Pakistan

Vol. 51, 2015

Annual Research
Journal

DETERMINANTS OF CHINAS FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Aftab Hussain Gillani*
Ms. Mavra Farooq
Ms. Samia Khalid

ABSTRACT
The Peoples Republic of China proclaimed in Peking on 1st October,
1949, and emerged as an Independent State. Chinas foreign policy toward South
Asia is an important as a counterbalance to the superpowers, as a sphere for
Chinas influence elsewhere. China pointed out that she turns to till toward the
US than toward the USSR. Despite Pekings [Beijing] professional for economic
and security reasons intentions with the US has higher priority for China.
Moreover Chinas foreign policy remains reactive to the both superpowers. The
Chinese foreign policy is always considered a contentious topic. There are dual
motives of the Chinese policy; the Chinese leadership reluctant to war and
willing to expand their power. Their views on peaceful coexistence mere a
tactical manoeuvres design to hinder preparation to resist Chinese aggression.
On the other hand the Chinese leadership in reality wants a peaceful coexistence
and the peace could be attain in the Far East if only other countries were willing
to cooperate with China and accept Chinese peace provisions.

KEYWORDS: foreign policy, Beijing, Moscow, dogma, revolution

* Dr. Aftab Hussain Gillani, Associate Professor, Department of Pakistan Studies,

the Islamia University of Bahawalpur,
Ms. Mavra Farooq, M. Phil. Punjab University, Lahore, Ph.D, Student
Government College University, Lahore
Ms. Saima Khalid, Assistant Professor, Department of History, the Islamia
University of Bahawalpur.
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 The apparently saw the third world as the area of greatest political
opportunity on the contemporary world scene. It was a world in flux, one in
which old political orders and alliances where crumbling and new ones were
being formed an area where new friends could be won, old balances of power
upset and powerful new alliances established.1
China has retained her foreign policy toward the third world as she is also part of
South Asia. On international level, she seeks security, recognition, national
independence, reunification and regional influence in Asia, a position as
sportsman for the Third world and recognition of chinas place as a world power-
a nation whose influence show it to be of world class importance. The three
objectives of Chinese foreign policy are: (1) opposition to hegemonism, (2) the
strengthening of unity and cooperation among third word countries, (3) the
safeguarding of world peace.2
Chinas foreign policy based on Maos famous Theory of the
Differentiation of the three World.3 China has been continued to call for third
world pressure against the developed world to equalize economic and political
advantage and thus create international stability.
China refused that it wishes to attain the leadership of the third world and
says it will never seek superpowers status (a pejorative term in the PRC Lexicon)
or try to get hegemony over others states, China saw an unprecedented chance
within enlarge multipolar world during the mid 1970s.
China evolved into the third three world theory. Winston Lord, who was
during 1969-73 a member of the national Security Councils planning staff. He
was top aide to national security Advisor of Henry Kissinger said in an interview
that The Chinese clearly had feared and suspicion of the Soviet Union and that
was one of their incentives to opening up with the United States.4 It was also
noteworthy that China had border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969.
Since 1949, China has consistently guided her relations on five
ideological concepts with the third world countries. These are (1) the theory of
contradiction, (2) the concept of the United Front, (3) The concept of the

