Conjugal Property Dispute Between Widow and Bank

VOL.
453, MARCH 11, 2005 283

Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs.
Dailo
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005. *
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA

C. DAILO, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Property; The sale of a conjugal property requires the
consent of both the husband and wife; Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the
Supreme Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire
sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of
the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same
principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed next,
there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to
Article 124 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Conjugal Partnership; Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
284
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
84 ANNOTATED
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank
vs. Dailo
is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be
governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code
is silent on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such; Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the
records of the case to compel a finding that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family; Conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.The burden of proof that
the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners
sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit
of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the
case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

285
VOL. 453, MARCH 11, 2005 285
Dailo
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edgardo R. Marilim for respondent Miguela Dailo.
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1
CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed with

modification the October 18, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
2
Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748(97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married
on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a
house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from
a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-
2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife. 3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of

Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter
to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed
on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner. The abovemen-
_______________
1 Penned by J. Juan Q. Enriquez and concurred in by JJ. Eugenio S. Labitoria, Chairman, and Teodoro
P. Regino; Rollo, p. 34.
2 Penned by Judge Bienvenido Reyes.
3 Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 36.
286
ANNOTATED
Dailo
tioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent. 4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner

instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-
president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6,
1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute
Sale. 5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In

one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its
premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on
the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo
City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on
October 18, 1997. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
_______________
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
287
VOL. 453, MARCH 11, 2005 287
Dailo
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the
allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1.1.The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
1.(a)The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before
Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No.
212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
2.(b)The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on
April 20, 1995.
3.(c)The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
4.(c)The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
over the residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City,
covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book
No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
5.(d)The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
1.2.The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint
to the plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1.1.The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the
value of the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION:
1.1.The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2.2.The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3.3.The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4.4.To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.

288
ANNOTATED
Dailo
SO ORDERED. 6
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal
in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the
presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of
spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership. The appellate court
7
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was

constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in
accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, it upheld the trial
courts order to reconvey the subject property to respondent. With 8
respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found

petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the
consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to
accomplish the assigned task. All told, the appellate court affirmed the
9
trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys
fees for lack of basis.10
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts
consideration:
1.1.WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER
THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2.2.WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR
THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE FAMILY. 11
_______________
6 As quoted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
7 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 5; Rollo, p. 38.
8 Id., at p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.
9 Ibid.
10 Id., at p. 7; Rollo, p. 40.
11 Rollo, p. 24.
289
VOL. 453, MARCH 11, 2005 289
Dailo
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the
factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family
Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code,
which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires
the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties,
the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a
spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus,
12
petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to
the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal
partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal
13
property requires the consent of both the husband

_______________
Rollo, p. 26.
12
353 Phil. 578; 291 SCRA 372 (1998).

13
290
ANNOTATED
Dailo
and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
14
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale
null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle
in Guiangsquarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as
an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August
8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity
15
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal

Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity
unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. 16
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations

of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory
manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on
17
co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
18
shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is

not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership
_______________
14 Id., at p. 374.
15 Article 119, The New Civil Code.
16 Article 105, Family Code.
291
VOL. 453, MARCH 11, 2005 291
Dailo
of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
19
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed,

foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code.
In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions
on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a
real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of
the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same
manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil
Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are
20
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the
principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the
conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the
family. 21
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other
_______________

20 Recaa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123850, January 5, 2001, 349 SCRA 24, 33.
21 Rollo, p. 27.
292
ANNOTATED
Dailo
to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the
subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly,
to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed
objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. 22
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
23
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping 24
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to
the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not
persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is
nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the
loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of
the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable
for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the
trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the
answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner
never
_______________
22 Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942, 952; 286 SCRA 272, 282
(1998), citing Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969).
23 Id., at p. 954, 286 SCRA 272, 283 (1998).
24 Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 378 Phil. 1009; 321 SCRA 393 (1999).
293
VOL. 453, MARCH 11, 2005 293
Dailo
claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only
be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal
25
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. 26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Note.Under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the sale of
conjugal property is not required. Fact that Nieves Tolentinos signature
in the deed of sale is a forgery does not render the deed of sale void.
(Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, 344 SCRA
95[2000])
o0o
_______________
25 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949; 270 SCRA 211(1997).

26 Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals, 205 Phil. 789; 120 SCRA 897 (1983)
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 735

Ching vs. Goyanko, Jr.
G.R. No. 165879. November 10, 2006. *
MARIA B. CHING, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR.,

EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA GOYANKO,
JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS
GOYANKO, respondents.
Sales; Husbands and Wives; The proscription against sale of property between
spouses applies even to common law relationships.The proscription against sale
of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. So this
Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al., 129 SCRA 675 (1984):
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for
being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husbandin
favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they
derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose
cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352 also
provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
736

36 ANNOTATED
public order, or public policy. Additionally, the law emphatically
prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to
certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances
between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of
conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the
exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the
institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions
apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage,
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union. Those provisions are dictated by public
interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. . . .
Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Due Process; The general rule
that a party in a litigation is not permitted to freely and substantially change the
theory of his case so as not to put the other party to undue disadvantage by not
accurately and timely apprising him of what he is up against, and to ensure that
the latter is given the opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him
by presenting evidence to the contrary, does not apply where the nullification of the
sale is anchored on its illegality per se, such as its being violative of Articles 1352,
1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code.As to the change of theory by respondents from
forgery of their fathers signature in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public
policy, it too does not persuade. Generally, a party in a litigation is not permitted
to freely and substantially change the theory of his case so as not to put the other
party to undue disadvantage by not accurately and timely apprising him of what
he is up against, and to ensure that the latter is given the opportunity during trial
to refute all allegations against him by presenting evidence to the contrary. In the
present case, petitioner cannot be said to have been put to undue disadvantage and
to have been denied the chance to refute all the allegations against her. For the
nullification of the sale is anchored on its illegality per se, it being violative of the
above-cited Articles 1352, 1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code.

737
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 737
Edmund R. Abesamis for petitioner.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for respondents.
Villanueva, Gabionza & De Santoscollaborating counsel for
respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela
Cruz (Epifania) were married. Out of the union were born respondents
1
Joseph, Jr., Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all
surnamed Goyanko.
Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square
meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they
(the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was
registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia).
On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale over the property in
2
favor of respondents father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on

October 12, 1993 a deed of sale over the property in favor of his
3
common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate

of Title (TCT) No. 138405 was thus issued in petitioners name.
After Goyankos death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that
ownership of the property had already been transferred in the name of
petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature of their
father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery. 4
_______________
1 Records, p. 119.
2 Id., at p. 122.
3 Id., at p. 40.
4 Id., at p. 42.
738
ANNOTATED
Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner,
praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405
and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.
In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the
property as it was she who provided its purchase price. To disprove that
Goyankos signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery, she
presented as witness the notary public who testified that Goyanko
appeared and signed the document in his presence.
By Decision of October 16, 1998, the trial court dismissed the
5
complaint against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision

read:
There is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void,
fictitious and simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is genuine.
The testimony of Atty. Salvador Barrameda who declared in court that Joseph
Goyanko, Sr. and Maria Ching together with their witnesses appeared before him
for notarization of Deed of Sale in question is more reliable than the conflicting
testimonies of the two document examiners. Defendant Maria Ching asserted that
the Deed of Sale executed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in her favor is valid and genuine.
The signature of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale is
genuine as it was duly executed and signed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. himself.
The parcel of lands known as Lot No. 6 which is sought to be recovered in this
case could never be considered as the conjugal property of the original Spouses
Joseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz or the exclusive capital property of the
husband. The acquisition of the said property by defendant Maria Ching is well-
elicited from the aforementioned testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the defendant. Although for a time being the property passed through Joseph
Goyanko, Sr. as a buyer yet his ownership was only temporary and transitory for
the reason that it was subsequently sold to herein defendant Maria Ching. Maria
Ching claimed
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 331-346.
739
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 739
that it was even her money which was used by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the
purchase of the land and so it was eventually sold to her. In her testimony,
defendant Ching justified her financial capability to buy the land for herself. The
transaction undertaken was from the original owner Sulpicia Ventura to Joseph
Goyanko, Sr. and then from Joesph Goyanko, Sr. to herein defendant Maria Ching.
The land subject of the litigation is already registered in the name of defendant
Maria Ching under TCT No. 138405. By virtue of the Deed of Sale executed in
favor of Maria Ching, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138405 was issued in her
favor. In recognition of the proverbial virtuality of a Torrens title, it has been
repeatedly held that, unless bad faith can be established on the part of the person
appearing as owner on the certificate of title, there is no other owner than that in
whose favor it has been issued. A Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. It
is a well-known doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and
indefeasible, and the duty of the court is to see to it that this title is maintained
and respected unless challenged in a direct proceedings [sic]. (Citations omitted;
6
italics supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents appealed, they argued

that the trial court erred:
1. 1. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo. . . , in effect,

sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and
the defendant-appellee, despite the proliferation in the records and
admissions by both parties that defendant-appellee was the
mistress or common-law wife of Joseph, Sr.
2. 2. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo. . . , in effect,
sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and
the defendant-appellee, despite the fact that the marriage of
Joseph, Sr. and Epifania was then still subsisting thereby
rendering the subject property as conjugal property of Joseph, Sr.
and Epifania.
3. 3. . . . in dismissing the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining
the validity of the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr.
and the defendant-appellee, despite the clear findings of forgery
and the non-credible testimony of notary public. 7
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 345-346.

