Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Autonomy,
Governance
and Federalism
Forum 2016 Summary of Proceedings
October 19-20, 2016
ISSN: 2243-8165-16-17
Phillip Gonzales
Director, Asia and Australia, Prof. Surya Dhungel
Forum of Federations (Case of Australia) Visiting Professor,
Kathmandu University School of Law
28 Open Forum (Case of Nepal)
Guiamel Alim
Chairperson,
Consortium of Bangsamoro
Civil Society (CBCS)
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Director of Transitions to Peace Programme,
Conciliation Resources, United Kingdom
WELCOME REMARKS
Mr. Seemann greets the audience. He acknowledges IAGs long-standing commitment and
contribution to the debate on autonomy and federalism, saying it has been working on this issue
even before it became a byword in the recent elections.
He also says that the forum will be a huge benefit to the audience and the Philippines as a
whole, as the country is a newcomer in the federalism sphere. He adds that the two days will
give all those interested a comprehensive and international view on the issue. He says that the
Philippines can learn from the different models of federalism from around the world.
He says that whatever the citizens call itautonomy, federalization, decentralization
ultimately, it will be about the self-determination of the people in those places where autonomy
will be implemented. Also, what is good for the people will be good for the country.
He wishes everyone a good day and a good exchange.
MESSAGE
Amb. Gorely acknowledges the officials in the room, along with the event partners, participants,
and her colleagues. She expresses her pleasure at being invited to open the Forum, and that
her country is proud to support it. She congratulates IAG for bringing together a wide array of
experts from around the globe.
She mentions that though her country is a federation of states, she is not there to promote that
system of government, but to say that federalism has its own challenges. However, she recognizes
that autonomy and good governance will be good for the Philippines, particularly Mindanao.
She also congratulates the Philippines for being open to new ideas and mutual arrangements for
peace and development.
The ambassador then mentions many of her countrys forms of support in Mindanao, in the
fields of education, inclusive economic growth, early childhood development, and programs for
peace in partnership with civil societies and organizations.
She reiterates Australias support to the Philippine government as partners for peace, and says
she hopes that the Forum will be a productive one and inspire new ideas.
KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
Atty. Lorena greets the audience in behalf of Sec. Dureza and apologizes for Durezas absence.
He acknowledges that IAG has always been at the forefront of the subjects of autonomy,
federalism, and governance through inclusivity, creativity, and creative thinking, and looks
forward to learning more about these. He believes that a multidisciplinary approach, much like
what will be presented throughout the next two days, offers the most creative and dynamic
solutions.
He likens the concept of federalism to sultanatesseparate but equal parts of a whole, and that
Filipinos are not alien to the concept as Filipinos are at the same time Bangsamoros, Ilocanos,
Davaoenos, etc. He says a federal republic will bring equality to minority groups sidelined by more
dominant cultures. With decentralization, the grassroots needs of these groups can be addressed
and they can take part in the issue of governance, as well as perhaps correct the grievances
committed against indigenous communities in the Philippines.
He mentions that federalism and autonomyin reference to constitutional change with regards
to the Bangsamoro roadmapas being one of President Rodrigo Dutertes cornerstones in his
administration.
The discussion of the need to shift to federalism, the buy-in of the peoples attitudes towards
this new vision of government, and how to make it work, are the main challenges. These
commitments are investments in nation-building. The people should know that diversity and
uniqueness can act as unifiers, rather than dividers.
Amer, speaking for Ebrahim and in behalf of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) thanks
IAG for the invitation to the GAGF.
He says that he will take this opportunity to present and expound the MILFs stance on the
issue of federalism. MILFs keen interest and monitoring of the issue is driven by their desire
to preserve the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), which they believe
is the solution to the centuries-old Bangsamoro problem. This problem or situation, he says, is
unique, as the Bangsamoro is the only region in the country that has continuously asserted and
fought for its right to self-determination.
Thus, the MILF is in support of President Rodrigo Dutertes plan to make the Philippines
a federal country. They are counting on the presidents commitment to implement the CAB
with the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). With this, the prospective Bangsamoro
Government shall serve as template of the Philippines as federal states.
He mentions how the peace process was accelerated under the administration of President
Benigno Aquino III, until the Mamasapano incident that resurrected age-old biases against the
Bangsamoro and made the BBL as its biggest casualty.
He goes on to mention that the issue of the CAB and the BBLs alleged unconstitutionality will
be settled by Supreme Court. The MILF also takes the position that if any provision of the CAB
will be declared unconstitutional, this shall be included in the charter change for federalism.
On other issues, he proposes that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation through the
Bangsamoro Coordinating Forum be the main mechanism to address the issue of convergence of
the peace agreements. The issue of inclusivity and convergence, meanwhile, can be addressed by
the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC). He and the MILF hope that the Executive Order
for the reconstituted BTC will be fasttracked so that the task of refining and enhancing the draft
BBL can commence.
He closes by saying that he hopes that this Forum will enlighten policy-makers to think of out-
of-the-box solutions to political problems. He believes there are successful modes of conflict-
resolution that can keep the integrity of minority rights. He speaks in behalf of the Bangsamoro
group when he says this is what they want to explore in this Forum.
Atty. Bacani begins his message by saying that the shift from unitary to federalism is part of the
new presidents campaign promise, and the two reasons often mentioned on the reason to shift
are:
1. To spur countryside development
2. To solve the Mindanao conflict
He adds that most are of the belief the term autonomy encompasses both local and regional
autonomy, and is likely to fail, while federalism is championed as the better alternative. These are
misleading and simplistic definitions.
He gives the objectives of the GAGF, which are: To broaden, refine, sharpen our frame of
analysis of 1) decentralization in the Philippines, 2) local autonomy for LGUs, 3) special autonomy
for Mindanao, and 4) federalism.
Atty. Bacani goes on to explain that these goals will be achieved by exploring how different
jurisdictions practice autonomy and federalism; how autonomy and federalism are negotiated,
and then entrenched as public policy, and implemented.
He adds that federalism is an effective device to manage and resolve societal divides and
conflicts. The forum will touch on the Cordillera case, but will focus on Muslim Mindanao, being
the only autonomous region in the country, that could be a template for a federal state in a federal
Philippines.
Presentations
Trends and prospects of autonomy and federalism as conflict resolution
devices for balancing self-determination and state sovereignty
Professor Suksi opens his talk saying that for sub-state governance to work properly, there has to
be existence of rule of law and respect for human rights.
He acknowledges that the issue of dividing internal sovereignty may be sensitive, but around
65 countries around the world with autonomy arrangements have succeeded at this, and many
other countries are contemplating such a shift. In addition, there is an increasing number of
federally organized states in the world.
He gives definitions and characteristics of classical federation and autonomy arrangement
according to the distribution of powers:
Classical federation legislative powers of the federation are enumerated, residual for
constituent states; representation is in part institutional for the constituent states through a
senate or federal council, and in part determined for the federal level through election by rest of
population.
Autonomy arrangement the powers are residual for the national level, and enumerated for
autonomous entities; representation at national level is determined through regular elections for
the population.
Usually, some sort of conflict is behind autonomy. However, introducing autonomy does not
necessarily mean the complete reversal of the conflict. The conflict may merely become latent
and that is what people should learn to manage under the rule of law, by means of constitutional
or sometimes also international law.
Defusing a conflict with autonomy or federalism is complex, especially when the notion of
secession arises. However, the constitutional or supreme courts of several countries do not
support this. International law does not support unilateral secession either. Therefore, countries
are ensured their state sovereignty is protected.
Prof. Suksi continues that the solution to restructuring a state is found within the state, via
exercise of self-determination. On the basis of the right to self-determination in its internal
fashion, people also have the option to consider an autonomy arrangement. With sovereignty of
the state protected by international law, states can also consider various ways their sub-states
can exercise of foreign powers. The possibility of autonomous entities becoming members of
international organizations, such as is the case with the Nordic Council in relation to the Nordic
autonomies of the land Islands, Faroe Islands and Greenland, can also be explored.
He ends by saying that there are many trends and prospects for balancing self-determination
and state sovereignty, and there are increasing numbers of autonomy arrangements and
federations in the world.
Prof. Suksi reiterates that because international law protects the sovereignty of the state,
in part also on the basis of the right to self-determination, autonomous entities have no right
to secession except perhaps under very particular circumstances. States should then be able to
adopt a relaxed attitude towards the grant of autonomy or creation of federalism.
Professor Ghais talk revolves around the structures of autonomy and federalism, and how they
can be restructured. Each can work within each other, or as a form of state, or as a federal function
with the center having varying degrees of authority.
He clarifies the differences among the various terms: decentralization, devolution, federalism/
federation, autonomy/autonomous area. For the purpose of his talk, however, he defines
federation/federalism as the system where state power is shared between a central/national
government and a number of federal units.
Autonomy/autonomous units, meanwhile, refers to the system where most of the country
is run as a unitary state but one or more areas enjoy considerable powers of self-government.
Devolution and decentralization are generic terms. In the federal and autonomous systems
where units do not have a uniform set of powers, the system is asymmetrical; when the powers
are similar, they are called symmetrical.
Federal systems take on many forms and arrangements. They have different distributions of
power; can represent groups depending on ethnicity, culture, or language; have different sharing
modes of legislative and implementation powers; different fiscal arrangements. Autonomy is
more clearly driven by ethnic differences than federalism, though in recent years, federalism
has also been also influenced by these differences. Prof. Ghai underscores that federalism is not
a steady or fixed state, rather, it is a dynamic construct in which a wide variety of factors result
in constant shifts in the intergovernmental relationship. The details of devolution are largely
dependent on the unique circumstances of a country.
There are many factors that can influence the working of devolution: if the state is undergoing
a regime change; whether or not there is a dispute about state sovereignty; if the international
community becomes involved in the states conflict resolution (this can also result in failure);
whether the negotiations are done in a democratic and participatory way, and under the rule of
law, rather than when the autonomy arrangements have merely been imposed, among others.
Autonomy has been the most successful in states that already operate within a liberal
framework, where the rule of law is respected, and where respect of cultural and religious
differences is upheld.
Critical is respect for the constitutionthe underlying basis of the state.
The aforementioned were also part of the guidelines to the making, structure, and process of
devolution that Prof. Ghai shared with the forum in the digital library.
Open Forum
1 How can a small LGU that relies on revenue allotment from national government benefit
from federalism?
Ghai: I think for that reason, when the economy of federal system is being designed,
special attention must be given to the distribution of wealth. Include in the Constitution
a formula for sharing of national revenue. Its also important to not leave all control
to the government, but to an independent authority. It might be controversial, but the
compromise can be a national or independent commission that takes care of distributing
national revenue to different parts of the country depending on their needs. This is
something to consider.
2 If only some parts of a country are seeking autonomy, do you think this calls for a shift
to federalism?
Ghai: Special arrangements can be made for that part of the countryfor those who want
to be federal. For example, Canadas Quebec French-speaking minority has a special
condition. India makes a special provision. Mindanao as a federal state can have special
negotiating powers.
Suksi: Political dynasties are a very domestic issue. I dont recognize that issue in any
other place. But reforms can be made at a sub-state level, including regular (sessions)
participated by everyone, which I think will work against political dynasties.
Ghai: I do not see that as an issue in any other state. Consider having a special kind
of autonomybetter to have that before federalismwith slightly more power. I say
that because you are trying to build some sort of identity and nationhood. If parties
are separated, and also physically apart, then they will not be able to join national
enterprises.
4 Regarding the unit not receiving any help from the centralbut what about a nation
like the Bangsamoro, which has existed for 300 years and resisted colonialism from the
Spanish? We were only legally annexed to the Philippines in 1946. Can it determine to
become independent or ask for a plebiscite just like Quebec or Scotland?
Suksi: Certainly. Such a political entity can seek for independence but with the pre-
condition that the state within which this request is made should consent to the
independence. I decline to go further into answering this question but my position is
the international order cannot sustain very uncontrolled independent rule in the world,
in spite of the fact that there may be justifiable cases which have long standing historical
struggles of independence.
Panel 1
Autonomy and Federalism:
Addressing Societal Divides
Phillip Gonzalez
Director, Asia and Australia,
Forum of Federations (Case of Australia)
Chair
Amina Rasul
President, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID)
Amina Rasul opens the talk, jesting that GAGF can be read, Gag Federalism.
She proceeds to summarize the earlier talks, noting that Prof. Suksi said that conflict will
not disappear under federalism, but really should be managed. Prof. Ghai, meanwhile, said that
autonomy can be easily accommodated within a federalist structure.
Rasul brings up that if the BBL had been passed, the Philippines would now have a working
model that could be tweaked to implement federalism.
However, President Dutertes campaign for federalism has resonated, and in Mindanao,
federalism is seen not just a means to share resources, but a means to peace with separatist
movements. She mentions that Duterte has made this a legislative priority, as the current unitary
system has failed to meet the needs of the Filipinos.
Rasul poses this question to the audience: If federalism is the answer, what is the question?
She then proceeds to welcome the international experts and panel.
Mr. Anderson opens his talk by giving an intro about Canadastatistics, its size, that it is bi-
lingual (a key feature of federalism). The three percent aboriginal population is scattered through
northern provinces with reserves with own governments.
He also touches on the rich natural resources of four provinces: Alberta, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia, and Newfoundland, as distribution of resources is a major issue in federations.
Giving a background on the federal system in Canada, he says they practice executive
federalism. It has an upper house but it has little political legitimacy in their system. He adds
that not all federalisms have important upper houses. Canada has a Supreme Court that is not
separate from the Constitution.
In the Canadian system, all their governments have large spending power. The federal
government uses its spending power in areas of social policy, promoting and creating a national
health system, social systems, etc. through conditional transfers. The money is also used for
housing systems, infrastructure, and higher education. The government spends in areas where it
cannot make law. This is another key feature in Canadian federalism.
In terms of fiscal federalism, both orders of government have broad, overlapping powers in tax.
Compared to many federalisms, Canadas provinces raise a significant amount of money, but they
also get a certain amount from the federal government. Federal government gives about two-
thirds to the provinces for health and social programs; one third goes to the poorer provinces for
services to raise the poorer provinces to a national level.
After transfers, only 35 percent is left with the government for government spending. Most of
what is spent goes to the level of the provinces or municipalities.
Observations:
Power balance shifts due to resources. Major shifts in the structure of the federation
happen over time due to war, the period of developing the welfare state, and active federation in
relation to provinces. Resource development has been a major factorparticularly in the oil and
gas industryand this has shifted the power balance between provinces.
A large part of success is the language policy and economy sharing. One of the Philippines
biggest tensions now has to do with different economic bases in different parts of the country.
Prof. Flores opens his talk with a historical overview on the regional divides in his country, touching
on the Hapsburg and Bourbon dynasties, Spains transition to democracy, the disputed wordings
in their 1978 Constitution, the re-making of Estado de las Autonomias, the characteristics of the
Spanish autonomous communities, and the current push for independence by the Catalans and
Basques.
Flores emphasizes that although Spain was founded in the late 15th century, regional
peculiarities still have not disappeared and continue to be a major source of tension. In modern
history, these were made most significant during the Spanish Transition to Democracy, when
pre-autonomous institutions were created in 13 regions in a mere year, even before the 1978
Constitution was passed. The final wording of the Constitutional text, was also controversial.
But new Statutes of Autonomy or reforms of existing regions who opted for autonomy were
passed from 2006 to 2010. The main goals were aimed at: Reaffirming their national identity
and symbols; including rights and liberties in their statutes; assuming new competencies, or
reflecting in their statutes those which they already enjoyed; introducing new institutions, among
others. Every community has a unicameral Parliament or Assembly; they elect the president
of the autonomous community among their members, and control him and his government.
Notwithstanding its global success and wide popular acceptance, several problems in the
implementation of the State of the Autonomies have appeared throughout the last decades,
among them:
1. A dramatic increase in the size of the public administration
2. Widespread corruption in all levels of government
3. A high level of inter-institutional conflict, which the Constitutional Court has barely been
able to resolve, at the cost of a heavy criticism and a loss of political support
4. Controversial financial criteria
5. Mounting public deficit
6. Social inequality
7. An unsatisfactory relationship with the European Union
8. The failure to consolidate a widely accepted common national identity, as a consequence of
disparate educational policies, aimed and what is peculiar of each region, and not to what
is common to all. But above all of them, the two most important challenges to the existing
model of territorial self-government in Spain derive from:
9. Public opinion radicalization: While a portion of Spanish public opinion has began to
believe that the State of the Autonomies is no longer valid, and should move towards
federalism, or even disintegration, another portion has started to demand a more rational
(centralized) State model, with moderate positions gradually losing ground.
