Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner,
vs.
LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside
the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the Resolution dated 29 April 2008
dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed the trial courts Orders dated 20 September
2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution dated 18 July
2008 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after
herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the allegation in the
Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R.
Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in
1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in
1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007; that the decision
became final and executory on 15 May 200[7]; and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal
Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.
In its comment/opposition to the motion, the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent
committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on
16 February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first
marriage null and void on 27 April 2007. The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary
thereto are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
After a hearing on the motion, the court quashed the Information. Applying Morigo v. People, it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally married to
Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the
definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that
the first marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar
case, [the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from
the beginning." xxx The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. xxx
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order on the ground, among
others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise
pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan, this Court has already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense."
In its Order of 6 December 2007, the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating that Mercado has already
been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, petitioner
questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No.
B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the
marriage of petitioner with respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No.
B-1290) to file her "answer to the complaint." On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of
marriage for failure of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.
Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals. The matter is still
pending resolution thereat.
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court
of Appeals, herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and
denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations in the petition are
based on authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal information for bigamy filed against
private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of
the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal
cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject criminal case is
tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial courts finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which
is a first valid marriage contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the
petition that the dismissal was tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioners right to due process.
Notably, petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private respondents motion to quash before the trial
court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the information. Hence, if there is no denial of
due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to
the double jeopardy rule.
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted
Resolution for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading and the question
of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be
treated as unsigned pleading.
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the ends of justice may
be served. The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the
correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served." At any rate, a
pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were
true and correct and not based on mere speculations.
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the authority to represent
the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The Administrative Code specifically defined
its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals
in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a party.
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala, we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order. Not even the appearance of the conformity of
the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his
assistant to represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the
government were not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or ruling of the trial judge in a
criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines,
we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the
petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and
adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., without
requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits of
the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority
to settle cooperative disputes as well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of
one of the countrys major cooperatives."
And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even absent the
imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone." To borrow the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case
where the dismissal of a criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law,
ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s].
xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its
case.
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the respondents right
against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial court quashed
the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to
the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without
his express consent.
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not yet entered his plea
to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with
his consent but, in fact, at his instance.
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining
a motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense." Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was based on
Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that the facts charged in the complaint do not
constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense, for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule
[now substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.
III
We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged
in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information," for which reason, the court
cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the information.
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the essential elements of the
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a
preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination.
Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the petitioners evidence, such as [this].
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro, where we found no merit in respondents allegation that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly charged a specific offense and provide[d] the
details on how the offense was committed," we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the
case at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a
lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity.
sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and
void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a
subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a
motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into consideration the
established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the new allegations are
admitted by the prosecution; (2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy; and (3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties
which destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the
court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak
even to support possible conviction xxx."
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first marriage offer? Would it
serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby
warranting the non-observance of the settled rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie
truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts
and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her
part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage void ab initio,
respondent heavily relied on the rulings in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy
based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a
void ab initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that
there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was promulgated by the
late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondents subsequent marriage was celebrated in
1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado, where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision
expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases, this
Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise
stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the Order dated 6
December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already superseded Mercado. In fact, in
Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from one another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
xxx
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this Court to give full
meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx. (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, this Court
pronounced:
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may
such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule
that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the
Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged
thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the
information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of
which is obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Abad, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011
CENON R. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in
Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision found petitioner Cenon R. Teves guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE FACTS
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. While
on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon
(Edita). To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of
Marriage indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust
Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously
united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one
Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the execution of the offense by
marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130, Caloocan City,
rendered a decision dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground
that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cenon R. Teves, also
known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the
court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed
that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed by the prosecution.
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-
2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.
On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. This however, was denied by
the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of." He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage
null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a
second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the
Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In
petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in
court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioners
contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction
of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the
finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about
five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita
has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent
marriage.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged
with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 1avvphi1
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioners case the complaint
was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was
overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a
complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision
nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading of
the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. The crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The
finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be
made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009 of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric
Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married
at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition
was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However,
in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the
Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April
2009.
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same
Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of
Appeal is unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed
thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of
respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was
an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect
an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory."
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the
RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of
the Court in Republic v. Jomoc, issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for
the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial
court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court, a record on appeal is required
to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this
Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls
under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to
enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article
41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this
action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the
RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its
ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary
proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that
the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately
final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic
v. Nolasco, United States v. Biasbas and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the
Philippines soon after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer.
Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his
"well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling
thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the
Civil Code. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or
that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas, which it found to be instructive
as to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts
of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only
basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling
affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground
that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead.
The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence
of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does
not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea
firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1wphi1 It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their
actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring
supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse,
she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and
can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and
3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita
Valdezs petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the
spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and
their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in
Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up
at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to
that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however,
Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied
because petitioners marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before
the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It
said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been
absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their
mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her mother prevented her from
looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he
would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly
low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not
the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family
Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil
Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the
Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be
found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will
impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside
the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the
requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It
said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence
during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family
Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the
presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG
posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code. Title
XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover,
Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights.
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying the
Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a
decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-
founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June
20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for
less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of
the settlement of the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived
together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some
friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found
that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband
was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband
arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him
and about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed
property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the
petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a
person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is
tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against
her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would
not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a
particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided
by a final judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then
the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the
existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he
had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been
heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December
10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from
him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address,
proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years,
petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead
and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v.
Republic are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were residing
and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway
communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11
years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions
of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that
petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law
and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the
seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity
to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner
could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the
time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The
Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will,
ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a
situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be
granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that
petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the
said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought
by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not
being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition
for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage
license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano
who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.
 Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition for
the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to
the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized
by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on
November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the
marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003, however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by
any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the
deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced.
Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that
the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV.
NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV
NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights,
duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general
rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law. To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not
anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the
void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force
at the time of the marriage ceremony.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.)
No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted
from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated
under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage,
and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11,
1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one,
and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to
Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental
interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the
petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated
in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased
excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate. Necessarily, therefore, the
right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon
involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse their
error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos surviving wife,
stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover,
that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order
to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage
might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable
party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. 1avvphi1 It
is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an
action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently,
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge
that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As
such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering
that Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the
same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial
courts) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend
his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving
heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Abad, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 168796 April 15, 2010
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner,
vs.
MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A.
Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that,
during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He
described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he
claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a
hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored.
His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.
In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children,
and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with
her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was
back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was
nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the
same was serious and incurable.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on
the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture
and, therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction."
The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but
to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the
public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright
dismissal.
Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed
CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals. Relevant to this petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish
respondent Mays psychological incapacity.
Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even
Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that
the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some
character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the
time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand,
blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable
social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity,
trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon
its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
89761 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854.
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly
developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other
couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the
family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by
the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By
1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent
got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses.
A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this,
the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game
plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat
Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-
laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to
make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter,
another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was
the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not
seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioners
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A
week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to
find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means
to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with
another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures,
this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well.
Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift
to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he
was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the
removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached
respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner
and respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and
did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their
house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his
children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to
petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled,
thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null
and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are
already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their
studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment
shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no
properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by
the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the
parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon
City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public
Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity
of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the
parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the
majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated
July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF
THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

 INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH
IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT
FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND
THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS
VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained
from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles
220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the
Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to
the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and
outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the
psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception
has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to
effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code).
In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of
his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of
the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from
personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being
professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as
credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and
exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the
respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent
behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion
that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In
fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to
save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally
disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard
position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the
siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the
parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires
surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties
as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not
create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders
him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural
system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra.
Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized
with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist
while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by
the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their
inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that
though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which
is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and
orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any
party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological
incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor.
Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this
reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could
no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond
the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from
the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical
psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be
suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong
sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place
whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent
with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno
nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific
and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they
never personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of [respondent]
is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to
Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The
undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used,
behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the
conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling
sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular
support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still
falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family,
sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his
business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking
of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
[Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in
the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her
Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the
tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned
Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that
[respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated
upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the
marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and
(3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with
high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but
despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family
and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen
strength in the family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and
community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her
love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not
the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home
environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to
help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong
sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of
objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and
reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in
a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner]
remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would
make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to
compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping
mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she
characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic),
where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was
acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At
an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly.
Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going.
His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted,
without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He
presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His
studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent
high intellectual resources (sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his
family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses
failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and
consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and
insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in
reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled
with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability
and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding
his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and
closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his
strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of
inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he
suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He
seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is
centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his
dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual
relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in
their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to
do so.

Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested
strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that
renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of
adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings
and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the
unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed
attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy
specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it
resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and
stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as
severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them,
respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in
life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish
anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are
times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at
home doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family.
[Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s
brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things
with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has
grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993.
His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when
he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems
are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to.
He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things
with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he
is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid
conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause
anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.

xxxx

Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

xxxx

B. Vocational Preference

xxxx

C. Socio Emotional Functioning

xxxx

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-
esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is
"different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these
feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with
himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead.
A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be
able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very
angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval,
which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over
[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts.
Despite

his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings
of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no
sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling
 discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to
prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path
to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant
others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Severe

He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable
to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological assessment,
and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of
this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial
personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and
irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good,
sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children.
Her achievements in

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human
situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains
why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to
do something about her situation.

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and
infidelity)

Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent
features

Axis III No diagnosis

 Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)

Severity: 4 (severe)

xxxx

One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of
by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother.
Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt
"api, treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act outwith
poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.).
Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his
charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear
(esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In
the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship
with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro
and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would
just "come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a
mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife
spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between
his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were
manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his
dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major
areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent
and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is]
null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one
spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case,
the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception
of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with,
and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists
and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and
sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions
with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors
assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as
indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen
from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on
a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily
have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses,
does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy
are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds
of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo
therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations. As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the
ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the
persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the
all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business
attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists
or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting,
and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party. In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found
in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina, the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between
the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse
testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological
tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported
by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual
finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical
features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their
histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home,
thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in
childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental
content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently
have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any
conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear
to lack a conscience.
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs;
(3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is
not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In
fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to the
evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was
given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her
best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr.
Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20
years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing
evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time
of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is
REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010
NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the
Decision dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and
Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to
one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels
proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which
traits he found attractive.
Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that
Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to
attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel,
however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he
observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family
members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but
she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He
tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman
so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still
continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic
moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything
from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant
with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were
immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa,
Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her
way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never
contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have
any sexual contact with Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her.
He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she
showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came
home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General
Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an
intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang
ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30
a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noels house and did not come back
anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk
to him and she rejected his phone calls.
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial
proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive
from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its
agreement or opposition to the case.
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto celebrated on November
23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office are hereby directed to
record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective marriage registers.
The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the
property regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was
due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the
marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative
particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper
and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation.
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring
as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the
instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was
the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes
were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations
which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have
failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the
law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital
obligations.
The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find
her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual
relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this
particular obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul the
marriage under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to
marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 46 of the Family Code. Maribels
misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article
45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels personality disorder is
not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may
be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder had no connection with Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove
Maribels alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity.
Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when
she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly
and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-
marital sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated
to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of
the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He further stresses that
Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with his child.
But after their marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with
him.
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and that she consistently
exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during their
marriage. He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels family even
if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his
mother and was also "interpersonally exploitative" as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel
to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed
indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy
when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable with the
root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of
psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit that their
behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels psychological
incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during adult life.
Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to
her parents and their over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was
insensitive to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her
character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even
admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.
Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further
pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the
law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
 employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.1avvphi1
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse
with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged
miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the
psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly
assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was
capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must
be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a
psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Sereno, JJ., see concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner Noel Baccay was not sufficient to
sustain a finding that his wife, respondent Maribel Baccay, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, and, thus, there was no basis to declare their marriage a nullity.
Noel primarily contended that Maribel failed to comply with her marital obligation to consummate their marriage.
While admitting that he and Maribel had several sexual encounters before their marriage, Noel narrated that after
getting married, Maribel senselessly and constantly refused to have any sexual relations with him. He asserted that
Maribel's unreasonable refusal amounted to a psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Noel further pointed to several traits of Maribel that negatively affected their marital relationship. Maribel was
described as arrogant, haughty, rude, and disrespectful; she mingled only with a few individuals and failed to
endear herself to Noel's family, even if they lived with them under the same roof. She was also "interpersonally
exploitative," as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. All of these, Noel
contended, are manifestations of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), which clinical psychologist Nedy
Tayag diagnosed Maribel to be suffering from. Accordingly, Noel petitioned the Court to review the Court of
Appeals' decision that reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court's decision granting his petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 refers to the Incapacity to
Fulfill Essential Marital Obligations
due to a Psychological Condition

