PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo
City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.
FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and
Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent
Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a
fee-charging employment agency, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee
charging employment agency by charging fees and
expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a
motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged
for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article
13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a
fee.
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered
and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June
24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case,
the view of the private respondents is that to constitute
recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in
this article should involve dealings with two or more
persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other
hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two
or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment
and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in
consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code
provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the
CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed
against private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely
intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise
or offer of employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall
be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the
said presumption.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D.
AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-
appellant.
FACTS : on January 12, 1988, an information for illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicateand in large
scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor
Code (Presidential DecreeNo. 442) as amended by
Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was led
againstspouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein
accused-appellant Nelly Agustin, alleging that in
orabout during the period comprised between May
1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusivein the
City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent
themselves to have the capacity torecruit Filipino
workers for employment abroad.According to one of
the witnesses, Agustin, representing herself as the
manager of the CloverPlacement Agency, showed him
a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed
foroverseas employment. Salado learned that he had
to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, whichamount he
gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He
was issued the correspondingreceipt. Also, Salado,
accompanied by ve other applicants who were his
relatives, went to theoce of the placement agency at
Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin
and metthe spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of
the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learnedfrom
Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of
the original amount of P5,000.00 forthe placement fee.
Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they
subsequently agreed aslong as there was an
assurance that they could leave for abroad. Thereafter,
a receipt wasissued in the name of the Clover
Placement Agency showing that Salado and his
aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead
of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually
paid.Several months passed but Salado failed to leave
for the promised overseas employment.
ISSUE: WON there is proof that Agustin oered or
promised overseas employment to thecomplainants.
HELD: YES, the testimonial evidence hereon show that
she indeed further committed actsconstitutive of illegal
recruitment.
RATIO: All four prosecution witnesses testied that it
was Agustin whom they initiallyapproached regarding
their plans of working overseas. It was from her that
they learned aboutthe fees they had to pay, as well as
the papers that they had to submit. It was after they
hadtalked to her that they met the accused spouses
who owned the placement agency.There is illegal
recruitment when one gives the impression of having
the ability to send a workerabroad." 29 It is undisputed
that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that shehad the power or ability to send
people abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced togive her the money she demanded in
order to be so employed.
IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Maria Toledo convinced by the petitioner that she has
the authority to recruit workers for abroad and that she
can facilitate the necessary papers, gave Darvin
Php150,000 for airfare and US visa. However, she was
not given a work permit to validly work in the US.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of illegal
recruitment?
Held: There is lack of evidence that accused offered
Toledo a job. Procuring of an airfare ticket and a US
visa does not qualify illegal recruitment.
SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the
following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure,
petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make
petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to
stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioners employment contract was for a period of 12
months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999,
but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he
had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of
his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint
against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999,
declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the
complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the
above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on
the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment,
the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainants salary for three (3)
months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary
damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of
US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the
salary period of three months only rather than the
entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioners employment contract applying the subject
clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of
US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioners [b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed
overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay
= US$2,590.00/compensation per month.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA
that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the
LAs computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to
petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from
US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042
does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which
should be proven to have been actually performed, and
for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but
this time he questioned the constitutionality of the
subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on
a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it,
as directed by this Court in its Resolution which
granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of
the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the
following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have
decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable
decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue
of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal
to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment
instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations
[of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from
petitioners award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they
form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition
mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional
question raised therein.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is
unconstitutional
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be
awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part
of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary
award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that
the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed.
Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of
US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA
computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of
three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a
total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause,
petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00
awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,
equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months
and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed
at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer,
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies
them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue
should not be entertained, for this was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA,
and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he
filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A.
No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions
could not have impaired petitioners 1998 employment
contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded
petitioners contract, the provisions thereof are deemed
part of the minimum terms of petitioners employment,
especially on the matter of money claims, as this was
not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Courts Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section
3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord
all members of the labor sector, without distinction as
to place of deployment, full protection of their rights
and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the
foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be
borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or
spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of obligation to afford
protection to labor, the Court in the present case also
employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears
facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has
a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact
on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioners right to equal protection, but also her right
to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs,
regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform
rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by
the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042
introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the
money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on
their employment periods, in the process singling out
one category whose contracts have an unexpired
portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the
peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards
limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the
unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the
while sparing the other category from such prejudice,
simply because the latters unexpired contracts fall
short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of
computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system
was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioners right to equal protection, but also her right
to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is
entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay
should form part of the salary basis in the computation
of his monetary award, because these are fixed
benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner,
DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides
a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work performed
on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the days leave pay for
the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted
since the same is given during the actual service of the
seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The
subject clause or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to
the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for
the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract
consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ENGINEER RODOLFO DIAZ, accused-
appellant.