10. The Catalan challenge, now more radical and straightforward than ever, claiming the
completeand even unilateralsegregation from Spain.
As further background, Prof. Saxena gives the following reasons for federalism in India:
1. To accommodate cultural diversity.
2. Since India was a British colony, they wanted a strong setting. She points out that in the
Constitution, the word federation is not used. It was used only in debates. India, however,
was described as a union of states with a strong center, which meant that they were
indestructible parts of a unit and could not secede. Eventually India has moved to greater
federalization since 1989.
She then moves on with how they deal with the divide:
1. Historical. Federal autonomy is given through asymmetrical power-sharing. Example:
through (special) provisions to Jammu and Kashmiri and the northeastern states; also to
Goa. She cites similarities in the Jammu and Kashmir and Moro issues. Both had/have
clamor for autonomy due to Muslim majority. The differences, meanwhile, lie in the fact
that the Philippines has conducted referendum, while India has not conducted referendum.
Also, autonomy in the Philippines is more oriented towards the administrative, not in the
political, sphere.
2. Tribal. Special provisions are given regarding tribal areas in the Fifth and Sixth schedule
of Indias Constitution. It was decreed that the hinterland population of the northeastern
states would be more autonomous from the center as compared to the Sixth Schedule tribal
areas. There is power sharing now among the northeastern states.
3. Religion. A set of provisions towards religious freedom was set, with no territorial
autonomy. But there are collective rights of communities, and also educational and cultural
Phillip Gonzalez
Mr. Gonzalez starts his talk with a background on the size and cultural make up of Australia
similar to the size of United States, a multi-cultural society, with aborigines making up 2.4
percent of the population.
He says Australias federal structure has much to do with reconciliation. As a result of many
revenue raising powers residing with the Commonwealth level of government, effective policy
often demands Commonwealth leadership, financial support and effort. One issue that has
received international support is Australias Close the Gap framework, a long-term effort that
builds on the foundation of respect and unity with indigenous Australians. It had targets such
as focusing on health, education, and employment outcomes. The campaign was about enabling
the indigenous Australians to also enjoy the same socio, cultural and economic opportunities as
other Australians.
Mr. Gonzalez runs down some milestones in Australian reconciliation history:
1967 Almost 100 percent of Australians vote Yes in a referendum to give the Australian
Government the power to make laws for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
1992 First meeting with Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. High Court recognizes special
relationship between the Aborginal and Torres Strait Island people and their land
1996 First National Reconciliation week
Open Forum
3 Can you expound on criticisms of the outcome-based approaches on Closing the Gap?
Gonzalez: The campaign was launched because IPs and civil society felt that the
government had acted without proper consultation with indigenous communities
and the focus was not sufficiently inclusive. The outcome-based approach also lacked
sufficient engagement with all segments of the society. They ignored the history and
culture of Australia; the history of abuse. They did not properly address the historical
crimes and abuse of aborigines in Australia.
4 Are the rights of the Inuits and other IPs in Canada at par with the majority/minority?
Anderson: Thats a complicated issue because technically, the Indians and Inuits have
rights that go beyond the regular Canadians. In fact, they were once called citizens-
plusthey have rights of normal citizens, plus aboriginal rights. In time, the courts
gave more credence to this notion. Weve also added treaties for the aboriginal people.
This said, their economic circumstances along with constitutional rights are obviously
much lower than other Canadians. There is a dichotomy of a higher level or rights, and a
lower level of socio and economic outcomes. This is part of the dilemma they are facing.
6 How many times has Quebec held a referendum, and who paid for it?
Anderson: There have been two referendums in Quebec, 1980 and 1995. Weve always had
the referendums without any reference to the federal government. Theyve allowed us to
hold them, but were not obligated to pay any attention to them. The second referendum
produced close results, so the federal government had to clarify rules of secession, and
it led to a referral to the Supreme Court. But the outcome of those negotiations will
be subject to a series of discussions, so its not done yet. If we do have the northern
part of Quebec as an aboriginal majority (who are also against independence), one of
the references in the court decisions is the boundaries of Quebec. That will have to be
negotiated. Thats a complex issue that arises in other countries.
7 Who can ease the conflict between the Spanish Constitutional Court and Parliament,
and the Catalan legislature that voted for a separate republic?
Flores: There is no higher institution in Spain than the Constitutional Court, which is
obviously an independent, and highly professional legal body.
8 Regarding offshore and onshore natural resources, how should different revenue
streams be treated?
Anderson: When you look at the boundaries of provinces or states within federations,
theyre usually placed at the high water mark, or the three-mile limit. But they do not
extend out to the furthest boundaries of the economic zone. So the economic zone in
the offshore lies outside the boundary of any state or province. The consequence of this
is that weve had legal decisions in Canada or Nigeria, etc., saying that these are within
the area of federal boundaries. However, the politics in both Canada or Nigeria are such
that you have to reach agreements between state and federal governments, so anything
off shore is treated as revenues from the offshore.
That is not the case in the U.S.
You do have different models and it has to do with the issue of boundaries and the
political arrangements that might be found around this.
One more comment Ill make about this complex issue is that oil revenues are central
to the fiscal revenue of the whole country. So having to manage oil in that country is
different for those countries where oil is secondary or unimporant part of the whole
mix. In Canada, oil is not that significant, whereas it is central in Nigeria. Nigeria has
had very generous arrangements for allocations for the oil-producing states and this
has caused disparities for those without oil. Its very problematic.
Rasul closes the panel by remarking that we might have to re-think the idea of autonomy
and federalism as the solution to managing latent conflicts, because these systems are not
only for where we have conflicts, but where there are strong dividers such as economic
divides, as well.
MESSAGE
Amb. Ahmad begins his message about how federalism is not about structures and models, but
about intention.
He says that federalization is neither good or bad, but he cautions that no system will work
without clear intention.
Speaking in behalf of the U.K, he says he sees themselves as facilitators to share knowledge
with the Philippines through experts and experiences. He considers the Philippines not just as
a powerful player in investments, but as a positive influence to other nations around the world.
He ends with a re-commitment to continue working with NGOs, CSOs, the administration,
opposition, and institutions to support the Philippines in her endeavors.
Panel 2
Negotiating, Policy-
Making and Implementing
Political Settlements
Speakers of Panel 2
included (from left):
Edward Aspinall
Professor, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs,
Australian National University
(Case of Aceh, Indonesia)
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Director of Transitions to Peace Programme,
Conciliation Resources, United Kingdom
(Case of Colombia)
Chair
Atty. Jimeno welcomes the audience and introduces the panel one by one. She then calls on the
first speaker.
Dr. McGrath starts his talk with a little background on his work, and says that a large part of the
work is building capacity. This takes takes time, and money.
He then gives an introduction about the Northern Ireland conflict between Protestants and
Catholics, which lasted over a hundred years, and cost 3,000 lives and untold economic damage.
The turning point was the election of a new democratic government in 1997 which resulted in
partial federalism, and the devolution of Scotland and Wales.
Northern Ireland (NI), though, only started its Peace Process in 1998.
Dr. McGrath gives observations on this:
1. After a period of conflict, the cessation of violence is relatively easy. The negotiating between
political police, and creating trust and conciliation takes years. Building institutions isnt
easy, and strengthening them is much harder.
2. There are a range of other powers which can potentially be devolved in the NI assembly,
but have not been requested. This is because sometimes it does not make sense for a region
with the size of NI to have, for example, a total independent air traffic control system, or
a postal service system. Things like this are too expensive and require too long to develop
necessary costing for policy development, implementation, and operation.
He says to be careful of what you wish to devolve as part of the process of federalism, and it
might be wise to wait for federalism to mature before developing too quickly.
3. Irrespective of any form of federalism that you end up with, its important that the institutions
are truly represented, transparent with public with regards to their proceedings, and can
be easily accessed particularly by the powers. There is no ideal model of federalism. It has
to take into account local values, conditions, circumstances.
4. Capacity cannot be built overnight. It takes many years.
Edward Aspinall
Aspinall begins his talk by pointing out the similarities between the Aceh case and situation
in Mindanao: Aceh is a developing Islamic region in a major southeast Asian state, and it also
experienced a secession after war. The heart of issue when it signed a peace agreement in 2005
was funding for the territory of Aceh. He tells the audience that his key message today is that this
issue has been resolved and resulted in sustained and dramatic reduction of violence in Aceh.
Prof. Aspinall then gives a brief history about the the Aceh movement, starting when Suharto
left in 1998, and in 2005 when negotiations succeeded. He says there were two factors that
accelerated events.
1. The Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed 5,000 people, which also acted as a circuit
breaker; and
2. A new mediator, former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaar, who adopted a new formula
of negotiations: Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This put major pressure on
both sides to come to a deal.
To make the agreements work, both sides had to make major concessions. They had to come
up with:
a model based on self-government, and
mobile political parties
Aspinall brings up the possible points of relevance to the Bangsamoro situation:
1. The Aceh peace process worked because it was based on a formula of asymmetrical
autonomy. It was was not focused on decentralization or federalism as a whole.
The special autonomy arrangements were outlined by the Helsinki Agreement and then
embodied into a law. It had special arrangements which distinguished Aceh from other provinces,
for example, on the allocation of natural resource revenue, maritime boundary issues, role of
judicial institutions in Islamic law, etc.
2. The agreements were based less on the political arrangements than the informal
settlements made between two sides. Despite repeated mentions of legal and constitutional
provisions, correct delineations and authority, etc., the rule of law in a country like Indonesia is
very weak, so what matters more is the informal political arrangements between two sides. The
maintenance of peace on both sides were of utmost importance. This arrangement opens up the
avenues to patronage and the sharing of power.
3. Both groups were able to deal with spoilers. Aceh is luckier than Mindanao in the sense
that Aceh had to deal with only one, centralized ethno-nationalist group that was easier to
discipline. The government also had the political will to prevent spoilers from both parliamentary
and military sides from destroying the peace.
4. Inclusivity. The Aceh case was very successful because it had a narrow, exclusive, and
focused set of negotiations between authority figures of the two sides. This ensured their
followers obeyed the agreement.
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Mr. Herbolzheimer starts his talk by saying that the Philippines and Colombia, being the two
countries in the world who most recently signed pacts of peacethe CAB of March 2014 and the
Peace Agreement in Colombia in September 2016signify hope to the rest of the world, by ending
violence and conflict through dialogue. However, he notes that he still remains worried because
the situation of both countries after the signing of the peace agreement is no war, but no peace.
He then shares the sad reality that no peace process in the world has been fully implemented,
and that addressing the root cause of conflict and achieving positive peace is a long term challenge.
He cites cases like NI and South Africa, which 20 years later, are still struggling with inequality
and reconciliation.
However most conflicts still end through dialogue. Therefore, the collective challenge for
those at the forefront of building peacefrom civil society to the policy makers, to the academe
is to get better at their work. Innovative practice and concepts are fundamental to increase the
quality of a peace process, for it to become more transformative and sustainable. Innovation
comes through practice, by responding to the needs of people in their context.
He goes on to share the five innovations in the peace negotiations in Colombia, a context with
many similarities to the Philippines, but also major differences such as the much higher levels of
violence there.
Democratizing the peace process. Peace cannot be left to the armed actors alone. The
Framework Agreement for the negotiations indicated a two-phase approach with a fundamental
conceptual distinction between negotiations and process: peace negotiations in Havana (Cuba)
between the Government and FARC with the purpose to terminate the armed conflict. And a
much more inclusive, long term, and democratic peace process in Colombia to agree on additional
changes and commitments the country needs in order to achieve peace.
Addressing access to land. This is the root cause of many armed conflicts in the world, but
has never been properly addressed. Herbolzheimer suggests that the Colombian peace agreement
may contribute to the global quest for doable, transformative, and sustainable reforms that
address this challenge.
Womens participation. In response to pressure from civil society and the international
community, the peace negotiations created the first ever Gender Sub-Commission, which ensured
a gender-responsive language in all agreements.
Preventing impunity. The high number (eight million) of victims, strong human rights groups
and a sensitized public opinion meant it was not possible to sign a blanket amnesty. Colombia has
innovated in acknowledging and responding to the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparations,
and guarantees of non-recurrence. Victims from government, FARC, and paramilitary violence
were invited to present their testimonies at the peace negotiations.
Preparing for implementation. Colombia was very well aware of the risks and difficulties in
implementation. They understood the peace process would not terminate with the agreement. A
Ministry of Post-Conflict was formed two years before they reached the agreement, in order to have
all the government agencies aligned in the implementation. Government also worked with Congress
on a special peace framework to fast-track new legislation and constitutional change.
Despite all these innovations, a slim majority of people voted No in the referendum on
October 2nd on the Peace Deal.
Herbolzheimer then draws comparisons between the Colombia and Philippines. The
differences lie in the levels of violence and geography, but they are also similar in terms of political
polarization, weak institutions and political parties, and that personal interests often come
before collective interests. He suggests that if the BBL had been put to vote in the Philippines,
the results may have been the same as in Colombia.
He closes with last comments on the implementation challenges, which are quite similar for
Colombia and the Philippines.
Widening the ownership to ensure public endorsement.
Moving from words to deeds when it comes to implementation.
Convergence with the other armed groups.
Cultural transformation to identify and accept the value of difference, and the unity in
diversity. This is as important as the political agreement, but more challenging.
Open Forum
1 What were the elements in place for the Aceh peace deal if the tsunami did not occur?
Aspinall: The tsunami accelerated the process. Before the tsunami there was a
breakdown of earlier peace talks, military offensives, human rights violations. It was
obvious that the army had failed in this issue. The tsunami helped seal the deal but it
wasnt the cause of a successful peace process.
3 What is the impact of the peoples No in Colombia to the peace agreement and the
FARC?
Herbolzheimer: It creates a situation of uncertainty similar to when the BBL was not
enacted by congress. What do we do? Start from scratch? Make some adjustments?
These are open-ended questions. The turnout of votes was only 35 percentit was a
psychological shock to the country: we were about to end a 50-year old war, and for the
first time, I think there is a pressure on government to not allow us to go back to war,
to stay the course and find out the solution. Thats hopeful because that causes cultural
transformation, the change in the political culture that our country needs.
5 What are the indicators of peace and trust, or lack of these in NI?
McGrath: If you look back from 1998 to 2007, our political agreement was originally
based on show of diplomacy. Since 2007, Ive seen the transformation. I see that the
degree of trust between our political candidates is probably higher than some of our
communities but then again, this is a long term process and involves capacity building.
6 Where does social conflict fit in these examples? In Mindanao, the primary causes of
violence is rido (clan feuds), the shadow economy, and common crimes.
McGrath: One of the biggest factors behind violence in NI is criminality. Smuggling
across borders, racketeering. One factor was that one sector of community, for whatever
reason, did not have faith in the institution of justice. So one of the big areas of agreement
in 1998 was a reform of the police service in NI, and implementation of a whole range of
checks balances and arrangements where people felt they had full confidence in rule of
law. So criminality is now much less of an issue.
7 To what extent can community programs help sustain peace process in NI?
McGrath: One of the most distinct features that you might not see anywhere else is that
Catholic and Protestant children are not educated together. I think sending children
to State schools together will help. Im proud to say that my kidswe belong to the 10
percentgo to state school. Sorry to say I dont have an answer, but its something our
politicians have to face in the future.
8 Regarding our situation of no war, no peacethat if you want peace, be prepared for
war: Its said that one solution to the conflict is inclusivity, but if this is not practiced
by those involved in this peace process (particularly the BIFF, the Abu Sayyaf, or other
potential spoilers), how else can peace be attained?
Herbolzheimer: Some groups do not join peace negotiations and form splinter groups.
The question is, do these splinter groups want to enter the negotiation at all, or is there
a reason for them not wanting to enter the negotiations? When Duterte took oath, I was
surprised to hear him say he was willing to talk to the Abu Sayyaf, but were the Abu
Sayaff ready to talk to him? Apparently not. Its a normal situation. Essentially, equality
becomes a matter of strength in the peace process, and the reason to take up arms will
disappear. The idea that you have to pick up arms to have peace disappears if you can
show that peace is delivered. That is the challenge.
McGrath: Two points: 1) Negotiation and building agreements between political elites
take many years. Our first major talk was in 1998, our major political party did not agree
with our agreement, it took years to refine the agreement before they agreed to form
part of the institution. 2) What we tend to find is groups splinterpolitical parties form
their own political parties. We have extreme groups who are violently opposed to the
process and who remained outside of it. We need the force of argument to make sure
groups arent increasingly marginalized.
Aspinall: We shouldnt underestimate the complexity of the situation. One of the
particulars in the failure of agreements is the number of armed groups.
