Uson v.

Del Rosario, 92:530| Andres

FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession
of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against
Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death
in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left
no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of
their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her
husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was
given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit
any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI
found for Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of
her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have
successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in
the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a
common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the
deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of
land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death
to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).
As this Court aptly said, The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death. From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit
any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his
death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired.

1
Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband,
the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.

Borja v. Borja, 46 SCRA 577 | Ang

FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his
wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son
Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife
Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI
of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana
opposed the approval of the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into
such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco,
and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being
probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full
payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of
Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his
will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by
Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest,
actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or
legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)there is
no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Bonilla vs. Leon Barcena
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
Martin, J.:
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Bonilla, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion,
wife of Ponciano Bonilla (petitioner) instituted a civil action to quiet title over
certain parcles of land located in Abra. Respondents opposed and when

2
Fortunata died, moved to dismiss the same since a dead person has no legal
capacity to sue. CFI dismissed the civil action earlier instituted and although
counsel for the plaintiff prayed that Rosalio and Salvacion be allowed to
substitute their deceased mother, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to substitute the deceased
plaintiff.
RULING:
If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, whenever a party to a pending case dies
it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
This duty was complained with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff but the
court, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground
that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. Art 777 NCC provides the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the parcels of land
in litigation was not extinguished but was transferred to her heirs upon death.
CASE # 18
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on March 13, 1952, at the age of 88 years,
without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
All his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
On April 19, 1952, JOSE JUNQUERA filed a petition for the probate of a one
page document as the last will and testament, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia (all surnamed Borromeo), in equal and
undivided shares and designating Junquera as executor.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, the
probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased
was a forgery. The decision was affirmed upon appeal.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
On April 10, 1969, the trial court issued an order declaring the following, to the
exclusion of all others, as the INTESTATE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED VITO
BORROMEO: Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana
Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera, Salud Borromeom Asuncion

3
 Borromeo, Marcial Borromeom Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and, The heirs
of Canuto Borromeo.
- The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
On August 25, 1972, respondent FORTUNATO BORROMEO filed a motion to
be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son and that he was omitted in the declaration of heirs.
- As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a
legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.
- Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the
order of the court dated April 10, 1969, the court dismissed the motion.
Fortunato filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he
submitted, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the
estate. He asserted and incorporated a WAIVER OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS
(7/31/1967). In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The trial court, acting as a probate court,
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; Fortunato is estopped
from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it
was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having
been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance
of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject
matter.
- The "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" has been cancelled and revoked on
June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia
Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no effective
waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil
Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person
must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of
his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not
certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their
rights were, therefore, uncertain.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there
is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or
repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of
the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain
of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of
the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver
document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of
their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
On December 24, 1974, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs
who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to

4
 Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to
5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed in 7/31/1967 is

valid as to entitle Fortunato to the estate of Vito?
RULING:
The heirs could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to
partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
- In Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., the Court held: The
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of the death of the deceased (Article 657
and applied by Article 661), the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere
fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death
of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary
property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of
the death (Article 989). The right is vested, although conditioned upon
the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.
However, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered
to be effective.
- For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a
right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to
relinquish such right.
- The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party
does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an
intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
The circumstances of this case that the signatories to the waiver document
did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus:
- (1) On October 27, 1967, Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a
pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the
amicable settlement of the case. In this document, the respondent
recognizes and concedes that the petitioner is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent purports it
to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to
settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of
the deceased
- (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. The
Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969.

5
 - (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner signed a document entitled Deed of
Assignment purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent
and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights,
interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo.
- (4) On June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo
(assignees in the deed of assignment) in turn executed a Deed of
Reconveyance in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00;
- (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was
signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION: The trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the waiver agreement. In Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower
court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal,
the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Subsequently, several
parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. There is no
impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said
claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.
[COMMENT: Bwisit tong case na to. Ang habatapos konti lang ung
kailangan. Pero to summarize the cases that were consolidated: (1) G.R. No.
41171; (2) G.R. No. 55000: Issues are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No.
41171; the supposed waiver of hereditary rights cannot be validated. The
essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing intention
to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case; (3) G.R. No. 62895:
For the termination and closure of Special Proceedings No. 916-R; pending
motions to compel petition as co-administrator to submit an inventory; (4)
G.R. No. 65995: Matter of attorney's fees; (5) G.R. No. 63818: Respondents
Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra O. Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in
the CFI of Cebu, presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the
judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R; (6) G.R. No.
65995: The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting
on any and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the
pendency of this petition and No. 63818.]
Rioferio v. CA
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan
City and
Kalookan City.He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom
he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the
herein

6
 respondents.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada,

legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner
Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent
located in Dagupan City.

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the

Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the
defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial
settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the
titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had
managed
to register them in his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without

doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance
with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to
succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs
from

7
 representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which
an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses
the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions,
1. If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of
and he is made a party defendant

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

20

JUL

[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily
residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death,
her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the
reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that
since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracions will, Hermogenes
C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES

[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of
a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.