FACTS: Three women (Navarro, Fabricante, and
Ramirez) were enrolled at the Henichi Techno
Exchange Cultural Foundation in Davao City, studying
Niponggo, when they were informed by their teacher,
Mrs. Aplicador, that she knew of a Mr. Paulo Lim who
also knew of one Engineer Erwin Diaz who was
recruiting applicants for Brunei.
Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three women went
to Mr. Lim who told them that his children had already
applied with Engr. Diaz. The four women were then
accompanied by Mr. Lim to the CIS Detention Center
where Engr. Diaz was already being detained. After
Navarro and Ramirez had already given 20k as
placement fee, Fabricante went to the office of the
POEA and found out the Engr. Diaz was not licensed.
Fabricante informed the two women about her
discovery and they all withdrew their applications.
Engr. Diaz refunded their payments.
The trial court held Engr. Diaz guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON Diaz was engaged in illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES. Diaz was neither a licensee nor a holder
of authority to qualify him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement activity. Appellant told the
three women that he was recruiting contract workers
for abroad, particularly Brunei, and promised them job
opportunities if they can produce various amounts of
money for expenses and processing of documents. He
manifestly gave the impression to the three women
that he had the ability to send workers abroad.
Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of workers for
Brunei, he promised them work for a fee and
convinced them to give their money for the purpose of
getting an employment overseas.
DARVIN VS CA
G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998
FACTS: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It
stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who
was convinced by the petitioner that she has the
authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate
the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of
this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly
intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto, hence this petition.
ISSUE:WON appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment.
HELD: Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of
accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown:
(1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said
person does not have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient
evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job
to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave
the impression that she was capable of providing the
private respondent work abroad. What is established,
however, is that the private respondent gave accused-
appellant P150,000.By themselves, procuring a
passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another
individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of
private respondent, there is nothing to show that
appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the
prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion
that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged.
But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required
quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable
doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably
prove the accuseds authorship of the crime of which
he stand accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the
accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
OSCAR IRINEO, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed
as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was
assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty
from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr.
FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his
residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A
few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call
from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its
employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on
duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home
to inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived at
the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio
immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr.
Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the
evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient
to the hospital. The patient died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director
ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an
investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted
that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that
he immediately left his residence upon being informed
by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at
the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio
panicked and brought the patient to the hospital
without waiting for him.
Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable,
the management charged private respondent with
abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he
abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that
he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In
fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening
upon being informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of
private respondent, he was given a suspension for
three months effective December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision declaring the suspension of private
respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent the amount equivalent to all the
benefits he should have received during his period of
suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after
finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is
supported by the facts on record and the law on the
matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the
NLRC erroneous.
2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.
HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
portion of the assailed decision awarding moral
damages to private respondent is DELETED. All other
aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED
1. The legality of private respondents suspension: Dr.
Fabros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner
at his house, which was only a few minutes drive away
from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the
nurse on duty so that he could be easily reached in
case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr.
Acostas condition, private respondent immediately left
his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie
petitioners claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues
that being a full-time employee, private respondent is
obliged to stay in the company premises for not less
than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the
company premises during such time, even to take his
meals. We are not impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the
Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work.
The normal hours of work of any employee shall not
exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities
and municipalities with a population of at least one
million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed
capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold
regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five
(5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except
where the exigencies of the service require that such
personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48)
hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an
additional compensation of at least thirty per cent
(30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day.
For purposes of this Article, health personnel shall
include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists,
dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory
technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists,
midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic
personnel. (emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods.
Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of
Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every
employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60)
minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods.
Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of
sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for regular
meals, except in the following cases when a meal
period of not less than twenty (20) minutes may be
given by the employer provided that such shorter meal
period is credited as compensable hours worked of the
employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in
nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion;
(b) Where the establishment regularly operates not
less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or
impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be
performed on machineries, equipment or installations
to avoid serious loss which the employer would
otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary
to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest
periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty
(20) minutes shall be considered as compensable
working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does
not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it
be inferred that employees must take their meals within
the company premises. Employees are not prohibited
from going out of the premises as long as they return
to their posts on time. Private respondents act,
therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not
constitute abandonment. 2. The award of moral
damages: Not every employee who is illegally
dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a
rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended
by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive
to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy In the case at bar, there
is no showing that the management of petitioner
company was moved by some evil motive in
suspending private respondent. It suspended private
respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that
private respondents act of leaving the company
premises to take his meal at home constituted
abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of
suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that
private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.
 Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines
ROSA C. RODOLFO recruitment and placement as [a]ny act of
VS canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
498 SCRA 377 (2006) referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
Promises or offers for a fee employment is sufficient not.
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
That the first element is present in the case at bar,
Petitioner Rosa C. Rodolfo approached private there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas
complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
individually and invited them to apply for overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records
employment in Dubai. Rodolfo, being their neighbor, of the POEA do not show that Rodolfo is authorized to
Ferre and Corpus agreed and went to the formers recruit workers for overseas employment. A
office. The office bore the business name Bayside Certification to that effect was in fact issued by
Manpower Export Specialist. In that office, Ferre gave Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division
P1,000.00 as processing fee and another P4,000.00. of POEA.