73
centrality of armed struggle to political victory, (4) the principle of self-reliance
and (5) the concept of China as a model for development.
Three major doctrines the doctrine of Peoples War, the five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence and the Three World Theory have evolved from the basic
five ideological concepts as main role in the Chinas relations with the Third
World. The doctrine of Peoples War, presented in fully developed from in
Defense Minister Lin Piaos 1965 article, Long Live the victory of Peoples
War, had been a core concept in Maoist revolutionary thought since the early
days of the CCP. The Five principles of peaceful coexistence were officially
adopted by the PRC at the first gathering of the third world in 1955at Bandung
conference of Asian and African countries. The Three Worlds theory was
formally set forth by Peking in 1974 statement by Vice Premier Deng before the
UN General Assembly and expanded upon in Peoples Daily editorial in
November 1977.
As outlined in Maos essay in 1937 on contradiction, this theory
defined the crucial role of conflict in political affairs, going towards negative
position in any states foreign relations. The implementation of the theorys able
to identify the main contradictions of any situation. All contraptions may be
subordinated to policies aimed at solving the contradiction.
As for as Chinas concerned with the theory of contradictions, China has
been able to pursue foreign policy tactics that appear mutually contradictory but
are in fact but intended to advance international conditions towards ultimate
Chinas goal of primacy in the Third world. For example, adhering to rigid
dogmas of what constitutes true socialism, the PRC has demonstrated flexibility
in its relationship with non socialist third world states. In the early 1960s, The
Sino-Indian dispute prompted Beijing to denounce Indian Socialism as
fraudulent, but no attacks were made on such notions as African socialism and
Arab socialism.5
The United front has been advanced on an international level since the
late 1940s. for example, China supported the Algerian nationalists in an non-

74
communist united front against the French in the Algerian war for independence
and Since 1950s has promoted Arab Unity against Israel. In 1979, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, Peking took a step promoting an anti-Soviet front, with
the third world and the US.
The concept of armed struggle, China grew its experience during the
eight year struggle against Japan and the Civil war between the National and the
communists.
According to Lin Piao, the contemporary world revolution presents
a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis,
the whole course of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the
Asian, African and Latin American people. As for revolutionary wars waged by
the oppressed nations and peoples, so for from opposing them, we invariably give
them firm support and active aid.6
Lins article came as the Cultural Revolution began and confirming
Chinas position as a supporter of revolutionary armed struggle leading to an
international Communist victory. In 1970s the Three Worlds Theory and the
doctrine of the United Front provided China the explanation. China considered
the Soviet Union the greatest threat to international security, China also began to
seek dtente with the West. China has begun, although with continued doubt, to
stress the need for a pro-peace policy over the policy of anti hegemonism, that
is struggle and including armed struggle.
This Self-Reliance principle intended to remind of the dangers that lurk
in the dependence that increase out of alliances with and acceptance of aid from
stronger states. China has adopted the principle of self-reliance as central to its
foreign policy pronouncements for current modernization program despite the
economic open door to the west.
Liu Shaoqi, Second-in-Command, described in Moscow in 1949 that the
Chinese revolution as a model for underdeveloped and colonialist-dominated
Asian and African countries since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the concept
Model for Development has been deemphasized Peking has attempted to apply

75
the armed struggle aspect of the model. During the Cultural Revolution in
Omans Dhofar province, they portrayed Peking as patterning their lives around
devotion to Chairman Mao. And according to Mohammad Heikal, biographer of
Egyptian President Gamal Abdal Nasser, Mao advice Egypt in 1967 to carry on a
peoples war in the Sinai following the Egyptian defeat by the Israelis and had to
remind by Nasser that there are no people in the Sinai.
After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have diminished the concepts
of armed struggle and model for development and self reliance has been
reinterpreted.
China continued adherence to the Three Worlds Theory, it placed on
Chinas willingness to work with all governments the theory is malleable doctrine
and evolution continues in its form.
Since 1970s China adopted greater flexibility in support of international
issues as United Front concept is emphasized in favour of policy Pekings Third
World ambitions are as well as how the Second and Third Worlds linked each
other. Basically Peking tries to improve Western European Independence from
the US is hint of a desire to get together all nations against superpower
domination.
Chinese Foreign minister Huang Hua stated to the UN General Assembly
in September 1977, that the great significance of this thesis lies in the fact that it
provides the people of the world with a powerful ideological instrument with
which to identify the main revolutionary forces, the Chief enemies and the middle
forces that can be won over within the international struggle today. 7 Chinese
leaders Continued to apply the Three Worlds Theory as a powerful source to
Third world influence because it provides for China the opportunity to
participate in defining the terms of global order.8
Chinas pre-cultural revolution foreign policy divided into these periods:
1949 53, 1954-59 and 1960-65. The main issue remained security and
recognition which motivated the PRCs relations with the developed countries.