7 CA Rollo, p. 18.
740
ANNOTATED
By Decision dated October 21, 2003, the appellate court reversed that of
8
the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale
and TCT No. 138405. Held the appellate court:
. . . The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid
marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary, we find no
evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr.
and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-
appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband
and wife, there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his
marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that
the 661-square meter property located at No. 29 F. Cabahug Street, Cebu City
belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still we
cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to defendant-
appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on records that they
have been living together as common-law husband and wife. On this score, Art.
1352 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
We therefore find that the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant
Maria Ching was null and voidfor being contrary to morals and public policy. The
purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine,
undermines the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy
vigilantly protects. Furthermore, the law emphatically prohibits spouses from
selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions. And this is so because
transfers or conveyances between spouses, if allowed during the marriage would
destroy the system of conjugal partner
_______________
8Penned by Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with the concurrence of Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and
Hakim S. Abdulwahid, Id., at pp. 342-346.
741
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 741
ship, a basic policy in civil law. The prohibition was designed to prevent the
exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other and is likewise applicable
even to common-law relationships otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. (Italics supplied)
9
Hence, the present petition, petitioners arguing that the appellate court
gravely erred in:
I.
. . . APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST

CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE
AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THE SAME
BEING FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO, AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF
PETITIONER, AND THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER PART OF THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS MOTHER
EPIFANIA GOYANKO AND PETITIONERS COMMON LAW HUSBAND,
JOSEPH GOYANKO, SR., NOR THE EXCLUSIVE OR CAPITAL PROPERTY OF
THE LATTER AT ANYTIME BEFORE THE SAME WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED
BY PETITIONER.
II.
. . . NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS

PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLES 1448 AND 1450 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE CAN VALIDLY EXIST BETWEEN COMMON LAW SPOUSES.
III.
. . . NOT FINDING THAT A CONVEYANCE OVER A PROPERTY MADE BY A

TRUSTEE, WHO BECAME AS SUCH IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, AND
WHO HAPPENS TO BE A COMMON LAW HUSBAND OF THE BENEFICIARY,
IS NOT A VIOLATION OF A STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST
CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE
AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES.
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 345-346.
742
ANNOTATED
IV.
. . . ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ABANDON THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY

OF THEIR CASE DURING APPEAL. 10
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which apply to the present
case read:
ART. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
1.(1)Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good

customs, public order or public policy;
2.(2)Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
3.(3)Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
4.(4)Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
5.(5)Those which contemplate an impossible service;
6.(6)Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of
the contract cannot be ascertained;
7.(7)Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.
ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, except:
1.(1)When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage

settlements; or
2.(2)When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191.
(Italics supplied)
The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even

to common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas
v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al.: 11
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

11 214 Phil. 593; 129 SCRA 675 (1984).
743
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 743
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for
being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in
favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they
derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause,
object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling
property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations
between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if
transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that
would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was
also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the
other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of
family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. Those
provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon
the will of the parties. . . . (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
12
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his

common-law wife herein petitioner, it was null and void.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 598-599; p. 680.
744
ANNOTATED
Petitioners argument that a trust relationship was created between
Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary as provided in Articles 1448
and 1450 of the Civil Code which read:
ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of
having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the
latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a
child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is
implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.
ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person
for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to
secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the
person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem
the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him.
does not persuade.

For petitioners testimony that it was she who provided the purchase
price is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the
breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she earned a
living do not conclusively clinch her claim.
As to the change of theory by respondents from forgery of their fathers
signature in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public policy, it too does
not persuade. Generally, a party in a litigation is not permitted to freely
and substantially change the theory of his case so as not to put the other
party to undue disadvantage by not accurately and timely apprising him
of what he is up against, and to ensure that the latter is given the
13
opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him by

presenting evidence to the contrary. In the present case, petitioner
cannot be said to have been put to undue
_______________
13 Olympia Housing, Inc. v. Panasiatic Travel Corp., 443 Phil. 385, 399-400; 395 SCRA 298, 309 (2003).
745
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 745
disadvantage and to have been denied the chance to refute all the
allegations against her. For the nullification of the sale is anchored on
its illegality per se, it being violative of the abovecited Articles 1352,
1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairman), Carpio and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., On Leave.
Petition denied.
Notes.In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that
the man and the woman living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. (Malang vs. Moson, 338 SCRA 393 [2000])
Where the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a
property in which they have a common interest, the signing of one of
them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on
certification of non-forum shopping. (Dar vs. Alonzo-Legasto, 339 SCRA
306 [2000]
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 475

Pelayo vs. Perez
G.R. No. 141323. June 8, 2005. *
DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA B. ** PELAYO,

petitioners, vs. MELKI E. PEREZ, respondent.
Actions; Judgments; Law of the Case; Words and Phrases; Law of the case has
been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the
case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the
law of the case upon subsequent appeal.Under the principle of law of the case,
said ruling of the CA is now binding on petitioners. Such principle was elucidated
in Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals, to wit: Law of the case has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule
that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.
Sales; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership; A wife, by affixing her
signature to a Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have
given her implied consent to the contract of salea wifes consent to the husbands
disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in
any particular document so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent
or approval was indeed given.We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner
Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for
witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. Sale
is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be
express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal
property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular
document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval
was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed
of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental wit-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
Loreza in CA Rollo and original records.
**
476
76 ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
ness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact
that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented
to the sale.
Same; Same; Same; Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be
aware of serious problems such as threats to her husbands life and the reasons for
such threats.Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of
serious problems such as threats to her husbands life and the reasons for such
threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners problems over the subject property
had been going on for quite some time, so it is highly improbable for Lorenza not to
be aware of what her husband was doing to remedy such problems. Petitioners do
not deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale
as her signature appears thereon. Neither do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had
no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject document. Thus, it is
quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her
husband and respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns.Under the rules of evidence, it is
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Petitioners did not
even attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was
ever presented to show that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental
faculties and, hence, could not have fully understood the ramifications of signing
the deed of sale. Neither did petitioners present any evidence that Lorenza had
been defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened either by her own husband or by
respondent into affixing her signature on the subject document. If Lorenza had any
objections over the conveyance of the disputed property, she could have totally
refrained from having any part in the execution of the deed of sale. Instead,
Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 173, in relation to Art. 166, both of the Civil
Code, lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make
the contract void ab initio but merely voidable.Under Article 173, in relation to
Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11,
1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but
merely voidable.
Same; Agents; The prohibition in par. 2 of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, against
agents purchasing property in their hands for sale or management,
477
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 4
77
Pelayo vs. Perez
does not apply if the principal consents to the sale of the property in the hands of
the agent or administrator.In Distajo vs. Court of Appeals, a landowner,
Iluminada Abiertas, designated one of her sons as the administrator of several
parcels of her land. The landowner subsequently executed a Deed of Certification
of Sale of Unregistered Land, conveying some of said land to her son/administrator.
Therein, we held that: Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the prohibition
against agents purchasing property in their hands for sale or management is not
absolute. It does not apply if the principal consents to the sale of the property in
the hands of the agent or administrator. In this case, the deeds of sale signed by
Iluminada Abiertas shows that she gave consent to the sale of the properties in
favor of her son, Rufo, who was the administrator of the properties. Thus, the
consent of the principal Iluminada Abiertas removes the transaction out of the
prohibition contained in Article 1491(2). The above-quoted ruling is exactly in point
with this case before us. Petitioners, by signing the Deed of Sale in favor of
respondent, are also deemed to have given their consent to the sale of the subject
property in favor of respondent, thereby making the transaction an exception to
the general rule that agents are prohibited from purchasing the property of their
principals.
Same; Courts; Attorneys; Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and
extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him
from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts; It is highly unlikely
and contrary to human experience that a layman would be able to defraud, exert
undue influence, or in any way vitiate the consent of a lawyer who is expected to be
more knowledgeable in the ways of drafting contracts and other legal
transactions.Petitioners contend that the consideration stated in the deed of sale
is excessively inadequate, indicating that the deed of sale was merely simulated.
We are not persuaded. Our ruling in Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals is
pertinent, to wit: . . . Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the
exact value of the subject matter of sale. . . . As we stated in Vales vs. Villa: Courts
cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect
him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the
effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons
who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been
defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
miserable judgment, and lose money by themindeed, all they have in the world;
but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in
addition, a
478
78 ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as
an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation
and remedy it. Verily, in the present case, petitioners have not presented proof
that there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence exercised upon them by
respondent. It is highly unlikely and contrary to human experience that a layman
like respondent would be able to defraud, exert undue influence, or in any way
vitiate the consent of a lawyer like petitioner David Pelayo who is expected to be
more knowledgeable in the ways of drafting contracts and other legal transactions.
Due Process; The Court has consistently held that a partys right to due process
is not violated where he was able to move for reconsideration of the order or decision
in question.We have consistently held that a petitioners right to due process is
not violated where he was able to move for reconsideration of the order or decision
in question. In this case, petitioners had the opportunity to fully expound on their
defenses through a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners did file such motion but
they wasted such opportunity by failing to present therein whatever errors they
believed the CA had committed in its Decision. Definitely, therefore, the denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration, praying that they be allowed to file
appellees brief, did not infringe petitioners right to due process as any issue that
petitioners wanted to raise could and should have been contained in said motion
for reconsideration.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
Cariaga Law Offices for petitioners.
Vivencio Jumamil for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: ***
This resolves the petition for review on certiorariseeking the reversal of

the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
1
_______________
***Acting Chairman.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court),
with Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired),
concurring.
479
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 479
Pelayo vs. Perez
April 20, 1999 which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Panabo, Davao, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 91-46; and the CA
Resolution dated December 17, 1999 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts as aptly narrated by the CA are as follows:
David Pelayo (Pelayo), by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 11, 1988,
conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the lots) situated
in Panabo, Davao which are portions of Lot 4192, Cad. 276 covered by OCT P-
16873.
Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is
illegible witnessed the execution of the deed.
Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for
witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration of the deed with
the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum, Davao was denied.
Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed
but she refused, hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the instant complaint for
specific performance against her and her husband Pelayo (defendants).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no
cause of action, citing Section 6 of RA 6656 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which took effect on June 10, 1988 and which provides that
contracts executed prior thereto shall be valid only when registered with the
Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this
Act.
The questioned deed having been executed on January 10, 1988, the defendants
claimed that Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988 within which to register
the same, but as they failed to, it is not valid and, therefore, unenforceable.
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint. On appeal to this Court, the
dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
In their Answer, the defendants claimed that as the lots were occupied illegally
by some persons against whom they filed an ejectment case, they and Perez who is
their friend and known at the time as an activist/leftist, hence feared by many, just
made it appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him in order to frighten said
illegal occupants, with the intentional omission of Lorezas signature so that the
deed could not be
480
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
registered; and that the deed being simulated and bereft of consideration is
void/inexistent.
Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in
consideration of his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary
representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants in the
ejectment suit; and that after his relationship with defendant Pelayo became sour,
the latter sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not to
entertain any transaction concerning the lots title to which was entrusted to Perez
who misplaced and could [not] locate it.
Defendant Pelayo claimed in any event, in his Pre-trial brief filed on March 19,
1996, that the deed was without his wife Lorezas consent, hence, in light of Art.
166 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent . . .
it is null and void.
The trial court, finding, among others, that Perez did not possess, nor pay the
taxes on the lots, that defendant Pelayo was indebted to Perez for services
rendered and, therefore, the deed could only be considered as evidence of debt, and
that in any event, there was no marital consent to nor actual consideration for the
deed, held that the deed was null and void and accordingly rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering and directing the defendants to pay
plaintiff Melki Perez the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos as principal with 12%
interest per annum starting from the date of filing of the complaint on August 1, 1991 until
plaintiff is fully paid.
The defendants shall likewise pay to plaintiff the sum of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) as
attorneys fees.
The court further orders that the Deed of Absolute Sale, (Annex A) of the complaint and
(Annex C) of the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is declared null and void and without
force and it is likewise removed as a cloud over defendants title and property in suit. . . .
2
_______________
2CA Rollo, pp. 59-62.

