POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva D. de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017

Article VIII
The Judicial Department

Section 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA - 32 SCRA 188

D: BEFORE A TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS,

IT IS NECESSARY THAT THERE BE A LAW THAT GIVES RISE TO SOME SPECIFIC RIGHTS OF
PERSONS OR PROPERTY UNDER WHICH ADVERSE CLAIMS TO SUCH RIGHTS ARE MADE, AND
THE CONTROVERSY ENSUING THEREFROM IS BROUGHT, IN TURN, BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL,
BOARD OR OFFICER CLOTHED WITH POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHAT THAT LAW
IS AND THEREUPON ADJUDICATE THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES

N: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.

F: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents
sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal
and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action
was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become moot and academic since the
graduation ceremony already pushed through. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the
teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule
65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function.

I: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.

H: NO.

R: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,

Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:

1) There must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2) That the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) The tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least not
the legislative nor the executive)
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It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

JUDICIAL POWER is defined:

As authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
Authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there
from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine.

ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY 297 SCRA 754

D: WHAT TERMINATES UPON THE FINALITY OF A JUDGMENT IS THE SUPREME COURTS POWER
TO AMEND, MODIFY OR ALTER THE SAME. HOWEVER, FINALITY OF A JUDGMENT DOES NOT
DIVEST THE SUPREME COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION TO EXECUTE AND ENFORCE THE SAME
JUDGMENT. THE POWER TO CONTROL THE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION IS AN ESSENTIAL
ASPECT OF JURISDICTION. In this case, the Supreme Court exercised its judicial power when it granted a
TRO, which delayed the execution of the death penalty upon petitioner in order for the Court to determine
whether Congress was set to repeal the death penalty or the petitioner would be granted executive clemency.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

F: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year old daughter
of his common-law spouse and sentenced him to death. After the judgment became final and executory,
petitioner filed a TRO against the execution of said judgment on the ground that members of Congress were
making attempts at asking that clemency be granted to him and that capital punishment be reviewed and
repealed. The Supreme Court granted the TRO, which delayed execution of said judgment. The OSG filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the decision had already become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of the executive authority. In other words, the OSG alleged that the Supreme Court
does not have jurisdiction over the execution of the final and executory judgment.

I: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to execute and enforce final judgments?

H: YES

R: The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
the same judgment. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment (continues even after the
judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement) and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same (terminates when the judgment becomes final).

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THE PARTICULARS OF THE EXECUTION ITSELF, WHICH ARE CERTAINLY NOT ALWAYS
INCLUDED IN THE JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF EXECUTION ARE ABSOLUTELY UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, WHILE THE EXECUTIVE HAS NO POWER OVER THE
PERSON OF THE CONVICT EXCEPT TO PROVIDE FOR CARRYING OUT OF THE PENALTY AND TO
PARDON.

THE POWER TO CONTROL THE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION IS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF

JURISDICTION. IT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSTANTIAL SUBTRACTION FOR OUR
CONSTITUTION VESTS THE ENTIRETY OF JUDICIAL POWER IN ONE SUPREME COURT AND IN
SUCH LOWER COURTS AS MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW. To be sure, the most important part of a
litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. The Rules the Court has promulgated concerning pleading,
practice and procedure are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and
incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Such rule-making power
was granted by the Constitution to enhance its independence. The 1987 Constitution expanded the rule-making
power of the Court, under which the Court was for the first time given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

Thus, in this case, the TRO requested the postponement of the date of execution. Such a request is allowed under
certain circumstances, as there is an imperative duty to investigate any such emergency and to order a
postponement. What the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner.

TUA V. MANGROBANG - G.R. NO. 170701, JANUARY 22, 2014

D: THE PRIMARY JUDGE OF THE NECESSITY, ADEQUACY, WISDOM, REASONABLENESS AND

EXPEDIENCY OF ANY LAW IS PRIMARILY THE FUNCTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE ACT OF
CONGRESS ENTRUSTING US WITH THE ISSUANCE OF PROTECTION ORDERS IS IN PURSUANCE
OF OUR AUTHORITY TO SETTLE JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES OR DISPUTES INVOLVING
RIGHTS THAT ARE ENFORCEABLE AND DEMANDABLE BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE OR THE
REDRESS OF WRONGS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SUCH RIGHTS.

It is settled doctrine that there is GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

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F: Respondent filed a Petition for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner. The Petition was
for herself and in behalf of her minor children. This was after petitioner forcibly took her children from their
new home, and following a series of abusive conduct of petitioner-husband.

The RTC issued ex parte a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA
9262, particularly its Section 15 as it violates due process clause of the constitution and sought to lift the TPO.
Without awaiting the resolution of the RTC on the foregoing, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution and arguing granting power
to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders are invalid delegation of legislative power.

I.1: Is Section 15 of RA 9262, allowing ex parte application of a TPO, constitutional?

H.1: YES

R.1: The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.

TPO issuance is within the Courts discretion based on the petition and affidavits to determine that violent acts
against women and the their children have been committed. Time is of the essence in cases of VAWC. It should
be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court
shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent

I.2. Is there an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection
orders?

H.2: No.

R.2: Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of
Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.

As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:

SEC. 14.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
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the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must
be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the
time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY CA.

Section 2 The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

MALAGA V. PENACHOS, JR. - 213 SCRA 516

D: P.D. 1818 WAS NOT INTENDED TO SHIELD FROM JUDICIAL SCRUTINY IRREGULARITIES
COMMITTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES SUCH AS THE ANOMALIES ABOVE DESCRIBED.
Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondents
memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been 100% completed as to the Engineering
Standard. This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.

N: PETITION for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City; the extent and applicability
of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of
the government.

F: ISCOF (Iloilo state college of fisheries) through its pre-qualifications and awards committee published an
invitation to bid for the construction of a micro laboratory building at ISCOF. Petitioners Malaga (represents BE
construction) and Najarro (represents Best Built Construction) submitted their respective bids at 3pm on Dec. 2,
while petitioner Oceanna submitted his bid on Dec. 5. All three were denied to participate in the bid, not being
able to make the cutoff time which is at 10am on Dec. 2. Hence, all three filed for injunction and TRO for the
awarding of the project. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, upon the motion of the respondents, the
same court denied the injunction complaint on the ground that P.D. 1818, Sec. 1 thereof, prohibited the courts
from having jurisdiction over infrastructure projects, and that the building being constructed by ISCOF is
considered as an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D 1818.

I: Whether RTC has jurisdiction to issue injunction and TRO over this case?

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H: Yes.

R: Although ISCOF, a chartered institution, is covered by P.D. 1818, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF
is covered by the prohibition in the said decree.

In the case of Datiles v. Sucaldito, it was declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb
the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues
definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

There are two irregularities here:

PBAC set deadlines for the filing and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior
notice to prospective participants.
Initial: Dec 2 (prequalification), 3pm Dec 12 (opening of bid)
Revised: 10 am Dec 2 (prequalification), 1 pm Dec 12 (opening of bid)
PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms
for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between
P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on Dec 2 or only ten days before
the bidding scheduled for Dec 12. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on Nov 12, or 30
days before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. WHAT IS INVOLVED HERE IS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PROCEDURAL RULES ON BIDDING WHICH REQUIRED STRICT. P.D. 1818 WAS NOT INTENDED
TO SHIELD FROM JUDICIAL SCRUTINY IRREGULARITIES COMMITTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES SUCH AS THE ANOMALIES ABOVE DESCRIBED.

Section 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.

A. Fiscal autonomy

BENGZON V. DRILON - 208 SCRA 133

D:

N: PETITION to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the
General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992.

F: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said
pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s
to restore said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as

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well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).

I: Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary

H: Yes

R: Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of the
specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which
is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization
of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any
particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the
fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but
DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing
us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders.

Section 4: 1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules
of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
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required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. COURT OF APPEALS - 334 SCRA 465

D: THE ACT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ACCEPTING CASES FOR THE BANC TO PASS UPON IS A
LEGITIMATE AND VALID EXERCISE OF ITS RESIDUAL POWER WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
PAR. 9 OF THE RESOLUTION EN BANC OF 18 NOVEMBER 1993, WHICH READS: ALL OTHER CASES
AS THE COURT EN BANC BY A MAJORITY OF ITS ACTUAL MEMBERSHIP MAY DEEM OF
SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO MERIT ITS ATTENTION.

