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G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.

Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to
whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international
personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code1 is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed the action
taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible
personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to
the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for
resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the
alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the
Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking.
It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition for review was filed on January 2,
1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was
held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign country" possess an international personality to
come within its terms.2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal
interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano
Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the
former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of
intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria
de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen
and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among
others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a
provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent,
pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and
P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return
was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. On
November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts
of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied
the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received
by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax
exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... . However,
respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised
the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign
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country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties regarding the values of the
properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the
reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the
meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In fine,
we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or
whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5

Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of
ruling definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent
back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as
follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both subdivisions (a)
and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables'
and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal
tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues raised
by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on whether or
not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible
person property', as used in the Tax Code."6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence
submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the
transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well as of
securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have
been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter
back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963. Respondent presented
no evidence."7

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax
shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of
intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which
the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character
in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only
obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal
personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country". Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was
made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that
it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law.9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with
the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common
consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare.11Correctly has it been described by Esmein as
"the juridical personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over
the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society
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divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly
would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter
into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of
statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It
bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was
specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe
and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible
personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the
alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. 18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an
opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity,
in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it proof of
the laws of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino
citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or
inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive
ruling: "The Collector hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court,
holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this country
is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here.
Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and
inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that demand reciprocity as
in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA. G.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971

FACTS:
Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by
reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her death. At the time of her demise she
left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The CIR then issued an assessment for state and inheritance
taxes of P369,383.96. Rueda filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties worth P396,308.90 should be
exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 (now
Section 104) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section 122
"refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law,
does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a
similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government
order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."

ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid.

RULING:
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YES.
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no
tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect
of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of
which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation
that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. A foreign country is thus a
sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal
competence to exact obedience to its commands.

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the CIR has not successfully made out a case. The
Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, like Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the
sense, did fall under this exempt category.

G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE; respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that this Court
declare Presidential Decree 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes"
unconstitutional.

The petition contains the following allegations:

5. That said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under Amendment No. 6 of the
Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595 and which is quoted as
follows:

Whenever in the Judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that
in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.
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6. That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution "(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a
Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa
(Sec. 11, Art. VII);

7. That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7,
1981; that while Section 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution provides:

All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein
provided for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa
provides otherwise.

such re-confirmation of existing powers did not mean to include the President's legislative powers under Amendment No. 6: by "the
laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official" only those laws that have been passed by the
existing and/or prior legislature are intended;

8. That the Respondents are intending and in fact implementing the provisions of the questioned decree and the same tends to
affect all taxpayers in the Philippines including herein Petitioner; that he is now in a quandary on whether to take advantage of the
benefits of said decree since the same is of doubtful constitutionality leaving him no protection as guaranteed by the decree and
thus subject him to prosecution for violation of which otherwise would have held him immune under said decree;

9. That as a member of the Batasang Pambansa he knows that the subject of the questioned decree has not been brought to the
attention of the Batasang Pambansa requiring immediate attention, the fact being that the original tax amnesty decree which the
questioned decree amended or modified has long been effective and implemented by the Respondents while the Batasang
Pambansa was in session;

10. That Presidential Decree No. 1840 is patently null and void having been passed without the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa and it is likewise of public interest and of the nation that the question of whether the President retained his legislative
power after lifting Martial Law and after the Constitution was amended on April 7, 1981 be resolved;

11. That the questioned decree being the first dated after the lifting of Martial Law and the April 7 amendments brings to test the
validity of the exercise of standby emergency powers invoked in Amendment No. 6. (Pp. 3-6, record.)

As the petitioner himself puts it in his memorandum, the issue is: Whether the 1973 Constitution as amended by
Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same amendments, more particularly Amendment No. 6, after it was again amended in
the Plebiscite held on April 7, 1981?

On the issue thus formulated by petitioner, it is maintained that "Amendment No. 6 is rendered inoperable, deleted and/or
repealed by the amendments of April 7, 1981". Opening his discussion of this proposition thus:

Amendment No. 6 as originally submitted to the people for ratification under Pres. Dec. No. 1033, and thereafter approved reads as
follows:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.

Whether the matter or that there was an exigency which required immediate action let it be conceded that in the judgment of the
President such facts do exist. (Emphasis ours)
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It is to be observed that the original text mentions President (Prime Minister). This is so because under No. 3 of the same
amendment,

... The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after
the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution.

Parenthetically, the term "Incumbent President" employed in the transitory provisions could only refer to President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275).

After the April 7 amendments there exists no longer "a President (Prime Minister)" but "A President"and "A Prime Minister." They
are now two different offices which cannot be held by a single person not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and
governed by the main provisions of the newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality that we are no longer
governed by the transitory provisions of the Constitution. (Pp. 27-28, Record.)

petitioner rationalizes his affirmative position thereon this wise:

Is Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution as approved in 1976 reproduced or unaffected by the April 7, 1981 amendment? Or,
is it considered repealed by Omission?

The Constitutional provisions of the Presidency do not restate the provisions of Amendment No. 6 which grants the President
(Prime Minister) limited powers to legislate. This is tantamount to a withdrawal or deletion of such grant.

There is no way by which the incumbent President be referred to anymore as the "incumbent President" in the amendment of 1976.
While it is true that Amendment No. 6 fails to distinguish between "incumbent" and "regular" all provisions with reference to the
powers of the Presidency is deemed foreclosed by Article VII of the newly amended Constitution. Article VII enumerates presidential
powers. To construe that the 1976 Amendments are still applicable, other than that referring to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
would be an incompatibility to the application of the present constitutional provisions.

