“A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation; it is not, because it cannot be,

a photographic representation.” Critically discuss.

Is photography capable of representing anything? In order to answer this claim we

must first consider what a representation is. Roger Scruton outlines a representation as
something that can represent the artist’s thoughts and intentions. That is to say,
something that provides the viewer with an aesthetic interest. Scruton explains that
photography is not a mode of representation: it is only capable of capturing and recording
things as they are (to the camera) and it offers not imaginative effort further than what is
portrayed. He explains that unlike photographs, paintings are representative because they
communicate thoughts about the subject, whereas photography stands in a causal relation
to its subject. The photograph imparts no thoughts on the part of the photographer. He
goes on to explain that cinema is not a representation art form because it is a
photographic medium. Since photography is incapable of representation, any
representation found in cinema must thus be from the conventions of drama and theatre
which it records. Scruton writes, “A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation; it
is not, because it cannot be, a photographic representation.” In this essay I will outline
Scruton’s main claims against photography as a representational art. I will consider the
objections to Scruton’s arguments, and then apply his arguments to cinema to establish
why he considers cinema to be only capable of dramatic representation and not
photographic representation. I will then consider Rudolf Arnheim’s objections to Scruton,
and how cinema is indeed, according to him, capable of artistic expression. Finally, I will
discuss digital cinema as a medium and whether or not Arnheim’s and Scruton’s theories
apply to it.

Scruton’s Arguments Against Photography As A Representational Art

Scruton identifies two main arguments against photography being a

representational art: the first which we shall call the ontological argument, and the second
which we shall call the aesthetic argument. The ontological argument points out that the

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nature of photography means that photographic representations do not exist. Since
Scruton defines a representation as something that communicates or expresses thoughts
about its subject, Scruton’s depiction of an ideal photograph by its very nature cannot
express or communicate thoughts, thus leading to his conclusion that photographs cannot
be representations. He argues that the ideal photograph stands in a causal relation to its
subject, as opposed to an intentional relation. This means that for every photo of a man,
there is a particular man for whom the photo is of. It also follows that if there is a photo
of a subject that the subject exists, and is roughly the same as it appears in the photo.
Scruton explains that an intentional act isn’t essential in a photographic relation, as an
ideal photograph is a record of how an actual object looked at a point in time. He
contrasts this with the ideal painting, which does have an intentional relation. Using the
example of a painting of the goddess Venus, Scruton illustrates how she can be painted,
but not photographed because she does not actually exist. That is to say, the causal
relation between a photograph and its subject entails that the subject must actually exist
to be photographed, creating a limitation in the medium: we cannot photograph that
which is not there, whereas a painter can create any image his imagination entices. The
painting can also be radically different from Venus’ appearance, or she can be painted in
various different ways: both of which are not possible with a photograph, which records
the subject accurately as it appears at the period in which the photograph was taken.
Scruton is essentially arguing that a photograph is only a recording of reality at a given
point in time (the causal relation) and as such cannot convey the artists intentions or
impressions about the world. But what about photographers who create scenarios and
depictions to convey their ideas and impressions about the world? Scruton gives the
example of a photographer who uses a nude model draped in cloth to represent Venus,
and photographs her. This, he explains, would be a representation before the photograph
is even taken, and as such is a photograph of a representation of Venus, instead of being a
photographic representation of Venus. That is to say, that the photograph only points to
the representation, and is not used to represent something in its own right. Lastly, a
painting can depict Venus and there is no fact-of-the-matter about the particular time she
is being shown at: whereas a photograph is tied to temporality. Scruton concludes that
photographs have a causal relation to their subject, which limits them from having the

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intentional relation required for a representation. Scruton is trying to point out with his
ontological argument that the nature of photography does not allow the photographer to
convey his intentions in the photograph, as it is simply a mechanical method for
recording concrete facts, and as such cannot be artistic. Painting, on the other hand
involves the communication of thoughts about the subject: the spectator is asked to think
beyond the actual image and consider what the artist is conveying about the subject.
Scruton makes his point by showing that photography imparts none of the photographer’s
thoughts, and that “it is neither necessary nor even possible that the photographer’s
intention should enter as a serious factor in determining how the picture is seen.”1