Panel 3
Negotiating, Policy-
Making and Implementing
Autonomy/Federalism
Arrangements
CHAIR
Prof. Dunghel begins his talk with the geographical uniqueness of Nepal, which is ensconced
between two big powers, India and China. Its 2.6 million population is composed of more than
126 ethnic groups, with over 100 languages/dialects.
Nepals new Constitution, its seventh in seven decades, aims to address and manage this
kind of diversity, and to end discrimination through restructuring of the state, inclusivity, and
empowering of the people.
The following federalization aspects were taken into consideration during the design phase:
Creation of vertical and horizontal (multi-order) governments
Governance through Self Rule and Shared Rule
Constitutionally-defined sources of power for each level of government with five lists of
competencies
Mechanisms included inclusive representation; devolution of state powers; cooperative
federalism with institutional collaboration, cooperation, and coordination
Precondition: Democracy and Rule of Law
Incorporation of major changes: republicanism, federalism, secularism, inclusivity, and
mixed electoral process
The issue of inclusivity was top of mind during the constitution-making process in Nepal.
After intensive negotiations, almost all the essential aspects of federalism have been integrated
in the new constitution.
Its federal structure now has three tiers of government: Federal, Provincial, and Local. It has a
mixed Republicanism and Parliamentary system of governance; provisions for protected areas and
the autonomous regions; a restructured judiciary; and five lists of competencies (three exclusive and
two concurrent lists), with residual power at the center. The Prime Minister heads the Inter-State
Council, while the President has the power to warn, suspend, and dismiss provincial governments.
Aside from the executive, judicial, and legislative mechanisms put into place, formal
mechanisms that are constitutionally-based are also present. Examples of these are the creation
of commissions to: 1) manage societal and fiscal issues including that of identity and social
justice (Articles 250-265); 2) create inter-provincial relationships to implement decisions, resolve
issues, and ensure protection/security through equal application of laws to inhabitants of other
provinces (Article 233); and 3) enhance cooperation and non-obstruction to promote inter-
provincial trade, transportation, etc. (Article 236). These reflect the aims of the new constitution,
which are anchored on inclusivity and participation.
The challenges of transitioning from a functional unitary state to a new complex federal
system, according to Prof. Dunghel, are as follows:
Dr. Paikiasothy
Saravanamuttu and Dr.
Ashley South presented
the cases of Sri Lanka and
Myanmar, respectively.
All federations are different. Learning from other federations is essential in the best interest
of the country.
Implementation is an expensive venture.
Ensuring unity in diversity though tactful management of different aspects of cultural,
geographical, and economic diversities.
Mitigating discriminations and ensuring social justice through federal governance.
Issue of legitimacy (ownership and peoples acceptability), resolving disputes over demarcation
and finalizing federal design.
But he says there have been positive developments, including a First Amendment, and that
people are gradually open and prepared for dialogue and democratic practice, and international
support and comparative experiences. Other developments are:
Promulgation of a Federal Republic Constitution, Institutionalization of Rule of Law, Federal
Constitutional Order, and Local Governance System
End of conflict: Establishment of peace, political stability, human rights and rule of law
The assumption in Myanmar is that federalism might be based on ethnicity. This push for
sovereignty of ethnic communities leads to the impression that ethnicities are not problematic.
However, the issue is more complicated than discourses will present, and gives rise to the
question: Just how much ethnicity can be translated into territory, as the recognition of minorities
through territorial decentralizaiton can be a wonderful way to managing conflict. Myanmar has
14 statesdo you work within those boundaries?
Another issue facing Myanmar is the discussion of secession. Dr. South mentions that
the countrys colonial legacy has led to a great deal of distrust of federalism, and therefore
transformation of political cultures and engaging majority political minorities in discussions of
secessions are needed.
There is also the issue over economic and resource control and distribution. At present, much
of the control rests with the state, and the amount of authority they will cede if and when a
federal government is achieved remains uncertain.
Open Forum
1 Tayao: How do we make regional or state governments viable so that the issue of ethnicity
is settled and a government can function as an autonomous one?
Dunghel/South: That is the whole idea of self and shared rule, and uncertainties are part
of it.
Saravanamuttu: As far as Sri Lankan politics is concerned, independent states will not
get money unless they know for sure it will go to certain province.
3 In Spain, political parties start the programs. Is this also the case in other new federal
democracies?
South: No. In the case of Myanmar at the moment, the closest thing to a political party
are the armed troops. The question is, at what point do the armed groups transform
themselves into political parties? (There are instances when) formal political parties
are at rivals with armed groups.
4 In the experience of Sri Lanka, how do people determine the ownership of the peace
agreement?
Sravanamuttu: At the moment, what passes for the agreement is the constitutional
reform, and the people who are key in that are members of the Parliament. So in terms
of ownership, as it is going through constitutional reform, it will pass from members of
Parliament to people. That is partly the problem because the traffic is one way.
Presentations
Transitional justice and multi-level government in divided societies
Prof. Steytler begins by saying that by understanding conflicts of the past, you are able to move
forward and achieve a sustainable peaceful future. He says this in context of South Africas
experience, which has been the most successful model for transitional justice thus far, and has
been copied in a number of places.
Bridging the divide (transitional justice) can be done only by dealing with the past (in this case,
South Africas divided society). Establishing a multi-level government is part of a peace deal that
helps a nation move forward from marginalization and oppression to self-governance and self-
determination.
There were four broad issues that South Africa had to face when transitioning. Ideally, this is
an integrated, nationally-driven process:
1. Uncovering the past and holding perpetrators of human rights abuses to account through
amnesties and prosecutions
2. Reparations
3. Land restitution
4. Economic development
For dealing with uncovering the past and reparation, the National Unity and Reconciliation
Act of 1995 established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1996. The TRC came up
with corrective measures for the above.
The corrective measures to No. 1, Uncovering the Past, included truth-seeking and telling,
wherein human rights violations, violators, and victims were uncovered and heard out.
For No. 2, Reparations, no blanket amnesty was made available. Unsuccessful amnesty
applicants had to be prosecuted. However, due to the refusal of leaders to take individual
responsibility for apartheid, many foot soldiers were held accountable but commanders got away.
For No. 3, Land Restitution, there was poor and incomplete response by government. The
Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, for example, continues to be a slow process. By 2013 only
6.7 million hectares had been transferred to 230,000 beneficiaries. In 2016, land reform promised
50 percent of farms to workers.
For No. 4, Economic Development, moves such as the de-racialization of civil service; affirmative
action in appointments; affirmative action in state procurement; representivity targets for private
sector; and ownership charters for mining and other sectors were made. However, after 20 years,
whites still control a major portion of economy.
In the provinces (which enjoy restricted powers), the transition was marked by an extension
of basic education; a curriculum change from being Euro-centric to Afro-centric; social and
economic development; and agricultural assistance after land restitution and land reform.
In local government, as well, a non-racial future was being formed through proportionally-
represented councils and committees. Basic services were brought to previously-neglected areas,
and free basic services were given to indigents.
Part of remembering and honoring the past also included bringing back historical names, such
as Pietersburg to Polokwane (meaning Place of Safety), and Pretoria to Tshwane (son of Chief
Mushi, who settled in area a century before Pretorius arrived in 1840s).
These initiatives for reconciliation continue in 2016 in the light continued socio-economic
marginalisation of majority of blacks, and the radical voices question the reconciliation pact
made in 1994.
Prof. Steytler closes by giving lessons learned:
All elements of past injustices must be addressed adequately, but it is a slow process.
Primary responsibility for transitional justice lies with national government as it has powers
and resources.
Subnational governments play important roles in addressing structural historical injustices
of socio-economic marginalization.
Local government also plays a key role in remaking the local space so that it belongs to the
community.
Lord McConnell begins his presentation by stating he is not an academic, not a diplomatic
or technical expert on development and peace building, but a believer in tackling the global
inequality, global development to reduce inequality, global action to support peacemaking, and
peace building. He believes that lasting sustainable peace is impossible without sustainable
development, and vice versa.
In Muslim Mindanao, for example, only one third of young girls have the chance to finish basic
schooling. This is the impact of conflict and underdevelopment, so reaching a comprehensive
agreement to peace for the Bangsamoro is extremely important. The inequality of opportunities
for children in conflict-ridden and persecuted areas is the worst indictment of our times.
Lord McConnell gives what he thinks is the first context of the GAGF: The agreement of Goal 16
in the UN Global Goalspeace, justice, strong institutions, and inclusive societies of sustainable
development. This is a global movement that recognizes the need for the need to tackle historic
injustices, and to engage and inform the people.
The second is the nature of modern conflict. They are not battles or about colonies; most conflicts
now happening are within countries, and are about identity, voice, opportunity, injustice, and
displacement.
He says he hopes this will become a regular event and be supported all over the world. He
congratulates Atty. Bacani and says he is pleased to see many people present.
Lord McConnell then gives three points on building sustainable peace:
1. The solutions are different, but you cannot build sustainable peace without consent
for new political institutions. In Northern Ireland, it was about devolution, but it was
also about resolving conflict. The Colombian experience is not the same for the Philippines,
and not the same for Myanmar. Everyone has to find their own solution and they have to
build consent for it. He says that you have to make sure you hold onto that consent in the
future.
2. Inclusion. It is important that the people involved have a voice, when new political
institutions are being formed. You cannot just have winners or losers in elections. Different
political views, attitudes, ideologies, approaches, different marginalized groupsall have
their say in building peace and development. It is important to not make the mistake of the
past, of excluding voices. The voice of women is also important for new institutions. He
gives the Scotland example, when there were 50 percent men and 50 percent women in
parliament. The mix changed the issues they discussed, the focus, and the representation
of the public. The blank sheet or opportunity to create something out of something new
should be seized.
3. Be able to deliver. Institutions and agreements should be able to deliver. Its just as
important to think about what to deliver with the institution, not just the institution to
deliver. In addition to thinking about building the capacity to have the institution in place,
think clearly about the policies, and how they can change the lives of people they represent.
Institutions should deliver for the peopleprovide opportunities, create jobs.
He ends with an anecdote about a girl he visited in a refugee camp in May 2016. She was
smiling as she told him about her familys hardships, but broke down when Lord McConnell
asked about her schooling. What mattered to the 12-year-old girl, who had seen horrific things,
was her education. This encounter underscored just how important economic policy, education,
and opportunity are to people affected by conflict.
Open Forum
1 How did South Africa deal with the many faces of justice? Wasnt truth always shaped
by the political?
Steytler: What took shape and taking it as face value, added with a judicial angle,
presents a credible view of the past. Often it wasnt contested. So it wasnt simply that
a new truth was imposed on the people. The search for truth has to be critical. How do
you do that? Through thorough research.
Steytler: In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) as the liberation
movement started forming elites, and they had vested interests. And now there comes
an opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, that after the 2016 local elections governs
four of the eight metropolitan municipalities in the country, something which was
unthinkable five years ago. This opposition party said, We will give you better services
than what you received in the past, based on their good government in one metro. So
ANC is saying: We cannot risk this any longer. We have to improve service delivery as
well. Competitive politics have in fact started to shake up old elites.
4 How can the prejudice against the BBL be overcome? How can we change the mindset of
majority vs minority?
Steytler: Biases are one of the most difficult things to change. One must look at
various ways to change mentalities. One way is through education, to ensure a greater
understanding of each other, making the other not so other. A second way is through
the media. Changing attitudes is a long process and something you must work at
constantly.
McConnell: Challenging prejudice requires strong public leadership. We only have
to look at the most advanced democracies in the worldUK, US, Franceto see that
democracy does not automatically reduce racism and prejudice.
Panel 4
Women, Indigenous Peoples
and Childrens Forum
Edtami Mansayagan
Member, UN Expert Mechanism
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Lotta Sylwander
Country Representative, UNICEF Philippines
Chair
Crisanto Cayon
Independent Consultant
Cayon opens the panel by noting how interesting the topic is, and how much the audience can
gain. The personalities around which the talks will revolve are the most vulnerablewomen,
children, and IPs.
In relation to this, he notes that;
1. The Philippines is now experiencing a demographic window. Until 2050, half of the
population will be below 23 and the other above 23. This means more able-bodied
individuals in the population compared to dependents.
2. We have powerful, independent women. They pick up the pieces after displacements. Being
a woman is not being in a position of vulnerability, but of power and potential.
3. The Philippines is the first to have an action plan in the UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1325.
Cayon says the panel seeks to explore the place of these groups in the peace process, and in
political reforms that seek to resolve societal conflicts. It will also explore global studies, best
practices, welfare, and rights. He adds that he hopes meaningful ways forward will also be
uncovered.
He then introduces the speakers.
such as muscle, exclusion, prejudice, and corruption at both national and local levels will bring
about the same undesired results.
Therefore, its important to determine what powers will deal with womens interests and
issuesfamily (ex.: how to get a divorce), succession (ex.: what happens to property when
someone dies), custody rights, labor (ex: maternity leaves), and sexual offenses. This also includes
education, health, and human rights.
Ms. Ghai ends her talk with the following questions. These questions that should be taken into
consideration before opting for autonomy or federalism:
Are local customs likely to have particular approaches to women issues?
How strong are local customs?
How different are local customs?
If customs and traditions are not friendly to women, how are you going to set mechanisms so
that these customs are regulated or changed to ensure women get best out of federalism?
Edtami Mansayagan
Mr. Mansayagan opens his talk by apologizing that he does not have a prepared presentation, but
just as well, since his people are used to oral transmission of knowledge.
He laments the fact that IPs are under-represented, and reduced to being a sectora sector
that is often seen as vulnerable.
The vulnerability often attributed to them, he says, is due to their land being continuously
taken away. The IP identity is always tied to their territory. But every day they suffer from
discrimination, are uprooted from their lands and livelihoods. Their culture and the material
basis for their cultures are also being destroyed.
He also laments that IPs are seen as baggage and not givers of solutions.
However, he says that IPs too can talk about governance and autonomy, and are holders of great
wisdom, since they live the experience: living by themselves, not depending on others. They are
also masters of their own environment, and are gatekeepers to traditional medicinal knowledge.
Mr. Mansayagan says that during the time of his forefathers, differences did not necessarily
mean one was superior or inferior to another. Each compensated for the others weakness.
He wishes the states would look to the IPs for wisdom. The sad thing is that, even if people
indeed study and spend time with them, it is mainly about the things that interest the scholars
that make it to the books and documentaries. These people go out into the world with incomplete
knowledge, and therefore misrepresent the IPs once more.
Mr. Mansayagan says he is saddened that there are still no specific guidelines recognizing
the IPs. Because of this, the institutions of state and government, in the context of the peace
process, are at a loss on how to relate with them. That they are continuously divided by religion,
by development, by NGOs, and even by the peace process, does not help in their goal to gain a
solid voice.
He closes by informing the audience that a colleague is working on the One flag, one territory,
one governance framework, and that all they want is to restore the collective dignity of people
who would like to participate in the mainstream government.
Cayon acknowledges the heartfelt message of Mr. Mansayagan, and adds that of the 110 ethnic
groups in the Philippines, 60 percent are found in Mindanao.
Lotta Sylwander
Ms. Sylwander begins her talk with a short intro on her work in the Philippines. She says that
most notably, the issue of federalism has raised questions on what impact it has on children, and
that UNICEF is interested to participate in this discussion and share some experiences about the
issue, and what it has learned from other countries.
She adds that the Philippine government is a signatory in the Convention of Rights of the Child,
which mandates and obligates that every Filipino child survives and develops full potential. Forty
percent of 100 million population are children. Unfortunately, there are still key deprivations
being suffered by Filipino children.
The deprivations face mostly the poor, especially the children in the Bangsamoro, and
particularly the IP children in those areas. One out of three kids are stunted, which means they
will never reach their potential height and cognitive ability. The Philippines is also one of the top
10 countries in the world who have the highest number of kids who are not able to attend school.
This totals 1.2 million children from the ages of five to 15, excluding kids from the Bangsamoro
region. In 2009, it was found that four out of 10 kids live in poverty, especially in Mindanao. And
while the Philippines has experienced economic growth, there is still disparity, which is highest
among IP and kids with disabilities.
On the relation between autonomy/federalism and children, Ms. Sylwander says there is
no evidence that says autonomy and decentralization actually improves the lives of children;
material on the effect of federalism is scarce as well.
She draws on the experience of other countries to come up with the following points:
1. Decentralization increases equity, responsiveness, and quality of service. If decentralization
and federalism is well-practiced and well implemented, they can avoid these risks:
- capture of benefits by local elites
- increased ethnic, religious, and cultural rivalries
- lack of capacity to administer
- loss of economies of scale
- increased duplication of functions and and increased sub-national disparities from greater
reliance on local generation resources.
