Notes and Cases Digest Art. XI

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
ARTICLES & CASES DIGESTS
Article XI
Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.
Mackoy Kolokoy Page 1 of 31

A. Impeachment
1. FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- 415 SCRA 44
D: The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section
is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
A determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislatureit is beyond the scope of the Supreme Courts judicial power; Although
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of theseother high crimes
and betrayal of public trustelude a precise definition.
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides
that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made
to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
initiated. To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps:
(1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and
(4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted
to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates an impeachment case.
N: PETITIONS for review of the House of Representatives Second Impeachment Complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr.
F: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed
and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form,
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second
impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
I1: Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?
H1: No.
R1: Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.

I2: Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional?
H2: Yes
R2: The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI
as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.
I3: Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution?
H3: Yes
R3: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint
filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2. IN RE GONZALES- 160 SCRA 771
D: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for
the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal
from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar
and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment
of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of
the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the Commission on
Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to
be members of the Philippine Bar.
N: Per Curiam Resolution
F: Raul M. Gonzales (Tanodbayan/ Special prosecutor) forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. Attached
to the letter-complaint was an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the SC, referring to charges for disbarment
against Justice Fernan.
I: Can a public officer required by the Constitution to be a member of the PH bar be disbarred during his term?
H: No.
R: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the
office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during
the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally
before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or
any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
Members of the Supreme Court must be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by
impeachment. To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in
effect be to circumvent the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. The same situation exists in
respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies, a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections and the members

of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be
members of the Philippine Bar.
This is not to say however, that such officers are entitled to immunity from liability for alleged criminal acts or violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the
Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he
may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
3. GUTIERREZ V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON

JUSTICE, ET AL. - G.R. NO. 193459, FEBRUARY 15, 2011
D: The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment
complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints, they would
have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.
The one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power or function to refer a complaint. The
House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year without regard to the claims
set forth in the complaint.
An impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather apolitical exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the
Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases.
Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee
chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any
question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be
respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.
N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
F: July 22, 2010, 4 days before opening of the 15th session of Congress, private respondents (Risa Hontiveros et al) filed an
impeachment complaint against OMB. Merceditas Gutierrez endorsed by Party-list representative. July 27,2010, a day after
opening of the 15th session, the impeachment complaint was transmitted to the House
August 3, 2010, private respondents (Renato Reyes et al) filed another impeachment complaint against Omb. Gutierrez
endorsed by other Party-list representative. It was transmitted to the house on August 9, 2010. August 11, 2010, the House
of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. After hearing, on September 2010, both
complaints were found to be sufficient in form and considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
September 7, 2010, public respondent found both complaints to be sufficient in substance. 6 days after she received the copy
of the notice to file an answer, petitioner filed a petition questioning the resolution of public respondents and prayed for
injunctive reliefs. Petitioner claims that the 1 year bar rule applies to her. Petitioner alleges that the findings as to sufficiency
of the substance of the complaint was tainted with bias since public respondents chairperson is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting.
I: W/N 1 year bar rule applies to her? W/N petitioner allegation should be given merit?
H:
1) NO
R: Petitioners argument suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of
Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. The
question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the
body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the
House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official
records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already

been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating
a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. So, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is
afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper
referral.
In the case of Francisco, initiate refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with congress taking initial
action of the complaint. Thus, the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral of the Committee of Justice
which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Thus, referral is the reckoning point that ignites impeachment
proceedings. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This
is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. Thus petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first
impeachment complaint filed by the Hontiveros group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was
yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which
date the 10-day session period started to run. and when, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed
the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period
2) NO
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. Rep. Tupas (respondents
chairperson) did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaint.
4. CORONA V. SENATE G.R. NO. 200242, JULY 17, 2012
D: By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly
entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove
any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were
followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for
impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on
the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote
required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following
day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner.
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being violated in the
ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges by
acting as prosecutors.
Petitioner wanted to nullify the impeachment complaint of the ground of the behavior of certain Senator-Judges.
I: Whether the impeachment complaint is VALID.

H: YES
R: Respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges
in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and
exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless
there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial
review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings.
By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to
propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any
semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or
not, is a political question that is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
A. Sandiganbayan
5. MAYOR LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 128 SCRA 324
D: It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not
only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but
also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as
may be determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language
thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII titled Accountability of Public Officers.
The President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution,
issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporation, in relation to their office. (Italics supplied) When the lawmaking
authority chose to include all public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the
courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the
lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply.
N: PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Sandiganbayan.
F: In 1979, Sta. Cruz, Province of Marinduque, Mayor Lecaroz took over the operation and control of the gasoline station
owned by Pedro Par. Ordered policemen to sell the gasoline to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and
some pieces of yellow pad. He then ordered the padlocking of the gas station by the police. In 1980, Pedro Par charged the
Mayor with the crime of grave coercion before the Sandiganbayan. Mayor Lecaroz filed petition for certiorari assailing the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. The Offense committed was NOT in relation to his office as mayor, vrave coercion not among
those mentioned or determined by Section 4(c), Presidential Decree No. 1486
I: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of grave coercion?
H: Yes
R: Sandiganbayan has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though
not involving graft and corrupt practices. The crime was committed with abuse of his office for the policemen would not
have obeyed him, in selling gas and padlocking the gas station, had he not been the Mayor. A crime for which petitioner is
charged, grave coercion, is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00 under the first paragraph of Article
286 of the Revised Penal Code. Sandiganbayan has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well established is the
rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue
exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts.

