RULE 12 CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT, PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES AND

INSTRUMENTS

AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
VIII, Tacloban City,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte,

PONENTE: ROMERO, J.:

The confiscation proceedings under AO No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised penal code"
which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. despite the order of release "the truck can be
seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truck and the driver as co-
accused which complainant has done as manifested before the lower court or by enforcing AO No. 59. Section
thereof categorically states that the confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without
prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person who used the
conveyance in the commission of the offense.

FACTS

Police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was
driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded.

A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he
ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the DENR filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge
alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A 1and Administrative Order
No. 59, Series of 1990. He claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite
the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint.

In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that
Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow
blocks. On his way home, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber and deliver the same
at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a barangay high school building. They
were apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. Both the lumber and the truck were ordered deposited at the
police station of Hinunangan.

The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that a formal investigation be
conducted. In the Resolution, the Court resolved to refer the case to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao,
Jr, for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.

During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but sent his representatives, DENR lawyer
Constantino Esber and legal assistant Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel. However,
on the third hearing date, respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a stroke and was hospitalized.
Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the
turnover of the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the DENR.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Omipon has the authority to release said truck and thus be free from any disciplinary action.

RULING

Yes, Judge Omipon has the authority to release the truck.

We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable,
hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary sanction.

In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in
the event accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted.
Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck

We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation
and satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705
and Adm. Order No. 59. The confiscation proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 6 is different from the
confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction.
Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and
motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the
lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation
of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed
against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense." There
being no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be visited with
disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San Juan, Southern Leyte.

SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts

In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac, Palawan, a combined team of Philippine
Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V
Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats and a long fishing net
already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew
composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion.

Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1) Violation of Section 97[7] of Republic Act (RA) No. 8550[8] against all
those arrested, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-032; (2) Violation of Section 90[9]of the same law against the captain of F/V Sea
Lion, the Chief Engineer, and the President of the corporation which owned said vessel, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061;
and (3) Violation of Section 27(a) and (f)[10] of RA 9147[11] and of Section 87[12] of RA 8550 against all those arrested and
the President of the corporation which owned the vessel, respectively docketed as I.S. Nos. 2004-68, 2004-69, and 2004-
70.

Ruling of the Provincial Prosecutor

While the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed I.S. Nos. 2004-61, 2004-68 and 2004-69, he nevertheless found
probable cause for the remaining charges[13] but only against the 17 Chinese fishermen.[14] This was after it was found
out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the
crew of the F/V Sea Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew, unarmed,
outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives
and property which hindered them from asserting their authority over these Chinese nationals. Accordingly,
corresponding Informations against the 17 Chinese fishermen were filed in court.

With the crew of F/V Sea Lion now exculpated, petitioner Sea Lion Fishing Corporation filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor an Urgent Motion for Release of Evidence[15] alleging that it owns the vessel. Said Office thus
issued a Resolution[16] dated August 25, 2004, viz:

Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.

The Chinese nationals entered separate pleas of "not guilty" for both offenses. Later, however, in Criminal Case No.
18965, they changed their pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty" for the lesser offense of Violation of Section 88, sub-
paragraph (3) of RA 8550. Hence, they were accordingly declared guilty of said lesser offense in a Sentence by RTC/

On January 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision denying the petition.
Thus, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the sole issue of whether the confiscation of F/V Sea
Lion was valid.[33]

Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the registered owner of said vessel and her
captain and crew members were not among those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. To
buttress its contention, petitioner invokes Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be
the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce
shall be destroyed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due process of law when it was not notified of the judicial
proceedings relative to the confiscation of the fishing vessel. It argues that such notification was necessary considering
that the provincial prosecutor was duly informed of its claim of ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that
since the 17 Chinese nationals were charged with violations of the provisions of RA 8550, a special law, Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply. This is in view of Article 10 of said Code which specifically declares that acts
punishable by special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. They are only supplementary to
such laws unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. Hence, the forfeiture and confiscation of the fishing
vessel under RA 8550 are different from the forfeiture and confiscation under the Revised Penal Code which are
additional penalties imposed in the event of conviction. And, since RA 8550 provides that the vessel used in connection
with or in direct violation of the provisions of RA 8550 shall be subjected to forfeiture in favor of the government
without mention of any distinction as to who owns the vessel, the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion was proper.

