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PDVSA N TITLE
APPD.BY Youhad Kerbaje DATE OCT.02 APPD.BY Ral Rivero DATE OCT.02
PDVSA
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Index
1 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4.2 Atmospheric Discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.3 Toxic Vapors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5 VENT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6 VENT STACKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1 Sizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2 Design Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3 Vent Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4 Local Vents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7 REMOVAL OF ENTRAINED LIQUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.4 Design Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8 NOISE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1 Excessive Noise Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2 Noise Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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1 SCOPE
This Engineering Guide contains criteria for the selection of vent equipment and
calculation methods for the basic sizing of emergency venting equipment.
2 REFERENCES
The following publications are referred to herein or are of general interest:
2.4 API R.P 520, Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Pressure
Relieving Systems in Refineries.
2.5 API RP 521 Guide for Pressure Relief and Depressurizing Systems.
2.7 David Evans/Dwight Pfenning. Water sprays suppress gas well blowout fires Oil
and Gas Journal. April 29, 1985 pp 8086.
3 NOTES
This guide deals only with vent systems. This Engineering Guide does not
discuss, Flare Systems, nor Safety Relief Valves or Header Sizing. Please
refer to Guides 90616.1.021 and 90616.1.022 for information on those subjects.
For Petrochemical Industries, each specific case shall meet regulations of
MARNR.
4 GENERAL
4.1 The selection of a disposal method is subject to many factors that may be specific
to a particular location or an individual unit. The purpose of a disposal system is
to conduct the relieved fluid to a location where it may be safely discharged.
In general, gases and vapors should be discharged upward well overhead and
liquids downward to proper receivers or nearby trapped drains which lead to
waste collection facilities. Frequently, liquids will be discharged with vapors, and
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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this requires a proper separation pot or enlarged section of line. Liquids in flashing
condition require open vent pipes to release vapors overhead as well as
downpipes for safe disposal of liquids. All vent pipes must be drained to minimize
backpressures due to atmospheric condensate, rain, or process fluid condensate.
Vent outlets should be designed to discharge upward in order to prevent the
relieving system from being plugged and inoperative. All gas and vapor must be
projected above equipment, piping, structures, and operating levels or to large
open areas for rapid dissipation in the atmosphere. Considerations must be given
to any phase change either vaporization of liquid or condensation of vapor, that
occurs in the fluid when the pressure is reduced or as result of cooling.
Disposal systems generally consist of piping and vessels. All components must
be suitable in size, pressure rating, and material for the service conditions
intended.
A remote controlled snuffing system is recommended for each vent stack,
specially in locations where the incidence of lightning is high or where access to
the point of discharge would be difficult with conventional fire extinguishing
equipment. An automatic water sprinkling system is required for each vent stack,
specially in locations where the incidence of lightning is high, in order to cool the
tip of the vent stack and avoid reignition (see schematic drawing in Fig. 1).
Other spray geometries, as shown in Figure 2 have been studied to supress gas
fires.
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ignition of relief streams at the point of emission, excesive noise levels, and air
pollution.
4.2.4 Formation of Flammable Mixtures
To evaluate the potential hazards of flammable mixtures that result from
atmospheric discharge of hydrocarbons, the physical state of the released
material is of primary importance, for example, the behavior of a vapor emission
is entirely different from that of a liquid release. Between these two extremes are
situations involving liquidvapor mixtures where mists or sprays are formed.
Vapors, mists, and liquids each introduce special consideration in analyzing the
risk associated with atmospheric relief.
a. Vapor Emission
When hydrocarbon relief streams comprised entirely of vapors are discharged
into the atmosphere, mixtures in the flammable range will unavoidably occur
downstream of the outlet as the vapor mixes with air. Under most circumstances
where individual safety relief valves discharge vertically upward through their own
stacks, this flammable zone will be confined to a rather limited definable pattern
at elevations above the level of release. At exit velocities from the safety relief
valve stack, the jet momentum forces of release will usually be dominant. Under
these conditions the air entrainment rate is very high and the released gases will
then be diluted to below the lower flammable limit before the release passes out
of the jetdominated portion if:
Re u 1.54x10 4 f
a
Where:
Re = Reynolds number, calculated at vent outlet.