Article 36 of the Family Code states that -

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Dissecting the terms of the provision, we list down its elements:
a celebration of marriage;
non-performance of marital obligations;
3. the marital obligations which are not performed are essential obligations;
non-performance is due to causes psychological in nature and it is chronic: constant and
habitual;
the cause/s are present during the celebration of marriage although they may not be manifest or
evident at that point; and
the cause/s surface after the celebration of marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity relate to the essential obligations of
marriage, i.e., "it is the non-performance of this class of obligations which will lead to a declaration of nullity of
marriage due to psychological incapacity." Corollarily, "the non-compliance with these non-essential marital
obligations has no effect on the validity of the marriage."
The essential marital obligations under the Family Code are found in Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221, and 225. Notably,
these essential marital obligations refer primarily to obligations of spouses towards each other and towards their
children. While a harmonious relationship with the in-laws is ideal, particularly in this country's cultural set-up, it
appears that the law does not consider it an essential obligation of either spouse to maintain one. The "incapacity
should make the party disabled from rendering what is due in the marriage, within the context of justice, not
merely in the sphere of good will." Maribel's failure to socialize, interact, and endear herself to Noel's family, as far
as our family laws are concerned, is, thus, not considered a non-fulfillment of an essential marital obligation. If at
all, Maribel has failed to meet her husband Noel's expectations of how she should conduct herself with and relate
to his family, a matter not dealt with by Article 36.
The consummation of the marriage, on the other hand, is an essential marital obligation. Marriage is entered into
for the establishment of conjugal and family life; its consummation is not only an expression of the couple's love
for each other, but is also a means for procreation. That the Court nullified a marriage due to the husband's
obstinate and unjustified refusal to have intimate sexual relations with his wife indicates that the consummation of
the marriage is considered an essential marital obligation.
The failure to consummate the marriage by itself, however, does not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage.
The spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in nature, i.e., the
psychological condition of the spouse renders him/her incapable of having intimate sexual relations with the other.
This crucial nexus between the non-fulfilled essential marital obligation and the psychological condition was what
Noel failed to allege and prove; Maribel's refusal to satisfy Noel's sexual needs during their marriage was never
proven to have been due to some psychological condition. The evidence did not rule out the possibility that the
refusal could be caused by other factors not related to Maribel's psychological make-up; the refusal could very well
be attributed to Maribel's pregnancy and her subsequent miscarriage (assuming these were true). That Maribel's
refusal to have intimate sexual relations with Noel had more to do with the stresses brought on by married life than
her actual psychological condition is validated by Noel's statement that prior to marriage, they have had several
sexual encounters. The connection between the psychologist's finding that Maribel was supposedly suffering from
NPD and her refusal to have intimate sexual relations was similarly not established.
Even supposing that a spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual relations with the other spouse may be reasonably
inferred from or connected with the traditional signs and symptoms associated with NPD, I have difficulty finding
credible the psychologist's diagnosis of Maribel's psychological condition.
The narration of facts declared that Maribel never participated in the proceedings below, and indicated that the
psychologist's evaluation of Maribel was based mainly on Noel's testimony. As the petitioning spouse, Noel's
description of Maribel's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. In Suazo v. Suazo, the Court declared that -
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist [Nedy Tayag, who incidentally is the same
psychologist in the present case] evaluated [the husband's] psychological condition only in an indirect
manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from [the wife] whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must
be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
The Court's statement above should not be read as making mandatory the personal examination by the psychologist
or expert of the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated. We have already stated in Marcos v. Marcos
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist to establish the former's psychological incapacity. Subsequently after the Marcos case, the Court
promulgated the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
which stated that "[t]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged."
To balance, however, the need for an objective evaluation of the psychological condition of the spouses alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated and the non-necessity of an expert's opinion, we refer again to the Court's ruling
in Suazo, which declared that -
[F]or a determination x x x of a party's complete personality profile, information coming from
persons intimately related to [him/her] (such as the party's close relatives and friends) may be
helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that
it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
 entirely on doubtful sources of information.
It did not help that Noel's case was based entirely on his testimony and that of the psychologist, whose findings, in
turn, were also based on Noel's description of Maribel. Apart from these biased testimonies, there was no other
evidence presented by which the Court could objectively evaluate Maribel's psychological condition.
Psychological incapacity, by its
nature, refers only to the most serious
cases and is the root cause of the failure
to fulfill the essential marital obligations
Noel enumerated other negative traits of Maribel that he claimed were indicative of a psychological illness,
specifically, that of NPD. But not all negative traits exhibited by a person are rooted in some psychological illness
or disorder; these may simply be a character flaw or a bad habit that the person has developed over the years. It has
been said that "[a] deeply ingrained bad habit does not qualify as a source of x x x incapacity." Slight character
flaws also do not make a person incapable of marriage.
Assuming that these negative traits were indeed manifestations of NPD or some other psychological illness,
jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the
marriage a nullity under Article 36. "[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." The psychologist testified that persons suffering from NPD were unmotivated to
participate in therapy sessions and would reject any form of psychological help, rendering their condition long
lasting, if not incurable, perhaps in an attempt to define the gravity and extent of Maribel's NPD. This, however, is
but a general description of on persons with personality disorders, as the term is clinically defined; NPD is just one
of the kinds of personality disorders. The testimony did not specifically refer to Maribel and did not paint a clear
picture of the seriousness of her NPD.
Furthermore, the petitioning spouse must also allege and prove that the psychological illness/disorder/condition is
the root cause of the respondent spouse's incapacity or inability to fulfill any, some, or all of the essential
obligations of marriage. Noel attempted to establish this link by alleging that Maribel's NPD has made her view
marriage simply as a piece of paper and made her believe that she can easily get rid of her husband without any
provocation. He claimed that she entered marriage not because of an emotional desire for it, but to prove
something.
Rather than establishing Maribel's incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations, Noel's contentions seem to
indicate that Maribel was utterly unaware of the nature of marriage and its consequent obligations. There is,
however, a significant difference between lack of awareness or understanding of marriage and its obligations, and
lack of capacity to fulfill these marital obligations. A spouse's lack of awareness or understanding of marriage and
its obligation is an irrelevant consideration for a petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code refers
to psychological incapacity to fulfill
essential marital obligations, not
to understand or appreciate what these
essential marital obligations are
Article 36 of the Family Code was based on Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law of the Catholic Church. Canon
1095 states that-
[t]he following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. Those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Those who suffer from a grave lack of discretionary judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Specifically, it is the third paragraph of Canon 1095 that provided for the model for what is now Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The third paragraph of Canon 1095 does not refer to a defect in the consent of one of the contracting parties to the
marriage; in fact, it recognizes the existence of a valid consent. Rather, the third paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to
the incapacity to assume essential marital obligations. Church decisions "held that a person may appear to enjoy
full use of his faculties, but because of some psychiatric defect, he/she may be incapable of assuming the
obligations of marriage, although he/she may have a conceptual understanding of such obligation." Thus, a
person's ability to give a valid consent can be equated to his/her ability to know and understand the essential
marital obligations, but this does not necessarily equate to a similar ability or capacity to actually fulfill
them. The spouse "may very well know what are the substantive imperatives of marriage, and [he/she] may also
very much want to observe these unconditionally, but at the same time [he/she] simply cannot do so for a given
psychical causal factor that gravely lessens or seriously undermines their self-dominion in terms of dysfunctional
volitive faculty." This situation was exemplified by Adolfo Dacanay, S.J., in the following manner:
The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual
nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to
its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities
which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object
of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
In the same manner that the Chuich has limited the third paragraph of Canon 1095 to refer only to lack of capacity
to fulfill essential marital obligations (lack of due capacity), Article 36 of the Family Code should also be
interpreted as limited only to this kind of incapacity. The framers of Article 36 of the Family Code intended that
"jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment x x x cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid x x x to the interpretation and construction of the codal provision."