Issue: W/N the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.

Ruling Yes.
We note, at the outset, that petitioner pursued an incorrect remedy when it sought recourse before the CA. The filing of
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA is limited only to the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.[34] "A special civil action for certiorari is an
independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."[35] The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion

We also agree with the CA's observation that the trial court impliedly recognized petitioner's right to intervene when it
pronounced that petitioner failed to exercise its right to claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion. This being the case,
petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of a petition for certiorari before the CA. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, certiorari is unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not supported by any proof on record. The only document on record
that is relevant in this regard is a request for the release of the F/V Sea Lion based on petitioner's alleged ownership
filed with the Provincial Prosecutor. While the latter authorized the release of said fishing vessel, this was conditioned
upon petitioner's submission of a proof of ownership and the filing of a bond, with which petitioner failed to comply.
Even when judicial proceedings commenced, nothing was heard from the petitioner. No motion for intervention or any
manifestation came from petitioner's end during the period of arraignment up to the rendition of sentence. While
petitioner later explained before the CA that its inaction was brought about by its inability to put up the required bond
due to financial difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification for it to deliberately not act at all.

Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner
filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support
the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed
for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual issue - to be proved by proper evidence
in order to be properly considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the
accused. Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the
admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, we
believe and so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the
alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court.[43]

Accordingly, petitioner's recourse to a motion for reconsideration was not proper. Although it attached a copy of an
alleged Certificate of Registration, the same cannot be considered by the trial court because it has not been formally
offered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As suggested by the CA, petitioner should have instead
moved for a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect, rather than a mere motion for
reconsideration.[44]

Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner
filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support
the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed
for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual issue - to be proved by proper evidence
in order to be properly considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the
accused. Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the
admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, we
believe and so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the
alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court.

In fine, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that F/V Sea Lion was used by the 17 Chinese fishermen in the
commission of the crimes. On the other hand, petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim of ownership
of F/V Sea Lion. Therefore, the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper.

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, MTCC, PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, respondent.
VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
The administrative complaint against Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan relates to an order he has issued, authorizing, prior to the
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of a criminal case, the release of seized evidence to movants who claim ownership
thereof.
Several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as The Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998 . The items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c) 1 unit light
(500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish. Three
days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal
fishing activity, filed an Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net, alleging that the fish net which costs no less than P600,000.00
was left unattended at the beach exposed to the elements and movements of the sea which could cause its early deterioration
and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, granted the motion in his order.
The public prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a motion for reconsideration. Instead of deciding the pending motion, respondent
Judge deferred its resolution until after the arraignment of the accused and the pretrial of the case would have been had. [
Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge for Gross Misconduct with
Prayer for Preventive Suspension asseverating that the release of the evidence had exposed said evidence to tampering and that
the deferment of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration virtually resulted in the undue archive of the case.
In his comment, respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the accused were charged with having
transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being presented since it had sufficient witnesses
for the purpose.

Isse: WON the contention of the respondent was correct

Held: No.
The attempt at justification must fail.
As the Office of the Court Administrator has so correctly pointed out, while it can be argued that the remedy is judicial in nature
or that the case involves an error in judgment, Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court (however), is much too elementary to
be brushed aside (and that) x x x the existence of a judicial remedy does not (necessarily) preclude resort to an administrative
remedy. Nowhere in the statute would it appear that the seizure of the items, alleged to have been used in the illegal fishing
activity, is proscribed by it. Evidently, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an incident to a lawful
arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The seized items ordered released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence; hence, the prosecution, not the
court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to have the responsibility over such items. The pronouncement by the
Court in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeal is instructive; viz:
x x x The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. If found to be contraband, i.e., articles
the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime and the repossession of which would subject defendant to criminal
penalties and frustrate the express policy against the possession of such objects, they will not be returned, but shall be
confiscated in favor of the State or destroyed, as the case may be. If not contraband, the property shall be returned without
undue delay to the person who appears from the evidence to be the owner or rightful possessor.
While, verily, respondent Judge has committed a fundamental error, no proof, however, is extant or has been proffered to also
establish that he has acted with malice or in bad faith.