It bears stressing that where the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice.

N: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court, Third Division.

F: The consolidation of cases involves a vast tract of land with an area of around 99 hectares, presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and which had been adjudicated to private individuals. Petitioners
alleged that the court that made the adjudication had no jurisdiction. They submitted a motion to refer the case
to the SC en banc. The court voted 9-5 to accept the cases

I: Can the SC en banc accept the case?

H: Yes.

R: Supreme Court Circular 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:

The following are considered en banc cases:

1) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;
2) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3) Cases raising novel questions of law;
4) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5) Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6) Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or
a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed;
8) Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention
of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9) All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.

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The action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its residual power within the
contemplation of paragraph 9, which reads: All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

It is decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the
attention and decision of the entire Court en banc. Where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a
case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of
rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer
voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its
actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of
the whole Court.

FORTICH V. CORONA - 312 SCRA 751

D: It is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is
not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration.

The reason is simple. THE ABOVEQUOTED ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4(3) PERTAINS TO THE
DISPOSITION OF CASES BY A DIVISION. IF THERE IS A TIE IN THE VOTING, THERE IS NO
DECISION. THE ONLY WAY TO DISPOSE OF THE CASE THEN IS TO REFER IT TO THE COURT EN
BANC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF A CASE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED BY THE DIVISION AND
THE LOSING PARTY FILES A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE FAILURE OF THE DIVISION
TO RESOLVE THE MOTION BECAUSE OF A TIE IN THE VOTING DOES NOT LEAVE THE CASE
UNDECIDED. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the
division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed
affirmed.

True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants
fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are
exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the
arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing
more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November
17, 1998.

N: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION in the Supreme Court

F: In a previous case, the Office of the President approved the conversion of the 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. 2 MR were filed. SC in its Resolution in 1998 by vote of 2-2
affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President. In this case, Respondents filed for another MR and for
Referral of the case to this honorable Court en banc claiming that since the earlier MR were resolved by vote
of 2-2, the required number to carry a decision of 3 was not met and that the case should be referred and decided
by SC en banc pursuant to Article VIII Sec 4 which provides: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three
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of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that
no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc

I: W/N it should be properly referred and decided by SC en banc?

H: NO

R: A careful reading of Sec 4 (Article VIII) reveals the intention of the framers that there is a distinction between
cases and matters. Cases are "decided" while Matters, which include motions, are "resolved".

Clearly, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters". Thus, only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. And
the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a
motion for reconsideration.

Also, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration,
the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided
instead the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this SC in 1998 (previous case)

Lastly, although there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration,
such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, such second motions for reconsideration
must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior
leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to
give due course to their second motions for reconsideration.

PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE - 600 SCRA 413

D: When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive
requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions are deemed
sustained

N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a

decision of the Supreme Court.

F: Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to establish,
maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance
organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the
administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization. Individuals enrolled in its health care
programs pay an annual membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical
services provided by its duly licensed physicians, specialists and other professional technical staff participating
in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned, operated or accredited by it.

CIR assessed the petitioner (PHCP) of deficiency for DST of its agreements with its members. PHCP is not subject
to DST. One of its arguments, is that the Court is bound by the ruling of the CA in CIR v. PNB that a healthcare
agreement of Philamcare Health Systems is not an insurance contract for purposes of the DST. Petitioner cites

10
the August 29, 2001 minute resolution of this Court dismissing the appeal in Philippine National Bank (G.R. No.
148680). Petitioner argues that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680 by minute resolution was a judgment on the
merits; hence, the Court should apply the CA ruling there that a health care agreement is not an insurance
contract.

I: IS THE COURT BOUND BY A MINUTE RESOLUTION IN ANOTHER CASE?

H: Whether this Court is bound by the ruling of the CA in CIR v. Philippine National Bank that a health care
agreement of Philamcare Health Systems is not an insurance contract for purposes of the DST.

R: It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of
the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.
As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a
petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with
its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?

WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SAME ISSUES CONCERNING THE SAME
PARTIES, IT CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA. HOWEVER, IF OTHER PARTIES OR ANOTHER SUBJECT
MATTER (EVEN WITH THE SAME PARTIES AND ISSUES) IS INVOLVED, THE MINUTE RESOLUTION
IS NOT BINDING PRECEDENT. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v.
Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a
minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the
previous case had no bearing on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they
were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.

Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The
constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts
and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions,
not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices,
unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute
resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks
of a decision. INDEED, AS A RULE, THIS COURT LAYS DOWN DOCTRINES OR PRINCIPLES OF LAW
WHICH CONSTITUTE BINDING PRECEDENT IN A DECISION DULY SIGNED BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE COURT AND CERTIFIED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioners liability for DST on its
health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the
minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor. Nonetheless, in view of the
reasons already discussed, this does not detract in any way from the fact that petitioners health care agreements
are not subject to DST.

Section 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

11
 a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

A. Judicial review: ripeness

PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION - 97 PHIL. 806

D: The 1st requisite for the exercise of judicial review is there must be an actual case. The question must be ripe
for adjudication, that is, the government act being challenged must have an adverse effect on the person
challenging it.

BONA FIDE SUIT.JUDICIAL POWER IS LIMITED TO THE DECISION OF ACTUAL CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES. THE AUTHORITY TO PASS ON THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES IS INCIDENTAL TO
THE DECISION OF SUCH CASES WHERE CONFLICTING CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND
UNDER A LEGISLATIVE ACT ASSAILED AS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION ARE RAISED. It is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between litigants." (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

F: In 1955, a petition was filed by Phil. Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) an association of owners
of private schools. They assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 entitled "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and
colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." The act was enacted in 1917, it requires that before
one opens a private school to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Sec. of Education. According to
private schools, it deprive them as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of
law. And that they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; Most
importantly, they assail the provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion
to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Solicitor Generals
defense was that Petitioners do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke

12
their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form
they now seek to obtain. Plus, they all have applied and were granted permits by the Secretary

I: Whether there is an actual case or controversy that needs to be ruled upon by the Court?

H: None

R: Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. There must first be a
bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass
on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.
(Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. To be entitled, a private individual must be in immediate
danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action. And it is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action. He must show
that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. Courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation

B. Judicial review: locus standi

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS V. COMELEC

289 SCRA 537

D: A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action

N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Commission on Elections.

F: Telecoms and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and tv
companies. They are suing as taxpayers and citizens and registered voters. They assail the validity of BP 881
which requires that radio and tv companies provide free airtime to COMELEC for the use of candidates in the
campaign and for other political purposes. Telebap claims that the law takes property without due process and
that it violates the eminent domain clause which provides for payment of just compensation. GMA Network,
also filed a similar case.

I: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi

H: TELEBAP has no locus stnadi, GMA has locus standi

R:
TELEBAP NO STANDING AS CITIZENS. A Citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only
when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of government, that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury is

13
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In this case, it has not shown that they will suffer or have suffered
harm as a result of the operation of BP 881.

TELEBAP NO STANDING AS REGISTERED VOTERS. No interest as registered voters since this case does
not concern their right to suffrage. Their interest in BP 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity.

TELEBAP NO STANDING AS TAXPAYERS. No interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.

TELEBAP NO STANDING AS CORPORATE ENTITY. No standing to assert the rights of radio and
television companies which they represent. The mere fact that Telebap is composed of lawyers in the broadcast
industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.
Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation
to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right.

GMA7 HAS STANDING. Since GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations, they will be affected by the
enforcement of BP 881. It suffered losses amounting to several millions in providing COMELEC time in
connection with the 1992 and 1995 elections. Now, its stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year (1998 elections). GMAs allegations that it will suffer losses again is sufficient to give it standing
to question the validity of BP 881.

JOYA V. PCGG - 225 SCRA 568

D: Rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry.

LEGAL STANDING means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest
is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of
a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental
act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

A TAXPAYERS SUIT can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of
public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose
of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined
at the request of a taxpayer.

