
ItalianRepublic
092/1997 AgreementfortheAvoidanceofDoubleTaxationandthePreventionofFiscal
EvasionwithRespecttoTaxesonIncomeandCapitalbetweentheFDREand
theStateofKuwait
4.Cooperation,Trade,InvestmentPromotion&ProtectionAgreements
779/2012 CotonouACPEUPartnershipAgreementAmendmentRatification
758/2012 BilateralTradeAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFederal
DemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya
Ratification
757/2012 BilateralTradeAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFederal
DemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandtheGovernmentoftheRepublicof
GambiaRatification
752/2012 CooperationAgreementintheFieldofTourismbetweentheGovernmentof
theFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandtheGovernmentoftheState
ofKuwaitRatification
751/2012 AgreementonCulturalandArtsCooperationbetweentheGovernmentofthe
FederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandtheGovernmentoftheStateof
KuwaitRatification
745/2012 AgreementonScientificandTechnologicalCooperationbetweenthe
GovernmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandthe
GovernmentoftheRepublicofKorea
744/2012 AgreementonScientificandTechnologicalCooperationbetweenthe
GovernmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaandthe
GovernmentofthePeoplesRepublicofChina
675/2010 InternationalCoffeeAgreement2007
663/2010 TheReciprocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestmentAgreementwiththe
RepublicofEquatorialGuinea
644/2009 PromotionandReciprocalProtectionofInvestmentAgreementwiththe
KingdomofSpain
638/2009 AgreementonEducation,CultureandYouthCooperationwiththeKingdomof
Spain
637/2009 AgreementonEducation,Science,HigherEducation,Culture,Youth,Sports,
TourismandMediaCooperationwithPortugeseRepublic
RepublicofIndiaontheEstablishmentofJointMinisterialCommission
619/2008 TheEthiopiaandKuwaitJointCommitteeforCooperationEstablishment
604/2008 AgreementonYouthandSportCooperationwiththeRepublicofYemen
599/2008 AgreementbetweentheFDREandtheRepublicofIndiaonthePromotionand
ProtectionofInvestment
RepublicofIndiaonCooperationintheFieldsofScienceandTechnology
580/2008 EthioSpainGeneralAgreementofCooperation
578/2008 AgreementonCultureandTourismCooperationwiththeFederalRepublicof
Nigeria
577/2008 AgreementonTourismCooperationwithRepublicofTurkey
562/2008 TheProtocolonTechnical,ScientificandEconomicCooperationintheFieldof
AgriculturebetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandtheRepublicofTurkey
561/2008 EthioYemenBilateralTradeAgreement
560/2008 EthioEquatorialGuineaBilateralTradeAgreement
537/2007 TheBelgianLuxembourgEconomicUnionAgreementontheReciprocal
PromotionandProtectionofInvestment
525/2007 EthioNigeriaBilateralTradeAgreement
524/2007 CotonouACPEUPartnershipAgreementAmendment
518/2007 TheRepublicofFinlandAgreementonthePromotionandProtectionof
Investment
517/2007 TheArabRepublicofEgyptAgreementonthePromotionandProtectionof
Investment
516/2007 TheEthioDjboutiPreferentialInvestmentFacilitationandProperty
AcquisitionAgreement
509/2006 AgreementonCultural,EducationalandScientificCooperationwiththeState
ofIsrael
489/2006 GovernmentoftheStateofIsraelScienceandTechnologicalCooperation
477/2005 AgreementonCultural,ScientificandEducationalCooperationwiththe
IslamicRepublicofIran
463/2005 EthioSudanYemenTripartiteMaritimeAffairsCooperationAgreement
462/2005 AgreementonCulture,Education,Science,Massmedia,YouthandSports
CooperationwiththeRepublicofTurkey
461/2005 InvestmentPromotionandReciprocalProtectionAgreementwiththe
KingdomofSweden
460/2005 InvestmentPromotionandProtectionAgreementwiththeRepublicofAustria
453/2005 EthioTurkeyCooperationinMaritimeFieldAgreement
452/2005 AmendmentontheEthioIranTradeAgreement
437/2005 TourismCooperationTreatybetweentheFDREandtheRepublicofSudan
423/2004 AProclamationtoRatifytheAgreementSignedonthePromotionand
ProtectionofInvestmentswiththeIslamicRepublicofIran
422/2004 RatificationoftheAgreementbetweentheFDREandtheGreatSocialist
People'sLibyanArabJamahiriyaonCooperationintheFieldofCulture,Youth
andSports
421/2004 EthioLibyaTradeAgreement
420/2004 EthioAlgeriaTradeAgreement
417/2004 InvestmentReciprocalPromotionandProtectionAgreementwiththeRepublic
ofTunisia
407/2004 AgreementEstablishingtheSana'aForumforCooperation


