ALVAREZ v. IAC G.R. No.

L-68053, 7 May 1990

FACTS: The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-
A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters,
was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes. Aniceto Yanes was
survived by his children and grandchildren, herein private respondents. It is on
record that on May 19, 1938 and September 6, 1938 Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B,
respectively, were registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago. Fortunato D.
Santiago eventually sold the two lots to Monico Fuentebella which was eventually
sold to Rosendo Alverez. The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental for the return of the ownership and possession of the lots, and
prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of
the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered
to them, and damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to
Dr. Rodolfo Siason.

ISSUE: Are the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez liable to the respondents, Yaneses, for
damages for the properties sold by their late father (in bad faith while there was a
case pending) to Dr. Siason even though the heirs of Alvarez have not inherited
the property involved herein?

RULING: YES. Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine

obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and
obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or
by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo
Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction,
which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit
the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the
monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their
totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.

GEVERO v. IAC G.R. No. 77029 30 August 1990

FACTS: Respondent corporation purchased a parcel of land from one Luis

Lancero, and the latter purchased the same on February 5, 1952 per deed of
sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at
the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified
as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed
surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122
square meters. Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was
survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on
October 17, 1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the
estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476.
By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs
of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot
2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at
the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private
respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to
quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha
insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.

ISSUE: Is the right to succession deemed to have transmitted only from the date
of the execution of an extrajudicial partition thereby rendering the sale of the land
to respondent invalid?

RULING: NO. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or

vested immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v.
Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]). Teodorica Babangha died long before
World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the
moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the
date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as
inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over
lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless
expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

LOCSIN v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 89783 19 February 1992

FACTS: During the lifetime of Dona Catalina Locsin, she executed a will affirming
and ratifying the transfer she made during her lifetime in favour of her husband
and her own own relatives. After the will was read all relatives agreed that there
was no need to submit it to probate. Six years after the death of testatrix some of
her nephews and nieces (surnamed Jaucian) who had already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from the estate filed an action to recover the
properties which the testatrix conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,
averring that the same were inofficious, without consideration and intended to
circumvent the laws on succession. Both the RTC and CA decided the case in
favour of Locsins. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Are private respondents, nephew and nieces of testatrix entitled to inherit
the properties which she had already disposed of ten years before her death?

RULING: NO. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten
(10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her
hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." The rights to a person's succession
are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other
persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her
death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property
that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs;
and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents
since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,
Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke: Art.
750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for
the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for
annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced
decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after
Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions
were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether considered an action based
on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private
respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the
registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole
world.

OPULENCIA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 125835 30 July 1998

FACTS: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo Aladin
Simundac and Miguel Oliven (private respondents) alleged that Natalia
Opulencia (petitioner) executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125
of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of
P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that
[petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay
damages, attorneys fee and litigation expenses. Opulencia put forward the
following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed
part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a
petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna; that at the
time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the
probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate
court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the
downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to
accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant
who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that
[petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract. With these defenses, Opulencia
denies the validity and efficacy of the contract to sell.

ISSUE: Is the Contract to Sell dated February 3, 1989 executed by the petitioner
and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval valid

RULING: The contract is VALID. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs
from the moment of the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the
owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner
has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of
her late father. Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted. upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-
owners of the estate while it remains undivided. Hence, where some of the heirs,
without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased
father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said
that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which
may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

EMNACE v CA G.R. No. 126334 23 November 2001

FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emance, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia
were partners in a business known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in
January 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them,
consequent to Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership. Throughout the
existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise,
petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and
liabilities of the partnership, and to render accounting of the partnership finances.
Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the
deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Consequently,
Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for
accounting, payment of shares division of assets and damages. Petitioner
asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue
since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.

ISSUE: In the absence of an appointment as administratrix or executrix of an

estate, does a surviving spouse (and other heirs) have legal capacity to sue on
behalf of the estate of the deceased spouse?