There must be AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSYone which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

14
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good
Government to proceed with an auction sale.

F: The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies of
New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives
and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already
opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were
turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

I: Whether petitioners have locus standi to bring this case to court to enjoin PCGG from conducting the auction
sale of the artworks in question. Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to
exercise its power of judicial review over this case

H: No.

R: On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review, the rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: THAT THE QUESTION MUST BE RAISED
BY THE PROPER PARTY; THAT THERE MUST BE AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY; THAT THE
QUESTION MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY; and, THAT THE
DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGAL QUESTION MUST BE NECESSARY TO THE
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE ITSELF. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

STANDING OF PETITIONERS

On the first requisite, we have held that ONE HAVING NO RIGHT OR INTEREST TO PROTECT CANNOT
INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AS PARTY-PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION. This is premised
on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review
only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "LEGAL STANDING" MEANS A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE CASE
SUCH THAT THE PARTY HAS SUSTAINED OR WILL SUSTAIN DIRECT INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL ACT THAT IS BEING CHALLENGED. THE TERM "INTEREST" IS MATERIAL
INTEREST, AN INTEREST IN ISSUE AND TO BE AFFECTED BY THE DECREE, AS DISTINGUISHED
FROM MERE INTEREST IN THE QUESTION INVOLVED, OR A MERE INCIDENTAL INTEREST.
MOREOVER, THE INTEREST OF THE PARTY PLAINTIFF MUST BE PERSONAL AND NOT ONE BASED
ON A DESIRE TO VINDICATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SOME THIRD AND RELATED
PARTY.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: MANDAMUS AND TAXPAYERS SUIT:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
WHEN A CITIZEN BRINGS A CASE FOR MANDAMUS TO PROCURE THE ENFORCEMENT OF A
PUBLIC DUTY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF A PUBLIC RIGHT RECOGNIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION,
and WHEN A TAXPAYER QUESTIONS THE VALIDITY OF A GOVERNMENTAL ACT AUTHORIZING
THE DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS.

15
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national
and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have
been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine
arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings
when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts
from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion
personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these
paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred
to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If
these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their
acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof
whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the
Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.

Not every ACTION FILED BY A TAXPAYER can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayers suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving
public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that
the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such
as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date11 January 1991which is long past, the
issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

16
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversyone which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not
be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.16
A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the
purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of
the artworks on a particular date11 January 1991which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.

WE NEED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS COURT HAS THE DISCRETION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A
SUIT WHICH DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN ACTUAL CASE OR LEGAL
STANDING WHEN PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED.

SANDOVAL V. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485

D: A PARTY SUING AS A TAXPAYER MUST SPECIFICALLY PROVE THAT HE HAS SUFFICIENT

INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE OF MONEY RAISED BY TAXATION. In
essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi WHEN A CASE INVOLVES AN
ISSUE OF OVERARCHING SIGNIFICANCE TO OUR SOCIETY, WE FIND AND SO HOLD THAT AS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL STANDING TO FILE
THE PETITIONS AT BAR. In the instant cases, petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes
an infringement by PAGCOR of the legislatures exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution, so petitioners contend. THE CONTENTION
COMMANDS OUR CONCURRENCE FOR IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES HAS STANDING TO MAINTAIN INVIOLATE THE PREROGATIVES, POWERS
AND PRIVILEGES VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN HIS OFFICE.

To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. A member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office. Thus, petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, have the standing
to question the operation of jai-alai by PAGCOR without a congressional franchise.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto

F: These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of whether the franchise granted to the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai. The petition
for injunction seeks to enjoin PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque pelota
games by itself or in joint venture with Belle corporation. A petition-in-intervetion was also filed alleging that
the operation of jai-alai by PAGCOR was illegal because it was not included in its franchise. Petitioners filed
such petitions as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
respondents, among other allegations, contend that the petitioners do not have the locus standi to file the
petitions because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the disbursement of funds.

17
I: Whether or not members of the House of Representatives have standing to question the validity of PAGCORs
operation of jai-alai without congressional franchise?

H: YES

R: The rule is that a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.

However, in line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching
significance to our society, the Supreme Court declared that members of the House of Representatives have legal
standing to file such petitions when the action complained of allegedly infringes the legislatures exclusive
power to grant franchise. To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. A member
of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.

LOZANO V. NOGRALES 589 SCRA 356

D: This Courts power of review is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having
adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers,
prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of
Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress, convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to
amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the
procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate
voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted
with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., of the members of Congress without
distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).

I: Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No. 1109.

H: No.

R: The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may interpret petitioners moves
as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle
the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional
disputes.

18
The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with
parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-controversy
requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give
opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are
centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness:
first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether
an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first
place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the
second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a
future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has
yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been
made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House
Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room
for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification
may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) HE HAS PERSONALLY SUFFERED
SOME ACTUAL OR THREATENED INJURY BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF
THE GOVERNMENT; (2) THE INJURY IS FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO THE CHALLENGED ACTION; and (3)
THE INJURY IS LIKELY TO BE REDRESSED BY THE REMEDY BEING SOUGHT. In the cases at bar,
petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus
standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness
and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional
questions. The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page
petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar
as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or
disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with
locus standi

19
THE RULE ON LOCUS STANDI IS NOT A PLAIN PROCEDURAL RULE BUT A CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT DERIVED FROM SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH
MANDATES COURTS OF JUSTICE TO SETTLE ONLY ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING
RIGHTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY DEMANDABLE AND ENFORCEABLE.

Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving FROM
THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS OF PERSONAL INJURY to the BROADER TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE DOCTRINE, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant
and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., ET AL. VS. ANTI-

TERRORISM COUNCIL - 632 SCRA 146

D: Judicial Review; Requisites.IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATIONS, THE POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW IS LIMITED BY FOUR EXACTING REQUISITES: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

LOCUS STANDI or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged; A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interestit
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

A TAXPAYER SUIT is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,
whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding; Republic Act (RA) No.
9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation.

F: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372 An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus
standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners
invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. KARAPATAN,
Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to close security surveillance
by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields,
and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim they have been branded as
enemies of the State. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim
such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

20
I: WON petitioners have locus standi

H: NO

R: Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
concrete adverseness.

In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, locus standi has been defined as that requiring:
1. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest
2. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct inquiry as a result of the
act being challenged.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that:
1. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury;
2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
3. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with
the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury,
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any
of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance also
lacks locus standi. The same is true for Wigberto Taada and Osmea III, who cite their being a human rights
advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.

IN RE SAVE THE SUPREME COURT INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL

AUTONOMY MOVEMENT UDK-15143, JANUARY 21, 2015

D: THERE MUST FIRST BE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. PLEADINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

MUST SHOW A VIOLATION OF AN EXISTING LEGAL RIGHT OR A CONTROVERSY THAT IS RIPE
FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right,
but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of
judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party
complaining or the constituents that they legitimately represent. The REASON: Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.

LOCUS STANDI is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." IN PRIVATE
SUITS, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
21
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

FOR PUBLIC SUITS: This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." This court, however, has occasionally
relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of "TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE" TO
THE PUBLIC. The rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter

determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be
supported by the proper allegations. Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive for giving
the following determinants of transcendental importance, due to lacking definition in our jurisprudence:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.

N: Petition for Writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress

F: Rolly Mijares as a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer,filed this petition as part of his "continuing
crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution. Believing in the rule of law, he is concerned about the threats
against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund case on November 19,
2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014. Certain members of Congress filed bills
requiring court to remits is JDF collections to national treasury, and creating Judicial Support Fund under the
National Treasury, repealing in the process PD 1949. Petitioner argued that Congress gravely abused its
discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, by
exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility in trying to
abolish the JDF of the Supreme Court.

I: Whether petitioner has locus standi to bring the case before the Supreme Court?

H: No.

R: The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review. No actual case or controversy and Mijares
has no locus standi.

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.
Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the
case. The requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

22
 (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

On actual case or controversy, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself,
clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect
the judiciary.