406/2004 InvestmentEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionTreatywiththeGreat
SocialistPeople'sLibyanArabJamahiriya
405/2004 InvestmentEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionTreatywiththe
RepublicofFrance
404/2004 InvestmentEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionTreatywiththeFederal
RepublicofGermany
403/2004 RatificationoftheAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandthe
GovernmentoftheRepublicofSudanonCooperationintheFieldofCulture
397/2004 TheAgreementonPromotionandReciprocalProtectionofInvestmentwith
thePeoplesDemocraticRepublicofAlgeria
389/2004 TheStateofIsraelAgreementonPromotionandReciprocalProtectionof
Investment
388/2004 TheTreatyonEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionofInvestmentwith
theKingdomoftheNetherlands
353/2003 TheAmendmenttotheProtocolAgreementonPortSudanUtilization
352/2003 AProtocolAgreementonPortSudanUtilization
350/2003 EthioSaudiArabiaGeneralCooperationAgreement
347/2003 EthioIranTradeAgreement
346/2003 EthioCubaTradeAgreement
339/2003 CooperationAgreementwithRepublicofTurkeyinFightingAgainst
InternationalIllicitTraffickinginNarcoticDrugandPsychotropicSubstances,
InternationalTerrorismandOrganizedCrime
326/2003 RatificationoftheAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREandthe
GovernmentoftheHellenicRepubliconCooperationintheFieldofTourism
325/2003 TheRatificationoftheAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDREand
theRepublicofTurkeyonCooperationintheFieldofHealth
324/2003 TheInvestmentIncentiveAgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheFDRE
andtheGovernmentoftheUSA
323/2003 TheTreatyontheReciprocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestmentwiththe
RepublicofTurkey
319/2003 EthioKoreaRepublicTradeAgreement
318/2003 EthioSudanPreferentialTradeAgreement
316/2003 InternationalCoffeeAgreement2001
312/2003 EthioBelgiumDevelopmentCooperationAgreement
292/2002 PromotionandReciprocalProtectionofInvestmentAgreementwiththe
KingdomofDenmark
284/2002 EthioDjboutiUtilizationofPortofDjboutiandServicestoCargoinTransit
Agreement
261/2001 ExportofTextileandApparelProductstotheUnitedStatesofAmericaunder
theAGOA
242/2001 CotonouAgreement
222/2000 EconomicandTechnicalCooperationAgreementwiththeGovernmentofthe
HellenicRepublic
221/2000 EthioSudanTradeAgreement
GovernmentoftheRepublicofSudan
215/2000 EthioRussiaTradeAgreement
GovernmentoftheRussianFederation
205/2000 EthioRussiaEconomic,ScientificandTechnicalCooperationAgreement
196/2000 PreferentialTradeAreaforEasternandSouthernAfricanStatesCustomsBond
GuaranteeAgreement
195/2000 EthioCubaEconomic,ScientificandTechnicalCooperationAgreement
191/2000 EthioLibyaEconomic,Scientific,CulturalandTechnicalCooperation
Agreement
186/1999 EthioYemenAgreementonCulture
185/1999 EthioYemenExportPromotionAgenciesTechnicalCooperationAgreement
184/1999 EthioYemenIndustrialCooperationAgreement
183/1999 ReciprocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestmentAgreementwiththe
RepublicofYemen
174/1999 EthioYemenEconomic,ScientificandTechnicalCooperationandTrade
RelationsAgreement
172/1999 EthioMalaysiaEconomic,ScientificandTechnicalCooperationAgreement
164/1999 TheInvestmentEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionAgreementwith
theKingdomoftheNetherlands
163/1999 TheInvestmentPromotionandReciprocalProtectionAgreementwiththe
GovernmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChina
162/1999 TheInvestmentPromotionandReciprocalProtectionAgreementwiththe
GovernmentofMalasia
161/1999 EthioMalasiaTradeAgreement
130/1998 EthioNorwayDevelopmentCooperationAgreement
127/1998 InvestmentsPromotionandReciprocalProtectionAgreementwiththe
GovernmentoftheSwissConfederation
107/1998 EthioItalianCulturalCooperationAgreement
072/1997 EthioKuwaitEconomic,Commercial,ScientificandTechnicalCooperation
Agreement
070/1997 StateofKuwaitAgreementonInvestmentPromotionandProtection
069/1997 RepublicofItalyAgreementonInvestmentPromotionandProtection
056/1996 EthioAustrianDevelopmentCooperationAgreement
044/1996 EthioChineseTrade,EconomicandTechnicalCooperationAgreement
021/1996 RepublicofTunisiaTradeAgreement
020/1996 RepublicofTunisiaAgreementonEconomic,Scientific,CulturalandTechnical
Cooperation
5.PeaceandSecurity
493/2006 TheComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreaty
485/2006 TheSecurityCooperationbetweentheFDREandtheRepublicofYemen
Agreement
428/2004 ConventionontheProhibitionoftheUse,Stockpiling,ProductionandTransfer
ofAntipersonnelMinesandonTheirDestruction
348/2003 RatificationoftheConventionforthePacificSettlementofInternational
Disputes(1899)
331/2003 ImplementationoftheConventionontheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons
304/2002 InternationalConventionagainsttheTakingofHostages(1979)