Accordingly, the incapacity that Article 36 speaks of is not the incapacity to know and understand marriage and its
concomitant obligations (lack of due discretion), but the incapacity to fulfill these obligations for some
psychological reason (lack of due capacity). A party may be considered as incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage even though he may have sufficient use of reason plus due discretion in judgment. The lack
of due discretion, on the other hand, may be indicative of vitiated consent, but this is not the concern of Article 36
of the Family Code. Noel's assertion of Maribel's failure to appreciate marriage and its obligations was, therefore,
an irrelevant allegation insofar as his Article 36 petition was concerned.
Republic v. CA and Molina did not
set forth guidelines beyond those
contemplated by the framers of
Article 36 of the Family Code
Lately, the Molina case has been receiving flaks because, apparently, the guidelines it has established created a
straitjacket that unduly limited the application of Article 36 of the Family Code. The case of Ngo-Te v. Te said that
"[t]he resiliency with which the concept [of psychological incapacity] should be applied and the case-to-case basis
by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina." Ngo-Te v. Te found it erroneous for courts to
apply the rigid set of rules laid down by Molina, without regard to the law's clear intent to treat each Article 36 case
separately. As a consequence, "the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals."
I find Ngo-Te's argument contradictory. It advocates a case-to-case approach in resolving psychological incapacity
cases, yet, at the same time, implies that since the Church has already annulled marriages on account of the
enumerated personality disorders, the courts should declare the marriage's nullity if these were alleged and proved
in the case.
Surprisingly enough, Ngo-Te backtracked on its criticism of Molina a month later by saying in the case of Ting v.
Velez-Ting that Ngo-Te did not abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ting explains the Ngo-Te simply
suggested a relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth in Molina.
At any rate, whatever conflict and confusion that might have surfaced because of Ngo-Te's attack against Molina,
the Court reconciled these in Suazo, saying that "[Ngo-Te] x x x merely [stood] for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity." It noted Ngo-Te for
the new evidentiary approach it directed the courts to adopt - to consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
The guidelines listed in Molina are but expositions of what the Court has determined in Santos v. Bedia-Santos as
characteristics of the psychological incapacity that render a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code;
these guidelines merely incorporated the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Molina did not create new rules, but simply identified and consolidated the legislative intent behind Article 36 of
the Family Code. A majority of the guidelines listed corresponds to and is consistent with the concept of
psychological incapacity that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee had in mind, the interpretation
of Canon 1095 from which the provision was modeled after, and the existing laws, both procedural and
substantive. The guidelines in Molina were never intended to remove the resiliency and flexibility envisioned by
the framers in the application and interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. The resiliency and flexibility,
however, are not a license to interpret Article 36 of the Family Code as allowing any and every assertion of
psychological incapacity to merit a declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court remains bound to interpret the
provision in a manner consistent with the Constitution and relevant family laws. For now, Article 36 of the Family
Code will remain to be a limited remedy, addressing only a specific situation - a relationship where no marriage
could have been validly concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time when the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
essential marital obligations and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, the
Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy.
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
Justice Eduardo Caguioa, member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, explained
that the definition of psychological incapacity "has been left [by the Family Code] for the determination by the
judges since to define it in the Code would be straight-jacketing the concept." I disagree with the wisdom of
leaving to the judiciary the task of defining psychological incapacity. The legislature should have provided clear
standards that the judiciary can apply even while the latter takes into account the peculiar circumstances of each
case brought before it. However, I recognize that it has been twenty-two (22) years since the Family Code took
effect and so much water has passed under the bridge. It is not an ideal situation and is not compatible with the
constitutional design of the division of labor among the three great branches of government. The situation speaks
poorly of the ability of the legislature to provide sufficient legal standards for application by the judiciary of a law
as important as the law on declaration of nullity of marriages.
To clarify the meaning of Article 36, we need to look closely at its origin and the journey it has gone through in the
courts. Article 36 of the Family Code was taken from paragraph 3 of Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
which took effect on 27 November 1983. The Court at one time explained the essence of "psychological
incapacity" under the Family Code by referring to Canon Law discussions comparing marriage in the context of the
psychological incapacity of one of the parties to a contract between the parties to sell a house, which, unknown to
both, had already burned down. In such a case, "the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective
because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.
Refining the concept, we held in Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity - the incapacity must be grave or serious, such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence - it must be rooted in the party's history antedating
the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability - it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure must be beyond the means of the party involved.
After observing that Article 36 was being abused as a convenient divorce law, the Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its interpretation and application in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. While a majority
concurred in the decision, three justices concurred only "in the result" and another three rendered their individual
Separate Opinions. Justice Padilla warned that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts." Justice Vitug preferred the earlier simpler legal
standard set in Santos v. Court of Appeals.
In Antonio v. Reyes, the Court reinstated the trial court's declaration of nullity of the subject marriage based on "the
totality of the evidence," with the caveat that "Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception." We held that granting a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 is not incompatible with the Constitution's recognition of the sanctity of the family. Rather, it
"should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest
in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is
a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life."
In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, after tracing the origin and development of jurisprudence relating to Article 36, the Court noted
that "(t)he resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina. ... Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. ... The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided
by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency .... The Court should rather be alarmed by the
rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape."
In Ting v. Velez-Ting, the Court clarified that "(f)ar from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of
the stringent requirements set forth therein." Requiring petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause
of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of the accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist proved to be too expensive and adversely affected poor litigants' access to justice. This was the finding
of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).
In Azcueta v. Republic of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, we then concluded that "(w)ith the advent of Te v.
Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36, although
there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine."
In this instance, whether we apply the Molina standard or a more relaxed interpretation and application of Article
36, petitioner was unable to prove his case with preponderant evidence. Since the presumption in favor of the
validity of marriage was not ably rebutted, this presumption prevails. 1 therefore concur in the Decision denying
the Petition, but I reach this conclusion based solely on the insufficiency of the evidence presented by petitioner.
However, I disagree with the import this Decision conveys that Molina, in its undiluted form, should be reiterated
and emphasized in this case. Had the case gone forward to a choice between the strict application of Molina and
the more recent decisions cited, I would have submitted that a second hard look at Molina is warranted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,
vs.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that
his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially,
petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each
other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though
petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and demanded more
time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love,
time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before
Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common
occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels
increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became
worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner
gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became
another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent
learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their
quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was
further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was
unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear
his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the
properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their
children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of
farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This
caused petitioners mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and
worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined.
He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President
and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a
child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical
psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from
"Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners
personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners
psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners
psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did
she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate
court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven
and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by
Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he
[has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit,
lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support
his claim for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he
is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes.
Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.
Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even before
the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of
rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention.
Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incapacity.
According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological
incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven.
The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner
maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of
irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners personality disorder which rendered him
unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties
to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological
incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that
petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his
claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he
and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG
argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and
socially deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological
incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist
was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his
infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be
his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence
of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological
incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment and Memorandum stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual
bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. These are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to
the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
 counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him
to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are
insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the
root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated
for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis
to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which
became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did
not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More
importantly, there was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles and differences in handling finances and managing their business
affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity
which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial
difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children.
Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons
why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became
unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his
personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of
a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent
learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and
subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to
fulfill his essential marital obligations.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin, and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,
vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They
have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time
of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing
and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the
time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent
jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to
assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs.
He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and
embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very
quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for
boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot
delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested
psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private
respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife
to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of
a marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the
allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198),
otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of
juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in
paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the
petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in
turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the
Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition
shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that
there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine
revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO
DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY
AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE
OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this
present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 prohibits the
filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of
the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of
cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in
the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient
to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends
that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition.
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both
petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity.
Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly
suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of
the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their
marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would
show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have
testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be
too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it
would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Even
assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents
petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an
error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which
is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his
motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an
adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time. The existence of that adequate remedy removed the
underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR GALANG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), challenging
the decision dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62,
Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground
of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
 Antecedent Facts
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the
respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the
Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a
housewife. They have one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked
money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care,
love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was "extremely serious" and
"appears to be incurable."
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito I.
Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties.
The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not
want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the
market when Juvy brought him there.
The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He added that Juvy stole his
ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers pension. He,
likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy
borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that
she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an
interview, but the latter did not respond. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following
findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling
activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality
disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid
behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital
obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the
defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
xxx
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such occasions wherein
the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early;
this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;
2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one
cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and never attended to
her husbands needs;
 3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the irresponsible
attitude of the defendant;
4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion wherein the
defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling;
5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein the defendant
would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false
pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other people.
6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant
never listened to his advices;
7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave for work,
the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the
incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother;
8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples separation.
Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These
disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any
sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping she would
change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a weekend vacation,
cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor
clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is sufficient
reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife
and mother to their only son.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, this Court is
convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a)
gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by
any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause
of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear
over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner and
defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The CA Decision
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its
decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It explained
that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling,
undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys
condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the
respondent.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9,
2005.
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was
insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner
additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys
condition. The respondent took the exact opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage." We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina,
whose salient points are footnoted below. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in
Santos.
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos, we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the
Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages) which provided that "the complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged."