FACTORAN V. CA
Ponente: J. De Leon Jr.
FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000
board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent
Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation
Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them,
and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the
documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267,
while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been
accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log
Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the
buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or transportation
of lumber to be supported by the following documents:

1 Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant
District Forester;
2 Sales Invoice;
3 Delivery Receipt; and
4 Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-
wheeler truck.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order
for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President.
Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised
to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale
of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale
and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin)
supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx
[n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G.
Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject
properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He
then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their
intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a
cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the
Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash
counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The
trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul
the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order
(TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners
of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that
the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec.
1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based on a
written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition
and lifting the preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of
any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days
from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head
may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the
Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given
an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It
held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it
is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of
Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ
should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the
private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held in
custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in
custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and
independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time
of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal
prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no
investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus,
disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated
was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990
were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders
dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to
render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby
permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against petitioners.

Mamento vs Magumun (bellosillo)

Facts:

On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Tabuk, Kalinga, tasked with the
enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with Plate No. PJC-321 loaded with narra flitches
wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles and cartons. Confronted by the forestry employees, Villamor
Martinez, driver of the van, could not produce any legal permit authorizing him to transport the narra lumber. Hence, after
issuing seizure receipts, the vehicle and its load of narra flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry employees.
On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation of Sec. 78 of P.D. 705 as amended, and implemented by DENR Administrative Order 59. On 24 July
1996, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by the DENR
Regional Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority to administratively order the confiscation and forfeiture of lumber
possessed without permit including its conveyance.
Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its agent Aimardo V. Interior, filed a case for recovery of
personal property and damages with application for writ of replevin with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
against herein complainants. The trial court issued a warrant of seizure of personal property directing its sheriff to take hold of
the van and its contents.
On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff Jacinto Contapay of RTC-Br. 1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and
agents of the Philippine National Police, went to the office of the DENR in Tabuk, Kalinga, to enforce the warrant issued by the
trial court but the forestry employees and officials refused to release the van on the ground that it had already been forfeited in
favor of the government and was now in custodia legis. Despite this explanation, on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
accompanied this time by Sheriff John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, and twenty (20) other
persons, took the van without permission of the employees and officials of the DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse of the
five-day period prescribed by law for filing an opposition to the writ, the vehicle was delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of
SMC.
In his comment, Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his ministerial duty to execute the warrant in accordance with
its mandate and his duties as sheriff under the Rules of Court and the Manual for Clerks of Court.He conceded that he was
informed by the forestry employees and officials of the forfeiture of the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure but he reasoned
that it was not within his discretion to withhold the implementation of the warrant.The execution of a warrant of seizure on a
vehicle allegedly forfeited in favor of the government was a question of law too technical for him to resolve[6] and faced with
such a dilemma he opted to follow the order of the court and execute the warrant in accordance with its mandate.
On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very literal interpretation of Sec. 4, Rule 60, of the
Rules of Court as amended. The OCA noted that while Rule 60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed
by the defendant in the replevin that the personal property to be seized has been forfeited in favor of the government and is
already in custodia legis, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the warrant of
seizure. The appropriate action should have been for respondent to inform his judge of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs
Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.[9] For such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA
recommended that Sheriff Magumun be penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at the very least.

Issue:

Whether or not Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the warrant of seizure?

Ruling:
Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the warrant of seizure .Respondent was
placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure had already been confiscated by another
government agency and forfeited in favor of the government. However, the novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use
his discretion and justify his insistence on taking the property subject of the warrant without waiting for instructions from his
judge. A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of
the attached property, much less does he have any discretion to decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority
over the matter at hand.

When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.However, the prompt implementation of a warrant
of seizure is called for only in instances where there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where the
plaintiff has shown by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of the property; that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution or attachment, or if
so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure,then the executing officer has no other recourse but to execute the warrant or writ
expeditiously.

In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property had been impounded due to violation of
forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was advised that the proper
remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR. The prudent recourse
then for respondent was to desist from executing the warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.
Instead, Deputy Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue haste as evidenced by
the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of seizure on the DENR officials to the time of his precipitate
seizure of the van. A warrant could be returned within a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after
its receipt by the executing officer.[15] Within this time frame, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge
and thereafter execute the warrant judiciously and with more certainty.