303/2002 ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentofCrimesAgainst
InternationallyProtectedPersonsIncludingDiplomaticAgents(1973)
301/2002 InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofTerroristBombings(1998)
030/1996 ConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,Stockpiling
andUseofChemicalWeaponsandontheirDestruction
6.Otheragreementsandconventions
742/2012 UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea
703/2011 AmendmentsoftheArticlesofAgreementoftheIMF
677/2010 AgreementbetweentheFDREandtheGovernmentoftheStateofKuwaiton
theFieldofExchangeofManpower
628/2009 TheControlofHarmfulAntiFoulingSystemsConvention
576/2008 InternationalConventionontheHarmonizedCommodityDescriptionand
CodingSystemRatificationProclamationAmendment
554/2007 ConventionagainstDopinginSport
RepublicofItalyonMutualAdministrativeAssistanceforthePrevention,
InvestigationandRepressionofCustomsOffences
522/2007 OPECFundfortheInternationalDevelopmentDebtReliefAgreement
379/2003 RatificationoftheAmendmenttoArticleIVoftheStatuteoftheInternational
AtomicEnergyAgency
374/2003 ConventionontheMeansofProhibitingandPreventingtheIllicitImport,
ExportandTransferofOwnershipofCulturalProperty
373/2003 TheConventionfortheProtectionofCulturalPropertyintheEventofArmed
ConflictanditsFirstProtocolAccession
371/2003 TheConventiononInternationalInterestinMobileEquipmentandthe
ProtocoltotheConventiononMattersSpecifictoAircraftEquipment
369/2003 OPECFundforInternationalDevelopmentDebtReliefAgreement
349/2003 ConventiononStandardsofTraining,CertificationandWatchkeepingfor
Seafarers,1978,asAmendedin1995
275/2002 FourthAmendmentoftheArticlesoftheAgreementoftheInternational
MonetaryFund
055/1996 RatificationoftheProtocolontheAccessionofAustria,Finland,andSweden
totheFourthLomeConvention
054/1996 RevisedFourthLomeConvention
7.LoanandFinancing,2012
785/2012 AfricanDevelopmentFundLoanAgreementforFinancingEthiopiaKenya
ElectricityHighwayProjectRatification
784/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationFinancingAgreementforEastern
ElectricityHighwayProjectundertheFirstPhaseoftheRegionalEasternAfrica
PowerIntegrationProgramRatification
778/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationFinancingAgreementfortheTransport
SectorProjectinSupportofthe4thRoadSectorDevelopmentProgram
777/2012 SaudiFundforDevelopmentLoanAgreementforFinancingtheGedoLemlem
BerehaRoadProjectRatification
776/2012 ArabBankforEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaLoanAgreementforFinancing
theGedoLemlemBerehaRoadProjectRatification
775/2012 AbuDhabiFundforDevelopmentLoanAgreementforFinancingtheGedo
LemlemBerehaRoadProjectRatification
772/2012 AfricanDevelopmentFundLoanAgreementforPromotingBasicServices
Program(PBSIII)ProjectRatification
771/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationFinancingAgreementforPromoting
BasicServicesProgramPhaseIIIRatification
770/2012 KuwaitFundforArabEconomicDevelopmentLoanAgreementforFinancing
theDessieKutaberTentaJunctionRoadProjectRatification
765/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationAmendedandRestatedFinancing
AgreementtoProvideAdditionalFinancetoUrbanWaterSupplyand
SanitationProjectRatification
764/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationFinancingAgreementforFinancing
WomenEntrepreneurshipDevelopmentProjectRatification
762/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationFinancingAgreementforElectricity
NetworkReinforcementandExpansionProjectRatification
756/2012 InternationalDevelopmentAssociationAdditionalFinancingAgreementfor
ProductiveSafetyNetAPLIIIProjectRatification
755/2012 ExportImportBankofIndiaCreditLineAgreementtoProvideAdditionalLoan
forFinancingProjectsfortheDevelopmentofSugarIndustryRatification
754/2012 ExportImportBankofChinaLoanAgreementforFinancingAddisAbabaDeep
WellsWaterSupplyProject(PhaseIII)Ratification
741/2012 InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopmentLoanAgreementfor
FinancingRuralFinancialIntermediationProgramII
740/2012 AfricanDevelopmentFundLoanAgreementforFinancingBedeleMetuRoad
UpgradingProject
739/2012 AfricanDevelopmentFundLoanAgreementforFinancingHawassaAgere
MariamRoadProject

Index4
Regulations:Themes,SectorsandInstitutions
1.AgricultureandRuralDevelopment
253/2011 RiftValleyLakesBasinCoucilandAuthorityEstablishment
207/2011 CodeofPracticeoftheFloricultureSector
178/2010 SesameandWhitePeaBeansTransaction
161/2009 CoffeeQualityControlandTransaction
156/2008 AwashBasinHighCouncilandAuthorityEstablishment
151/2008 AbayBasinHighCouncilandAuthorityEstablishment
016/1997 EthiopianSeed
2.BankingandInsurance
201/2011 FederalMicroandSmallEnterprisesDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment
172/2009 ReorganizationoftheManagementoftheNationalBankofEthiopia
134/2007 CommercialBankofEthiopiaEstablishment(amendment)
116/2005 DevelopmentBankofEthiopiaReestablishment(amendment)
104/2004 MicroandSmallEnterprisesDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment(amendment)
083/2003 DevelopmentBankofEthiopiaReestablishment
033/1998 MicroandSmallEnterprisesDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment
3.Businessrelated
A.Mining
124/2006 MiningOperations(amendment)
070/2001 EthiopianMineActionOfficeEstablishment
027/1998 MiningOperations(amendment)
B.RegistrationandLicencing
246/2011 CommercialRegistrationandBusinessLicensingandRelatedSevicesFees
Tariffs
139/2007 ObligatoryUseofSalesRegisterMachines
095/2003 CommercialRegistrationandLicensing(amendment)
087/2003 CommercialRegistrationandLicensing(amendment)
066/2000 FilmShootingPermit
034/1998 PrivateEmploymentAgencyLicenseFees
014/1997 AddisAbaba/DireDawaAdministrationCommercialRegistrationandLicensing
013/1997 FederalGovernmentCommercialRegistrationandLicensing
C.TradeandIndustry
020/1997 EthiopianTradePointEstablishment
D.Transport
248/2011 EthiopianRoadConstructionCorporationEstablishment
247/2011 EthiopianRoadsAuthorityReestablishment
208/2011 RoadTransportTrafficControl
206/2011 VehiclesIdentification,InspectionandRegistrationFees
205/2011 NationalRoadTrafficSafetyCouncilEstablishment
141/2007 EthiopianRailwayCorporationEstablishment
074/2001 MotorVehiclesandTrailersIdentification,InspectionandRegistration
(amendment)
051/1999 RoadTransportTariffs(amendment)
E.Others
126/2007 ExportPrizeAwards
4.CriminalLaw
072/2001 SpecialPublicProsecutorsAdministration
044/1998 FederalProsecutorAdministration
5.Education
210/2011 FederalUniversities
154/2008 HigherEducationCostSharing
091/2003 HigherEducationCostSharing
Establshment
245/2011 TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingInstituteEstablishment
241/2011 GonderUniversityReestablishment
240/2011 JimmaUniversityReestablishment
239/2011 MetuUniversityEstablishment
238/2011 DillaUniversityReestablishment
237/2011 AdamaScienceandTechnologyUniversityEstablishment
236/2011 MedaWolabuUniversityEstablishment
235/2011 ArbaminchUniversityReestablishment
234/2011 BahirDarUniversityReestablishment
233/2011 MekelleUniversityReestablishment
232/2011 HaremayaUniversityReestablishment
231/2011 HawassaUniversityReestablishment
230/2011 DireDawaUniversityEstablishment
229/2011 DebreTaborUniversityEstablishment
228/2011 DebreBirhanUniversityEstablishment
227/2011 DebreMarkosUniversityEstablishment
226/2011 JigigaUniversityEstablishment
225/2011 AxumUniversityEstablishment
224/2011 MizanTepiUniversityEstablishment
223/2011 AdigratUniversityEstablishment
222/2011 WachamoUniversityEstablishment
221/2011 WelloUniversityEstablishment
220/2011 WoldiaUniversityEstablishment
219/2011 WolkiteUniversityEstablishment
218/2011 WolaitaSodoUniversityEstablishment
217/2011 WellegaUniversityEstablishment
216/2011 AddisAbabaScienceandTechnologyUniversityEstablishment
215/2011 AssosaUniversityEstablishment
214/2011 AddisAbabaUniversityReestablishment
213/2011 BuleHoraUniversityEstablishment
212/2011 AmboUniversityEstablishment