RULING: YES. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of the
surviving spouse as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the
heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes
of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent. She and her children are complainants in their own
right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of the death of
the decedent, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (CIVIL CODE, Art. 777). Whatever claims
and rights the deceased had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to his heirs by operation of law, more particularly by succession,
which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted. Respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares
from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. From the moment of his death, his rights
as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioners obligations were transmitted
to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the courts
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

RABADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113725 29 June 2000

FACTS: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament
wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land in
Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner. The
codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. The
codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and
rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required
Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to
Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the
same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the
obligation to deliver the piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his
wife and children (pet).In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the
heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the
heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES: 1. Did the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla inherited his obligations under the
Codicil 2. Was there a substitution?

RULING: 1. YES. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes
all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil
were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death. 2. NONE. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge
that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In simple
substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in
the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the
property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are
not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

TANEDO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 104482 22 January 1996

FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of

absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife,
Teresita Barera, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00,
one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral
survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac, the said property being his future
inheritance from his parents. Upon the death of his father, Lazaro executed an
Affidavit of Conformity dated February 28, 1980 to re-affirm, respect,
acknowledge and validate the sale he made in 1962. On January 13, 1981,
Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot
191. He acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as consideration
therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property
to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29,
1980. On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their
favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 166451.

ISSUE: Is a sale of future inheritance valid?

RULING: NO. Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law. Consequently, said contracts made in 1962 conveying one (1) hectare of his
future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between parties. Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated
February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale is also
useless and in the words of the respondent Court, suffers the same infirmity.

SANTOS vs. LUMBAO G.R. No. 169129 28 March 2007

FACTS: Herein petitioners, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving
heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos. Herein respondents Spouses Lumbao are the
alleged owners of a lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from
Rita during her lifetime. The facts of the present case are as follows: On two
separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her
deceased mother, Maria Catoc. Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate
share in her mothers estate through a document denominated as Bilihan ng
Lupa. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took
actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been
occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the
subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands
upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to
execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in
favor of respondents insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents
alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she
could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property
inherited by her and her coheirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. After
the death of Rita, petitioners executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate
left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents.

ISSUE: Are petitioner heirs legally bound to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa that
was supposedly executed by the late Rita Catoc?

RULING: YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessorsin-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC
is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by
way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the
decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the
liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest
between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as
against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance
is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. ALMEIDA G.R. No. 162784 22 June

2007

FACTS: The Land Tenure Administration (now the National Housing Authority),
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land evidenced by an
Agreement to Sell No. 3787. Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (mother of the private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
predeceased her mother and left heirs. After Margaritas death, Francisca
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication, claiming that she is the only remaining
relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to
be the exclusive legal heir of Margarita. The Deed of Self Adjudication was based
on a Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by Margarita, wherein she stated
that it was Francisca who continued paying for the subject portions of land and
that she conveys said portions of land to Francisca. It was also stated that the
Sinumpaang Salaysay shall take effect upon the death of Margarita. The
surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self
Adjudication. The CFI declared the deed as null and void. However, during the
trial of the case for annulment of the Deed, Francisca filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same portions of land submitting therewith a copy of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida
protested the application. The NHA granted the application. When Francisca
died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the
heirs of Francisca. Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of
Franciscas heirs. The RTC and the CA both ruled that the Sinumpaang Salaysay
was not an assignment of rights to Francisca but a disposition of property which
shall take effect upon death. They also held that said document must first be
submitted to probate before it can transfer property.

ISSUE: Is the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Margarita Herrera her last will?

RULING: YES. The NHA should have noted that the Sinumpaang Salaysays
effectivity commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in
Margaritas words sakaling akoy bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay Hence,
in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall
be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue
of a will or by operation of law, as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code. By
considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant (Margarita) has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away
on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The
NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without
considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights
and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have
had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original
owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera
had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin
accordance with a will or by operation of law. The death of Margarita Herrera
does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an
existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's
demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to
Sell was an obligation on both parties Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations
are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at
the time of her death either by will or by operation of law. If we sustain the
position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a
resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to
sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such
would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and
obligations. When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the
estate of the decedent as the next "person likely to stand in to fulfill the
obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.