481
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 481
Pelayo vs. Perez
The RTC Decision was appealed by herein respondent Perez to the CA.
Petitioners failed to file their appellees brief. The CA then promulgated
its Decision on April 20, 1999 whereby it ruled that by Lorenzas signing
as witness to the execution of the deed, she had knowledge of the
transaction and is deemed to have given her consent to the same; that
herein petitioners failed to adduce sufficient proof to overthrow the
presumption that there was consideration for the deed, and that
petitioner David Pelayo, being a lawyer, is presumed to have acted with
due care and to have signed the deed with full knowledge of its contents
and import. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, declaring
as valid and enforceable the questioned deed of sale and ordering herein
petitioner Lorenza Pelayo to affix her signature on all pages of said
document.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the decision but the same was
denied per Resolution dated December 17, 1999. The CA found said
motion to have been filed out of time and ruled that even putting aside
technicality, petitioners failed to present any ground bearing on the
merits of the case to justify a reversal or setting aside of the decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:
1.1.The CA erred in ignoring the specific provision of Section 6, in relation to
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 which took effect on June 15, 1988 and which provides
that contracts executed prior thereto shall be valid only when registered
with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the
effectivity of this Act.
2.2.The CA erred in holding that the deed of sale was valid and considering the
P10,000.00 adjudged by the trial court as Perezs remuneration as the
consideration for the deed of sale, instead of declaring the same as null and
void for being fictitious or simulated and on the basis of Art. 491, Par. 2 of
the New Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase
properties from his principal under his charge.
482
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
1. 3.The CA made a novel ruling that there was implied marital consent of the
wife of petitioner David Pelayo.
2.4.Petitioners should have been allowed to file their appellees brief to
ventilate their side, considering the existence of peculiar circumstances
which prevented petitioners from filing said brief.
On the other hand, respondent points out that the CA, in resolving the
first appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38700 brought by respondent
3
assailing the RTC Order granting herein petitioners motion to dismiss,

already ruled that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale or transfer of private
agricultural land is allowed only when the area of the land being
conveyed constitutes or is a part of, the landowner-seller retained area
and when the total landholding of the purchaser-transferee, including
the property sold, does not exceed five (5) hectares; that in this case, the
land in dispute is only 1.3 hectares and there is no proof that the
transferees (herein respondent) total landholding inclusive of the
subject land will exceed 5 hectares, the landholding ceiling prescribed by
R.A. No. 6657; that the failure of respondent to register the instrument
was not due to his fault or negligence but can be attributed to Lorenzas
unjustified refusal to sign two pages of the deed despite several requests
of respondent; and that therefore, the CA ruled that the deed of sale
subject of this case is valid under R.A. No. 6657.
Respondent further maintains that the CA correctly held in its
assailed Decision that there was consideration for the contract and that
Lorenza is deemed to have given her consent to the deed of sale.
Respondent likewise opines that the CA was right in denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration where they prayed that they be
allowed to file their appellees brief as their counsel failed to file the
same on account of said counsels failing health due to cancer of the
liver. Respondent emphasized that in petitioners motion for
reconsideration, they did not even cite any errors made by the CA in its
Decision.
_______________
3 Entitled Melki Perez, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Spouses David and Loreza Pelayo, Defendants-
Appellees, Records, pp. 30-36.
483
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 483
Pelayo vs. Perez
The issues boil down to the question of whether or not the deed of sale
was null and void on the following grounds: (a) for not complying with
the provision in R.A. No. 6657 that such document must be registered
with the Register of Deeds within three months after the effectivity of
said law; (b) for lack of marital consent; (c) for being prohibited under
Article 1491 (2) of the Civil Code; and (d) for lack of consideration.
We rule against petitioners.
The issue of whether or not the deed of sale is null and void under R.A.
No. 6657, for respondents failure to register said document with the
Register of Deeds within three months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
6657, had been resolved with finality by the CA in its Decision dated
November 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38700. Herein petitioners no 4
longer elevated said CA Decision to this Court and the same became
final and executory on January 7, 1995. 5
In said decision, the CA interpreted Section 4, in relation to Section 70

of R.A. No. 6657, to mean thus:
. . . the proper interpretation of both sections is that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale
or transfer of a private agricultural land is allowed only when said land area
constitutes or is a part of the landowner-seller retained area and only when the
total landholdings of the purchaser-transferee, including the property sold does not
exceed five (5) hectares.
Aside from declaring that the failure of respondent to register the deed
was not of his own fault or negligence, the CA ruled that respondents
failure to register the deed of sale within three months after effectivity
of The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law did not invalidate the deed
of sale as the transaction over said property is not proscribed by R.A.
No. 6657.
_______________
Ibid.
4
See Decision and Entry of Judgment, Record, pp. 30-37.

5
484
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
Thus, under the principle of law of the case, said ruling of the CA is now
binding on petitioners. Such principle was elucidated in Cucueco vs.
Court of Appeals, to wit:
6
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is
a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a
question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Petitioners not having questioned the Decision of the CA dated
November 24, 1994 which then attained finality, the ruling that the deed
of sale subject of this case is not among the transactions deemed as
invalid under R.A. No. 6657, is now immutable.
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her
signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which
may either be express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands
7
disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set

forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the
wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case,
8
although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed
only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution
of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the
sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
_______________
6 G.R. No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290.
7 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. IV, 5th Ed., pp. 440,
447.
8Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 5th Ed., p. 448.
485
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 485
Pelayo vs. Perez
In their Pre-Trial Brief, petitioners admitted that even prior to 1988,
9
they have been having serious problems, including threats to the life of
petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal occupants of the
property in question, so that respondent, whom many feared for being a
leftist/activist, offered his help in driving out said illegal occupants.
Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of
serious problems such as threats to her husbands life and the reasons
for such threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners problems over
the subject property had been going on for quite some time, so it is
highly improbable for Lorenza not to be aware of what her husband was
doing to remedy such problems. Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza
Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her
signature appears thereon. Neither do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo
had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject
document. Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the sale of their
conjugal property between her husband and respondent.
Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns. Petitioners did not even attempt to
10
overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever

presented to show that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental
faculties and, hence, could not have fully understood the ramifications of
signing the deed of sale. Neither did petitioners present any evidence
that Lorenza had been defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened
either by her own husband or by respondent into affixing her signature
on the subject document. If Lorenza had any objections over the
conveyance of the disputed property, she could have totally refrained
from having any part in the execution of the deed of sale. Instead,
Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the
New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988
_______________
9Records, pp. 59-62.
Section 3 (d), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
10
486
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to
the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab
initiobut merely voidable. Said provisions of law provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal property without the wifes
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her
to grant the same.
...
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls
the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent
was not obtained. In the present case, despite respondents repeated
11
demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed
of sale, showing respondents insistence on enforcing said contract,
Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was
only when respondent filed a complaint for specific performance on
August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up Lorenzas alleged lack of
consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed
entered into without Lorenzas consent, we find it quite puzzling why for
more than three and a half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek
the nullification of the assailed contract.
_______________
11Alfredo vs. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145; Heirs of Christina Ayuste vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118784, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 493.
487
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 487
Pelayo vs. Perez
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza
knew of the full import of the transaction between respondent and her
husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in
effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.
With regard to petitioners asseveration that the deed of sale is invalid
under Article 1491, paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, we find such
argument unmeritorious. Article 1491 (2) provides:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
...
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted
to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
...
In Distajo vs. Court of Appeals, a landowner, Iluminada Abiertas,
12
designated one of her sons as the administrator of several parcels of her

land. The landowner subsequently executed a Deed of Certification of
Sale of Unregistered Land, conveying some of said land to her
son/administrator. Therein, we held that:
Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the prohibition against agents
purchasing property in their hands for sale or management is not absolute. It does
not apply if the principal consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the
agent or administrator. In this case, the deeds of sale signed by Iluminada Abiertas
shows that she gave consent to the sale of the properties in favor of her son, Rufo,
who was the administrator of the properties. Thus, the consent of the principal
Iluminada Abiertas removes the transaction out of the prohibition contained in
Article 1491(2). 13
The above-quoted ruling is exactly in point with this case before us.
Petitioners, by signing the Deed of Sale in favor of respondent,
_______________
G.R. No. 112954, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 52.