f = Density of the gas at the vent outlet.
a = Density of the air
On the other hand, if the release is at too low a velocity (below 500 fps) and has
too low a Reynolds number, jet entraintment of air will be limited, and the released
material will be wind dominated. Principles of atmospheric dispersion will then
determine the dilution rate and how far flammable conditions can occur. Under
these conditions, it is possible that flammable mixtures can occur at grade or at
distant ignition sources. A complete evaluation requires consideration of the
following:
1. The velocity and temperature of the exit gas.
2. Gas composition and quantity of the exit gas.
3. The prevailing meteorological conditions, specially any adverse conditions
peculiar to the site.
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Typical hydrocarbon relief streams are diluted to their lower flammable limit at
approximately 120 diameters from the end of the discharge pipe, measured along
the axis. In essence when hydrocarbon vapors are diluted with air to
approximately 3 weight percent the concentration of the resultant mixture will be
at or below the lower flammable limit. This value actually vanes from 3.0 weight
percent for methane to 3.6 weight percent for hexane.
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b. Mist Emission
Mists, as referred to in this guide, result from condensation following emissions.
Condensed mists are finely divided, the diameters of most drops is less than 10
micrometers, with few larger than 20 micrometers. Mechanical sprays do not
usually contain many drops below 100 micrometers in diameter.
Whether vapors will condense in appreciable quantities when released to the
atmosphere will depend on the stream composition, atmospheric temperature,
and exit velocity. Frequently, the assumption is made that if the lowest anticipated
atmospheric temperature is below the dew point of a released hydrocarbon,
significant condensation will occur.
In cases in which vapor discharges from safety relief valves condense,
consideration must be given to how the condensation influences the formation of
a flammable atmosphere. Combustible liquid mists in air are capable of
propagating flame when ignited, even though the liquid is so involatile that no
appreciable amount of vapor is formed at the ambient temperature. Thus, mists
of flammable liquids can present a hazard even at temperatures well below the
flash point.
In cases in which calculation indicates that vapor discharges from safety relief
valves may condense, it is possible for coalescence to produce droplets that
rapidly settle to grade rather than dispersing as a mist similar to vapors. The
hydrocarbon partial pressure at which the calculated cooling curve intersects the
dewpoint curve should be considered indicative of bounding the region in which
coalescence seems unlikely.
Although no conclusive data are now available, it is suggested that condensation
at hydrocarbon partial pressures of 34 kilopascals absolute (5 pounds per square
inch absolute) or lees should be treated as finely divided mists without
coalescence. In the absence of coalescence, the effect of gravity should be
negligible since the freefall velocity of 10 micrometer hydrocarbon particles in air
is approximately 3 millimeters per second (0.01 feet per second). Therefore, even
with very light wind, the discharge from an elevated location will travel a
considerable distance before reaching grade.
Based on the foregoing factors pertaining to the dispersion and combustion
characteristics of a mist, it can be concluded that as long as the condensate
remains in finely divided form and is airborne, the mixture can be treated for
flammability and dispersion characteristics as though it were completely
vaporized.
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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c. Liquid Emission
Unlike discharges composed of vapor or mist, which rapidly disperse when vented
to the atmosphere at high velocity, liquid discharges settle to grade. If volatile
components are present a flammable atmosphere may result. The risk of fire or
explosion may be high if appreciable quantities of liquid hydrocarbon are released
to the atmosphere when the ambient temperature is at or above the flash point
of the liquid or when their presence concur whith an unexpected source of ignition.
Theoretically, liquide that have a flash point above the maximum anticipated
ambient temperature would not vaporize enough to create a flammable
atmosphere. However widespread spraying of oil droplets could create concern
in an emergency and could constitute a serious nuisance. Also, minor fires might
occur if liquid came in contact with very hot line or equipment.
Fluids that are discharged from relief devices as liquide should be handled in the
following manner.
Flammable liquide with atmospheric boiling points above 35C (95F) should be
directed downward within 1020 cm (48 inches) of grade and shielded to prevent
splashing of liquid and debris. The discharge should be in or near a trapped drain
or some other safe location.