On transcendental importance, none of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared
by petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural. The transcendental importance of the issues they want us
to decide will be better served when we wait for the proper cases with the proper parties suffering real, actual
or more imminent injury. There is no showing of an injury so great and so imminent that we cannot wait for
these cases. The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in Congress. The
threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into
law. There is no transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.

C. Operative Fact

DE AGBAYANI V. PNB 28 SCRA 429

D: THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF A STATUTE, PRIOR TO SUCH A DETERMINATION (OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY), IS AN OPERATIVE FACT AND MAY HAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH
CANNOT JUSTLY BE IGNORED. THE PAST CANNOT ALWAYS BE ERASED BY A NEW JUDICIAL
DECLARATION. THE EFFECT OF THE SUBSEQUENT RULING AS TO INVALIDITY MAY HAVE TO BE
CONSIDERED IN VARIOUS ASPECTS, WITH RESPECT TO PARTICULAR RELATIONS, INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE, AND PARTICULAR CONDUCT, PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL.

N: APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

F: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage. On July 13, 1959 (15 years after maturity of the loan), defendant instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan which remained unpaid. The plaintiff countered alleging
that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed (this is because fifteen years had already lapsed
from the date of maturity). PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available
if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from
the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower
court did not find that argument persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

I: Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before they
were declared invalid, stayed the period of prescription (supposed effect of the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a law).

23
H: Yes.

R: In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being declared void
is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. This is because of the judicial recognition that the
moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who suffered during the war. The
court solidified its view in a series of cases that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court is clear. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed was 6 days short of
fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order
No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two
months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

D. Political Questions:

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS - 177 SCRA 688

D: Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION LIMITS RESORT
TO THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND BROADENS THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY
INTO AREAS WHICH THE COURT, UNDER PREVIOUS CONSTITUTIONS, WOULD HAVE
NORMALLY LEFT TO THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS TO DECIDE. BUT NONETHELESS THERE
REMAIN ISSUES BEYOND THE COURTS JURISDICTION THE DETERMINATION OF WHICH IS
EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRESIDENT, FOR CONGRESS OR FOR THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
THROUGH A PLEBISCITE OR REFERENDUM. We cannot, for example, question the Presidents
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving
of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us
because the power is reserved to the people.

IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT IS
MERELY TO CHECK, NOT TO SUPPLANT THE EXECUTIVE

WHEN POLITICAL QUESTIONS ARE INVOLVED, THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE

DETERMINATION TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE OFFICIAL WHOSE
ACTION IS BEING QUESTIONED. IF GRAVE ABUSE IS NOT ESTABLISHED, THE COURT WILL NOT
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED AND DECIDE A MATTER
WHICH BY ITS NATURE OR BY LAW IS FOR THE LATTER ALONE TO DECIDE.
24
N: Petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents
decision to bar their return to the Philippines

F: Former President Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippine to die. President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of the
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

The Marcoses filed a petition asking the Courts to order the issuance of documents to Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

I: Whether the Presidents ban on the return of the Marcoses is a political question?

H: No.

R: There is nothing in the case before us that precludes the Courts determination on the political question
doctrine. Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Nonetheless, there remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress, or for the people themselves through a
plebiscite or referendum.

E.g: Presidents recognition of a foreign government; Presidential pardon; Amendment of the the Constitution.

Framers of the Constitution intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of
justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution
limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. It
goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards
the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive,
or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President
to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines.

25
If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused
her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

DAZA V. SINGSON - 180 SCRA 496

D: The Supreme Court has the competence to act in the case at bar since it involved the legality of the act of
the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.Ruling
first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondents assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments. That is not a POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE, AS CHIEF JUSTICE
CONCEPCION EXPLAINED IN TANADA V. CUENCO: X X X THE TERM POLITICAL QUESTION
CONNOTES, IN LEGAL PARLANCE, WHAT IT MEANS IN ORDINARY PARLANCE, NAMELY, A
QUESTION OF POLICY. IN OTHER WORDS, X X X IT REFERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH,
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, ARE TO BE DECIDED BY THE PEOPLE IN THEIR SOVEREIGN
CAPACITY, OR IN REGARD TO WHICH FULL DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY HAS BEEN
DELEGATED TO THE LEGISLATURE OR EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. IT IS
CONCERNED WITH ISSUES DEPENDENT UPON THE WISDOM, NOT LEGALITY, OF A PARTICULAR
MEASURE.

F: After the 1987 congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12
seats in the Commission on Appointments among the political parties. Raul Daza was among those chosen,
a representative of the Liberal Party (LP). Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized and
resulted to 24 members of LP resigning and joining LDP. Members of the LDP increased to 159 while the
Liberal party was reduced to 12. The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission
on Appointments. The seat occupied by Daza was withdrawn and given to the LDP. Luis Singson was the
additional member from the LDP. Daza challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments
based on the ff grounds: LDP is not the permanent political party because it was not registered and LDP has
not yet achieved stability.

Luis Singson claims that the questions raised by Daza are political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court.

I: Whether question of party representation and manner of filling seats in COA is a political question?

H: No.

R: The issue involves that legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling up the
seats Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution.

Political question refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government."

And, even assuming that the issue presented before us was political in nature, SC would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.

26
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

E. Review of capital offenses

PEOPLE V. MATEO 433 SCRA 540

D: IF ONLY TO ENSURE UTMOST CIRCUMSPECTION BEFORE THE PENALTY OF DEATH,

RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS IMPOSED, THE COURT NOW DEEMS IT WISE
AND COMPELLING TO PROVIDE IN THESE CASES A REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS BEFORE
THE CASE IS ELEVATED TO THE SUPREME COURT; A PRIOR DETERMINATION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS ON PARTICULARLY THE FACTUAL ISSUES WOULD MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
ERROR OF JUDGMENT.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are
at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care
in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A PRIOR DETERMINATION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS ON, PARTICULARLY, THE FACTUAL ISSUES, WOULD MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
ERROR OF JUDGMENT. IF THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM THE PENALTY OF DEATH,
RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD THEN RENDER JUDGMENT
IMPOSING THE CORRESPONDING PENALTY AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT, REFRAIN
FROM ENTERING JUDGMENT AND ELEVATE THE ENTIRE RECORDS OF THE CASE TO THE
SUPREME COURT FOR ITS FINAL DISPOSITION.

Allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review is a procedural matter within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than
the law-making power of Congress.

N: APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City

F: The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to
indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the SC due to mandatory review
provision for cases which penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death. Solicitor General
assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

I: Whether mandatory review, automatic appeal in this case is an absolute rule.

H: NO.

27
R: Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense
for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
IT MUST BE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION IS NOT PRECLUSIVE
IN CHARACTER, AND IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY PREVENT THE COURT, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
RULE-MAKING POWER, FROM ADDING AN INTERMEDIATE APPEAL OR REVIEW IN FAVOUR OF
THE ACCUSED.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS, FIRST AND FOREMOST, FALL MORE SQUARELY WITHIN THE RULE-
MAKING PREROGATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT THAN THE LAW-MAKING POWER OF
CONGRESS. THE RULE HERE ANNOUNCED ADDITIONALLY ALLOWING AN INTERMEDIATE
REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, A SUBORDINATE APPELLATE COURT, BEFORE THE CASE IS
ELEVATED TO THE SUPREME COURT ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW, IS SUCH A PROCEDURAL
MATTER.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence
would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor
General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which
the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly
been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation
of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual
issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the
case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

28
 F. Rule-making power

IN RE CUNANAN - 94 PHIL. 534

D: THE CONSTITUTION HAS NOT CONFERRED ON CONGRESS AND THIS TRIBUNAL EQUAL
RESPONSIBILITIES GOVERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. THE PRIMARY
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES, CONTINUE TO RESIDE
IN THIS COURT. CONGRESS MAY REPEAL, ALTER AND SUPPLEMENT THE RULES THE AUTHORITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY OVER THE ADMISSION, SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND
REINSTATEMENT OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW AND THEIR SUPERVISION REMAIN VESTED IN THE
SUPREME COURT.

POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED.Being coordinate

and independent branches the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of
law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession,
and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which,
exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other
in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

F: Congress passed RA 972 or the Bar Flunckers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the SC then passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72% by raising it to 75%. After its
approval, many unsuccessful candidates filed petition for admission to the bar invoking RA 972, while other
motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked such law as additional
ground for admission.

I: Whose function it is regulate and supervise the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers? Whether the Bar Flunkers Act is constitutional.

H: The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Bar Flunkers Act is
unconstitutional.

R: The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty
to the judicial department of our state government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune
from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape
responsibility for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are

29
exercised. The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attach of the
courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar.
An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts
themselves into disrepute.

When Congress enacted RA 972, it in effect repeals, alters and supplements the rules on admission to the bar.
This contravenes the Constitution as only the SC can decide who may be admitted to the bar and may continue
the practice of law according to its existing rules.

JAVELLANA V. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR - 212 SCRA 475

D: AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THIS COURT ACCORDS GREAT RESPECT TO THE DECISIONS

AND/OR ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BUT ALSO FOR THEIR PRESUMED KNOWLEDGEABILITY AND
EXPERTISE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ENTRUSTED TO THEIR
JURISDICTION.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari from the decision of the Department of Interior and Local Government.

F: This involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the
Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City
Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for:
(1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10,
1980in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," and
(2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department.

On the other hand, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly
that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the
sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

I: Whether DLG Memo circulars are issued in violation of the Constitution for encroachment on SCs exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.

H: NO!

R: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches or encroaches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice
of law.

30
The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for
public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice
of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does
not discriminate against lawyers and doctors.

It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90
explicitly provides that Sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is
because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of
public service

FABIAN V. DESIERTO - 295 SCRA 470

D: THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUIESCENCE AS A MATTER OF

FACT BUT AN ISSUE OF CONFERMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a joint order of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.

F: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
persuaded petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which,
private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner
filed an administrative complaint against private respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without
pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private
respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

I: W/N Section 27 of RA 6770 is constitutional?

HELD: As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of RA 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being
substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results
in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural
in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of
the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of RA 6770 is
substantive or procedural.

31
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence
within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule
may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational
and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, THE TEST IS WHETHER THE RULE REALLY
REGULATES PROCEDURE, THAT IS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS FOR ENFORCING RIGHTS AND
DUTIES RECOGNIZED BY SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND FOR JUSTLY ADMINISTERING REMEDY AND
REDRESS FOR A DISREGARD OR INFRACTION OF THEM. IF THE RULE TAKES AWAY A VESTED
RIGHT, IT IS NOT PROCEDURAL. IF THE RULE CREATES A RIGHT SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL,
IT MAY BE CLASSIFIED AS A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER; BUT IF IT OPERATES AS A MEANS OF
IMPLEMENTING AN EXISTING RIGHT THEN THE RULE DEALS MERELY WITH PROCEDURE.

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates
to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the
law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed
by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to
the remedy.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act
of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate
appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as
impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
remedy.

THUS, IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY HELD THAT RULES OR STATUTES INVOLVING A TRANSFER OF
CASES FROM ONE COURT TO ANOTHER, ARE PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL MERELY AND THAT,
AS SUCH, THEY ARE APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS PENDING AT THE TIME THE STATUTE WENT INTO
EFFECT OR, IN THE CASE AT BAR, WHEN ITS INVALIDITY WAS DECLARED. ACCORDINGLY, EVEN
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF JURISDICTION EX HYPOTHESI THE VALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER OF
APPEALS IN SAID CASES TO THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN BE SUSTAINED.

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS COOPERATIVE VS. CORTES- 613 SCRA 733

D: The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in
Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission
led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 (1999) that this Courts power to
promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress.

The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress may not grant
exemptions from legal fees.
32
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City

F: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Baguio Coop) is a credit cooperative organized
under the Cooperative Code of the Philippines or RA 6938. The Cooperative Code exempts cooperatives from
the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all
actions brought under such Code or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority
before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative. In 2004, the Baguio
Coop filed a petition to extra-judicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135 as amended. Under Section 7(c) of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value
of the mortgagees claim. Invoking the Coop Code, the Baguio Coop sought exemption from payment of the
fees. The RTC denied the request for exemption, on the ground that under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
exemption is granted only to the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits
of LGUs. The OSG argued that the substantive rule in the Cooperative Code prevails over a judicial rule of
procedure (Rule 141). The Courts Office of the Chief Attorney opined that Rule 141 prevails because the power
to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers
from Congress interference.

I: Whether Congress may grant exemptions from legal fees?

H: No

R: First, a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135 is outside the ambit of the
Cooperative Code because the legal exemption granted therein is limited to two types of actions: 1) actions
brought under the Cooperative Code; and 2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to
enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives; and

Second, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental
omission led the Court to observe in ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THAT THIS COURTS
POWER TO PROMULGATE JUDICIAL RULES IS NO LONGER SHARED BY THIS COURT WITH
CONGRESS.

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with the Supreme
Courts En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption
from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds. Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the
Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the
safeguards of this Courts institutional independence: The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.

Section 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.

33
 A. Supervision of courts

PEOPLE V. GACOTT, JR. - 246 SCRA 52

D: At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted therein. Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by
the full Court itself.

To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless
of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction
for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
the Supreme Court or the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in
divisions of three, five, or seven members.

Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court
en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against
members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one
year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.

N: MOTIONS for reconsideration of a decision of the Second Division of the Supreme Court.

F: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City
Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss
the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board
under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same.
The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by
Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the
motion espousing the position that the Letter of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law
contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus,
respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority
to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed. For failure to check citations of the
prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled
by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for
gross ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.

I: Whether the case should have been decided by the court en banc as required in the constitution

34
H: No

R: See. Doctrine.

JUDGE CAOIBIS V. OMBUDSMAN - 361 SCRA 395

D: By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against
judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative
case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For,
aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should
give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining
whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but
also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not
have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative
prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy
which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Office of the Ombudsman

F: RTC Judge Alumbres filed before the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious
mischief and assault upon a person in authority against fellow Judge Caoibis. This started when Alumbre
requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed. However, petitioner did not answer so
respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and
boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away,
rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. Based on the same facts, respondent filed another complaint, this time
an administrative case before the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner. Meanwhile, Ombudsman required
petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. Petitioner instead filed an ex-parte motion stating that said case is under the
exclusive supervision and control of the SC. Ombudsman denied the motion.

I: Whether the Ombudsman have the jurisdiction over the administrative case between the two judges.

H: YES.

R: See Doctrine.

Section 7: (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must
be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
35
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine
Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

Section 8: (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for
the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

A. Judicial and Bar Council

CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL 676 SCRA 579

D: Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary.Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative
solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the
Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC,
the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence
in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would,
as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

N: Motion for Reconsideration

F: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Coronas departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw
the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus,
it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
36
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. To comply, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from
the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members,
an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that the petitioner
has questioned.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets
to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the
JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.

I: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members
of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

H: No.

R: The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC
violates the 1987 Constitution. It is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is
a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase,
a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering
37
the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute
is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is
made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need
to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives
of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there
are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow
the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality among the three branches
of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus,
any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time.
It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the
whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

VILLANUEVA V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL 755 SCRA 182

D: The JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in
a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary.
Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the

38
men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

N: Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the
Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction

F: Judge Ferdinand Villanueva, one-year after being appointed as MCTC Presiding Judge of Compostela,
applied for vacant positions as Presiding Judge for 3 RTCs. JBC did not include him in the list of applicants
having failed to meet the 5 years of service requirement. He then assailed the policy of the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Villanueva argued (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more; (2) the JBCs five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution; and (3) the JBCs five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice
and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment.

I: Whether the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.

H: Yes.

R: The JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list
officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus,
the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBCs principal function
of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria
in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a
degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but
not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBCs ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote
an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set
of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications
and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy
applied by JBC to the petitioners case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution
to the JBC.

EQUAL PROTECTION: In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance
with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended
39
appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it
employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served at
least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as
follows: Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next
level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an efficient case management system,
adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the judicial process. A five-year stint in the
Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To
merit JBCs nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty,
integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise,
their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and
strength of character.