12
Id., p. 57.
13
488
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
are also deemed to have given their consent to the sale of the subject
property in favor of respondent, thereby making the transaction an
exception to the general rule that agents are prohibited from purchasing
the property of their principals.
Petitioners also argue that the CA erred in ruling that there was
consideration for the sale. We find no error in said appellate courts
ruling. The element of consideration for the sale is indeed present.
Petitioners, in adopting the trial courts narration of antecedent facts in
their petition, thereby admitted that they authorized respondent to
14
represent them in negotiations with the squatters occupying the

disputed property and, in consideration of respondents services, they
executed the subject deed of sale. Aside from such services rendered by
respondent, petitioners also acknowledged in the deed of sale that they
received in full the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos. Evidently, the
consideration for the sale is respondents services plus the
aforementioned cash money.
Petitioners contend that the consideration stated in the deed of sale is
excessively inadequate, indicating that the deed of sale was merely
simulated. We are not persuaded. Our ruling in Buenaventura vs. Court
of Appeals is pertinent, to wit:
15
. . . Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the
subject matter of sale. . . . As we stated in Vales vs. Villa:
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him
from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish
acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent.
Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he
has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts,
use miserable judgment, and lose money by themindeed, all they have in the world; but not for
that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of the law,
the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
_______________
Rollo, pp. 12-13.

14
G.R. No. 126376, November 20, 2003, 416 SCRA 263.

15
489
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 489
Pelayo vs. Perez
wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. 16
Verily, in the present case, petitioners have not presented proof that
there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence exercised upon them
by respondent. It is highly unlikely and contrary to human experience
that a layman like respondent would be able to defraud, exert undue
influence, or in any way vitiate the consent of a lawyer like petitioner
David Pelayo who is expected to be more knowledgeable in the ways of
drafting contracts and other legal transactions.
Furthermore, in their Reply to Respondents
Memorandum, petitioners adopted the CAs narration of fact that
17
petitioners stated in a letter they sent to the Register of Deeds of Tagum

that they have entrusted the titles over subject lots to herein
respondent. Such act is a clear indication that they intended to convey
the subject property to herein respondent and the deed of sale was not
merely simulated or fictitious.
Lastly, petitioners claim that they were not able to fully ventilate
their defense before the CA as their lawyer, who was then suffering from
cancer of the liver, failed to file their appellees brief. Thus, in their
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, they prayed that they be
allowed to submit such appellees brief. The CA, in its Resolution dated
December 17, 1999, stated thus:
By movant-defendant-appellees own information, his counsel received a copy of the
decision on May 5, 1999. He, therefore, had fifteen (15) days from said date or up to
May 20, 1999 to file the motion. The motion, however, was sent through a private
courier and, therefore, considered to have been filed on the date of actual receipt on
June 17, 1999 by the addresseeCourt of Appeals, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
Technicality aside, movant has not proffered any ground bearing on the merits
of the case why the decision should be set aside.
_______________
Id., p. 272.
16
Rollo, p. 140.
17
490
ANNOTATED
Pelayo vs. Perez
Petitioners never denied the CA finding that their motion for
reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period.
On that point alone, the CA is correct in denying due course to said
motion. The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had
then attained finality. Thus, in Abalos vs. Philex Mining
Corporation, we held that:
18
. . . Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the CA that said motion did not present
any defense or argument on the merits of the case that could have
convinced the CA to reverse or modify its Decision.
We have consistently held that a petitioners right to due process is
not violated where he was able to move for reconsideration of the order
or decision in question. In this case, petitioners had the opportunity to
19
fully expound on their defenses through a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners did file such motion but they wasted such opportunity by
failing to present therein whatever errors they believed the CA had
committed in its Decision. Definitely, therefore, the denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration, praying that they be allowed to file appellees
brief, did not infringe petitioners right to due process as any issue that
petitioners wanted to raise could and should have been contained in said
motion for reconsideration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 1999 and its Resolution
dated December 17, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.
_______________
18G.R. No. 140374, November 27, 2002, 441 Phil. 386; 393 SCRA 134.
19Batongbakal vs. Zafra, G.R. No. 141806, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 399; Toh vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 140274, November 15, 2000, 344 SCRA 831; Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
106153, July 14, 1997, 341 Phil. 413; 275 SCRA 413.
491
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 491
Davao New Town Development
Corporation vs. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno (Chairman), J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.When a minute resolution attains finality, it becomes the
law of the case. (Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 476[1997])
The absence of the consent of one spouse in the sale of a conjugal
property renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof
makes it merely voidable. (Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA
372 [1998])
o0o
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 107

Go vs. Yamane
G.R. No. 160762. May 3, 2006. *
Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO,

petitioners, vs. LEONARDO YAMANE, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional; Some instances in which the court dispensed with technical
infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals.The perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen
days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment. There have been
exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed with technical infirmities and
gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the presence of any
justifying circumstance recognized by lawsuch as fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligenceproperly vested the judge with discretion to approve or
admit an appeal filed out of time. In other instances, lapsed appeals were allowed
in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
c) the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the
failure to show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory; and
f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced.
Civil Law; Property; As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of Article 160
of the New Civil Code in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage; The presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.Article 160 of
the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this
article in favor of the
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
108
08 ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the
presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
Same; Same; The nature of a propertywhether conjugal or paraphernalis
determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses.Respondents interest
cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in her Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-
R that the subject parcel of land was her paraphernal property. Significantly, the
nature of a propertywhether conjugal or paraphernalis determined by law and
not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse
can change the character of a conjugal property.
Same; Same; The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does
not destroy its conjugal nature.The mere registration of a property in the name of
one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be contended in
the present case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the
parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and
exclusive property. In concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial courts reliance
on Stuart v. Yatco, 4 SCRA 1143 (1962), was clearly erroneous.
Same; Same; Instances where a wife may bind the conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows
money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the needed sum;
when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case means that the
conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for Muriels personal obligation.
109
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 109
Go vs. Yamane
Court of Appeals.
E.L. Gayo and Associates for petitioners.
Albert Umaming for respondent.
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is
presumed to be conjugal in nature. This presumption stands, absent any
clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1
Court, challenging the November 22, 2002 Decision and the September 2
17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.

3
60939. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated August 12,
1981 and the Final Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982 are declared
NULL and VOID. 4
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-22.

2 Annex L of Petition; Id., at pp. 62-72. Penned by Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and concurred
in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico (Division chairperson) and Regalado E. Maambong (member).
3 Annex N of Petition; Id., at p. 82.
4 Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; Id., at p. 71.
110
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
The CA denied reconsideration in its September 17, 2003 Resolution.
The Facts
The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:
Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot located at Res. Sec.
K, Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo
Yamane, [respondent] herein, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12491.
As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty. Guillermo
F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841, entitled Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie
Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation, which said
counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Pucay sisters, the subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees
in the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public
auction on August 11, 1981.
Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party Claim with
the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the
subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable
for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded
with the auction sale despite [respondents] protest. The subject property was sold
to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as highest bidder. No
redemption having been made during the one-year period, a Final Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale was eventually issued on August 26, 1982 conveying and
transferring the said property to [petitioners].
On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No. 417-R, against [petitioners] and
Sheriff Melgar for annulment and cancellation of auction sale upon the same
ground stated in the abovementioned third-party claim. Citing the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No. 2288, which
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed the Register of Deeds to
issue new title in the name of Josephine Go x x x, [petitioners] moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of res judi-
111
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 111
Go vs. Yamane
cata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was denied by the trial
court.
In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the material
allegations of the complaint and interposed the following special affirmative
defenses: that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment; that [respondent]
has not pursued any lawful remedy to annul the execution proceeding; that there is
no flaw or irregularity in the auction sale; and that since the execution sale was
made in accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is
deemed final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof will not vitiate
its validity.
On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R, against [petitioners] and Atty. Guillermo De
Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud, misrepresentation, manipulation and unlawful
acts of the defendants in causing the levy of the subject property with an estimated
commercial value of P200,000 as against a charging lien in the amount of P10,000.
In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint hearing of Civil
Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. On August 30, 1985, Muriel was declared non-suited
for failure to appear in the hearing despite due notice. As a consequence, Civil
Case No. 505-R was dismissed on October 15, 1985. 5
In its Decision dated March 25, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
6
Baguio City, Branch 4, held that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamanespouse of
respondentand was not their conjugal property. The appearance of his
name on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was deemed to be merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, his late wife.
Hence, finding that he had no legal standing to question the auction sale
or to pray for its annulment or cancellation, the RTC dismissed the case
for lack of merit.
_______________
5Id., at pp. 1-3; Id., at pp. 62-64.

6Annex A of petitioners Memorandum; Rollo, unnumbered. Penned by acting Presiding Judge
Robert T. Cawed.
112
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998, respondent filed a
Motion, in which he prayed that he be allowed to file his Motion for
7
Reconsideration of the Decision, on or before May 30, 1998. The trial

court granted his Motion;
8 received the Motion for
Reconsideration, which was filed on May 28, 1998; and eventually
9
denied it in its Order dated June 5, 1998. He then elevated the matter
10
to the CA on June 15, 1998.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the RTCs Decision. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
dated August 12, 1981, and the Final Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated
August 26, 1982, were declared null and void.
According to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are
shown to have been used for the purpose. That the land was acquired
during the spouses coverture was sufficiently established by the TCT
and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both indicating that Muriel Pucay
Yamane was married to Leonardo Yamane; and by the undisputed
testimony of the previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners
failure to establish that the land in question had been acquired by
Muriel using her exclusive funds, the CA concluded that the contested
land was conjugal property.
The appellate court further held thus:
x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property of [respondent] and his
wife, and absent any showing of some advantage or benefit that accrued to their
conjugal partnership from the transaction between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De
Guzman, the public
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 53.
8 Id., at p. 54.
9 Id., at pp. 55-57.
10 Id., at p. 58.
113
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 113
Go vs. Yamane
auction sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is null and void. 11
Hence, this Petition. 12
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the appeal and in
not dismissing the same, despite the fact that the respondent failed to perfect his
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.
II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as
conjugal property, despite the existence of clear evidence showing that the subject
property is the exclusive paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during her
lifetime, always claimed the said property as her own exclusive paraphernal
property and not as property co-owned with her husband, the respondent herein.
III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that the subject
property is conjugal property between respondent and Muriel, gravely erred in
ruling that the same cannot answer for the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de
Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841. 13
In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the procedural
question of whether the CA erred in giving due course to respondents
lapsed appeal; and, second, the sub-
_______________
11 Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 71.