Flammable liquide with atmospheric boiling points between 35C (95 F) and
50C (58 F) should be routed to a liquid knockout pot to separate vapor and
liquid. The vapors should be disposed of as in the section on Vapors Emission.
Flammable liquide with atmospheric boiling points below 50C (58 F) should
be directed upward and discharged at least 45 meters (150 feet) above grade or
above the tallest column in the unit. The discharge should be a minimum of 2.4
m (8 feet) above the shutoff valve underneath the relief device.
Nonflammable liquids that are not hazardous to personnel with atmospheric
boiling points above 35C (95F) should be directed downward within 1020 cm
(48 inches) above grade and shielded to prevent splashing of liquid and debris.
Nonflammable liquids that are not hazardous to personnel with atmospheric
boiling points below 35C (95F) should be discharged up in the air a minimum
of 2.4 m (8 feet) above the shutoff valve under the relief device.
Nonflammable liquide that are hazardous to personnel must be discharged in a
safe manner to prevent personnel injury. Each case will require individual
consideration because of the many types of hazards that can be encountered.
d. Sources of Ignition
The possibility of accidental ignition of the outflow of hydrocarbon vapors from a
safety relief valve can best be analyzed in terms of four possible causes of ignition:
outside sources (including open flames, hot surfaces, or nonclassified electrical
equipment), lightning, static electricity, and autoignition.
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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4.3.1 Although most vapor streams would be harmful to breathe at high concentrations,
the majority present little or no risk to personnel whendischarged from safety
relief valves at a remote location. The average person can tolerate shortterm
exposure to most hydrocarbon vapors at concentration levels equivalent to or
above the lower flammable limit. Thus, if facilities are designed to avoid flammable
atmosphere the results of inhalation at the same location will not be injurious.
4.3.2 However, certain refinery and production streams may contain vapors that are
dangerous at extremely low concentrations: for example, hydrogen sulfide vapors
can cause unconsciousness and death within seconds following exposure to a
concentration above 1000 parts per million. This is approximately onetenth the
concentration representing the lowest flammable limits of any hydrocarbon.
Therefore where hydrogen sulfide or similar toxic materials are present in a relief
stream, an investigation should be made to predict the maximum downwind
concentration at any location where personnel may be exposed. Special attention
should be given to adjacent elevated structures that may he within the path of the
plume and will thus be subject to relatively high concentrations. If the presence
of toxic vapors can not be avoided proper disposal system must be designed and
installed, and safety equipment must be available on site.
4.3.3 The ground level concentration of toxic vapors at any location downwind a stack
can be estimated as described in PDVSA Guide 90616.1.020.
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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5 VENT SYSTEMS
5.1 Process gases released from pressure safety valves (PSVs) or depressurization
valves must be collected in two closed vent systems defined as low and high
pressure relief systems (LP and HP relief). Typically, the LP relief collects gases
from equipment operating below 31 bar (450 PSIG), and HP relief from equipment
operating at 31 bar (450 PSIG) and above, nevertheless other pressures could
be set according to the operating conditions of the plant. Both headers will be
routed to a common blowdown knock out drum (BDKO).
5.2 Systems shall be designed so that 90% depressurization of the plant must be
achieved within 5 minutes without overpressure of any component.
5.3 Headers shall be in elevated position inside compression modules and sloped
downward to the BDKO drum (usually the slope is in the order of 1%). The BDKO
drum shall be horizontal type connected through a short line (or directly) to a vent
stack. The gas outlet should be connected through a single point. Methods of
separators calculations are presented in PDVSA Engineering Guides
MDP03S03 LiquidVapor Separators.
5.4 Collected liquids will be pumped to the common K.O drum at plant inlet or at any
other suitable location. The pump should be spared, start automatically at high
liquid level and cut out at low liquid level and shall be connected to the emergency
power generator. An on/of f light in the control room should indicate on/off of the
pump. The pumps shall be sized for specific gravity range from 0.6 to 1.0.