CONDE V. ABAYA G.R. No. 4275 23 March 1909

FACTS: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina
Labadia, died. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, moved the
settlement of' the said intestate succession. Roman Abaya, brother of Casiano,
was appointed as administrator claiming himself as the nearest relative of the
deceased. Roman Abaya moved that the court declare him to be the sole heir of
Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde,
and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate,
and that it be adjudicated to him. Paula Conde, in reply, claims that her right was
superior and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the
evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be
adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof. The trial
held that the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize
Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the
petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children
with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya;
and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the
said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya.

ISSUE: Is an action for acknowledgment by a natural child transmissible as a

portion of his inheritance to his ascendants or descendants?

RULING: NO. As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce

recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the lifetime of such child, but the right of
a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status continues only during the
life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is
transmitted to the heirs of the child only when - the latter dies during minority or
while insane, or in case the action has already been instituted. On the other hand
an action by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the parents
in the event of the death of the parents during the minority of the child, or upon
the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly
acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes to this
natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Therefore, the
respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of
action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118,
may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2)
That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article
137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no
mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. It is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child
may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights
of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish
its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article
118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article
118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his
lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general
rule not susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished
by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists,
the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and
without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.

PAMPLONA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-33187 31 March 1980

FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During
their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba
Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna. The spouses Flaviano Moreto
and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo,
Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. Ursulo Moreto
died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio,
Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. Marta
Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria
Tuiza. La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs,
namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed
Mendoza. Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir
herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto. Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942
leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the
other plaintiffs herein. On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in
Calamba, Laguna. On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of
his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his
said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of
Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute
sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale contained a description
of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer
certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to
Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result
of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate
of title no. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to
Apolonia Onte. After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale, the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the
eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it
as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also
built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the
adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona
thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject
matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be
the subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion
sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496. From
1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged
their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said
house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496. On
August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded
on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and
piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he
sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of
Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale
was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the
premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of
Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of
July 30, 1952 as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow
the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. After a
relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was
found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed
recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it
was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction. ISSUE: Does Moreto have the right to sell
the property without the consent of the wifes heirs, considering that the subject
property is part of the conjugal partnership and that the sale was made when the
wife was already dead? RULING: YES. The Court held that at the time of the sale
in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved six years before and
therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the
surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article
493 of the New Civil Code is applicable. The Court held that there was a partial
partition of the coownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed
out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-
vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the
son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
The Court rejected CAs pronouncement that the sale was valid as to one-half
and invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto,
the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal
estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners.
The title may be pro indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor
pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences
were to be erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners,
on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, the Court ruled that a factual partition or termination of the co-
ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor,
Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting
as against the vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of
sale executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. Lastly, equity commands that the
private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano
Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by
Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and
which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs
of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-
bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which
is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transferring the
ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his
heirs, the herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the
inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased parents
and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations
which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311,
paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are
the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq.
meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor
Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply
with said obligation. The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to
and occupied by petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the
complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas.
Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH
UMALI y AMADO G.R. No. 84450 4 February 1991 FACTS: Pierre Pangan a
minor was investigated for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery.