12 This case was deemed submitted for decision on January 5, 2005, upon this Courts receipt of
petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Emiliano L. Gayo. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Albert A. Umaming, was received by the Court on December 22, 2004.
13 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 11; Rollo, unnumbered.
114
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
stantive issue of whether the subject property is conjugal or
paraphernal.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue: Whether Respondents Appeal
Should Be Given Due Course
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal
filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998.
He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998, within which to file an appeal.
Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new counsel be
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1998. It was
eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was denied. Respondent
subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1998. By this time, the
original period to appeal had expired. It should be clear that the Rules
prohibit an extension to file a motion for reconsideration. 14
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period

prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory, but
also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen days
deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment. 15
There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed

with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In some
of those instances, the presence of any justifying circumstance
recognized by lawsuch as fraud,
_______________
14RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 3.

15J. FERIA AND M.C. NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2, 163 (2001); Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
115
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 115
Go vs. Yamane
accident, mistake or excusable negligenceproperly vested the judge
with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In other 16
instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve substantial

justice, upon consideration of a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; c) the
merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the
rules; e) the failure to show that the review being sought was merely
frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact that the other party would not be
unjustly prejudiced. 17
Indeed, in some exceptional cases, the Court has allowed the

relaxation of the rules regulating the reglementary periods of appeal.
These exceptions were cited in Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v.
CA, from which we quote:
18
In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395 (1980), the Court excused the delay of four
days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial
court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record
was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the
prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 453 (1978), the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the
Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and
had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38 (1989), a tardy appeal was accepted
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled
with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal
_______________
16 Catubay v. National Labor Relations Commision, 330 SCRA 440, April 12, 2000.
17 Dela Cruz v. Sison, G.R. No. 142464, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 35; Barnes v. Hon. Padilla, 461
SCRA 533, June 28, 2005 (citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 540, June 20, 2003 and Aguam v.
Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 784, May 31, 2000).
18 344 SCRA 769, November 15, 2000.
116
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same
reparation to the appellee. 19
We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in the

present controversy. We have carefully studied the merits of the case
and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to be merely
frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the conclusion that the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in Civil Case No. 417-R), must be set
aside. It would be far better and more prudent to attain the ends of
justice, rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice in the process. Thus, we would rather excuse a technical lapse
and afford respondent a review of the case on appeal.
Substantive Issue: Paraphernal or Conjugal?
The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Accordingly, the transaction
20
was aptly covered by the then governing provisions of the New Civil
Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the issue of the
nature of the contested property.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As 21
a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the
conjugal partner-
_______________
19 Id., at p. 777, per Vitug, J.

20 M. STA. MARIA, JR., PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW, 94 (3rd ed., 1999).
21 The provision is reproduced in Article 116 of the Family Code, which states: All property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
117
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 117
Go vs. Yamane
ship, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the
22
property was acquired during the marriage. 23
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not

operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with
24
strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict 25
proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of 26
proof rests upon the party asserting it. 27
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land

belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo
Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or 28
specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that proof of
29
the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices to

render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear enough that the
presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the
subsistence of the marriage of Muriel to respondent. 30
_______________
22 Flora v. Prado, 420 SCRA 396, January 20, 2004.

23 Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555, March 31, 2005; Jocson v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 333,
February 16, 1989.
24 Phil. National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435, August 31, 1987.
25 Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 200 SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.
26 Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil.
519; 299 SCRA 188, November 25, 1998.

27 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 423; 273 SCRA 229, June 10, 1997.
28 Annex P of the Petition; Rollo, p. 87.
29 See Annex 2-A of respondents Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 148.
30 See petitioners Memorandum, p. 22; Rollo, unnumbered.
118
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
Nonetheless, they insist that it belonged exclusively to her for the
following reasons:
First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in Civil Case
No. 505-R, which she had filed during her lifetime; or in AG-G.R. Sp. No.
01616(entitled Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Josephine Go), that the
disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They
allege that his failure to file a denial or opposition in those cases is
tantamount to a judicial admission that militates against his belated
claim.
Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name
of Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had the spouses jointly purchased this
piece of land, the document should have indicated this fact or carried the
name of respondent as buyer.
Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within
the redemption period after the auction sale indicated that he was not
its co-owner.
We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.
Unilateral Declaration
Respondents interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel in her
Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of land was
her paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a property
whether conjugal or paraphernalis determined by law and not by the
will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse
31
can change the character of a conjugal property. 32
Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the
nature of the subject piece of land being levied upon, but whether Atty.
Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. In that case,
Muriel claimed that she had not
_______________
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 439, April 14, 2004.

31
Id.
32
119
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 119
Go vs. Yamane
officially retained him as counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship
had been established between them. 33
Deed and Title in the

Name of One Spouse
Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be contended in
34
the present case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale
covering the parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was
therefore her personal and exclusive property. In concluding that it was
paraphernal, the trial courts reliance on Stuart v. Yatco was clearly 35
erroneous.
As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property, petitioners must present clear and convincing evidence. We
affirm and quote below, for easy reference, the relevant dispositions of
the CA:
x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners] contention that the subject
property was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. Mere registration of the
contested property in the name of the wife is not sufficient to establish the
paraphernal nature of the property. This reminds Us of the teaching in the recent
case of Diancin v. Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses,
regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. To quote:
As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is
registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of
_______________
33 See Annex C of Petition; Rollo, pp. 34-38.

34 Acabal v. Acabal, supra note 20 (citing Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154, August 17, 1983 and Bucoy
v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248, April 26, 1968).
35 4 SCRA 1143, April 27, 1962.
120
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case at
bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having been acquired during the coverture of the
marriage between Matilde and Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that the grant was
solely in the name of Matilde did not make the property paraphernal property. What was
material was the time the fishpond lease right was acquired by the grantee, and that was during
the lawful existence of Matildes marriage to Tiburcio.
x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence.
The burden of proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party
asserting it. Mere assertion of the propertys paraphernal nature is not sufficient.
The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead us to conclude
that the contested property was indeed acquired during the marriage of herein
[respondent] and Muriel. To prove that it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is
incumbent upon [petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that
Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed to discharge
the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by them do We find any indication
that the land in question was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. The
presumption not having been overthrown, the conclusion is that the contested land
is conjugal property. 36
Non-Redemption
After the Auction Sale
The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period
prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his right
or title to it. Contrary to petitioners allegation, the fact is that he filed a
Third-Party Claim with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy and
37
impending auction sale. This fact was specifically admitted by

petitioners. Respon-38
_______________
36 Assailed CA Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 68-69.

Third Party Claim dated August 3, 1981; Rollo, pp. 135-136.
37
See Answer dated December 7, 1984, p. 2; Rollo, p. 29.

38
121
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 121
Go vs. Yamane
dent claimed that the parcel of land was conjugal, and that he could not
answer for the separate obligation of his wife and her
sisters. Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed piece of land was sold
39
at a public auction on August 11, 1981. Consequently issued were a

Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and a Final Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982. 40
Likewise, in his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File Adm.

Case No. 2288, respondent raised the issue of the conjugal nature of the
41
property and reserved his right to file an independent action to annul

the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983 Order, however, Branch 5 of the
42
RTC of Baguio City did not rule on either the actual ownership or the
nature of the parcel of land. Rather, it granted the Petition to issue a
new certificate of title in favor of Petitioner Josephine Mendoza Go. It
found that, under Section 75 of Presidential Decree 1529, respondent
had no legal standing to question the auction sale, because he was not
the registered owner of the property. Instead, his right to prove his claim
in a separate and independent action was upheld. Thus, he instituted 43
the present case for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale.
The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of respondent to
redeem the property. Misplaced is petitioners empha-
_______________
39 See Complaint dated August 31, 1984, p. 3; Rollo, p. 25.

40 Annex 1-F of Respondents Comment; Rollo, pp. 141-142. The third Whereas clause states that
the sale was made in accordance with Rule 39, Section 17 of the Rules of Court; Article 161 of the Civil
Code; and Fulgencio v. Gatchalian, 21 Phil. 252, January 23, 1912.
41 In re: Petition for the Issuance of New Title, filed by Josephine Mendoza Go against Muriel Pucay
Yamane and Leonardo Yamane before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region of Baguio City,
Branch V.
42 Annex 2-A of respondents Comment; Rollo, pp. 147-150.
43 Id., at pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 148-149.
122
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
sis on his failure to do so within the period required by law, because
redemption in this case would have been inconsistent with his claim that
the sale was invalid. Redemption would have served as an implied
44
admission of the regularity of the sale and estopped him from later
impugning its validity on that ground. 45
Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the

property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore
stands. The next question before us is, whether the charging lien of Atty.
de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land in
question.
Charging Lien Not Chargeable
Against Conjugal Property
It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were acquired
during the marriage of respondent and Muriel. The lawyers legal
services were engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil
Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the sale of the
exclusive property of Muriel and her sisters. The recovery was done
46
during the marriage. 47
The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:

x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters
appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was
acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring
the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her
_______________
44 Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563, June 30, 1987.
45 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 464 SCRA 89, July 22, 2005; Aclon v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 415,
August 20, 2002; Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563, June 30, 1987.
46 See Reply dated June 9, 2004, p. 1; Rollo, p. 241.
47 Id.
123
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 123
Go vs. Yamane
sisters private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and
certainly cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property.
Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be held liable,
levy on execution of the same property should still be denied in accordance with
the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia that before a conjugal property
could be held liable for the obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a
showing of some advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove that the services rendered
by Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil Case No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had,
somehow, redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of herein
[respondent] and Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge. 48
We find no reason to deviate from the CAs findings, which are amply
supported by evidence. The expenses incurred by Muriel for the recovery
of the balance of the purchase price of her paraphernal property are her
exclusive responsibility. This piece of land may not be used to pay for
49
her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be one of
the charges against the conjugal partnership. Moreover, her 50
_______________
48 Assailed CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 70.

49A. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILS., Vol. I, 456 (1990).
50 CIVIL CODE, Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for the following:
1. (1)All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally
bind the partnership;
2. (2)Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
3. (3)Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
124
ANNOTATED
Go vs. Yamane
rights to the property are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family,
or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure
to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal
51
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the 52
husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for

53
charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present

54
case means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for
Muriels personal obligation.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In 55
this case, therefore, the propertybeing conjugal in naturecannot be

levied upon. 56
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and

Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
_______________
1. (4)Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;

2. (5)The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and
of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
3. (6)Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
51 Id., Art. 115.

