ATTY. OSCAR L.
EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in
OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-
WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN
JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty
of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having
allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court
stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional
Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom
(UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by
Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the
request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special
Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files
revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner
was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr. Hunt sent a
letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the
October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt
to apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on
the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on
March 4, 2005,7wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the
issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The
allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo
but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman
for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent
be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of
the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office
of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the
Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage;
that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the
annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a
copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him
that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that
the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas
Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila
to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao,
Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator
Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late
husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the
instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as
his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that
the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear
that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact
the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando
Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had
received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her
conclusions thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one
Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented
the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to
believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an
almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch
except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent
did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his
side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the investigation. His
story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible
reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in
this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law
for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-70921 denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to
the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require the
respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within 10 days from notice; and
(4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was
guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of
money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted
that he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been
the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady
characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an
OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to
achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit
generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical
declaration on the respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which
by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial,
which by nature was negative evidence.23 Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against
Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command credence. It is worthy to
note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through
the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment. 24 The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an
afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the
forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of
the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the
unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the
husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost
verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real
Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person.
He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,
nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their
vs.
professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DECISION
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by
x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients x x x. (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is her money despite several demands.
always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may
withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers The Facts
Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He
may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor
of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross
in her best friends wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To
misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness
facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of
for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him.27Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17,
2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract), 2 whereby respondent
Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainants
committed either in a professional or private capacity. 28The test is whether the conduct
favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid
shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties likewise
officer of the Court.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
stipulated that should complainants visa application be denied for any reason other than
her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL
any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US
and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against
respondent.5
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be
initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply
with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico
Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom
he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a
business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas
to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain
Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US visa
application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent
claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but,
nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant. 7 To
buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family
with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the
latter.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable,
and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer
penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful
conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver
the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants
downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to
respondents defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that the
latters identity was not proven and in light of respondents self-serving evidence, i.e.,
photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification
increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return
the amount of P350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 14 In this regard,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which
resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa
and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In
truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a
contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US
visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pinedas identity
considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and
thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondents
deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession;
it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. 15
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under
the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of
complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,
to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients cause
with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
 xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. 18 The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics.20
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the same time, failed to return
the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his
legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to
facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa and return her money, he likewise
committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting
in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be
imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase
the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to
note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his
civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." 23 Hence, since
respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the
return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.1wphi1
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the
legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive
will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-
CASILIHAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-
Andrade and Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan. On 7 December 2009, this Court,
through the First Division, issued a Resolution1 referring the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within
ninety (90) days from the receipt of records.
After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its Notice of Resolution,2 alongside the Records
of the case. The IBP Board of Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13 February 2013
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation4 of the Investigating
Commissioner for this case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as follows:
Here is complainants version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar Andrade,
stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7617 for
Injunction, Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte when she was illegally suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel
Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then pending before the
Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya appeared
as counsel for all respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal
case against Mabini College Inc. and now pending before the Honorable Court of
Appeals. In the said labor case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc.
and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on September 28,
2005 currently pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for
Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that on June 27,
2008, the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled
Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending
respondent from the practice of law for one month.
Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the Bar Confidants
certification confirming that until date (apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No.
0304748 was issued) respondents suspension order has not yet been lifted.
On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the Supreme Court
Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts that respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for one month and said suspension was received by respondent on June
15, 2008.
However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite
knowledge of her suspension from the practice of law, the said resolution having been
further posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asias Lex
Libris, respondent continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme
Courts suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.
In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following papers and
pleadings as counsel in Civil Case No. 7617, to wit:
Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.
Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November 12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence in
Support of the Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was
received by petitioners counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit Amended
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners
counsel on February 12, 2009.
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.
Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and
Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.
Also in connection with complainant Casahilans Petition for Certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, respondent never withdrew her appearance. The same is true in the case of
Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her appearance therein.
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law
and respondent clients in other cases before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial
Court in Daet, Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:
CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay R. Belen,
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting
Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and
CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal
Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter
President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet, Camarines
Norte, respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with the order of the
Supreme Court relative to her suspension from the practice of law from June 27, 2008
up to the present.5
Respondents version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving the suspension
order on 20 May 2009. This was also her position in her Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise alleged therein that she
had filed with the Supreme Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension with the Supreme Court, which was unresolved as of the date of her
Manifestation.8Additionally, she argued that the resolution of the initial administrative
case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her position in this particular case. 9
The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law despite the clear language of
this Courts suspension order.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We
adopt the same, with modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008. 10 Despite this, she
continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and the
certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for her
services throughout the duration of her suspension.12
It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she was indeed
suspended, and allegedly served her suspension.13 She claimed that she never received
the resolution that had allegedly suspended her.14By logical inference therefore, her sole
defense is ignorance of the resolution that suspended her.