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 During 1949- 53, China was maintained a close relationship with the
Soviet Union as leader of world communism, although the seeds of discord were
increasing. Relations with the US were never worse than during this early era,
which included armed confrontation during the 1950-53 Korean War.
At a meeting in agreement with the Soviet two camp theory, first put
forward in September 1947, China leaned toward the side of international
communism to compete the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Later on,
China has faced international isolation resulting in large part from US. China got
benefit from anti-imperialist position adopted by neutral or non-communist forces
appeared to belong to Chou EN Lai, who sought establishment of broad United
Front against imperialism. Chous objectives were both the enhancement of
Chinas international influence and the establishment of a neutral belt of states
as the Zone of Peace between the western coalition and China.9 In the early
1950, Chou was able to redefine neutrality, as opposition to US influence and
rejection of anti Chinese alliance rather than as anti communist. He was
influenced by Nassers concept of positive neutralism, which advocated third
world distancing from East-West politics.
During 1954-1959 periods, China officially took Peaceful coexistence
to increase Chinas diplomatic efforts to influence third world governments,
despite the slogan of peaceful coexistence, the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) reemphasized her foreign policy toward armed struggle. By 1958, China
defined once again the East-West conflict as basically a class struggle. In the late
1950s, the Chinese concluded that active Chinese support for revolutionary
struggle was essential to third world Countries, as was the PRCs identification of
its own experience with other countries national struggle. According to Chinas
specialist Charles Neuhauser:
The Chinese have often overlooked the specifics of a given situation for more
generalized revolutionary pronouncements. They have confused local rebellion
with genuine national revolutionary movement. Indeed, one looks in vain for
discussion of Africa and the Middle East in terms of Marxian class analysis
Moreover, Peking apparently has a tendency to see analogies to the Chinese
experience where they do not in fact exist.10

77
 China has lost her credibility in the Third world countries after 1957.
Contributing to Pekings loss of advantage in the Third world was:
1- Opposition to Chinas revolutionary queue by nationalist
governments already in powers,
2- Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia for its neutralism
3- In 1959, a dispute with Indonesia over Chinese residents there,
4- Worse Sino-Indian relations over Tibet and actual fight to India
over border questions in 1958 and 1962.
5- Controversy with Egypt over the suppression of communists in
Egypt and Nassers support for anti-Communist activities in Iraq.
By 1960, china has isolated from all crucial non-communist third world
countries. Pakistan was also queued in this line because Ayubs foreign policy
turned toward pro-US rather than China.
During the 1960-1965 period of anti revisionism and anti imperialism
,China increased its of efforts to achieve influence in the Third world at both
Soviet and US on explicable level, as adopting foreign policy that explicated,
Asia, Africa and Latin America as the focus of world contradictions and
storm center of the world revolution During the 1960s, Frederick wrote that:
Maos preoccupation with the future of the Chinese revolution typified an
indecisive search for new direction with the party as a whole.11 Mao responded
in 1964 with a restatement of his 1946 division of the world into two
intermediate Zones.12( Maos talk with Anna Louise Strong, August 1946,
1969, 97-101.) It was a forerunner to the three Worlds Theory in which
developing and developed zones called for unity to form a third force which
would oppose superpower efforts to achieve international control. China wanted
that Moscow had abolished to use it military capability to serve of anti imperialist
struggles.
China desired to counter the Soviet, so China redoubled its efforts to find
allies in the third world. The Chinese Asia Africa Society was formed in May