52 Id., Arts. 167, 178 and 196.
53 Id., Art. 168.
54 Id., Art. 174.
55 Republic v. Enriquez, 166 SCRA 608, October 21, 1988; Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 200
SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.

56 Johnson and Johnson (Phils.) v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 856; 262 SCRA 298, September 23, 1996.
125
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 125
Selegna Management and Development
Corporation vs. United Coconut Planters
Bank
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Note.Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal (Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 439 [2004])
o0o
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 327

Gonzales vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. 159521. December 16, 2005. *
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.ERMINDA F. GONZALES,

respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Property Relationship; Under the property regime of
co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union in the absence
of proof to the contrary are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts
of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.These provisions
enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together
under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares.
Same; Same; Same; Article 147 of the Family Code creates a presumption that
the properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired
through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares.Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or
industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by
the parties and passed upon by the Court.In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
328
28 ANNOTATED
Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by
the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the Appellate Court
are generally binding on, especially this Court, when in complete accord with the
findings of the trial court, as in this case. This is because it is not our function to
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.

Court of Appeals.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Hector L. Hofilena co-counsel for petitioner.
A. Tan Zoleta and Partners for respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision
dated April 2, 2003 and Resolution dated August 8, 2003, both issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, entitled, Erminda F.
Gonzales, plaintiff-appellee versus Francisco L. Gonzales, defendant-
appellant.
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda
Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband and wife. After two (2)
years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union, four
(4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria
Angelica and Marco Manuel.
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of marriage with
prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111.
The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable
reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual
comfort and loyalty. During the time they lived together, they acquired
properties. She managed their pizza business and
329
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 329
worked hard for its development. She prays for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is respondent
who is psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she was the one
who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns
the properties existing during their marriage.
In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire
generation of Fiesta Pizza representing 80% of the total management of
the same and that all income from said business are conjugal in nature.
The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of the trial
court, and pursuant Section 48 of the Family Code, certified that no 1
collusion exists between the parties in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage and that he would appear for the state to see to
it that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Each party submitted a list of the properties with their valuation,
acquired during their union, thus:
Valuation Valuation
of of
respondent petitioner
(Record, p. (Record, p.
110) 111)
1. Acropolis None P 6,000,000
property
2. Baguio City P 10,000,000
property 10,000,000
3. Nasugbu, 5,000,000 5,000,000
Batangas
property
4. Corinthian 18,000,000 23,000,000
house and lot
_______________
1 Sec. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
330
330 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
5. Sagitarius 2,500,000 2,000,000
condominium
6. Office 30,000,000 24,000,000
7. Greenmeadows 10,000,000 15,000,000
lot
8. White Plains 7,000,000 10,000,000
9. Corinthian lot 12,000,000 None
Personal Property (Vehicles)
1. Galant 83 model None P120,000
2. Toyota Corona 79 - 80,000
model
3. Coaster 77 model - 150,000
4. Pajero 89 model - 500,000
5. Corolla 92 model 180,000
6. L-300 90 model 350,000
7. Mercedes Sedan 79 220,000
model
8. Pick-up 89 model 100,000
9. Mercedes wagon 80 300,000
model
10. Nissan Sentra 89 200,000
model
11. 8Tamaraws - -
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used to beat
respondent without justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing
her in the presence of people and even in front of their children. He has
been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder characterized by
excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his indiscriminate
womanizing. The trial court found that:
The evidence adduced by plaintiff was overwhelming to prove that the defendant
by his infliction of injuries on the plaintiff, his wife, and excessive and promiscuous
hunger for sex, a personality disorder called satyriasis, was, at the time of the
celebration of marriage, psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage although such incapacity became manifest only after its
solemnization. The defendants evidence, on the other hand, on the psychological
incapacity of plaintiff did not have any
331
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 331
evidentiary weight, the same being doubtful, unreliable, unclear and
unconvincing.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1.1)Declaring the marriage contracted by and between FRANCISCO L.

GONZALEZ and ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO solemnized by Rev. Fr.
Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4, 1979, at the Manila Hilton Chapel,
Nuestra de Guia Parish, Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab initio with all
legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;
2.2)Awarding the custody of minors Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel to the
plaintiff, and Carlo Manuel and Maria Angela with rights of visitation given
to both parties under an arrangement mutually acceptable to both of them;
3.3)Ordering the parties to deliver the childrens legitimes pursuant to Article
50, in relation to Article 51 of the Family Code;
4.4)Ordering the defendant to give monthly support to Maria Andrea and
Marco Manuel in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos within
five (5) days of each corresponding month delivered at the residence of the
plaintiff staring January 1997 and thereafter;
5.5)Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing
the conjugal properties between the plaintiff and the defendant as follows:
A. Plaintiffs share of real properties:

1)
1. Corinthian lot P
............................. 12,000,000
2. Acropolis property 6,000,000
............................
3. Baguio property 10,000,000
..............................
4. Nasugbu property 5,000,000
............................
5. Greenmeadows 12,500,000
property .................
6. Sagitarius 2,250,000
condominium
..................
P 47,750,000
332
332 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model P 500,000
..............................
2. L-300 90 model 350,000
..................................
3. Nissan Sentra 89 model 200,000
....................
P
1,050,000
B. 1.) Defendants share of real properties:
1. Corinthian house and lot P
........... 20,500,000
2. Office 27,000,000
...............................................
P
47,500,000
2) Personal:
1. Galant 83 model P 120,000
.............................
2. Toyota Corona 79 model 80,000
......................
3. Coaster 77 model 150,000
...............................
4. Corolla 92 model 180,000
................................
5. Mercedes Sedan 79 220,000
model .................
6. Pick-up 89 model 100,000
...............................
7. Mercedes wagon 80 300,000
model .................
P
1,150,000
8. Four (4) Tamaraws
...........................................
1.6)Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in cash the amount of
P2,196,125.
2.7)Ordering the defendant who has actual possession of the conjugal
properties to deliver to plaintiff her share of the real and personal
properties, including four (4) Tamaraws, above-described, and execute the
necessary documents valid in law conveying the title and ownership of said
properties in favor of the plaintiff.
Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. He did not contest that part of the
decision which declared his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the
assailed Decision of the trial court.
333
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 333
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an
Order dated July 23, 1997.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the properties should be divided equally between the
parties.
Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate
Courts Decision declaring his marriage with respondent void.
Consequently, their property relation shall be governed by the
provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted as follows:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property
relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together
under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership,
properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
334
ANNOTATED
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint
efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It
further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds
of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was
not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the
business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he
admitted that Youve helped me for what we are now and I wont let it
be destroyed.
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered
respondent to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its
operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976. Her job
was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage
the personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of
outlets. She reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and
Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the Appellate
2
Court are generally binding on, especially this Court, when in complete
accord with the
_______________
2 Vicente vs. Planters Development Bank, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 282; Almira vs. Court of
Appeals, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 351; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, December 8,
2003, 417 SCRA 196.
335
VOL. 478, DECEMBER 16, 2005 335
findings of the trial court, as in this case. This is because it is not our
3
function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. 4

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
66041, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.A man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other but who nonetheless live together conjugally may be deemed
co-owners of a property acquired during cohabitation only upon proof
that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. (Tumlos vs.
Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 [2000])
o0o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works &
Construction Corporation
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005. *
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON WORKS &

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, respondents.
Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; The Supreme Court may determine and
resolve questions of facts in cases where the findings of facts of the trial court and
those of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent, where highly meritorious
circumstances are present, and where it is necessary to give substantial justice to the
parties.We note that the only questions raised in this case are questions of facts.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in and
resolved by the Court. The Court may, however, determine and resolve questions of
facts in cases where the findings of facts of the trial court and those of the CA are
inconsistent, where highly meritorious circumstances are present, and where it is
necessary to give substantial justice to the parties. In the present action, the
findings of facts and the conclusions of the trial court and those of the CA are
opposite. There is thus an imperative need for the Court to delve into and resolve
the factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law raised by the parties.
Husband and Wife; Marriages; Co-Ownership; Article 144 of the New Civil Code
applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is
void from the very beginningit does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous
or amounts to concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man
and his lawful wife.We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New
Civil Code does not apply in the present case. This Court in Tumlos v.
Fernandez held that Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each
other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the very
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
495
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 4
2005 95
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife. In this case, the petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo
cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry her.
Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage; The Family Code,
can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.The
Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly
regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The
petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in
question.

Court of Appeals.
Trieste & Mendoza Law Offices for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Deci-sion of the 1
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 59045, which reversed and
set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque,
2
Metro Manila, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 94-2260 and the Resolution
of the CA denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (retired), with Associate Justices Salvador J.
Valdez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring.

2 Penned by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
496
ANNOTATED
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G.
Francisco were married on January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then 3
employed as the vice president in a private corporation. A little more

than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the
Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for
P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo
Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon
located at St. Martin de Porres Street, San Antonio Valley I, Sucat,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. One of the lots was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36519, with an area of 342 square meters,
while the other lot, with an area of 360 square meters, was covered by
TCT No. 36518. The purchase price of the property was paid to the
4
Bank via Check No. 002334 in the amount of P320,000.00 drawn and
issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila, for which the Imus Bank
issued Official Receipt No. 121408 on August 31, 1984. On the basis of 5
the said deed of sale, TCT Nos. 36518 and 36519 were cancelled and, on
September 4, 1984, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550)
and 87977 (60551) in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to
Eduardo G. Francisco. 6
On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No.
85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before
his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land,
including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that
he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property. On January 7
13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said

_______________
3 TSN, 24 January 1995, pp. 13-14. (Exhibit H).

4 Exhibit D.
5 Exhibit E.
6 Records, pp. 149, 151. (Exhibits A and B).
7 Dorsal portion of TCT Nos. 87976 and 87977.
497
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 497
property to Leonila Cando for a loan of P157,000.00. It appears that 8
Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. 9
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and
President of Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of
cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works & Construction
Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27,
1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City
for the return of the said commodities, or the value thereof in the
amount of P768,750.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
3251. On January 8, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
MIWCC and against Eduardo. The fallo of the decision reads:
Accordingly, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff Master Iron
Works And Construction Corporation against the defendant [Eduardo] Francisco
ordering the latter as follows:
1.1.To replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50 kilos/bag of Portland cement or, in

the alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount of P768,750.00;
2.2.In either case, to pay liquidated damages by way of interest at 12% per
annum from June 21, 1990 until fully paid;
3.3.To pay P50,000.00 as actual damages; and
4.4.To pay attorneys fees of P153,750.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 10
The decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 became final and executory and,
on June 7, 1994, the court issued a writ of execution. On June 14, 1994,
11
Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a public auction one stainless, owner-type
jeep for P10,000.00 to
_______________
8 Records, pp. 236-239. (Exhibits 13 to 13-D).