211/2011 SemeraUniversityEstablishment
200/2011 SaintPaulHospitalMilleniumMedicalCollegeEstablishment
199/2011 TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingAgencyEstablishment
132/2007 EthiopianPoliceUniversityCollegeEstablishment
129/2006 RegulationstoEstablishtheDillaUniversity
127/2006 DebubUniversityEstablishment(amendment)
123/2006 AlemayaUniversityofAgricultureEstablishment
121/2006 EthiopianCivilServiceCollegeReestablishment
120/2006 AdamaUniversityEstablishingCharter
112/2004 CharterRegulationEstablishingGonderUniversity
111/2004 ArbaminchUniversityEstablishingCharter
068/2001 NationalDefenseUniversityCollegeEstablishment
063/1999 JimmaUniversityEstablishment
062/1999 DebubUniversityEstablishment
061/1999 MekelleUniversityEstablishment
060/1999 BahirDarUniversityEstablishment
050/1999 EducationMaterialsProductionandDistributionEnterpriseEstablishment
019/1997 MassMediaTrainingInstituteEstablishment
003/1996 TheEthiopianCivilServiceCollegeEstablishment
6.EnvironmentalLaw
163/2009 WildlifeDevelopment,ConservationandUtilization
159/2008 PreventionofIndustrialPollution
7.Health
191/2010 TheEthiopianHealthInsuranceAgencyEstablishment
189/2010 EthiopionFood,MedicineandHealthCareAdministrationandControl
AuthorityEstablishment
167/2009 FederalHospitalsAdministration
076/2002 EthiopianHealthProfessionalsCouncilEstablishment
040/1998 HealthEducationCenterEstablishment
004/1996 TheEthiopianHealthandNutritionResearchInstituteEstablishment
8.IntellectualProperty
012/1997 Inventions,MinorInventions,andIndustrialDesigns
9.Investment
162/2009 IrrigationDevelopmentInvestmentIncentives
146/2008 InvestmentIncentivesandInvestmentAreasReservedforDomesticInvestors
(amendment)
084/2003 InvestmentIncentivesandInvestmentAreasReservedforDomesticInvestors
036/1998 InvestmentIncentives(amendment)
035/1998 InvestmentAreasReservedforDomesticInvestors
009/1996 InvestmentIncentives(amendment)
007/1996 InvestmentIncentives

10.LabourLaw,CivilService,Pensions
203/2011 PublicServantsSocialSecurityAgencyEstablishment
202/2011 PrivateOrganizationsEmployees'SocialSecurityAgencyEstablishment
166/2009 WorkPermitFees(asamended)
157/2008 AdministrationofEmployeesoftheNationalBankofEthiopia
155/2008 AdministrationofEmployeesoftheEthiopianRevenuesandCustoms
Authority[AMHARIC]
077/2002 FederalCivilServantsDisciplinaryandGrievanceProcedure
032/1998 PublicService(amendment)
11.MediaLaw
019/1997 MassMediaTrainingInstituteEstablishment
12.Nationality,RegistrationofVitalEventsandImmigration
252/2011 CertainRightsandPrivilegesofForeignNationalsofEthiopianOrigintobe
ExercisedintheirCountryofOrigin(amendment)
114/2004 Immigration
101/2004 ProvidingForeignNationalsofEthiopianOriginwithCertainRightsand
PrivilegestobeExercisedintheirCountryofOrigin
13.ProfessionalServices
065/2000 FederalCourtsAdvocates'License,Exam.RegistrationandRegistrationofLaw
FirmFees
057/1999 FederalCourtAdvocates'CodeofConduct
14.SocietiesandFoundations
106/2004 RegulationtoProvidefortheImplementationofCooperativeSocieties
Proclamation
168/2009 CharitiesandSocieties
15.Utilities
A.Electricity
170/2009 EthiopianElectricPowerCorporationReestablishment
140/2007 EthiopianElectricPowerCorporationEstablishment(amendment)
049/1999 ElectricityOperations
018/1997 EthiopianElectricPowerCorporationEstablishment
B.Telecommunications
197/2010 EthioTelecomEstablishment
099/2004 EthiopianTelecommunicationCorporationEstablishment(amendment)
093/2003 EthiopianTelecommunicationCorporationEstablishment(amendment)
047/1998 TelecommunicationServices
010/1996 EthiopianTelecommunicationCorporationEstablishment