78
1959 to aid in the forward to strengthen ties with third world governments. In
1964, and 1965, Chou visited twice time to Africa which he promoted Pekings
stated ideals of anti-imperialism, anti-revisionist and Asian-African Unity.
Chinas major goal was to counter the growth of US and Soviet influence. As
Robert C. North described that the PRCs approach was that The development
of bargain basement methods of influencing Asian, African and even Latin
American countries by economic and technical assistance and by advice on
guerrilla warfare and political and economic policy.13
In 1960s, China sought to expand relations with African revolutionary
organizations, a policy that was in 1960, fragmentary and opportunistic in the
extreme, leading China to extend support to groups that were non durable and
those that had little chance for success.14 This opportunistic and revolutionary
policy did not develop Chinas relations in the region. Chinas promotion was
successful only to Algeria, to whose nationalist leadership China had provided
support since the late 1950s and which gained its dependence in 1962.
The Afro-Asian peoples Solidarity organization became a special field
for Sino-Soviet rivalry, it started public quarrels between the Chinese and the
Soviets and their supporters. China condemned the Soviet formulas for
coexistence and disarmament and promotion of Chinese positions on armed
struggle. The second AAPSO conference, which was to have been held in Algiers
in 1964, was permanently postponed; the Algerian coup replaced Ahmed Ben
Bella with Houari Boumedienne. The haste with which china recognized the new
government in an effort to reschedule the APSO conference, despite long ties
with Ben Bella, was distasteful to several African governments and provided
further speed for a decline in Chinese influence in Africa.
China tended to concentrate their efforts in African governments who
have the greatest possibility for socialist revolution. These governments included
Mali, Ghana, Guinea and Algeria for increase Chinese influence. The Chinese
diplomats were expelled from Brund on charging of using the country as a base
to sponsor rebellion in Congo/Kinshasa (now Zaire), as well as from Niger,

79
Dahomey (Benin) the central Africa Republic and Ghana on Changes of engaging
in subversive activities.
China also sought to increase its contacts in Latin America, where
Chinas major goal was to counter Soviet influence. Except Cuba China could not
establish diplomatic ties between any Latin American Country in the early 1960s.
During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the US and the USSR, Peking
verbally supported Cuba, accusing Soviet of a Munich Policy, During the 1960,
There was not an armed movement of any consequences in Latin America that
did not receive at least implicit support from Peking.15
China established such groups as the Sino-Latin American Friendship
Association and the Chinese African Friendship Association, a subsidiary of the
PRC Association for Friendship with foreign countries. But China completely
failed to establish a position of authority inside any influential Third world group.
By 1967 the Chinese had lost administrative influence even in the AAPSO. When
the first African-Asian Latin American peoples solidarity conference was held in
Havana in January 1966, Soviet military movements prevented China from
obtaining any degree of influence in that organization.
By 1965, China lost her ties with South Asia countries, in 1962, border
conflict with India and in 1965 break diplomatic relations with Indonesia
following a communist inspired coup attempt. China had no diplomatic relations
and little contact with several Asian states including Japan, Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea. The one and only real Asian success for
China during this era was the beginning of the long and mutually beneficial
friendship with Pakistan, where China sought to counter close Soviet-Indian ties
and Pakistan sought to cover against the Indian threat. On 2 March 1963,
Pakistan foreign minister, Bhutto achieved his major victory to conclude a Sino-
Pakistan boundary agreement that became the cornerstone of Pakistans strongest
Asian alliance. On the whole china has failed to develop relations with African
and third world countries. According to China scholar George Yu, writing in
1966, Chinas failure in Africa, was due to

80
 The basic incompatibility between Chinese Foreign policy objectives and
the goals of the African status. Verbally, China has supported Africas quest for
political and economic independence and international acceptance and
recognition, but actually she has attempted to induce the African states to accept
fully her world view and major policy objectives. This is the vast majority of the
African states have been unfulfilling to do.16