6. AZARCON V. SANDIGANBAYAN- 268 SCRA 747
D: The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction
over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
Who are public officers.For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in
said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Sandiganbayan
F: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were
contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at
the formers premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of JaimeAncla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering
him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then
volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain
possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since
Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcons failure to comply
with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds
or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion
temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
I: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained
property.
H: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
R: Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within
its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may
not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent
authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal
Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual
to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a
public officer.

7. REPUBLIC VS. INVESTA - G.R. NO. 135466, MAY 7, 2008
D: Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea, 159 SCRA 556 (1988), defined the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of the PCGGs powers under the applicable Executive Orders and the
Constitution, thus: Under section 2 of the Presidents Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former
President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents or Nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under
the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme
Court.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
F: This is a petition for review of the Order promulgated on 17 March 1998 and the Resolution promulgated on 28 August
1998 of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0182, Republic of the Philippines v. Investa Corporation, et al. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc., (Domsat) (collectively, petitioners) for lack
of jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the acts of the Board of Directors of Domsat, which the Republic claims amount to fraud, are
proper subjects of an intracorporate dispute which lies with the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) based on Sec. 5 of PD 902-A and not with the Sandiganbayan because this does not pertain or relate to funds, moneys,
assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family, cronies or
dummies. Neither does it involve an incident arising from, incidental to, or related to any case involving such property
over which the Sandiganbayan has no concern.
Part of Sandiganbayans Ruling: In fine, the dispute in the case at bar concerns acts of the board of directors which the
[Republic and Domsat] claim amount to fraud and consequently, detrimental to the interest of Domsat stockholders, more
particularly the Republic as regards the sequestered shares.
I: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the Civil Case filed by PCGG?
H: YES.
R: Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea defined the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the PCGG in the
exercise of the PCGGs powers under the applicable Executive Orders and the Constitution, thus:
Under section 2 of the Presidents Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding the
Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or Nominees
whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents
arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and
original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
The present case involves the question of the propriety of dilution of the Republics shares in Domsat. The Sandiganbayan
cited San Miguel Corporation v. Kahn (San Miguel) in its footnotes to support its ruling. However, contrary to the
Sandiganbayans ruling, we find that San Miguel does not stand on all fours with the present case.
In San Miguel, Eduardo De los Angeles (De los Angeles) was one of the PCGG representatives in the Board of Directors of
San Miguel Corporation (SMC). De los Angeles owned 20 shares in his name and was elected to the SMC Board by the
33,133,266 SMC shares sequestered by PCGG. De los Angeles questioned the SMC Boards resolution to assume the loans of
Neptunia Co., Ltd. (Neptunia), SMCs indirectly wholly owned subsidiary. When De los Angeles efforts to obtain relief from
SMC and PCGG proved futile, he filed a derivative suit with the SEC. Ernest Kahn moved to dismiss De los Angeles
derivative suit on two grounds, one of which stated that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the controversy because the
matters involved are strictly within the business judgment of SMCs Board of Directors.

The SEC ruled in favor of De los Angeles and stated, among others, that the SEC always has competence to inquire into
situations where business judgment transgresses the law. However, the Court of Appeals overturned the SECs ruling. The
Court of Appeals ruled that De los Angeles had no legal capacity to institute the derivative suit because (1) De los Angeles
ownership in his name of 20 shares out of 121,645,680 outstanding shares of SMC does not adequately represent the interest
of the minority stockholders; (2) De los Angeles position as PCGG-nominated director is inconsistent with his desire to
represent minority stockholders; (3) the PCGG can only exercise powers of administration over sequestered property; and
(4) De los Angeles suit is not brought for the benefit of SMC.
We ruled in favor of De los Angeles in his appeal before this Court. We found that De los Angeles ownership of SMC shares
in his name was sufficient to authorize him to bring suit. De los Angeles act was also not contrary to PCGGs position.
Moreover, De los Angeles complaint was confined to the validity of SMCs assumption of the indebtedness of Neptunia and
did not even inquire about the ownership of the SMC shares sequestered by PCGG. We then stated that the acts of the board
of directors which are claimed to amount to fraud and to be detrimental to the interest of the sequestered corporation
constitute an intracorporate dispute within the jurisdiction of the SEC even though a PCGG representative filed the case.
In the present case, the PCGG, as conservator of the sequestered Domsat shares, questions the dilution of the said shares
brought about by the management contract between Domsat and Investa. The management contract allegedly diluted the
Republics shareholdings in Domsat from 32.79% to 15.998%.
The power to sequester ill-gotten wealth is one of the powers granted to PCGG. A conservator of sequestered shares has
the duty to ensure that the sequestered properties are not dissipated under its watch. In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering
Co., Inc. v. PCGG, we stated that:
By the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be ill-gotten means to place or cause
to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any
records pertaining thereto may be found, including business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing the
destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the sameuntil it can be determined
through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten, i.e., acquired through or as a result
of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks, or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and
prejudice to the State.
In PCGGs exercise of its role as conservator of a going concern such as Domsat, the PCGG may in this case exercise some
measure of control in the operation, running or management of the business itself.
There should be no hasty, indiscriminate, unreasoned replacement or substitution of management officials or change of
policies, particularly in respect of viable establishments. In fact, such a replacement or substitution should be avoided if at
all possible, and undertaken only when justified by demonstrably tenable grounds and in line with the stated objectives of
the PCGG. And it goes without saying that where replacement of management officers may be called for, the greatest
prudence, circumspection, care and attention should accompany that undertaking to the end that truly competent,
experienced and honest managers may be recruited.
In light of the above, we hold that the PCGGs act of questioning the resulting dilution of the sequestered Domsat shares
brought about by the management contract between Domsat and Investa properly lies within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The present case clearly pertains to the percentage share of the Republic in Domsat as represented by the
sequestered Domsat shares. The Domsat shares are properties which the Republic claims to be illegally acquired or
misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, cronies, or dummies. The Sandiganbayan should
now rule upon the propriety of the management contract, and consider the issues raised by Investa in their memorandum
before this Court.
8. PEO V. GO - G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014
D: The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes
private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant
case, respondent is being charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in conspiracy with then Secretary

Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, it does not follow
that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule
otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its
jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
F: Henry T. Go, as Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) was charged
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in conspiracy with the late Arturo Enrile, then Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) before the Sandiganbayan. Prior to the filing of the
Information, Secretary Enrile died. Private respondent Go questions the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, alleging that
since Secretary Enrile had died, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over him, a private person.
I: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over charges against private persons when the criminal liability of the
alleged public officer involved has been extinguished by death?
H: YES
R: It is true that by reason of Secretary Enriles death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer
be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile
is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no
public officer who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes
private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant
case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally,
under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving
herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on
the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman
to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be
appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.
Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
Mackoy Kolokoy Page 10 of

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A. Ombudsman and Tanodbayan
9. ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 160 SCRA 843
D: Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with
the duty to: Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Incumbent Tanodbayan lost his right to conduct preliminary investigation and to direct the filing of criminal cases with
the Sandiganbayan effective February 2, 1987.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor
cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even
his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred
to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to
investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as he has not been
replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under
Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD1607 although concededly
some of the powers of the two offices are identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to
hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
F: Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is governor of Antique, and he is asking the court to restrain respondent Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing on the ground that it was filed by the
Tanodbayan who is without legal authority. Zaldivar argues that under the 1987 Constitution, it is only the Ombudsman
who has authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. On a subsequent petition, Zaldivar further prays that tanodbayan
Gonzales be retrained from a) from filing any further criminal Information b) conducting further preliminary investigation
aside from annulling the preliminary investigation he conducted and resolution in TBP CASE.
I: Is the incumbent Tanodbayan, who under the 1987 Constitution is made Special Prosecutor, vested with the authority to
file cases with the Sandiganbayan?
H: NO. SC granted the petition.
R: Under the 1987 constitution which took effect on Feb 2, 1987, the Ombudsman is charged with the duty to Investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officialwhen such appears to be illegal.
[Art XI, Sec 5]. The Constitution likewise provides that The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as office of the
Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to exercise powersexcept those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution. Therefore, the incumbent Tanodbayan, now Special Prosecutor, is without authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan except upon the orders of the
Ombudsman. The right was lost effective Feb 2, 1987. Under the present 1987 constitution, the Special Prosecutor is
subordinate to the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman), he cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same
upon instructions of the latter.
Even the incumbent Tanodbayans power to issue a subpoena under PD 1630 is now transferred to the Ombudsman, who
may, however, retain it with the Special Prosecutor in connection with the case he is ordered to investigate.
It is also incorrect to assume that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan as long as he had not
been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under
art XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607

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10. ACOP V. OMBUDSMAN- 248 SCRA 566
D: While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission
did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and
duties to the Ombudsman. As finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides: SEC. 13. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: x x x (8) Promulgate its rules and
procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.
When one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman
may exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law , it is indubitable then that
Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same
vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may
deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. Through the said law, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor was made an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is
prohibited from performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the
relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the
Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsmans deputies, one being the deputy for the military
establishment. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the
Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting
Ombudsman of the Kuratong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were allegedly killed in a shootout. However, SPO2 de los Reyes
made an expose, stating that there was no shootout, the 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were victims
of summary execution. The Ombudsman, his deputy for military affairs, the Senate Committee on Justice, the CHR
conducted investigations on such claim. The Deputy Ombudsman for Military affairs took over the investigation and
ordered petitioners to submit counter-affidavits. Petitioners are now refuting the power of Ombudsman to conduct PI,
because under Sec. 3 Rule II of Adm. Order 07 does not include the Ombudsman to conduct PI.
I: Whether the Ombudsman has the power to conduct PI.
H: YES.
R: Through the passage of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an organic component of the Office
of the Ombudsman, while the Ombudsman was granted the following powers, among others:
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise
or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided
Ombudsman shall have other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Thus, the Congress can, by statute, prescribe
other powers, functions and duties to the Ombudsman. Because he is authorized under RA 6770 to utilize the personnel of
his office to assist in the investigation of cases, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military affairs.
11. CALINGIN V. DESIERTO- 529 SCRA 720