In his aesthetic argument, Scruton suggests that even if he were to concede that
photography can be representational, it still is not a representational art. A
representational art implies that there must be an aesthetic interest in the representation.
This means that there must be an aesthetic interest in the photograph for its own sake and
not as a means or instrument. Scruton claims “the photograph is transparent to its subject,
and if it holds our interest it does so because it acts as a surrogate for the thing which it
shows. Thus if one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one finds something
beautiful in its subject. A painting may be beautiful, on the other hand, even when it
represents an ugly thing.”2 When we apply the idea of aesthetic interest to photography,
we see that unless we are interested in it as an abstract art, we are only interested in its
subject and not in how the medium presents it. Scruton explains that there isn’t sufficient
control over the details available to the photographer (the dust on the subject’s jacket, the
wrinkles on the subject’s skin, etc), while a painter, on the other hand has ultimate control
over every aspect of the work (from mixing the paints to the choice of canvas, and of
course the composition of the work and every line he chooses to omit or include).
Because of this limited control, there is a lack of possibility of an aesthetic
transformation. That is, the only beauty that we see in a photograph is from the beauty of
its subject. There is no possibility of the aesthetic properties of the photograph to be
different from the aesthetic properties of the subject. Therefore any aesthetic interest we

1
Scruton, Roger. “Photography and Representation”
2
Scruton, Roger. “Photography and Representation” p.114

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have in the photo is in the subject and not in the photograph itself. And so, Scruton
concludes, that even if there are photographic representations, they wouldn’t be an art
form, as we look through the photograph to assess the aesthetic properties of the subject.
From this conclusion Scruton goes on to explain that any emotional qualities we derive
from a photograph we do so from the qualities that the photograph “represents” with the
subject: that is, “if the photograph is sad it is usually because its subject is sad.”3 Because
photographs record the way that things are, it would be difficult see a photograph of
martyrdom as anything other than horrifying, whereas a painting of martyrdom can
convey serenity or calmness. It is the causal relation of the photographic medium that
impedes on the ability to distinguish between photograph and object. As such, it is
impossible to separate the viewer’s interest in the subject from the photograph: that is to
say, the viewer is incapable of having an interest in the photograph without having the
same interest in the subject.
Objections To Scruton’s Arguments

But why does Scruton insist that a representation must be something that
expresses thoughts? That is, does the distinction between causal and intentional relations
prove that ideal photographs cannot communicate thoughts? Intentions are not
necessarily expressed in ideal photographs, but it does not strictly follow that intentions
are necessarily not expressed (that they would never be expressed) therefore photographs
can be both causal and intentional. Scruton would respond to this objection by pointing
out that the way we express thoughts in photographs does not suffice to make
photographs sufficient for representation. But is it really the case that when we are
interested in a photograph we are only interested in its subject matter? Surely it is
possible to take beautiful photographs of ugly things, and thus the aesthetic properties of
the photograph can differ from those of the subject. Similarly, an abstract photograph (i.e.
a macro shot) can show the appreciation for the lines, lighting, definition and framing
captured by the photograph, without appreciating the subject in and of itself. Scruton
would point out that a macro shot is not an ideal photograph, as it manipulated: but what
counts as manipulation? If we draw the distinction at post production: so that any