Likewise, Corpus gave Rodolfo P7,000.00. Rodolfo
then told Ferre and Corpus that they were scheduled to The second element is doubtless also present.
leave for Dubai. However, private complainants and all The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, is
the other applicantswere not able to depart on the the act of passing along or forwarding of
scheduled date as their employer allegedly did not an applicant for employment after an initial interview of
arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled, but the a selected applicant for employment to a selected
result was the same. Suspecting that they were being employer, placement officer or bureau.
hoodwinked, Ferre and Corpus demanded of Rodolfo Rodolfos admission that she brought private
to return their money. Except for the refund of complainants to the agency whose owner she knows
P1,000.00 to Ferre, Rodolfo was not able to return and her acceptance of fees including those for
Ferres and Corpus money. Ferre, Corpus and three processing betrays her guilt.
others then filed a case for illegal recruitment in large
scale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Rodolfo issued provisional receipts indicating that the
Rodolfo. amounts she received from the private complainants
were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante
The RTC rendered judgement against Rodolfo but in Hinahon does not free her from liability. For
imposing the penalty, the RTC took note of the fact that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is
while the information reflected the commission of sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a
illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of fee employment to warrant conviction for
two (Ferre and Corpus) of the five complainants was illegal recruitment. Parenthetically, why Rodolfo
proven. Rodolfo appealed to the Court of Appeals accepted the payment of fees from the private
(CA). The CA dismissed the petition but modified the complainants when, in light of her claim that she
penalty imposed by the trial court. The CA also merely brought them to the agency, she could have
dismissed Rodolfos Motion for Reconsideration. advised them to directly pay the same to the agency,
she proferred no explanation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is guilty of illegal recruitment in On Rodolfos reliance on Seoron, true, the Court held
large scale that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not
make a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to
HELD: state that it is rather the undertaking
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, of recruitment activities without the necessary license
which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no or authority that makes a case for illegal recruitment.
valid license or authority required by law to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement under Article
13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
Article 34 of the Labor Code. If another element is Petitioner,
present that the accused commits the act against three vs.
or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
an illegal recruitment in a large scale.
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of
RA 10022
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and
placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus
signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for
Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
She alleged that in her employment contract,
she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997,
a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that
she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for
immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she was told
that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a
total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal
deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law
that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is
null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that
was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated
clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling
change in the circumstances that would warrant us to
revisit the precedent.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC
reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost
of her repatriation, and attorneys fees
The Court declared, once again, the clause,
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the

unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the

three-month equivalent of respondents salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract. In Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process. A
statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. The Court said that they
are aware that the clause or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is

supreme. No branch or office of the government may
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL
REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused-appellants
FACTS: In April 1993, eight (8) informations for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight
(8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-
appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together
with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses
were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco
Hernandez remained at large.1wphi1.nt
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of
illegal recruitment.
HELD: In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellants engaged in activities that fall within the
definition of recruitment and placement under the
Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they
promised overseas employment to private
complainants and required them to prepare the
necessary documents and to pay the placement fee,
although they did not have any license to do so. There
is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess
the necessary authority or license gives the impression
of having the ability to send a worker abroad. Accused-
appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure
Austrian visas for private complainants, which act did
not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the
document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they
promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private
complainants. We are not convinced. Private
complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and
Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and
Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them
overseas employment and promised them that they
would be able to leave the country on a specified date.
We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of
their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill
motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against
accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with
the Reichl spouses and the latter represented
themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful
employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the
testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused-
appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility,
especially since they corroborate each other on the
material points, i.e., that they met with the three
accused several times, that the three accused
promised to give them overseas employment, and that
they paid the corresponding placement fee but were
not able to leave the country. It has been held that
truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give
error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory. Moreover, it was
shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as
Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments
given by private complainants for the processing of
their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's
claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to
sign said document. There is no showing, whether in
his testimony or in that of his wife, that private
complainants threatened to harm them if he did not
sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an educated man and
it cannot be said that he did not understand the
contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed
his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his
obligation to ensure the departure of private
complainants and to provide them gainful employment
abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of
overseas placement made by him and his co-accused
to private complainants. The admission made by
accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to
obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not
negate the fact that they also promised to procure for
them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of the private
complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00.
However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later
date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each
complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This
is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants
received payments from the complainants not only for
securing visas but also for their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to
impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed
from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City.
Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until
September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the
Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21,
1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that
he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various
informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is
only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the
spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent
them from going to Batangas to engage in their
recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the
three accused worked as a team and they conspired
and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic
helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco
Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the
job applicants as his business partners. Karl and
Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private
complainants that they would seek employment for
them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the
payments given by the applicants to the Reichl
spouses and the latter undertook to process the
applicants' papers. There being conspiracy, each of
the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his
co-accused even if he himself did not personally take
part in its execution.