One of the failures of national decentralization policies is to ignore qualitative differences
between social sectors. Decentralization works differently between each sector, like health,
education, and water.
2. The challenge is to identify and allocate local needs, capacities, budgets for these sectors.
Choices or assignments of responsibilities also have to be tailored among these sectors.
If done well, there will be improved equity, efficiency, accessibility, and accountability.
If identification and allocation are done poorly, it can result in chaos and inequity.
Decentralization can make possible equity-based intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
Challenges rise when:
- LGUs are unable to raise resources
- There is competition for the resources from the center
- There are constraints in devising formulas and indicators for calculation of sub-national
grants
Ms. Sylwander closes her talk by saying that in theory, decentralization could have a positive
impact on poverty. It also makes the voice of the poor heard, can increase participation of the
poor and their children at local levels, and increase accountability of government at different
levels.
She reiterates that whatever form we choose, whether it be federal or autonomy or decentralization,
the government is obligated to fulfill not just human rights but the rights of 40 million children in the
Philippines.
Open Forum
1 There are 110 indigenous groups, 60 percent of those are in Mindanao. Do you have a
sense of how they collectively look at federalism in this transition time?
Mansayagan: We have been talking about this even before federalism became a
buzzword.
3 Can IPs make their own basic law so that they can establish their own peoples original
identity?
Mansayagan: Just like when you ask for respect, we have to assume collective
responsibility and assert our rights. These rights are too precious. We have to continue
and demand and to work so we can promote our basic rights. So with this peace process,
I encourage my brothers and sisters, the IPs in the Bangsamoro area, to partner with us.
I am looking forward to exchanging ideas on the partnership.
SUMMARY OF
KEY POINTS
Mr. Anderson begins by commenting on the incredibly rich and long day, and that he was struck
by the views and energy of the day.
He draws the following points from the days talks and as someone who has seen exercises of
devolution and federalism around the world.
De-link the issues of Bangsamoro agreements and federalism. The Bangsamoro agreement
doesnt provide the model of what the states might look like in a federal system.
Consider asymmetry. There are many special autonomy arrangements around the world.
Some of them grant a very extensive autonomy to particular groups. Anderson says that in a study
he made, he found out that the relative size of special autonomy groups compared to the whole of
the population of the larger unitex: Kashmir, Puerto Rico, Azores, Zanzibarhave populations
that are only one to three percent of the whole population. This means giving autonomy to one
group is not very de-stabilizing to the whole unit.
In the Philippines, the Bangsamoro accounts for just four percent. This is quite manageable for
an extensive devolution.
Re-frame the debate. How do you frame the debate of the Bangsamoro and federalism and
take it to the public? You need to emphasize that a federalism is an extraordinary government,
and some federal governments are more centralized than unitary.
One way to engage the debate on the national level, is creating the vision for a more effective
and responsible form of government. If you make the Bangsamoro too central to the issue of
federalism, you re-focus the debateand the impression is that the shift to federalism is being
done for only the Bangsamoro, as opposed to doing it for the whole country.
It should be about better government, not just about conflict resolution. In many countries that
have very low levels of conflict, but have geographical challenges (like the Philippines, with 100
million people), adopting a devolved government is a natural direction. Most countries who do
not have a 100 million population have a devolved government.
Success factors:
Respect for the rule of law. Anderson says people have to have a high respect for the system
they choose.
National and regional identity. Most federations did not arise from conflict, but most have a
national identity and a regional identity. Its important to think about both national and regional
identity.
Success in transition. Build capacity. Think about Colombia, which, two years prior, already
made laws in anticipation of implementation. But having things on paper will not make things
happen. Ethiopia, although not very federal, made a ministry for capacity. They made remarkable
transformations even though they did not have the resources.
Fiscal arrangements. A reasonable fiscal structure is needed to keep this country viable.
Most federal governments have structures for funding. Not having one will set the Philippines
up for failure.
Transfer of power. Have a variable rate of transfer of power. States can have different levels
of readiness.
Re-think adding another level of government. The Philippines already has a lot of provinces.
Italy is already thinking about a referendum to abolish provinces because it is too expensive.
Sovereignty, or leaving certain areas to their own devices. This is the formula for problems.
There is a need to develop strong systems for transparency and capability at the sub-national
levels. Devolution and federalism can accommodate that, but this doesnt mean that these sub-
states cannot be held accountable to fiscal matters and various other issues.
Governor Hataman welcomes everyone to the dinner and congratulates IAG and KAS for
organizing the forum.
He acknowledges the community and spirit of learning that transpired that day, and the
importance of listening and knowledge sharing, especially since there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to governance.
He adds that neither federalism nor decentralization are new propositions in Philippine
governance. He revisits how the Local Government Code of 1991 was ratified, and how its flaws
showed throughout the years.
Hataman continues with a description of the case of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
which appears to enjoy more autonomy than LGUs, but in reality does not. Implementing the
devolution of powers has not been so smooth, as ARMM still has to depend heavily on the national
ARMM Executive
Secretary Laisa
Alamia delivering a
message in behalf of
ARMM Governor Mujiv
Hataman.
DAY
Autonomy,
Governance
and Federalism,
for Sustainable
Peace and
Development
Message
Mr. Hasper opens Day 2, saying it is a great honor and pleasure to address the participants.
He goes on to say that the topics to be discussed on the second day are complex, but such
substantive input and discussions are needed for results.
He gives background on the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German foundation that is also
for federalism. Federalism is particularly special to Germans as it helped shaped their country.
It was a tool to end dictatorship, and they brought it back after fall of the Nazis. Federalism has
become the pillar of German democracy.
Mr. Hasper describes their system of federalism: It has limited powers at the center and
provides autonomy to the independent states; provides for fair elections through democratic
structures within municipalities; protects local minorities and regional differences; and the
concept of subsidiarity is part of their constitution.
However, he says there is no ideal political system, and federalism comes at a price. In a federal
system, political processes can be complicated and time consuming. But that is also the core and
strength of the democratic process.
One more challenge is how to define individual states, territory, and rightsthe same challenges
that might be at the heart of the Filipino discourse.
Whether federalism will work or not, he says, depends on the Filipino people. Compromise is
a central part of any constitutional change, and a federal system can only be successful if it fits
OPENING REMARKS
Atty. Bacani opens the second day by describing the power of the first. By bringing the participants
around the world via the international speakers, and by seeing how federal systems are practiced
globally, he is certain the audiences views on similar issues have been enriched and sharpened.
He discloses that while designing the program, there was apprehension that local participants
might find the international views irrelevant. But feedback revealed the opposite, which could
only mean that the audience felt a sense of belongingness to the global community as everyone
faces similar challenges. For this, Atty. Bacani thanks the foreign experts present for sharing
their perspectives and possible solutions to problems in the Philippines.
He announces that #GAGF2016 trended on Twitter as the No. 3 trending topic in the country
the day before. He invites the audience to continue tweeting so their followers can learn more
about the subject.
Atty. Bacani then says that for the second day, the issues discussed will be more local. He also
urges the Filipino speakers to keep to time.
He closes by calling for cooperation so as many ideas can be generated, as in the previous day.
He bids everyone a great day.
Negotiations, Policy-Making
and Implementation of Moro Autonomy
Dr. Mercado begins by saying that his advocacy for autonomy is as old as the Tripoli Agreement,
which was forged in 1976, and he hopes he will see full autonomy in the country before he passes
away.
Before he delivers his talk, he admonishes that one should never separate the Moro Autonomy
movement from the War of Secession led by the MNLF in 1972, the coming of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC, now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in 1973, and the Tripoli
Agreement (TA).
He gives detailed accounts of the three stages that led to the present autonomous set-up in
Mindanao.
First generation of autonomy. President Marcos issued Proclamation 1628 on March 25,
1977, establishing a regional autonomy in the Southern Philippines. A successful plebiscite-
referendum followed on April 17, 1977 that paved the way for full operation of two regular
autonomous regional governmentsone in Region 9, and the other in Region 12. The Marcos
government poured billions in these regions for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Corazon Aquinos term brought in a second round of negotiations between the Government
of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro National Libearation Front (MNLF) that re-visited and
changed the landmarks of the then-existing Regional Autonomous Government in Region 9
and Region 12. Meanwhile, a new Philippine Constitution was ratified in February 1987. This
provided, among others, the creation of two autonomous regionsone in the Cordillera and
another in Muslim Mindanao.
Second generation. The new Constitution mentioned devolution of powers and the
participation of regional governments in national government. This was a departure from the
first generation of Moro Autonomy that is completely contextualized in the secessionist war of
the Moro people and a political settlement emanating from peace agreement.
On August 1, 1989, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6734, the Organic Act creating
an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as mandated by Article X, Sections 15 to
21 of the Philippine Constitution. With the results of the plebiscite, only four provincesLanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawiformed the ARMM.
While many continue to look at the ARMM as an emasculated government unit, it is in terms
of territory, an example of devolution of powers to the regional government pertaining to local
and regional affairs.
Third generation. President Ramos opened new negotiations between the government and
MNLF. He wanted to bring closure to the contested RA 6734 and the actual implementation
of the agreed autonomy in the ARMM. The whole negotiation from 1993 to 1996 zeroed in on
details that were left unspecified in the 1976 TA. Thus the 1996 Peace Agreement is named as the
Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the GPH and the MNLF.
There were two phases in the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement. The first phase
was the establishment of a Special Zone of Peace and Development or SZOPAD consisting of the
original 14 provinces and all cites therein as specified in the 1976 TA.
The Phase Two of the implementation of the FPA involved the amendment of the ARMM
Organic Act or RA 6734 through Congressional action, after which the Amendatory Law shall be
submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of
a new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy.
In 2001, Congress enacted the Amendatory Law known as Republic Act 9054. The Organic
Act as amended was submitted to the people of the SZOPAD, that is, 10 provinces (minus the
ARMM four provinces) and 10 cities for ratification. The provinces and cities that would ratify
the Organic Act as amended would, with the four ARMM provinces, form a reconstituted
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The referendum on RA 9054 added only one province
(Basilan) and one city (Marawi) to the existing four provinces that constituted the ARMM under
RA 6734.
Chairman Nur Misuari rejected the new law, RA 9054, as not in accordance with the letter and
spirit of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. He went back to the hills while some MNLF Leaders
lent their hands in the implementation of RA 9054.
The era of President Benigno Aquino III was a total disaster from the perspective of the MNLF.
Not only was the MNLF fully marginalized but it also created deep resentment and bitterness
resulting from the now infamous Zamboanga City Siege.
On the other hand, the second Aquino Era successfully negotiated a peace agreement with another
Moro Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB) is seen as comprehensive articulation of the Moro dreams and aspirations of the
right to self-determination over their ancestral domain.
But the CAB requires the Congress of the Philippines to enact a new Autonomy Law that is faithful
to its spirit and letter.
Thus the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) draft was submitted to Congress. After almost two
years of debates and public hearings, both Houses of Congress came up with their own respective
version known as the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or BLBAR. Even with
this new version, the 16th Congress failed to muster enough courage and time to enact a new
autonomy law.
Dr. Mercado acquiesces that he does not know what is next, but says that the new Duterte
administration seems to be committed to the implementation of the 2014 CAB and the 1996 Final
Peace Agreement. The transition from the present unitary system of government to a federal one
with a parliamentary form of government also seems to be a priority. During the transition, the
President was quoted as agreeing to the passage of an all-inclusive (all stakeholders, particularly
the MNLF and the MILF) transitional law, that is, BBL sans all the unconstitutional provisions.
Dr. Mercado wraps up by saying that Moro autonomy, with all its negative and positive aspects,
should be perhaps viewed again from its original context: secessionist war, political settlement,
and peace agreement. People should also learn that self-determination is not simply served as
mixing it with hot water; it is evolving. Also, there is no real relevant autonomy without fiscal
autonomy.
Presentations
CORDILLERA AUTONOMY: STATE AND PROSPECTS
Prof. Ciencias presentation covers a brief history of the bid for autonomy in the Cordillera, why
previous attempts failed, and some factors to consider when drafting a new Cordillera autonomy bill.
He starts (and ends) his talk by enumerating the key arguments revolving around the concept
of autonomy in the Cordilleras.
Dr. Casambre begins her talk by citing papers published six years ago. She explains that there
are two proponents of autonomy: The Cordillera Peoples Alliance or CPA, and Cordlilera Peoples
Liberation Army; and the call for administrative regionalization and middle forces led by
professionals.
Her presentation revolves around why the 1990 and 1998 plebiscites failed.
These reasons are:
CPA campaigning for a No vote in the first plebiscite
CPA justifying Ka-Igorotan as a pan-Cordillera identity as its call for autonomy. This was
a movement aspiration rather than actual reality, and did not have popular support. (Ironically,
the constitutional provision for Cordillera autonomy can be credited to the efforts of the CPA.)
CPLAs ideology that referred to a Cordillera nation justified by an indigenous culture and
relationship to the land, which likewise seemed romanticized.
CPLA, a breakaway from the NPA, had roots in armed struggle. Its leader, Fr. Balweg, was
from Abra. He was therefore an outsider to the convention of BIBAK (Benguet, Ifugao, Bontoc,
Apayao, and Kalinga) and did not generate support. (Ironically, the CPLA, with the first Aquino
administration, led to the promulgation of EO 220 that created an interim Cordillera government
that sat for 13 years. But it did not meet its mandate to pave the way for a Cordillera autonomous
region.)
The proposals coming from the middle forces were worded in legalese or parliamentary
terminology, which the villagers did not understand.
She closes with two observations:
1. The rationale for an autonomous region as stated in Art. 10 in the 1987 Constitution must be
understood, especially by the indigenous communities, to refer to a fact that indigenous social
practices persist.
2. The Cordillera discourse (as with the Organic Act) has to be anthropologically-informed (ex:
recognizing the ili (hometown) as the basic unit of government), and not be legalistically- and
bureaucratically- informed.
Panel 5
Autonomy and Federalism
Debate in the Philippines
CHAIR
Miriam Grace Go
News Director, Rappler
Mr. Lorenzana opens his talk with a rundown of events in Mindano through the lens of a
Mindanaoan: The uprisings that started in the Spanish regime, insurrections in modern times,
the MILF and MNLF resorting to violence and armed conflict, and the all-out war initiated by
President Joseph Estrada.
He mentions President Dutertes position on federalism, saying it needs a consensus first, and
that it requires a series of steps including the revision of the Constitution. Lorenzana then lays
down the steps for federalism to succeed.
1. Four pre-conditions must be kept:
a. Political party reforms. Political parties are not there just to win elections
and hold power; they must have an ideological core that answers the needs and
aspirations of society. This can be achieved via the Political Party Development
Financing Act, a bill that has been pending for several years. Lorenzana suggests
penalizing political butterflies, or those who switch political parties at whim.
b. Enforcement of transparent mechanisms that provide and regulate
campaign financing to prevent graft and corruption. This includes passing
the FOI (Freedom of Information) Law to enforce transparency in all transactions
in government and give public access to certain information. This will compel
accountability in public services.
c. Provision of state subsidy to promote political party education. Lorenzana
mentions the German model, which professionalizes political parties and their
campaign initiatives.
d. Enactment of a law to ban political dynasties from barangay, local, and
national levels. This is particular to Article 2 Section 46. Should Congress fail to
pass this law, then what is written in the Constitution should be self-executory.
Reforming the COMELEC (Commission on Elections) must also be considered to
remove from it all quasi-judicial work.
2. Immediate transition into parliamentary government. Lorenzana says he and his
colleagues propose that the executive and legislative will be fused in one body, with the
president as the prime minister, and the cabinet recruited from the members of parliament.
The president is head of state with mostly ceremonial powers. The prime minister, elected
by the parliament, is head of government and can be booted out of office.
3. Creation of autonomous territories leading towards a federal republic. During this
transition period, the provinces and highly urbanized components will be allowed to evolve
first into one autonomous territory. Central to this decision will be self determination.
Provinces and cities who do not agree to become autonomous will be disadvantaged, as the
success of others will be a huge incentive to convert into autonomy. If a referendum is passed
within the year, parliament by that time must enact a law defining the autonomous territorys
land, area, powers, etc. If 60 percent of the provinces become autonomous, then the Federal
Republic of the Philippines will be created.
Lorenzana closes by reiterating that federalism is a complex process and may take several
years. He adds that the Philippines should educate and involve themselves now, and calls on the
involvement of the millennials as they have the time and energy needed for the long haul.
Atty. Monsod begins his talk by demurring that with so many experts on federalism in attendance,
he feels like a layman preaching theology to a roomful of bishops.
He says there have been six failed attempts to change the Constitution approved by a 76 percent
majority in the 1987 plebiscite. The articulated purpose of the attempts was to improve the lives
of the poor which was perceived as only a smokescreen for self-serving agendas.