3
Scruton, Roger “Photography and Representation” p. 115

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photograph that is manipulated once the image has been captured counts as manipulation,
then a photograph taken with a macro lens, or a fisheye lens still stands as an ideal
photograph. If that is so, then Scruton is wrong in stating that photographs cannot convey
intention, as a fisheye lens can distort the subject and draw attention to aspects of the
image he wishes to emphasize. Let us consider a scenario in which a painter paints an
image he sees in a photograph with precise detail: why is his painting considered a
representational art, while the photograph that looks nearly identical is not? Both depict
the same scenario with the same amount of detail: the photographer has chosen what
composition and lighting he wants in his frame, and the painter has copied it. Scruton
would argue that the painter’s ability to manipulate the medium and choose what to
include and omit makes his work an artistic representation. But didn’t the photographer
do the same by choosing the aperture and shutter speed so that the photograph captured
more light and detail or more darkness and blur? Moreover, didn’t the photographer also
choose the composition and framing of his image, what to include, what angle to shoot at,
etc? Scruton would protest that any aesthetic appreciation found in this photograph would
be due to the subject that the photographer chose to capture, but it seems intuitively
absurd to claim that the photographer is not conveying any intention in his choice of
lighting, crop, framing and angle of shot. Scruton believes that when the photographer
takes into consideration framing, lighting, etc, he is moving towards a painter role and
away from the ideal photograph: but perhaps Scruton’s ideal photograph is the real
problem. Why is the photograph that accurately represents reality considered to be ideal?
Scruton limits the medium by imposing a value system that prefers accuracy about the
way things are over interpretation, setting photography up for failure. Surely one could
say the same about a painting: if a painter decides to paint an image exactly as he sees it
instead of adding and omitting things in order to express himself, then he is not
conveying any other intention than wishing to record the world accurately. The same
must be true for photography: the idea of an “ideal photograph” that is a close
representation of reality seems to be the only leg that Scruton’s argument stands on. If we
remove the constraints that this “ideal” imposes, Scruton’s arguments against
photography as an expressive art fails.

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 Implications On Film And Cinema As A Medium

Film is grounded in photography, it is a technological medium that developed in

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the 19 century and is quite literally the art of moving pictures. The first film screening in
1895 that was seen as entertainment was not thought of as an art form. Scruton holds that
his arguments against photography as a representational art are thus also applicable to
cinema. He points out that since photography is incapable of representation that any
representation in film cannot be photographic. What sort of representation, then, if any, is
found in film? Scruton claims that film is a photograph of a dramatic representation and
as such the film medium, like its photographic predecessor is purely a mechanical tool for
viewing the representation. There are three main challenges that film faces against being
an art form. First, the function of the medium: as a form of mass entertainment intended
to provide pleasure to the lowest denominator, it is arguable that entertainment isn’t
compatible with an art form and as such film cannot be an art. However, let us consider
Shakespeare, known to be a true literary artist and wordsmith: he considered himself to
be an entertainer and artist. There seems to be no reasonable argument for why
entertainment and art are incompatible, especially when a viewer can easily be
entertained by a large mural, or a great symphony, both of which are unquestionably
works of art. The second challenge film faces is the production argument: cinema is the
wrong mode of production because it is industrial and made collectively. Thousands of
people are involved in the making of a film, from the directors and producers through to
the actors and the set and design crew, but if art is an individual trying to produce his
view on the world, then it should follow that film cannot be an art form as it does not fit
into this romantic paradigm. There are two replies to this argument, the first is rooted in
Auteur Theory, and the idea that it is possible to have one artist of the film (usually the
director or writer) who is actualizing his artwork and requires the collective effort to
produce it. The second entertains the possibility of collective artworks: it is not a
constraint of an artwork that there be one single author, just as medieval cathedrals have
more than one architect who designed and constructed them. Finally, film is challenged
by the technology argument, which is an offshoot of Scruton’s arguments: if the viewer
observes something that is a genuine representational art, he is interested in what its

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representing as well as how it represents it. But film is merely mechanical and therefore
has no room to explain how the artist is expressing himself. Scruton uses the example of
a waxwork being used to produce a copy of an original: there appears to be no artistry in
the form of reproduction. That is to say, a mechanical reproduction has no way of
allowing the artist to express himself. So Scruton concludes that film is simply the means
to an end (the dramatic representation), and as such it is not an artistic representation in
itself.