Generally taken, the 1976 amendments are amendments to the transitory provisions of the Constitution. Insofar as the office of the
President or the Prime Minister is concerned they have ceased to be governed by the transitory provisions but under the newly
amended Constitution.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 125 called for the election of a President under the newly amended Constitution. President Marcos ran as
candidate and was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines by resolution no. 2 of the Batasang Pambansa dated
June 21, 1981. He took his oath of office as the duly elected President. The Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet and the
Executive Committee took their oaths after having been appointed and are now exercising their functions pursuant to the new
provisions. We even consider ourselves the Fourth Republic because of a new system of government. What particular part of the
newly amended Constitution would Amendment No. 6 fit in?

President Ferdinand E. Marcos ceased to be the incumbent resident referred to in the transitory provisions or in the 1976
amendments. The Solicitor General argued that Amendment No. 6 provided for the contingency that the office would be separated
consisting of a ceremonial President and a Prime Minister who will be he executive. Yet, without express constitutional grant the
President now assumes a power intended to be that of the Prime Minister. The intent of the 1981 amendments could not be
interpreted any other way except that after the amendment it would no longer be proper to exercise those reposed upon the Prime
Minister. Powers previously reposed upon the Prime Minister were expressly removed from him and given to the President.
Amendment No. 6 is not one of those.
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The proposed amendments under Batasan . No. 104 became Question No. 1 in the ballot of April 7, 1981 plebiscite to which the
voter was asked (B.P. Blg. 122):

Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution and to Amendment No. 2, as proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa in Resolution No. 2, which, in substance, calls for the establishment of a modified parliamentary system, amending for
this purpose Articles VII, VIII and IX of the Constitution, with the following principal features: ...

Nowhere in feature (1) was it submitted that the President would enjoy conditional or qualified legislative powers as modified
parliamentary system.

The original intent to set out the original act or section as amended is most commonly indicated by a statement in the amendatory
act that the original law is amended to "read as follows." The new statute is a substitute for the original act or section. Only those
provisions of the original act or section repeated in the amendment are retained (Paras vs. Land Registration Commission, July 26,
1960, L-16011).

That "The Legislative power shall be vested in the Batasang Pambansa" is an old provision which has been retained. This in essence
was Question No. 1 in the April 7 Plebiscite as to who exercise legislative powers and who are to execute. Nowhere in the approved
Amendment can it be hinted that the hybrid-type of government also includes a one-man legislature. The intent to repose
legislation only upon the Batasan is very apparent. The adoption of the new Constitution repeals and supersedes all the provisions
of the older one not continued in force by the new instrument (16 C.J.S. 88). (Pp. 30-33, Record.)

After mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the formulation of Amendment No. 6,
the Court's conclusion is, that Assemblyman-Petitioners posture lacks, to say the least, sufficient merit.

Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional
construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding
conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and
developments but likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical background and environment at the
time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel thereof. As long as this Court adheres closest to this
perspective in viewing any attack against any part of the Constitution, to the end of determining what it actually encompasses and
how it should be understood, no one can say We have misguided Ourselves. None can reasonably contend We are treading the
wrong way.

True enough Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Philippine Constitution as amended in 1981 explicitly ordains that "(T)he legislative power
shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa". Section 2, however, readily reveals that the Batasang Pambansa contemplated in that
Section 1 is the regular assembly (formerly referred to as National Assembly, now as Batasang Pambansa evidently to indigenize
the nomenclature, which, incidentally should have been done also with the Pangulo and Pangunang Ministro), to be elected in May
1984, per Sec. 5(1) of the same Article. Thus, to begin with, in the instant case, We must keep in mind that at least for the present
and until 1984, what can be properly discussed here are only the legislative powers of the interim Batasang Pambansa as such.

Without intending any reflection on any of those responsible for the Idea, it may be that it is for non-essential reasons that the
current legislative assembly is being referred to generally simply as the Batasang Pambansa. For in legal truth and in actual fact, and
as expressly admitted by petitioner, it is inherently no more no less than the same interim. Batasang Pambansa created by
Amendment No. 2 by virtue of the Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16-17, 1976. And, in this connection, it may be observed that
indubitably, and as a necessary and logical consequence, the amendment of Amendment No. 2 in 1981 carried with it the
corresponding appropriate adjustments literal and otherwise of Amendment Nos. 3 and 4, although these latter two were not
specifically mentioned in the proposal pursuant to BP-CA Resolution No. 4 of the Batasan, acting as a constituent body nor in the
Plebiscite Referendum Act itself, much less in the ballots presented to and used by the voters. This is because it cannot be denied
that Amendments 3 and 4 are by their very nature inseparable parts of amendment No. 2.
 Page 8

But examining closely how the 1981 amendments altered Amendment No. 2, it will be readily seen that the only change consisted
of the non-inclusion of the "incumbent President" as member of the assembly in pursuance of the fundamental objective to
separate the Presidency from the regular legislative body and thereby establish in our country a modified form of parliamentary
government more appropriate for and suitable to the peculiar conditions of our political development and the idiosyncrasies of our
people, and at the same time introduce into it features that would strengthen its structure so as to enable the government to cope
with emergencies or abnormal situations, not only like those that presently exist but even those that might arise in the future. Thus,
it is characterized with a presidency more powerful than the idea of a strong President desired by President Quezon and actually
embodied in the 1935 Constitution.

It is, therefore, evident that the reference to Amendment No. 2 in the amendments of 1981 was not intended at all to convert or
upgrade the present existing assembly into the regular Batasang Pambansa. To repeat, what we have now is still
the interim Batasang Pambansa created in 1976. Importantly, it must be said that had the present Batasan, acting as a constituent
body, ever thought of making itself the regular National Assembly, the very odious spectacle that the people rejected when in the
referendum of January 10-15, 1973 they repulsed and repudiated theinterim National Assembly provided for in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1973 Constitution whereby the members of the old Congress of the Philippines made
themselves automatically members of the interim assembly would have resuscitated, and we can readily imagine how the reaction
of our people would have been exactly the same as in 1973 and for sure the 1981 proposed constitutional amendment affecting the
Batasang would again have been denied sanction by our people.

Having arrived at the ineludible that the present Batasan is still interim, it also ineluctably follows that its legislative authority
cannot be more exclusive now after 1981 amendments than when it was originally created in 1976. Thus even as
the interim Batasan which came into being "in lieu of the Interim National Assembly" by virtue of Amendment No. 2 consequently
acquired "the same powers and its Members the same functions, responsibilities, rights and privileges, and disqualifications as
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof", there can be no question that coeval with the creation of
the interim Batasan, Amendment No. 6 came into force and effect. And Amendment No. 6 mandates in unequivocal and
unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent legislative authority to an official (the President [Prime Minister]) who is not in the
Batasan itself.

In brief, the inexorable logic of the events that brought forth the present Batasan leads to no other conclusion than that the
legislative authority vested in it by Amendment No. 2, read together with Section 1, Article XVII and Section 1, of Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, is subject to the external concurrent legislative prerogative that Amendment No. 6 vests on the "President
(Prime Minister)."

Actually, the insistence of petitioner that Amendment No. 6 has been repealed by the 1981 amendments springs from another
point of view. It is fundamentally based on analysis and ratiocination related to the language and tenor thereof. Petitioner
maintains that said amendments vested extraordinary legislative powers on "the President (Prime Minister)" and on nobody else,
and since there is no one who is President (Prime Minister) under our present governmental set-up pursuant to 1981 amendments,
no one in the existing government can exercise said powers.

The persuasive force of such theory is more apparent than real. As We have said earlier, the Constitution is not merely a literal
document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary signification of its words. Beneath and beyond the literal terms of
the Charter, like a mine of incalculably immense treasures, are elements and factors radiating from political and economic
developments of the situation prevailing at the time of the inclusion of any particular provision thereof or amendment thereto. It is
only from the light of the implications of such elements and factors that the real essence and significance of the words of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny can be properly and adequately seen and comprehended.

With reference to Amendment No. 6, it is of decisive importance that anyone who would try to decipher its true import should be
acquainted with its ration d'tre, i.e., the whys and the wherefores thereof. Contrary to the imputations of petitioner, this
amendment is not rooted in the authoritarian, much less dictatorial tendencies or inclinations of anyone. Any tinge or tint of
 Page 9

authoritarianism in it is not there for the sake of the Ideology of dictatorship or authoritarian itself. Such hue of a one-man
authoritarianism it somehow connotes is there only because it is so dictated by paramount considerations that are needed in order
to safeguard the very existence and integrity of the nation and all that it stands for. Perhaps the truismalmost a dogmawell
recognized by constitutionalists and political scientists of all persuasions as a convenient pragmatic rule for survival of nations,
namely, that in an emergency, the best form of government is a dictatorship, might have been in the mind of those who formulated
it, but it is quite obvious, as will be explained anon, that other fundamental factors must have been taken into account in order
precisely to minimize the rigors and generally feared oppressiveness of a dictatorship in an unrestricted martial regime, its being
dubbed as martial law "Philippine style" notwithstanding.

At this juncture, it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the "President
(Prime Minister)" are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists
or there is a threat or imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
(now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action." The power is to "issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the
land." As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously,
therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other Powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or
allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.

Indeed, it is but fitting and proper that in framing the fundamental law of the land which sets up a form of government and defines
and delimits the powers thereof and its officers, reserving as they must plenary sovereignty to themselves, the people should
prudently provide what powers may and should be exercised by the government and/or its officials in times of crises and
emergencies that could jeopardize the very life and/or territorial integrity of the country. Even as individual rights and liberties are
valued and enshrined as inviolable, the people, as they write their Charter thru a convention or other legitimate means, cannot
ignore that in the event of war, insurrection, rebellion or invasion, including any other critical situation, any one of which cannot but
affect the regular course of normal constitutional processes and institutions as well as the prerogatives and freedoms of individual
citizens of and inhabitants within the country, appropriate protective, defensive and rehabilitative measures must be provided
therein and may be made to function or operate.

Accordingly, both in the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines and in that of 1973, the following provisions were precisely intended to
operate during such perilous situations:

1. In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. The 1935
version of this provision differs from it in that what was granted to the President was not the broad authority "to exercise such
powers necessary and proper" but only to issue rules and regulations purported to accomplish the same objective.

2. Section 10(2) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided thus:

... (2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under the martial law...

Under Section 12 of Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, exactly the same powers were conferred on the Prime Minister.

However, what is now Section 9 of Article VIII under the 1981 amendments transferred all said powers to the President.
 Page 10

As can be seen, as authorized by the Commander-in-Chief clause of all our Constitutions, there have been as there still are three
other measures that may be resorted to during an emergency, namely:

(1) Call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, when public safety requires it;

(2) Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and

(3) Place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

It appears, therefore, that within the four corners of the Constitution itself, whether that of 1935 or that of 1973, there were four
constitutionally designed ways of coping with abnormal situations in the country, namely: (1) the so-called emergency powers
delegated by the assembly to the President; (2) the calling of the armed forces; (3) the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and (4) the placing of the country or any part thereof under martial law. Understandably, it is to be supposed that
these measures are to be resorted to one after the other according to the degree of gravity of the situation.

A backward glance at our past experiences since the implantation of American sovereignty in our country at the turn of the century
should remind us that at one time or another all of these four measures have been resorted to, albeit martial law proclamations in
the long past were limited in area and duration because of the localized nature of the disturbances they were meant to remedy.

Bearing all the foregoing considerations in mind, the question that naturally arises at this juncture is what need is there for the
power contemplated in Amendment No. 6? Why does the country have to have a one-man legislating authority concurrent with the
Batasang Pambansa? Are the above-discussed safeguards not enough?

At this point, it must be noted that Amendment No. 6 does not refer only to the interim Batasang Pambansa but also to the regular
"National Assembly" (now Batasang Pambansa), a consideration which lends force to the conclusion that the 1981 amendments
could not have been intended nor understood to do away with it. What, indeed, is the fundamental ration d'tre of Amendment No.
6?

It is to be recalled that the said amendment was formulated in October 1976, more than fully four years after the whole Philippines
was first placed under martial law pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972. True, without loss of time, President
Marcos made it clear that there was no military take-over of the government, and that much less was there being established a
revolutionary government, even as he declared that said martial law was of a double-barrelled typed, unfamiliar to traditional
constitutionalists and political scientists for two basic and transcendental objectives were intended by it: (1) the quelling of
nationwide subversive activities characteristic not only of a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by a foreign power of a different
Ideology from ours, and not excluding the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a strong separatist movement in Mindanao, and
(2) the establishment of a New Society by the institution of disciplinary measures designed to eradicate the deep-rooted causes of
the rebellion and elevate the standards of living education and culture of our people, and most of an the social amelioration of the
poor and underprivileged in the farms and in the barrios, to the end that hopefully insurgency may not rear its head in this country
again.

The immediate reaction of some sectors of the nation was of astonishment and dismay, for even if everyone knew that the gravity
of the disorder, lawlessness, social injustice, youth and student activism and other disturbing movements had reached a point of
peril, they felt that martial law over the whole country was not yet warranted. Worse, political motivations were ascribed to be
behind the proclamation, what with the then constitutionally unextendible term of President Marcos about to expire, and this
suspicion became more credible when opposition leaders and outspoken anti-administration media people who did not hesitate to
resort even to libel were immediately placed under indefinite detention in military camps and other unusual restrictions were
imposed on travel, communication, freedom of speech and of the press, etc. In a word, the martial law regime was anathema to no
 Page 11

small portion of the populace. Criticisms or objections thereto were, of course, mostly covert, but there were even instances of
open resistance.

Truth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome anywhere in the world. And when it is prolonged without anyone knowing when it
would be lifted, the feeling of discontent grows and spreads. Indeed, it is difficult to describe fully in an opinion like this all that
many consider obnoxious in martial law. Suffice it to say that the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory features
appreciated by large segments of the people, but with many cases of abuses of the military marring such receptive attitude, the
clamor for the early lifting of martial law became more and more audible.

We can definitely say that no one more than President Marcos was aware of those feelings and sentiments and, in fact, even of the
undercurrents of resistance. And as We visualize the situation he found himself in, he was faced with no less than a dilemma. He
was convinced of the advantages, not personally to him, but to general welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also
conscious that martial law, in any form call it Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other euphemistic adjective was
growing to be more and more distasteful. Even the New Society it was supposed to bring about was slowly losing its splendor.
Backsliding was creeping in some ways, discipline was loosening. But over and above all such adverse developments, the perils to
national security and public order still remained, if in a slightly lesser degree.

It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the concept embodied in
Amendment No. 6 was born. In brief, the central Idea that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our
country and people against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian powers, the
latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the
assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. In other
words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an
emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law.

We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a)
emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the
barracks; (c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial
law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. And the President who first conceived of what is now
Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus, Our understanding of the development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of
Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be
a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances of actual surface
warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without martial law itself.
Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest
extreme situations should ever demand it.

To recapitulate, the amendments of October 1976 were deliberately designed against martial law. The creation thereby of
the interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly which never came into being because of vehement and
justified popular repudiation thereof was definitely an indispensable step towards the lifting of martial law. Everyone can
understand that martial law could not be lifted without a legislative body to make the laws. The legislative authority could not be
left in the hands of the President (Prime Minister). It would have been anachronistic to lift martial law and still leave the law-making
authority with the President (Prime Minister) alone.

Relatedly but more importantly, the vesting of the legislative authority to the interim Batasang Pambansa, without more or
exclusively, would have maintained the safeguards of national security only to the four traditional constitutional measures
repeatedly discussed above, including martial law. The framers of the amendment realized only too well they had to look for a
remedy thereto, the dislike of the people, justified or not, of martial law. And so, to make the proclamation of martial law remotest,
but nevertheless enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they conceived the Idea of granting to the President
(Prime Minister) the power endowed to him by Amendment No. 6.
 Page 12

Skeptics and hardcore critics of the administration there must be who would sarcastically allude to Amendment No. 6 as martial law
just the same but only like a dog with merely another collar. A word of explanation is thus called for of the vital differences between
one and the other.

The attitude of those who are opposed to Amendment No. 6 must be due to lack of sufficient acquaintance with the real essence of
the various constitutionally authorized emergency measures imperatively needed to safeguard the national security and integrity
already discussed above. The delegation of legislative power thru the issuance of rules and regulations to carry out a national policy
declared by the Batasan has its own virtues as a restrained way of conferring law-making authority to the Executive during an
emergency. It is limited, restricted, subject to conditions and temporary. It is obviously the simplest remedy to cope with an
abnormal situation resulting in the least violence to revered democratic republican processes constitutionally established.

But being purely a political and legislative remedy, it cannot be adequate when lawless violence becomes generalized and public
safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces. And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring
the preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution.
without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure
that carries with it repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country,
it is but natural to think of it only as a very last resort.

Well, it is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing
President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by
the military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to accompany the
exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the
President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality
no less than disguised martial law.

Apparently conceding, at least in gratia argumenti, the truth and the logic of all the foregoing discussion and conclusions, petitioner
raises the question of how can Amendment No. 6 fit into the new set up under the 1981 amendments, which abolished the dual
position of President Marcos of President-Prime Minister mandated by the 1976 Amendment No. 3. According to petitioner,
President Marcos is President now (no longer President-Prime Minister) pursuant to the 1981 amendments and by virtue of his
election as such as proclaimed by the Batasan on June 21, 1981. Not without a bit of sarcasm, petitioner even refers to the
reference to the status of our government after the inauguration of President Marcos as the Fourth Republic. How then, petitioner
asks, can the President of the Fourth Philippine Republic exercise powers granted to the President-Prime Minister of the provisional
government established by the Transitory Provisions and conferred upon him only by Amendment No. 6 of October 1976?

If We go solely by the rules of literature, a considerable degree of plausibility, as We have intimated earlier in this opinion, may be
conceded to the pose of petitioner. It indeed seems that since the positions of President and Prime Minister have been separated
by the 1981 amendments and the same do not state to whom the power under Amendment No. 6 would appertain, neither the
present President nor the present Prime Minister can exercise such power. But again, We hold that petitioner is laboring under a
misconception of facts and of the principles of constitutional construction.

Earlier hereinabove, We discoursed on the inevitability of the conclusion that the current Batasan, being merelyinterim "in lieu of
the interim National Assembly" established under Section 1 of the Transitory Provisions, it is subject to the provisions of
Amendment No. 6 which was approved and ratified together with the creation of the Batasan. We have also made a rather
extensive exposition of the whys and wherefores behind Amendment No. 6. As may be noted, the ultimate thrust of Our discussion
is to establish as a legal proposition that behind and beneath the words of the amendment, the literal reference to "the President
 Page 13

(Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was the intention to make such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the
totality of the executive power under the system of government established thereby. For as a matter of general principle in
constitutional law, belonging as he does to the political department of the government, it is only with such official that, the high
prerogative of policy determination can be shared. And in this connection, it is very important to note that the amendment does
not speak of the "incumbent President" only, as in the other amendments, like Nos. 1, 3 and 5, but of the President, meaning to
include all future presidents. More, Amendment No. 6 makes mention not only of the interim Batasan but also of the regular one.
All these unmistakably imply that the power conferred upon the President thereby was not for President Marcos alone but for
whoever might be President of the Philippines in the future.

As to the parenthetical mention therein of the Prime Minister, We are of the considered view that it was necessary to do so because
under the governmental system then, which was markedly Prime Ministerial, the substantive executive powers were vested in the
Prime Minister, the President being merely the symbolical and ceremonial head of state, and the two positions were being held by
one and the same person. In other words, the power was contemplated to be conferred upon whomsoever was vested the
executive power, and that is as it should be, for, to reiterate, from the very nature of the power itself, the authority to legislate
should be allowed, if at all, to be shared only with one in the political department, directly deriving power from the vote of the
people.

Withal, as the Solicitor General aptly posits, it is neither sound nor in consonance with well and long settled principles of
constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by implications, specially in regard to a
transcendental matter as that herein under discussion. Indeed, the fact that Amendment No. 6 was not in any way or sense
mentioned in the amendments submitted to the people for ratification in 1981 and there being nothing in the latter intrinsically
inconsistent with the former, it is safe to conclude that it would be deceiving the people themselves and depriving them of
something they had decided in 1976 to be part of the fundamental law of the land to now eliminate the power conferred by them
upon the Executive of sharing legislative authority with the Batasan on appropriate occasions of emergency and urgency.

Anent petitioner's claim that the President may not constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in P.D. 1840, to Our mind, the
following well taken brief answer of the Solicitor General, with whom We fully agree, is more than sufficient to dispose of the same
adversely to petitioner's stance:

Petitioner argues that Presidential Decree 1840 is likewise invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on
Article VII, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides that

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and
with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.

Again, we beg to disagree. Article VII, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the
case at bar, Presidential Decree 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be
indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather,
he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.

We cannot close this opinion without underscoring the patent tendency and unrelenting effort of the leadership of the country to
make our government and our way of life indigenously Filipino as much as it is possible to make them so. It has, of course, tried its
utmost to see what is good in other lands, but it has chosen generally to bring out what is best in our own traditions, usages,
customs and systems that have proven efficacious and beneficial during the times of our forebears. The sanggunians and barangays,
which have inherited from the Filipinos of the past and that have been institutionalized in Constitutional Amendment No. 7 of 1976
have, as everyone can see, proven to be unshakable bedrocks for the foundation of duly constituted governmental authority with
firm nationwide mass base. Our present government, if in some ways similar to any foreign one, is in truth a product of our own
genius in political science and matters of government. Nowhere else in the world but in the Philippines are martial law decrees and
 Page 14

acts subject to the judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court. Amendment No. 6 is of the same strain. It is our native and indigenous
way of coping with crucial situations.

We are Filipinos, so much so that the writer of this opinion has purposely avoided reference to, much less lifted quotations from
alien jurisprudence and authorities. If only in this particular case, it is but appropriate to use language and style of our own.

All the above premises taken into account. Our considered conclusion and judgment is that Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of
the Constitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of
1981.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting
tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said
decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can issue such decrees.

HELD: It is to be observed that the original text mentions President (Prime Minister). This is so because . . . The incumbent
President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim
Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and
prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution.Parenthetically, the term Incumbent President employed in the transitory provisions could only refer to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275). After the April 7 amendments there exists no longer
a President (Prime Minister) but A President and A Prime Minister. They are now two different offices which cannot be held
by a single person not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and governed by the main provisions of the newly
amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality that we are no longer governed by the transitory provisions of the
Constitution. This form of government is essentially parliamentary with presidential features.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET
AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the
pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant
 Page 15

Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript
of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to
Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment
of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A.
Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought
the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National
Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. On February 6,
1954, the Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary
of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of P10
every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial
ruling that the National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers fees
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1) that Defendant National
Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; (2) chan roble svirtualawlibrary

that the payments already made by said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from the former in the
total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just and legal; and (3)
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

that Plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to make a refund of these payments already received by them. This
is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is exempt from paying the legal
fees provided for therein, and among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes
taken by them that may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees in question are for the transcript of
notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was
requested by its assistant corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as follows:chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The Government of the Philippine Islands is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which
the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether
pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government.
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the
term Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for
in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to a government entity through
which the functions of government are exercised, including the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or municipal branches or
other form of local government. This requires a little digression on the nature and functions of our government as
instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term Government may be defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by
which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference
to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the
judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are
twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Page 16

compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for
debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

and the advancement of its international interests. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is required to exercise
to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty,
and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter
class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain
aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized
with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform certain functions of government make
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

them a part of the Government of the Philippines?

The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was
organized with the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the
United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it
was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of
our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2
and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and
in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, The mere fact that the
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation (National Coal Co. vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation . Unlike the cralaw

Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal
Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government. (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50
Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines used in section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government are
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made
effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal
 Page 17

corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be
determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State. (Section 3, Republic
Act No. 1459, Corporation Law).
The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized cities and towns, and like
organizations, with political and legislative powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the
inhabitants of the particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation. Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309,
312.
In its more general sense the phrase municipal corporation may include both towns and counties, and other public
corporations created by government for political purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces
only incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661. (McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)
We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to be the incorporation, by the
authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate
capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal
concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal
corporation proper. (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not
less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the
National Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services rendered by
the Plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor
General. The payment of the fees in question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond
the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to say that the same is insubstantial, considering
that this case refers not to a money claim disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the
purpose of which is to restrain the officials concerned from deducting from Plaintiffs salaries the amount paid to them
as stenographers fees. This case does not come under section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a
decision of the Auditor General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

BACANI VS NACOCO

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.
 Page 18

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a
Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary
of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government, make them a part of
the Government of the Philippines.

DISCUSSIONS:

NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The term
Government may be defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries
out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when
referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments,
the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions
are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

RULINGS:

No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of
coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.

G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969

 Page 19

THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT and COOPERATIVE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (ACCFA), petitioner,

vs.
ACCFA SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, ACCFA WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS:

(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized
and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the
other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are
labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and
Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of
unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in
the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to
bargain.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal.

During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations praying
that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the
ACA.Trial court agreed with this move.

However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.

ISSUE: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given that the mother company
(ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

HELD: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified

Ratio:

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend
credit and similar assistance to agriculture.

According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its
activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These
include powers non really accorded to non-government entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and
prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the
nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may
legally exercise.

Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a government agency tasked t implement land
reform.
 Page 20

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining powers in the respondent
Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as
proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.

These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as
those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense
and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these letter functions being
ministrant, he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals." continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them,
established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than,
say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.

Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including
the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.

This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:

"SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that
employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government
including but not limited to governmental corporations."
 Page 21

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

Case Digest:

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by ExecutiveTreasurer Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de
Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as
received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000
was left untouched and was thus invested to Montede Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same
amount.In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to returnt he $80,000 deposited from before. The
Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On
account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the
$80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in
respondent bank.

Discussions: In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has
the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with
such right hence as parents of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of the
legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating
their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the
 Page 22

legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly
capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

FACTS:

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies
while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was
only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the childs
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and
obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy?

HELD: YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof
such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve according to the best interest of that person.With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis,
the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or
 Page 23

inhis absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance." And Article 321 statesthat "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or byany lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother
under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it
is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called
upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen,
family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things
but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father
and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO
NEPOMUCENO, BISHOP JESUS VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO LOPEZ,
JR., SERGIO OSMEA, III, ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and
EMILIO DE PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Renato E. Taada and Wigberto E. Taada for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor
General Vicente V. Mendoza & Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

62 SCRA 275 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Marcos as a De Jure President Under the 1973
Constitution

In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some Presidential Decrees issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.

HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal personality to sue
because they have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same
office can legally file such a quo warranto petition.
 Page 24

On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by
President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that
the factual bases (the circumstances of lawlessness then present) had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the
question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution.

Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the
1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign
people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this
was the decision of the people, in whom sovereignty resides . . . and all government authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond
the scope of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the
Philippines.

IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ

145 SCRA 160 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
 Page 25

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and
answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent president.

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it
being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and
Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino
was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The
said cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme Court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and
their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
 Page 26

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION,
GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

---------------------------------------

G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made
against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made
and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
 Page 27

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall,
filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):

1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left
the Palace.
 Page 28

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant issuesPresident
Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the
press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he
was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President.
Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada
is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of
the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping
him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use
the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The
Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as
to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be
more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Page 29
 Page 30

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE (MINISTRY OF LABOR)

108 SCRA 757 Political Law Delegation of Power Completeness Test

In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the
Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the
issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred
that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the
National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on
free collective bargaining.

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take
on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the
law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed
that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the
state should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of
the law, that is yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of
the labor dispute in issue.
 Page 31

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The
law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH

 Page 32

G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of
the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting
such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control has invalidated
all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.

3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and
proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation.

Discussions:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The
 Page 33

right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of
the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated
and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of
the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless,
has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new
ones.

General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then
pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same exception in case of
absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.

Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.

2. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the
fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese
military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into
the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
 Page 34

General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice
into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of
War states that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in this connection
says: From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of
actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror
to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch
as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient
character.

*The Court, therefore, vote for the granting of the motion for reconsideration.
 Page 35

GR No. L-26379, Dec 27, 1969

WILLIAM C. REAGAN v. CIR

30 SCRA 968 Political Law Sovereignty

FACTS: William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US
Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he
got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the
USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark
Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable
income of Reagan to be at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed
tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the
sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines.
Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from
Philippine taxation.

ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military
Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory.
This countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the
Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity,
courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is
derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.
 Page 36

G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LORETA GOZO
FERNANDO, J.
53 SCRA 476 Political Law Sovereignty

FACTS: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she
demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another
house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to
secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the
lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot
because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine
Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise
of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located
within the US Naval Base
G.R. Nos. 70116-19 August 12, 1986
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. FRANK ROBERTSON,
JAMES W. ROBERTSON, ROBERT H. CATHEY, JOHN L. GARRISON AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Frank and James Robertson (brothers) were American citizens born in the Philippines. They stayed here in
the Philippines until they were repatriated by the US in 1945. Thereafter they established their domicile in California.
Soon after they were employed by the US Federal Government as workers in the US Navy. They were later assigned
at the US Naval Base in Olongapo City in 1962. They hold American passports and are admitted as special temporary
visitors under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. On the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
contends that the American brothers are subject to taxation because their residence here in the Philippines is not by
reason of their employment in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the US Bases
here as provided by the Military Bases Agreement. Further, the burden of proof of such exemption to taxation shall be
upon the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the American brothers are exempt from taxation?

HELD: Yes. The law and the facts of the case are so clear that there is no room left for doubt the validity of the
brothers defense. In order to avail oneself of the tax exemption under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement: he must
be a national of the United States employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense,
of the bases, residing in the Philippines by reason of such employment, and the income derived is from the U.S.
Government (Art. XII par. 2 of PI-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947). Said circumstances are all present in the
case at bar.

"to exempt all U.S. citizens working in the Military Bases from the burden of paying Philippine Income Tax without
distinction as to whether born locally or born in their country of origin." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos (one must not distinguish where the law does not distinguish)
 Page 37

BORIS MEJOFF vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
TUASON, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner: Boris Mejoff, a Russian national brought to the Philippines as a secret operative by the Japanese
during the Japanese Occupation
Yet another petition for habeas corpus (i.e. this was not the first case filed by Mejoff)
First petition denied by SC on July 30, 1949
[Now that were done with that, lets go back to the story]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines, Mejoff was arrested as a spy by the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps
The Peoples Court ordered Mejoffs release, but the Deportation Board then found out that he had no travel
documents and referred the matter to the immigration authorities
The Immigration Board declared Mejoff an illegal alien, having illegally entered the Philippines in 1944, without
inspection or admission by immigration officials, and ordered that he be deported to Russia come the first
available transport
Mejoff was then under custody, having been arrested on March 18, 1948
Repeated failures to ship Mejoff to Russia
Mejoff was moved to Bilibid where he has been confined for give or take two years; no ship or country would take
him, says the decision

ISSUE: WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation

RULING:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against
the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens,
regardless of nationality
Sec. 3, Art. II of the 1935 Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the Nation, which means that the incorporation doctrine holds sway here
The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights proclaims the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights
as applied to all human beings, stating that all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights (Art. 1);
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or
other status (Art. 2); that every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9 ), etc.
The writ of habeas corpus will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under reasonable surveillance c/o the immigration authorities or
their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available
when the Government is ready to deport him
 Page 38

KURODA V. JALANDONI,
G.R. NO. L-2662, MARCH 26, 1949
MORAN, C.J.
I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes.
He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules
on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
 Page 39

JOVITO SALONGA VS ROLANDO HERMOSO

G.R. No. L-53622 April 25, 1980
FERNANDO, C.J.
Right to travel is not suspended during martial law
A republican State under martial law must still abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Basic constitutional rights are still protected during martial law

97 SCRA 121 Political Law Right to Travel Even During Martial Law

FACTS: During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso of the
Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel in favor of Salonga.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.

HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not deny
Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel.
The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such
similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.

AGUSTIN VS EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229,issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure earlywarning devices to be installed a distance away from
such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. Incompliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office
issuedAdministrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawfuland unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and
unduedelegation of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued isunconstitutional
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed notunconstitutional. These were
definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established topromote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
instruction is based on the constitutionalprovision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
theland. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 ViennaConvention on Road Signs and
Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - thatsuch letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of
road accidents due to stalled or parkedvehicles on the streets and highways.