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D: R.A. No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Special Prosecutor has the power and
authority, under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and perform such other duties assigned to him by the Ombudsman
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision and
control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan, 503 SCRA 252 (2006), this Court held that control means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did not act with grave
abuse of discretion.
F: Petitioner Antonio P. Calingin is a former mayor of Claveria, Misamis Oriental. During his incumbency, the municipality
undertook a low-cost housing project. The Commission on Audit of Region X conducted a special audit of the housing
project for calendar years 1995 and 1996. The members of the COA Special Audit Team executed a Joint Affidavit
embodying their findings for the purpose of filing criminal charges against Calingin and other public officials. They then
submitted their Audit Report and Joint Affidavit to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao.
In a Resolution dated December 2, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer Jocelyn R. Araune of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner and co-accused for violation
of Section 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, and for violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon review, however, Special Prosecution Officer Alberto B. Sipaco, Jr., Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended that the said Resolution be disapproved and the charges be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
On August 13, 1999, then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, respondent, disapproved the Memorandum of Sipaco and
approved the Resolution of Araune. Consequently, 47 Informations for violation of Section 3 (e) and (h) of R.A. No. 3019
and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Calingin and his co-accused.
Calingin filed a motion for reinvestigation which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. It then ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to reinvestigate the cases.
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2000, Special Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz recommended the dismissal of all the cases against
all the accused for lack of probable cause. In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2000, the Chief of the Office of Legal Affairs,
Office of the Ombudsman, reversed the Ruiz Resolution and recommended that Calingin and his co-accused be prosecuted.
The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.
Hence, Calingin filed a petition for certiorari, contending that the Office of Legal Affairs which recommended his
prosecution has no authority to review the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor since the
latter is not subject to the control and supervision of the Ombudsman.
I: Whether respondent Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss all the charges against herein petitioner
and his co-accused? Is the Special Prosecutor co-equal to the Ombudsman or to his deputies?
H: No.
R: The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor are creatures of the 1987 Constitution as provided by Sections 5, 7 and 13 of Article XI..
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of
the Ombudsman and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters authority or orders..
R.A. No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Special Prosecutor has the power and authority,
under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
before the Sandiganbayan and perform such other duties assigned to him by the Ombudsman.
Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision
and control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or

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nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter. Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
dismiss all the charges against petitioner and his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of
discretion.
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the
time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of
the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding
election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three
months after they occur.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively,
of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased
during their term of office.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment.
They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from
office.
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
A. Power to investigate
12. DELOSO V. DOMINGO - 191 SCRA 545
D:
N:
F: Proceeding from a pre-wedding celebration, Governor Amor D. Deloso, on board his service car and accompanied by
his security escorts, were allegedly ambushed. During the lull in the shooting, his security escorts were able to rush him
home. Later, he learned that 3 of the supposed ambushers killed. On the contrary, eyewitness testimonies report that the
Governors group was actually the ambusher, not the group ambushed. Governor Deloso was charged with multiple
murder before Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales, who referred the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Governor Deloso questions the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, claiming that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to investigate the multiple murder charge against him for its jurisdiction is confined to investigations only of
acts or omissions that are connected to the performance of his duties as governor.
I: Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction to investigate the multiple murder charge against Governor Deloso?
H: Yes.
R: As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or omission of any public

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official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman
is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against
a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the petitioner
as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsmans investigative authority.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government
and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law.
A. Powers of the Ombudsman
13. HONASAN V. PANEL OF INVESTIGATIONS- G.R. NO. 159747, APRIL 13, 2004
D: If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive
conferment of the power to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials to the Ombudsman. The power of
the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with
other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been
settled in several decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do
not give, to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees
the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors; Respondent Department of Justice
(DOJ) Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of

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penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman
may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
The power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may
be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutorsthere is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place.
Since the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner, a
Senator, holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the
charge of coup detat against him.
F: Honasan was charged of the crime of coup detat. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice sent a
subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation. Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case, claiming that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office
of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that
should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the
case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
I: Who has jurisdiction?
H: Ombudsman and DOJ
R: The Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers
and employees.
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors
has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for
complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate
the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been
held in the Natividad case as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct
of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman
may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
Lastly, considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers,
the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to
investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him.
14. LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ - 243 SCRA 497
D: The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected
with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public
official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.The Ombudsman may utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to
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act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated
or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and
all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even
if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the
nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under 31 of the Ombudsmans Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision and
control of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify his (prosecutors) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the
information as directed by the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules
of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases
involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this
Court said in that case: The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the judgment of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint.
N: PETITION for review of an Order of the Ombudsman.
F: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed, with the Ombudsman-
Visayas, a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
Ombudsman directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. (overruled
decision of investigation officer in Visayas)
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E.
Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
It appears that petitioner, PROSECUTOR, conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only
acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994
an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe.
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27,
1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt
for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice.
Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime
involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to
follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.-WRONG
I: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of
the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. (YES)
H: Yes
R: Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
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This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless
of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his
official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when
committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate
of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided
shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all
that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of
the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under 31
of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman
which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed
by the Ombudsman.
Petitioner contended that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them
is not strong as required by 24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension
not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however,
whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence
before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case: The import of the Nera decision is that the
disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the judgment of the Ombudsman on the basis of
the administrative complaint.
15. ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ - 244 SCRA 286
D: the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed in any form or manner
concerning official acts or omissions.
Testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient
basis for the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not necessary.
The phrase in an appropriate case means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.
N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Supreme Court.
F: Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while
Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. OMB received anonymous letter from an
employee of EIIB, alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed
by employing ghost or fictitious agents. The letter stated that Almonte received a huge share in the illegal disbursement
and used it to support Reformed the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and for the purchase of the latters guns and
ammunition. Ombudsman required petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian,