He notes that President Duterte proposes federalism to address the problem of imperial
Manila.
Atty. Monsod says that the high plurality vote for President Duterte reflects the following
challenges:
1. The everyday concerns of ordinary peoplecrime, drugs, traffic, public services, corruption,
etc.
2. Peace in the Bangsamoro and with the National Democratic Front (NDF)
3. Development
The question is: Is federalism needed to address these challenges?
For No. 1, these can be addressed by the strong central powers of government under the present
Constitution, and President Duterte is perceived as having started very well in this regard, given
his high approval ratings.
Monsod gives the example of Davao City, of which the president was mayor for 20 years, and
which he transformed under the present Constitution.
On No. 2, Peace, Monsod says that the Constitution already provides for the creation of the
ARMM, and charter change is not an issue with the NDF. That the president himself said the
Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) should take precedence over federalism and can be a model also
adds to the argument that a charter change is not needed.
On No. 3, Development, Monsod explains that the main problem of the country is mass poverty
and inequality. Development is about high growth rates and the equitable distribution of its
benefits. The government has failed in both not because of the Constitution, but because the
Constitution has not been fully and correctly implemented, especially its provisions on social
justice and its local autonomy mandate.
An overhaul of the Constitution by a Congress dominated by family dynasties is not the answer
and will likely result in a removal or weakening of the social justice provisions. Instead, what
should be addressed are:
Flawed policy and weak institutions rooted in a feudalistic system that has been
impervious to change and steeped in corruption for generations. While federalism invokes
the power of subsidiarity, and is said to empower local communities and hastens development, it
is based on probabilities that each chain of reasoning will lead to a desired outcome. Instead of
empowering the people, it might just lead to the oppositewith existing power holders hijacking
the powers for themselves.
The Local Government Unit (LGU) Code. Although considered a landmark legislation, this
has turned out to be inadequate. Monsod cites the findings of fiscal experts Professor Rosario
Manasan and former Finance Undersecretary Milwida Guevara, who point out that simple
amendments in the LGU Code and other laws and reforms would result in the decentralization
of functions and devolution of powers and resources to enable LGUs to achieve meaningful self-
determination, without federalization. But the social reform programs should stay in a strong
central government because of the need for big resources that poorer LGUs cannot raise and for
a uniformity of results.
He says that the Duterte administration can learn from lessons from other countries:
1. The current push for federalism comes from above. More successful federalism start from
below, and is voluntary.
2. Since federalism reflects the history, social and political economy, and cultural
characteristics of its context, when adopted with existing inequalities, federalism tends to
serve the interests of existing dominant groups.
3. A federalized state need not be democratic.
4. A shift to federalism is complex and takes time. It is essentially asymmetrical, but Dutertes
vision seems to be symmetric.
5. Federalization may lead to unraveling, not unifying of communities.
6. Federalism works best through changing circumstances. But a constitutional shift that
not only devolves but also recognizes the sovereignty of the regions means it cannot be
changed by popular vote, and makes the shift irreversible.
7. Many of the people support federalism not because they know much about it, but because
they trust Duterte. Would they still support federalism if his prior supervision of LGUs
stops at the regional state governora new layer of governmentand they c ould not even
vote for him, if a parliamentary system is also adopted?
Monsod closes by warning against the leap of faith to federalism and its virtual irreversibility.
He reiterates a purposive and full implementation of the Constitution to address our problems.
Dr. Carlos opens her presentation by acknowledging the dynamics of opposing views from Mssrs.
Lorenzana and Monsod. She says federalism is not the answer neither to corruption or dynasties.
What they are all advocating is the education of the people.
She says there are two ways to undertake change: the slow way, and the quick way. The slow
way involves changing the individuals values, perceptions, and orientations. This usually takes
90 years or three generations. The quicker way is through institutions, and this is done by simply
changing the organization in which the individual operates.
Dr. Carlos then shows a slide showing Unitary and Federal with the three levels of
government under Federalism: Federalism, Sub-National, Local. She says that not one government
is exactly the way it labels itself. The delineations on paper are not so on the ground. Australia,
for example, calls itself a centralized federalism, which is an oxymoron. She says she agrees
with Herbolzheimers advice to stop copying systems from others because we all have unique
political histories.
So why devolve from unitary to federal? The objective should always be to increase happiness
and well-being.
She moves on to describe the qualities of multi-layered government authorities:
Dr. Hutchcroft launches right away into his talk with three basic concepts of political reform that
involves three basic decisions:
1. Will it have central-local relations?
2. Will it be parliamentary, presidential, or hybrid?
3. What will be the electoral system pre-design? The formula as to how votes are converted
into seats?
He adds that there are three basic principles of political reform:
1. Study and understand the pre-existing condition. Since there is no one-size-fits-
all model, each country has to decide what are the problems that need to be solved. It is
important to have a problem-driven analysis, not a solution-driven one.
2. Understand the nature of underlying political institutions. It is important to have
strong parties in place. What are the capacities of the administration system that are able
to aggravate or alleviate societal demands and bring them into political sphere?
3. Always recognize and anticipate unintended consequences. The bigger the reform,
the bigger the risks of unintended consequence. Know if there might be smaller and more
predictable reform solutions. In either case, be prepared for the unintended consequences.
He shares insights he picked up from the day before:
Federalism has many varieties.
The Philippines can design its own style from infinite varieties.
He also gives conclusions on centralization and de-centralization:
Decentralization requires a strong and capable central state able to enforce the rules by which
authority is being devolved to the sub-national level. On the paradox of decentralization (and
federalism), he borrows a quote from scholar James Fesler: One of the most curious aspects
of decentralization is the responsibility that a national government must assume to assure the
realization that decentralization, as doctrinally advocated, is supposed to serve.
Dr. Hutchcroft further explains this with an anecdote: Filipinos like to say, We have beautiful
laws, they just dont get implemented. He counters that if Filipinos are thinking about a major
political reform, those issues of implementation are going to be magnified a thousandfold. A
strong national government is needed to implement that.
A strong and effective state bureaucracy is needed. There is the need to recruit highly
qualified public servants to do the jobimagine hiring 10 National Economic Development
Authority heads, 10 Department of Public Works and Highways heads, and so on. This will mean
strengthening of people at sub-national levels.
He closes by throwing out questions and points to augment the question posed the day before
by Amina Rasul: If federalism is the answer, what is the question?
1. What will work better across the archipelago to promote peace in Mindanao? A symmetrical
or asymmetrical arrangement?
2. Will federalism curb the patronage practice that undermines the quality of Philippine
democracy? No. Every new layer of government means a new layer of patronage. Consider
electoral re-design. When well done, it will curb patronage and build stronger political
parties.
3. Will federalism undermine oligarchy and enhance long term development project? Consider
strengthening the central state to promote competition to curb the duopolies, cartels, and
promote more inclusive growth.
4. Will federalism help to resolve regional inequality? Dr. Hutchcroft says he doesnt know
how. He offers an alternative: that the national government play a more active role in
nurturing and empowering the regional government. Make the regions work to support
autonomy as they are the nexus between national and local government units.
5. Closely look at the impact of the chosen federal arrangement on health and education,
provision of infrastructure, gender equality, violence against women, trafficking, and much
more.
OPEN FORUM
1 On the four pre-conditions for federalismshould one come first or all be met, and what
is the specific period for transition?
Lorenzana: It should be done all together. Provided we can put in the mechanics of
process in the amended Constitution, it has to be done now, so we can have a long time
to transition. It has to be self-executory. The transition is having first the autonomous
territory, thats why I like to have the Bangsamoro succeed, because whats good for the
Bangsamoro is good for BangsaIloko, BangsaVisaya, and so on.
2 How are our Constitutional provisions not being properly or fully implemented?
Monsod: The heart of the Constitution is social justice and human development. The
social reform programs are under-performing: agrarian reform, urban land reform and
housing, ancestral domain, fisheries. The poorest of the poor belong to these sectors.
And local governments are not implementing delegated functions properly or cite lack
of budget. The extension services for farmers are devolved but the positions are given
to political appointees, not experts. Another example is education. When we talk about
human development, you have to create jobs, and improve the mobility and capability
of the poorthat means education must be given to everybody, everywhere, regardless
of cost.
My suggestion is why dont we do all these amendments and corrective legislation.
Just do it now. Go and amend the LGU Code. If we shift to a federal system, well have
to do it anyway.
3 If mindsets do not change as fast formal institutions do, how you propose we approach
reform in general?
Carlos: The institutions have a life of their own, and they are usually generational. There
is a certain pattern in a way that they replicate and change over time, and they become
the bedrock on which society is embedded.
But we are living in another world. The millennials, they dont care about territorial
sovereignty. The nation state is on its way out to obsolescence. Even the young Muslims
in my class, they dont care about territory, about sovereignty, they care about where are
they going to be architects or so on...they can work anywhere in the world. Thats why
the ASEAN will make federalism a non-issue.
Go steps in to give a comment that a group of millennials are in the room, and they say they care
about sovereignty.
Go reads aloud another comment about how congressmen and big businessmen should be in the
room, which they are.
Monsod: The equalization fund is compensation for the market cost to the poor regions
of the uneven playing field. But you cannot depend on this reasoning very long. The
richer ones can say, this excess should be for our people because we worked for it. Its
very difficult. So we cant say that the equalization fund is the solution to the economic
development of the regions.
Go closes the panel by remarking that perhaps the Philippines for now should strengthen and
expand its national set up, instead of shifting to federalism within six years, or at least do it
gradually. When the time comes that the LGUs are finally viable, the shift to federalism can be
considered again.
Panel 6
Moro Autonomy and
the Promise of Federalism
Mohagher Iqbal
Chair, MILF Implementing Panel
CHAIR
Dr. Canuday opens the panel by commenting on the spirited and passionate feedback in the room,
and thanks everyone for their recommitment to the event. He says that this panel may very well
be the heart of the forum, not just because of relevance, but because the speakers are the main
actors in the issue of peace in Mindanao.
He goes on to say that the panel will examine the links between federalism and Moro autonomy
as the suggested political solution to the Mindanano conflict.
He gives the four points around which the panelists talks will revolve:
1. What is the status of implementation of the political aspect in the negotiations of the peace
agreement?
2. Current proposals or recommendations for federalism and the Mindanao Peace Process
3. How does federalism promote meaningful political autonomy solutions?
4. How should the Mindanao Peace Process be positioned in the drive towards federalism?
5. What concrete steps must stakeholders make to ensure the framework and timeline
promote meaningful Moro autonomy?
Mohagher Iqbal
Chairman Iqbal begins right away with his answers to the four points raised:
1. What is the status of implementation of the political aspect in the negotiations of the
peace agreement?
He says they are now in the stage of implementation, hence the change from GPH negotiating
panel to GPH implementing panel. The more serious side of negotiations has been done.
He adds that the political solution to the Bangsamoro question has been around since 1987, and
the point was included in the CAB. The implementation involves three tracks:
a) Implementation of security mechanisms like the ceasefire and partnership in the campaign
against criminality (most recently, drugs).
b) Implementation of the normalization process, which entails a lot of sub-processes (ex.: the
transformation of MILF camps into peaceful communities).
Chairman Iqbal gives the assurance that these first tracks are bilateral in character, with the
government and MILF cooperating with each other, and with the participation of international
community.
c) Need to pass the BBL, which is a unilateral and sole responsibility of the government. The
MILF is not involved directly, except through the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC).
2. What are the current proposals for federalism and the Mindanao Peace Process?
a) To pass the BBL and work on the shift from unitary to federal.
b) To pass BBL and use it as template for peace and order in the country. Iqbal and his
organization support the second option. Iqbal emphasizes that they are not against federalism,
but it is a matter of sequencing. The passing of BBL is easier than shifting to federalism, which is
too complex.
3. How does federalism promote a meaningful Moro autonomy as a political solution?
Iqbal says federalism will help create self-governing/autonomous entities or states, and that
passing the BBL will set the centerstage for federalism. With federalism, the Bangsamoro people
can also strengthen each other.
He also says federalism answers a national problem or agenda, while the BBL addresses a
historical injustice committed against the Bangsamoro people. Shifting to federalism without
passing the BBL, therefore, will not address the historical injustice.
Meaningful Moro autonomy will be stunted without the BBL because the crafting of the BBL
is the part of the exercise to self-determination by the Bangsamoro people. He also voices the
concerns about charter change pushing through, and it being imposed on the Bangsamoro.
4. How should the Mindanao Peace Process be positioned in the drive towards
federalism?
The delivery of the BBL is a commitment and responsibility of government, as provided in the
CAB.
5. What concrete steps must stakeholders make to ensure the framework, process, and
timeline of federalism promote and not inhibit meaningful Moro autonomy?
Chairman Iqbal answers that the parties should be faithful to the wordings in the CAB; that
the EO reconstituting the BTC should be signed now, not later.
He reiterates the urgency of the BBL, and that Congress should adopt a liberal interpretation
of the constitution in relation to the BBL. The Supreme Court should take a liberal interpretation
as well, as the problem is political, not legal.
Dr. Casino explains that when anthropologists (such as he) look at the Philippines, they see an
evolutionary framework that follows a meta-narrativethe evolution from wild tribes, to semi-
civilized tribes, etc. When Americans came, they were thinking in the context of this framework.
There was a whole bureau dealing with these non-Christian groups, which was an estimated
1/8 of people of the Philippines, with lands occupied by one half. The first bureau was a research
bureau to understand characteristics of these groups.
The second bureau came in 1916 with the goal of unifying the Philippines. The notion of mutual
intelligence or mutual-understanding was prominent in the Second Bureau of Non-Christian
Tribes because there was an assumed moral equality and respect for all the ethnic groups of
the country. This sense was lost when the succeeding Commission on National Integration
substituted the notion of national integration and created the invidious distinction between
national cultural minorities and the majority.
In 1957, the Commission of National Integration for the first time used national cultural
minorities. Dr. Casino says this was never used by the Americans. This only happened in the
Philippine context. This integration brought out disparities in the minority and majority groups,
but at the same time, advancements in peoples material, economic, and social lives.
Throughout the years, minorities became communities, and then Indigenous Peoples. This
term was used by United Nations. Philippine scholars used it, however, to only non-Christian
goups, or restricited indigenous groups. Unrestricted included the Tagalog, Bisaya, Ilocano,
etc.
Groups then found other ways of identifying themselves. Emergent regional consciousness
and identity in the Cordillera was initially expressed by students who created the collective
acronym BIBAKrepresenting Benguet, Ifugao, Bontok, Apayao, and Kalinga. This was later
echoed by Moro students who formed the MNLF which wants to subordinate the non-Moro
ethnic identities under the Bangsamoro collective.Identity politics and parity of esteem claims
remain a powerful driver in all negotiations for autonomy and federalism.
Dr. Casio closes with two statements on identity:
1. Whereas Moro was used only to refer to Muslims before, carrying a religious connotation,
it has now become a national identity. Christian groups and tribal groups are now also
considered Bangsamoro.
2. Is prescriptive identity the new normal for the Southern Philippines?
OPEN FORUM
Some of the panelists begged off from sharing their positions on certain subjects.
1 Have you sought the support of President Duterte to first push the BBL in Congress
before delving into federalism?
Iqbal:There were already several pronouncements and specific statements from the
President about BBL.
2 How can MILF and MNLF treat the inherent rights of IP to their ancestral land?
Parcasio: In the full implementaton of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, we reached a
consensus with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) that the IP
Rights Act (IPRA) would be fully implemented within the autonomous region. IP rights
act do not run counter to the concept of self-rule.
3 That the BBL draft is unconstitutional has been repeated enough to become gospel
truth. Can the panel give examples?
Parcasio: It embodies the best peace agreements that this country has entered with the
Bangsamoro people.
Iqbal: There is nothing unconstitutional, thats why the BTC, which I chair, did not
propose amendments to the Constitutionotherwise, we would be stating the fact that
there are provisions that would be unconstitutional.
5 Will you include sensitization to gender in the development of genuine and meaningful
political parties?
Koeppinger: I think it makes sense that a party who will try to get a majority, to include
women. It is important for them to understand to play their role. It is possible to work
in this direction, but you have to work on the electoral system. If you keep the electoral
system as it is now, the dynasties will continue to dominate any assembly, whether
regional and national.
Observations/Reactions
from the International
Perspective
Prof. Choudhry opens his talk by acknowledging the wealth of knowledge presented in the room
for the past two days. He says he will present some ideas and questions that connect the issues.
Legalism and Rule of Law. He poses the question: Why do the powerful obey the rule of
law? Why do they allow the law to exist? He answers that Constitutions allow the interests of
powerful, economic, and political actors. He also gives an admittedly cynical view that these
actors have more to gain by not letting the law work, but he believes its important to stay realistic
about this ingredient of constitutional success.