5.5 The complete system shall be continuously purged at a low and sufficient rate. A
restriction orifice should be installed to pass the required amount. Provide purge
connection at the farthest end of vent header to ensure that the entire system will
remain purged.
5.6 A flashing light and an audible alarm should be activated in case of venting to
prevent boats presence (offshore location). Confusion with fire or gas alarm
should be avoided.
5.7 For atmospheric vents the discharge shall be vertical, with the vent pipe:
Being at least 2 m long.
Terminating at least 5 m above grade.
At least 3 m above the tallest structure within an 8 m radius.
At least 30 m horizontally from furnaces, boilers etc. or their air intakes.
5.8 In addition, for production facilities and gas compression plants the discharge
shall be:
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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5.10 The tail pipes shall be provided with a steam hose connection or other systems
for flame extinguishing.
5.11 The vent outlet velocity shall not be lees than 150 m/sec (500 ft/sec) and not
higher than 80% of the sonic velocity at the rated capacity. The tail pipe shall not
be smaller in diameter than the relief valve outlet.
5.12 The bottom of the vent shall be provided with a 1/2 dia (minimum) drain at the
lowest point, which should be opened frequently (i.e. once a week), to prevent the
liquid build up. The vent pipe shall be adequately supported against reaction
forces.
6 VENT STACKS
6.1 Sizing
6.1.1 The size of a vent stack is determined by the available pressure drop and by any
minimum velocity required to prevent hazardous conditions due to combustible
or toxic material at grade or working levels. Normally, a size is selected that will
result in a high discharge velocity for example, velocity of 150 meters per second
(500 feet per second) will provide excellent dispersion. The size should be
checked to ensure that sonic flow is not established or, if it is, that allowance has
been made for the pressure discontinuity at the discharge end in calculating
pressure drop. A sample calculation is presented afterwards.
6.1.2 Assume the following conditions: The maximum relief rate, W, is 113400 kg/h
(250000 pounds per hour). The molecular weight of the vapor, M, is 44. The
temperature of the vapor just inside the tip, T. is 361K (650R). The exit velocity,
V, is 150 meters per second (500 feet per second)).
6.1.3 The pressure of the vapor just inside the vent tip, P, is 101 kilopascals absolute
(14.7 pounds per square inch absolute). The gas constant, R, is 8.3 for metric
units (10.7). The density is then calculated as follows:
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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+ MP
RT
(44) (101)
+ + 1.48 kilograms per cubic meter
(8.3) (361)
+ MP
RT
(44) (14.7)
+ + 0.1 pounds per cubic foot
(10.7) (650)
Tip size + W
V
Tip size + W
3600 V
Thus the pipe diameter should be about 16 inches nominal pipe size.
6.2.2 If the vent stack is in a location remote from other facilities, a guyed stack will
usually be as satisfactory as, and more economical than, providing a structure to
support the stack. Vent stacks are frequently located in a process area that
contains equipment connected to the stack. It is often possible to support the stack
from a fractionating tower, chimney, or other tall structure in the unit. Such an
arrangement provides for economical discharge at a safe elevation.
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Pgina 13
.Men Principal Indice manual Indice volumen Indice norma
6.2.3 The height of the vent stack is selected so that the concentration of vapor at a point
of interest is well below the lower flammable limit of the vapor. Usually 0.10.5
times the lower flammable limit is an acceptable concentration. Toxicity requires
much lower concentrations on certain applications and is therefore the controlling
factor. The radiant heat intensity for vent stack should also be checked in the event
a relieving vapor should ignite; calculation should be made assuming a flow rate
equivalent to an outlet velocity of 150 m/seg (500 FPS), this is done by the same
means as for flare stacks, and the came limits apply for radiant heat intensity.
Radiant heat levels sometimes take precedence over dispersion in determining
stack height. Methods of flare calculations are presented in PDVSA Guide
90616.1.021.
6.2.4 In every vent stack installation, careful consideration should be given to two
potential problems: accumulation of liquid in line terminating at the vent stack and
accidental ignition by lightning. Accumulation of liquid in line to the vent stack may
result from leakage into the system of highmolecularweight vapors that
condense at ambient temperature. If appreciable quantities of liquid collect, they
will subsequently be discharged to the atmosphere when vapors are released into
the system.