Scruton’s arguments against photography apply to cinema. He argues that

cinematic masterpieces are only as such because they are first and foremost dramatic
masterpieces. Cinema is thus a dependent art form: it is not independent from theatre but
merely a method of transmitting theatre. Essentially, Scruton holds, cinema is a recording
of an artwork. He doesn’t deny that films are artful, he simply points out that they are not
artistic cinematically, but rather dramatically, or because of the actors, set design, etc. For
example, let us consider the film The Big Sleep. We are seeing various photographs of
Humphrey Bogart representing Phillip Marlowe, we are not, however, seeing Phillip
Marlowe himself. So if the film is to be considered a work of art, it is only thought of as
such because of Humphrey Bogart’s portrayal and representation of Phillip Marlowe.

We have established that cinema is essentially various photographs being shown

in rapid succession. A central technique to cinematic art is montage: an editorial process
“using a series of dissolves to connect short, expressive, often symbolic shots”4. Surely
Scruton would agree that the images that make up the montage have been edited in the
process and no longer constitute an “ideal photograph”, and as such are excluded from
his arguments that cinema is incapable of representation. On the other hand, it does not
seem sound reasoning to say that photography is not a representational art and therefore
cinema is not a representational art either. Cinema is not restricted to the “ideal cinema”
in the same way the Scruton has restricted photography to the “ideal photographs” and as
such, manipulation and editing, careful choice of soundtrack, and stylization all make
cinema an art form. But on the other hand, one could argue that all those characteristics

4
Katz, Steven D. Film Directing : Shot by Shot (Glossary of Terms)

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are artistic in their own right, irrespective of cinema: that is, the music in the feature film
is an artwork, as is the set design and the lighting, etc, irrespective of the film itself.

Arnheim’s Arguments Against Scruton

Following from Scruton, Arnheim set out to defend cinema against

Scruton’s objections. He believed that silent film can indeed be a representational art. He
agreed with Scruton on the expression thesis: that a work of art must be expressive.
However, he argued for the analogy theory of expression, that is, that something
expresses an emotion by resembling something that has that emotion (for example a sad
melody is slow and trudging like a sad person). He held that no mechanical recording of
reality can be expressive, but because of its limitations, film diverges from the
mechanical recording of reality and therefore can be expressive. This differs from
Scruton’s causal challenge; it is a reproductive relation instead of a causal one. Arnheim
finds a loophole in Scruton’s criticisms of film by denying that film is capable of
recording reality without any less limitations than a painter. Essentially, Arnheim holds
that film is an artistic medium in so much that it diverges from reality. Arnheim proceeds
to list the limitations that allow film to be expressive: no colour, since in reality we see in
colour, just as lighting can be used for symbolic purposes in black and white; no sound,
which also distinguishes the film from reality; lack of constancy in size and shape, since
in reality we adjust our sight for the apparent size of things, but the camera does not
adjust for closeness; and finally, the absence of the space/time continuum, since in
reality we cannot leap from one point or time to another, but in cinema we can (i.e. using
montage). Having established his divergence thesis, Arnheim specifies that for film to be
expressive in an artistically good way it must diverge in a way peculiar to the medium.
That is to say, film must differ in a way that no other medium can adopt. For example, a
painting is unique as it puts paint onto a flat canvas, therefore Arnheim holds that cinema
is most artistic in the manners which it diverges from a recording of reality. However,
Arnheim’s divergence thesis is not without objections. It is indeed possible for a
mechanical recording to be expressive, it can express objectivity. If we consider Warhol’s
film “Empire” which is a recording of the empire state building for a period of 24 hours,

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we can see that the camera was recording an objective view of the world at the empire
state building. Similarly, Arnheim doesn’t distinguish between capacity and limitation.
For instance, when considering colour and sound: choosing to shoot in black and white in
the colour era can be expressive: but if a film is entirely silent you cannot use silence as a
form of expression. Essentially, Arnheim sees the cinematic capacity as a limitation
instead of thinking that it can record reality and in different ways, leading us to question
why film makers chose to record it in that particular way. Never the less, Arnheim’s
arguments help us consider Scruton’s claims from a different angle: it is indeed possible,
as Arnheim would argue, for cinema to be artistic in its own right through the medium
and not merely as a dramatic representation. Arnheim’s insistence that cinema is not
simply a mechanical recording of reality allows him to argue that it is an artistic medium,
and as such does not simply transmit a theatrical representation.