9 Id., at p. 238. (Exhibit 13-D).
10 Id., at p. 221.
11 Id., at p. 222. (Exhibit 2).
498
ANNOTATED
MIWCC. Sheriff Alejo issued a Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment
12
over the lots covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551) for
the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 90-3251. On June 24, 1994, the sale of the
13
property at a public auction was set to August 5, 1994. 14
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party

Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were
15
her paraphernal property, and that her husband Eduardo had no

proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of
waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. She, likewise,
requested Sheriff Alejo to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution/attachment earlier issued by him.
On July 7, 1994, Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim
in the trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then
submitted an indemnity bond in the amount of P1,361,500.00 issued by
16
the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction
proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property for the price of
P1,350,000.00. 17
On July 28, 1994, Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and

Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Paraaque for damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-2260. She alleged then that she was the sole owner
of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo in Civil Case No. 90-
3251; hence, the levy on execution of the property was null and void. She
reiterated that her husband, the defendant in Civil Case No. 90-3251,
had no right or proprietary interest
_______________
12 Id., at p. 45.
13 Id., at p. 223. (Exhibit 3).
14 Id., at p. 224. (Exhibit 4).
15 Id., at p. 153.
16 Id., at p. 227. (Exhibit 6).
17 Id., at p. 229. (Exhibit 8).
499
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 499
over the said property as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver annotated
at the dorsal portion of the said title. Josefina prayed that the court
issue a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin MIWCC from causing the sale of the said property at public
auction. Considering that no temporary restraining order had as yet
been issued by the trial court, the sheriff sold the subject property at
public auction to MIWCC for P1,350,000.00 on August 5,
1994. However, upon the failure of MIWCC to remit the sheriffs
18
commission on the sale, the latter did not execute a sheriffs certificate of
sale over the property. The RTC of Paraaque, thereafter, issued a
temporary restraining order on August 16, 1994.
19
When Josefina learned of the said sale at public auction, she filed an
amended complaint impleading MIWCC, with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to this
Honorable Court that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants and the same be in the following tenor:
1.1.Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the
following amounts:
1.A.The sum of P50,000.00 representing as actual damages;

2.B.The sum of P200,000.00 representing as moral damages;
3.C.The sum of P50,000.00 or such amount which this Honorable Court deems
just as exemplary damages;
4.D.The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
1.2.Declaring the levying and sale at public auction of the plaintiffs properties
null and void;
2.3.To issue writ of preliminary injunction and makes it permanent;
_______________
Id., at p. 56.
18
Id., at p. 19.
19
500
ANNOTATED
1.4.Order the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the titles as a

result of the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 90-
3251.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just under the premises. 20
In its answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family
Code of the Philippines and averred that the property was the conjugal
property of Josefina and her husband Eduardo, who purchased the same
on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on January 14, 1983. MIWCC
asserted that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver to evade the
satisfaction of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 and to place the
property beyond the reach of creditors; hence, the said affidavit was null
and void.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a
petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, on the ground that when they were married on January
15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0169.
Josefina and Carmelita testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169. Josefina
declared that during her marriage to Eduardo, she acquired the property
covered by TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551), through the help
of her sisters and brother, and that Eduardo had no participation
whatsoever in the said acquisition. She added that Eduardo had five
children, namely, Mary Jane, Dianne, Mary Grace Jo, Mark Joseph and
Mary Cecille, all surnamed Francisco.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraaque rendered
judgment in Civil Case No. 95-0169, declaring the marriage between
21
Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

_______________
20 Id., at p. 32.
21 Id., at pp. 287-289
501
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 501
In the meantime, Josefina testified in Civil Case No. 94-2260,
declaring, inter alia, that she was able to purchase the property from the
Bank when she was still single with her mothers financial assistance;
she was then engaged in recruitment when Eduardo executed an
affidavit of waiver; she learned that he was previously married when
they already had two children; nevertheless, she continued cohabiting
with him and had three more children by him; and because of Eduardos
first marriage, she decided to have him execute the affidavit of waiver.
Eduardo testified that when his wife bought the property in 1984, he
was in Davao City and had no knowledge of the said purchases; he came
to know of the purchase only when Josefina informed him a week after
his arrival from Davao; Josefinas sister, Lolita Castillo, told him that
22
she would collect from him the money his wife borrowed from her and
their mother to buy the property; when he told Lolita that he had no
23
money, she said that she would no longer collect from him, on the
condition that he would have no participation over the property, which
24
angered Eduardo; when Josefina purchased the property, he had a

25
gross monthly income of P10,000.00 and gave P5,000.00 to Josefina for

the support of his family; Josefina decided that he execute the affidavit
26
of waiver because her mother and sister gave the property to her. 27
On December 20, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
levy on the subject property and the sale thereof at public auction to be
null and void. The fallo of the decision reads:
_______________
22 TSN, 11 July 1995, p. 15.

23 Id., at pp. 10-12.
24 TSN, 14 July 1995, p. 14.
25 TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 19-20.
26 Id., at p. 31.
27 Id., at pp. 29-32.
502
ANNOTATED
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THIS COURT finds the Levying and
sale at public auction of the plaintiffs properties null and void.
The court orders the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff the
following amounts:
1.a.The sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages;

2.b.The sum of P50,000.00 representing as moral damages;
3.c.The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.d.The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
The court orders the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the Titles as
a result of the enforcement of the writ of execu-tion issued in Civil Case No. 90-
3251.
SO ORDERED. 28
The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was the sole
and exclusive property of Josefina, applying Articles 144, 160, 175 and
485 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also held that MIWCC failed
to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to the acquisition of the
property.
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which it alleged that:
1.I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REAL ESTATE
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL
PROPERTIES OWNED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO;
2.II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RECEPTION OF
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES MARRIAGE WITH EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
3.III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LEVY ON
EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF
THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID;
_______________
CA Rollo, pp. 41-42.

28
503
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 503
1. IV.THETRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-

APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR
ALLEGED IMPROPER LEVY ON EXECUTION. 29
The CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the decision of
the RTC on September 20, 2001. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision, dated 20 December 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0126.
SO ORDERED. 30
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal

property of Eduardo and Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut
such presumption. It also held that the affidavit of waiver executed by
Eduardo was contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as such,
had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision, which was, likewise, denied by the CA.
Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review,
alleging that:
1.A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER
AND EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
2.B.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL
PROPERTIES OF PETITIONER;
3.C.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISTURBING
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN ITS DECISION OF DECEMBER 20, 1997,
_______________
Id., at p. 21.
29
Rollo, pp. 39-40.

30
504
ANNOTATED
THE SAME BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE. 31
The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not
the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and
Eduardo Francisco; and (b) whether or not the subject properties may be
held to answer for the personal obligations of Eduardo.
We shall deal with the issues simultaneously as they are closely
related.
The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is
void ab initio, there is no occasion that would give rise to a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The petitioner adds that to rule otherwise
would render moot and irrelevant the provisions on the regime of special
co-ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, in relation to Article 144 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code governs
their property relationship, the respondents must adduce evidence to
show that Eduardo actually contributed to the acquisition of the subject
properties. The petitioner asserts that she purchased the property before
her marriage to Eduardo with her own money without any contribution
from him; hence, the subject property is her paraphernal property.
Consequently, such property is not liable for the debts of Eduardo to
private respondent MIWCC.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the appellate court
was correct in ruling that the properties are conjugal in nature because
there is nothing in the records to support the petitioners uncorroborated
claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject properties were
her personal funds or came from her mother and sister. The respondents
point out that if, as claimed by the petitioner, the subject
_______________
Id., at p. 13.
31
505
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 505
properties were, indeed, not conjugal in nature, then, there was no need
for her to obtain marital (Eduardos) consent when she mortgaged the
properties to two different parties sometime in the first quarter of 1986,
or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver.
We note that the only questions raised in this case are questions of
facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised in and resolved by the Court. The Court may, however, determine
and resolve questions of facts in cases where the findings of facts of the
trial court and those of the CA are inconsistent, where highly
meritorious circumstances are present, and where it is necessary to give
substantial justice to the parties. In the present action, the findings of
facts and the conclusions of the trial court and those of the CA are
opposite. There is thus an imperative need for the Court to delve into
and resolve the factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law
raised by the parties.
The petition has no merit.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her
personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the
sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the Imus
Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner
on August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued
to the latter as vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage to
Eduardo on January 15, 1983.
We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil Code
does not apply in the present case. This Court in Tumlos v.
Fernandez held that Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only to a
32
relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to

marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void
from the very beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that is
adulterous or amounts to concubinage, for it would be absurd to cre-
_______________
330 SCRA 718 (2000).