DUE PROCESS: Procedural Due process was questioned here for non-publication of the Rules of the JBC and
non-submission to the ONAR. SC said that as a general rule, the JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR
because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is
not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code. However, as a rule implementing the
a constitutional provision, it should have been published.

As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are
intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the
publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and
affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who
meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant
positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements
to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by analogy,
publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional
provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary. Nonetheless, the JBCs failure to publish
the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioners private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the
petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of
the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that ones name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. Ones inclusion in the
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.

SOCIAL JUSTICE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT - The questioned policy does not violate
equality of employment opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the
Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by

40
the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice

Section 9: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the
submission of the list.

A. Appointment of Justices

DULAY V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL G.R. NO. 202143, JULY 3, 2012

D: A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and
"Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be
the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.

We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and
no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To
follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy
occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the
same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.

We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to
the Judiciary.For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the
President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the
Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot,
therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although
it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated
task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman
does not sit in the JBC

Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power
over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court who is
not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should participate in the deliberations for the selection of
nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-named
Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly
qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice

N: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order
41
F: With the removal and impeachment of Hon. Renato Corona, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant.
Famela R. Dulay raises this petition against the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito
N. Ochoa, claiming: That the President cannot validly appoint the Chief Justice of the SC, because the
Constitution only empowers him to appoint members or Justices, but not the Chief Justice; and That the JBC
cannot be validly headed by a retired Associate Justice of the SC, because the Constitution specifically provides
that it be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other.

I: Whether or not the President has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the SC? Whether or
not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the incumbent Chief Justice?

H: YES to both.

R: A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and
"Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be
the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.

Section 4 (l), defines the composition of the SC, namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4 (2) and (3) describe
the manner of conducting business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7 (1) enumerates
the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the other members of the Judiciary; Section 11 provides for
the security of tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12 states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts; and Section 13 lays down the process of decision-making.

In all of these provisions, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice.

Thus, in Section 9 on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" clearly
refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within
the appointing power of the President. There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
required to compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court.

Dulay argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic
would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC.
We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same will not be
filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.

The principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC
submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not
in the list. Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from
the occurrence thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC.

Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform
its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officio
Chairman does not sit in the JBC.

42
Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power
over the JBC, the most Senior Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should
participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the
proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 296 ( Judiciary Act of 1948):

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly
qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.

Section 10: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and
of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased.

A. Salary of Justices and Judges

NITAFAN V. COMMISSIONER ON INTERNAL REVENUE - 152 SCRA 284

D: THE SALARIES OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES ARE PROPERLY SUBJECT TO A GENERAL INCOME
TAX LAW APPLICABLE TO ALL INCOME EARNERS AND THAT THE PAYMENT OF SUCH INCOME
TAX BY JUSTICES AND JUDGES DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
AGAINST DECREASE OF THEIR SALARIES DURING THEIR CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE.

It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.

N: Petition for Prohibition and Injunction.

F: Petitioners in this case are the duly appointed and qualified Judges seeking to prohibit and enjoin respondent
(CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. Claiming that any tax withheld
from their emoluments or compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
violates Sec 10 of Article VII. Petitioners argued that in the 1973 Constitution, it specifically stipulated that No
salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax but the 1987 Constitution provides, the salary of the Chief Justice and of
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased Petitioners insisted that the intent of the framers is to
revert the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers.

I: Whether Tax withheld constitute diminution of their salaries?

H: NO

R: The debates, interpellations and opinions show that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

43
Also in construing Section 10, Articles VIII: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.

It refers to the authority granted to the Congress to a pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower,
it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into
the provision an exemption from taxation.

SC reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable
to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

Section 11: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon.

A. Security of tenure

VARGAS V. RILLORAZA - 80 PHIL 297 (1948)

D:

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided
that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges
to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the
required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.

I: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

H: No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

We propose to approach this question from the following angles: (a) whether or not the Congress had power to
ass to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court, that provided for in said
section 14; (b) whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments pursuant to the constitution ,
even only as a "designee"; and (c) whether or not by the method of "designation" created by the aforecited section
14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President
under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" of the Supreme Court by virtue thereof.

R: a) to discover whether the above quoted section 14 of the Peoples Court Act is repugnant to the constitution,
one of the best tests would be to compare the operation with the same section if the latter were to be allowed to
produce its effects. It is self-evident that before the enactment of the oft-quoted section of the Peoples Court Act,
it was not only the power by the bounden duty of all members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in all
44
treason cases duly brought or appealed to the Court. That power and that duty arise from the above cited
sections of Article VII of the Constitution, namely, section 4, providing how the court shall be composed and
how it may sit, section 9, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become, incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, and the pertinent constitutional
and statutory provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Court.
Competently referring to the instant case, if section 14 of the Peoples Court Act had not been inserted therein,
there can be no question that each and every member of this Court would have to sit in judgment in said case.

But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under the
Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic would be disqualified
from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office or
position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this
respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Peoples Court Act
would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling what the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer
case of repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.

For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the disqualified Justice
from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would have been an
uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment
of the duties appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or disqualification under Rule 126.

(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, we are of the
opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme Court and that the designation
authorized in Section 14 of the People Court Act to be made by the President of any Judge of First Instance,
Judge-at-large of First Instance or cadastral Judge cannot possibly be a compliance with the provision requiring
that appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation by or
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Without intending the least reflection on the ability, learning, and
integrity of any such "designee", we are merely construing and applying the fundamental law of the land. A
Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised
Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a judge
of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article VIII
of the Constitution), because under said section he need only have practiced law for a period of not less than
five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So
that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice of
the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the deliberations and functions
of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess the required constitutional qualifications
of a regular member of said Court. Here again is another point of repugnancy between the challenged section
and the constitution. And if we consider the actual fact that only four of the present ten Justices of this Court are
not adversely affected by the disqualification established in section 14 of the People's Court Act, we see that the
"designees" constitute a majority when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise to the result that, if the
composed by them all should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed by four members
appointed and confirmed pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution and six who have not
been so appointed and confirmed. The situation would not be helped any by saying that such composition of
the Court is only temporary, for no temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the
constitution. This tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the permanent institutions of the
government. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 can not be construed to
authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the
Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. In principle, what really matters is not the length or
45
shortness of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence an unalterability of that
composition so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We are furthermore
of opinion that said clause refers to the number of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial
organization under the Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; that is, that the Legislature, when
providing for the initial organization of the Supreme Court under the Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a
different number of Justices than eleven, and determine the manner of the Court's sitting differently from that
established in section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution, but it was and is not empowered to alter the
qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their appointment, which are matters governed by sections 5 and
6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" does not ever exist, nor the provision
on who shall be the component members of the Court. Such a legislation was enacted in the form of
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, the pertinent provisions of which amended sections 133 and 134 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But after liberation, the Chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 40 (41 Off. Gaz.,
187) amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 3 and sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 259, and repealed all acts or parts of
acts inconsistent with the provisions of said executive order; and the same Chief Executive, by Executive Order
No. 86 (42 Off. Gaz., 15) further amended section 133 of the Revised Administrative Code, as thus previously
amended, also repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith. Both by virtue of Executive Order no. 40
and Executive Order No. 86, the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, as originally fixed at eleven by the
Constitution, was restored.

(c) However temporary or brief may be the action or participation of a judge designated under section 14 of the
People's Court Act in a collaboration case of the class therein defined, there is no escaping the fact that he would
be participating in the deliberations and acts of the Supreme Court, as the appellate tribunal in such a case, and
if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice of the Court. There can be no
doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution to
compose the Supreme Court indeed, a "temporary member" thereof would be a misnomer, implying a
position not contemplated by the constitution. Section 5 of the same Article VIII, in requiring the members of
the Supreme Court to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment,
makes it plainly indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices who are to compose the Court and sit
therein under section 4, have to be thus appointed and confirmed.

As already adverted to, a mere designation under section 14 of the People's Court Act does not satisfy the
Constitutional requirement of appointment, with the additional circumstance that as to such designation, the
Commission on Appointments is entirely dispensed with. We find absolutely nothing in the context which may
soundly be construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the constitutional composition of the
Supreme Court, or the performance of its functions by any but its constitutional members. On the other hand,
we have to go by the cardinal rule that "usually provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory,
and mandatory provisions are binding on all department of the government." (16 C.J.S., 120).