Digial Cinema As An Artform

Do Scruton’s arguments hold against digital cinema? Whilst analogue

traditional cinema is literally a collection of moving photographs, digital cinema is
constructed differently by a collection of pixels. Furthermore, digital images are infinitely
manipulable and therefore can be manipulated far more than analogue photographs,
meaning that more ideas and thoughts can be expressed. Scruton would reply that once an
image is manipulated it ceases to be a photograph, but we have already explained that this
is not a plausible reply as there are plenty of ways of manipulating traditional
photographs before capturing the image (using various lenses, etc), and it would be too
strong a claim to say that any manipulation ceases to be a photograph. Scruton would also
argue that there are no digital photographs. Since digital images can be constructed in a
variety of different methods, they are not exactly photographs. Simply because the
picture looks like a photograph doesn’t mean that it is one, just as we would not call a
photorealist painting a photograph. The nature of digital photographs as well as their
construction proves that they are not photographs: they reach a finite point and have a
smallest possible denominator (the pixel), whereas traditional images do not. But this is

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not necessarily true, as analogue photographs do indeed have a finite point: grains of
photographic sand. Whilst it could be argued that digital photographs are not actual
photographs, it seems absurd: both record reality and can create the “ideal photograph”
that Scruton outlines: so therefore is digital cinema susceptible to the same objections
against traditional film? Digital cinema can perhaps be seen as a more accurate recording
of reality than traditional film, proving that it is indeed incapable of expression
(according to Arnheim). As digital cinema does not have the limitations that traditional
cinema has, it is closer to imitating reality, which Arnheim argued traditional film failed
at doing. If digital cinema can record and imitate a virtual reality, is it capable of being
expressive, or is Scruton right in claiming that it is purely mechanical and not
representational? Digital cinema is capable of creating a fictional world just as paintings
do, but Scruton would point out that in creating a fictional world we are moving towards
a painter-like manipulation and away from the actual medium. Scruton believes that if a
kind of expression is genuinely cinematic it would not exist independent of cinema: and
since actors who express their feelings through acting can do so independent of whether
they are being filmed, it is not purely a cinematic expression. But with digital cinema it is
possible to generate images digitally that cannot exist independently of the cinematic
apparatus. Scruton would reply that the generation of images is the art form, not the
recording of their generation.

To conclude, Scruton argues that cinema is not a photographic representation, but

rather a photograph of a dramatic representation. He argues that the constraints of such a
mechanical medium do not allow for artistic expression, and as such film is merely a
recording of reality. Arnheim, in contrast, explains that film is capable of being a
photographic representation, as the limitations of the medium do not allow it to
accurately record reality in the way that Scruton suggests. Arnheim thus believes that
cinema is capable of being a photographic representation. While Scruton’s argument
seems to be logically valid, intuitively I am inclined to disagree with him and argue that
cinema is indeed capable of existing as a representative medium and not solely as
parasitic on literature, painting and theatre. Scruton’s “ideal photograph” is the only
confining factor that regulates photography and cinema as a mechanical medium only

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designed to record reality. When we consider Arnheim’s alternative, we see that it is
indeed plausible for cinema to be a photographic representation in and of itself, without
gaining its aesthetic qualities from being a recording of a dramatic representation. Digital
cinema, on the other hand, seems more likely to fall into Scruton’s trap, as it records
reality far more accurately and with fewer constraints than conventional film. However,
as Scruton does not believe that there are digital photographs; digital cinema escapes the
trappings of Scruton’s arguments. And so, neither film nor digital cinema are simply
photographs of dramatic representations; both are capable of being representational arts
with their own aesthetic interest.

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 Bibliography and Works Cited

Scruton, Roger. “Photography and Representation” (Photocopy, so I am unaware

of the source book)

Katz, Steven D. Film Directing: Shot by Shot: Visualizing from Concept to

Screen. Michael Wiese Productions, 2001.

Arnheim, Rudolf, “Film as an Art” in Film theory and Criticism (6th ed) Oxford
University Press 2004.

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