LEBRUDO vs.

LOYOLA [GR 181370; MARCH 9, 2011]

*Sinumpaang Salaysay

FACTS:

Respondent Remedios Loyola owns a 250 sq. m parcel of land located in Cavite awarded by
DAR under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Subject lost is covered by Certificate of Land Ownership No. 20210 issued in favor of Loyola
and was duly registered on March 14, 1991 under TCT/CLOA No. 998
On June 27, 1995 petitioner Lebrudo now deceased and represented by his son, petitioner
Reynaldo Lebrudo filed with the Office of the Provincial Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Trece Martires City, Cavite an action for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA
PARAD dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed
prematurely.
On March 11, 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action.
Lebrudo alleged that Loyola approached him sometimes in 1989 to redeem the lot, which
was mortgaged by Loyolas mother Cristina Hugo to Trinidad Barreto. In exchange, Loyola
promised to give Lebrudo the portion of the lot.
Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued un favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed
two Sinumpaang Salaysay, one of which is waiving and transferring her rights over the
portion of the land in favor of Lebrudo and committing herself to remove her house
constructed on the corresponding portion to be allocated to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola refused.
Despite the steps taken to amicable settle the issue by Lebrudo, no amicable settlement was
attained. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against Loyola.
In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her and
offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied promising portion of
the lot as payment as well as the genuineness of the two Sinumpaang Salaysay. The records
do not show whether Loyola renounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay.
PARAD of Trece Martires City decided the case in favor of Lebrudo.
Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
DARAB reversed the decision of the PARAD and ruled in favor of Loyol.
Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied.
Lebrudo then filed a petitioner for review with the CA.
CA affirmed the decision of the DARAB
Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Lebrudo is entitled to the portion of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of
the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by
Loyola in his favor.

RULING:

THE PETITION LACKS MERIT. A certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document

evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR and contains the
restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657,
as amended by RA 9700, which provide for the transferability of awarded lands, provides:

Section 27, Transferability of Awarded Lands. Lands acquired by beneficiaries

under this ACT may not be sold, transferred except through hereditary succession, or to
the government , or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10)
years.
 It is clear from the provisions that the ands awarded to beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a
period of 10 years. The law enumerated of 4 exceptions:
1) Through hereditary succession;
2) To the government;
3) To the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or
4) To other qualified beneficiaries.
In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights
is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.

In the present case, Lebrudos assertion of entitlement of portion of the subject lot must
fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land
reform rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for 4 exceptions and
Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions.

In Mayhem v. Ellano, the Court held that the waiver of rights ad interest over landholdings
awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver
and transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void
for falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.

As to the issue whether Lebrudo is a qualified farmer beneficiary who is entitled to the lot
under the CARP, DAR Administrative Order No. 3 series of 1990 enumerated the qualifications of a
beneficiary, to wit:
1) Landless;
2) Filipino Citizen;
3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing
of the application; and
4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive.

Lebrudo is not a qualified beneficiary because of the absence of (1) ad (3). First, Lebrudo is
not landless according to the certification issued by MARO Officer Amelia Sangalang and lastly,
Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of filing of the application. It was
Loyola and her family who were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a
beneficiary under the CARP.

Further, the CA correctly observed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible title and after the expiration of the 1-year period from the issuance of the registration
decree upon which it is based, the title become incontrovertible. Accordingly, by the time when
original petitioner Julian Lebrudo filed on June 27, 1995 the first case, the respondents certificate of
tile had already became incontrovertible. That consequence was inevitable, for as the DARAB
correctly observed, an original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an
administrative proceeding was as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding. Clearly, the respondent as registered property owner was entitled to the
protection given to every holder of a Torrens title.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. The main purpose of the agrarian reform
law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiarys continued possession and enjoyment of the land he tills.

PETITION IS DENIED. CAs DECISION IS AFFIRMED.

OLIVA vs. REPUBLIC [G.R. No. 163118; April 27, 2007]
*40-meter vs. 3-meter legal easement

FACTS:
Petitioner Oliva is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Talamban, Cebu City covered by
a TCT originating from OCT No. 1066 issued from a free patent granted under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The free patent, OCT No. 1066 and TCT No. 5455
contained the condition that a 40-meter legal easement from the bank of any river or stream
shall be preserved as permanent timberland.
On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for reduction of legal easement before the RTC
of Cebu City.
Petitioner alleged that the property is residential as shown by the tax declaration and the
Certification of the Office of the City Assessor. Thus, the applicable legal easement is only 3-
meters pursuant to DENR Administrative No. 99-21, and not 40-meters, which applies to
timberlands and forest lands.
DENR countered that the property is inalienable. It also claimed that the applicant agreed on
the 40-meter legal easement when the free patent was applied for.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.1
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision. 2 The appellate court later denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE LAND.
2) WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LEGAL EASEMENT?