6.2.5 To avoid liquid accumulation, it is important to prevent pockets from occurring the
lines and to dope the system to a lowpoint dram. These drains can be installed
to function automatically by use of a properly designed seal. The height of the seal
should provide a head equivalent to at least 1 1/2 times the backpressure under
the maximum relief load to avoid release of vapor through the seal. As an
alternative to a sealed dram, a small disengaging drum may be installed at the
base of the vent stack. This type of installation is recommended where significant
quantities of liquid may occur.
6.2.6 The possibility that vapors from the vent stack may be accidentally ignited by
lightning or other sources usually makes a remotecontrolled snuffing steam,
water (for cooling) or CO2 connection necessary on the vent stack. This is
specially true in locations where the incidence of lightning is high or where access
to the point of discharge would be difficult with conventional fireextinguishing
equipment. Each system consists of CO2 cylinders, connected by flexible
discharge loops to a manifold which is piped to two opposed discharge nozzles,
installed approximately 4.5 m (15 feet) below the top of the vent stack. The
operation of the valves is manual.
6.2.7 It is frequently impractical to size the steam supply line for a rate sufficient to
extinguish a fire under maximum venting conditions, however, steam would still
be essential, since in most cases, vent fires occur when the only flow to the system
consist of leakage or minor venting. With relatively small amounts of vented vapor
in small stacks, it is possible to dilute the vented vapor to the point where
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
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combustion ceases. It requires on the order of one pound of steam per cubic foot
of vented vapor to dilute a flammable vapor to this point. As the vented vapor rate
and stack size increase, the steam rate for dilution to the extinguishing ratio
becomes excessive, and. it becomes necessary to depend on a blowout
phenomena for achieving extinguishment. Blowout results from the combined
effects of dilution with steam and outside air at high velocities and cooling resulting
from the dilution.
6.2.8 Furthermore, unless steam or cooling water and CO2 is supplied, if ignition occurs
when venting at or near the maximum design load, the fire will quite likely continue
to burn when the cause of overpressure is corrected with an accompanying
reduction in venting.
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7.2 It is estimated that the loss of heat in a vent system is 24.4 to 48.8 kcal/ m2 C (5
to 10 British thermal units per square foot of surface per degree Fahrenheit)
temperature difference between the steel and the atmosphere. The range is due
partly to the effect of wind, while the rate of cooling would be greater in a rain
storm. The vapor space in the knockout drum must be sufficiently large to reduce
the vapor velocity below the dropout velocity of the fine entrained droplets. API
RP 521 present a method for sizing knockout drums to remove droplets of 150
microns and larger. Drums equipped with pumps on automatic control should
have sufficient capacity for the maximum liquid accumulation expected in 15
minutes. The pumps must be capable of handling the lowest molecular weight
liquids that are likely to accumulate.
7.3 If a very heavy flow of vapor should occur suddenly, previously condensed liquide
may be entrained and carried out the stack. Experiments carried out showed the
relative effectiveness of cyclones, mist eliminators, water seals, and knockout
drums. The use of mist eliminators is objected because they may become plugged
and increase the pressure drop of the systems. Experience has demostrated that
a combination of water seals with vane type mist eliminators is a good design to
prevent liquid carryover. Cyclones are effective at high velocities but poor at less
than design flows.
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7.4.3 Normally all closed safety valve discharges are combined into one header
entering the drum, although separate headers and inlet nozzles are acceptable
if economically advantageous
7.4.4 Sizing of the blowdown drum and location of the level instruments are based on
the following (see Figure 4 and 4A):
a. Liquid holdup below the LH (CO) A (AB in Figure 4 and 4A) is the light ends
stream diversion requirement or the closed drainage requirement for residual
process liquide at a normal shutdown, whichever is greater. This closed dram
requirement is taken as 10% of the total liquid hydrocarbon inventory of all vessels
in one process unit which are provided with closed dram header connections. This
assumes that 90% of the liquid inventory of these vessels can be removed by
pressuring or pumping out through normal process disposal routes. The process
unit to be used for sizing purpose is the one which has the largest closed dram
requirement and which can shutdown independently for turnaround. Inventory of
vessels is calculated at the top of the working level range, excluding tray holdup
and the contents of piping. In the case of vessels containing large liquid
inventories, e.g., surge drums, the individual closed dram header requirement
may be reduced below 10%, where appropriate, by taking credit for alternative
means of disposal of the liquid contents, e.g. water displacement to storage.
