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DR. LORNA VILLA, Petitioner, RULING: YES.

vs. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ALTAVAS, namely: Enrique Altavas II,


Erlinda Liboro and Maria A. de Jesus, Respondents. With respect to the first and second issues, the CA sustained
the following findings of the MCTC, to wit: that respondents'
FACTS: On November 26, 1997, Enrique Altavas II, Erlinda predecessor, Enrique Altavas, was not divested of his
Liboro and Maria de Jesus (respondents), in their capacity as ownership of the subject lots; that the titles over the subject
heirs of Enrique Altavas (Enrique), filed a Complaint5 for properties remain in his name; that, not being the owner or
ejectment with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) administrator of the said lots, Virginia has no right to enter
of Pontevedra-Panay in the Province of Capiz against Dr. into any contract for the lease of the said properties; and that
Lorna Villa (petitioner) together with Virginia Bermejo petitioner's possession of portions of the disputed properties
(Virginia) and Rolito Roxas (Roxas), alleging that respondents is merely upon tolerance of respondents.
are heirs of the deceased Enrique, the registered owner of
two parcels of fishpond designated as Lot No. 2816 and Lot Settled is the rule that the trial courts findings of fact,
No. 2817, who have been in actual possession through their especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and
administrator, overseer and representative, the late councilor conclusive upon this Court.
Mussolini C. Bermejo, the husband of Virgina; that on January
31, 1994, after the death of Mussolini, Virgina took over the Respondents attached, as annexes to their Complaint, the
possession of the premises in question without the consent Original Certificates of Title Nos. RO-4326 and RO-4327 in the
or permission of respondents; that Virginia leased in favor of name of Enrique, covering Lot Nos. 2816 and 2817,
petitioner a portion of about five hectares of Lot No. 2816, respectively, as evidence of their ownership and right to
without any right whatsoever to do so; that on October 21, possess the disputed properties. Moreover, being a mere
1997, respondents through counsel formally sent demand lessee, petitioner steps into the shoes of her lessor, Virginia.
letters to Virginia and petitioner to vacate the respective However, Virginia's claim of ownership was not sustained by
portions occupied by them; and that despite said demands, the MCTC, which instead found that she was not the owner of
they persisted in continuing their illegal possession of the and had no right to possess the disputed property or to
premises. transfer possession of the same, through lease, in favor of
another person. Virginia later withdrew her appeal filed with
Petitioner and Virginia filed their respective Answers to the the RTC. By reason of such withdrawal, she is bound by the
Complaint. findings of the MCTC. (MAO RA NI DISCUSSION RELATED SA
PROPERTY BAI. MAO RA PUD NI SA POWERPOINT NI SIR
On her part, petitioner contended that: she is in lawful GRAVAMEN)
possession of the area possessed and developed by her as
lessee; she is a possessor in good faith; the subject lot was BONUS AS TO NEGLIGENCE OF THE COUNSEL:
leased to her by a person who was in actual possession
thereof, and who represented herself as the owner of the The Court is also not persuaded by petitioner's contention
said lot; and respondents have no cause of action against her, that her failure to submit her appeal memorandum was
as they (respondents) are no longer the owners of the said because her counsel also had to prepare a memorandum
lots, it appearing that the same were already conveyed by the required by this Court in another case which was due for
original owners during their lifetime; and the complaint was submission on December 10, 2000. Petitioner's counsel
premature, as there was still a pending case in court involving should have prioritized the preparation of the memorandum
the ownership of the properties in question. required by the RTC because of its earlier deadline.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WHO DID NOT Clearly, petitioner's counsel is guilty of simple negligence.
HAVE ACTUAL, PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE LOT IN Settled is the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the
QUESTION FOR YEARS RECOVER POSSESSION THEREOF client.
THROUGH THE SUMMARY REMEDY OF EJECTMENT? WILL AN
ACTION FOR EJECTMENT LIE AGAINST PETITIONER? [The rest ky procedural bai and about memorandum2x so
deleted nlng]
BARTOLOME ORTIZ, petitioner, remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his exclusive benefit
vs. HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, in his capacity as Judge of the all the fruits which he may derive from the property,
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV; ELEUTERIO WITHOUT any obligation to apply any portion thereof to the
ZAMORA, QUIRINO COMINTAN, VICENTE FERRO, AND payment of the interest and the principal of the debt.
GREGORIO PAMISARAN, respondents.
ISSUE: Is petitioners contention tenable? Are the toll fees for
FACTS: The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of his exclusive benefit?
Homestead Application No. 122417 of Martin Dolorico II,
plaintiff's ward who died on August 20, 1931; that since then RULING: We find this contention untenable.
it was plaintiff who continued the cultivation and possession
of the property, without however filing any application to There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled
acquire title thereon; that in the Homestead Application No. to the fruits received before the possession is legally
122417, Martin Dolorico II named his uncle, Martin Dolorico I interrupted. 11 Possession in good faith ceases or is legally
as his heir and successor in interest, so that in 1951 Martin interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made
Dolorico I executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the
the property in favor of defendants Quirino Comintan and filing of an action in court by the true owner for the recovery