In China, the failure of the Great leap forward (1957), Political

differences resulting from the first five year economic plan (1953-57) and were
disorder of the cultural revolution. The Chinese communist experiment was in
process of destroying itself.
Pekings major focus during the period [Cultural Revolution] was on
internal problems rather than on external relations. According to Asian scholar
Chalmers Johnson, Maos desire to elevate the anti colonialist struggle to
historical significance in its own right lies at the ideological base of Peoples
War. 17
During the 1969 1971 periods, was a transition from chinas
revolutionary to post revolutionary foreign policies. As the Cultural Revolution
ended and China reduced aid and verbal support for revolutionary movements.
Her basic aim was remained to end its international isolation in world in which
the power balance appeared to be shifting in favour of the Soviet Union.
In 1968, Soviet attacked Czechoslovakia of a fellow communist state
through the Brezhnev Doctrine, vividly contributed to a new Chinese openness to
the west. Moreover, President Lyndon Johnsons peace offer to Vietnam was
seen by Peking as the welcome come out from US pressure at a time when Sino-
Soviet relations were highly worsened. In November 1968, China reviewed of
Warsaw talks with the US, but the talks did not resume until 1970.
Lillian highlighted that despite the fact that Chinas perception of a
threat from the Soviet Union had been growing through the 1960, China still
described the United States as the the number one enemy.18 In 1968, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, Premier Chou made the first Chinese reference to

81
Soviet Social- Imperialism and the Soviet became in Chinas view the greatest
threat to world peace and security.
Nonetheless, Chou did not get outside tensions between them and the
Soviets. In move to relieve serious tension Sino-Soviet border clashes in March
1969, the Chinese invited Alexsel Kosygin to visit Peking. This event also served
to demonstrate to the third would that the PPC was not interested in throwing her
into the US Camp.
During the next ten years, china tended distance from the Soviet and the
emergence of ties with the US. Ten Hsiao-Ping [Deng Xiaoping] called publicly
for a Long term, strategic relationship with the US, a step achieved a de facto
Sino-US alliance.
After 1969, the beginning of a new era in Chinas foreign and domestic
policies. The Soviet Union was seen as overwhelm over the US, USSRs policy
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Combined with growing Soviet pressure on Chinas
borders, reduced the threat of US imperialism to a secondary position in relation
to the dangers of Soviet hegemonism.
Defence Minister Lin Piao preferred to oppose both superpowers and
stress to maintain internal policy. As the struggle between the two approaches to
security intense, Mao established its ties with the US by inviting the US table
tennis team to visit China in 1971, which was also called Ping Pong diplomacy.
President R. Nixon visited to Peking was the climax of Chous diplomatic efforts
to move China of escape from isolation. From the 1969-71 period, Yahya Khan
carried out meeting between the US and China. And it was Chou En lain rather
than Mao who figured in the 1971-77 Beijing discussion with president Nixon
and US national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Chous objectives was not
alignment with the US anymore than with the USSR. In the border clash of 1969
with Moscow, it was Chou who pushed opening of talks with the USSR.
After the death of Mao in 1976, Gang of four purged resisted opposition
of Chou to their radical domestic programs. In 1972, Qiao Guanhua foreign
minister stated at the UN general Assembly that China continued to adhere to