b. The space in the drum above the LH (CO) A (Above the upper LH (CO) A when
two are installed) is made up of a holdup capacity (BD in Figure 4 and 4A) for 30
minutes accumulation of liquid safety valve releases, plus a vapor space (DF)
for the associated vapor release. The drum sizing is determined by the single
contingency which requires the maximum combined space BD plus DF.
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2. Liquid loads are considered from all safety valves that discharge as a result
of a single contingency, plus in each case an allowance for knockout drum
liquids (fuel gas K.O. drums, absorber overhead K.O. drums) equal to the
inventory of all drums which discharge to the blowdown drum, at their LHA
point. In a typical gas compression plant, this allowance is not necessary
since those liquids are not directed to the vent knock out drum, they are
connected either to the suction plant knock out drum or with another suitable
facility.
3. Vapor space velocities normally should not exceed 100% of critical;
experience demonstrates that this keeps liquid entrainment into the flare line
within acceptable limits. However, a velocity of 175% of critical is permitted
when one is applying the 1.5 times Design Pressure Rule to remote
contingencies. The constant value 0.157 could be different if any type of
internals are installed inside the vessel.
V c + 0.157 L * v
v
Where:
VC = Critical vapor velocity, ft/s
L = Liquid density, lb/ft3 at operating conditions.
V = Vapor density, lb/ft3 at operating conditions.
Crinkled wire mesh screens are not permissible.
4. The depth of the vapor space should under no contingency be less than 20%
of the drum diameter, or less than 30 cm (12 inch).
e. A LL (CO) A with local manual reset is provided to trip the pumpout pump when
the liquid has been pump down to a low level.
7.4.5 The blowdown drum design pressure is 3.4 bar g. (50 psig) or less.
7.4.6 The maximum allowable operating pressure in the blowdown drum is determined
by the lower of the following:
a. The maximum allowable back pressure on safety valves which discharge to the
blowdown drum, according to set pressure and type of safety valve, or
b. The pressure at which vapor diversion from any gas compressor suction to the
blowdown drum is required to be released. These facilities are normally provided
on cat cracker and steam cracker process gas compressors.
c. The maximum allowable operating pressure on any condensible blowdown drum,
water disengaging drum, etc., which vents into the same flare or vent header.
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7.4.7 The blowdown drum design temperature is set by the extremes of emergency
operating temperature which can result from any of the streams tied into it. If
materials are handled at temperatures below 1600 (60F), or if they can
autorefrigerate to below 1600 (60F), a minimum design temperature must also
be specified.
7.4.8 Blowdown drum materials must be adequate for any corrosive substance that
may be released into it, and for the temperature limits defined by paragraph 7.1.7
above. The corrosion allowance shall be 3 mm.
7.4.9 Depending on the weather or operating conditions at the plant site a heating coil
could be provided in the blowdown drum for deicing, winterizing and weathering
purposes. Sizing of the coil is based upon weathering off the light ends from the
flashed liquids at the maximum level accumulated as a result of any of the design
contingencies described in paragraph 7.1.4 above. This material must be
weathered in two hours to temperature and vapor pressure conditions which will
permit safe pumpout to associated shops or other receiving facilities. In some
cases weathering must be followed by cooling of the pumpout stream (see
paragraph 7.1.13 below). For most applications when steam is available, a steam
coil consisting of a nominal 60 m (200 ft) of 2 inch pipe is adequated. The coil
should be sloped to insure condensate drainage.
7.4.10 For services where a steam coil may be exposed to cold or autorefrigerated
liquids, the design should be such as to prevent blockage by freezing of steam
condensate. The following methods are available to achieve this:
a. A 5 cm (2 inch) steam trap by pass direct to sewer. This is required in all cases
where temperatures below 0C (32F) may occur in the blowdown drum.
b. Connections for methanol injection into the steam coil inlet and outlet piping for
deicing.
d. Use of a hot oil heating medium to the coil, or a cascade heating system (e.g.,
steam, methanol).