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respectively, of the to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such
as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.
Almonte filed motion to quash subpoena as it makes them produce evidence to be used against them, violative of their
right against self-incrimination. He further contended that the documents are classified and would endanger lives of
agents.
I: 1. Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents that classified, list of personnel including secret agents? -
H1: YES
I2: Complaint in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one?
H2: IT IS APPROPRIATE
R: The OMB and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as such they are required
by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation
The allegations happened 7 years ago, the agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the
service of the EIIB. Sufficient safeguards may be observed by the OMB to protect lives and function of EIIB personnel.
Inspection can be done in camera. The examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the
Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may
render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency Matters of national security have
been inquired into in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts.
The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning
official acts or omissions. Testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court
constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not
necessary. Phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged
to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
16. COA V. HINAMPAS- 529 SCRA 245
D: The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatoryunder Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has a constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public
official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
The findings of an offices fact-finding investigation which does not qualify as a quasi-judicial proceeding wherein
respondents are named, offenses are charged, and parties are heard, cannot act as a bar to the Ombudsmans exercise of
jurisdiction and rendition of decision.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: Cast against different factual backdrops but raising a common issue relative to the nature of the administrative
disciplinary power of the Office of the Ombudsman (OOMB) are these five (5) consolidated petitions for review assailing
the decisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which overturned the Ombudsman's actions on the premise that the
Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power is merely recommendatory.
Re: G.R. No. 158672 -

On September 21, 1998, a certain Teodoro A. Gapuzan filed a letter-complaint with the OOMB alleging anomalies in the
conduct of public biddings by the Office of the District Engineer, First Engineering District of Agusan del Sur, and the
collusion of licensed private contractor Engr. Rafael A. Candol, representing JTC Development, Construction and Supply
and NBS Construction under a joint venture agreement. The letter-complaint alleged that, despite these firms being holders
of small licenses entitled only to projects costing not more than three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) on a single undertaking,
Engr. Candol was awarded seven (7) projects of more than P3,000,000.00 each.

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Re: G.R. No. 160410 -
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte filed with the OOMB a complaint charging Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio and Rogelio P.
Montealto, both officers of the National Book Development Board (NBDB), with Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service.
In his complaint, Marte alleged that Montealto wrote a letter to Apolonio requesting that a cash advance in the amount of
P88,000.00 be issued in Apolonio's name to "cover the cost of supplies and materials, food and other miscellaneous
expenses" for an upcoming Team Building Workshop for NBDB employees. As requested, Apolonio secured a cash advance
in her name, and, in due course, Check No. 19595 for P88,000.00 was issued. Apolonio encashed the check and used
P80,200.00 to purchase gift checks from SM North Edsa. The gift checks were then distributed to the members of the NBDB
Secretariat who attended the seminar workshop.
Re: G.R. Nos. 160605 and 160627 -

Roseller A. Rojas, a Special Agent I of the Bureau of Customs-Enforcement and Security Service (BOC-ESS), filed a
complaint with the OOMB against his superior, herein respondent Virgilio M. Danao (Director III) for Dishonesty. The
complaint alleged that respondent Danao had falsely made it appear in his personal data sheets (PDS) that he is a 1972
graduate of the Manila Central University (MCU) with a course in Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (BSBA).
By way of proof, complainant Rojas submitted a Certification issued by MCU stating that per its records, there is no
graduate of BSBA for the year 1972 by the name of Virgilio M. Danao. Rojas also presented copies of the PDS prepared and
submitted to the Bureau of Customs (BOC) whereon it is stated that Danao had graduated with a degree in BSBA from
MCU in 1972.
Re: G.R. No. 161099 -

Respondent Sonia Gonzales-Dela Cerna is the Chief of the Entry Processing Unit (EPU), MIASCOR Composite Unit, Bureau
of Customs (BOC) at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), while respondent Milagros Umali-Ventura is the
Customs Document Processor of the Cargohaus Warehouse Collection Unit, BOC-NAIA, Pasay City.
The shipments were successfully released from the Customs warehouse under the pretext of voluntary payment of duty,
tax, plus penalty for non-submission of the CRF requirement. An attempt to release the January 12, 1997 shipment in the
same manner was also made.
As a consequence of the fraudulent acts adverted to, the government suffered a revenue loss of P1,246,983.00. This was
made possible by Samsung's undervaluation with the complicity of concerned Customs officials and employees assigned
at BOC's Cargohaus Warehouse Collection Unit at NAIA.
The Office of the Ombudsman ruled: in GR G.R. NO. 158672 the penalty of one year suspension from office without pay; in
G.R. NO. 160410 meted on them the penalty of dismissal from the service; in G.R. NOS. 160605 & 160627 imposed upon
him the penalty of dismissal from the service; in G.R. NO. 161099 meted upon them the penalty of one month suspension.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the said decisions. Hence, this appeal.
I: Whether or not the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory in nature, as ruled by the CA.
H: The answer, as laid out by recent jurisprudence, is a resounding NO. As this Court has already held in Ledesma v. CA
and Estarija v. Ranada, the so-called Tapiador "doctrine," upon which the assailed CA decisions are based, is mere obiter.
Tapiador takes note of the following Section of the Constitution:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
The word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure compliance therewith." In Ledesma v.
CA, supra, we had this to say:
x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to
present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power
of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to
varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this
Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
In Estarija v. Ranada, we reiterated our pronouncements in Ledesma and went on to categorically state:
x x x [T]he Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of