16.WaterResourcesandWaterWorks
115/2005 EthiopianWaterResourcesManagement
110/2004 WaterWorksDesignandSupervisionEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
109/2004 WaterWorksConstructionEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
042/1998 WaterWorkDesignandSupervisionEnterpriseEstablishment
17.Miscellaneous
255/2011 EthiopianShippingandLogisticsServicesEnterpriseEstablishment
254/2011 EthiopianNationalTheatreEstablishment
251/2011 FederalUrbanRealPropertyRegistrationandInformationAgency
Establishment
250/2011 InformationNetworkSecurityAgencyReestablishment
244/2011 NationalCouncilfortheCoordinationofPublicMobilizationforthe
ConstructionoftheGrandEthiopianRenaissanceDamEstablishment
243/2011 BuildingRegulation
242/2011 FederalBoardProvidingAffirmativeSupportforRegionsEstablishment
204/2011 SaltIodization
196/2010 EthiopianConformityAssessmentEnterpriseEstablishment
195/2010 EthiopianNationalAccreditationOfficeEstablishment
194/2010 NationalMetrologyInstituteEstablishment
193/2010 EthiopianStandardsAgencyEstablishment
190/2010 FinancialAdministration
188/2010 RepealingoftheRegulationfortheImplementationofAfricanPeerReview
MechanisminEthiopia
187/2010 DefenseConstructionDesignEnterpriseEstablishment
186/2010 DefenseConstructionMaterialsManufucturingEnterpriseEstablishment
185/2010 DefenseConstructionEnterpriseEstablishment
177/2010 InformationTechnologyParkCorporationEstablishment
173/2009 ClassificationofTouristFacilities
171/2009 FinancialIntelligenceCenterEstablishment
169/2009 AccesstoGeneticResourcesandCommunityKnowledgeandCommunity
Rights
165/2009 EthiopianPostalServiceEnterprise
160/2009 NationalLotteryAdministrationReestablishment
158/2008 GovernmentCommunicationAffairsOfficeEstablishment
145/2008 EstablishmentoftheEthiopianScientificEquipmentCenter
144/2008 TheFunctioningofEthicsLiaisonUnits
142/2008 TheImplementationoftheAfricanPeerReviewMechanisminEthiopia
138/2007 TreatmentofFederalPrisoners
136/2007 DryPortAdministrationEnterpriseEstablishment
135/2007 PaymentofCompensationforPropertySituatedonLandholdingExpropriated
130/2006 InformationNetworkSecurityAgencyEstablishment
128/2006 FederalBoardtoProvideAffirmativeActiontoLessDevelopedRegions
Establishment(amendment)
117/2005 EthiopianMilleniumFestivalNationalCouncilEstablishment
103/2004 EstablishmentofFederalBoardtoProvideAffirmativeSupportforLess
DevelopedRegions
085/2003 EmergencyReliefTransportEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
071/2001 CouncilofMinistersFinancial(amendment)Regulations
067/2000 EmergencyFoodSecurityReserveAdministrationEstablishment
064/1999 CouncilofMinistersFinancial(amendment)Regulations
056/1999 PreShipmentInspectonServiceFees
054/1999 EthiopianDevelopmentResearchInstituteEstablishment
037/1998 FreightForwardingandShipAgencyLicenceIssuance
023/1997 EthiopianConferenceCenterEstablishment
021/1997 EmergencyReliefTransportEnterpriseEstablishment
017/1997 CouncilofMinistersFinancialRegulations
005/1996 EthiopianInternationalInstituteforPeaceandDevelopmentEstablishment
001/1996 RegistrationofShips

18.VariousOrgansandInstitutions
249/2011 EthiopianYouthSportsAcademyEstablishment
209/2011 NazarethTractorAssemblyFactoryDissolution
198/2010 AgriculturalTransformationCouncilandAgencyEstablishment
192/2010 SugarCorporationEstablishment
183/2010 MetalandEngineeringCorporationEstablishment
182/2010 MetalsIndustryDevelopmentInstituteEstablishment
181/2010 LeatherIndustryDevelopmentInstituteEstablishment
180/2010 TextileIndustryDevelopmentInstituteEstablishment
179/2010 ArmyFoundationEstablishment
176/2010 EthiopianMeatandDiaryTechnologyInstituteEstablishment(amendment)
175/2010 GenetHotelEnterpriseEstablishment
152/2008 TheEthiopianHorticultureDevelopmentAgencyEstablishment
150/2008 NazarethCanvasSewingandGarmentFactoryEstablishment
149/2008 KalityConstructionandConstructionMaterialsProductionEnterprise
Establishment
148/2008 DefenseConstructionandEngineeringEnterpriseEstablishment
147/2008 EthiopianAirlinesEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
143/2008 TheEthiopianMeatandDiaryTechnologyInstituteEstablishment
131/2007 TendahoSugarFactoryEstablishment(amendment)
125/2006 RegulationstoEstablishTextileandLeatherIndustryDevelopmentCenter
122/2006 TendahoSugarFactoryEstablishment
119/2005 ConstructionWorks&CoffeeTechnologyDevelopmentEnterprise
Establishment
118/2005 TextileandApparelIndustryInstituteEstablishment
113/2004 DissolutionofLalibelaEngineeringandConstructionEnterprise
107/2004 DistributionofProfitsofPublicEnterprises
105/2004 LeatherandLeatherProductsTechnologyInstituteEstablishment
(amendment)
102/2004 DissolutionoftheAddisMetalPressingsEnterprise
100/2004 EthiopianSeedEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
098/2004 FinancialPublicEnterprisesAgencyEstablishment
097/2004 AgriculturalMechanizationServiceEnterpriseEstablishment
096/2003 AddisAbabaPoliceCommissionEstablishment

092/2003 EthiopianAirlinesEnterpriseEstablishment(amendment)
086/2003 FederalPoliceAdministration
082/2003 EthiopianAirportsEnterpriseEstablishment
081/2003 EthiopianAirlinesEnterpriseEstablishment
058/1999 EthiopianGrainTradeEnterpriseReestablishment
053/1999 MugherCementFactoryReestablishment
045/1998 KalityConstructionMaterialsProductionEnterpriseEstablishment
041/1998 LeatherandLeatherProductsTechnologyInstituteEstablishment
038/1998 AddisMetalPressingsEnterpriseEstablishment
031/1998 DissolutionoftheTeaProductionandManagementEnterprise
030/1998 WushWushTeaDevelopmentEnterprise
029/1998 GumaroTeaDevelopmentEnterprise
028/1998 TeaProductionandManagementEnterpriseEstablishment
026/1998 ZequallaSteelRollingMillEnterpriseEstablishment
015/1997 DissolutionoftheEngineeringDesignandToolEnterprise
174/2009 CateringandTourismTrainingCenterEstablishment
137/2007 FederalPrisonWardensAdministration
022/1997 JusticeandLegalSystemResearchInstituteEstablishment
Index5
ListofProclamations(Amharic)
A
A
001/1987 I -
002/1987 I
003/1987
004/1987 I A A