82
the theory of Just wars reflects this domestic debate over the direction of
foreign policy.19
Chou En Lai had served as the great mediator between groups in the
Chinese communist party (CCP) almost 40 years and he will be remembered as
the greatest Chinese statesman of the past two centuries.
Before set future international relations, the issue of Mars succession had
to be solved. According to US state Department China analyst carol Lee Hamrin,
two antagonistic power coalitions, the radical Maoists and the Moderate Maoists
were identifiable in the mid 1970s.20 These two groups sought to take over after
Maos death. Chou En Lai and Deng may be identified with the moderates and
Hua Goufeng and Mao himself with the radical group.
CHINAS FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES IN THE 1970S
After 1969, Chinas foreign policy brought major changes from the
foreign policy positions of the 1960s. Firstly, the transfer of the title Public
enemy number one from the US to the Soviet Union Secondly ideology play a
minor role than in 1960s as China sought to create alliance with all those who
opposed the Soviet Circle. By the end of 1970s, chinas foreign policy dimension
had become more delay definable. A strategic re assessment was made, in this
way the encirclement theory of the Third world, China pointed out three areas.
Where she perceived a major threat Indochina, the Middle East and the waterway
stretching from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean. According Harry
Harding, some Chinese leaders have taken this view but were prevented by the
Gang of Fours control of the press from showing it publicly. Europe had faced
crisis direct confrontation with the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
China felt that the USSR was now engaging in a policy of Strategic encirclement
which would allow her (USSR) to gain control of the Middle East aid fields and
supply routes and got naval predominance in the Indian and pacific oceans. In
1979 invasion of Afghanistan, proved Beijing that the USSR was engaging in
expansion policy. In 1970s, China reestablished her relations with Cuba and

83
Vietnam and China described them as Moscows Catspaws and Trojan
horses in the Third world of foreign policy.
There are some guidelines of foreign policy on which parameters China
worked during the 1970s.
1- REESTABLISH OF THE PUSH FOR THIRD WORLD
LEADERSHIP

China enhanced its security and independence as a responsible member of

the international security China adopted three worlds theory in the mid-1970s.
Behind this theory China keep nostalgia in leadership of the late 1950s, when
china took a position as a growing third world power was acceded by other states
and Chinese domestic and revolutionary achievements were respected. The Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were now strengthened by more specific
policy. Moreover, china enhanced its position as UN membership and its
permanent seat on the Security Council.
2- DEVELOP POLITICAL POTENTIAL IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

The PRC joined a number of international organizations and groupings in

the 1970s especially those who affiliated with the UN. China as a newly member,
she limited its roles in most groups. Unfamiliarity and lack of experience with the
working of international organizations a desire to avoid making hostile third
world as in the Past were reflected in this new hesitancy. China did not use its
UN Security Council veto even once during 1970s.
Cuba became member of the Non-Aligned movement in 1970; her efforts
were toward pro Soviet. China had feared that a pro-Soviet non-Aligned would
help Vietnam consolidate its hold on Indochina and increase the USSRs use of
Cuba to influence the third world. After the expiration of the Sino-Soviet
friendship treaty in 1980, china did not offer to join. China was seeking to
influence the course of that organization through her allies such as Egypt and
Pakistan.

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3- STRESS ON THE CENTRALITY OF DIPLOMATIC TIES
INSTEAD OF ARMED STRUGGLE

China returned her ambassadors to their posts in 1969 and started

development of official relations with almost all countries except Israel and South
Africa. During January 1970 to December 1980, China has established her
relations with 77 additional countries, She desires to maintain good diplomatic
ties, Peking reduced its support to third world revolutionary groups including
communist parties. China did not support in Latin America and Africa such as the
Eritrean Liberation Front, to which the PRC stopped aid in 1970 in order to
establish diplomatic ties with Ethiopia .China was terminated aid to the Peoples
Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) because of the
opposition of Iran. China also did not verbal or economic help to Pakistan in the
into-Pakistan war 1971. The reason was that, India signed treaty with the USSR
and she China0 adopted policy of diplomatic ties and refused armed struggle. But
the PRC continued to support for communist internationalism to give aid to
communist parties in Thailand, Burma, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.
4- REDEFINITION OF SELF-RELIANCE
Under this definition, China continued to control of the outside danger,
but advised the Third world states to select aid carefully, with the understanding
that the developed countries had an obligation to assist those countries who had
been exploited by capitalism and colonialism. This new concept of definition
promoted self-help and mutual support. Since China defined as collective self
reliance. In the late 1970s, self-reliance gave explanation for a major cut in
chinas international aid programmes as Chinas own modernization programs
were given priority.
5- DECREASE AS A MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT
In the 1970s, reassessment of Maoist economic policies brought about the
reevaluation of Chinas actual position in the international development. Peking
did not stop its early revolutionary experience, the emphasis turned to Chinas