As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his
parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police
headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked
the police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the
marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the
community. The police then sought the help of Francisco Manalo. Previous to the
case of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise
investigated by operatives and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous
Drug Act was filed against him. Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo
was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and
other crimes against property. Manalo agreed to help in the identification of the
source of the marijuana. Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana
which he allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Gloria Umali and
Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria
Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant denied the findings of the
lower court and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting
her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and
because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell
falsehood. The plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if
Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when he testified,
such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. His testimony is not only
reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material
respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers. ISSUE:
Is a person facing several criminal charges disqualified from being a witness?
RULING: NO. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons
convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the witness Francisco Manalo
is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the Court ruled that
the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did
not in any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness should be
given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by
improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco
Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full
credence. TEOPISTA DOLAR v. FIDEL DIANCIN G.R. No. L-33365 20
December 1930 FACTS: The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied
probate in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on the sole ground that the
thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the thumbmarks of the testator.
Disregarding the other errors assigned by the proponent of the will, we would
direct attention to the third error which challenges squarely the correctness of this
finding. The will in question is alleged to have been executed by Paulino Diancin
at Dumangas, Iloilo, on November 13, 1927. A thumbmark appears at the end of
the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages in the following manner:
"Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro Diamante." The witnesses to the will were
the same Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will
is detailed in nature, and disposes of an estate amounting approximately to
P50,000. ISSUE: Is the disputed will valid despite the fact that there was a
thumbmark instead of a signature in the will? RULING: YES. The requirement of
the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the customary
written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert
Testimonyas to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible.
The method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study
.Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far
from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts
as showing the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified
in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its own
opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine
thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here. There
is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three
instrumental witnesses united in testifying concerning the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will. It was stated that in addition to the testator
and themselves, on other person, Diosdado Dominado, was present. This latter
individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the will to identify Exhibit
8. He was later placed on the witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and
thereupon declared positively that he was the one who prepared the will for the
signature of Paulino Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were
those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw Paulino Diancin make these
impressions. The testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy of credit.
We reach the very definite conclusion that the document presented for probate
as the last will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that the
thumbmarks appearing thereon were the thumbmarks of the testator
.Accordingly, error is found, which means that the judgment appealed from must
be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the will ordered admitted to probate, without
special finding as to costs in this instance. YAP TUA v. YAP KA KUAN G.R. No.
6845 1 September 1914 FACTS: In 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the
petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased.
It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo
Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. The judge ordered that the last will
and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to
probate. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of
the will, upon the giving of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later. In
1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging
that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene
and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause.
The court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. In his
motion, he alleged the following: First. That the will dated the 11th day of August,
1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of
September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a) Because the same had
not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b)
Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her
sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud
and illegal influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from
the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of
executing the same. Second. That before the execution of the said will, which
they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed
another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August,
1909. Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that,
even though they had been negligent in presenting their opposition to the
legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age.
Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the
order allowing and admitting the will to probate. ISSUE: Did Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her
faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909? RULING: YES. While it is true that
some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had
attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other
hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at
the time of the execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower
court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during
their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence
showed that no undue influence had been used. While the testimony of Dr. Papa
is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet,
nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before
the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified that at the time
the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and
memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or
fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at
the time she signed this will. Also, the mere fact that she executed a former will is
no proof that she did not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to
dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very
last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke
any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that
the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the
charge that she did not make the new will. In another assignment of error there is
involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in
her first will was not identical with that which appears in her second will. Several
witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the
witnesses testified that she had written her full name. The Court is of the opinion
that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name to the will, with
the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been
held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using
a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a
will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a
will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted
as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. With reference to the
fourth assignment of error, it may be said that during the trial of the cause, the
protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not
sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their