7.4.11 In some cases the drum is provided with a drawoff boot of nominal 60 cm (2 ft)
diameter by 90 cm (3 feet) in height, with a separate steam coil fabricated from
1 inch pipe. Normally it is not necessary to withdraw hydrocarbon and water
separately, and the pumpout pump takes suction from the bottom of the boot. The
LL (CO) A is located as close as possible to the top of the boot to ensure that the
pump is shutdown before losing suction.
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
8 NOISE
8.1 Excessive Noise Levels
8.1.1 Noise created from the venting of hydrocarbons may cause problems due to either
the potential hearing loss of exposed personnel or the nuisance created in
surrounding areas.
8.1.2 The noise generated by a pressure relief valve discharging to the atmosphere can
be relatively loud. Emergency relief is ordinarily of short duration and occurs
infrequently, so a high noise level is usually acceptable.
8.1.3 The allowable noise intensity and duration should be evaluated at areas where
operating personnel would normally work or at property limits. Where two or more
pressure relief valves can discharge to the atmosphere simultaneously, the
combined effects will need to be evaluated.
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
Figure 5 ilustrates the noise intensity measured as the sound pressure level at 30
meters (100 feet) from the stack tip versus the pressure ratio across the safety
valve.
The following symbols are used in the procedure for calculating the noise level:
M = Mass flow through the valve, in kilograms per second (slugs per second).
C = Speed of sound in the gas at the valve, in meters per second (feet per
second).
Notes:
In feet per second:
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
d. Add items a and c to obtain the average sound pressure level at 100 feet, L100 in
decibels. Assume the followings:
M = 1 slug per second
= 32 pounds per second
k = 1.4
Molecular weight = 29
T = 560 degrees Rankine
PR = 48/16 = 3
C + 223 (1.4)29(560)
= 1159 feet per second
k = 1.4
Molecular weight = 29
PR = 48/16 = 3
C + (91.2) (1.4)29(311)
C = 353 meters per second
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
12
SPRINKLING NOZZLES (3/4)
1 1/2
CO2 CONNECTION
2
1 1/2
GATE VALVE 2
LINE 2
DRAIN LINE
STACK PLATFORM
ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDE PDVSA 90616.1.029
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
Mw/Mg = 6.4
30
Mw/Mg = 4.2
Mw/Mg =9.5
Mw/Mg =5.3
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
Vent Stack
Weld
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
TO FLARE
*
VAPOR SPACE FOR 100% OF CRITICAL VALOCITY MAX. LIQUID LEVElL FOR PUMPOUT
E
PUMP SIZING
MAX. LIQUID LEVEL FOR DRUM SIZING
30 MINUTES LIQUID FROM SAFETY VALVES D
PLUS MAX. LIQUID LEVEL FOR
C LHA
ALLOWANCE FOR LIQUID FROM KNOCKOUT DRUM LHA LOCATION
LH(CO) A
CLOSED DRAIN HEADER REQUIREMENT B
OR
LIQUID STREAM DIVERSION REQUIREMENT
A TI
LL(CO) A
(1)
STEAM
CLOSED DRAIN
HEADER
PUMPOUT FROM
MAXIMUM
LIQUID LEVEL IN
2 HOURS
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
TO VENT
F
MAX. LIQUID LEVEL FOR PUMPOUT
PUMP SIZING
MAX. LIQUID LEVEL FOR DRUM SIZING
B TI
A
LL(CO) A
PUMPOUT FROM
MAXIMUM
LIQUID LEVEL
IN 2 HOURS
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
Fig 5. NOISE INTENSITY AT 100 FEET (30 METERS) FROM THE STACK TIP
10
9
5
PRESSURE RATIO (PR)
1.5
20 30 40 50 60 70
(DECIBELS)
SOUND PRESSURE LEVEL AT 100 FEET
(30 METERS) FROM STACK TIP