85
ability to guide third world through application of certain aspects of Chinas early
revolutionary experience and to help third world learn from Chinas recent
errors from cultural revolution.
6- REVIVAL EFFORTS TOWARD TO REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
During 1970s, China took up Chous political efforts and established
diplomatic ties with Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Malaysia and reduction in
favour for Asian communist parties depicted this trend as China valued the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) China made efforts to settle
border demarcation question with India, Burma, Nepal and Vietnam.
Chinas stance on the Taiwan issues from the 1970s related to her
regional leadership. China referred to reunification with Taiwan instead of
liberation. In 1970s, Chinas influence in Asia extended through Cultural
economic and political ties. In 1972, China developed diplomatic ties with Japan
and India. In 1979 Chinas invasion of Vietnam revived fears of militant China.
During the 1970s decade, Chinese foreign and domestic policies
fluctuated openness to the west and controlled economic and social policies. A
Peking Review article of January 1984 attributed the basic principles of chinas
foreign policy to Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai, described China Unique style
of independent foreign diplomacy and outlined five main aspects of foreign
policy. These are (1) independence from any big power or bloc or pressure from
any big nation, (2) the development of relations will all countries on the basis of
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, (3) oppose hegemonism, (4) to
strengthening of unity with third world, (5) the open door policy of economic
flexibility.
Chinas policy consist of anti hegemonism, keep China from outside
control, strengthen itself internally and internationally, built alliance who
opposed Soviet policies, and Soviets threat of the encirclement and
containment theory. Although China changed her foreign policies principles, as
she became UNs member and Security Councils permanent member but
Chinese representative Chiao Kuan-hau stated in the UN Security Council:
that the soviet Government is the boss behind the Indian aggressors. The

86
Indian government is an outright aggressor. Now China emphasized on the
centrality of diplomatic ties but in the war of 1971 China played crucial role,
pointed out Indian hegemonism and aggressions in which the Soviet played a
dark horse in this war.
China stressed the common experience of the struggle against
imperialism, hegemonism, Colonialism, the racism and the mutual interest in
safeguarding national independence and developing national economics with
Pakistan. During 1970s, China described the land bridge from India west side to
Turkey as Soviet in South ward. For the PRC, Pakistan is a major buffer between
Chinas western side and the Soviet. China has used Pakistans good offices to
make better or improve tensions with other countries, including Iran and the US.
Pakistan is a leader in the Islamic conference organization and the Non-Aligned
movement as well as in the UN, and Peking supports Pakistan in its pro Islamic
and anti-Soviet politics, expects to continue to use its ties to Pakistan to
strengthen relations with international and nonaligned group.
During Bhutto era, Pakistan has developed its diplomatic ties with China.
Although China had changed her policy principles due to many factors in 1970,
these are revival of the push for the leadership third world, enter in international
organization, emphasis of diplomatic ties and declined Armed Struggle, redefine
self reliance renewed efforts towards regional leadership and against the Soviet
Union.
China is truly the economic miracle of the twentieth century and a
beacon of hope for peace in the East and keeps it safe from intrusion of the
west.21 China under this foreign Principles has established diplomatic relations
with more than 60 countries (from 1970 to 1977) 22
. China sought to establish
diplomatic relations with foreign Government which is willing to observe the
principle of equality territorial integrity and sovereignty.
In the economic issue, China adopted do as I say not as I do position in
international organization. By end of 1970s, Chinas development model of self-
reliance had emphasized its on national economy. When Peking entered in UN,
China new world economic order foundations. Peking expressed her support for