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Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring
officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and
25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.
His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that
under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove
from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
17. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ESTANDARTE, 521 SCRA 155
D: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases against government employees, which includes public
school teachers, is vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution which statesSec. 12. The
Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers - the Court ruled that Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4670 reflects the legislative
intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers.
Even if we hold that the Ombudsman (Visayas) had concurrent jurisdiction over the administrative case, we would still
sustain the DECS authority to decide the administrative case. In one case, the Court pronounced thatIn any event,
since We are not dealing with jurisdiction but mainly with venue, considering both court concerned do have jurisdiction
over the cause of action of the parties herein against each other, the better rule in the event of conflict between two
courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the present case, is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court
which, under the circumstances obtaining in the controversy, would, in the mind of this Court, be in a better position
to serve the interests of justice, considering the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the court to
the parties, having in view their peculiar positions and capabilities, and other similar factors.
Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the
DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating
Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: Heidi Estandarte, being the school principal, was complained by the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the Ramon
Torres National High School for 33 allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular
financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Peoples Graftwatch referred the complaints to the Office of the
Ombudsman Visayas for immediate investigation. The Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to DECS Region VI Office
and the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. For not complying with the formalities under EO 292, DECS dismissed
the complaint without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate case. Faculty Club filed a formal complaint but the same was
outright dismissed for lack of verification and certification against forum shopping. But the complaint was corrected to
comply with the required verification and certification. Once required by DECS-Region VI, Estandarte filed answer to the
complaint, So a Special Investigating Committee was created to hear the case. The SIC required the State Auditor to produce
documents but it the State Auditor replied that they could not produce the originals required as the same were being used
by the Ombudsman Visayas in the criminal and administrative cases pending before it concerning the same parties.
Committee recommended the dismissal of the case due to forum shopping.
Meanwhile, COA referred the case to the Negros Occidental Provincial Auditor, which concluded that only 24/33
allegations were within the bounds of propriety. With the report in the hands of the Ombudsman Visayas, it decided to
refer to the case to DECS Region VI. The first referral did not reach DECS-Region VI, but once the process was cleared, the
2nd referral consolidated the case with DECS-Region VI, and SIC resumed its hearing on the case. Faculty Club, however,
requested the Ombudsman to take over the case for expediency. With Ombudsman communicating with the DECS-Region
VI that it would not object taking over the case from DECS-Region VI, DECS-Region VI turned over the records of the case
to the Ombudsman, noting the intent of the complainants that Ombudsman handle the case and that Ombudsman also
manifested willingness to assume jurisdiction of the case.

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Estandarte, objected to the transfer of jurisdiction claiming the DECS-Region VI already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. This objection was denied, hence, reaching the Court of Appeals which sided with Estandarte, holding that the
transfer of the case under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Visayas violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that once
jurisdiction is acquired by or attached to a proper investigative body or agency, such jurisdiction continues until the
termination of the case. The Ombudsman is now assailing this CA decision.
I: Whether DECS=Region VI now has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaints for gave misconduct of Estandarte?
Who has jurisdiction?
H: DECS-Region VI should continue handling the case.
R: True, Ombudsman and DECS have concurrent jurisdiction over the case (See Doctrine). Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region
VI first assumed jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against the respondent. It should be recalled that when
Peoples Graftwatch forwarded the complaint to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter treated it as a request for assistance
and referred it to the DECS-Region VI and COA for appropriate action. After it had resolved to upgrade the matter to an
administrative case, the Ombudsman decided not to take cognizance of the same and refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region
VI.
Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested
on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence
of the DECS and petitioner.
18. QUARTO V. OMBUDSMAN G.R. NO. 169042, OCTOBER 5, 2011
D: Included in the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers is the power to grant immunity, as expressed
(and granted to it by Congress [granting immunity is legislative in nature, but implementation of such grant is an
executive function]) in the Ombudsman Act. The exercise of such power is still subject to the review of the Supreme
Court. However, such review is limited to the determination of whether or not grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed in such exercise. Absent such abuse, the Court will affirm its policy of non-
interference in the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutorial powers. In this case, petitioner questioned the
validity of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity to the respondents. The Supreme Court held that petitioner failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to prove that grave abuse of discretion attended the grant of immunity.
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. The exclusive power of Congress
to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power to immunize
certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution
of crimes with high political, social and economic impact.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.
F: Petitioner Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE),
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special
Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are members of the SIT.
The DPWH created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of
spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001. As a result of the investigation, a complaint for Plunder, Money Laundering,
Malversation and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Administrative Code was filed against
several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees and other private individuals who purportedly benefited from the
anomalous transactions.
The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when he signed the
job orders and the inspection reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted the existence of irregularities in the repairs
and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide evidence against the DPWH
officials and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for their immunity from prosecution.