The main reason for this rule is that in the Constitutions the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules
which, for the time at least, are to control alike the government and the governed. It is an instrument of a solemn
and permanent character, laying down fundamental maxims, and, ordinarily, is not supposed to concern itself
with mere rules or order in unessential matters (Baker vs. Moorhead, 174 N.W., 430, 431; 103 Neb. m, 811);

Court is loath to say that any language of the constitution is merely directory. Scopes vs. State, 289 S.W., 363,
366; 154 Tenn., 105; 53 A.L.R., 821). (Footnote 93, C.J.S., 120.)

Under sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers intended the Supreme Court
to function through the members who are therein defined: and by section 6 they determined who may be
46
appointed such members. This naturally excludes the intervention of any person or official who is not a member
of the Court in the performance of its functions; and it is self-evident that the "designees" spoken of in section 14
of the People's Court Act cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed and
confirmed as such pursuant to said sections 5 and 6.

Hence, we do not see the way clear to the proposition that the "designees" in such a case can constitutionally "sit
temporarily as Justices" of the Supreme Court.

By an act of the United States Congress dated February 6, 1905, it was provided in part as follows:

Temporary judges of the Supreme Court; ... Whenever by reason of temporary disability of any judge of the
Supreme Court or by reason of vacancies occurring therein, a quorum of the court shall not be present for
business the Governor General of the Philippine Islands is authorized to designate a judge or judges of the court
of First Instance in the islands to sit and act temporarily as judge or judges of the Supreme Court in order to
constitute a quorum of said Supreme Court for business. . . . .

As part of the membership of the Court believes that this provision is still in force by virtue of Article XVI, section
2, of the Constitution, and should still be applied to cases of "temporary disability ... or vacancies occurring" and
preventing a quorum; while the other members are not prepared to subscribe to the same view, for the reason
that the designation" thereby authorized would be "inconsistent with this constitution," in the word of the cited
section, the same as the "designation" authorized by section 14 of the People's Court Act. Anyway, we need not
decide the point now.

DE LA LLANA V. ALBA - 112 SCRA 294

D: It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
x x x And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition
of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary.

N: PETITION directly filed with the Supreme Court for the adjudication of the Constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129

F: BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes,
was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because he would be one of
the judges that would be removed due to the reorganization. Judge De la Llana asserts that BP 129 contravened
the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He also averred that
only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

I: WON a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129)? -
47
HELD: YES

R: An exhaustive report was submitted by the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. The report
stated that there is a great need for a major reform in the judicial system so that it can adopt measures to address
issues & concern of the present society. Congress took time and effort to study this report before it was enacted,
which shows good faith. The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal if made in good faith.
The legislature may abolish courts inferior to the SC and therefore may reorganize them territorially. Removal
is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior
courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office.

Section 12: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.

Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision en
banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a Member
for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties.
Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state
the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

A. "Decisions" and "petitions," "minute resolutions."

COBARRUBIAS VS. PEOPLE - G.R. NO. 160610, AUGUST 14, 2009

D: The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of
the decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the subject
of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering
nothing. However, where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that
there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. Thus, in Spouses
Rebuldea v. Intermediate Appellate Court (155 SCRA 520 [1987]), the Court held that the trial court did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it corrected the dispositive portion of its decision to make it conform to the
body of the decision, and to rectify the clerical errors which interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

F: Petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged with Frustrated Homicide (RTC NOT GUILTY), Homicide (RTC
SET FOR FURTHER TRIAL), Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32
of Republic Act No. 7166 (RTC SET FOR FURTHER TRIAL) and Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (RTC NOT GUILTY). Petitioner maintained that there was a typographical error in the
48
dispositive portion considering that in the body of the Order, the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. On
26 February 2002, respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, succeeding the retired judge who originally
decided and wrote the decision, denied the motion, holding that the alleged error was substantial in nature
which affected the very merit of the case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which respondent Judge denied
on 23 July 2002.

Petitioners main contention is that there is a clerical error in the fallo or the dispositive portion of Judge
Alumbres Order dated 20 March 2001, which should have dismissed Criminal Case No. 94-5038 instead of
Criminal Case No. 94-5037, considering that in the body of the order, the trial court ruled that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Frustrated Homicide (Criminal
Case No. 94-5036) and Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038). However, respondent Acting Judge Maceda, who
was assigned to the trial court after Judge Alumbres retired, denied petitioners motion for correction, holding
that the alleged error was substantial in nature.

Due to technicalities, CA dismissed the appeal, hence this case was elevated to the SC.

I: What should govern in case of discrepancy between fallo and the body of the decision.

H: General Rule, Fallo; but where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision
that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision must prevail.

R: The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of the
decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the subject of
execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering
nothing.18 However, where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that
there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. Thus, in Spouses Rebuldea
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
corrected the dispositive portion of its decision to make it conform to the body of the decision, and to rectify the
clerical errors which interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee.

In this case, considering the clear finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, while the two other charges
for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of the Omnibus Election Code require further evidence, it is only
just and proper to correct the dispositive portion to reflect the exact findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, in accordance with the findings of the trial court, Criminal Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated Homicide) and
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide) should be dismissed, while Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866) and Criminal Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166) should be set for further trial.
PETITION GRANTED

TAYAMURA V. IAC, G.R. NO. 76355, MAY 21, 1987

F: Borromeo charges the divisions clerks of court. Chief of the Judicial Records Office of this Court with
usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273.

49
His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the
Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He
likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the
facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."

I: Whether the minute resolutions issued by the Court did not comply with the constitutional requirements?

H:

R: The September 13, 1989 resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division which disposed of
Borromeo's petition is a four-page resolution which more than adequately complies with the constitutional
requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and its
incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the Third Division.

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merits where the issues
raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by: substantial evidence and, is in
accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is
filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on
their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the
deliberations of case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits
the Court's action.

In Macario Tayamura, et al. v. IAC, et al., the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions
disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review ... shall
be refused due course ...without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When
the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions
decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error
in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case
nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign all resolutions
issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be
spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be more profitably
used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character.

50
 FRANCISCO V. PERMSKUL- 173 SCRA 324

D: The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and
second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order
or ruling under review

In order for a memorandum decision to be valid, it must: 1) PROVIDE FOR DIRECT ACCESS TO THE FACTS
AND THE LAW BEING ADOPTED, WHICH MUST BE CONTAINED IN A STATEMENT ATTACHED TO
THE SAID DECISION; and 2) IS RESORTED TO ONLY IN CASES WHERE THE FACTS ARE IN THE
MAIN ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES OR EASILY DETERMINABLE BY THE JUDGE AND THERE ARE
NO DOCTRINAL COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED THAT WILL REQUIRE AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION
OF THE LAWS INVOLVED. Failure to comply with such requisites constitutes a violation of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution and will be considered evidence of lawless disobedience.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception
by the parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate before judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the
members of the judiciary to discharge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.

For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum
decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

N: PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: The parties had entered into a contract of lease. Upon expiration of the lease, private respondent requested a
refund of his deposit. Petitioner rejected his request. Private respondent sued the petitioner in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati. A summary judgment was rendered sustaining the complainant and holding that the
repainting was not chargeable to private respondent. This decision was appealed to the RTC of Makati. The RTC
Judge affirmed the MeTC through a memorandum decision: After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation
and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds
that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On his appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner alleges that the CA
committed an error when it affirmed the RTCs memorandum decision because said memorandum violates
Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution. In his defense, private respondent alleges that the memorandum
decision is authorized by Section 40 of B.P. 129 and the Courts ruling in Romero v. Court of Appeals, which
considered adoption by reference as substantial compliance with Section 40, BP 129 and Article VIII, Section 14
of the Constitution.

Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:

Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. ___ Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases
shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based which may
be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision,
order or resolution appealed from.

51
Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. ___ The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt
by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or final order appealed from.

In Romero v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that That if the decision or order be an affirmance in
toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of
rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial courts findings of fact and pronouncements of law
which have been adopted as basis for the affirmance.