RULING:

On the first issue, CA No. 141, as amended, provides that the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of DENR may classify lands of the public domain, into:
1) Alienable or disposable;
2) Timber; and
3) Mineral lands
However, only alienable or disposable lands may be disposed of through any of the forms of
concession enumerated in the law.

A free patent is one of such concessions and once it is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and become
private property. Verily, by the issuance of a free patent and the subsequent issuance of OCT No.
1066 and TCT No 5455, the property in this case had become private land.

On the second issue, Section 90(i) of CA No. 141 requires that a 40-meter legal easement
from the bank of any river or stream shall be preserved as permanent timberland. To implement this,
the DENR promulgated A.O. No 99-21 which provides the guidelines n the processing, verification
and approval of isolated and cadastral surveys.
Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the public domain, the
application for free patent contained the condition that a 40-meter legal easement from the banks on
each side of any river or stream found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved s permanent
timberland.

1 The RTC said that there is no longer any reason for the 40-meter legal easement because the property had been transformed into residential
land and the area where it is located has been reclassified as urban. Applying DENR A.O 99-21, the applicable legal easement is only 3-mter
2 The CA upheld the DENRs claim that the property is inalienable. Accordingly, a positive act of the government was necessary to declassify it
from forest land to alienable land. Declaration of the property as residential in the tax declaration and reclassification of the area where it is
located as urban were insufficient bases to reclassify the property.
 However, after the property was administratively titled, it underwent surveys for purposes
of subdivision, consolidation, or consolidation-subdivision as evidence by TCT No 5455. Thus,
presently, only 3-meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland.

INSTANT PETITION IS GRANTED.

REPUBLIC vs. GALENO [G.R. No. 215009; JANUARY 23, 2017]

FACTS:
On September 2, 2003, respondent Galeno filed a petition for the correction of the area of Lot
No. 2285 before the RTC.
She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the subject property by of a Deed of
Sale. The survey and subdivision of the subject property was duly approved by the DENR.
Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property
resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy n the land area of the
subject property.

Area in the Title 20,498 sq. m

Area in the Certification 21, 298 sq. m
Discrepancy 350 sq. m

Hence, she sough to correct the area of the subject property in order to avoid further
confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners.
There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of respondents
evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of the jurisdictional
requirements.
The RTC granted the petition. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC Order. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence
the instant petition.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT TE CA ERRED IN UPHLDING THE CORRECTION OF THE ARE OF TE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

RULING:

THE PETITION IS MERITORIOUS. The respondent failed to proved that the there was
sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of the subject property from 20,948 sq.m to 21,248
sq.m.

Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following document:

1) CERTIFICATION issued by Althea Acevedo, an Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical
Services Section of the Regional Technical Director, land Management Services of the
DENR in Iloilo City which states that the true and correct area of Lot 2285 is 21,
928 sq. m
2) TECHNICAL DESCPRIPTION of Lot 2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto
Caballero, chief of the Surveys Division; and
3) APPROVED SUBDIVISION PLAN of Lot 2285 certified by Santome, Geodetic Engineer;
Muyarsas, Chief of the Regional Surveys Division and Gerobin, Regional Technical
Director of the Land Management Services, DENR.

Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the
correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that
the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court the facts stated therein. In Republic vs.
Medina, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be
considered prima facie evidence f the facts stated therein.

Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries

in public records made in performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR certifications do not fall within the
class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in
the legal custody of the government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents. At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and
date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondents sole witness and
attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents as
she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned
government agencies.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However the lack of objection to
hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into
thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.

In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove
that the true and correct area of the subject property is 21, 298 square meters instead of 20,948 sq.m
to warrant a correction thereof. Accordingly, respondents petition for the correction of the said
Certificate of Title must be denied and the present petition be granted.

PAZ vs. REPUBLIC [G.R. No. 157367; November 23, 2011]

FACTS:
On November 29, 2000, the petitioner brought a petition for the cancellation of OCT No. 684.
The petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of Parcel 1 situated in Paranaque,
Pasay, Taguig and San Pedro, Laguna as well as Parcel 2 situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Paranaque and Las Pinas City with a total area of approximately 14, 310 hectares.
That OCT No. 684was registered in the name of the Republic and included Lot 392 of the
Muntinlupa Estate
That