However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the Court
Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated the following:
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the Third Division dated 27 June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494
entitled, "Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and hereby
SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry Return Receipt
No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15
Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8 May 2009 that
the suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16
We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following
guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from
the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice
of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision
final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a
Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the
IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending
cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted.17
This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for
discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by the
Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the
practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous
order of suspension.1wphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding
his position as Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law. 19
The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active practice
of law for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any similar infraction in the future
would be dealt with more severely.20 In light of this and the jurisprudence already cited,
we adopt the recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY
of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from her one (1)
month suspension, totaling seven (7) months from service of this resolution, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-
LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the
PERALTA, J.: complaint against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S.
Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-
Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656
entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending
Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of
violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case
no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,
where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that
Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada,
and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted
certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well
as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of
the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced
by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in
a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife
of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is
defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of
grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to
give him legal assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the
IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three
(3) months.
 RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the
lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no
doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and
in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts,
conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her
two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law by
this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when
Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and
actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-
year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the
time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order.
Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or
clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the
court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. 15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out
and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus,
considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband
and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it
proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents
from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this
court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on
Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to
practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of
unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the
legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as
not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is
found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondents
record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of
this Decision, so that we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall
take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: were uttered in good faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated
April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against
respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint 2 for
damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino
represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando
stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-
00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing
of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected
payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just
the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was
furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando
had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel,
claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among
others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as
[your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to
Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a
manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from
charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for
motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent
to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 9 and 192210, and prayed
for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
11
In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late
submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the
aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in
his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against
Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily
entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation,
consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening
and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of
the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find
any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo,
who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case
against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved
for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014
with modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review
on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the
complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the
legal profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty
to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in
the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private
life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial
forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy,"
"inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity.
Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is
considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession. 25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as
casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's
mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages
were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the
word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately
terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his
colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of
guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo
was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's
opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of
nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or
private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the
statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar,
Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they
pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly
improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,
constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. 28 The Court has
consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering
the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the
IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the
complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint
as well as the expunction thereof from the records. 30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of
violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with
his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. FLORITA S. A.C. No. 7241
LINCO, Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, October 17, 2011
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed
by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform
his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their
property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square
meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public
for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband
in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof
also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly
personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds
of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT
No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and
candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of
donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David
T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was
then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but
was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that
Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along
with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead
told Algodonand Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at
their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was
then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as
he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed
of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that
indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003. 7 Respondent,
likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he,
however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died.8
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation, 9 the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after
Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that
who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed
and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was
notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement
portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that
Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is false. This act of respondent is
also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied. 11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require
complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything
new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned
for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for
reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the
instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before
he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document
after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to
notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw
Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the
notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation,
considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In
the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that
Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously,
Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter
died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL,
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
instrument.16
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity SO ORDERED.
of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. DECISION
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
PER CURIAM:
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
with public interest.18Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondents first marriage was
not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but subsisting.1
also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required
for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4
public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
penalty. Commission as follows:
 1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married
thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant
submitted his on 01 August 2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a
financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters
numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant
claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten
percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to
December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate
rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he
was entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a
result of his work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their
clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent
set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing
two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S.
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on
07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant
was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder. 15 Respondent
alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they
presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant
had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He
contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and
that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of
the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent
attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005
entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by
William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having
no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did
not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with
two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the
earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent.
The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between
respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The second
marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place
at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso,
and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third
Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed
by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory
conference or submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He disclosed
that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission
that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered
that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He
prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his
willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with
the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to
be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original
copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted
by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged
respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of
the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty
as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge,
for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack
of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper
courts since it was only empowered to determine respondents administrative liability.
On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On
the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the
solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited
cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latters first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution
of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his
name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that
the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was
not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the
administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with
the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts. 43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration
and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents
disbarment.44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not
concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed
to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal
services through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary
evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc.
were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latters legal services and
to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and
ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to
point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to
be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he
violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such
a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. 48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically
for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi &
Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services.
The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a
bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the
letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as
partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in
those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and
not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for
violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected
to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the
administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to
controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant submitted
NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latters first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative
pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he
contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had
filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to
declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed
the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two
other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages,
he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions
for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated
under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the
Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his
wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what
course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,56 we held thus:
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a
grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them
not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the