32
506
ANNOTATED
ate a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. In this case,
the petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter
was incapacitated to marry her.
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, on which the
petitioner anchors her claims, provides as follows:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New
Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations
of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256
of the Family Code, the law can be applied retroactively if it does not
prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner failed to prove that
she had any vested right over the property in question. 33
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the
marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the
same should be presumed to be conju-
_______________
Id., at p. 733.
33
507
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 507
gal property. Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides
34
that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the
code took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the New Civil Code or other laws. Thus, even if Eduardo and
35
Carmelita were married before the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the property still cannot be considered conjugal property
because there can only be but one valid existing marriage at any given
time. Article 148 of the Family Code also debilitates against the
36
petitioners claim since, according to the said article, a co-ownership may

ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-
existing valid marriage provided that the parties prove their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of
their proportionate interest thereon. 37
We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner
failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and,
hence, is not a co-owner of the property:
First of all, other than plaintiff-appellees bare testimony, there is nothing in the
record to support her claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject
properties came from her mother and sister. She did not, for instance, present the
testimonies of her mother and sister who could have corroborated her claim.
Furthermore, in her Affidavit of Third-Party Claim (Exh. C), she stated that the
subject properties are my own paraphernal properties, including the
improvements thereon, as such are the fruits of my
_______________
34 Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.
35 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439.
36 Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra.
37 Ibid., Malang v. Moson, 338 SCRA 393 (2000).
508
ANNOTATED
own exclusive efforts . . ., clearly implying that she used her own money and
contradicting her later claim that the funds were provided by her mother and
sister. She also stated in her affidavit that she acquired the subject properties
before her marriage to Eduardo Francisco on 15 January 1983, a claim later belied
by the presentation of the Deed of Absolute Sale clearly indicating that she bought
the properties from Imus Rural Bank on 31 August 1984, or one year and seven
months after her marriage (Exh. D). In the face of all these contradictions,
plaintiff-appellees uncorroborated testimony that she acquired the subject
properties with funds provided by her mother and sister should not have been
given any weight by the lower court.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age,
it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties
as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality,
she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an
afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant
Master Iron as judgment creditor. 38
Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered nothing to prove her
allegation that she borrowed the amount of P320,000.00 from her
mother and her sister, which she paid to the Imus Bank on August 31,
1984 to purchase the subject property. The petitioner even failed to
divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her income, if any,
and that of her sister. When she testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169, the
petitioner declared that she borrowed part of the purchase price of the
property from her brother, but failed to divulge the latters name, let
39
alone reveal how much money she borrowed and when. The petitioner
even failed to adduce any evidence to prove that her mother and sister
had P320,000.00 in 1984, which, considering the times, was then quite a
substantial amount. Moreover, the petitioners third-party-claim
affidavit stating that the properties are the fruits of my own exclusive
_______________
Rollo, pp. 34-35.

38
Exhibit G-1.
39
509
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 509
effort before I married Eduardo Francisco belies her testimony in the
trial court and in Civil Case No. 95-0169.
We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued by the Imus Bank,
the payment for the subject property was drawn via Check No. 002334
and issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila in the amount of
P320,000.00. The petitioner failed to testify against whose account the
40
check was drawn and issued, and whether the said account was owned
by her and/or Eduardo Francisco or her mother, sister or brother. She
even failed to testify whether the check was a managers check and, if so,
whose money was used to purchase the same.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of waiver
executed by Eduardo on February 15, 1985, stating that the property is
owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative weight. We are convinced
that he executed the said affidavit in anticipation of claims by third
parties against him and hold the property liable for the said
claims. First, the petitioner failed to prove that she had any savings
before her cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite Eduardos
affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless affixed his marital conformity to the
real estate mortgage executed by the petitioner over the property in
favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986. Third, the petitioner testified that
41
she borrowed the funds for the purchase of the property from her mother
and sister. Fourth, the petitioner testified that Eduardo executed the
42
affidavit of waiver because she discovered that he had a first

marriage. Lastly, Eduardo belied the petitioners testimony when he
43
testified that he executed the affidavit of waiver because his mother-in-

law and sister-in-law had given the property to the petitioner.
44
_______________
40 Exhibit E.
41 Exhibit 13-D.
42 TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 11-12.
43 TSN, 30 May 1995, pp. 8-9.
44 TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 29-30.
510
ANNOTATED
Basa vs. People
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.Once proved that a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose
her right to inherit from the latter. (Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300
SCRA 406 [1998])
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the co-
ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the
man and the woman living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. (Malang vs. Moson, 338 SCRA 393 [2000])
o0o
JOHN ABING, petitioner, vs. JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.

Property; Ownership; Other than Johns bare allegation that he
alone through his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for
the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim.Other than Johns bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and
money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex
structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even
failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of
the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing
his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting up the subject
structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect
that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his
affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him.
With the petitioners own admission that the subject structure was constructed
only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even
doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the
construction of the structure in dispute.
Same; Same; Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and again
that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of
ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than indicating
possession in the concept of an owner. Neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
203
VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 2
03
Abing vs. Waeyan
Co-ownership; In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.The law
is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their
property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this
regime, they owned their properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a
co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not
be ejected therefrom.
Ma. Inglay Capuyan-Fokno for petitioner.
Mathew P. Kollin for respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set aside
the Decision1 dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an ejectment suit thereat
commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who,
during the good old days, lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties.
Later, they parted
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria
(ret.) and Eloy R. Bello (ret.), concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-23.
204
ANNOTATED
Abing vs. Waeyan
ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their
common properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for
short) met and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple
bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua which
was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street,
Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax declaration of
the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea.
She would send money to John who deposited the same in their joint
bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation.
To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This
new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved
in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John.
She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee
of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse.
Hence, they decided to partition their properties. . For the purpose, they
executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of
Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the
parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned
agreement, John shall leave the couples dwelling with Juliet paying him
the amount of P428,870.00 representing Johns share in all their
properties. On the same dateOctober 7, 1995Juliet paid John the
sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the
balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly
installment beginning November 1995.205
VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 205
Abing vs. Waeyan
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof,
John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-
sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit
against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction
of the annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed
from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the
structure was under his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive
ownership of the subject structure, which thereby gave him the right to
eject Juliet therefrom upon the latters failure to pay the agreed balance
due him under the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was
renovated thru their common funds and that the subject structure
annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their
original residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of them
in common.
In a decision2 dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the
money used in the construction of the structure in question solely came
from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and
accordingly ordered Juliets eviction therefrom, including the sari-
sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession thereof to
John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against
the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation
covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and turn
over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a
month from the time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in June 1996
until she vacates the same and turn over possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
_______________
2 As reproduced in the Petition, p. 1, Rollo, pp. 9-12, at p. 9.

206
ANNOTATED
Abing vs. Waeyan
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way
of Attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliets appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29,
1995, affirmed that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24,
2000,3 reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled
to possess the property and maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties
which must be divided between them upon the termination of their common law
relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code
on conjugal partnership... . . . but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the parties share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during
their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, Johns evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for
the construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same pertained to
both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom,
adding that if ever, Johns cause of action should have been for a sum of
money because he
_______________
3 Supra note 1.
207
VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 207
Abing vs. Waeyan
claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension.
According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliets
possession of the premises in dispute was not by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, Johns present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties Memorandum of Agreement which should
have been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-
sari store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a
separate action for partition even as the community character of the subject
premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or
not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership
of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of the two courts
before it, the CA found that the premises in dispute is owned in common
by Juliet and John, the latter having failed to establish by the required
quantum of proof that the money spent for the construction thereof
solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the same structure, Juliet
may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court
normally eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the
three courts below, the Court shall go by the exception4 to the general
rule and proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.
_______________
4 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118749, April 25, 2003, 401 SCRA 594.
208
ANNOTATED
Abing vs. Waeyan
First and foremost, , it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived
together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of
marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet
left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the
latter deposited in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still in Korea
when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than Johns bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds
and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of
the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim.
For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither
did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from whom he made his
borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. . All
that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his claim of spending his
own funds and borrowed money in putting up the subject structure was
the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that
petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated
in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioners own admission that the subject
structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed
P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he
allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the
structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was able to
present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar
affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom he claimed to have
made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came forward to
confirm petitioners tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support petitioners self-serving
allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was
put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure,
petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject
structure. We have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations
do not prove own-
209
VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 209
Abing vs. Waeyan
ership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership.5 Payment of taxes is
not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the
concept of an owner.6 Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership
for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
realty when not supported by other effective proofs.7
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. . It
reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any
property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts
and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is
governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a
_______________
5 Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-65334, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 820.
6 Arambulo v. CACourt of Appeals,, G.R. No. 120166, August 3, 1998, 293 SCRA 567.
7 De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506.
210
ANNOTATED
Abing vs. Waeyan
co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the
CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 4878 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may
bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It
bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to
establish Johns or Juliets exclusive ownership of the property in
question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-
owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession
and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the
subject Memorandum of Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and John,
has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did
pay John the amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for Johns share
in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in
twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. . It is also a
matter of record that the Agreement was signed by the witnesses
thereto. . Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was
left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding force
or effect between them, as evidently, Juliets initial payment of
P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had agreed
upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliets
failure to pay John the balance of the latters share in their common
properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against
Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.

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VOL.

453, MARCH 11, 2005 283

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed with

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of

3 Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 36.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In

1.1.The declaration of the following documents as null and void:

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION:

The counterclaim is dismissed.

declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was

respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found

10 Id., at p. 7; Rollo, p. 40.

property requires the consent of both the husband

353 Phil. 578; 291 SCRA 372 (1998).

of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations

shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is

17 Article 106, Family Code.

18 Article 90, Family Code.

property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed,

19 Article 108, Family Code.

asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping 24

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

25 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949; 270 SCRA 211(1997).

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 735

MARIA B. CHING, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR.,

7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

favor of respondents father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on

common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate

complaint against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision

5 Id., at pp. 331-346.

Before the Court of Appeals where respondents appealed, they argued

1. 1. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo. . . , in effect,

6 Id., at pp. 345-346.

. . . APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST

. . . NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS

. . . NOT FINDING THAT A CONVEYANCE OVER A PROPERTY MADE BY A

9 Id., at pp. 345-346.

. . . ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ABANDON THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY

1.(1)Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good

1.(1)When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage

The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even

10 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his

does not persuade.

opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him by

VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005 475

DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA B. ** PELAYO,

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

This resolves the petition for review on certiorariseeking the reversal of

2CA Rollo, pp. 59-62.

assailing the RTC Order granting herein petitioners motion to dismiss,

In said decision, the CA interpreted Section 4, in relation to Section 70

See Decision and Entry of Judgment, Record, pp. 30-37.

disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set

overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever

designated one of her sons as the administrator of several parcels of her

G.R. No. 112954, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 52.