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te placed some cloud in the continued
applicability of the time-tested Molina guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline,
Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and
be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo, however, laid to rest any
question regarding the continued applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon
Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ngo Te simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We
also explained that Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
The Present Case
In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation
insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
a. The respondents testimony
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left
their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the
P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the
money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up
false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress
that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., we ruled that it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other
words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of
the psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality
rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her
essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack
of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring, we emphasized that irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family
Code addresses.
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents
ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt
reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows
that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong
and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick,
warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy
engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after
their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy
even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store
and by working as a manicurist.
b. The Psychologists Report
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36
of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a
considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly
be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition
precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered
and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the
celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists
report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative
traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and
irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and
declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible." In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion that
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties as a wife and mother to their only son."
We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even
identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys
psychological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during
the marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the
report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not
even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the
incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that her
mental incapacity "appears incorrigible" are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of
Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy
and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to
borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these
allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or
insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the
symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability.1wphi1 In these respects, she
merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From
this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very
hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the
Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where
the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, Abad, and Villarama, Jr. JJ., concur.
Sereno, J., sick leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision and December 15,
2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein
parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained
a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who
gave birth to a son in March 1983.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his
marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The househelp would just
call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody
agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation.
Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two
younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house
on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
 2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.
During trial, Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985,
he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn
was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw
Benjie and Malyn inside. At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist,
while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with
adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights. They put their agreement in writing
before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy,
S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant
others. Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it
is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and
without a proper maternal role model.
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-
in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner
of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids
and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys
needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only
constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of ones familial duties. Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad
Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness. He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual
allegations regarding Malyns "habits" because he believed it is the courts duty to do so. Instead, he formed his
opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as
frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1
p.m. to 6 p.m. only. And in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children
and their respective yayas with her. She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape
her physically abusive husband. On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset
that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out
of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors.
Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that
Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house. She never returned to their
conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her
resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her
because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the
door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time. Malyn insisted that she wrote the
letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later
obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her
(which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity,
as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence. Malyn presented Dr.
Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the
spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother
because of her mahjong habit, while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical
abuse. Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic
impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for
marriage even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered
her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave
him. But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-
dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him
and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who
admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he
was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing,
drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man
with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his
work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds
(both came from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts
they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual personalities broke through,
precipitating the demise of their marriage.
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe,
dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness.
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to
have a good relationship with her kids. As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically
incapacitated to perform this duty.
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio
testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends.
None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually
witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother. The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
mother would visit them only in school.
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was
abroad. While they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in
agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common
recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any
of them was sick.
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of
Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her
spouse. He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt
hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the
hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the
stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties
as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey
and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn; and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are
financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the
minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to
be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the
fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in
their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she
made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the
children for several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family
abroad. The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children
with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts
Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as
much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to
become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was
found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA.1wphi1 The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is
not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support
a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility
in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the
diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements
for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court
that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to
prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude,
immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from
performing her essential martial obligations; and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her
upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity,