I: Whether a memorandum decision violates Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution?

H: NO

R: The first paragraph of Section 14 of Article VIII has been in force since the 1935 Constitution and now applies
to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose of the same is to inform the person reading the decision
and especially the parties of how the decision was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts
and examination of the applicable laws. SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR THE REQUIREMENT ALSO
INCLUDE: 1) THE LOSING PARTY MUST BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE THE DECISION
SO THAT, IF PERMITTED, HE MAY ELEVATE WHAT HE MAY CONSIDER ITS ERRORS FOR REVIEW
BY A HIGHER TRIBUNAL; 2) IF WELL-PRESENTED AND REASONED, MAY CONVINCE THE LOSING
PARTY OF ITS MERITS AND PERSUADE IT TO ACCEPT THE VERDICT IN GOOD GRACE INSTEAD
OF PROLONGING THE LITIGATION WITH A USELESS APPEAL; AND 3) DECISIONS WITH A FULL
EXPOSITION OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED, ESPECIALLY THOSE
COMING FROM THE SUPREME COURT, WILL CONSTITUTE A VALUABLE BODY OF CASE LAW
THAT CAN SERVE AS USEFUL REFERENCES AND EVEN AS PRECEDENTS IN THE RESOLUTION OF
FUTURE CONTROVERSIES.

Considering that adoptions by reference in memorandum decisions may (a) be subject to abuse; (b) may
undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which ears before it decides and bases its
decisions on established facts and the applicable law; and (c) may result in undue inconvenience in having to
search for the decision referred to, the Supreme Court laid down the following requirements as a condition for
the proper application of Section 40 of BP 129 (to be applied prospectively):

For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision. It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of
the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law
on which it was based.

It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the
facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum
decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

The Court did not apply its interpretation retroactively, since it was done in observance of Romero v. Court of
Appeals. Additionally, the Court found that there was substantial compliance with Section 40 because of the
52
direct availability and actual review of the decision of the MeTC Judge incorporated by reference in the
memorandum decision of the RTC Judge (the CA had access to the MeTC and RTC records).

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form
prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

ODCHIGUE-BONDOC VS. TAN TIONG BIO - 632 SCRA 457

D: Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged of a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the prosecutor
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or
inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may
be taken.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations. The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for
the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any
reversible error.

The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the
facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based).

Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of
executive departments such as the DOJ.

Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

I: Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power or Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises
quasi-judicial power.

H: No & No.

R: A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of
innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed

53
and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused.

The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot
be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Section 15: (1)All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

COURT ADMINSITRATOR V. QUIANOLA - 317 SCRA 37

D: THE FAILURE OF A JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES PROMPTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PRESCRIBED 90-DAY PERIOD CONSTITUTES GROSS INEFFICIENCY, WHICH
CONSEQUENTLY WARRANTS ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.

F: Petitioner Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial and physical inventory of cases
pending before the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, in view of the then impending compulsory retirement of its
presiding judge, Leonardo Quianola. The OCA's Judicial Audit Team 1 reported that, there are 1,268 pending
cases before the sala of Judge Quianola: 17 cases had been submitted for decision; 12 of which were pending
beyond the 90-day reglementary period; 47 cases with interlocutory matters awaiting resolution; 41 of which
had been pending beyond the reglementary period; 137 cases had not been acted upon or set for hearing even
after the lapse of a considerable time. 53 had not been acted upon from the time they were filed. There was a
huge backlog of pending cases in the court of respondent judge. Office of the Court Administrator recommended
administrative penalties to respondent judge and clerk of court. Judge Quinola invoked the heavy docket in his
court especially in 1993. He also pointed out that he suffered from cerebral hematoma and stroke in 1994
evidenced by a Medical Certificate.

I: Whether respondent judge should be held administratively liable.

H: YES.

R: In this case, respondent judge was remiss in the performance of his duties. As borne out by the findings of
the OCA, he failed to decide twelve (12) cases within the prescribed period and to resolve matters pending in
forty-one (41) others. That he was burdened with a heavy case load and suffered intra-cerebral hematoma serves
only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him. To be completely faultless, he should have written this Court
to explain his predicament and to ask for extensions of time. Had we been apprised of the problem, we could
54
have taken appropriate steps to expedite the resolution of the pending matters. Specifically, Judge Quianola
should be reminded of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides that judges should be prompt
in disposing of all matters submitted to them. To repeat, should the resolution of a case within the reglementary
period prove to be unlikely, they should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time.

Taking into account his failing health and his having already compulsorily retired, Judge Quianola should be
fined in the amount P40,000.

RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN -370

SCRA 658

D: ARTICLE VIII, Section 15 does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of
lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeal.

Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over particular or specialized categories of
actions. They are the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Sharia Courts.[30]

Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to the Sandiganbayan for the said court
is not a regular court but a special one. Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over
particular or specialized categories of actions. The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The
provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court
of Appeals. The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all
the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special one. The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure.
However, on March 30, 1995, Congress repealed the Sandiganbayans power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all
cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited
jurisdiction over particular or specialized categories of actions. They are the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, and the Sharia Courts.

N:

F: Administrative Circular No. 10-94 requires all Courts to submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual report
indicating the title, date of filing, date of pre-trial in and arraignment, the date of initial trial, the date of last
hearing and the date that the case is submitted for decision, and to post, in a conspicuous place within its
premises, a monthly list of cases submitted for decision. However the said admin order was not applicable to
the Sandiganbayan. The IBP in line with its duty to help the speedy disposition of the cases filed a resolution
with the Board of Governors, recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the decision of cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan was filed with the supreme court and recommending to the Supreme Court that
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 be made applicable to the Sandiganbayan in regard cases over
which the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction. It states: Section 16, Article III of the Constitution guarantees
that, [a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies, WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers mandates
that [a] lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E.

55
Garchitorena to comment on the letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases pending its
decision the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415) cases for decision remaining undecided
long beyond the reglementary period to decide.

The IBP submitted its reply stating

o There was much to be desired with regard to the expeditious disposition of cases, particularly in the
Sandiganbayans First Division, where cases submitted for decision since 1990 remained unresolved.
o Since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is required to submit the same reports required of Regional Trial
Courts.
o The Constitution states that, all lower collegiate courts must decide or resolve cases or matters before it
within twelve (12) months from date of submission; however, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required
to resolve and decide cases within a reduced period of three (3) months like regional trial courts, or at the most,
six (6) months from date of submission.

the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum to the Court stating that the causes of delay in the
disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:
o (1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit reinvestigation report despite the lapse of several
years;
o (2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc.
that remain unresolved for years;
o (3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court;
o (4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings despite the lapse of considerable length of time;
and
o (5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if the ponente is still in service.

The court considered ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as an
administrative complaint against Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for serious delays in the decision of
cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.

Issue: What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling
within its jurisdiction? Is Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the Sandiganbayan?

Held:

1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases - Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of lower
collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.
56
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent
powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court

Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The law creating the Sandiganbayan,
P.D. No. 1606 is clear on this issue. It provides: Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as
practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated
and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.
On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules, thus: Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide
Cases The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months
from the date the case was submitted for decision (underscoring ours).A delay of three (3) years in deciding a
single case is inexcusably long. The court finds that Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena failed to devise an
efficient recording and filing system to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and
timely disposition. This is his duty on which he failed.

2. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme Court Circular No. 10-94 applies to the
Sandiganbayan. Administrative Circular 10-94 directs all trial judges to make a physical inventory of the cases
in their dockets. Given the rationale behind the Administrative Circular, we hold that it is applicable to the
Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its original and appellate jurisdiction. Decision making is the
primordial and most important duty of the member of the bench. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases
with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants disciplinary sanction, including
fine, suspension and even dismissal. The rule particularly applies to justices of the Sandiganbayan. Delays in
the disposition of cases erode the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lower its standards, and
bring it into disrepute. Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated especially in the anti-graft court, the showcase
of the nations determination to succeed in its war against graft

Due to a finding of lack of bad faith on the part of respondent justice, we issued only a warning. However, the
dispositive portion of the decision cautioned respondent justice that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Section 16: The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session
of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.

57