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Submitted by: Raychelle Pacheco

Subject: Evidence
Professor: Atty. Parungo

Analysis on Rule 130 Section 22 and Section 24(a)

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants
- Discussion:
Also called the spousal immunity/marital disqualification rule
o Complete and absolute rule
o General rule - neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse,
o Exceptions
In a civil case by one against the other, or
In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants
Rationale: the conjugal harmony sought to be protected by this rule no longer exists
o Rationale:
To protect the identity of interests between the spouses,
To prevent the consequent danger of perjury where one spouse testifies against the other,
To uphold the legal policy on guarding marital confidences
To prevent domestic disunion
To prevent the danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
o Requisites:
1. Marriage is valid and existing as of the time of the offer of testimony
2. Witness spouse may or may not be a party to the action but the other spouse must be a party to
the action
o May be waived (Ex: accused husband in his testimony imputed the commission of the crime to his
wife, he is deemed to have waived his objection to the latters testimony in rebuttal)
o The prohibition extends not only to a testimony adverse to the spouse but also to a testimony in
favor of the spouse. It also extends to both criminal and civil cases because the rule does not
distinguish.
o The prohibited testimony is one that is given or offered during the existence of the marriage
o The spouse may testify in a trial where the spouse is a co-accused. The disqualification is between
husband and wife, but the rule does not preclude the wife from testifying when it involves other
parties or accused. The testimony of the wife in reference to her husband must be disregarded if
properly objected to.
- Cases:
a. Alvarez v. Ramirez G.R. No. 143439

o Facts:
Susan Ramirez, respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case for arson allegedly
committed by accused Maximo Alvarez, husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
Esperanza Alvarez, estranged wife of the defendant, was called to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. Her
testimony was for the purpose of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the
elements of the crime; that accused Maximo Alvarez pour gasoline in the house owned by his sister-
in-law Susan Ramirez and set it on fire.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. Lower court granted,
but CA reversed. Hence, the present petition.
o Issue: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case
o Ruling:
Under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Disqualification by reason of
marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants
or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk
of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.
Marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses
and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.
The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect.
Prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto, hence, the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
Decision of CA was affirmed.

b. People v. Pansensoy, G. R. No. 140634

o Facts:
Appellant Roberto Pansensoy was adjudged by lower court guilty of the crime of murder for
killing Hilario Reyes. Analie Pansensoy is the legitimate wife of appellant. She testified that she had
been living-in with the victim, Hilario Reyes and that she saw the appellant killed the victim on May
8, 1994 inside their house.
Appellants first assignment of error in the present petition is focused on the sufficiency of the
evidence for the prosecution, questioning in particular the trial courts assessment of the credibility
of the prosecutions eyewitness, Analie.
o Issue: Whether or not Analie, wife of the accused is disqualified to be a witness against her husband.
o Ruling:
As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analies testimony would have been disregarded had
appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule.
Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution
against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally.
The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as
a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to make a timely
objection to the admission of Analies testimony.

c. Ordono vs Daquigan G.R. No. L-39012

o Facts:
Avelino Ordoo was charged with having raped his daughter, Leonora. Catalina Balanon
Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that
same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino
Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they reported
the crime to the police. She also revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter,
Rosa.
During trial, after she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense counsel objected to
her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Section 20, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to
his wife's testifying against him.
o Issue: whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by
him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
o Ruling:
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is
no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and
the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. The security and
confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home"
When an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with
incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too
obvious to require much elucidation.
The court adopted the interpretation that "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other" may refer to a crime where the wife is the individual
particularly and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the husband is being prosecuted.
The wife may testify against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest because
incest is a "crime committed against the wife".
Case was dismissed.

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
a. The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
- Discussion:
o The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants; (marital privilege)
o Requisites:
1. There was a valid marital relation;
2. there is a communication received in confidence by one from the other
3. the confidential communication was received during the marriage
4. The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication between the spouses during
said marriage; and
5. The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered has not given his or her consent to such
testimony
o Cannot apply to:
Communications made prior to the marriage
Where it was not intended to be kept in confidence by the spouse who received the same, as in
the case of a dying declaration of the husband to his wife as to who was his assailant
if the communication is overheard or comes into the hands o f a third party, whether legally or
not, third party may testify
o Collusion with or voluntary disclosure by either spouse to the third person, the latter becomes an
agent of the spouse hence covered by the prohibition
o Communications in private between husband and wife are presumed to be confidential
- Cases:
a. Zulueta v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107383

o Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. Petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence
Ruling:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.
Denied.

b. People vs Carlos 47 Phil 626

o Facts:
The victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical operation upon the
defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. After the surgery, she was required to
go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds. On one of the
visits, Doctor Sityar sent Carlos out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while he was
absent, Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. Dr Sityar did not make any special resentment and even
asked the defendant to pay the account for the professional services rendered to his wife.
When he again visited the clinic of Dr Sityar, the defendant killed him, but maintained that he
did so in self-defense. That the deceased took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk and
attacked the defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; that the defendant, making use
of his knowledge of fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from the deceased and blinded by
fury stabbed him first in the right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing
that the deceased might secure some other weapon or receive assistance from the people in the
adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time in the back.
The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation evidenced by a letter
written to the defendant by his wife who feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to
physical violence in dealing with the deceased, therefore constituted murder.
Counsel for the defendant argues that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore
not admissible in evidence.
o Issue: Whether or not the letter is inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is privileged
communication between husband and wife.
o Ruling:
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third
party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent,
becomes admissible.
The letter must, however, be excluded because the letter was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for
that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here;
the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his
part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay
Testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness is, however, admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses
took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply
where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.
Defendant was adjudged guilty of simple homicide, without aggravating or extenuating
circumstances.

c. Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10 2006

o Facts:
Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom) filed an administrative case against respondent-
spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (respondents).
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in
a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos (Barrientos). The Municipal
trial court rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Judge Lacurom of Regional Trial Court,
reversed the earlier judgments
Due to contents of Veneracions counsels Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Lacurom ordered
Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of
court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
Velasco-Jacoba claimed that she did not actually or actively participate in this case. Nevertheless,
Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration and alleged that she signed the pleading handed to
her by her husband, Ellis Jacoba without reading it.
Judge Lacurom issued another order directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt. Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a
decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court.
Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). IBP Commissioner Navarro recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted the
recommendation except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.
o Issue: Whether or not the evidence against Ellis Jacoba is inadmissible for being privileged.
o Ruling:
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author
of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental. Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in
Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari
before deciding the contempt charge against him.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor
required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an
insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba
acknowledged that the words created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.
The Court suspended Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
upon finality of this Decision and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision.

Section 22 and 24(a) Distinguished: