ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE another may not be filed against the same official within
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with
the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June
2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question

has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
Poe v. Ullman
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellants, several
couples and their physician (Appellants), brought suit,
seeking the overturn of a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the
giving of medical advice on the use of such devices.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A penal statute is not ripe
for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the
state enacting the statute.
Facts. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
construed a state penal statute as prohibiting the use
of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical
advice on their use. Appellants included a couple who
had several pregnancies result with severely
abnormal progeny which died shortly after birth, a
couple whose wife had experienced a severely
traumatic pregnancy and their physician, who
believes the safest course of treatment for the
couples includes using contraceptive devices.
Issue. Is the petitioners claim ripe for judicial review?
Held. No. Judgment affirmed. Connecticut has never
attempted to fully prosecute any case under the
statute. Because of this, not only have the Appellants
not suffered injury in fact from the statute, but there is
no evidence that they would be prosecuted for acting
in violation of the statute.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) argues
that the mere threat of prosecution is injury in fact,
that it is not the choice worthy of a civilized society
to require individuals to risk penalty for their behavior
to have their constitutional rights determined.
Discussion. Although ripeness is the central issue in
Poe, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) does not articulate any clear guidelines to
evaluate ripeness. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
seems to articulate that a penal statute that has not
been enforced is not ripe for judicial review.
US V Richardson
Respondents claim that w/o detailed info on the CIAs
expenditures he
cannot properly follow legislative or executive action
and thereby fulfill his
obligations as a voter is a generalized grievance
insufficient under
Frothingham or Flast to show that he has sustained
or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of
such action.
MOOTNESS
Sanlakas vs Exec Sec
Facts:
1.Three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) staged a mutiny by storming the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City on July
27, 2003
2. The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; demanded for the
resignation of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP)
3. In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to
suppress the rebellion
4. The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003
5. After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their
barracks, the President lifted the state of rebellion five
days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435
6. Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM),
and Social Justice Society (SJS), in relation to
Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:
The declaration of a state of rebellion is not
required to call out the armed forces
Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists
no factual basis for the imposition of a state of
rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended on
the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of rebellion
ensued for five days until August 1, 2003)
The report circumvents the report requirement,
which requires the President to make a report 48
hours after the proclamation of martial law
7. Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the
declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is
an indirect exercise of emergency powers
a. Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2),
Art. VII of the Constitution, such exercise of
emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that
the declaration made by the President thus results to
the latters usurpation of their said exclusive power
8. Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the
presidential issuances constitute an unwarranted
exercise of martial law power, which is baseless
under the Constitution
Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the
President may pave way for the unconstitutional
imposition of warrantless arrests
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion
is required to call out the armed forces
4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the
imposition of a state of rebellion
5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes
exercise of emergency powers
6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to
exercising martial law powers
HELD:
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the
Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction over cases that
are capable of repetition yet evading review
The petitions are deemed moot and academic,
because the state of rebellion has been lifted already
on August 1, 2003
The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this
case is capable of repetition; in the said case, an
angry mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001
has compelled the President to call upon the AFP and
PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation
No. 38 and General Order No. 1
In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess
the validity of the Presidents declaration
2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal
standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al. and
Pimentel (Members of Congress) have standing to
sue
Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered
peoples organizations that represents the interest of
the people, the Supreme Court is still observant of the
rule that only real parties in interest or those who
would suffer a direct injury from the controversy, are
the ones who may invoke the judicial power
Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear
the validity of their legal standing, since their
contention involving the alleged usurpation of the
President of their constitutional power speaks of their
incurrence of direct damage
3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power,
the President is not required to declare a state of
rebellion
Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution: whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the
President, in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief,
the following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
In order for the President to exercise the latter two
powers, these two conditions must exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required for ensuring public
safety
The aforementioned conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out power
The Constitution of the United States of America
(USA) serves as the foundation of the overall concept
of the Presidents power as Chief Executive and
Commander-In-Chief
Residual executive powers of the President, as
suggested by Justice Cortes, rests upon the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized
nature of the Philippines government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein
residual executive power is practiced by the President
by barring the return of former President Marcos due
to perceived threats of destabilization against the
government and other forms of socio-political
disturbances
4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a
state of rebellion
Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution: The
Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, ad must promulgate its decision
thereon within three days from its filing.
No proof was shown by the petitioners that the
President has acted without factual basis
5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces is
in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief
There was no instance wherein the President has
acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief
6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the
declaration of martial law
No indication that military tribunals have taken over
jurisdiction over civil courts
No indication of curtailment of civil and political
rights
No indication of Presidents encroachment of other
branches of government
No indication of attempt, at all, that President
attempted to exercise martial law
Petitions DISMISSED.
Defunis v Odegaard
FACTS:
Marco Defunis applied for admission at University of
Washington Law School of w/c Charles Odegaard is
president. DeFunis was denied admission. He then
commenced with this suit contending that the
procedures and criteria will be employed by the
admissions committee discriminated against him
because of race in violation of the Equal Protection
clause. He brought the suit on behalf of himself alone
and not as a representative of any class. He asked
and the trial court gave a mandatory injunction
commanding the Univ to allow to enroll him. He began
studies in 1971. On appeal, the Washington SC
reversed the trial courts decision. He was in his 2nd
year. DeFunis then petitioned the United States SC
for a writ of certiorari. The WSC's decision was stayed
until final dispostion by the USSC. In the 1st term of
his final year, the USSC considered his petition and
requested both parties to make a brief on the question
of mootness. Respondent claimed that the petitioner
had another term for him to enroll therefore the
question was not moot. USSC granted petition. The
case was finally heard during DeFunis' final term.
Counsel for Respondent made it clear that the
petitioners registration will not be abrogated
regardless of USSC determination.
Issue: Is the case moot?
Ratio:
"Federal courts are w/o power to decide questions
that cannot affect the right of litigants before them"
(this doctrine stems from Consti that judicial power
can only be exercised when there exists an actual
case or controversy) All parties agree that DeFunis
will be allowed to complete his term and graduate.
Therefore, the case is moot.
Rationale:
A USSC deision would no longer be necessary to
compel the result nor prevent it. The controvrsy
between the parties is no longer "definite and
concrete" and "no longer touches the legal relations of
parties having adverse interests".
Defunis suit is not a class action; his only remedy was
that he be admitted. He already had that remedy and
is in his final term. It does not matter that there
admission policy issues involved. DeFunis will no
longer be affected.
Doctrine of "mere voluntary cessation of allegedly
illegal conduct does not moot case" is irrelevant
because mootness arose from the fact that Defunis is
in his final term, not the unilateral change in
admissions procedure.
Doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
also irrelevant because Defunis will never again be
required to enter admission processes. The issue will
never be raised again in review. If admissions
procedures are left unchanged, there is no reason to
suppose that a subsequent case will not come to
court. This is not exception to doctrine in Southern
Pacific Terminal Co v ICC; actual controversy must
exist at stages of appelate or certiorari review, and
not simply at the date the action is initiated.
DISPOSITION: WSC decision vacated, case
remanded for such poceedings necessary
DISSENTS:
Douglas: does not address issue of mootness directly.
Discusses admissions policy. Argues for remanding of
case to determine if LSAT exam should be eliminated
for racial minorities because of it's inherent
discriminatory white man viewpoint
Brennan: case is not moot bec something might
happen to cause Defunis to miss final term, thus he
will have to enter admission processes again.
"Voluntary cessation" doctrine relevant bec university
implied no concession that admission policy is
unlawful. university allowed only that
petitioner will be allowed to complete this term.
respondent did not demonstrate that there was not
even a mere possibility that the petitioner would once
again be subject to the challenged admissions policy.
respondent free to return to their old ways (the
challenged policy).
Requirements for ripeness present because of case's
history (procedural facts). Reqirements are "questions
are framed with necessary specificity, issues will be
contested with necessary adverseness, litigation will
be pursued with
necessary vigor, to assure that the constitutional
challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought
to be capable of judicial resolution.
Mooting the case disserve public interest. Many
people are affected and are involved with 26 amicus
curiae briefs. This issue will be raised again and again
until SC decides. Avoidance of repetitious litigation
serves public interest, and this case's inevitability
counsels that SC should decide on it now.
II. Due Process Clause
Const. Art III, Sec. 1
1. Procedural Due Process
Banco Espanol Filipino v Palanca
FACTS: 1. This action was instituted by "El Banco
Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon
property situated in the cityof Manila. The mortgage
was executed by the original defendant herein,
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, as security for a debt
owing by him to the bank.
2. After the execution of this instrument by
Tanquinyeng, here turned to China and he there died.
3. As Tanquinyeng was a nonresident at the time, it
was necessary for the bank in the foreclosure
proceeding to give notice to Tanquinyeng by
publication pursuant to sec399 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Publication was made in a newspaper of
Manila. The court also directed the clerk of court to
deposit in the post office a copy of the summons and
complaint directed to Tanquinyeng at his last place of
residence, the city of Amoy, China pursuant to the
same provision:
4. Sec 399 of the code,In case of publication, where
the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons
and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the
person to be served, at his place of residence.
5. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not
affirmatively appear.
6. The case proceeded in the CFI, and the defendant
not having appeared, judgment was taken against him
by default.
7. July 3, 1908, decision was rendered in favor of the
bank.It was ordered that the Tnaquinyeng should
deliver amount owed to the clerk of the court, and it
was declared that in case of failure to satisfy the
judgment, the mortgage property should be exposed
to public sale.
8. The payment contemplated in said order was never
made.Court ordered the sale of the property which
was bought in by the bank
9. 7 years after confirmation of sale, motion was
made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of
Tanquinyeng, requesting the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment rendered upon July
3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto.
10. Basis of motion: that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the
court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action
11. The motion was denied
ISSUES: Assume that the clerk of court failed to mail
the papers which he was directed to send to the
defendant in Amoy.
1. Has the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to
enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the
mortgage?
2. Were the proceedings conducted in such manner
as to constitute due process of law?
HELD:
1. YES.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of
the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
the institution of legal proceedings wherein the power
of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective.
Tanquinyeng is a nonresident and, remaining
beyond the range of the personal process of the
court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never
acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. This,
however, is not essential. The property itself is the
sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible
object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial
power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court is
based exclusively on the power which it possesses
over the property.
The jurisdiction over the property based upon the
following:
o that the property is located within the district;
o that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the
property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and
o that the court at a proper stage of the proceeding
stakes the property into custody, if necessary, and
expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the
mortgage debt.
Given that jurisdiction is exclusively over property,
the relief granted by the court must be limited to such
as can been forced against the property itself.
2. YES. Requirement of due process is satisfied if;
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which his
the subject of the proceeding;
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and
judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Opportunity to be heard:
In a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the
time within which appearance must be made is
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes
generally provide for:
o Publication
o Personal notice thru mail, if his residence is known
o
In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual
notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not,
under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
Assumption in recognizing the effectiveness of a
means of notification which may fall short of actual
notice is:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession
of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be
safely held,under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted
for its condemnation and sale.
Right to due process has not been infringed.
Petition DENIED.
Ang Tibay v CIR
FACTS: 1. This case deals with a dispute between
Ang Tibay (Shoe manufacturer) and the National
Labor Union (NLU). And Tibay decided to
temporarily lay off 89 workers (all of which are NLU
members) because of an alleged shortage of leather
soles coming in from U.S.
2. This case has already been decided by CIR and
was elevated to the Supreme Court. Here, NLU filed a
motion for new trial. They believe that it was the
membership in their union which influenced the said
decision. They would like to check the records in
Bureau of Customs and Book of Accounts of native
dealers in leather in order to determine whether there
was really a shortage. They also want to prove that
Toribio Teodoro(owner) established an illegal union,
The National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay.
3. However, Ang Tibay opposed the said motion.
ISSUES:
1. Should the motion for new trial be granted?
Held:
1. YES.
The Court of Industrial Relations. It is a special
court created by virtue of Commonwealth Act # 103,
which primarily exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in determining employer-employee disputes.
However, its not just limited to that. It exercises
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to deal with
controversies affecting employee-employer, landlord-
tenant and regulate their relations. It also deals with
the settlement of such disputes, and even appeal to
voluntary arbitration in order to settle industrial
disputes. In short, its a government instrumentality
which enjoys both executive and judicial powers.
It is not strictly bound by technical rules of
procedure [Goseco v CIR]. It is mandated by CA# 103
to act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case. However, it still has to adhere to
the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in administrative trials and investigations. The
primary considerations are as follows:
o the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
o The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
o The decision must have something to support itself;
o The evidence must be substantial;
o The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
o The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
o The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
Application to the Case. The court believes that it is
in the best interest of justice to let Ang Tibay present
the necessary evidences in order to resolve the
issues at hand.
Motion for new trial GRANTED.
Relevance to Topic:
This case shows the important elements involved in
administrative due process. Agencies like the CIR,
which are relatively new at that time, are those which
do not exercise strict adherence to procedural rules
but instead follow a more liberal approach which is
primarily all about rendering a decision in consonance
with the principles of equality and justice.
Ateneo v CA
FACTS:
1. On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon
(from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and Teresita
Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights,
and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck at the left
temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini
Hall cafeteria.
2. Other boarders held him from striking again, but the
boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The
university conducted an investigation of the slapping
incident. On the basis of the investigation results,
Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.
3. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing
of a complaint for damages by his parents against the
university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Occidental at Bacolod City.
4. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was
expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in
violation of his right to due process and that they are
prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City,
with the unceremonious expulsion of their son
causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages
as well as attorneys fees.
5. In its answer, the university denied the material
allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal
of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming
behaviour is contrary to good morals, proper
decorum, and civility, that such behaviour subjected
him as a student to the universitys disciplinary
regulations action and sanction and that the
university has the sole prerogative and authority at
any time to drop from the school a student found to be
undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its
integrity and discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning.
6. After due trial, the lower court found for the
Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them
P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the
costs of the suit.
7. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the
university, the trial courts decision was initially
reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for
reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate
court reversed its decision and set it aside through a
special division of five.
8. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred
to a special division of five in view of the failure to
reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the
vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
Hence, the University filed a petition for review before
the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Would the absence of notice to the dismissed
students parents negate the compliance of the
requirements of administrative due process?
Held:
1. NO.
Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair
and objective investigation of the incident, due
process in administrative proceedings also requires
consideration of the evidence presented and the
existence of evidence to support the decision.
Here, the original Court of Appeals decision
(penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the
procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate. There was nothing in the
records to reverse the findings in the reconsideration.
Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful
motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de
Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of
the proceedings.
He actually appeared to present his side. The
investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All
requisites of administrative due process were met. It
cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan
Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age,
was already a college student, intelligent and mature
enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully
cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed
as he asked if he could be expelled for what he did.
When informed about the 19 December 1967
meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to
seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or
parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and
did not inform them about his case, not even when he
went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation,
was not the fault of the University.
Petition GRANTED.
Non v Judge Dames
Facts:
1. Petitioners were students in Mabini College, Inc,.
2. They were not allowed to re-enroll for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass action against the school in the prior semester.
3. The subject of the protest was not made clear in
the pleadings.
4. Petitioners filed a petition for them to me
readmitted to the school, but the trial court dismissed
the petition.
5. The decision was based on the ruling on Alcuaz vs
PSBA1
6. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege
to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of school year
1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College
reserves the right to deny admission of students
whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory
and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct
discredits the institution and/or whose activities
unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation
of the college. Students, therefore, are required to
behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
7. The court also contends that the termination of their
contract at the end of a specific semester gave the
school the right to admit/not to admit students on the
next semester.
8. Respondents also contend that they also refused to
re-admit the students because of failing grades.
ISSUES:
1. Was there a violation of the students right to
freedom of speech and assembly infringed?
2. Was the action of the respondent school justifiable
because of the termination of contract theory?
3. Were the students given due process?
HELD:
1. YES.
The protection to the cognate rights of speech and
assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly
available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
However there are limitations. The permissible
limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights
within the school presupposes that conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior
should not materially disrupt class work or must not
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others
2. NO
The contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions
The student is presumed to be qualified for
enrolment for the entire period he is expected to
complete his course without prejudice to his right to
transfer
3. NO
The decision not to accept students for
reenrollment was just a mere afterthought.
Excluding students because of failing grades when
the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline
not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes
a violation of the basic tenets of fair play
Insufficient information was provided by the
respondent school regarding the failure grades of the
petitioners thats why the courts cannot take into
consideration their contention.
 However, disciplinary action can be taken against
petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so
warranted.
Petition GRANTED.
Goldberg v Kelly
Facts:
1. The question for decision is whether a State that
terminates public assistance payments to a particular
recipient without affording him the opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the
recipient procedural due process in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Ammendment
2. Complainants (appellees): NY residents receiving
financial aid under the program Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) under NYs Home Relief
Program. Their complaint: NYC officials terminated
aid without prior notice and hearing thereby denying
them due process of law.
3. Prior to the filing of complaints, no prior notice or
hearing of any kind was required before termination.
The state however adopted procedures for notice and
hearing after suits were brought and the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutional adequacy of said
procedures
4. Procedure No. 68-18: a caseworker sees the
recipient and then reports to the unit supervisor to
make an official review abt ineligibility and whether or
not aid should be stopped.
5. Appellees challenge to this procedure emphasizes
the absence of any provisions for the personal
appearance of the recipient before the reviewing
official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for
confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. However, they are afforded post-
termination fair hearing for redress when the can
appear personally, offer oral presentation of evidence,
and for confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. If they win, they get what was
withheld from them and if not, they can avail of judicial
review.
6. District Court found for the complainants and only
the Commissioner of Social Services appealed
Issues:
1. Does the due process clause require that the
recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before
the termination of benefits?
Held:
1. YES
Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in
the face of a brutal need without prior hearing of some
sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming
consideration justify it.
The need to protect tax revenues is not
overwhelming consideration. It does not justify
denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of
due process.
Due process requires an adequate hearing before
termination of welfare benefits
Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement.
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by
an argument that public assistance benefits are a
privilege and not a right.
Due process is influenced by the extent to which
one may be condemned to suffer grievous loss and
depends upon whether the recipients interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
interest in summary adjudication
Consideration of what procedures due process may
require under any given set of circumstances must
begin with a determination of the precise nature of
government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental
action.
What will serve due process in this case is pre-
termination evidentiary hearing
Crucial factor: is that the termination of aid pending
resolution may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits (immediately
desperate)
Appellants argument: these are outweighed by
countervailing governmental interests in conserving
fiscal and administrative resources
SC: these governmental interests are not overriding
in the welfare context
Pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a
judicial or quasi-judicial trial, just a full administrative
review
The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a
meaningful manner
The seven-day notice, the letter, and the personal
conference with a caseworker (of above mentioned
procedure) are not constitutionally sufficient per se.
insufficiency is in not permitting welfare recipients to
appear personally before the official who determines
eligibility
Informal procedures will suffice. In this context, due
process does not require a particular order of proof or
mode of offering evidence
Jurisprudence says: where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and reasonableness of
the action depends on fact findings, evidence used to
prove govts case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
This is true not only in criminal proceedings but also
for admin actions
Trial Court Decision AFFIRMED.
UP v Hon Ligot-Telan
Facts:
1. Ramon Nadal, a student from the UP College of
Law, applied for a scholarship under the Socialized
Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP) a.k.a.
Iskolar ng Bayan program. (It was granted)
2. The applicants were asked to answer a
questionnaire asking then to state the ff:
Amount and source of their annual income
Real and personal properties
Special circumstances that will help UP evaluate
their financial status and any basis that will help the
university to categorize them.
3. The falsification or suppression of any material
information is prohibited by the university and is a
punishable act under Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules and
Regulations on Student Council Discipline of the
University.
4. The University also had a random sampling system
where the residence of the applicant will be visited to
check the applicants alleged/ sworn informations.
5. When the team went to Ramons house they found
out that he lied about certain things like owning a
1977 Toyota Corolla and that his mom was an OFW
supporting the studies of his two other siblings.
6. The UP charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT), which found him not
guilty of withholding information.
Car Disregarded (not proven ata)
Moms income Guilty
7. This charge was tantamount to acts of dishonesty,
which had the penalty of expulsion.
8. March 29: A special meeting was held, without
Nadal.
9. The BOR found Nadal guilty, with a penalty of a
1-year suspension, non-issuance of certificate of good
moral character, and reimbursement of STFAP
benefits.
10. April 22: Nadal filed with the RTC of QC a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer
for TRO against the BOR and other UP officers,
stating that he was denied due process since he was
not present during the March 29 meeting. The
preliminary injunction was granted.
Issues: 1. Was Nadal denied due process in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against him?
Held:
1. NO.
Admission to the UP falls under the ambit of the
schools academic freedom.
Due process is not to be equated with the notice,
the due process in this case is the process that is
due which is governed under the UPs rules. UPs isolation. It must be read in relation to the civil code
rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings
of individuals whose cases are included as items on
the agenda of the Board.
Besides, the March 29 meeting was only for the
reconsideration of the previous decision. Nadals
presence was unnecessary. Thus, he was not denied
due process.
Petition DENIED.
DBP v NLRC
Facts:
1. Two cases are consolidated
2. The complainants in the two cases were former
employees of LIRAG ( mortgage debtor of DBP)
3. The private respondent LAND was a bargaining
representative of the more or less 800 former rank
and file employees of LIRAG
4. Around Sept 1981 LIRAG started terminating
employees o the ground or retrenchment that by
December there were already 180 regular employees
separated from the service
5. Joselito Abaya and LAND filed charges against
LIRAG for illegal dismissal and they are seeking for
separation pay, 13th mo pay, gratuity pay, sick leave
and vacation leave pay and emergency.
6. The Labor Arbiter rule in favor in the petitioners and
issued a writ of execution. However DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties fro
failure of LIRAG to pay its mortgage obligation and
DBP was able to acquire it being the only bidder
without any payment.
7. Again LAND filed a motion for writ of execution and
garnishment of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale
and upon that motion the labor arbiter requested the
intervention of DBP
8. However by proclamation of nos. 50 and 50-A ,the
asset privatizations trust ( APT) became the
transferee of the DBP foreclosed assets of LIRAG
9. They were able to enter in agreement but the
president of LAND filed its opposition to the
compromise agreement for being contrary to law,
morals and public policy
10. The NLRC affirmed the appeal and dismissed the
appeal of DBP, hence this petition
Issues:
1. Did the NLRC gravely abuse its discretion in
affirming the order of the Labor Arbiter granting the
writ of garnishment out of the proceeds of LIRAGs
properties?
Held:
1. NO
DBP in this case cannot rightfully contend that he
was deprived of due process because he was given
the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence ,
in fact he even filed an opposition to the Motion for
Execution and Garnishment filed by LAND
Article 110 of the Labor Code must be viewed with
scheme on classification and preference of credits. It
must also be read in harmony with Insolvency Law
Amendments made of article 110 by RA 6715
expand workers preference to cover not only unpaid
wages but also other monetary claims
RA 6175 Sec. 10. Payment of wages and other
monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. In case of
bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's business,
the unpaid wages and other monetary claims of the
employees shall be given first preference and shall be
paid in full before the claims of government and other
creditors may be paid.
In the event of insolvency, a principal objective
should be to effect an equitable distribution of the
insolvents property among his creditors. To
accomplish this there must be some proceeding
where notice to all of the insolvents creditors may be
given
A distinction should be made between a preference
of credit and a lien. A preference applies only to
claims which do not attach to specific properties. A
lien creates a charge on a particular property. In
relation to art 110, it does not constitute a lien on the
property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers.
Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as
amended, should be interpreted to mean "absolute
preference," the same should be given only
prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that
laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided (Article 4, Civil Code). To give
Article 110 retroactive effect would be to wipe out the
mortgage in DBP's favor and expose it to a risk which
it sought to protect itself against by requiring collateral
in the form of real property.
In fine, the right to preference given to workers
under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist in
any effective way prior to the time of its presentation
in distribution proceedings. It will find application
when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such
unpaid wages shall be paid in full before the "claims
of the Government and other creditors" may be paid.
But, for an orderly settlement of a debtor's assets, all
creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained
and inventoried, and after that the preferences
determined in the course of judicial proceedings
which have for their object the subjection of the
property of the debtor to the payment of his debts or
other lawful obligations.
Petition DENIED.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
BELLOSILLO; 11/19/2001
Facts:
1. Estrada was charged of the violation of the Anti-
Plunder Law (RA 7080, amended by RA 7659).
2. On April 4, 2001, petitioner filed Omnibus Motion
initially alleging the lack of a preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offense, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause, all of
which were quashed.
3. On June 14, petitioner moved to quash the
Informations filed against him. Sandiganbayan denied
motion, hence this appeal to SC.
4. Petitioner:
Anti-plunder Act is unconstitutional under the void
for vagueness doctrine which states that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute.
Anti-Plunder act in unconstitutional for being
overbroad, which states that a government purpose
may not be achieved with means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
constitutionally protected freedoms
Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses
with due process since the terms in Sec1, par. D and
Sec 2 (combination,series, pattern) are precisely
vague &overbroad, which denies the petitioner of the
right to be informed of the nature & cause of the
accusation against him.
Anti-Plunder Act is unconstitutional for it dispenses
with due process since the Sec 4 thereof sets a lower
standard for evidence required to convict a person to
the crime.
Issue:
1. Is the Anti-Plunder law unconstitutional for being
vague and overboard?
2. Does the law deny due process?
3. Is the law mala prohibitum?
Held: 1. NO.
There is a basic principle that a legislative
enactment is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort.
Combination-at least two acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in sec 1 par (d)
Ex. raids on public treasury and fraudulent
conveyance of asset while series- two or more
criminal acts falling under the same category. Ex.
misappropriation and malversation.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains as certain
standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficient in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity.
It is a well settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be interpreted in the
natural, plain & ordinary meaning except in cases
where it is clear that the legislature intended a
technical & special legal meaning
A statute is not rendered uncertain & void merely
because general terms are used, or because it
employed terms that were not defined. There is no
statutory or constitutional command that the Congress
needs to define every word it uses. Inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Vagueness doctrine only applies when the face of
the law itself is vague.
 It does not violate the due process since it defines
the acts which the law punishes and gives the
accused a fair warning of the charge against him.
2. NO
Like all criminal cases, the accused is always
presumed innocent till proven guilty which is
guaranteed by our constitution. The prosecution still
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at least
two acts constituting plunder occurred, and these
predicate acts form a pattern. This gives life to the
Due process clause which protects the accused
against conviction except it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. NO
It is mala in se. Criminal intent is needed to convict
the person of this crime. It also must prove all
elements of the crime occurred.
Petition DISMISSED.
2. Old Substantive Due Process:
Protection for Property Interests
Lochner v New York
Facts:
1. Defendant (no name specified) was convicted of
violating a New York statute (Sec. 110, Art. 8, Ch. 415
of the Laws of 1897), which limits the hours a baker
could work for each week
2. The previous decisions of the lower courts held that
the law is necessary to protect the health of bakers;
this is pursuant to the practice of police powers by the
state
3. However, there is a contention that the said law
violates the peoples liberty to practice the right of free
contract; that it constrains the options that would best
fit the signatories in a contract; such is implicit in the
due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment
Issues:
1. Is the said law a reasonable practice of police
power?
Held:
1. NO, the Supreme Court held that this is just a mere
labor law that sets the hours of work of bakers; this
law contains no valid connection to the protection of
the health of bakers
The Supreme Court recognizes that the state
reserves the right to exercise its police powers, if it is
for the protection of the publics health and welfare
However, the Supreme Court held that the act must
have a more direct relation to the valid exercise of the
police powers of the state
The statute does not validly establish that public
health, or the health of bakers, will be compromised in
necessitating the limit of work hours for bakers
The statute in question is, therefore, violative of the
due process clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment, due to the fact that it constrains the
peoples right of free contract
It is thus held that the said statute does limit the
options best suited for various contracts, in this case,
for employment of bakers; such may affect the
families of bakers in that extra hours may be needed
by some bakers for more profit
Decisions of the lower courts REVERSED.
NDC and AGRIX vs. Phil Veterans
Facts:
1. This case involves the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
1717 (PD 1717) and its application under the 1987 Constitution as
compared to the authoritarian period of Marcos; such orders the
rehabilitation of the Agrix companies which is to be administered by
the National Development Company, notably Sec. 4 (1) thereof
The said law outlines the procedure for filing claims against the
Agrix companies, creating in effect a Claims Committee to process
such claims
Sec. 4 (1) of the said decree states: all mortgages and other liens
presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations
are hereby extinguished
2. 7 July 1978 Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX), a company under
Agrix companies, executed a real estate mortgage to Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB; respondent herein) over three parcels of land in
Los Banos, Laguna
3. While the mortgage was still existing, AGRIX and its fellow
companies went bankrupt; such bankruptcy became the reason why
Marcos wanted to have all Agrix companies salvaged, hence the
purpose of PD 1717
4. Because of such bankruptcy, the PVB files a claim with the AGRIX
Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit; both the National
Development Company (NDC) and the New Agrix, Inc. (petitioners
herein) filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Laguna,
praying for the cancellation of the mortgage lien, which AGRIX
executed to PVB
5. PVB took extra steps in extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage,
thus another petition stopping such foreclosure was filed by the
petitioners
6. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, annulling in effect not
only Sec. 4 (1) of PD 1717 but also the whole law itself
Presidents exercise of legislative powers a contravention of the
doctrine of separation of powers
PD 1717 impairs obligation of contracts
PD 1717 violates the equal protection clause
7. Petitioners, after denial of their motion for reconsideration, elevated
this case to the Supreme Court, reaching the en banc because of its
constitutional issues
Issues:
1. Is respondent PVB is estopped from contesting the validity of the
decree?
2. Does the decree justify the use of police power to protect public
interests?
3. Are due process and equal protection is denied?
4. Is there is a violation of the obligation of contracts?
Held:
7. NO. The Supreme Court held that estoppel is not applicable in this
case
The regime of Marcos characterized the nature of estoppel in such
cases
During the said regime, not a decree by him was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
The case of Mendoza vs. Agrix, decided under the Marcos regime
and cited by petitioners, cannot be applied as precedent in this case,
because the said case did not resolve PD 1717 due to estoppel being
applied
 This case, however, does not fall under the Marcos regime
anymore; rights are duly regarded under the present Constitution

8. NO. There is not enough showing that public interest is taken into
account to justify the exercise of police power as provided for by PD
1717
It appears that the decree only favors a special group of investors
Public interest aspect of PD 1717 is not duly explained
PD 1717 does not state the number of investors, and the kinds
thereof, that would be allegedly benefiting from the exercise of police
power under the decree

9. YES. Due process and equal protection is denied by PD 1717

Sections 1 and 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution
Due process is denied because the right of property of the creditors
of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed because of Sec. 4 (1) of PD 1717,
which extinguishes all of their mortgages and other liens granted to
them by the Agrix companies
Secured creditors are placed on the same plane with the
unsecured creditors, making all of them unsecured creditors
o Only difference is that the loans of secured creditors are still
allowed to earn interest, but
o The decree in question altogether extinguishes said interests,
whether due to the secured or unsecured creditors
In effect, persons that are differently situated are similarly treated,
disregarding the principle that there should be equality over equals

10. YES. There is a violation of the obligation of contracts in PD 1717

Sec. 4 (1) effectively impairs the contract between AGRIX and PVB
without justification
Impairment of said contracts may be reasonable if it is in favor of
public interest, yet in this case, such is not justified
Contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX are purely
private transactions and does not show that they affect public interest

Petition DISMISSED. PD 1717 declared