the form of damages or a finding that the law either does not apply to the party
Facts:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial
management of the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National
Power Corporation and the National Food Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the
matter of activities of GOCC and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the
President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
President Aquino issued E.O 7 strengthening the supervision of compensation
levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of excessive salaries,
allowances and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions the constitutionality of
E.O 7 in his capacity as a lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional
Office. As he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or
imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary increase and other benefits
granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making
sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and
implemented.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the
petition before the Court.
Ruling:
No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is
simply concerned about his entitlement to future salary increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued.
Salary increases are a mere expectancy volatile and dependent on various
variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase
in petitioners compensation will only depend on usual factors considered by
proper authorities was misleading and incorrect due to the concept of injury as
an element of Locus standi. He only points out the denial of a reasonable
expectation which is not a subject of harm to go against the law.
His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to
clothe his legal standing. Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible minimum
condition to trigger the exercise of judicial power.
STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI
Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that
party's participation in the case.
The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in
question, and the harm suffered will continue unless the court grants relief in
or that the law is void or can be nullified. This is called the "something to lose"
doctrine, in which the party has standing because they directly will be harmed
by the conditions for which they are asking the court for relief. A person cannot
bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be harmed by the law.
Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit,
and will dismiss the case without considering the merits of the claim of
unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law unconstitutional, there must
be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to lose in
order to sue unless it has automatic standing by action of law.
Case Digest: Amora, Jr. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011
SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice
elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for
councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not
properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in
executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of
presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had
no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.
Amora countered that:
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out
of time;
2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of
the COC;
3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the
notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the
document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members
of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the
COC be under oath.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified
Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a
ground for disqualification.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an
improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an
additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the Omnibus
Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity
of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds
for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions.
Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition
upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack
of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that
Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom
his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that accordind to the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act
in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the
instrument or document.
Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the
affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.
In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with
the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada
personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of
Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant
relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since
the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.
Castillo v Castillo G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her
subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and
contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to
Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed
Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity
of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is
the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Ratio:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the
law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in
1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,
82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83
(second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the
beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by
a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified
by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are
natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains
no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated
after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior
to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void.
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS [A.C. No.
5645. July 2, 2002]
FACTS:
Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de
Rosales, borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No.
194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her name. The lot measures 112 square
meters and is located at the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro
Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro.
When she asked her brother Manuel to return her title he refused.
Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to
the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to
the property was already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5 September 1990. The
document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October
1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book
No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied having signed any deed of
sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
Respondent admitted in his Answer that he had affixed his signature on the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial
Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on 12 September
1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint since according to him he only inadvertently signed the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was procured
through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that
he simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would not be
used for purposes other than a loan between brother and sister, and that he
affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to
obtain personal gain or to cause damage or injury to another.
ISSUE: Should the notarized documents be recorded?
RULING:
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the
necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized and
retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and
certification especially when it is a contract. The notarial registry is a record of
the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments
recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or instrument
does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt
is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that
it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this
document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the
failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is
tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when
in fact it was not.
ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA A.C. No. 6294,
November 17, 2004
Facts:
Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero to
finance and undertake the filing of a Petition for the Issuance of a Second
Duplicate Original of the Owners copy of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
4153, in the names of Sps. Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales.
On May 20, 1997, complainant purchased the said property from Marero and
had the title transferred to him and his wife. The next day, complainant
requested a certain Mrs. Adoracion Losloso and Mr. Nestor Aguirre to register
the title in the complainants name at the Assessors Office of Antipolo City.
However, they were unable to do so because the property was already
registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Inc.
On May 27, 1997, respondent Zabala notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same land, executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro Sumulong in favor of the
complainant and his wife.
Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of the land, subject of the
Deed of Sale which was notarized by respondent, with damages against the
complainant and his wife. The Deed of Sale was the same document Marero
used when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and in disbarment against the
complainant.
To clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment against
respondent. According to complainant, respondent notarized an irregular
document where one of the parties to the transaction was already dead, grossly
violating his oath as a notary public.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala was negligent in his conduct as
a notary public.
Ruling:
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein
are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as
the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that (1)
all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) they are all
personally known to him; (3) they were the same persons who executed the
instruments; (4) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before him that they
voluntarily and freely executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with
faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale
without ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same
constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will,
the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-
siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on
June 30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence
certificateof the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as
his signature as donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his
purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased
father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s].
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective
voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in
the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution
of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is
in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary
public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in
a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes
long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the
manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows
that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied
with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These
formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.
Dela Cruz vs. Dimaano [A.C. No. 7781 September 12, 2008]
Facts: In their complaint for disbarment against respondent, complainants
alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated as
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly
executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. According to
complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the
acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear,
among other things, that complainants "personally came and appeared before
him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence.
In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister,
Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased parents' property in and
sell the same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.

The respondent however argued that "he notarized the document in good faith
relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the
signatures and the community tax certificates appearing in the document were
true and correct." Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having
known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be penalized for committing violations

of his duties as a notary public.

Held: YES. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge

with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that
notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a
private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for
this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in
notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notarized
documents will be eroded.