005/1987
006/1987 I
007/1987 I
008/1987
009/1987 A
010/1987 A
011/1987
012/1987
013/1988
014/1988 A -
016/1988 A
017/1988 A
019/1988 I
020/1988 I
021/1988
022/1988 E ()
023/1988 E ()
024/1988 A
025/1988
026/1988 I A
027/1988
028/1988 A I E-
029/1988 E ()
030/1988

031/1988
032/1988 E
033/1988 A ()

034/1988 A I E- A

036/1988 ()
037/1988 I
038/1988
039/1988 1989
040/1988 A A A
041/1988 I ()
042/1988 I E ()
043/1988 I
044/1988 I I
047/1989 I I
048/1989 ()
049/1989
050/1989 A ()
051/1989 A ()
052/1989 I ()
054/1989 A
055/1989 O A

056/1989 I-O
057/1989 I A
060/1989 E A
061/1989 I A
063/1989 A
065/1989 - ()
066/1989
067/1989
068/1989 O
069/1989 I I

070/1989 I

072/1989 I- I
073/1989 I ()
074/1989 I A ()
075/1989 I ()
076/1989 1989
077/1989 I ()
079/1989 I E
080/1989 I E ()
081/1989 A
082/1989 A
083/1989 1990
084/1989
085/1989 A I
086/1989
087/1989 A A
088/1989 A
089/1989 A
090/1989 A AE A
092/1989 I-
093/1989 I A A
()
094/1989 1990 A
095/1990 I-
096/1990 1990 A
097/1990
098/1990
099/1990
100/1990
101/1990 A A A
102/1990 I
103/1990 E
104/1990 A
107/1990 I
108/1990 A A
109/1990 1990
110/1990
112/1990 1990
113/1990
114/1990 A A
116/1990 I ()
117/1990 E E O
118/1990 E ()

119/1990 1990
120/1990 I
121/1990 A
122/1990 E I ()
123/1990 ()
125/1990 ()
126/1990 1991
127/1990 I

128/1991
129/1991 A A
130/1991 I-
131/1991
132/1991 I
133/1991 A A
134/1991 I A A
()
137/1991
138/1991 ()
139/1991 -A A

141/1991 1949 ()
145/1991 I ()
146/1991
147/1991
149/1991 I ()
151/1991 I
152/1991
153/1991 I
157/1991 A A
160/1991 A
161/1991 I-
162/1991 I

163/1991 I

164/1991 I

167/1991 I ()
168/1991 I ()
171/1991 ()
172/1991 I- I
173/1991 -
174/1991 I- I E

175/1991 1992
176/1991 A
177/1991
178/1991
179/1991 I - -
180/1991
181/1992 (I)
A
182/1992 ()
183/1992 I

184/1992 I- I
185/1992 I-
186/1992 I
187/1992 I A I
()
188/1992 A
190/1992 ()
191/1992 I- I
192/1992 A E A

193/1992 ()
194/1992 I O
195/1992 I- I
196/1992 A A A

197/1992 I A
198/1992 E E O ()
199/1992 A
200/1992 A
205/1992 I- I
206/1992 E
207/1992

208/1992 A
209/1992 A
210/1992 I
211/1992 E
212/1992 A
213/1992
214/1992 I

215/1992 I-
216/1992 ()
217/1992 A A ()
218/1992 A
219/1993 1993
220/1993 I

221/1993 I-
222/1993 I
223/1993

225/1993 I

226/1993 ()
227/1993 ()
228/1993 I ()
232/1993 A
233/1993
235/1993 - -
236/1993 - -
237/1993 I ()
238/1993 I
239/1993 - - ()
240/1993 I
242/1993
247/1993
248/1993 1994
249/1993
250/1993 - A
251/1993
253/1993
254/1993 ()
255/1994 I
256/1994 I A A A
257/1994 I
258/1994 1994
261/1994 A E E A
A
262/1994
263/1994 E ()
267/1994 E
268/1994 A
269/1994 I I E
270/1994 I A

271/1994 A - A
A
272/1994 E
273/1994 I A E
274/1994
275/1994 A (A )
276/1994 A .A../ .A../

277/1994 I

278/1994
279/1994

280/1994 I
281/1994 ()
282/1994 1995
283/1994 A
284/1994 I- A A

285/1994 E
286/1994
287/1994 A ()
288/1994
292/1995 I


295/1995 A A
296/1995

297/1995 I A A

299/1995 A E
300/1995 A
301/1995 A A
302/1995 A A

303/1995 A

304/1995 E A
306/1995 E ()
307/1995 I
308/1995 O
311/1995 A A
312/1995 I- A
313/1995
315/1995 A
316/1995 A 2001
317/1995
318/1995 I-
319/1995 I-
320/1995 I AE
321/1995 ()
322/1995
323/1995 I

324/1995 A I
325/1995 I

326/1995 I

327/1995
328/1995 ()
329/1995 A
330/1995 E A
331/1995
332/1995 A A I

333/1995 A
334/1995
335/1995 A A E

336/1995
337/1995 A
339/1995 E - A -
A
341/1995 E
342/1995 A
343/1995 ()
344/1995 1995
345/1995
346/1995 I-
347/1995 I-I
348/1995 A
349/1995
... (E)
350/1995 I-U A A
351/1995
352/1995 A
353/1995 I A

354/1995 I
355/1995
356/1995
357/1995
358/1995 1996 A
359/1995
360/1995 I I
361/1995 A A
362/1995
364/1995 E
365/1995
366/1995 -
367/1995 A E
368/1995 E A A ()

