PARANAQUE v. VM REALTY "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality
of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of
the Municipal Council will not suffice.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before
an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.[27]
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of
the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to
ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
TAN v. COMELEC
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and
municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not
included in the area of the new Province of Negros del
Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term
XI of our Constitution.
xxx
It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the
division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the
people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental
and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The
economy of the parent province as well as that of the
new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or
both of these political groups will be affected and they
are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included
in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
VILLACORTA v. BERNARDO
This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an
ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City
which contradicts a law.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates
to other ordinances amending and so violating national
laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances
could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the
execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of
passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless,
but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
vires.
QUEZON v. ERICTA
Ordinance requiring memorial park operators to set aside
2% land area for charity.
(lower court) It seems to the court that Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his
private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation.
at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually
a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden
to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries.
TATEL v. VIRAC
It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints
received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March
18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of
petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the
neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust
emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the
municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the
Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the
warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New
Civil Code. 2
Held: Ordinance is valid.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
and must be in consonance with certain well established
and basic principles of a substantive nature. These
principles require that a municipal ordinance:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable. 5
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. In
spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by
the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses
are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of
houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The
purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of
fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the
government.
ORTIGAS v. FEATI
(contract stipulates that the lot should be used exclusively
for residential purposes whereas the zoning as per
resolution of the city declares it to be for commercial.)
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police
power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or
supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee.
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at
least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below. when plaintiff-
appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as
stated by the trial court was whether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4
and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial
zone of the municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting
as encumbrances on the lots in question. 31 Having admitted the
validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-
appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for
plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of the
municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its
posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal
Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not
restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore,
granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
"regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same
section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding ... "
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to
defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power,
i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as
"the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" 36 and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government, 37 the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of
highway as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality
of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was
reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
BALACUIT v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF
PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN
THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS
TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS,
GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES
TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND
TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL
PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS
BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE
SAID TICKET
[The ordinance was not valid for being unfair and oppressive.
While the intention of the ordinance was to help parents save up
the cost of this however is to be shouldered by movie operators
who are legitimately exercising their business.]
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance
being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be
resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business
may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation
must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business
or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police
power. 33 A police measure for the regulation of the
conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the
citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to
fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within
the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away. 36
Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe
the rule but it has already been held that although the
presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself
or is established by proper evidence. 37 The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right. 38
BASCO v. PAGCOR
See digest
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
Respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series
of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
and leased them.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council
of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets
or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question
of whether the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing
the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary
to examine the laws in force during the time the said
ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as Local Government Code, in connection
with established principles embodied in the Civil Code an
property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of
property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,
Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used
for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the
local government which are devoted to public service are
deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334).
Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives
authority to local government units to close roads and other
similar public places should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by
law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a
public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code
lays down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made available to the
public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government
unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a
road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property
from public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public use
or public service.
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof
that it has complied with the foregoing conditions
precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations
of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not
used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the
residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market
on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will
show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the
designation by respondents of a time schedule during which
the flea market shall operate is absent.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe
Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-
being of the members of the community. Every local
government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures
that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience,
maintain peace and order, and promote the general
prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on
this objective, the local government should refrain from
acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO
he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit
the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing
broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood
flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons
came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole.
One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General
Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he
was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his
left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left
thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip
apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital,
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner
who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico
filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a
complaint which was, subsequently, amended for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police.
The first issue raised is whether the present case is
governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of
the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of defective conditions
of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
 other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code,
and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is
a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but,
as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general
rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said
Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of
the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon
the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically
"of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability
due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of
Manila, under Republic Act 409.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced
the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that
they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City.
CRUZ v. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is
whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,
represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of
a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted
with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners
at the same time alleging that their rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws were violated as the
licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn
without judicial hearing. 2
This Court is, however, unable to agree with such a
conclusion and for reasons herein set forth, holds that
reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared
null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in
general terms as follows: "General power of council to
enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal
council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is
Municipal Code. 11 An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof,
according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in
the leading case of United States v. Abendan 12 "is valid,
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine
Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it
is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the
mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are
not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must
be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United
States v. Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice
Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision
was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general
welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself
to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are
not here directly concerned. The second branch of the
clause is much more independent of the specific functions
of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general
rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power
found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powersand purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated and
not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth,
this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded:
"The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation." 16 It is clear that
in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance
a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in
the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those
night clubs and property in terms of the investments made
and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act
No. 938 as amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June
20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its
first section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or
city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement
within its territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21,
1954, the first section was amended to include not merely
"the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " 20 The
title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as
Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus
amended, if only the above portion of the Act were
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit
the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the
appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is
not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It
was not changed one whit. The exact wording was
followed. The power granted remains that of regulation,
not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced
by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as
allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs
would give rise to a constitutional question. The
Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
" 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There
is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power
"to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, 22 in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all
"the great public needs, 23 to quote from Holmes, and to
interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In
accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two possible interpretations by
one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity
and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is
to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than
one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24