albeit on petitioners part.
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.
She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was
a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and
irresponsible.
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common
children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was
grave and incurable. Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to
support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum. She manifested that she was no
longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological
incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice. Her manifestation and motion were noted
by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack
of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that
the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their
mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing.
The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of
respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only
testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to
prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by
itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see
and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that
shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings
to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties,
but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and
its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing
in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether
the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon
City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC
Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it
would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for
the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October
2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005. Respondents petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met
since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case
the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of
a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences." In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned."
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-
04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR.,
Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between
respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the
latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground
that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage.
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection
to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion
between Eduardo and Catalina.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments
with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home
in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a
psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of
Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was mainly
characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she admitted her
psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardos consent and flirting with
different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties from
the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her
incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically
incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes
was the best evidence of Catalinas psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that
Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not
have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred
because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE
CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE
CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid
down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); and that Catalinas refusal to do household chores,
and her failure to take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature
warranting the declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to
perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not
grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred
prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of
the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalinas
psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalinas past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even
a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion
between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in
exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas deployment that had required
him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends
emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable
to her inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas marriage
to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her
responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the
Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the
confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x
x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. x x x.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,
making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity
of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage.
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining
the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal
in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without
Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling),
were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior.
At best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter
that was submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity. In
particular, they relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several
aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up
with what is expected in a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships,
as they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be
attended to as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not
feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of
repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these
characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as
required in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of
the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being
concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude
before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage.
Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her
duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will
still change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained within her.
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas supposed
psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the
report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline
personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause
that could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalinas
various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the
gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only
established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be
treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity."
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. We
have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported
by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual
finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons,
aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the
marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary
support for the conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to perform
her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability
of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged
borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly
pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with
its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas immaturity and apparent refusal
to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To
rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were
manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal
home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the
Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such
marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his
claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was
based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal
home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-
de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and
represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this
case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please
tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you
filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal
properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not
pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here?
A Yes sir, it could be.
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo. 1wphi1 To
recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but
she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The
probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so
also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the
marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but
resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
 DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision
(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia,
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June
16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based
on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions
business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.
He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her
illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric
illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as
well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare
Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that Lolitas abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with
her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a
ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration of the CAs decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its
original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTCs decision. In its amended decision, the CA found
two circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1)
Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and deliberate act
of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering
from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolitas infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and
incurable psychological incapacity.
 The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse.
Cesar failed to prove Lolitas
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates
when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued
financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing
Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record
exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric
illness. Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as
a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a
spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their
relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as
measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted
cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a
rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolitas psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.