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After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed Informations charging petitioner, et al., with plunder,
estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
However, the Ombudsman granted the request of respondents for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
Petitioner assails the validity of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity in favor of respondents. The Ombudsman counters
that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly grants him the power to grant immunity from prosecution to
witnesses. The Ombudsman invokes this Courts policy of non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of his discretion
in matters involving his investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
I: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion that would justify interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutor powers?
H: NO
R: The Supreme Court held that petitioner was not able to present clear and convincing evidence that the Ombudsman had
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting immunity to respondents. Petitioner merely made bare allegations that the
testimony of respondents was not absolutely necessary and that they were the most guilty.
RA No. 6770 fully recognizes the Ombudsmans prosecutorial prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant
immunity, subject to such terms and conditions as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this
authority is the need to take into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. This provision requires that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
It is not without significance that the law encompassed (and appears to have pointedly not separated) the consideration of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court within the broader context of such terms and conditions as the Ombudsman
may determine. This deliberate statutory wording, to our mind, indicates the intent to define the role of Section 17, Rule
119 in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. It suggests a broad grant of discretion that allows the Ombudsmans
consideration of factors other than those outlined under Section 17, Rule 119; the wording creates the opening for the
invocation, when proper, of the constitutional and statutory intents behind the establishment of the Ombudsman.
Since the determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the
Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan
or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in his possession and the kind,
tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case. It should not be forgotten, too, that the grant of
immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have
incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This point is no less important as the grant directly affects the individual and
enforces his right against self-incrimination. These dynamics should constantly remind us that we must tread softly, but
not any less critically, in our review of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity.
The Ombudsmans unique power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court is a power
that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy.
The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial
powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence inherent in
the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the
public service. Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman best explains the reason behind this policy:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutorial powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered

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by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could
be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
19. GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT - 714 SCRA 611
D: While the Ombudsmans authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of
congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely
and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsmans
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power
of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
The Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon
them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the
President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.
Under the DOCTRINE OF IMPLICATION, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule,
therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwisethat is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than
the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the Presidents
power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after
impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed
only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article
VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the
Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall
likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As
priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and
the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating
the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the
Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsmans Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power
to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created
office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy
Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

31
F: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases
were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before
the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had
not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly,
the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings
despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his
colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in
whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals,
the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto.
The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence
the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown
persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General
Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a
Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the
hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House
of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public
hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the
dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
I: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
H: YES.
R: The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not
exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by
no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
31
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent
of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external
authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect
one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor,
Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to
provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in
the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority
over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not diminish the Independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is
tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office,
the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional
standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of
his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases
upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of
the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office
of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements that the decision was immediately implemented; or
that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as
evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no
evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount
to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of
petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a
betrayal of public trust.

31
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-
Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
20. MORALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 217126, NOVEMBER 10, 2015
D: The concept of Ombudsman independence CANNOT BE INVOKED as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as
impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident
of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from
the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares
certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended
that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution,
but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based"; and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the
deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a
constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the
effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past
Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: CREATION BY THE CONSTITUTION, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: FISCAL AUTONOMY, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose
of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials
of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: INSULATION FROM EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL, which means that those within the ranks
of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment
and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics.
THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 14, RA 6770 TEXTUALLY PROHIBITS COURTS FROM EXTENDING
PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO DELAY ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY HER OFFICE. DESPITE
THE USAGE OF THE GENERAL PHRASE "[N]O WRIT OF INJUNCTION SHALL BE ISSUED BY ANY COURT," THE
OMBUDSMAN HERSELF CONCEDES THAT THE PROHIBITION DOES NOT COVER THE SUPREME COURT.
31
With Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770)
without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him
The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein
elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of
Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
Condonation Doctrine under the Pascual Case:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term
is separate and distinct: Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause
for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall
not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to
remove him therefor; and
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of
their right to elect officers:
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST AND THE COROLLARY REQUIREMENT OF
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES, AS MANDATED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, IS
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE IDEA THAT AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL'S ADMINISTRATIVE
LIABILITY FOR A MISCONDUCT COMMITTED DURING A PRIOR TERM CAN BE WIPED OFF BY THE FACT
THAT HE WAS ELECTED TO A SECOND TERM OF OFFICE, OR EVEN ANOTHER ELECTIVE POST. ELECTION IS
NOT A MODE OF CONDONING AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE, AND THERE IS SIMPLY NO
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY BASIS IN OUR JURISDICTION TO SUPPORT THE NOTION THAT AN
OFFICIAL ELECTED FOR A DIFFERENT TERM IS FULLY ABSOLVED OF ANY ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY
ARISING FROM AN OFFENSE DONE DURING A PRIOR TERM.
Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when
they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what
is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
THAT BEING SAID, THIS COURT SIMPLY FINDS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SUSTAIN THE CONDONATION
DOCTRINE IN THIS JURISDICTION. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THIS DISCOURSE, IT WAS A DOCTRINE
ADOPTED FROM ONE CLASS OF US RULINGS WAY BACK IN 1959 AND THUS, OUT OF TOUCH FROM - AND
NOW RENDERED OBSOLETE BY - THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME. IN CONSEQUENCE, IT IS HIGH TIME FOR
THIS COURT TO ABANDON THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE THAT ORIGINATED FROM PASCUAL, AND
31
AFFIRMED IN THE CASES FOLLOWING THE SAME, SUCH AS AGUINALDO, SALALIMA, MAYOR GARCIA,
AND GOVERNOR GARCIA, JR. WHICH WERE ALL RELIED UPON BY THE CA.
N: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a WPI.
F: For being involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking
Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati, JunJun Binay and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), were accused of Plunder and violation of The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act The Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication of the Binay cases (2nd Special Panel). Thereafter, on March 9,
2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits. But
before Binay Jr et.al could file their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay
Jr. under preventive suspension for not more than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the cases.
Ombudsman claimed that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that: (a) the
evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents
on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the
release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public
service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective
positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in
office may prejudice the investigation relative to the cases filed against them.
Binay Jr assailed this preventive suspension order via petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals arguing that he cannot
be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases
III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic. CA granted the TRO motion of Binay Jr. CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine.
Thus, Ombudsman came to SC to argue that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a
reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the
OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013
I: Whether the order of the CA of issuing a TRO on the preventive suspension order of the Ombudsman is valid. Whether
the CA was correct in issuing TRO based condonation doctrine.
H: Yes. No
R: The Court ruled that CA has the authority by virtue of the power of judicial review to order TRO to the preventive
suspension order, on two grounds:
1. Section 14 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