names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question
there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will
was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the
room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof and it was
shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two
steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed
the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from
the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on
which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who
makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the
witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures
made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is
possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the
signatures placed upon the will. Upon a full consideration of the record, the Court
finds that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong
did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her
faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909. EUTIQUIA AVERA v. MARINO GARCIA,
and JUAN RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 15566 14 September 1921 FACTS: In
proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will
of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez.
Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one
of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full
possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was
corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two
of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted
for by the proponent of the will. When the proponent rested the attorney for the
opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a
vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was
so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. Judge found
that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and
disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly
admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of
the persons contesting the will. ISSUES: 1. Whether a will can be admitted to
probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness,
without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; and 2. Whether
the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of
the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left margin. RULING: 1. NO. (But in this case,
it was admitted to probate, read below). All three witnesses must be produced.
While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the
testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang
vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291, this court declared after an elaborate examination of
the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the
attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of
the court. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all
three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is
found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had been
pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was
April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing;
and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the
probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested,
incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement
of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses. Although this
circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does
not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above
referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of
the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses. It
appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower
court either upon the submission of the cause for determination in that court or
upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is
insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the first time
in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error
must be declared not be well taken. This exact question has been decided by the
Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we
see no reason why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us.
Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337. 2. NO. The controlling considerations on
the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan 40 Phil., 476, 479,
where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said: The
object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded. In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any
possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the
letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the
instrument. NAYVE v. MOJAL AND AGUILAR G.R. No. 21755 29 December
1924 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the probate of the will,
holding that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of
Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. The defects attributed to the will
are: (a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on
each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the
document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause
does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d)
the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all
the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other. Attestation Clause:
"In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig,
Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, composed of four sheets, including the next: "ANTONIO MOJAL "
(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and
testament in the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator Don
Antonio Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of each other and of the
testator.) "PEDRO CARO "SlLVERIO MORCO "ZOILO MASINAS" ISSUE: Is the
will valid? RULING: YES. Where each and every page upon which the will is
written was signed by the testator and the witnesses, the fact that the signatures
on each page do not all appear on the left margin thereof does not detract from
the validity of the will. Paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters is within
the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. The number of
sheets or pages of which the will is composed must be stated in the attestation
clause (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but where such a fact
appears at the end of the will so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number
of its sheets, then the failure to state in the attestation clause the number of the
pages of the instrument does not invalidate it. The attestation clause must state
the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will,
for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not
stated therein. But the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and
every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the
signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such
evident fact does not invalidate the will. PROBATE OF THE LATE REV. P.
ELEUTERIO PILAPIL v. PILAPIL CALIXTO AND OTHERS G.R. No. L-47931 27
June 1941 FACTS: P. Eleuterio Pilapil, the parish priest of Mualboal of Cebu
Province, died on December 6, 1935. No will has been presented after his death,
at least until early February 1939. A part of the will states that: ART. SECOND: I
hereby certify that this Last Will and Testament, which confirms, affirms and
assures the legitimacy of documents for my buyers granted consists of two items;
contains sixteen provisions and is written on three pages; x x x x x x x x x Also at
the bottom of the pages (1) and (2) are respectively the notes: "Go to 2. Pages",
"go to 3. Pages". ISSUE: Is the will NOT valid because the attestation clause
does not state the number of pages upon which the will was written? RULING:
NO. The will is valid. First translation: The court held that this deficiency was
cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it
had three pages. Second translation: The court held that the law has been
substantially complied with inasmuch as in the body of the will and on the same
page wherein the attestation clause appears written it is expressly stated that will
contains three pages each of which was numbered in letters and in figures.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA v. ALIPIO ABAJA G.R. No.
147145, 31 January 2005 FACTS: Alipio Abada (Abada) died sometime in May
1940, while his widow died sometime in 1943. Both died without legitimate
children. Respondent Alipio Abaja (respondent) filed before the RTC a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as
his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova.
Respondent is the son of Eulogio Abaja. Nicanor Caponong (Caponong)
opposed to the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died. He
further alleged that assuming a will was really executed, the same should be
disallowed on the ground, among others, that it was not executed and attested as
required by law. The nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada also opposed
based on the same grounds that Caponong alleged. The RTC allowed the
probate of the will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner Caponong primarily based the arguments on Article 804 and
806 of the New Civil Code. Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed
in a language or dialect known to the testator. Article 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. ISSUE: Was the will executed and attested in
accordance with the law? RULING: YES. Abada executed his will on 4 June