8
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of
Adoracions heirs.

RULING

[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of
the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358).It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
(Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the
parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of
Philippine Law.

Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor, The Parish Priest,
G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979.
20JUL

[AQUINO, J.]

FACTS

Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testators three sisters.
The will also contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male relative who
shall pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as
no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.

9
ISSUE

Whether the testators nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the
testators death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the
bequest is to be given.

RULING

NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at
the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice
lands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise
inoperative.

FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decent Margarita S.
Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion
since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs as her parents, grandparents, and siblings predeceased her.
She was survived by her first cousins which included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed portions of
her undivided shares in real properties to respondent. Margarita also left all her
personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole
executor of her will.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita
probated and respondent as executor of the will. CA affirmed.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with
the formalities required by law. NO

10
 (2) W/N it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs
of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner. NO

HELD:
We rule in favor of respondent.

(1) A review of the findings of the RTC reveal that petitioners arguments lack
basis. The RTC correctly held:
About the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of 3 pages while
the will, in truth, only consists of 2 pages only because the attestation is not part
of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation
clause is not a part of the will, the court is of the considered opinion that error in
the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material
to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is sufficient safeguard from
the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been
brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting
of 3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
The Court also rejects the contention that the signatures of the testator
were affixed on different occasions as the signature on the first page is allegedly
different in size, texture, and appearance as compared to the signatures on the
succeeding pages. The picture shows that the testator was affixing her signature
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no
evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2,
1987.

We find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC.

(2) Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent
under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her
properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to
claim any part of the decedents estate.

The petition is DENIED. The assailed CA decision is AFFIRMED.

11
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954

Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be the

last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on September
6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews of the deceased,
who would inherit his estate if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled
in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a holographic will, one
which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testators death, such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of
the case since the new Civil Code is already enforced, and that to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic will
of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the case shall be considered and not the
time of its execution

Held: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of
the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate
or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil Code. One reason in support of the
rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the
wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among
the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.

When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded
and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void
wills. Hence, the trial courts decision was reversed.

G.R.No.L32636March17,1930
InthematterEstateofEdwardRandolphHix,deceased.
A.W.FLUEMER,petitionerappellant,
vs.
ANNIECOUSHINGHIX,oppositorappellee.
MALCOLM,J.:

12
FACTS:Fleumer,thespecialadministratoroftheestateofEdwardRandolphHix
appealedfromadecisionofJudgeofFirstInstanceTuasondenyingtheprobateofthe
documentallegedtobythelastwillandtestamentofthedeceased.Appelleeisnot
authorizedtocarryonthisappeal.Wethink,however,thattheappellant,whoappearsto
havebeenthemovingpartyintheseproceedings,wasa"personinterestedinthe
allowanceordisallowanceofawillbyaCourtofFirstInstance,"andsoshouldbe
permittedtoappealtotheSupremeCourtfromthedisallowanceofthewill(Codeof
CivilProcedure,sec.781,asamended;Villanuevavs.DeLeon[1925],42Phil.,780).
ItistheoryofthepetitionerthattheallegedwillwasexecutedinElkins,West
Virginia,onNovember3,1925,byHixwhohadhisresidenceinthatjurisdiction,and
thatthelawsofWestVerginiaCode,Annotated,byHogg,CharlesE.,andascertifiedto
bytheDirectoroftheNationalLibrary,shouldgovern.
ISSUE:WhetherornotthelawsofWestVirginiashouldgovern.
RULING:Thelawsofaforeignjurisdictiondonotprovethemselvesinourcourts.the
courtsofthePhilippineIslandsarenotauthorizedtotakeAmericanUnion.Suchlaws
mustbeprovedasfacts.(InreEstateofJohnson[1918],39Phil.,156.)Herethe
requirementsofthelawwerenotmet.Therewasnowasprintedorpublishedunderthe
authorityoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedinsection300oftheCodeofCivil
Procedure.Norwastheextractfromthelawattestedbythecertificateoftheofficer
havingchargeoftheoriginal,underthesaleoftheStateofWestVirginia,asprovidedin
section301oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Noevidencewasintroducedtoshowthatthe
extractfromthelawsofWestVirginiawasinforceatthetimetheallegedwillwas
executed.
Note:Inaddition,thedueexecutionofthewillwasnotestablished.Theonly
evidenceonthispointistobefoundinthetestimonyofthepetitioner.Asidefromthis,
therewasnothingtoindicatethatthewillwasacknowledgedbythetestatorinthe
presenceoftwocompetentwitnesses,ofthatthesewitnessessubscribedthewillinthe
presenceofthetestatorandofeachotherasthelawofWestVirginiaseemstorequire.
OnthesuppositionthatthewitnessestothewillresidewithoutthePhilippineIslands,it
wouldthenthedutyofthepetitionertoproveexecutionbysomeothermeans(Codeof
CivilProcedure,sec.633.)
Itwasalsonecessaryforthepetitionertoprovethatthetestatorhadhisdomicile
inWestVirginiaandnotestablishthisfactconsistedoftherecitalsintheCATHYwill
andthetestimonyofthepetitioner.Alsoinbeginningadministrationproceedings
originallyinthePhilippineIslands,thepetitionerviolatedhisowntheorybyattempting
tohavetheprincipaladministrationinthePhilippineIslands.
Whiletheappealpendingsubmissioninthiscourt,theattorneyfortheappellant
presentedanunverifiedpetitionaskingthecourttoacceptaspartoftheevidencethe
documentsattachedtothepetition.Oneofthesedocumentsdisclosesthatapaperwriting
purportingtobethewaspresentedforprobateonJune8,1929,totheclerkofRandolph
Country,StateofWestVirginia,invacation,andwasdulyprovenbytheoathsofDana
WamsleyandJosephL.MAdden,thesubscribingwitnessesthereto,andorderedtobe
recordedandfiled.Itwasshownbyanotherdocumentthat,invacation,onJune8,1929,
theclerkofcourtofRandolphCountry,WestVirginia,appointedClaudeW.Maxwellas