The Constitution-making process can take two views:
1. An elite-driven process; and
Mr. Anderson begins by referring to an earlier statement by Mr. Hutchcroft, that the Philippines
already has a high level of devolution, but no federal structure. Anderson is of the opinion that
this is due to the country having 70 provincesthe more units a country has, the weaker it is
relative to the center.
He then poses a critical question: What problem is the Filipino people trying to address?
If the devolved government is too weak, could the provinces be strengthened and made into
instruments for a stronger devolved government? If they are still too weak, can existing regions
do the job? Can changes be made with structures around the provinces?
This is a relevant and central issue to the Philippines, he says, because perhaps devolution of
governments can happen with existing processes. Creating another level of government might
lead to regret, as in the experience of Italy.
Mr. Andersons second insight is about how there seems to be a majority preference for the
unicameral system. He warns that if a Senate is included in a parliamentary system, it should have very
limited powers, with no power to change budget or make decisions regarding defense, for instance.
He urges the rethinking of the structure of the parliamentary system. He also highly endorses
the political party law.
OPEN FORUM
1 Prof. Saxena comments that a bicamaral system might be better for the Philippines,
comparing it to the Indian experience.
2 Constitutional making is not just about writing a new Constitution. It is also getting
national consensus. The articulation from the different regions will be different because
they have different historical narratives and economic realitieshow will you get
consensus?
Anderson: (to Prof. Sexana) I find that the upper house in federal systems do not have much value.
They just add to popular opinion. If you move to a parliamentary system, you have to think about
the decision rulers.
On the budgetary issuesthe Philippines is already on the lower end of tax collection. Only
about 14 percent of GDP is collected. Only 15 or 14 percent is being distributed to the cities. Thats
not a lot to support devolved governments. The second issue is how you distribute money to
Bangsamoro. You can look at the British model on how they allocate to Wales, Scotland, and NI.
To simplify, they look at the programs that have been devolved to those countries and the per
capita amount they perceive for those programs. It works in a very fair way.
Choudry: (Addressing second question) How to build a national consensus? I dont know
many countries that have one, overarching narrative. But they have an agreement on
Constitutional framework. People have to have one vision on where the country is going,
live under its laws, and settle its disputes through law, not on the streets. Despite the
disagreement, there is a basic agreement on the processes. The fact that the Constitution
allows for more than just one story is a positive thing.
Panel 7
Mechanisms/Institutions
to promote security
and development in
Moro communities
Sam Chittick
International Advisor for the United Nations/
World Bank Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities (FASTRAC)
Naoyuki Ochiai
Head and Chief Leader of JICA Cotabato Project Officer
CHAIR
Prof. Ferrer starts by saying that the peace process has moved considerably forward in the last
decades. Violence is only one part of the reform agenda, but it is what stands out with the public.
What is important is that it shouldnt derail or stall the process.
During negotiations, the issue is two-edged:
1. People wanting an end to the violence
2. People wanting more war
Some factors have made the peace process more complex:
The presence of multiple armed groups operating in the very region which is undergoing the
process.
More and more porous borders. Because of these, groups tend to be lumped into one, and
therefore it makes it more difficult for those who have embraced the path to peace and willing to
undergo a dialogue process.
Issue of terrorism. The government needs the citizenry, especially the armed groups that
have already signed peace agreements, to address this.
Developments:
1. The MILF had already decisively cut off ties with armed groups. It took time to gain
their confidence, but the presence of the peace agreement means the mechanisms in place
have helped address conflict, criminality, and terrorism in the region.
2. Monitoring teams. A ceasefire committee and international local monitoring teams
ensure there are no ceasefire violations, or if there are, they are properly addressed and
managed.
3. Decline in hostilities and crime. Prof. Ferrer adds that hostilities between MILF and
government have declined over the years. The presence of kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) groups
have also been significantly reduced. She says there are also cases wherein the MILF are
involved in the rescue and helped put an end to the activities. There has also been a decline
in the proliferation of illegal drugs, through the cooperation and MILF, AFP, and police,
there have been some successes.
4. Contact between MILF and AFP. Prof. Ferrer credits technology; the MILF and AFP
commanders are now in communication, whether directly or through mechanisms of the
ceasefire agreement.
She furthers that there are aspects in the agreement that need to be implemented.
Prof. Ferrer also says the government has to handle other armed groups, aside from the MILF.
The objective is not the decommissioning of combatants, but to form good cooperation among
government players, the MILF, and other armed groups.
Sam Chittick
Mr. Chittick opens his talk by saying his focus will be on the socio-economic institutions that
support the peace process.
There are 11 different state actors that play a role in the process of socio-economic development.
Contributors include: the Bangsamoro Transition Commissions policy units, the government,
national agencies, the military, the MILF through the Bangsamoro Development Agency, the
MNLF and the Southern Philippine Council on Peace and Development, and the Southern
Philippine Development Authority.
Internationally, there is the Mindanao Trust Fund and FASTRAC.
Chittick has the following observations when it comes to the topic:
1. Government resources outweigh the international contributions.
2. Particular architectures have evolved over time. These architectures are an integrative
process that needs flexibility. An example is that with the election of President Duterte, the
relationship with the MILF is now in the negotiation stage. It isnt static.
3. The roles of the 11 international partners involved in the process are also different. Malaysia
and Indonesia play bigger facilitating roles for the two peace tracks; UK and Switzerland,
due to geographic and political distance, are further removed. However, they are able to
use their distance to provide useful investments. There are other multilateral partners who
stick to the socio-economic elements, and not political.
4. Mindanao assets in the Palace. Chittick points out that at present and for the first time, the
president is from Mindanao, and that there is a very distinctive Mindanao presence in the
Cabinet. These can serve as a good platform for the Moro relationship with the rest of the
country for the next few years.
5. The need to address the peace process in Muslim Mindanao in the context of the nation.
How does that affect national identity, or being a Filipino?
6. The solution will look different in different places. An international view is most effective
when directed by politics in local context.
Chittick offers suggestions to international organizations that have been drawn from
international assistance over the past decade:
1. Development needs to be strategic. Flexibility is critical, as the path to peace takes
different turns. While its important to be embedded in local contexts, there is a need to
collectively look beyond issues of capacity.
2. Listen. Donors usually dont.
3. Facilitate. Look at aid as the opportunity to build bridges and open doors between parties
and stakeholders.
4. Respect local leadership.
5. Remember that assistance a long term commitment.
6. Invest in national staff and national ideas. There are also indigenous ideas that are
groundbreaking, and need to be supported.
7. Stick to the core of the issue, which is negotiation. This provides the opportunity to
enhance and be drivers of resolution of injustice and identity in a political space within the
political nation. Chittick reminds the international community that the political always
takes precedence over the development agenda.
Naoyuki Ochiai
Mr. Ochiai opens by saying his talk will be on mechanisms for making and building peace and
development.
He relates how the Japanese government, through JICA, has been tackling the challenge of
building peace since 2006, when Japan declared their commitment in the peace process. They
arrived with the International Monitoring Team as independent ceasefire observers. Their
activities encompass security, civilian protection, humanitarian work, and socio-eco development.
Japans particular assistance is the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and
Development (J-BIRD) program. It helps in peace-building, reconstruction, and development
frameworks. Ochiai-san says they positively impact the political process and offer contributions
to the peace and stability in Mindanao. J-BIRD also helps increase understanding of conditions
and awareness of issues on the ground.
As part of fostering trust, the Japanese embassy attends all peace talks between the GPH
and MILF in its role of observer. Ochiai-san also mentions about how they are instrumental
in handling diplomacy and development support in the Bangsamoro Peace Process, fostering
expertise in development support.
Ochiai-san closes with stating that simultaneous efforts in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
peace building will be useful for the stage of implementation for the peace agreement. He also
hopes that the peace mechanisms used in the Philippines will be useful for future conflict
resolutions around the world.
Open Forum
1 The first question is from Chairman Balaoi: Can you elaborate further how the informal
sector in Mindanao, as discussed by Mr. Lara, was factored in the BBL?
Ferrer: Members of the informal economy are part of the development agenda, in that
they are regulated better. One of the arguments is the devolution of taxing powers. One
of our suggestions was allowing the peripheries to do collections. This will enhance the
regulating capabilities in the Bangsamoro.
Lara: There have been several instances in the past two years when inputs were made in the
BBL that delve in the issue of shadow economy, in particular cross-border trade in Sulu Sea
(one of the sources of revenue of emerging Bangsamoro). With pernicious aspects of shadow
economiesdrugs, KFR, weaponsthe position taken is the security response. Those are
embedded in the BBL. But the bigger questions left wanting are regarding the issue of the
overlapping claims on land, the issue of relationship between the LGU collections and
process for allocating revenues, and what federalism has to offer.
2 Steven Rood: On violent extremismwill resolution between the two Moro fronts be
useful in combating the issue of extremism?
Lara: I agree entirely. We believe that the main vector of extremism now is the failure of
the BBL. Im going to give it a timeframe, if I may, with all due respect to Iqbal. I think
the sooner the MILF is given a role in the sub-national issue by President Duterte
with or without a BBLthe better. Because based on our analysis on the ground, a lot
of people expect that the BBL would be approved, and the absence of an approval is
driving the youth to the arms of less moderate organizations in the Bangsamoro.
Banlaoi: When you talk about violent extremism in the Philippines, there are several
groupsone group that is disappointed with the CAB, represented by the multi-groups;
the others who are totally against the BBL; and groups who are against both and who
want to do their own thing, like Hapilon. Violence is articulated by many groups, there
is no single strand. But many of them pledge allegiance to the Islamic state, in theory.
So its not as simple.
3 Can the international community play a more active role in securing peace, rather than
through moratoriums, such as arms management?
Chittick: Yes, it already is. It already has a role in the independent decommissioning
which is specifically related to the security measures of CAB. All of the 11 state actors
plus the INGOs and NGOs that are part of the architecture are there on the request
of the parties. You should always think in the prism of whats desired on the part of
development partners. For example, with the World Bank, you can tell them that if you
invest in the Mindanao Trust Fund, over time, (your investments) will address some of
these fundamental concerns. Thats not part of the political answer, but part of long
term solution.
4 Why is Japan just addressing development and not political projects when the problem
is essentially political?
Ochiai: What we are doing in the development aspect is our way of addressing political
problems. (On international communitys involvement:) We have been able to do more
than monitoring. What we are doing now is maintaining and making the region safer,
providing infrastructure, agriculture, education, and medicines.
5 How can the Sabah issue be addressed with the current federalism solution?
Ferrer: The Sabah question has never been part of the negotiations between MILF and
the government. As for federalism, if you dont want to complicate the issue, then lets
not include the Sabah issue.
Lara: All I know is that the work were doing on cross border illicit tradethe blockade
undertaken by the Malaysian governmentactually strengthened the state-building
project in Mindanao when local traders were required by Sabah to register their
enterprises and boats in Philippine sovereign structures.The LGUs in Sulu, Tawi-tawi,
and Zamboanga had a very good season processing papers.
7 The main problem is insurgency and the problems like shadow economy and rido are
only fringe problemsdo you agree?
Ferrer: The peace process is only one aspect of the socio-political reforms, but it does
provide conditions for a more sustainable reform process. For example: The mere
fact that there has been no major fighting betwen MILF and government since 2008,
means that children have been able to finish education. There was no need for anyone
to be displaced. Relative peace has provided an incentive for business and investments.
But you need a comprehensive approach and there are other institutions that have to
be woven together to solve all these problemsthe faith issue, terrorism, detainees,
injustice. This needs a comprehensive leadership.
Chittick: Its a multi-layered complex issue. There is no one silver bullet to this. There
are myriad steps and solutions on how the country moves forward. This is a healthy
discussion for the country to have in the following months to shape the next decades.
Our role is to support domestic solutions, whether theyre national or more targeted in
approach.
Ochiai: The socio-economic development cannot stop. It can capacitate the people, as
long as they will not go for violence.
Panel 8
CSO Forum
Promoting participative,
consultative and
integrative forums with
relevant stakeholders
for Mindanao Peace
Irene Santiago
Chair, Government Implementing Panel for the Bangsamoro Peace Accords
Guiamel Alim
Chairperson, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)
Victoria Tauli-Corpus
UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples Rights
CHAIR
Irene Santiago
Ms. Santiago starts her talk by saying shed like to share her reflections on Peace Writ Largeto
form not only islands of peace, but a big world of peace and happiness. She says that working
within this, the goal of the Bangsamoro Peace Accords of 1996 and 2014 can be reached.
She mentions the two words the president has given to guide peace negotiations: inclusiveness
and transparency. The failure of many peace agreements is secrecy and the lack of understanding.
The key to effective implementation is involving the publics. All people want is to be heard
and to be taken seriously. Part of their power is the right to determine the new arrangements of
their society. Santiago shares her personal definition of power: transformative. She says that as a
woman, the power she claims is: to act for what is good.
Implementation must not only be legalistically- and anthropologically-informed, but peace-
informed. People have to be involved not just to pass a law, but for healing and transformation.
To do this, Santiago proposes Peace Tables. These will be safe spaces where conversations
and dialogues can be held. Tables per region, for youth and women, and not just about CAB, and
issues in Mindanao, but all over the Philippines. CSOs will be critical in this process as they will
design the Tables.
If designed and conducted well, the Tables will influence political will for peace to prosper,
building trust, strengthening Bangsamoro.
She closes by saying strategic deficit should be avoided by making our short term efforts part
of the long term.
Guiamel Alim
Mr. Alim opens by saying he added to Panels title: ...role of CSOs in the coming 4th generation
Moro autonomy and discussion of federalism.
He says Civil Societies (CS) have shown active participation over the years regarding the peace
efforts in Mindanao. These include peace education, service delivery, ceasefire monitoring,
rehabilitation of conflict-affected and displaced communities, among others.
They have even sat at negotiation tables as observers. At the grassroots level, they explain why
peace should be maintained, and the ways forward.
However, Alim says, as the peace process enters implementation stage, the role of CSOs is
threatened with disunity in its ranks. While everyone is united on the idea of peace, there was
no clear unity in the agenda for sustainable peace. Different CSOs saw peace through different
lenses. Sectoral interests further muddle the different views and understandings of the conflict.
Some groups were more focused on issue-based projects, while some groups turned apolitical to
safer service-delivery projects.
Alim outlines the challenges of CSO post-peace negotiations:
1. Being more coordinated and united. He says they need to learn from their mistakes, and
work on differences, just like the MILF and MNLF.
2. Enhancing of dialogues among CSOs. Likeminded CSOs should continuously look for
common agenda to bind them together.
3. Dealing with the culture of impunity that has been ingrained for decades. Also, dealing
with historical injustices and displacement.
4. Being sensitive to the possible sources of division. He says that from asymmetrical
autonomy, they are now faced with the possibility of a whole federalization. If the issue of
Bangsamoro can divide CSOs, federalism can wreak the same if they are not sensitive to
the latent and manifest divides.
He ends by saying CSOs are powerful stakeholders in peace-building, peacemaking, and in the
expected political transition. He reiterates the need for more dialogue to define common agenda
and interests to maintain cohesion and relevance in the lives of the people as they face a cause
greater than themselves.
narratives must be taken into consideration even if they are different or competing with
ones views.
5. Identify influencers at the community level. Potential sources of conflict should be identified
and addressed.
Miclat reiterates the need to create space for dialogue even with dissenting voices.
Constituents of the policy makers also should be included in the dialogue, and it must be
localized down to the community level even in areas not directly impacted by armed conflict.
He also acknowledges the challenge to stay impartial and independent and go beyond the
ideological and political agenda of the conflict.
The main roles of CSOs vary from lobbyist, enablers, campaigners, healers, watchersanother
challenge is how to fulfill their role as bridges for conflict actors, and advocates for a broader
array of stakeholders.
This can be done by maintaining their independence and reaching out to and consolidating a
broader constituency.
Victoria Tauli-Corpus
Ms. Tauli-Corpus thanks IAG for the invitation. She says the topic is dear to her, as they remained
key issues all life as an activist and rapporteur.
She says her talk will be limited to the role of the lumad or the non-Moro and their inclusion
in peace processes.
She makes the distinction that most IPs do not consider themselves CSOs. She explains they
are peoples recognized as distinct, and endowed with the right to self determination.
Ms. Tauli-Corpus mentions the assertive role played by the non-Moro in negotiations. They
studied, made amendments, spoke in public fora, and, with the help of NGOs, established a
network composed of tribes: Teduray, Manobo, Lambangian, Pulanguiyon-Manobo of Bukidnon.