369/1995 O A E
370/1995 I
371/1996 A E A E

372/1996 E
373/1996 E
374/1996 -

375/1996 I ()
376/1996 /E/
377/1996 A
378/1996 I
379/1996 A A I A 6

380/1996 I A A A
()
381/1996 I ()
382/1996 I ()
383/1996 A ()
384/1996 A
388/1996 - I

389/1996 E I

390/1996 A A
391/1996
392/1996 A A
393/1996 U A A A

394/1996 A ()

395/1996 -
396/1996 I A -
397/1996 A I

398/1996 3 1996 .. A

399/1996 A A
401/1996

402/1996 A
403/1996 I

404/1996 I

405/1996 I

406/1996 A I

407/1996
408/1996 A A A
409/1996
410/1996
411/1996 I A A A
()
412/1996
413/1996 I ()
414/1996
415/1996 I
416/1996 A
417/1998 I

420/1997 I-A
421/1997 I-
422/1997 I.... A

423/1997 I E I

424/1997 ()
428/1997 -

429/1997 A E A

430/1997 I E

432/1997 I A
433/1997 - -
434/1997 - -
435/1997 A A
437/1997 I

438/1997 I A I
- A ()
439/1997

440/1997
441/1997
A
442/1997 E
443/1997 A
A
444/1997 1997
446/1997
A
449/1997 E
450/1997 I
451/1997
A
452/1997 I-I
453/1997 I-
454/1997 A E
455/1997

456/1997 I A
A
457/1997
459/1997 - A
460/1997 O I

461/1997 - I

462/1997

463/1997 I--
464/1997 A
465/1997 I A A
()
466/1997 A ()
467/1997 ()
468/1997
469/1997 1998
470/1997 I.... A A -
471/1998 I A A

477/1998 I E

478/1998 A A A A A A
479/1998 E
I.... E /A
480/1998 I.... E

481/1998 E A
482/1998 E A
483/1998 A A
484/1998 I
485/1998 I

486/1998 E
I.... E
488/1998 I A
489/1998 E
493/1998 A E
494/1998 A ()
495/1998 E
499/1998 A A

500/1998 A A A
501/1998
502/1998 1999
A A - A
503/1998
504/1998 I
505/1999 E
I.... E E
507/1999 E
I.... E A A
508/1999 E
I.... E
509/1999 E

510/1999 A E
513/1999 A
514/1999 A A
515/1999
516/1999 I- I E
517/1999 A I


518/1999 I

519/1999 ()
520/1999 I- -
521/1999 I E
522/1999 O A E
523/1999 I....

524/1999 A A
525/1999 I-
526/1999
527/1999 A A
531/1999 E
532/1999 I
533/1999 A
534/1999
535/1999 A E
536/1999 A A
537/1999 - I I

540/1999 A A

541/1999 E A
542/1999 A
543/1999
544/1999 -
545/1999 A
546/1999 I A A
()
547/1999 E
548/1999 -
550/1999 I
551/1999 I
552/1999 2000
553/1999 E A
554/1999 A A
555/2000
556/2000
558/2000 I A
559/2000 A
560/2000 I-I
561/2000 I-
562/2000 I....
I
565/2000 A / /

566/2000 I A
567/2000
568/2000 A
570/2000 ()
571/2000
572/2000 A A
AA E
573/2000
574/2000 A
575/2000 E
576/2000 A A A A

577/2000
578/2000

579/2000 2000
580/2000 I- A
581/2000 A ()
584/2000 E
I.... E
585/2000 E
I....
586/2000 I

587/2000 I
588/2000 E
589/2000
590/2000
591/2000 I (E)
592/2000
593/2000 A

598/2000 2001

599/2000 I.... I

600/2000 A
601/2000 -
602/2000
I A A
603/2001 ()
604/2001
605/2001 A E
606/2001 A I
607/2001 A A A -

608/2001 ()
609/2001 E ()
610/2001 ()
611/2001 O ()
612/2001 ()
613/2001 A A
614/2001 A A

615/2001 I.... A
A A
616/2001 A
617/2001 A I
A A
618/2001
619/2001 I

620/2001 -
A
621/2001 A
622/2001
624/2001 I A
626/2001 A
628/2001 E A

629/2001 A E
A A
631/2001 A A E
A
632/2001 A
633/2001 (E)
634/2001 E A

635/2001 A AE AE A

636/2001 I E

637/2001

638/2001 -

639/2001 (E)
640/2001 A A
641/2001 I A A
()
642/2001 I A A
()
643/2001 I.... A I

644/2001 I

647/2001 2002
648/2001 I A
649/2001 I A
650/2001
651/2001 E
652/2001 -
653/2001
A
654/2001
655/2001
656/2001
657/2002 A

660/2002
661/2002 A
662/2002 -
663/2002 I I

665/2002 I //
666/2002 I
A

667/2002 A A

668/2002
669/2002 O //
672/2002 2002
673/2002 I
674/2002 -
675/2002 2007 A
676/2002 A
677/2002 I E

678/2002 E
681/2002
684/2002 A
685/2002 A
686/2002
687/2002 2003 A
690/2002
691/2003 I A A

692/2003
693/2003
699/2003
703/2003
704/2003 2003
706/2003 A A E
A
707/2003 A
708/2003 I
709/2003 ( A )
710/2003 I....