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administrator,cumtestamentoannexo,oftheestateofEdwardRandolphHix,deceased.
Inthisconnection,itistobenotedthattheapplicationfortheprobateofthewillinthe
PhilippineswasfiledonFebruary20,1929,whiletheproceedingsinWestVirginia
appeartohavebeeninitiatedonJune8,1929.Thesefactsarestronglyindicativeofan
intentiontomakethePhilippinestheprincipaladministrationandWestVirginiathe
ancillaryadministration.Howeverthismaybe,noattempthasbeenmadetocomplywith
CivilProcedure,fornohearingonthequestionoftheallowanceofawillsaidtohave
beenprovedandallowedinWestVirginiahasbeenrequested.Thereisnoshowingthat
thedeceasedleftanypropertyatanyplaceotherthanthePhilippineIslandsandno
contentionthatheleftanyinWestVirginia.
Referencehasbeenmadebythepartiestoadivorcepurportedtohavebeen
awardedEdwardRandolphHixfromAnnieCousinsHixonOctober8,1925,intheState
ofWestspecificpronouncementsonthevalidityorvalidityofthisallegeddivorce.
Foralloftheforegoing,thejudgmentappealedfromwillbeaffirmed,withthe
costsofthisinstanceagainsttheappellant.

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL. vs. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and CA

G.R. No. L-20234
December 23, 1964

Facts: SpousesBernabedelaCernaandGervaciaRebaca,executedajointwilland
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that the properties during their
marriagebegiventoManuelaRebaca,theirniece,becausetheydidnothaveanychild.
BernabediedonAugust30,1939,andtheaforesaidwillwassubmittedtoprobatebysaid
GervasiaandManuelabeforetheCFIofCebu.UponthedeathofGervasia,another
petitionfortheprobateofthesamewillinsofarasGervasiawasconcernedwasfiledon
November6,1952ofthesameCFI,butfailureofthepetitionerandherattorneyto
appear,thecasewasdismissed.

TheCFIorderedthepetitionheardanddeclaredthetestamentnullandvoid,forbeing
executedcontrarytotheprohibitionofjointwillintheCivilCode.Onappeal,theCA
reversedthedecisiononthegroundthatthedecreeofprobatein1939wasissuedbya
courtofprobatejurisdictionandconclusiveonthedueexecutionofthetestament.

Issue: Whetherthejointwillexecutedbythespouses,despiteitsprohibitionunderthe
CivilCode,canbeconsideredasvalid

Held:Yes.Admittedlytheprobateofthewillin1939waserroneous,however,becauseit
wasprobatedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdictionithasconclusiveeffectandafinal
judgmentrenderedonapetitionfortheprobateofawillisbindinguponthewholeworld.
Still,thisisonlytruewithrespecttotheestateofthehusbandbutcannotaffecttheestate
ofthewife,whowasthenstillalive,andoverwhoseinterestintheconjugalproperties
theprobatecourtacquirednojurisdiction,preciselybecauseherestatecouldnotthenbe

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inissue.BeitrememberedthatpriortothenewCivilCode,awillcouldnotbeprobated
duringthetestator'slifetime.

Consideringthatajointwillisaseparatewillofeachtestator,Itfollowsthatthevalidity
ofthejointwill,insofarastheestateofthewifewasconcerned,mustbe,onherdeath,
reexaminedandadjudicateddenovo.Hence,theundividedinterestofthewifeshould
passuponherdeathtoherintestateheirsandnottothetestamentaryheir
Adecreeofprobatedecreeisconclusiveonthedueexecutionandtheformalvalidityof
thewillsubjecttosuchprobate.

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