She says this partnership between lumad and NGOs should be emulated in the Peace Process.
She proposes that members of Congress and parliament include new iterations of the lumad into
the BBL.
She shares her lessons and challenges:
1. When the union of non-Moro asserted their rights, the public was made aware of them.
Before this, they were outside the radar of the government and MILF. She says the lumad should
persist to ensure their rights are upheld.
As for inclusion in the peace talks, they cannot be directly involved because they are not
combatants, but can serve in advisory groups in relation to their issues.
2. The ownership of the Peace Processit doesnt belong to just the prime players, but all the
stakeholders belonging to the different territories.
3. Alliances between IPs, CSOs, the government, and UN is crucial for them to bring issues to
their tables. She encourages the Bangsamoro, MILF, NDF, and government, to ensure, protect
and respect rights of IP.
She also strongly recommends that the final peace accord and relevant enabling laws include
specific reference to the commitment to the negotiating parties to ensure respect for international
and constitutional IP rights in all aspects of the negotiations.
Ms. Tauli-Corpus ends with another strong recommendation that in post-conflict, IPs be free to
choose their own political status and freely pursue their social, and economic development. When
given this, only then can lasting peace and cultural diversity for future generations be ensured.
Chairman Cagoco-Guiam comments that all the panelists stressed the importance of listening to
myriad publics and realities, and bringing down the issues to community level, making people heard,
and taking them seriously.
OPEN FORUM
1 How do you integrate all those voices, and is it possible to include all of them in your
Peace Tables?
Santiago: CSOs should also be part of those Tables to synthesize what will be discussed.
But I have a feeling that some will not talk about the law, they will talk about their own
concerns. How do we make sure they feel they are heard and taken seriously? There has
to be feedback and concern. It doesnt have to be about BBL, it can be about governance,
and how to make it a well-functioning government.
2 Is it possible for CSOs to achieve right to to self-determination while aligning with the
various liberation fronts? And should there be an assembly to recalibrate the BBL?
Alim: The civil society makes the BBL. I think we have already heard that the BBLs
expressions of independence have been put forward, and that is an expression of self-
determination. But time has passed and through all this effort, we are looking at self-
determination through peaceful means. The issue of federalism will go down to the
level of the CSOs.
About recalibrating citizenryright now the main concern among Bangsamoro
leaders is engaging in intra-dialogue. Traditional leaders and religious leaders answering
the call of the president for a more inclusive Bangsamoro. Calling together all people
with different agendas. Hopefully we can come up with a common political agenda so
government can give only one response. Now, the government can just give pieces of
peace, and that cannot work for us.
3 How wise will it be for the MILF to engage with the national public?
Miclat: A few years ago we brought some of our Bangsamoro friends on a roadshow
outside Mindanao. And one of the reactions of the people from Negros waswe should
have heard about this before, we like this and should have our own sub-state. Once
people from the outside know and interact personally with the Bangsamoro leaders and
people, it will help dissipate the prejudice, and help outsiders understand and respect
the Moro people. I would like to see more going on sorties. Not only with MILF, but
their constituents, students, businesspeople, etc.
The Philippine government should create the conditions for this to happen. I am
looking forward to seeing these peace tables become concrete, alongside government.
And also maybe ask their donors to give to the CSOs directly.
6 MNLF and MILF agreed to converge and work together to have autonomy law. There is
a plan to put up a configured BTC. All working together, with CSOs. When can you start
working together? Can you give a timeline of implementation?
7 How do yo ensure that the participants at the Peace Tables can freely express their
views especially in an atmosphere of fear? Where will the discussions go after these peace
tables?
8 Ferrer comments that it would be simplistic to say that no IP representation took place
in the negotiations, because the IPs are part of the formal structure. The issue might be:
Who has the right to legislate IPs rights for an autonomous region?
Chairman Cagoco-Guiam reiterates the points made on inclusivity and convergence of the
Peace Process, and closes the panel.
Panel 9
Third Party Perspectives:
Moving Forward for
Moro Autonomy, Peace
and Security
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Director of Transitions to Peace Programme, Conciliation Resources, United Kingdom
CHAIR
Dr. Rood begins with stating three general points regarding the topic:
1. Utility or necessity of international involvement in the peace process.
He has observed that when issues become an entirely domestic process, the problem tends to
go off the rails.
He traces the history of the peace negotiations and autonomy. He reminds the audience what
President Marcos did with the two autonomous regions after the Tripoli Agreement, the aborted
Jeddah Accord, the long discussions after the 1996 peace agreement, and final tripartite reviews
in 2016.
He says this is the reason the Third Party Monitoring Team was added to the MILF peace
process, to assess the extent to which the agreement is being implemented by government.
2. Technical problems of the convergence are less dire than the political problems.
3. Setbacks and silver linings.
Issue of priorities - government is trying to do everything at once. Example: fighting a war on
drugs while setting up the new government.
Federalism issue - the BBL or enabling law should go first, but this is not in consensus in the
entire government. Some say some parts are unconstitutional, others want to to amend those
parts, others dont want to pass it altogether.
Lots of consultations and work has been done, and lots of issues have surfaced in trying to
pass the BBL.
A president who everyone believes is trying to solve the problem, which gives a certain
amount of flexibility and time because people are willing to wait.
Different security aspects that have proved effective.
Dr. Rood closes musing on the current administrations attitude to the involvement of
international organizations, as there are some people who think there is too much foreign
involvement.
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Mr. Herbolzheimer opens by appreciating the concept of nested identities that came up the
previous day. In his work in the Philippines he carries the identities of: a passenger, as that
is the assignment he received when Irene Santiago invited him to be part of an International
Contact Group (ICG) in 2009: she made it clear to him that the Filipinos were in the drivers seat;
a peace professional conscious about the responsibilities that come with being a member of the
ICG; a peace and human rights activist; a Catalan, who shares with the Bangsamoro the longing
for parity of esteem; a Spanish, German, and Swedish citizen, because national identities are
not exclusive; a feminist, because feminism is about addressing unjust power relations, and that
is what a peace process is all about.
He shares his thoughts about the challenges ahead for the different stakeholders:
1. MILF is facing the challenge of a double transitionfrom war to peace, and from a
revolutionary to a mainstream organization. It is easier to wage war than to build peace.
In a context of uncertainty about Governments approach, the MILF has the opportunity
to develop its soft power and sharing with the people of the Bangsamoro a more specific
vision and the values that will drive change. This requires MILF proving their ability to
deliver to peoples expectations for change.
2. Governments golden opportunity stems from the fact that for the first time the
President, the Peace Adviser, and the Implementation Chair are all from Mindanao. It is
encouraging to hear Irene Santiagos commitment to a value-driven positive peace. At the
same time it is worrying that important confidence-building measures with the MILF
have yet to be implemented: releasing prisoners, or responding with livelihood packages
that were promised a year and a half ago to ex-combatants. He highlights that one of the
best achievements so far, though, is the general understanding that what is good for the
Bangsamoro is good for the Philippines.
3. Civil society organizations (national and international) have had significant achievements
(as expressed in the previous panel). However they also face the challenges of:
a. Funding, and scaling up the impact of their work.
b. Stepping out of their comfort zones and being creative, self-critical, innovative, and
willing to take risks.
c. International NGOs have to commit to horizontal partnerships, and have their exit
strategies for when it is time to leave.
4. The international community needs to prove consistency, and practice what they preach.
The International Contact Group increased the gender in-balance of the peace negotiations.
Spain, the UK or Japan are not role models when dealing with atrocities from the past.
In terms of human security, Europe, US, or Australia are also struggling with refugees
and racism. And finally, the international community is not much better in coordinating
among themselves than Filipino NGOs or government agencies. There is a need for the
international community to identify, acknowledge, and support local capacities.
After 17 years of negotiations, and two and a half years of implementation, true, lasting peace
is not yet acheived. Herbolzheimer urges not to lose this golden window of opportunity for peace
in the Philippines and in Colombia, with peace being hijacked by legal or procedural discussions.
There is a need to identify and explore the Bangsamoro path to peace after the CAB, outlining
the What (agenda and vision), the How (process), the Who (actors) and the When (time-frame).
He ends by saying that time is not on our side, but we know what to do, and we know how to
do it. So, lets do it.
OPEN FORUM
5 As experts, how do you address generations of thousands of boys who feel they dont
have a space in this world, who feel they can never have work, or be of use?
Kumar: Ironically those people who you create violence against might be the very people
who could help you escape that space. People like me and Steve (Rood), who can offer
jobs. If you reflect on your question: Who are the people who can engage with these
people on the ground, in their space, and actually listen, and not tell them what to do
one side of the question is psychological, and the other side is developmental. Once you
engage them, give them their own developmentempower, support them in the process.
That is the start of the conversation.
Rood: Simply stopping the violence is actually a cheap way of making things better.
Development (is another way). Malls going up, construction, traffic jams, the Bangsamoro
business clubthe public sector getting more dynamic. Just dampen down the violence
so normal activity can happen. Suddenly theres quiet. In these Peace Tables, its not
only about peace and its not one way. Its about getting a response to: I dont care about
Bangsamoro Peace Process, why cant I get a job? There needs to be feedback that is
possible and credible. And as Chetan (Kumar) says, if that doest happen repeatedly, you
wont gain anyones trust.
Herbolzheimer: Thats why I said the clock is ticking. People on the ground in the
Bangsamoro have no clue on what is next. One lesson from the failed plebiscite in
Colombia is just because we think were on the right side, doesnt mean the rest of
the people think the same way. Nobody has mentioned the risk that will come with
the plebiscite after the BBL: What will happen if people vote against the BBL? So
communication is fundamental. Not only the role of mediathe BTC needs to be much,
much, much better in their communications strategy. The government and MILF need
a joint communications strategy.
At the same time, the MILF has a big challenge. War is easyyou just blame the other
side for everything that is wrong but with peace comes responsibility. There is much
to be done in the Bangsamoro, while waiting for the BBL.
Dr. Edrisinha says he agrees with what was said earlier: that it is easier to deal with the immediate
and more important passage of the BBL before federalism.
He says that while there needs to be a wider consensus and communications strategy, listening
to concerns and fears of groups, there is also the need to define abstract and complex terms such
as federalism and autonomy.
The difference between federalism and autonomy is that both talk about self-rule but
federalism also shares notion of shared rule. There are also concerns about federalism being a
step to secession. Dr. Edrisinha says this is a reality we have to accept.
He adds that he has a differing view from Mr. George Anderson regarding the second chamber
design. He thinks that the second chamber gives provinces a voice, and that it can be a wathchdog
to protect devolution.
Other points he would like to make are:
1. The reality of diversity. The critique of countries that have a minority within a minority
is something that federalists should take seriously, as a federal arrangement will favor the
large group, and will result in discrimination of smaller groups. This is one reason why
smaller groups become spoilers.
2. Basics and the whole purpose of the Constitution must be remembered. A national
bill of rights binding all organs at the center and the provinces becomes very important.
3. One must challenge champions of federalism. Challenge those who want to stop the
federalism idea from percolating down to smaller units, in fear that the first tier will make
use of the third tier to undermine the second. Address that fear, but ensure mechanisms
are in place so the fear is unfounded.
4. Federalism and autonomy cannot be discussed in isolation. Basic principles like the
rule of law; the Constitutional Court having the interest of regions and the minority at
heart; the powers of the executive; electoral system design and second chamberthese are
important in Asia because these Constitutional arrangements deal with a political culture
that is centralized and believes in patronage politics.
5. The federalism concept is necessarily pluralistic, inclusive, and recognizes diversity.
Consider this when thinking about autonomy arrangements.
6. A value of federalism is partnership. Its only natural for groups to assert their claims
and rights, but at a certain point, the implementation should be towards partnership.
Dr. Edrisinha ends by saying the complexities and difficulties ahead may look daunting, and
so cooperation and partnership are needed to move forward. Federalism failed in Sri Lanka, was
partially successful in Nepal, and he hopes that in the Philippines, federalism will be a success.
CLOSING REMARKS
AND BOOK LAUNCHING:
Federalism and
Cha-Cha for Peace:
Critical Papers on
Federalism and
Charter Change
for the Mindanao
Peace Process
Prof. Yash Pal Ghai
Chair, GAGF 2016 International Advisory Board
Prof. Ghai thanks and congratulates Atty. Bacani for his initiative in conceiving and convening
GAGF 2016. He also thanks him for bringing so many interesting people together, and for the
great learning opportunities about the issues and political scene in the Philippines.
He is grateful to be invited.
He praises the efficient organization of the Forum. He discloses that he was worried during
the planning stage, as it was so packed, and he says he is impressed by the discipline showed by
everyone.
Prof. Ghai recounts the first few times he spent in the Philippines, and how he was drawn
into Asian politics. He recalls forging friendships in Asia and the Philippines, and learning more
about their political culture.
Atty. Bacani closes the event with the launching of Federalism and
Cha-Cha for Peace: Critical Papers on Federalism and Charter Change
for the Mindanao Peace Process by Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Atty. Bacani presents a Certificate of Appreciation and Recognition to Prof. Ghai as Chair of the
GAGF 2016 International Advisory Board. He says IAG is proud to be associated with Prof. Ghai
as their mentor and friend.
He then announces that Prof. Ghai is celebrating his birthday on that day.
Atty. Benny closes the Forum by thanking the personalities and groups that made it possible.
He calls members of the International Board one by one.
Later, he also presents the members of his team at the Institute for Autonomy and Governance.
He then launches the book, Federalism and Cha-Cha for Peace: Critical Papers on Federalism
and Charter Change for the Mindanao Peace Process by Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Started in 2001 as a program under the College of Law of Notre Dame University in Cotabato City
under Dean Benedicto Bacani and inspired by university president Fr. Eliseo Mercado, Jr. of the
Oblates of Mary Immaculate, IAG developed into an independent institute devoted to research,
training and technical assistance to evolve genuine autonomy and good governance as a way to
peace and development in southern Philippines.
An institutional partnership agreement with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in the Philippines
was forged in 2004 that enabled IAG to sustainably implement its core programs. In partnership
with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), IAGs reputation for independence, consistency,
inclusiveness and scholarship is domestically and internationally acknowledged.
IAGs regular quarterly reviews, policy briefs, monographs and discussion proceedings are
widely acknowledged as primary resource materials on Mindanao.
IAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept that encompasses any political structure
that is less than an independent state. It sees the promotion of autonomy in the southern
Philippines as strategic. It provides the countrys minority Muslims and Indigenous Peoples
platforms to evolve self-governance structures for meaningful self-determination, sustainable
growth and lasting peace.
IAGs programs are anchored on the belief that the basic root of the conflict in Mindanao is
injustice and underdevelopment; that it is essentially a political problem that requires a political
solution; and evolving an effective and viable vehicle for Moro and Indigenous Peoples self-
determination is the core of this political solution.
Toward this end, IAG continues to organize policy forums, roundtable discussions, and
conferences on the issues of autonomy and good governance.
IAG has regularly provided capacity-building programs focusing on the processes of policy
formulation and legislation to the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly and its constituent
Local Government Units (LGUs).
It has provided technical assistance in the crafting of regional laws in the ARMM.
IAG provided technical assistance in the establishment of the Iranun Development Council,
an economic and development aggrupation of five contiguous local government units in
Maguindanao.
IAG helped raised capacities of LGUs, military and police in peace-building and security sector
reforms.
IAG, KAS and Development Consultants brought to the mainstream the real plight of non-
Islamized indigenous peoples in the mainland ARMM, calling on authorities to enhance
mechanisms for the protection of the indigenous peoples rights.
IAG has provided technical assistance in the drafting of the Bangsamoro Basic Law particularly
in the areas of transitory mechanisms and processes, decentralized and ministerial system of
government, elections and political party systems.
It has conducted consultations with LGUs in the proposed Bangsamoro core areas for
submission to the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC).
It was recently given the mandate to help develop the MILF political party by the MILF
Interim Committee on the Development of the MILF Political Party.
Our Goals
To take a lead role in evolving meaningful policies to make autonomy and federalism an
effective instrument for peace and development.
To promote and develop good governance.
To expand and consolidate the network of organizations and leaders to promote autonomy,
federalism and self-determination as a means of addressing the causes of conflicts.
To initiate programs and activities that support and sustain meaningful security sector
reform.
Projects
Political Party Building and Development
IAG works with political movements and emerging principled political parties in laying the
foundation and subsequent formation of genuine and democratic political parties in Mindanao
and in the entire country.
It provides education and training services to different groups to promote the significant role
of democratic political parties and political movements as instruments for aggregating peoples
sentiments and interests to the government.