87
the New International Economic Order in its own press and in statements before
the US, starting with Deng Xiaopings address before six special session of the
UN general Assembly in 1974. China gave favour for a redistribution of global
economic resources, support for the formation of regional global economic raw
material organizations throughout the third world and more equitable control over
maritime and subsea resources, ways to stabilize the prices of third world
products and methods to renegotiate developing countries heavy debts. When
China became member of UN, in its first decade of participation Pekings actions
were more symbolic than substantive, more political than functional.23
CONCLUSION
To conclude this article, how China played a role, so Chinas foreign
policy toward third world especially Pakistan and her neighbour countries has
established a stable political environment and promoting economic development.
China extended participation in the international economy and inform of
responsible power willing to contribute to stability and cooperation in Asia. If
superpowers retain their involvement in the region, China will lack the military
power to awe into submission its neighbors. Thus, unless unforeseeable vacuums
of power develop in Asia, it is difficult to conceive that China is acquiring the
hegemonic role that the US long had in west or that the USSR plays in Eastern
Europe and in the communist bloc. Whatever the direction of Chinas future
policy in Asia, it is almost certain that Peking will want to play and independent
role, unconstrained by formal alliances. The Chinese are also remain a provide
people with a deep sense of their own greatness and a sense of reluctance rival
interests what. They perceive as their primary arena. The Chinese never inspired
by a pan-Asian ideology such as Japanese took during their imperial expansion in
the first half of the twentieth century. But the leaders of the PRC always will
continue to strengthen relations with Pakistan. Especially during the 1970-77
period, in which Pakistan played a role of bridge between the US and China, to
develop their relations and decrease constrains between them.

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 REFERENCES

1 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Pekings support for wars of
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2 Peking Review, August 9, 1982.
3 Peoples Daily editorial in Peking Review, November 4, 1977. Mao divided the world
into three spheres. (1) the two superpowers, the US and the USSR, (2) the
developed world of Europe and Japan; (3) the third world included socialist, the
oppressed and the developing countries Mao described the third world as the
main force in struggle against imperialism and hegemonies and said that, the
Second world oppresses and exploits the third, it is itself controlled and bullied
by the superpowers, when the third world exploited by the second, the third
world unite with it in the common struggle for self determination.
4 Ibid.
5 Ishwer C, Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of
Cultural Despair, (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press1969), p. 200
6 Lin Piao Long Live the victory of Peoples war, (Peking: Foreign Language press.
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7 UN Document A/32/PV, 3 September 29, 1977.
8 Bruce D Larkin, China and the Third world in Global Perspective, In James C.
Hsiung and Samuel S. Kin, eds., China in the Global Community, (New York: Praeger,
1980)
9 Shao Kuo Kang Chou En Lais Diplomatic Approaches Non-Aligned States in Asia:
1953-60, China Quarterly, No.78. , (1979), p. 324
10 Charles Neuhauser, , Third World politics: China and the Afro-Asian Peoples
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11 Frederick C. Teiwes, Chinese Politics 1949-65: A changing Mao, part 1, Current
Scene 12, No.1. (1974), p. 6
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13 Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China, 3rd ed. (North Scituate, mass:
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14 Charles Neuhauser. Op. cit. p. 62
15 Robert L Worden, Chinas Foreign Relations in Latin America, in C. T. Hsueh, ed.,
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16 Georg T Yu, Chinas Failure in Africa, Asian Survey 6, No.8. (1966), 468
17 Charles Johnson, Autopsy on Peoples war, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California
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18 Lillian Craig Harris The Washington Papers/112 chinas Foreign Policy toward the
Third World, (Washington: Georgetown University 1984), pp. 41-42
19 Ibid. p. 44
20 Carol Lee Hamrin,. Competing Policy Packages In Post-Mao China, Asian Survey
24, No.5 (1984), 489
21 Mushtaq Ahmed, Foreign Policy Pakistans Options, (Karachi: Royal Book company
1995), p. 58
22 SHI, Quin, China, 1998, (Beijing: New Star Publishers 1998), pp 62-63
23 Samuel S Kim, China, The United Nations and World order, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), p. 280

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