F Property Relations

PROPERTY RELATIONS
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in
the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom.
Property relations is the only instance when the husband and wife can stipulate as to
the terms and conditions.
The marriage settlement governs the property relations of spouses provided such is not
contrary to law.
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the Family Code comes in. If the Family Code
in a rare instance is not applicable, then custom comes in.
Therefore, in the absence of a marriage settlement or when such marriage settlement is

void, ACP shall be their marriage settlement by operation of law.
As an exception, when the first marriage is dissolved by reason of death and the
second marriage was entered into before the conjugal partnership is liquidated,
the law mandates that a regime of complete separation of property shall govern.
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete
separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
ACP is the regime of the spouses in the absence of a marriage settlement or when the
marriage settlement is void. This is so because ACP is more in keeping with Filipino
culture.
Article 76. In order that any modifications in the marriage settlements may be
valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the
provisions of Article 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
General Rule: All modifications to the marriage settlement must be made before the
marriage is celebrated.
Exceptions:
1. Legal Separation (Article 63 (2).) In such an instance, the property regime is

dissolved.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
2. Revival of the former property regime upon reconciliation if the spouses agree (Article
66 (2).)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the
following consequences:
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of
property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the
preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts
owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the
court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished
to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take
measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in
the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any
creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient
separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)
3. A spouse may petition the court for:
a. Receivership
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The
obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
b. Judicial separation of property
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been
decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article
101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in
fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of
the final
judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the
grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
c. The authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer

to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer

to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left
the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has
left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within
the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
4. Judicial Dissolution (Article 136)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the
voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the
absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the
filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other
persons with pecuniary interest.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They
shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper
registries of properties.
Form: Marriage settlements and their modifications must be in writing (private or public)
for validity
To bind 3rd persons, the marriage settlement must be registered in:

1. Local Civil Registry where the marriage contract is recorded.
2. Proper Registries of Property
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute
his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons
designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the
agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
If the party has not yet reached the age of 21, parental consent is also required with
regard to the marriage settlement.
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to
any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a party thereto.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the

property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:

(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is
located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the
Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws
require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the

preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations
between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the
celebration of the marriages shall be valid.
The marriage settlement and the donations propter nuptias are void if the
marriage does not take place.
System of Absolute Community
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements,
the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either

spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is
expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall
form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However,
jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as
the income, if any, of such property.
General Rule: Community property shall consist of all the property owned by the
spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
Exceptions:
1. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, including the fruits and the
income.
Exception to the exception: The donor, testator, or grantor expressly provides
otherwise.
Examples:
a. As father dies. A inherits from the father. A marries B. The property inherited
by A from his father is part of the community property.
b. Bs mother dies during Bs marriage to A. The property inherited by B from
her mother does not form part of the community property.
In ACP, the income from separate property of the spouses does not form part of
the community property.
In CPG, the income from separate property of the spouses forms part of the
community property.
2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse
Exception to the Exception: Jewelry forms part of the community property.
3. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits and income of such property.
This is provided for so that the children from the 1st marriage will not be
prejudiced.
Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom.
Presumption: Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the

community. However it can be rebutted by proving such property acquired during
marriage is excluded.
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children
shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
The ACP shall support the spouses common children and legitimate
children of either spouse
A common child of the spouse may not necessarily be legitimate. For
example, A is married to B. A has an affair with C. A and C have a child,D.
B dies. A and C get married. D cannot be legitimated since at the time of
Ds conception, A and C had no capacity to get married.
Illegitimate children are supported:

1. Primarily by their biological parent
2. Subsidiarily by the ACP (Article 94 (9)*)
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of
a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall
be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the
debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community.
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by
both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
The wordings under Articles 94 (2) and 94 (3) are different
Article 94 (2) contemplates 3 situations:

a. Obligations contracted by the designated administrator spouse for the
purpose of benefiting the community.
Under 94 (2) (a), purpose is enough. It is not required to show to
what extent the family benefited.
b. Obligations contracted by both spouses

c. Obligations contracted by one spouse with the consent of the other.
Article 94 (3) contemplates the situation wherein one spouse contracts an

obligation without the consent of the other.
The ACP is liable only to the extent that the family may have
benefited.
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs,
upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family;
Taxes and expenses for the preservation upon the exclusive property by
one of the spouses should be borne by the ACP. This is so because the
family
benefits.
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a

professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to

the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of

their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a
quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community; and
Ante-nuptial debts not falling under Article 94 (7) will be borne by the ACP
if the separate property of the debtor-spouse is insufficient.
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Administration and Enjoyment of Community Property
Art. 96 1. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall

belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
Administration of the community property belongs to both spouses jointly.
Both spouses must consent to the encumbrance or disposition of the community

property.
Art. 96 2. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition
or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
The other spouse may assume sole powers of administration when:

1. The other spouse is incapacitated.
2. The other spouse is unable to participate (i.e., abroad)
The power to administer does not include the power to dispose or encumber
solely by one spouse. Court authority or the approval of the other spouse is
required.
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community
property.
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent
of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make
moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of
family rejoicing or family distress.
General Rule: In order to donate any community property, the other spouse must
consent.
Exception: Moderate donations do not need the consent of the other spouse if for:
1. Charity
2. Occasions of family rejoicing or distress
Dissolution and Liquidation of Absolute Community
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Article 134
to 138.
Dissolution of the ACP is not synonymous with the dissolution of the marriage. In
Articles 99 (2) and (4), the ACP is dissolved although the marriage is not. However, the
dissolution of the marriage automatically results in the dissolution of the ACP.
In Article 99 (3), when a marriage is declared as a nullity, there is no ACP to dissolve

since there was no property regime to begin with. The dissolution in such a case would
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 99 is not a complete enumeration of the instances when the ACP terminates.
Another instance is when the marriage is terminated by the reappearance of the absent
spouse (Articles 42 and 43 (2).).
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
in default of children, the innocent spouse;
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter
be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute
its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties,
the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
Article 102 enumerates the steps in liquidation:
1. Inventory
a. Inventory of community property

b. Inventory of separate property of the wife
c. Inventory of separate property of the husband.
2. Payment of Community Debts
First, pay out of community assets. If not enough, husband and wife are solidarily
liable with their separate property.
3. Delivery to each spouse his or her separate property if any.
4. Division of the net community assets
NOTE: There are special rules regarding the family home.
5. Delivery of presumptive legitimes if any to the children
The presumptive legitimes are given in the following instances:

a. Death of either spouse (Article 103)
b. Legal Separation (Articles 63 and 64)
c. Annulment (Articles 50 52)
d. Judicial Separation of Property (Articles 134 137)
e. Reappearance of the absent spouse which terminates the 2nd marriage
(Article 43)
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter.s share.
Separation de facto does not dissolve the ACP.

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to

marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same
period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
If a spouse abandons the other spouse without just cause or fails to comply with
his or marital obligations, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for the
following:
1. Receivership
2. Judicial separation of property
3. Authority to be the sole administrator.
Abandonment occurs when one leaves the conjugal dwelling without intention of
returning.
Presumption of Abandonment: When the spouse has left the conjugal dwelling
for a period of 3 months without giving information as to his whereabouts.
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more
marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is
carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each
community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according
to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities
in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Knowing the CPG is important. Under the Civil Code, this was the preponderant
property regime. Since a lot of marriages took place before the effectivity of the Family
Code August 3, 1988 many property regimes are CPG.
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the
regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 255.
The regime of CPG applies:

1. In case the future spouse agree on this regime in their marriage settlement, their
property relations will be governed by their agreement with the Family Code
suppletorily applicable.
2. CPGs before the affectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their
efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided
equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.
The husband and wife place in a common fund:
1. Income of their separate properties

2. Everything acquired by them through their efforts (whether singly or jointly)
3. Everything acquired by them through chance (the winnings from gambling,
hidden treasure, those acquired from hunting)
The spouses are not co-owners of the conjugal properties during the marriage and
cannot alienate the supposed interest of each in the said properties.
The interest of the spouses in the conjugal properties is only inchoate or a mere
expectancy and does not ripen into title until it appears after the dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership that there are net assets (De Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of
Manila).
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88. and 89. shall also apply to conjugal
partnership of gains.
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence
at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or
implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall
be void.
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of
property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of
property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or
after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a
public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of
the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to
the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
The rules on partnership shall be applied in a suppletory manner.
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with
property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of
the husband.
Article 109 enumerates the exclusive property of spouses:
1. Property brought to the marriage as his or her own

Strictly speaking paraphernal property refers to the exclusive property of the wife
while capital is the exclusive property of the husband.
2. Property which each spouse acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title
Gratuitous title is either:
a. By succession
b. By donation
ACP also has a similar provision.
3. Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or exchange with

property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
Article 109 (3) is illustrated as follows: The wife owns exclusively a piece of land.
The wife sells such land with the right to repurchase it. The wife redeems the
money using conjugal funds. Under Article 109 (3), the property is still
paraphernal as the right of redemption belongs to the wife. The fact that conjugal
funds were used is irrelevant in that the wife must liquidate such debt to the
common fund upon the liquidation of the property regime.
Another illustration of Article 109 (3) is as follows: The wife owns exclusively a lot
in BF Homes in Q.C. The wife decides to sell the lot and gets money in
exchange. The money is paraphernal property.
4. Property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband
The rule is the same for ACP although there is no express provision.
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and
enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either spouse may, during the marriage,
transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means
of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the
place the property is located.
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose
of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and
appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.
Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the
other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the
proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with
designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or
her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share
alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne
by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been
advanced by the conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and

similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous
acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Presumption: All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal

(but the contrary may be proved).
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only
one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or
both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage
from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive
property of each spouse;
Article 117 (3) is inaccurate. There is no problem if the fruits come from the
conjugal property. The problem arises when the fruits arise from the spouses
separate properties. For fruits arising from the separate properties of the spouses
to be considered conjugal, one must look at when the fruits are due and not
when the fruits are received. For example, A lends P 1,000,000 to B at 20%
interest payable every quarter. B is supposed to pay interest on March, June,
Sept, and Dec. B did not pay the interest due on March. A gets married to C. B
finally pays the interests for the months of March and June on June. The interest
for March is exclusive property while the interest for June is conjugal property.
The interest for March is exclusive property because the test is not when A and C
receives the fruits. It is when the fruits are due. In this case, the fruits were due
on March before the marriage between A and C. That is why the interest for June
is conjugal property.
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to
the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the
number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or
betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-
spouse.
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of
either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any
amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
Test: When did the ownership vest in the buyer? The source of the funds is irrelevant.
For example, A who is single, buys on installment a lot in Tagaytay. A has to pay 60
monthly installments. The contract provides that ownership would vest upon the full
payment of the installments. A had already paid 20 monthly installments. A gets married
to B. After that A pays the remaining 40 monthly installments using conjugal funds. The
property is conjugal following Art. 118. The first 20 monthly installments is a credit of A
against the property regime. The converse is also true. The relevance of the funds is
only for accounting purposes.
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to
one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in
partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive
property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made
on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal
partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of
the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of
the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
This is known as reverse accession. The general rule is that the accessory follows the
principal. Thus, normally the improvement would follow the improvement. In Article 120,
this is may not be the case, and it may be that the land would follow the improvement.
Thats why it is called reverse accession.
In this situation, an improvement which is paid for by conjugal funds is built on land
which is exclusively owned by one of the spouses.
In Caltex vs. Felias, the Supreme Court said that before Article 120 could be applied, it
is essential that the land must be owned by one of the spouses before the improvement
is introduced.
Rules:
1. Reverse accession - if the cost of the improvement and the plus value are more
than the value of the principal property at the time of the improvement. Thus, the
entire property becomes conjugal.
For example, a lot is worth P1,000,000. A structure worth P800,000 was built.
Thus, the total cost of the separate property and the improvement is P1,800,000.
However due to the building of the improvement, the value of the entire property
increases by P300,000 the plus value. Thus, the entire property is worth
P2,100,000. In this case, the entire property becomes conjugal. The cost of the
improvement (P800,000) and the plus value (P300,000) is more than the cost of
the land (P1,000,000).
2. Accession if the cost of the improvement and the plus value are less than the
value of the principal property at the time the improvement. Thus, the entire
property becomes exclusive property of the spouse.
3. Ownership of the entire property shall vest on the owner-spouse or the

partnership as the case upon the reimbursement of the improvement.
4. Reimbursement time is the time of the liquidation of the CPG.
5. The value to be paid at the liquidation is the value at the time of the improvement
(This overrules Padilla vs. Padilla).
Plus value. refers to what the improvement contributes to the increase in the value of
the whole thing.
Problem Areas:
1. Suppose the improvement is destroyed before reimbursement. Will Article 120 apply?
Article 120 applies only on the assumption that the improvement exists at the time of
liquidation. If the property is destroyed before the liquidation, the Article 120 wont apply.
In the case of Padilla vs. Paterno, the SC said that land never became conjugal
because the conjugal improvements were destroyed before payment could be effected.
2. Does the vesting of ownership in reverse accession retroact to the time of the
building of the improvement? The law is not clear.
Charges upon the Conjugal Partnership of Gains
The charges upon the CPG are parallel to the charges on the ACP.
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children
of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed
by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon
the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon
the separate property of either spouse;
There is no requirement here that it be used by the family since the CPG is the
usufructuary of the property.
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,

vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the

spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Articles 122 to 125 have counterpart provisions in the ACP.
CPG PROVISION ACP PROVISION

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts Art. 94. The absolute community of
contracted by the husband or the wife property shall be liable for: (9) Antenuptial
before or during the marriage shall not be debts of either spouse other than those
charged to the conjugal properties falling under paragraph (7) of this Article,
partnership except insofar as they the support of illegitimate children of either
redounded to the benefit of the family. spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-
indemnities imposed upon them be delict, in case of absence or insufficiency
charged to the partnership. However, the of the exclusive property of the debtor-
payment of personal debts contracted by spouse, the payment of which shall be
either spouse before the marriage, that of considered as advances to be deducted
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
as well as the support of illegitimate liquidation of the community;
children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding Article have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse
shall be charged for what has been paid
for the purpose above-mentioned.
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the
marriage in any game of chance or in marriage in any game of chance, betting,
betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling whether permitted or prohibited gambling, whether permitted or prohibited
by law, shall be borne by the loser and by law, shall be borne by the loser and
shall not be charged to the conjugal shall not be charged to the community but
partnership but any winnings therefrom any winnings therefrom shall form part of
shall form part of the conjugal partnership the community property.
property.
Art. 124. The administration and Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall of the community property shall belong to
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such the date of the contract implementing such
decision. In the event that one spouse is decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include disposition or These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. either or both offerors.
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any
conjugal partnership property without the community property without the consent of
consent of the other. However, either the other. However, either spouse may,
spouse may, without the consent of the without the consent of the other, make
other, make moderate donations from the moderate donations from the community
conjugal partnership property for charity or property for charity or on occasions of
on occasions of family rejoicing or family family rejoicing or family distress.
distress.
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership Art. 99. The absolute community
terminates: terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal (2) When there is a decree of legal
separation; separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or (3) When the marriage is annulled or
declared void; or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of (4) In case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage under Article property during the marriage under Article
134 to 138. 134 to 138.
Art. 127. The separation in fact between Art. 100. The separation in fact between
husband and wife shall not affect the husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of conjugal partnership, except regime of absolute community except that:
that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just
home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal property, the separate property of both
partnership property, the separate property spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for support of the family. The spouse present
the support of the family. The spouse shall, upon proper petition in a summary
present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latters share.
the latters share.
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligation to the family, the his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for authority to be the sole property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership administrator of the absolute community,
property, subject to such precautionary subject to such precautionary conditions
conditions as the court may impose. The as the court may impose. The obligations
obligations to the family mentioned in the to the family mentioned in the preceding
preceding paragraph refer to marital, paragraph refer to marital, parental or
parental or property relations. A spouse is property relations. A spouse is deemed to
deemed to have abandoned the other have abandoned the other when her or
when he or she has left the conjugal she has left the conjugal dwelling without
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of returning. The spouse who has
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
for a period of three months or has failed three months or has failed within the same
within the same period to give any period to give any information as to his or
information as to his or her whereabouts her whereabouts shall be prima facie
shall be prima facie presumed to have no presumed to have no intention of returning
intention of returning to the conjugal to the conjugal dwelling.
dwelling.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
conjugal partnership regime, the following community regime, the following
procedure shall apply: procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse. properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal (2) The debts and obligations of the
partnership in payment of personal debts absolute community shall be paid out of its
and obligations of either spouse shall be assets. In case of insufficiency of said
credited to the conjugal partnership as an assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
asset thereof. liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 94.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive
the use of his or her exclusive funds in the properties of the spouses shall thereafter
acquisition of property or for the value of be delivered to each of them.
his or her exclusive property, the
ownership of which has been vested by
law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the (4) The net remainder of the properties of
conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the absolute community shall constitute its
the conjugal assets. In case of net assets, which shall be divided equally
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses between husband and wife, unless a
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid different proportion or division was agreed
balance with their separate properties, in upon in the marriage settlements, or
accordance with the provisions of unless there has been a voluntary waiver
paragraph (2) of Article 121. of such share provided in this Code. For
purpose of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the
said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the
community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive (5) The presumptive legitimes of the
properties of the spouses shall thereafter common children shall be delivered upon
be delivered to each of them. partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless the owner had been (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the
indemnified from whatever source, the loss parties, in the partition of the properties,
or deterioration of movables used for the the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which
benefit of the family, belonging to either it is situated shall be adjudicated to the
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall spouse with whom the majority of the
be paid to said spouse from the conjugal common children choose to remain.
funds, if any. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there in no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal

partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or unless
there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this
Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the
common children shall be delivered upon
the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the Art. 103. Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the conjugal marriage by death, the community
partnership property shall be liquidated in property shall be liquidated in the same
the same proceeding for the settlement of proceeding for the settlement of the estate
the estate of the deceased. If no judicial of the deceased. If no judicial settlement
settlement proceeding is instituted, the proceeding is instituted, the surviving
surviving spouse shall liquidate the spouse shall liquidate the community
conjugal partnership property either property either judicially or extra-judicially
judicially or extra-judicially within six within six months from the death of the
months from the death of the deceased deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month six months period, no liquidation is made,
period no liquidation is made, any any disposition or encumbrance involving
disposition or encumbrance involving the the community property of the terminated
conjugal partnership property of the marriage shall be void. Should the
terminated marriage shall be void. Should surviving spouse contract a subsequent
the surviving spouse contract a marriage without compliance with the
subsequent marriage without compliance foregoing requirements, a mandatory
with the foregoing requirements, a regime of complete separation of property
mandatory regime of complete separation shall govern the property relations of the
of property shall govern the property subsequent marriage.
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership properties of two or community properties of two or more
more marriages contracted by the same marriages contracted by the same person
person before the effectivity of this Code is before the effectivity of this Code is carried
carried out simultaneously, the respective out simultaneously, the respective capital,
capital, fruits and income of each fruits and income of each community shall
partnership shall be determined upon such be determined upon such proof as may be
proof as may be considered according to considered according to the rules of
the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as evidence. In case of doubt as to which
to which partnership the existing properties community the existing properties belong,
belong, the same shall be divided between the same shall be divided between the
the different partnerships in proportion to different communities in proportion to the
the capital and duration of each. capital and duration of each.
Like Article 99 (3), Article 126 (3) is incorrect. The marriage regime in a void marriage
never existed. There is nothing to dissolve. The special rules of co-ownership shall
govern.
The rules on dissolution are the same.
Articles 129 and 102 are counterparts although there are differences.
Steps in Liquidation
1. Inventory of the CPG assets.
2. Restitution of advances made to each spouse (i.e., Article 122, 3.)

Art. 122, 3. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of
the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.
3. Payment of debts to each spouse (i.e., Article 120.)

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made
on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal
partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of
the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of
the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
4. Payment of obligations to 3rd parties
5. Delivery of exclusive properties
6. Payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each spouse
7. Delivery of presumptive legitimes
8. Division
Separation of Property of the Spouses and Administration of Common

Property by One Spouse During the Marriage
Separation of the property of the spouses and the administration of common property by
one spouse during the marriage can take place in both ACP and CPG.
A petition may be filed for the dissolution of the ACP or the CPG by:
1. Both spouses: voluntary dissolution (Articles 134 and 136)
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,

the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause.
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the
voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as

well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and
notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
and other persons with pecuniary interest.
There is no need for causes in a voluntary dissolution.

2. One spouse: petition for sufficient cause (Article 135)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant
of the decree of judicial separation of property.
Causes are required for a petition for sufficient cause. Article 135 (3) must be
taken in relation with Articles 229 (4). and Articles 231 and 232..
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental

authority also terminates:
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party
concerned of parental authority;
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may
also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the
same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of
lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have
resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising
parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so
demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or
adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority

revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the
court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated.
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the
child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be
permanently deprived by the court of such authority.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
The definition of abandonment in Article 135 (4) is found in Articles

101 and 128..
Under Article 135 (6), the spouse must wait for 1 year. After 1 year, the spouse
can file the petition for sufficient cause. Also reconciliation must be highly
improbable.
The separation of the property of the spouses may not be done extrajudicially
even if the spouses agree. Court intervention is necessary.
After the decree of separation, the parties can revert back to their original regime
by filing a motion in court (Article 141).
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity
with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses
and their children.
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.
Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting
the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of
property.
Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property
was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that
existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following
instances:
(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;

(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration;
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal
separation resumes common life with the other;
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously
deprived thereof;
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile
and resume common life; or
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the
spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary
separation of property may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67.
If separation was by voluntary dissolution, the parties may agree to revert back to their
original property regime. However, if they do so, no voluntary separation of property
may be granted again.
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse
may be transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an
accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of

interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be
the administrator.
This article enumerates the instances when the court may transfer the administration of
all classes of exclusive property of either spouse.
The following are the instances in when there can be a sole administrator of the
conjugal property:
1. If such is stipulated in the marriage settlement (Article 74.)

Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed
in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage
2. If the other spouse is unable to participate (Articles 96, 2 and 124, 2*)
* In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate

in the administration of the common (conjugal) properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community (conjugal partnership), subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
3. The court may order such in case of abandonment (Articles 101 and 128.)
4. If the spouses agree to such an arrangement during marriage. However, in order to

affect 3rd persons, such agreement must be registered.
Regime of Separation of Property
Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their
property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation
of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.
Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It
may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as
separate shall pertain to the absolute community.
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or
her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each
spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry
and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from
his or her separate property.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their
income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value
of their separate properties. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family
expenses shall, however, be solidary.
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
Requisites of Article 147:
1. The man and the woman must have capacity to marry each other.
2. The man and the woman cohabit.
3. The cohabitation is exclusive.
4. The man and the woman are not married to each other or are married to each other
but the marriage is void.
Under Article 147, the property regime between the man and the woman would be
special co-ownership.
The special co-ownership covers:
1. Wages and salaries of either the man and the woman