Eleuterio Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law, respectively, of the property.12 Hence, all the fruits that the possessor
and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the homestead may receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when
application; that on the strength of the affidavit, Homestead he answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him
Application No. 122417 was cancelled and thereafter, to the owner or lawful possessor.
defendants Comintan and Zamora filed their respective sales
applications Nos. 8433 and 9258. However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in
fact can still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of
The plaintiff filed his protest on November 26, 1951 alleging the New Civil Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all
that he should be given preference to purchase the lot the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the
inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in property. This right of retention has been considered as one
continuous possession of the same since 1931; and inspite of of the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the
plaintiff's opposition, "Portion A" of the property was sold at protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is to
public auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only guarantee the reimbursement of the expenses, such as those
bidder (Naay Portion B pero wa pa gi-auction). From the for the preservation of the property,14 or for the
Public Lands Inspector, the dispute reached the Respondent enhancement of its utility or productivity.15 It permits the
Court where it rendered judgment favouring Comintan on actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not
March 22 1966. The Court, in its dispositive portion, ordered been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the
the reimbursement by Comintan and Zamora to Ortiz for the possession for those necessary expenses and useful
necessary expenses over the lot. improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The
principal characteristic of the right of retention is its
It is to be noted nga si Ortiz ky naa siyay improvements and accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation.
expenses over the land such as coconut trees and other fruit Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the
trees worth P13,000. Moreover, pending appeal, gigamit ang fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is necessary,
portion of the lot as diversion road hence nag-appoint ang in order that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to
court ug Receiver for the purpose of collecting the tolls. Gi- the creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the
question ni Ortiz ang receiver. But later, after filing the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment
necessary bond other special qualifications, gi-reappoint ang of the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he
receiver. It is to be noted nga while wala ang receiver, naka- remains in possession.
collect si Ortiz ug toll fees sa diversion road. (MAROA DIZ
GUY) According to Manresa, the right of retention is, therefore,
analogous to that of a pledge, if the property retained is a
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: petitioner contends that so long movable, and to that of antichresis, if the property held is
as the aforesaid amount of P13,632,00 decreed in the immovable.18 This construction appears to be in harmony
judgment representing the expenses for clearing the land and with similar provisions of the civil law which employs the right
the value of the coconuts and fruit trees planted by him of retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able
to obtain the payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731 of
the New Civil Code, any person who has performed work
upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until
he is paid. Similarly, under Article 1914 of the same Code, the
agent may retain in pledge the things which are the object of
the agency until the principal effects reimbursement of the
funds advanced by the former for the execution of the
agency, or he is indemnified for all damages which he may
have suffered as a consequence of the execution of the
agency, provided he is free from fault. To the same effect, the
depositary, under Article 1994 of the same Code, may retain
the thing in pledge until the full payment of what may be due
him by reason of the deposit. The usufructuary, pursuant to
Article 612 of the same Code, may retain the property until
he is reimbursed for the amount paid for taxes levied on the
capital (Article 597) and tor extraordinary repairs (Article
594).

19 In a pledge, if the thing pledged earns or produces fruits,


income, dividends or interests, the creditor shall compensate
what he receives with those which are owing him.20 In the
same manner, in a contract of antichresis, the creditor
acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his
debtor with the obligation to apply them to payment of the
interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
21 The debtor can not reacquire enjoyment of the immovable
until he has actually paid what he owes the creditor. 22

Applying the afore-cited principles to the case at bar,


petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit
the tolls which he collected from the property retained by
him. It was his duty under the law, after deducting the
necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such
amount collected to the payment of the interest, and the
balance to the payment of the obligation.

We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting


petitioner's expenses for administration, belong to Quirino
Comintan, owner of the land through which the toll road
passed, further considering that the same was on portions of
the property on which petitioner had not introduced any
improvement. The trial court itself clarified this matter when
it placed the toll road under receivership. The omission of any
mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be attributed to
the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after the
rendition of the judgment of the trial court.