Tolentino v.

Secretary of Finance
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct
bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as
required by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in
the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what
the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing
an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and
of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Courts decision dismissing the
petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several
petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional,
citing in support the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A.
No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt
without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that
Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite
policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason
is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really
matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation
on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The Court was speaking in that case
(Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation
may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of
another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the
tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of
any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716
exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The
sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and
services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of
R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these
transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that
R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the
VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to
be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The mandate to Congress is
not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the
Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under
which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities
and is thus upheld.
BLAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining
its implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
4
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn
the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.

tolentino
FACTS:
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goodsand properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.The Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that theimposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of
contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non
-impairment of
contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contractclause under Art. III, sec
10 of the Bill of Rights