31
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 which is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court) from issuing
a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional, for
being promulgated without the consent of the Court and against the existing Rules which the Supreme Court has the only
authority to establish.
2. The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is,
a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of
insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
Ruling on the Merits, the Supreme Court said that the CA by merely relying in the condonation doctrine did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since it was relying in good faith on what appears to be an existing good law. More so, while the
CA did not dwell on the merits of the preventive suspension order, the condonation doctrine was in fact, first among the
bases of objections raised by Binay Jr.
However, regardless of the being a moot and academic (Ombudsman already found administratively liable and dismissed
as Mayor), the Supreme Court took the occasion to invalidate condonation doctrine, that is not based on statutory law but
merely on a jurisprudence decided in 1959 under the 1935 constitution. Said doctrine is already in conflict with the mandate
of the 1987 constitution that considers public office as a public trust.
Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
SECTION 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
SECTION 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling
interest, during their tenure.
SECTION 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general
or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
Allegiance of public officers
21. CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS - 191 SCRA 229
D: To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act
or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office.

31
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion
is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
N: PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: Merito Miguel was elected Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. Caasi claims that Miguel is disqualified under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the US, not Bolinao.
Comelec ruled that possession of a green card is not sufficient to establish that he has abandoned the Philippines.
I: Whether possession of a green card holder is proof of a permanent resident of the US.
H: YES. Hence not qualified.
R: See Doctrine. On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US DOJ and Immigration and Registration
Service to respondent Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous disclaimer,
Miguels immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and resident in the Philippines.
For he did not go to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor. He entered the US with the intention to stay there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants visa (not visitors or tourists).

31

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

ARTICLES & CASES DIGESTS

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 1 of 31

1. FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- 415 SCRA 44

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 2 of 31

2. IN RE GONZALES- 160 SCRA 771

N: Per Curiam Resolution

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 3 of 31

3. GUTIERREZ V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON

N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 4 of 31

4. CORONA V. SENATE G.R. NO. 200242, JULY 17, 2012

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

I: Whether the impeachment complaint is VALID.

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 5 of 31

5. MAYOR LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 128 SCRA 324

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Sandiganbayan.

I: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of grave coercion?

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 6 of 31

N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Sandiganbayan

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 7 of 31

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 8 of 31

8. PEO V. GO - G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 9 of 31

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 10 of

9. ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 160 SCRA 843

H: NO. SC granted the petition.

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 11 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

I: Whether the Ombudsman has the power to conduct PI.

11. CALINGIN V. DESIERTO- 529 SCRA 720

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 12 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 13 of

12. DELOSO V. DOMINGO - 191 SCRA 545

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 14 of

A. Powers of the Ombudsman

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 15 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

I: Who has jurisdiction?

H: Ombudsman and DOJ

14. LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ - 243 SCRA 497

N: PETITION for review of an Order of the Ombudsman.

15. ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ - 244 SCRA 286

N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Supreme Court.

Mackoy Kolokoy Page 18 of

16. COA V. HINAMPAS- 529 SCRA 245

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Re: G.R. No. 158672 -

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Re: G.R. Nos. 160605 and 160627 -

Re: G.R. No. 161099 -

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17. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ESTANDARTE, 521 SCRA 155

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

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H: DECS-Region VI should continue handling the case.

18. QUARTO V. OMBUDSMAN G.R. NO. 169042, OCTOBER 5, 2011

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.

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Rules of Court. This provision requires that:

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