2. Property acquired through the work or industry of either or both
If the partner did not acquire the property directly, that partner's efforts must consist of
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household in order for such party to
own 1/2 of the acquired property.
In Maxey vs. CA, the SC said that the co-ownership arises even if the common-law wife
does not work is not gainfully employed. The common-law wife is still a co-owner since
she ran the household and held the family purse even if she did not contribute thereto.
The difference between this special co-ownership and the ordinary co-ownership is in
Article 147, 3. In this special co-ownership, the following cannot be done:
1. The co-ownership cannot be terminated until the cohabitation is also
terminated.
2. The co-owner may not dispose or encumber his share in the property.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If
one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
both faith.
Article 148 governs live-in partners who do not fall under Article 147.
Article 148 will apply if:
1. The live-in partners do not have the capacity to marry each other; or
Example of this is that there is an impediment of relationship, crime or age.
2. The cohabitation is not exclusive.
The special co-ownership only covers property acquired by both parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry. This is very similar to
an ordinary partnership.
If a live-in partner is legally married to someone else, the share of that live-in partner will
accrue to the property regime of his or her existing valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another his or her share shall
be forfeited to their common children or descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party.
CASES
De Leon v. RFC
On August 14, 1945, herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano,
father of third-party plaintiffs Teofila Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr.
Eugenio Soriano, obtained a loan for P10,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), Manila, mortgaging a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ibayo, Municipality of
Paraaque, Rizal, covered by original certificate of title No. 8094 of the land records of
Rizal Province in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, as
security for the loan
In this connection, it appears that the property was registered in the name of "Francisco
Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," and that based upon this fact alone without
any proof establishing satisfactorily that the property had been acquired during
coverture the lower court presumed that it belongs to the conjugal partnership of said
spouses. We agree with the RFC that the lower court has erred in applying said
presumption.
We should not overlook the fact that the title to said property was not a transfer
certificate of title, but an original one, issued in accordance with a decree which,
pursuant to law, merely confirms a pre-existing title. Said original certificate of title does
not establish, therefore, the time of acquisition of the Paraaque property by the
registered owner thereof.
Then, again, the lower court applied said presumption, having in mind, presumably,
Article 160 of our Civil Code, which reads:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
This provision must be construed in relation to Articles 153 to 159 of the same Code,
enumerating the properties "acquired during the marriage" that constitute the conjugal
partnership. Consistently therewith, We have held that "the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership." It had, earlier,
been declared, that "(t)he presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to
property acquired during the marriage ." We even added that, there being "no showing
as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the wife's
name alone is determinative." This is borne out by the fact that, in the previous cases
applying said presumption, it was duly established that the property in question therein
had been acquired during coverture. Such was, also, the situation obtaining in Servidad
v. Alejandrino cited in the decision appealed from.
The case at bar is differently situated. The Sorianos have not succeeded in proving that
the Paraaque property was acquired "during the marriage" of their parents. What is
more, there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
Ahern v. Julian
The schedule filed by the petitioner in these voluntary insolvency proceedings sets forth
that he has no property, estate or effects of any kind whatsoever, other than his
personal clothing valued at P50 and claimed as exempt from execution; and a claim of
P186.67 due from Sofronia Garcia de Ahern, his wife, for services rendered as manager
of her rice mill from March 1, 1917 to March 27, 1917, the date of the filing of the
petition, the amount of the salary being fixed at the rate of P200 per month.
The objector, a judgment creditor claiming the sum of P3,578.80 under his judgment,
opposed the discharge of the petitioner, on the ground that a certain parcel of land,
registered in the name of the wife of the petitioner together with a rice mill constructed
thereon and the business conducted in the mill in the name of the wife of the petitioner,
are in fact bienes gananciales (marital community property), and as such subject to the
payment of the husbands debts, and therefore improperly omitted from the schedule
filed by him at the institution of these proceedings.
To overcome the statutory presumption that all of this property, acquired during the
marriage of petitioner and his wife is communal property (bienes gananciales) the
burden of proof clearly rested on the petitioner. If the facts are contrary to that legal
presumption, the petitioner and his wife, better than any one else, should be able to
establish these facts by the production of satisfactory evidence. Doubt and uncertainty
may well be anticipated on a question of this kind where the interests of the husband
and wife are opposed to each other, or in cases wherein the lapse of time, or the death
of one or both of the spouses may have rendered the production of affirmative evidence
difficult or impossible. But in case such as that now under consideration, wherein both
husband and wife appear to be interested in establishing separate ownership in the
wife; wherein both spouses are living; and wherein the facts to be established are of
comparatively recent origin, we are justified in requiring clear, satisfactory and
convincing proof in rebuttal of the statutory presumption, when the interest of third
persons would be materially prejudiced by our failure to give the presumption its full
force and effect.
In discussing the contentions of counsel as to the character and weight of the evidence
necessary to overcome a presumption in the case of Alpuesto vs. Perez Pastor and
Roa (38 Phil. Rep., 785) we said:
Where the law imposes the burden of proof upon a party to establish the bona fides of
such a transaction as this, against a presumption of fraud, it is his duty, if he expects to
be believed, to lay before the court, so far as is within his power, a complete and true
revelation of all circumstances surrounding the affair; and where he suppresses
evidence or negligently fails to call a witness supposed to know the facts, it may be
presumed that the testimony of the witness, if adduced, would be unfavorable.
We find nothing in the record which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial
judge; and we agree with him that the petitioner should be required to include the
Cabanatuan property in his schedule of property subject to the payment of his debts. It
is doeS not appear, however, that the petitioners wife has been made a party to these
proceedings, and we are of opinion that the order directing the inclusion of the
Cabanatuan property in the petitioners schedule should be made, without prejudice to
the right of the wife to appear in the proceedings in her own behalf to defend her
interests, if any she have.
Jocson v. Jocson
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the
properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J',
pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637,
644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez
adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the
New Civil Code which provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held
that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the Property was
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property."
In the recent case of Maramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA
474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the marriage," and then
concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in
the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an
indication that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in
Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during
the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however,
upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was
still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because
the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467,
April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16,
1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of
the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this
ruling is not inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were
indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the
spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented
proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17,
1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to show
that the disputed properties were acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have
ruled that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are
conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such
proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of
Emilio Jocson.
Sideco v. Aznar
This is an action for partition and for the recovery of plaintiff and appellants share in the
produce of the land sought to be partitioned. The defendant and appellee is the judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased Crispulo Sideco, who died on the 26th of
May, 1942. She is the decedents widow by his third marriage, which took place on
January 26, 1912. The plaintiffs and appellants are his (Crispulo Sidecos) children and
grandchildren by his wife Matilde Jimenez, who died on March 14, 1906.
The subject of the action is a parcel of riceland 134.6671 hectares in area, situated in
the Sitio of Pulong Pandan, Barrio Sangitan, Municipality of Cabanatuan, surveyed on
May 21, 1908, and registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco, widower, on March 12,
1909, under certificate of title No. 77 (Exhibit 6). The land was declared for the land tax
in the year 1906 in Crispulo Sidecos name (Exhibit 5).
In the year 1917 cadastral proceedings were instituted in Cabanatuan, and the land now
in question was included therein. Pursuant to this order, Crispulo Sideco filed a petition
signed by himself, dated December 15, 1917, praying that the land be adjudicated in his
name and in those of his children (Exhibit G-1).
The most important issue of fact raised on this appeal refer to the finding of the trial
court that the land is not conjugal property of the spouses Crispulo Sideco and Matilde
Jimenez, but the exclusive property of Crispulo Sideco. The reasons given by the trial
court for this finding have been set forth above, and we find them to be insufficient to
sustain the conclusion arrived at. On the contrary, we find from a study of the record
that there is a clear preponderance of the evidence to show that it was conjugal
property of the decedent by his second marriage with Matilde Jimenez. The tax
declaration, Exhibit 5, shows that the land had been declared prior to the year 1906, the
decedent making the following pertinent statement therein:
This property was previously declared under Tax Declaration No. 213, Barrio of
Sangitan, Municipality of San Isidro.
(Sgd.) CRISPULO SIDECO.
Matilde Jimenez died on March 14, 1906, and, therefore, the land must have been
acquired before her death (for it had been declared prior to 1906). A presumption,
therefore, arises that it is their conjugal property. (Article 1392, Spanish Civil Code.)
We also have the petition of the decedent in G.L.R.O. record No. 79 (Exhibit G-1),
praying that the land be registered in his name and in those of his children (by the
second marriage), which petition was subsequently reiterated by his attorney, as shown
in the courts order of January 19, 1918 (Exhibit G-3). The motions presented by the
deceased personally and through his counsel, independently of the supposed illegality
of the proceedings in the cadastral court and of that of the order for the issuance of a
new title, are either admissions in pleadings, or judicial admissions, or against
proprietary interest (Section 29, Rule of 123, Rules of Court), which are competent and
satisfactory evidence of the fact that the land is owned jointly by him and his children by
his second marriage.
Onas v. Javillo
The community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled, or when during
the marriage, an agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal
partnership exists therefore so long as the spouses are legally united; the important
thing is not exactly the bond, the tie formed by the marriage, but, the existence in the
eyes of the law of the life in common. It is this life in common that creates common
necessities and represents common efforts, the result of which should be that both
partners should share in the profits.
When, for any cause, the conjugal partnership established upon the basis of the system
of community property is dissolved, all the provisions of articles 1401 to 1416, based
upon the existence of that partnership, cease to apply.
Consequently, whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the

partnership by death or presumption of death, or by either of the spouse on termination
of the partnership for other reasons and when this latter no longer exists, whether the
acquisition be made by his or her labor or industry, or whether by onerous or by
lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his
or her heirs, can claim no share. The fruits, as an accessory, follow the property; the
buildings, the soil; the plantings, the land all according to the general rules of
accession. (Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713, 717-719.)
It may fairly be deduced that prior to the liquidation, the interest of the wife, and in case
of her death, of her heirs, is an interest inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that
there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. . . .
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, supra.)
In this case it does not appear that there was a liquidation of the partnership property of
the first marriage nor does it appear that they asked for such a liquidation.
The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the above-mentioned
absurd claim and furthermore is not in conformity to law. One-half of all the conjugal
property of both marriages corresponds to the deceased Crispulo Javillo and must be
divided share and share alike among all the children of both marriages. One-half of the
conjugal property pertaining to the first marriage should be divided share and share
alike among the five children of that marriage. One-half of the conjugal property of the
second marriage must be adjudicated to the widow Rosario Oas and furthermore she
has a right of usufruct over the property of her deceased husband equal to one-ninth of
the two thirds of that property which constitutes the legitime of the children of both
marriages which is two-twenty-sevenths of the property corresponding to her husband.
This usufruct should be taken from the property pertaining to the second marriage.
De Ocampo v. Delizo
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two
marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted
from April 20, 1891 until her death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18)
years; and the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six
(46) years, or from October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at
the age of ninety (90) years. The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by
a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo,
and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943, specifically,
Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo
(the last three being minors were represented by their mother, Rosenda Genove) all
against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their
nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen,
Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.
It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the
second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article
1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however,
important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact
that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition of
these properties, and We have held that the children of the first marriage, as a matter of
equity, should share in the Caanawan properties. To deny the respondents-appellees a
share in such properties would have exacerbated discord instead of enhancing family
solidarity and understanding.
Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the
contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total
mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each partnership. 7 Under this criterion, the second
conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties,
and the first conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of
the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder 8 of the
conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second marriages, which would amount to
32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his
children of both marriages, 9 with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate
child. 10 The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half () of the net remainder
of the second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband
which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share
of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof.
PNB v. Quintos
The question whether or not appellants executed the aforesaid document Exhibit A as
husband and wife was decided by the trial court in the sense that the defendant
appellant Mr. Ansaldo is the husband of the other defendant Doa Margarita. For the
reason above given we cannot alter this finding of the trial court and consequently if the
defendants are husband and wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was contracted by
one or the other, for in either case as the debt was contracted during the marriage of the
defendants it must be paid for the account of the conjugal partnership in accordance
with article 1408 of the Civil Code.
Concurring:
There can be no doubt that the property pledged being insufficient, the property of the
conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation in accordance with article 1408 of the
Civil Code, because the same was contracted by the spouses during the marriage; but
in default of property of the conjugal partnership (Article 1401), what is the liability of the
spouses as to the private property (article 1396) of each of them?
In this jurisdiction we do not believe that a similar question was heretofore ever raised
and decided, and so far as the research of the write hereof discloses, it finds no
precedent in the Spanish jurisprudence.
By express provision of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership begins to exist at the
celebration of the marriage, and the separation of the properties between the spouses
shall take place (article 1432) only when it is expressly stipulated in the marriage
settlement, or is judicially decreed, or in the case provided in article 50 of the Code. This
conjugal partnership however, is confined to the properties mentioned in article 1401 of
the Civil Code, to wit: (a) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common property whether the acquisition is made for the community or
for only one of them; (b) those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses
or any of them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage,
from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. The partnership does
not produce the merger of the properties of each spouse. Each of them, notwithstanding
the existence of the partnership, continues to be the owner of what he or she had before
contracting marriage, as well as of what he or she may have acquired later by lucrative
title, by right of redemption, or by exchange with his or her property, or by purchase with
his or her money.
The ganancial partnership, to use the expression of Mr. Manresa, is the same conjugal
partnership constituted, in its economical aspect, under the system established by the
law as suppletory. It is, therefore, formed by the husband and the wife, each with his or
her own property and with his or her own debts. The legislator does not intend to effect
a mixture or merger of those debts of properties between the spouses. The partnership
maintains the separation of the properties brought by each spouse from those that he or
she may substitute for them, or privately acquire afterwards by lucrative title.
Under the provisions of the Code it appears evident that the conjugal partnership does
not produce the merger of properties, nor does it cause the personality of the wife to
disappear; on the contrary, the law established absolute separation of capitals a
complete independence of the capital account from the account of benefits pertaining to
the conjugal partnership, all of which constitutes a unsurmountable obstacle to the
presumption of solidarity between spouses.
The question submitted to our consideration presupposes the insolvency of the conjugal
partnership, and as there is no presumption of solidarity of property between the
spouses, the question may be asked, What liability do the partners have with respect to
the debts of the partnership? The legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained
in chapter 5, title 3, book 4, of the Civil Code, do not give an adequate answer to this
question; so that we have to resort to other sources for a solution thereof. Mr. Manresa
already indicates in his commentaries on article 1395 that in view of the provisions of
the Code regarding conjugal partnership, "the cases will be rare wherein there would be
any need to resort to the suppletory rule of the contract of partnership; but the law,
which does not in any manner pretend having provided for all the questions that may
present themselves in the practice, points out new sources of law to which resort must
be made in order to solve doubtful cases, situations or circumstances not provided in
articles 1392 to 1431." The case now before us is one of them, which requires, in order
to be solved, a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership, prescribed in article
1698, which provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of
the partnership, and none can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not given
him any power therefor.
The aforecited provision negativating solidarity in the liability of the partners is a