Though this process, ordinary citizens and political organizations are provided the avenue to
IAG builds on the gains of the EU and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung-funded 3-year project
Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao for their Empowerment and Sustainable Development or IPDEV that was completed
in February 2015.
With a cross-cutting approach, IAG seeks to address the absence of an enabling law in the
ARMM that recognizes indigenous peoples rights and social justice as embodied in the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), the 1987 Philippine Constitution and other existing
international laws for IPs.
Together with UNICEF, IAG aims to broaden the discourse on good governance, promote public
participation, frame the issues and generate options to the end that the proposed legislation for
the Bangsamoro and the subsequent regional local government code and other local laws will
entrench systems that promote good governance in local governance and a nurturing environment
for peaceful communities especially for children, youth and adolescents in the region.
Supported by the Australian Government, the ongoing Promoting Political Climate and Stability
for Peace in the Bangsamoro (Pro PolitiCS for Peace) is a three-year project that seeks to help
shape a stable political environment in support of the Mindanao peace process. It engages
political leaders in dialogue, capacity-building, researches and studies to enhance their informed
and principled participation in the crafting and implementation of the roadmap and processes
for sustainable peace and development in Mindanao.
This program trains, mentors and provides technical assistance to promote efficiency,
transparency, accountability and citizens participation in the affairs of the autonomous
regional government and local government units. It adopts the needs-driven, participatory and
collaborative approaches in introducing, developing and entrenching good governance practices
in regional and local laws and policies.
This program provides training and technical assistance to raise capacities of local governments
in promoting peace and security in their localities. This program trains and strengthens the Local
Peace and Order Councils on conflict resolution and in designing and implementing relevant
and effective programs to promote local security and peace. The program strengthens local and
indigenous mechanisms for conflict prevention and management.
This program conducts researches, workshops and trainings and discussions on political,
economic and security issues. It provides technical assistance in crafting public policies and local
or national laws, resolution or ordinances especially on the protection and welfare of vulnerable
groups such as indigenous peoples, elderly, women, children and people with disabilities.
Capacity-building for lawmakers and policymakers forms part of this program. Through
publications, roundtable discussions and use of traditional and social media, this program can
conduct campaigns towards putting in place relevant policies that effectively address public and
social concerns.
This program involves raising capacities of local government units in alliance-building and
research, survey and mapping to identify areas for economic collaboration among others. It trains
local economic development managers in feasibility studies, business planning and marketing.
This program also provides technical assistance in accessing loans and grants and public-private
partnerships (PPP) for local economic development.
IAG in partnership with the World Bank is building a coalition of multi-sectoral leaders to support
governments programs for the inclusive development of agriculture in Mindanao. Our goal is to
advocate and support policies and programs that will benefit small farmers and landholders,
thereby helping alleviate poverty in the agricultural sector.
Members
Benedikt Seemann
Country Representative to the Philippines, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Mr. Benedikt Seemann is the Country Representative
of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in the
Philippines. Prior to this task in the Philippines,
Mr. Seemann served as an Advisor at the German
Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) for more than 6
years. Before he joined KAS in 2014, he was Chief of
Staff at the Whips office within the parliamentary
group of the Christian Democratic Union. Mr.
Seemann holds a Masters Degree in Political
Science and Public Law. Having focused on political
Murad Ebrahim
Chair, Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Since his election as Chairman of the Central
Committee in 2003 until the present, Al Haj Murad
Ebrahim administers the entire affairs of the
MILF. He signed in behalf of the MILF major peace
agreements such as the Tripoli Agreement of 2001,
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)
in 2012, and the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014.
Orphaned at the age of 13, Murad Ebrahim persisted
in his Koranic studies, finished elementary with
honors in five years and went on to take his secondary
education in a public high school. In 1971, he was
recruited by a clandestine Moro movement to undergo
a secret military training program outside the country,
one semester short of finishing his civil engineering
degree in the Catholic-run Notre Dame University in
Cotabato City.
This opened to his taking up key positions in the
then unified Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF):
as Zone Commander covering 10 municipalities; as
Military Chairman in 1974 in Kutawato Region (now
covering 5 provinces); and as MNLF Chairman in
1978 covering the same region; and as designated
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee of
the new MNLF leadership (Salamat Hashim faction).
He went on to become Vice Chairman for Military
Affairs and Chief of Staff of the Bangsamoro Islamic
Armed Forces after the organization in 1982 of the
Salamat faction of the MNLF into the MILF until the
demise of Ustadz Salamat Hashim in 2003 whom he
succeeded as Chairman.
Phillip Gonzalez
Director, Asia and Australia, Forum of Federations
As Director for Asia and Australia of Forum of
Federations, Phillip Gonzalez leads the Forums
engagement in Australia, Pakistan, Nepal and the
Philippines. Phillip has worked extensively across
Asia in support of democratic transition and with
stakeholders on issues of multilevel governance.
Phillip has previously worked at the Canadian
Foundation for the Americas as well as the Australian
High Commission in Ottawa. He has a Masters degree
in International Relations from Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia. He received his Bachelors
degree from La Trobe University, Australia.
Amina Rasul
President, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID)
Amina Rasul is the President of the Philippine Center
for Islam and Democracy. She is a member of the
Board of Regents of the Mindanao State University.
She has been Presidential Adviser on Youth Affairs
and Chair of the National Youth Commission and
served on the Board of the Mindanao Development
Authority, the Philippine National Oil Corporation, the
Development Bank of the Philippines and a Founding
Director of the Local Government Guarantee
Corporation. A columnist with the Business World,
she has written and edited several books on the
Mindanao conflict, Islam, and democracy. She has
degrees in Economics (University of the Philippines),
Masters in Business Administration (Asian Institute of
Management), and Masters in Public Administration
(Harvard Kennedy School for Government). Awarded
2016 Most Distinguished Alumna of the University of
the Philippines, she is cited as one of the Worlds 500
Most Influential Muslims, 2017 by the Jordan Royal
Islamic Strategic Studies Centre. She was awarded
Muslim Democrat of 2007.
Kristian Herbolzheimer
Director of Transitions to Peace Programme, Conciliation Resources,
United Kingdom
Kristian joined Conciliation Resources full-time in
June 2009, where he directs the work on Colombia
and the Philippines. Together with Emma Leslie, he
represents Conciliation Resources at the International
Contact Group for Mindanao. Throughout his 16 years
of peacebuilding work he has focused his efforts on
comparative learning, womens empowerment and
other forms of innovation, sharing his analysis in
multiple publications.
Before joining CR he worked for seven years at the School
for a Culture of Peace, Autonomous University of Barcelona,
supporting peace processes in Colombia, Philippines,
Western Sahara, Basque Country and elsewhere.
Kristian earned a Masters degree in International
Peacebuilding from the Kroc Institute, University
of Notre Dame, in May 2009. He also holds a degree
in Agriculture Engineering and a Diploma in Peace
Culture. Languages other than English: Catalan,
Spanish, Swedish, German, French.
Dr. SuryaDhungel
Visiting Professor, Kathmandu University School of Law
Professor (Dr) Surya Dhungel is a senior advocate and
a constitutional legal advisor to the First President of
Nepal. He is the member of Kathmandu University
School of Law Planning Advisory Committee. He
chairs Management Board of the National Law College
affiliated with the Tribhuvan University of Nepal. He
has also contributed to the constitution building efforts
of the Constituent Assembly which adopted a new
federal Constitution in 2015, and was involved together
with Professor Yash Ghai in laying the foundation of
the Constitution Advisory Support Program of the
UNDP Nepal (2006-2008). He is also closely associated
with the Forum of Federations on Nepal Program. Dr.
Dhungel has been practicing law at the Supreme Court in
Kathmandu beginning 1976, except the period between
1999 and 2006 when he took up a job with the United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Lotta Sylwander
Country Representative, UNICEF Philippines
Ms. Lotta Sylwander joined as UNICEF
Representative to the Philippines in March 2014.
Ms. Sylwander brings with her over three decades
of substantive experience in the social development
sector, garnered from leadership positions she held in
many regions across the world where she championed
the cause of children and women. She has a keen
personal interest in child protection, social protection,
on ethnic minority issues, disaster risk reduction and
child friendly justice system and in education, health
and overall wellbeing of children. Before coming to
the Philippines, Ms. Sylwander served as the UNICEF
Representative to Vietnam from 2010-2014 and she
was UNICEF Representative in Zambia from 2006-
2010. From 2001 to 2006, and before joining UNICEF,
Ms. Sylwander served as Deputy Director General
and Director of the Africa Department at the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency,
Sida. A citizen of Sweden, Ms. Sylwander holds an
equivalent to Masters degree in Social Anthropology
and was a lecturer in the University of Stockholm.
Edtami Mansayagan
Member, UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
An Arumanen Manobo (an indigenous people from
Cotabato, Philippines), Edtami has worked in various
capacities for many indigenous peoples advocacy
groups, including his most recent roles as executive
director of the Tribal Filipino Center for Development
and as member of the Presidential Task Force for
Indigenous Peoples. He is also the Chairperson of
the Arumanen Ne Menuvu Advisory Council, their
governing council, and a former member of the Board
for the Foundation of the Philippine Environment.
Edtami holds a degree in Theology from a Protestant
Seminary. He is a Member of the United Nations
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of the Indigenous
Peoples for Asia and the Pacific (UN EMRIP).
Jill Cottrell
Author and Former Lecturer,Warwick School of Law and The
University of Hong Kong
Jill Cottrell(Ghai)was educated at the London School
of Economics and Yale University. She hastaught
law in several universities over a career beginning
in 1965: Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo) and Ahmadu
Bello Universities in Nigeria, Warwick University
and University of Hong Kong. She has extensive
experience in advising on constitutions, including in
East Timor, Nepal and Iraq, Somalia and the Maldives.
Jill is the author/co-author of numerous articles,
conference papers and books related to constitution-
making and human rights. She is now based in
Nairobi in what is laughably called retirement. In
other words she is very busy, doing some work for
an NGO committed to the implementation of the
constitution (Katiba Institutewww.katibainstitute.
org) and involved in various other constitution related
projects with public and civil society bodies.
Crisanto Cayon
Independent Consultant
Mr. Cayon specializes in political mapping and
analysis; political economy assessments; multi-
stakeholder coordination; and working with state,
non-state and community-level actors; as well as in
policy reform and development. He holds a track
record in developing influential constituencies
for building critical partnerships for peace and
development, conflict-prevention and resolution, and
normalization efforts. Prior to being an independent
consultant, Cris worked with UNICEF as Chief of
Zamboanga City Field Office, managing the day-to-
day operations of UNICEF Philippines humanitarian
response to the internal displacement that resulted
from the Zamboanga siege (conflict displacement) of
September 2013 and providing nuanced leadership
and strategy development for UNICEF engagement
in addressing humanitarian challenges characterized
by limited external humanitarian actors and funding,
multiple indigenous peoples in IDP communities,
national-local-community political dynamics, and
conflict-driven displacement.
Miriam Grace A. Go
News Director, Rappler
Miriam Grace Go is news director of Rappler.com,
the Philippines pioneering social news network.
She is co-author of the books Ambition, Destiny,
Victory: Stories From A Presidential Election
(with Chay Hofilea), How to Win An Election:
Lessons From the Experts (with Booma Cruz), and
Investigating Local Governments (with several);
and is anthologized in Unholy Nation: Stories From
A Gambling Republic. Her investigative reports on
local governments and political parties have received
national and international awards. She covered the
U.S. presidential election in 2008 as a Jefferson Fellow
of the East-West Center in Hawaii, learned of local
government innovations in Canada as a Marshall
McLuhan Fellow, and observed Thailands election
system as a Southeast Asian Press Alliance Fellow.
Mohagher Iqbal
Chair, MILF Implementing Panel
Mohagher Iqbal received his Masters degrees
on Political Science from the Manuel L. Quezon
University at Manila in 1972. In that year he joined
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), first
as a foot soldier and later as chair of the Committee
on Propaganda of the Kutawato Revolutionary
Committee. When the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) was organized in 1977, he was one
of the founders and served it in various capacities,
notably chair of the Committee on Information from
1979 to this day. Currently, aside from chair of the
Committee on Information, he has been the chair of
the MILF Peace Panel since 2003, and former chair
of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)
which crafted the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). He
is supervising at least seven other agencies related
to the GPH-MILF peace process including chairing
the Consultative Committee of the UN-World Bank
Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities
(FASTRAC). He is also the recipient of the Fr. William
F. Masterson SJ Award by Xavier University in
recognition of his service to the mission of building
a society of justice, peace and compassion during its
Commencement Exercises on 26th March 2015. Please
note: Mohagher Iqbal is a nom de guerre; it is not his
academic or real name.
Sam Chittick
International Advisor for the United Nations/World Bank Facility for
Advisory Support for Transition Capacities (FASTRAC)
Sam Chittick is currently the international advisor
for the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition
Capacities (FASTRAC), a joint facility of the World
Bank and United Nations in support of the peace
process between the Philippine government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Sam has
spent 18 years of his career in development working
in China, Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Vietnam, Malawi, Mozambique, Philippines,
South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. His work
entailed a six-year residence in Mozambique and
nine years in the Philippines, and he is now based
in Washington D.C.. Sam is a senior governance and
peace and conflict specialist whose focus through
the years has been the challenges of improving
governance in conflict-affected areas, including
peace building, social accountability, local economic
development, decentralization, rural development,
and public sector management. He holds a Bachelors
degree in Economics and a Masters degree in
International and Community Development.
Irene Santiago
Government Implementing Panel for the Bangsamoro Peace Accords
Ms. Santiago was recently appointed as GPH Peace
Implementing Panel chair. She is one of the few
women in the world with personal experience in
formal peace negotiations, having served from 2001-
2004 on the government panel negotiating with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). She brought to
the negotiations three decades of experience working
with Muslims, especially women, in Mindanao (the
second-largest island in the Philippines), as well as
varied experiences within the UN system and with
Guiamel Alim
Chairperson, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)
Guiamel Alim is the executive director of Kadtuntaya
Foundation, Inc. (KFI) since 1999 and chairperson
of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
(CBCS) since 2002. In 1997, he attended a course on
Peace building and conflict transformation at the
Eastern Mennonite University (EMU), USA. As an
offshoot of the EMU experience, he participated in the
foundation of the Mindanao Peace Institute (MPI) in
2001, and became a member of its board of trustees a
year later. He was a lead-convener of the Mindanao
Human Rights and Resource Center (MINHRAC)
in 2011. Guiamel joined the Transitional Justice and
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) as coordinator
tasked specifically to supervise the implementation
of the Listening process in the Bangsamoro
communities. He serves as the leading convener of
the Grassroots Peace Monitoring Network (GPMN),
a network of volunteers that monitor promotion of
security and Human Rights in the local communities
in conflict areas. He is the lead-convener of the
CSO-led Bangsamoro Platform for Unity, Solidarity
(BM-PUSH), a mechanism for intra-dialogues and
consensus-building among the Bangsamoro Leaders.
Victoria Tauli-Corpus
UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples Rights
Ms. Tauli-Corpuz has been U.N. special rapporteur
since 2014. She served as chair of the U.N. Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues from 2005-2009. She
is the founder of Tebtebba, the Indigenous Peoples
International Centre for Policy Research and
Education.
She has founded and managed various NGOs involved
in social awareness raising, climate change, the
advancement of indigenous peoples and womens
rights. As an indigenous leader from the Kankanaey
Igorot people of the Cordillera Region, she got
actively engaged in drafting and adoption of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
2007.
She is an Expert for the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights and has served as the chairperson-
rapporteur of the Voluntary Fund for Indigenous
Populations. She is also the indigenous and gender
adviser of the Third World Network and a member of
United Nations Development Programme Civil Society
Organizations Advisory Committee.
Rohan Edrisinha
Senior Constitutional Advisor, United Nations
Rohan Edrisinha is Senior Constitutional Advisor
for the United Nations in New York. He served as
the Constitutional Advisor to UNDP Nepal and the
International Project Manager of the Support to
Participatory Constitution Building Project (SPCBN)
of UNDP in Nepal from January 2011 to December
2014. Rohan who has law degrees from the University
of Colombo and the University of California, Berkeley,
taught at the University of Colombo Faculty of
Law from 1986 to 2011 and at the University of
Witwatersrand (South Africa) Faculty of Law in 1995.
He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the Study
of World Religions, Harvard University, 2004/2005
and a Saul Rae Visiting Fellow at Massey College,
University of Toronto in 2009. He has been involved
in various research and advocacy initiatives on
constitutional reform in South Asia and has written
widely on constitutionalism, comparative federalism
and human rights.
Sponsored by
Partners
GAGF 2016 resources, related presentations and additional reading can be found
at the homepage of Institute for Autonomy & Governance at
www.iag.org.ph