Digest #2
AGUSTIN vs EDU88 SCRA 195
FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of avolkswagen beetle car,model 13035
already properly equipped when it came out from the assemblylines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in
case of the emergenciesmentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules andregulations in
Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent LandTransportation commissioner Romeo Edu
issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices
(EWD) on motor vehicles.Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulationswere unlawful
and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?
HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as theimplementing rules and regulations were valid
and constitutional as a valid measure of police power.The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations
Organization was ratified bythe Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.It cannot bedisputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,betweenthe International law and municipal law in
applying the rule municipal law prevails.Petition is DISMISSED.VPA Notes:Bernas Page 60.
 Page 40

JOSE B.L. REYES VS RAMON BAGATSING

G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
FERNANDO, C.J.
125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution over International Law

FACTS: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from
Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then
Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally
would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the
500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy
from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our
constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law.

ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be
granted the permit.

HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the
Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be
invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech
and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may
infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have
taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no
showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the question of whether or not the
mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).
 Page 41

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS TRANQUILINO LAGMAN

G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
AVANCEA, J.
66 Phil. 13 Political Law Defense of State

FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1
(National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no
military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PEDRO MANAYAO

G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947
HILADO, J.:

78 Phil. 721 Political Law Citizenship Defense of State Treason

FACTS: Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao
conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they
killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting the
Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of
treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayaos counsel argued that his
client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of
allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for
only Japanese courts can do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.

HELD: No. Manayaos swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese
Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court
also emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required
to render personal, military or civil service
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and
joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also
indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason,
if he does not strictly observe this duty.
 Page 42

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1706 August 8, 1980

PROVIDING FOR COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE FOR FILIPINO CITIZENS AND AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER ONE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT" FOR THE PURPOSE

WHEREAS, Section 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that: "The defense of the state is a prime duty of the
government and the people, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service";

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article V of the same Constitution provides, among others, among others, that it is the duty of
the citizen to contribute to his country's development and welfare and to cooperate with the duly constituted
authorities in the attainment and preservation of a just and orderly society;

WHEREAS, Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, makes it obligatory for all citizens to render military
service;

WHEREAS, to serve the urgent needs of a developing country such as the Philippines, at present and in the
foreseeable future, it is equally vital to enhance respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and provide for,
promote and develop civic consciousness and participation as it is to insure national defense preparedness;

WHEREAS, the citizens of our country, particularly its youth, as the most valuable resource of our nation, need to be
motivated, trained, developed, organized, mobilized and utilized in regard to their responsibilities as citizens
particularly their commitment to civic welfare, their respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and the
fulfillment of their military or civil obligations;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree that:

Section 1. This Decree shall be known as "The National Service Law."

Section 2. National service shall be obligatory for all citizens of the Philippines. As used in this decree, "National
service" shall consist of three main programs namely: civic welfare service, law enforcement service; and military
service.

Section 3. Each citizen shall render national service in any of the three main programs stated in Section 2 of this
decree or a combination thereof: Provided, That such service shall be credited in his favor for the purpose of fulfilling
educational requirements established by law.

Section 4. The terms "military service" and "military training" referred to in Commonwealth Act Number One, as
amended, shall mean "national service" and "training for national service", respectively, as herein defined.

Section 5. The Minister of National Defense, in coordination with the Ministers of Human Settlements, Education and
Culture, and Local Government and Community Development, shall issue rules and regulations to implement this
Decree, subject to the approval of the President.

Section 6. All provisions of Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, laws, orders, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. This Decree takes effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
 Page 43

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 JULY 25, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE CITIZEN ARMED FORCE

WHEREAS, Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall
be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve, as may be provided by law. It
shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State"; and

WHEREAS, Section 4, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution mandates that: "The prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service";

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall include the Citizen Armed Force which is hereby constituted, to be
composed of all reservists, and officers and enlisted men on inactive status. All able-bodied citizens shall become
reservists with appropriate ranks. All reservists in a particular locality shall be organized into reserve geographical
units subject to call a

nd mobilization as the need arises, individually or as a unit. Reservists called to active duty shall serve with the regular
troops as part of the standing force. The Secretary of National Defense shall prescribe and implement a continuing
program of recruitment and training for the Citizen Armed Force to enable it to respond to all types of threats to
national security.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of National Defense shall cause the organization of the Citizen Armed Force into Geographical
Units (CAF GUs) throughout the country and the implementation of the reserve force development program of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Sec. 3. The Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units shall consists of cadre of officers and men in the active force and
qualified reservists residing in the locality. The cadre may, however, be assigned to another unit in the active force
while the CAF GUs to which they are assigned are on inactive status.

Sec. 4. Whenever dictated by military necessity, and upon the recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense
and approved by the President, the Citizens Armed Force may be called or mobilized to complement the operations of
the regular force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or to support the regular force formations or units. For this
purpose, Active Auxiliary Units which shall be part of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units, may be utilized, to
be constituted out of volunteers to be screened in consultation with the local executives and civic/business leaders.
These Active Auxiliary Units shall mean a degree of activation of military reservists short of full active duty status.
They shall not be vested with law-enforcement or police functions.

Sec. 5. All member of the Citizen Armed Force on training or service shall be subject to military law and the Articles of
War.

Sec. 6. Funds necessary to implement this Executive Order shall be taken from the applicable appropriation of the
Department of National Defense.

Sec. 7. The Secretary of National Defense shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this
Executive Order, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines.

Sec. 8. All laws, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 9. This Executive Order shall take effect after Ninety (90) days following the completion of its publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general publication in the Philippines.
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Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.