1932. The laws in force at that time are the Old Civil Code (Civil Code of 1889)
and the Code of Civil Procedure, which governed the execution of the wills before
the enactment of the New Civil Code. Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code
are new provisions. Relevant provision: Article 795. The validity of the will as to
its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.
Caponong pointed out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew
the Spanish language. This contention must fail, as there is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.
Respondent testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their
place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in Spanish
language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. The
Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil procedure, the intervention of a notary public is not necessary in the
execution of any will. Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment
before a notary public. Moreover, a scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an
attestation clause. Caponong argued that the attestation clause does not indicate
the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court applies the rule on substantial
compliance. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses,
a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the
instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion
of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal
construction, thus: They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of
the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They
only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any
fear of dire results. CANEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103554 28 May
1993 FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the
twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in
Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses. The said testator was duly
assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. Mateo Caballero himself filed a
petition before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his
last will and testament. The testator passed away before his petition could finally
be heard by the probate court. Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the testator, instituted a second petition for the intestate proceeding of Mateos
estate, had their said petition consolidated with the first petition aforementioned
and opposed the probate of the testator's will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate, claiming that the will in question is null and void for
the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the
will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another. The contested attestation
clause are reproduced below: We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose
Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective
names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator,
MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of
THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered
correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided
for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator
and in the presence of each and all of us. The attestation clause is subscribed at
the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting
witnesses. ISSUE: Is the absence of the statement \that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another in
the attestation clause fatally defective? RULING: YES. Under the third paragraph
of Article 805, an attestation clause, the complete lack of which would result in
the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages used upon
which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another
to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses;
and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the
will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of that
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
The Court stresses that under Article 809, i.e., the substantial compliance rule,
the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the
manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited
to merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde,
whether oral or written. The foregoing considerations do not apply where the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each
and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In
such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation
clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be
specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. The rule, as it now stands, is
that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without
the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly,
would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However,
those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
CODOY v. CALUGAY G.R. No. 123486 12 August 1999 FACTS: Evangeline
Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda. Ramonal, filed with the RTC
for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16,
1990. Respondents claimed that deceased was of sound and disposing mind
when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, there was no fraud, undue
influence and duress and the will was written voluntarily. Egneia Codoy and
Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the
holographic will was a forgery and that same is even illegible. It gives the
impression that a third hard of an interested party executed the holographic will.
Codoy and Ramonal argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing
on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the
one who executed the will, the dates and signature should appear at the bottom
after the dispositions, as regularly done. The lower court denied the petition for
probate of the document. On Appeal, the decision of the lower court was
reversed. The CA held, citing J.B.L. Reyes, xxx even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our
present civil code can not be interpreted as to require compulsory presentation of
3 witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the
probate denied. Since no witness may been present at the execution of the
holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond
the control of the proponent. xxx but it can not be ignored that the requirement
can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely
because of the presence of at least 3 witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills
is made by law essential to their validity. Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present and the rule requiring production of witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided. ISSUE: Is Article 811 of
the Civil Code mandatory? RULING: YES. The word shall connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory. Laws
are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief it
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the
wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration is to determine the true
intent of the deceased. We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will as in the
handwriting of the deceased. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented
by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting
of the testator. The Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the
requirement of three witnesses in case of a contested holographic will. Moreover,
the will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of
the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. There was
no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime.
The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay
when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents,
which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will,
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the formal lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A
visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were
uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in
the holographic will and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the letters, there
are continuous flows of the strokes evidencing that there is no hesitation in
writing unlike that of a holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. SPOUSES ROBERTO
AND THELMA AJERO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 14 September 1994 FACTS: The decedent names as devisees
Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong,
Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and
their children. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decedent's holo
will. Private Respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by the
decedent; and the will was procured by pets through improper pressure and
undue influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del
Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the holo will to
probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed and the pet for probate was
dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet the requirements for its
validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and 814. It alluded
to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or
signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. ISSUE: Is
the respondent court correct in disallowing the probate of the will? RULING: NO.
Refer to Art. 839. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can