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TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L.

JARDELEZA,
and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family Code took
effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed
L. Jardeleza.

On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced with the Regional Trial Court a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the
person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L.
Jardeleza.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than
to his mother. This was opposed by respondents.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for guardianship. The trial court concluded,
without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under
the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 124 of the Family Code renders superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person
and estate of an incompetent married person.

RULING:

Very recently, in a related case Uy vs. Jardeleza, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not applicable to the
situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial
guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Uy vs. Jardeleza where the court ruled:

ART. 124. xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse.

The situation contemplated under Art. 124 is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned
the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolutions of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,
in Special Proceedings No. 4689. The Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents
G.R. No. 109557 | November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to his parents, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza and Gilda L. Jardeleza,
private respondent filed a petition of guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. Teodoro averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties,
and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-
appointed guardian to administer said properties.

Respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza then herself filed a petition, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same.

RTC found that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, and that the sale of a conjugal lot and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses
for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza
was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.

Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza
Uy. Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale. This was denied by the lower
court.

On appeal, CA promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special
proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of
the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable.

Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered
him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such
incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition
for judicial guardianship.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article
124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose
condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain
stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's
administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not
the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial
court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial
court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition
should not be granted.

Hence,we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court
is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices
to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ,
respondents. G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

FACTS:

Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband, Junie Corpuz,
sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it
stood.

Private respondent then filed an Amended Complainant against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner- Spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, seeking the declaration of the deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of
private respondent and her husband, null and void.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gilda. Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, which however, affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance
by the husband of the conjugal propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of
the Family Code

RULING:

No. The contract entered into herein falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied
by the lower court:

Art.124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disgreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied)

Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory
effect of the above provision in this wise:
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with
the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot
generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to
annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities
made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wife's consent.
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 92245 June 26, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner discovered that her estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a contract of lease with
defendant Antonio M. Cayetano covering a portion of their conjugal lot.

Due to the illegal lease contract entered into between the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful deprivation of
petitioner from operating her own legitimate business on the same lot of which she is a conjugal owner, plaintiff has been
compelled to seek redress and ventilate her grievance to the court.

Defendant Antonio M. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.

Respondent judge dismissed the complaint. Petitioner directly appealed the Decision of the lower court to the Supreme
Court. The Court referred the case to CA. Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the Order of
the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife

RULING:

No. Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view
of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal
partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal
property. Responsibility should carry authority with it.

The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise
alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by
law to render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife.

However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been
declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably
to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same."

This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for
the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this
prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance and/or alienation within the scope of Art. 166
of the New Civil Code.

Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the
enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease
for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid." Under the law, lease is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant
of possession as opined by the Court of Appeals. The right to possess does not always include the right to use. For while
the bailee in the contract of deposit holds the property in trust, he is not granted by law the right to make use of the
property in deposit.

In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint indicates that petitioner's estranged husband, defendant
Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent
being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art.
173 to file a case for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of action
not only against her husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.