consequence of the conclusive rule of article 1137, of general application to all kinds of
obligation, to the effect that in obligations created by the will of the parties, solidarity will
exist only when it is expressly determined in the title thereof, giving them such a
character. Therefore if solidarity exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that the
partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership, because, as Manresa
says, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon him, and because the
same is not only not authorized by the contract of partnership, but is contrary to the
nature thereof, for gain being the consideration of the obligation, the latter cannot be
extended beyond the interest that the partner may have therein which is proportional to
his share.
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by the defendants does not show
that they have contracted a solidary obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the
properties given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of the conjugal partnership
of the defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are
jointly liable for the payment thereof.
Nable Jose v. Nable Jose
The Civil Code providing the manner in which the affairs of the conjugal partnerships
are to be liquidated prescribes:
Art. 1424. After the deductions from the inventoried estate, specified in the three
preceding articles have been made, the remainder of the same estate shall constitute
the assets of the conjugal community.
Art. 1426. The net remainder of the community property shall be divided, share and
share alike, between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs.
From the express terms of these articles read together with the other provisions of the
code touching he communal property, and more especially those which give to the
husband the exclusive administration of the partnership property, it may fairly be
deduced that prior to the liquidation, the interest of the wife, and in case of her death, of
her heirs, is an interest inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets
in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of the heirs
like that of the wife herself is limited to "the net remainder" (remanente liquido) resulting
from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after dissolution of the partnership;
and until a liquidation has been had, it is impossible to say whether or not there will be a
"net remainder" to be divided between the interested parties. Until the existence of a
"net remainder" has been determined as a result of the liquidation, they can assert no
claim of right or title in or to the communal property, which is places in the exclusive
possession and control of the husband as administrator.
The interest of the wife in the common property while the community exists is a mere
expectancy, and after her death her interest constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and there is nothing for the probate court to act upon, consequently the same is
not subject to administration under the laws for the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. (Packard vs. Arellanes, 17 Cal., 525.)
Having found that the heirs of the wife have no direct title or interest in or to the
communal property, as such, until a liquidation has been had and distribution made of
the "net remainder," it becomes necessary to ascertain the precise status of this
property after the dissolution of the partnership by the death of the wife and pending the
liquidation.
Under the decisions of this Court and those of the Supreme Court of Spain hereinbefore
cited, it has been definitely settled that during this period, the conjugal property remains
in the exclusive possession of the husband as administrator, charged with the
liquidation and settlement of the estate. But for the purposes of the case now pending
before us it becomes important to determine the nature of his powers as such
administrator, and the limitations, if any, which are set upon his disposition and control
of the property this intrusted to his possession.
The law prescribes his duties with relation to the conjugal property, which consist
substantially of the preparation of an inventory, the payment of the debts, and the
distribution of the net remainder. But how the debts shall be paid and how the "net
remainder" of the property shall be distributed the law does not attempt to direct.
Articles 1418 to 1421, Civil Code. "The object to be accomplished is fixed, but the
means of accomplishment," which "are as varied as the circumstances and discretions
of men" are not indicated. To secure the object in view, he has the exclusive possession
and control of the property, and in the performance of his duties, he is not subjected to
the guidance or control of the courts (as is the ordinary administrator of the estate of a
deceased person) except of course when fraud upon the rights of creditors or the heirs
is alleged and proven.
The duty to pay debts and obligations of the partnership imposed in Article 1423 of the
Code carries with it by necessary implication the right to realize the funds necessary for
that purpose from the property charged with the debts. But the law nowhere prescribes
how this shall be done or what property shall be sold or mortgaged, or in what order the
debts shall be paid, or what compromises or settlements the liquidator may accept, or
how the debts shall be ascertained. Since he is personally liable for the debts, he may
pay all or any part of them from his personal funds, and reimburse himself from the
partnership property. No judicial authorization or approval of such sales is required,
whether the property sold is real or personal. In a word, the husband, as liquidator, is
left absolutely free, in the exercise of his uncontrolled discretion, to provide for the
payment of the debts from the partnership funds in such manner as he sees fit.
We conclude therefore that the husband, acting as liquidator of the conjugal
partnership, and charged with the payment of the community debts, may sell or
mortgage all or any part of the conjugal property, real or personal, in the fulfillment of
the duties imposed upon him and give good and valid title to the purchaser or
mortgagee.
It would be inconsistent with the breadth and power of the discretion conferred upon the
husband to hold that purchases from him of personal or real estate should be required,
at their peril, to ascertain whether sales made by him are made in good faith for the
purpose of the payment of the debts of the partnership, or to require such purchasers to
see that the purchase price is in fact applied to the payment of such debts. The
purchaser has the right to assume that in disposing of the property, the husband, as
administrator, is proceeding according to law. And this is true even though the
purchaser knows that the husband intends to apply the money for the payment of his
own personal debts contracted after the dissolution of the partnership, because, as we
have said already, the husband may pay the partnership debts out of his private funds
and reimburse himself from the partnership property. So far as the purchaser is
concerned, he has the right to assume that when the husband liquidates or sells
partnership property and applies the proceeds to the payment of his personal debts, the
transaction is merely the means adopted by the husband to reimburse himself for
payments of partnership indebtedness theretofore made out of the husband's private
funds.
Thus far we have not considered the effect of misconduct or fraud upon the transactions
of the surviving husband as administrator and liquidator. The husband may fail or refuse
to liquidate the partnership; or he may sell the partnership property and misappropriate
the proceeds; or he may apply the proceeds to the payment of his personal debts
contracted after the marriage, not by way of reimbursement for the amount of the debts
of the partnership theretofore paid by him out of his private funds, but in fraud of the
rights of the heirs. Under such circumstances what are the respective rights of the
parties, and what is the effect of the misconduct of the administrator upon his
transactions with third persons?
The law expressly imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the
partnership without delay (desde luego). It follows therefore that any interested person
may institute the proper proceedings to compel him to perform that duty, and that he will
be liable to such person for any loss or damage entailed by his neglect to do that which
the law expressly prescribes and for any fraud committed by him with relation to the
property while he is charged with its administration.
While we have said that pending the liquidation the heirs have no direct interest in the
partnership property in the nature of as estate either legal or equitable, there can be no
doubt that they have an interest in the liquidation of the partnership; and such an
interest that they may compel the husband to discharge his duty in that regard; hold him
responsible for any fraud upon their rights of which he may be guilty; and, doubtless,
restrain him from the commission of such frauds in any case wherein they can establish
the intent to commit a fraud. They have no power to interfere with him in the exercise of
his sound discretion in the discharge of his duties as administrator, nor can they invoke
the aid of the courts to that end. He is the exclusive administrator and the manner in
which he shall discharge his trust is left to his uncontrolled discretion wherever and
whenever he undertakes to exercise that discretion. But the commission of fraud is not
an exercise of discretion, and the courts are always open to protect and relieve the
blameless victims of fraud when their jurisdiction is invoked in appropriate proceedings.
But what are the effects upon the transactions of the husband with third parties of the
perpetration of such frauds, or the attempt to perpetrate such frauds on the rights of the
heirs? Manifestly, where third persons are in connivance with the husband-administrator
or knowingly lend their aid or countenance, directly or indirectly, to the commission of
such fraud, the court will see to it that they will not profit by their misconduct, and the
fraud to which they are parties will vitiate and annul all such transaction.
The case is different, however, with innocent third person dealing with the husband in
good faith, and with no knowledge of his misconduct in the discharge of his duties as
administrator.
The doctrine of caveat emptor has no application since it would be inconsistent with the
nature and scope of the powers of the husband-administrator, to hold that purchasers of
partnership property must look beyond the insignia of power to dispose of the property
and ascertain, at their peril, whether in making the sale he is proceeding in the due
performance of his duties as such administrators.
In the case at bar, the husband-administrator of the affairs of the conjugal partnership
with his first wife, long after her death and after he had married a second time, executed
a mortgage in favor of the Standard Oil Company on certain property, real and personal,
to assure the payment of certain obligations assumed by him as agent of the company
after the death of his first wife. It appears that a large part of this property was acquired
during the first marriage, in the exclusive possession of the husband as administrator of
the affairs of the conjugal partnership which has never been liquidated. It appears also
that the title to all this property was in the name of the husband, the title to the real
estate being registered in his name. It appears also that the Standard Oil Company had
no knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage of the existence of a prior
marriage, or that the mortgaged property was held by the husband as administrator of
the conjugal property acquired during the former marriage. We think that it must be
clear from what has been said already, that whatever claims the children of the
deceased wife may have against their father, they can not successfully challenge the
validity of the mortgage to the Standard Oil Company.
De Ansaldo v. Sheriff
It is undisputed that the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy was derived from
the paraphernal property of the appellee, Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of the
other appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
said spouses. (Civil Code, art. 1401.)
The provision of article 1408 of the Civil Code to the effect that the conjugal partnership
shall be liable for all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
husband must be understood as subject to the qualifications established by article 1386
of the same Code, which provides that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment of personal
obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligation were productive of
some benefit to the family.
The meaning of this article is clarified by reference to the first paragraph of the
preceding article 1385 which reads as follows:
The fruit of the paraphernal property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership
and are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses.
Construing the two articles together, it seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal
property which become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for
the payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such
obligations were productive of some benefit to the family.
In the case now before us no attempt has been made to prove that the obligations
contracted by the appellee, Angel A. Ansaldo, were productive of some benefit to his
family. It is, however, claimed that, as the sum of P636.80 has become the property of
the conjugal partnership, at least one-half thereof was property levied on execution, as
the share of the appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. This contention is without merit. The right of
the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until
the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is also dissolved. (Civil
Code, arts. 1392 and 1426.)
Zulueta v. Pan Am Airways
The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is
due (or part of the amount due) from the defendant, with or without its compromise
agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar
as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the dismissal of
the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article
113 of said Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or
against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year."
This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real
party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in
interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage
with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the
conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract,
accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident
of the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that
said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate
award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with,
either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might have
been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to
sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs.
Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not
allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution
thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the
husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 18
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise
agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement
with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause,
such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if
indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the
law 19 seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that
had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult
a reconciliation between them.
It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs, that neither
is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets came from the
conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her personal suffering or
injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or
any of the plaintiffs. The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the
absence of said proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the
common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds,
for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life." 20 In fact
Manresa maintains21 that they are deemed conjugal, when the source of the money
used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been made by the
wife. 22 And this is the rule obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under
the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if
acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
there is competent proof to the contrary. 23
PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not among those
forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 153 of the Civil Code,
reading:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of
plaintiffs' contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare with
funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold that said damages fall
under paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired by
onerous title during the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of
our Civil Code, according to which:
ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property
belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these provisions or
of the other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of Book I of the Civil Code,
which chapter is entitled "Paraphernal Property." What is more, if "(t)hat which is
acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only
one of the spouses," and "(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband," 24belong exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that
that which is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms
part thereof. The rulings in Maramba v. Lozano 25 and Perez v. Lantin, 26 cited in
defendant's motion for reconsideration, are, in effect, adverse thereto. In both cases, it
was merely held that the presumption under Article 160 of our Civil Code to the effect
that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership does not apply
unless it is shown that it was acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract
of carriage was concededly entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs
were incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including
those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was
coupled, also, with a quasi-delict constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not
possibly have the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the
property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the wife. In the
absence, however, of proof that such right of redemption pertains to the wife and
there is no proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor
belongs to Mrs. Zulueta the property involved, or the rights arising therefrom, must
be presumed, therefore, to form part of the conjugal partnership.
Jovallanos v. CA
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of either or
both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full
ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such
ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
upon liquidation of the partnership.
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the property involved
with a lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the
former, as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the property. 10 In a
lease agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the
thing leased. 11 In fact, Daniel Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to
use the property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of a family,
permit inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in regard to the use and
preservation of the property. 12
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a
conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. 14 Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but
even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price
is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum
reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. 15Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive
condition. 16 the failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from acquiring binding force. 17
Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or as a contractual

amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by the aforestated contract in petitioners'
predecessor in interest was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His
monthly payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if
he faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be
considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the
said property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of
the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of
absolute sale thereof in his favor.
We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity
provided in the Family Code to the effect that
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired nights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was
merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right only upon
his acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment
of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A vested
right as an immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be
distinguished from a right that is expectant or contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed,
unalterable, absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, 21 and which is perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 22 Thus,
for a property right to be vested, there must be a transition from the potential or
contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it
must have become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. 23
The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled that the cases
cited by petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar since said cases involved friar
lands which are governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for
the purpose. In the sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate
of sale is delivered to the vendee and such act is considered as a conveyance of
ownership, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the
agreed price shall not be paid in full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was
delivered and full payment of the rentals was a condition precedent before ownership
could be transferred to the vendee. 24
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only after full payment of
the rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested
in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said
second wife.
As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference in the
case below that the rentals/installments under the lease and conditional sale agreement
were paid as follows (a) from September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds
of the first marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of Daniel
Jovellanos; (c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second marriage;
and (d) from 1972 to January 8, 1975, by conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy
Jovellanos Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements should be
made in line with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any
amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed
by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership."
Santos v. Bartolome
The first relates to item (c), representing P1,292, said to have been paid by Estanislao
Santos out of the community property to redeem certain lands belonging to his wife
(Marcela Tizon), situated in Bacolor, Pampanga, which lands had been sold, prior to the
marriage, under a contract of sale with pacto de retro. There can be no doubt that the
amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of the property should be deducted from
the community assets in liquidation, thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against
the portion pertaining to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which
reference is here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular
property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so also must
the property belong to her after redemption. (Civ. Code, arts. 1337-2; 1396-3.) And of
course where community assets have been used to effect the redemption, the
community estate becomes creditor to the extent of the amount thus expended. It
follows that, in the liquidation of the community property, account should be taken of this
obligation (arts. 1404, 1419, Civ. Code).
The second point to be considered relates to item (d) representing the sum of P3,000,
said to have been expended out of the community assets for the construction of an
irrigation system upon the lands of Marcela Tizon, resulting in an appreciation of their
value to the extent of 300 per centum. In respect to this item also, it is evident that the
trial judge fell into error in holding the claim to be inadmissible against the estate of
Marcela Tizon. An irrigation system beneficial to real property is a useful expenditure
with the contemplation of article 1404 of the Civil Code and, if financed from the
community assets, is chargeable against the party benefit when the time comes for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
The third point to be considered relates to item (e), representing the sum of P7,140.97,
expended by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, for the support and
maintenance of Marcela Tizon during the period that elapsed between the death of
Estanislao Santos and that of Marcela Tizon herself. It is undeniable that the expense of
the maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon, during widowhood, and while the
conjugal partnership had not as yet been liquidated, was properly borne by the
administrator of the deceased husband, but this expenditure was in the nature of a mere
advancement and under article 1430 of the Civil Code is to be deducted from the share
pertaining to the heirs of Marcela Tizon in so far as it exceeds what they may have been
entitled to as fruits or income. It results that there was error in the disallowance of this
item. We should add, however, that when this claims is again brought under the
consideration of the trial judge, the administrator of Estanislao Santos should be
required to show the source, or sources, from which the funds used for the maintenance
and support of Marcela Tizon were derived; and if it should appear that any part thereof
was derived from the net income of the proper property of Marcela Tizon, such amount
should not be charged against her heirs, in conformity with the precept of the article
above cited.
The last point to be considered relates to items ( f ), and (g), representing expenditures
of the sums of P1,034.95 and P209.85, respectively. The first of these represents the
costs of purchase, transportation, and erection of a grave stone of Italian marble, placed
to the memory of Marcela Tizon. The second represents the cost of a memorial crown
on a porcelain frame, with gold lettering, dedicated to the memory of Marcela Tizon. As
we understand the record, these expenditures were incurred just after the death of
Marcela Tizon and at the request of her own administrator, Pablo Bartolome, there
being a verbal agreement between the two administrator to the effect that Eliseo Santos
should advance the necessary sums for these expenditures, the same to be
subsequently reimbursed by Pablo Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon. There
can be no doubt whatever as to the property of allowing these items against the estate
of Marcela Tizon in the liquidation of the partnership property; and his Honor, the trial
judge, was mistaken in rejecting the same.
Lorenzo v. Nicolas
Upon the presumption that the parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 continued to be the
exclusive properties of Magdalena Clemente until shown otherwise and because she
had paid the sum of P116.84 for parcel No. 5 and P169.16 for parcel No. 6 before her
marriage to the late Manuel Lorenzo, the ancestor of the petitioners, from whom they
claim the deprive their rights to one-half of the parcels of land, the Court of Appeals is of
the opinion that they were paraphernal properties of the late Magdalena Clemente.
What she had paid during coverture for said parcels of land was declared conjugal and
deemed useful expenditures for which the conjugal partnership is entitled to
reimbursement.
From these provisions it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell the
friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same. In
case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to sell it is not the
heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the Government.
Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no
widow survives him. The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the
lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena
Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her
name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two parcels
of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente. The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel
Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid
during coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out
of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente.
Gonzales v. Miller
If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the alienation of her
paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would not
give rise to a cause of action for injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only
entitled to the net fruits of such property, after deducting administration expenses
(People's Bank vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is nowhere alleged that any
such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife's statutory power to alienate her
paraphernal (Phil Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future
fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself.
Rodriguez v. dela Cruz
It is admitted that soon after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz with the present
plaintiff he commenced to administer the property in question. There is no provision in
the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as
her representative, and certainly it cannot be concluded that the property which he
administers for his wife is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same for
a long time.
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the ownership of her
property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true that article 1384 prescribes
that she shall have the management of the property, unless she was delivered the same
to her husband by means of a public document, providing that he may administer said
property; but it cannot be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her
husband to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced by a
public document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become
the property of her husband. No such claim was made in the court below on behalf of
the defendants. Their claim was that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired said
property during the existence of his marriage with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.
With reference to the third assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and
so hold, after an examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause,
that the said lands in question were acquired by Matea E. Rodriguez by inheritance
during the existence of her first marriage, from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez.
Therefore, from all the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the said cause be
remanded to the lower court with direction that a judgment be entered declaring that the
said plaintiff, Matea E. Rodriguez, is the owner and is entitled to the possession, as
against the said defendants, of the lands described in the amended complaint
presented in this cause.
Moore v. Wagner
May support be demanded when the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of the
deceased spouse?
Mr. Manresa wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the
deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the
inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the
indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support
as part payment of the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to
the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny
the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just because of the fear
that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The judge or the administrator,
as the case may be, must grant the support referred to in article 1430, when the same is
requested, and if the creditors believe that they are prejudiced by such an action, by
separating from the estate a part of its income, they can appeal to the court therefrom,
by satisfactorily proving that there is no property or asset that may, in any case, be
allotted to the interested parties. It having proven that no property, either private or
conjugal, pertains to the surviving spouse or the heirs of the deceased, the support
cannot be granted, because this, in effect, according to article 1430, is only an advance
payment on account of the respective share of each partner."
Such is the case now before us. It appears from the record that the liabilities exceed the
assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his widow, by her own admission,
had not contributed any property to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the
present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance payment to be
deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no property to be
partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.
In re Bermas
The fourth paragraph of said Article 191 reads:
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of
the wife as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial
approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures
as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
It should be noted this connection, that, although petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. admittedly
has children by a previous marriage, their names have not been given in either Exhibit
Q or the petition for the approval thereof, despite the fact that his children with his co-
petitioner have been named in both. Consequently, said children by first marriage of
petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been notified personally of the filing
of the petition and of the date of the hearing thereof. In fact, no similar notice appears to
have been given to the children of the petitioners herein, although the danger of
substantial injury to rights would seem to be remote.
The situation as regards the children by first marriage is, however, materially different.
Indeed, the contract, Exhibit Q, purports to dissolve and, hence, liquidate the conjugal
partnership between the petitioners. But, this liquidation should not and cannot be
effected without a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and
his first wife, in which the children by first marriage certainly have an interest (Onas v.
Javillo, 59 Phil. 733, 737). At any rate, said Exhibit Q could adversely affect the rights of
said children by first marriage, for, "in case of doubt, the partnership property shall be
divided between the different (conjugal) partnerships in proportion to the duration of
each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses," as provided in Article
189 of the aforementioned Code (Article 1431 of the Spanish Civil Code). Hence it is
essential that said children by previous marriage be personally notified of the instant
proceedings, and that, for this purpose, their names and addresses, as well as the
addresses of the children of herein petitioners, be furnished by them.
Partosa v. CA
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval,
shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she
may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property or separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code,
which states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, of for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to martial,
parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal
dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either
of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just
cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to
return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime
providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. 5 There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states
that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected
the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City
when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the
action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the
petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for
the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the
family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their
conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other
women and siring many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner
and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later
for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied
being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his
refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing
as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation
of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us
although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez v. Court
of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in
reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law
prevailing at the term of such disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the
time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will therefore reverse a judgment
which was correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has
been an intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at the
time the case was finally disposed of on appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of
both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their real
owner. It is these properties that should now be divided between him and the petitioner,
on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the
spouses half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must
include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have
been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a
succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of
the properties he denied her despite his promise to her of his eternal love and care.
Tumlos v. Fernandez
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot
accept petitioners submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant
to Article 144 of the Civil Code.[20] As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not
Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, [21] only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith." Sc
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman
who are not incapacitated to marry each other,[22] or to one in which the marriage of the
parties is void[23] from the beginning.[24] It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts
to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife.[25]
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner

herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as
readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.
Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-
ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts
to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were
correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises.
Valdez v. RTC
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and
so applied in previous cases;[6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under
a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" [7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." [8] Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in
co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver
by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation [9] or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they
do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired
by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be
equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
Agapay v. Palang
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on
July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she
actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on
the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age
and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, [11] there
being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation
not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and
proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of
this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. [14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739
of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,[15] for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.[16]
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and claim as an illegitimate
son and heir to Miguels estate is here resolved in favor of respondent courts correct
assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristophers
heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent,
proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter
and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary
civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
Carino v. Carino
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man,[17] -
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
regime.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives
and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be
said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of
the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
xxx xxx xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and
will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
Dio v. Dio,
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article
147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both
of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous

marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for

purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court
in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages
are governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that
the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial
courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
BAR EXAM QUESTIONS
1. Property Relations; Ante Nuptial Agreement (1995)

Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without executing any
ante nuptial agreement. One year fter their marriage, Tirso while supervising the
clearing of Tessie's inherited land upon the latter's request, accidentally found the
treasure not in the new river bed but on the property of Tessie. To whom shall the
treasure belong? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, their
property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of the
Civil Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or the
proprietor belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. The one-half share
pertaining to Tessie as owner of the land, and the one-half share pertaining to Tirso
as finder of the treasure, belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
2. Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership of Gains (1998)

In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975,
Bob inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a
two-room bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was
worth P800.000.00 while the house, when finished cost P600,000.00. In 1989 Bob
died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative
values of both assets remained at the same proportion:
a. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal
but exclusive property of her deceased son. [3%]
b. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? [2%]
a. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The law that governs is the New Civil Code (Persons), in which case, the property
relations that should be applied as regards the property of the spouses is the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). By
conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or Industry (Article
142, Civil Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own
separate property, he having acquired the same by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148,
Civil Code). However, the house constructed from his own savings in 1981 during
the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property and not exclusive
property in accordance with the principle of "reverse accession" provided for in Art.
158, Civil Code.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Sofia, being her deceased son's legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts.
985, 986 and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not
conjugal but belong to the hereditary estate of Bob. The value of the land being
more than the cost of the improvement (Art. 120, Family Code).
b. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their
marriage way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). It will
not matter if Bob died before or after August 3. 1988 (effectivity date of the Family
Code], what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa
contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs them
is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)
ANOTHER ANSWER:
If Bob died be fore August 3, 1988. which is the date the Family Code took effect,
the answer will not be the same. Art. 158. Civil Code, would then apply. The land
would then be deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were
used in constructing it. The husband's estate would be entitled to a reimbursement
of the value of the land from conjugal partnership funds.
3. Property Relations; Marriage Settlement; Conjugal Partnership of Gains (2005)

Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10, 1990.
Prior thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in
the Register of Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly
acquired a residential house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In
1995, they decided to change their property relations to the regime of complete
separation of property. Mila consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative
business. The spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal
partnership and agreeing on a complete separation of property. Thereafter, Gabby
acquired a mansion in Baguio City, and a 5-hectare agricultural land in Oriental
Mindoro, which he registered exclusively in his name. In the year 2000, Mila's
business venture failed, and her creditors sued her for P10,000,000.00. After
obtaining a favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute on the spouses'
house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Gabby's mansion and agricultural
land.
a) Discuss the status of the first and the amended marriage settlements. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage settlement between Gabby and Mila adopting the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains still subsists. It is not dissolved by the mere agreement of the
spouses during the marriage. It is clear from Article 134 of the Family Code that in
the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of
property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order.
b) Discuss the effects of the said settlements on the properties acquired by the
spouses. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the properties acquired by the
spouses. All the properties acquired by the spouses after the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership. Under Article 116 of the Family Code, even if Gabby registered
the mansion and 5-hectare agricultural land exclusively in his name, still they are
presumed to be conjugal properties, unless the contrary is proved.
c) What properties may be held answerable for Mila's obligations? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since all the properties are conjugal, they can be held answerable for Mila's
obligation if the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family. (Art. 121 [3], Family
Code) However, the burden of proof lies with the creditor claiming against the
properties. (Ayala Investment v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February
12,1998, reiterated in Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
March 11, 2005)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Except for the residential house which is the family home, all other properties of
Gabby and Mila may be held answerable for Mila's obligation. Since the said
properties are conjugal in nature, they can be held liable for debts and obligations
contracted during the marriage to the extent that the family was benefited or where
the debts were contracted by both spouses, or by one of them, with the consent of
the other. A family home is a dwelling place of a person and his family. It confers
upon a family the right to enjoy such property, which must remain with the person
constituting it as a family home and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except
in special cases. (Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999)
4. Property Relations; Marriage Settlements (1991)

Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry each
other before the last day of the 1991 Bar Examinations. On September 15, 1991,
they agreed to execute a Marriage Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the
document in her own handwriting. They agreed on the following: (1) a conjugal
partnership of gains; (2) each donates to the other fifty percent (50%) of his/her
present property, (3) Rowena shall administer the conjugal partnership property; and
(4) neither may bring an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Both signed the agreement in the presence of two (2) witnesses. They did
not, however, acknowledge it before a notary public.
A. As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in the registry of

property? If not, what steps must be taken to make it registerable?
B. Are the stipulations valid?
C. If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above stipulations are
likewise valid, does it now follow that said Marriage Settlement is valid and
enforceable?
A. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is valid as to form because it is in writing. No, it cannot be registered in the
registry of property because it is not a public document. To make it registerable, it
must be reformed and has to be notarized.
B. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Stipulations (1) and (3) are valid because they are not contrary to law. Stipulation (4)
is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their
respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art 84, Family Code).
C. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The marriage settlement is not yet valid and enforceable until the celebration of
the marriage, to take place before the last day of the 1991 bar examinations.
5. Property Relations; Marriage Settlements (1995)

On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-year old businessman, married Karla, a
winsome lass of 18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin
and Karla entered into an ante-nuptial contract the day before their marriage
stipulating that conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their marriage. At the time
of their marriage Kevin's estate was worth 50 Million while Karla's was valued at 2
Million. A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left
no will, no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only
relatives: his brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.
a.) What property relations governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla? Explain.
b.) Determine the value of the estate of Kevin.
c.) Who are Kevin's heirs?
d.) How much is each of Kevin's heirs entitled to inherit?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.) Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and without
the participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage
settlement is invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides that a minor, who
according to law may contract marriage, may also enter into marriage
settlements but they shall be valid only if the person who may give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement. Karla was still a minor at the time
the marriage settlement was executed in September 1988 because the law, (R.A.
6809), reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December
1989. The marriage settlement being void, the property relations governing the
marriage is, therefore, absolute community of property, under Art. 75 of the FC.
b.) All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became
community property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution.
Since Kevin owned 50 Million and Karla 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52
Million constituted their community property. Upon the death of Kevin, the
community was dissolved and half of the 52 Million or 26 Million is his share in
the community. This 26 Million therefore is his estate.
c.) Karla and Luis are the Intestate heirs of Kevin.
d.) They are entitled to share the estate equally under Article 1001 of the NCC.
Therefore. Karla gets 13 Million and Luis gets 13 Million.
6. Property Relations; Obligations; Benefit of the Family (2000)

As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB
for the corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing
Surety Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to
pay the loan, and the bank obtained a judgment against it and Victorino, jointly
and severally. To enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the
conjugal partnership of Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not?
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement
executed by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation
contracted by the husband alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership
only when it was contracted for the benefit of the family. When the obligation was
contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was to
guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed
for the benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under
the surety agreement to be chargeable against the partnership it must be proven
that the family was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of such
agreement, (Ayala Investment v. Ching, 286 SCRA 272)
7. Property Relations; Unions without Marriage (1992)

In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a widow
thirty (30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined
earnings a parcel of riceland. After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived together
with Mabel, a maiden sixteen (16) years of age. Rico was a salaried employee and
Mabel kept house for Rico and did full-time household chores for him. During their
cohabitation, a parcel of coconut land was acquired by Rico from his savings. After
living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and
married Letty, a single woman, twenty-six (26) years of age. During the marriage of
Rico and Letty, Letty bought a mango orchard out of her own personal earnings.
a) Who would own the riceland, and what property relations governs the ownership?
Explain.
b) Who would own the coconut land, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain.
c) Who would own the mango orchard, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The Relations is that of co-
ownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph). (Optional Addendum: However,
after Rico's marriage to Letty, the half interest of Rico in the riceland will then
become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
b) Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The Relations is a sole/single
proprietorship (Art. 148. Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, and not Art. 147
Family Code). (Optional Addendum: However, after Rico's marriage to Letty, the
coconut land of Rico will then become absolute community property of Rico and
Letty.)
c) Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The Relations is the Absolute Community of
Property. (Arts, 75, 90 and 91, Family Code).

Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, Luis is gainfully employed, Rizza
is not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores. After
living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200,000.00 presently deposited in a
bank. A house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same
amount by the couple. Of the P500.000.00 used by the common-law spouses to
purchase the property, P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from
the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a building
belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits
received during the period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth
P100.000.00. being used by the common-law spouses, was donated just months
ago to Rizza by her parents. Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their
cohabitation, and hey ask you to give them your legal advice on the following:
(a) How, under the law should the bank deposit of P200,000.00 the house and lot
valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P100.000.00 be allocated to them?
(b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been
living together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Art. 147 of the Family Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of coownership.
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work, industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household. Thus: 1) the wages and salaries of
Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza.
2) the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of them
through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their
respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis
gets 2\5 while Rizza gets 3\5 of P500.000.00. 3) the car worth P100,000.00 shall be
exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been donated to her by her parents.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been
celebrated 20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, under which the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
by either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art. 142. Civil
Code). Thus: 1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of
P200.000.00 and the house and lot valued at P500,000.00 shall be divided equally
between Luis and Rizza. 2) However, the car worth P100.000,00 donated to Rizza
by her parents shall be considered to her own paraphernal property, having been
acquired by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civil Code).

For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer,
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they
were capacitated to many each other. Since Tony's salary was more than enough for
their needs, Susan stopped working and merely "kept house". During that period,
Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five
years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as coowners in equal shares.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and
wife, the property acquired during their cohabitation are presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or
her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the
parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment,
only those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or Industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the
family and household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of
the properties. Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot,
she has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation
from Alice, the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan
before his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or
partnership with Alice.
10. 2010
G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which
bore no offspring, was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code. At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the couple possessed the
following properties:
a house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the
purchase price (representing downpayment) of which he paid; one third (1/3) was
paid by G on February 14, 1990 out of a cash gift given to her by her parents on
her graduation on April 6, 1989; and the balance was paid out of the spouses
joint income; and
an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987.
a. Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)

b. If G and B had married on July 3, 1987 and their marriage was dissolved in 2007,
who owns the properties? Explain. (5%)
G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which bore no offspring, was
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. At the time of the dissolution of the
marriage, the couple possessed the following properties:
a house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the purchase price
(representing downpayment) of which he paid; one third (1/3) was paid by G on February 14, 1990 out
of a cash gift given to her by her parents on her graduation on April 6, 1989; and the balance was paid
out of the spouses joint income; and
an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987.
a. Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)
b. If G and B had married on July 3, 1987 and their marriage was dissolved in 2007, who owns the
properties? Explain. (5%)

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PROPERTY RELATIONS

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

Therefore, in the absence of a marriage settlement or when such marriage settlement is

1. Legal Separation (Article 63 (2).) In such an instance, the property regime is

b. Judicial separation of property

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer

4. Judicial Dissolution (Article 136)

To bind 3rd persons, the marriage settlement must be registered in:

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the

This rule shall not apply:

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the

System of Absolute Community

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either

2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse

Exception to the Exception: Jewelry forms part of the community property.

Presumption: Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

Illegitimate children are supported:

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

The wordings under Articles 94 (2) and 94 (3) are different

Article 94 (2) contemplates 3 situations:

b. Obligations contracted by both spouses

Article 94 (3) contemplates the situation wherein one spouse contracts an

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a

(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of

Art. 96 1. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall

Administration of the community property belongs to both spouses jointly.

Both spouses must consent to the encumbrance or disposition of the community

Art. 96 2. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

The other spouse may assume sole powers of administration when:

Dissolution and Liquidation of Absolute Community

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

In Article 99 (3), when a marriage is declared as a nullity, there is no ACP to dissolve

Article 102 enumerates the steps in liquidation:

a. Inventory of community property

2. Payment of Community Debts

3. Delivery to each spouse his or her separate property if any.

4. Division of the net community assets

NOTE: There are special rules regarding the family home.

5. Delivery of presumptive legitimes if any to the children

The presumptive legitimes are given in the following instances:

Separation de facto does not dissolve the ACP.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to

The regime of CPG applies:

The husband and wife place in a common fund:

1. Income of their separate properties

The rules on partnership shall be applied in a suppletory manner.

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

Article 109 enumerates the exclusive property of spouses:

1. Property brought to the marriage as his or her own

ACP also has a similar provision.

3. Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or exchange with

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and

Presumption: All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

3. Ownership of the entire property shall vest on the owner-spouse or the

4. Reimbursement time is the time of the liquidation of the CPG.

Charges upon the Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the