713/2003 A
714/2003
715/2003
716/2003 O
718/2003
719/2003 2004
721/2004
731/2004 ()
732/2004 I
733/2004 I A
734/2004 A
735/2004 A E -

736/2004 - A

737/2004 -

738/2004 2004
739/2004 A- A

740/2004 - A

741/2004 A

742/2004
743/2004 E
744/2004 I E

745/2004 I E

746/2004
747/2004 E
I.... E
748/2004 E
I.... E
749/2004 E
I.... E
750/2004 E
I.... E
751/2004 I

752/2004 I

753/2004 A E

754/2004 A A ( III)
-I
755/2004 -
I
756/2004 A

757/2004 I


758/2004 I

759/2004
760/2004 E
761/2004
762/2004
A
763/2004 - -I

764/2004
A
765/2004
A
766/2012 2005
767/2004
768/2004
769/2004 I
770/2005 -- A
I
771/2005 A E A

772/2005 A E

773/2012 E
I.... E
774/2005 E
I.... E /A
775/2005 - A

776/2005 - A A I

777/2005 -

778/2005 4
A
779/2005 A A

780/2005 A

781/2005
782/2005 E
784/2005 /A A -
E I A
785/2005 I- A

Index6
ListofRegulations(Amharic)

001/1989
002/1989 ()
003/1989 I
004/1989 I - I
005/1989 I A I
006/1989 ()
007/1989 I
008/1989 E
009/1989 I ()
010/1989 I
011/1989 ()
012/1990 A I
013/1990
014/1990 A A/ A
015/1990 A
016/1990 I E
017/1990
018/1990 I
019/1990 I
020/1990 I E
021/1990 E E
022/1990 I
023/1990 I E
024/1990
025/1990 ()
026/1991
027/1998 E ()
028/1998
029/1998
030/1998
031/1998
032/1998
033/1998 A
034/1998 A
035/1998
036/1998 I ()
037/1998 E A A
038/1998 A
039/1998
040/1998 A E
041/1998 I
042/1998 E
043/1998 ()

044/1998 A
045/1998 E
046/1998 A
047/1998 A
048/1998 ()
049/1999
050/1999
051/1999
052/1999 E I
053/1999 E
054/1999 I I
055/1999 ()
056/1999 - A
057/1999 -
058/1999 I E A
059/1999 A E
060/1999
061/1999
062/1999
063/1999
064/1999 ()
065/2000 E
A
066/2000 I
067/2000 A
068/2001
069/2001 A E
070/2001 I A
071/2001 ()
072/2001 A
073/2001 A
074/2001 (E)
075/2001 A
076/2002 I
077/2002 A A -
078/2002
079/2002 E
080/2003 ()
081/2003 I A ()
082/2003 I ()
083/2003 I E
084/2003 I
085/2003 E E ()
086/2003
087/2003 ()
088/2003 E
089/2003 ()
090/2003 I ()
091/2003
092/2003 I A ()
093/2003 I ()
094/2003 I ()
095/2003 ()
096/2003 A A
097/2004 A
098/2004
099/1996 I ()
100/1996 I ()
101/1996 I

102/1996 A
103/1996
104/1996 A ()
105/1996 E ()
106/1996 A 106/2004
107/1996
108/1996 A
109/1996 ()
110/1996 ()
111/1997 A ()
112/1997 ()
113/1997 I
114/1997 I
115/1997 I A
116/1997 I E
117/1997 I A
118/1997 I I
119/1997
120/1998 A ()
121/1998 I E
122/1998
123/1998 ()
124/1998 E ()
125/1998 I E
126/1998 A
127/1999 ()
128/1999 ()
129/1999
130/1999 I
131/1999 ()
132/1999 I
133/1999 A E
134/1999 I ()
135/1999
136/1999 A
137/1999 A
138/1999 A
139/1999
140/1999 I ()
141/2000 I

142/2000 A E I
143/2000 I I
144/2000 - A
145/2000 I E
146/2000 I A
()
147/2000 I A (E)
148/2000 I
149/2000 E
150/2000
151/2000 A E
152/2000 I
153/2000 ()
154/2000
155/2000 I A
156/2000 A E
157/2001 I A
158/2001
159/2001 I
160/2001 A E
161/2001
162/2001 I
163/2001 E A
164/2001 ()
165/2001 I A
166/2001 A (E )
167/2001 A
168/2001 A E
169/2001 E A E
170/2002 I E
171/2002 E
172/2002 I A E
173/2002 A
174/2002 E
175/2002
176/2002 I I ()
177/2002 I
178/2002
179/2002
180/2002 I I
181/2002 I I
182/2002 I I
183/2002 I
184/2002 A
185/2002 I
186/2002
187/2002
188/2002 A E I
189/2002 I A
190/2002 A
191/2003 I
192/2003
193/2003 I
194/2003 - I
195/2003 I A
196/2003 I
197/2003 I-
198/2003 E
199/2003
200/2003
201/2003 A I
202/2003
203/2003
204/2003 A E
205/2003
206/2003
207/2003 A A -
208/2003
209/2003
210/2003
211/2003
212/2003 A
213/2003
214/2003 A A E
215/2003 A
216/2003 A A
217/2003
218/2003
219/2003
220/2003
221/2003
222/2003
223/2003
224/2003
225/2003 A
226/2003
227/2003
228/2003
229/2003
230/2003
231/2003
232/2003
233/2003
234/2003
235/2003 A E
236/2003
237/2003 A
238/2003 E
239/2003
240/2003 E

241/2003 E
242/2003
243/2003
244/2003 I A
245/2003 I
246/2003 E A
247/2003 I E
248/2003 I
249/2003 I A
250/2003 E
251/2003 -
252/2003 I
()
253/2003 E
254/2003 I
255/2004 I A
256/2004 I I
____________________

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ETHIOPIANLEGALINFORMATIONCONSORTIUM

Members of the Working Group

6. Contracts related to Immovable Property

Poster v. Veno & Letitiya, 44101 (10: 2010) 44-47.................................................. 167

Access to justice is a right enshrined in major international human rights

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4 Yonas Hiluf v. Estifanos et al 38721 2010 12 555-560

5 Habtu Woldu v. Meselu Desta & 50440 2010 10 329- 331

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Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

The cumulative reading of 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution and 1204(2),

Nigisti Emnet -v.- Tewodros Tekle

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Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division

Petitioner: Nigisti Emnet

Signature of five justices

Holding of the court

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Petitioners: (1) Seshah Kifle; (2) Setugn Bekele

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Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38721 (December 6, 2010)

Cassation File No. 38721

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division

The first respondent brought an appeal against this decision to the

Signature of five justices

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Holding of the court:

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5 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. 23363 2008 6 33-36

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Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Benshangul Gumuz