Pp v Nitafan (1992)

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word

"memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker
or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition
concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer,
and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an
ordinary check, and if passed to a third person, will be valid in his hands like any
other check.

A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not
distinguish but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues
any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment . . ."

The members of the then Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to

include all checks drawn against banks.

A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence,

it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as
evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued in partial fulfillment of a pre-
existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a
deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum
prohibitum.

A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be

presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls
due. This understanding may be manifested by writing across the check
"Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem". However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such
understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal
sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance
of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive
provisions of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate
the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of
unfunded checks.

Svendsen v Pp (2008)

To be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must
thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

If notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of
the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period.
Not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand letters actually
received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also be proof of receipt
thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return
receipt.

While the registry receipt, which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of
demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a duly
authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return
receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of the letters.

Pp v Malngan (2006)

Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who
may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is
murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is
murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end.
There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main
object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main
objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by
the crime of arson.

If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not be a
qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.

Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated — whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:
(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.

In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill
them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified earlier,
the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructive. The
prosecution need only prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.

There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art.
320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple
arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage
caused, to wit: Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification
of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage
and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing
conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State
mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally
severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme
danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the
danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing
the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and
political fabric of the nation. If as a consequence of the commission of any of the
acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death
shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal
Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways,
bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the
purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social,
economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be
meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need
to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320
of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses.
Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case
"notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the
information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime
alleged therein. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited."

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No.
1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is: SEC.
5. Where Death Results from Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the
imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Buebos v Pp (2008)

Whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of an inhabited house which
merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned
by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited
that "accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set
on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and
prejudice."

In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph
1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.

Pp v Larranaga (2004)

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659."

Considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims
were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the
appellants is in order.

All the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape wherein Marijoy is
the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in wherein Jacqueline
is the victim.

In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints.

It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a

"direct relation, and intimate connection" between the kidnapping, killing and raping
of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as
a component offense forming part of the herein special complex crime.