True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and expeditiously, but equally
true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with propriety and
decorum and act above suspicion.[16] There must be no room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as
officers of the court have conspired with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The
sheriff is the front line representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.

As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier
taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and
forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs,
as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts
writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their
office and the efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found guilty of grave misconduct and, as recommended, is
fined P5,000.00 for arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal property and for ignorance of the proper
procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the personal property to be recovered has already been seized and
forfeited in favor of the government for violation of forestry laws. Respondent is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will merit a more severe sanction.

BASIANA MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION VS DENR SECRETARY (rule 12)

PONENTE: REYES, J.,

FACTS:
Petitioner BMEC, headed by its President Basiana, applied on July 31, 1997 for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
with the DENR for the extraction of nickel and other minerals covering an area of 6,642 hectares in Tubay and Jabonga, Agusan
del Norte, docketed as MPSA (XIII)-00014.6

Assignment of rights:
1. Pending approval of its application, BMEC, on April 29, 2000, assigned to Manila Mining Corporation (Manila Mining)
all its rights and interest in MPSA (XIII)-00014, with the latter acknowledging BMEC as the real and true owner of said
application.
2. Manila Mining, in turn, assigned on October 17, 2005, its rights and interest to SRMI.
3. On October 18, 2005, Basiana and SRMI executed a Memorandum of Agreement where SRMI agreed, to undertake
technical and geological tests, exploration and small-scale mining operations of the site subject of MPSA (XIII)-00014.
Necessary permits and certificates were then issued by the DENR and the Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte
to SRMI, San R Construction Corporation (San R) and Galeo Equipment Corporation (Galeo).
4. Consequently, SRMI, using BMEC's application, applied for an MPSA for the extraction of nickel, iron and cobalt on
Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The application was docketed as APSA-000014-XIII.
DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order against the mining operations due to excess in annual production, maximum
capitalization and labor cost to equipment utilization.

The Minerals Development Council, on December 7, 2006, also advised SRMI, San R and Galeo to immediately stop all mining
activities in Tubay, which were conducted under the pretext of small-scale mining.

Basiana then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City on May 15, 2007 for rescission of contract, abuse
of rights and damages against SRMI.

the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), on January 10, 2008, recommended the approval of APSA-000014-
XIII filed by SRMI.
Thus, BMEC and Basiana filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA) a petition to deny and/or disapprove and/or
declare the nullity of the application for MPSA and/or cancellation, revocation and termination of MPSA.

Pending resolution of the protest before the MGB-POA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR Secretary
entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII with SRMI for the development and commercial utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other
associated mineral deposits in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the issuance of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII on the grounds that (1)
"there was clear violation of due process and the entire proceedings was railroaded and suited for the benefit of [SRMI]," and
that (2) the approval of the application is a patent nullity and/or absolutely without any factual and legal basis.

CAS FINDINGS:
1. the petition for review filed by the petitioners cannot be treated as a special civil action for certiorari for lack of
jurisdictional grounds.
2. The approval by the DENR Secretary of SRMFs application does not involve a quasi-judicial function since both the
petitioners and SRMI are still applicants and there was yet an adjudication of rights between them.
3. The petition for review was premature due to the absence of any decision or resolution rendered by a competent body
exercising a quasi-judicial function and the petitioners should have exhausted all administrative remedies available
before it filed the petition for review.
4. Even if it were to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, it failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the DENR Secretary when it entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII. Citing Celestial Nickel Mining
 Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, the CA ruled that it is the DENR Secretary that has jurisdiction to
cancel existing mining agreements.
5. The petitioners to have committed forum shopping as the petition for review was filed despite the pendency of the
protest with the MGB-POA.

ISSUE:
WON the courts have the power to cancel MPSA

HELD:
NO. the power to approve and enter into agreements or contracts rests primarily with the DENR Secretary. Perforce, the power
to cancel an MPSA likewise lies with the DENR Secretary. Given that it is the DENR Secretary that has the primary jurisdiction
to approve and cancel mining agreements and contract, it is with the DENR Secretary that the petitioners should have sought
the cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not with the courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction instructs that if a case
is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had.

The DENR Secretary, no doubt, is under the control of the President; thus, his decision is subject to review of the latter.
Consequently, the petitioners should have appealed its case to the Office of the President under A.O. No. 18, series of 1987,
instead of directly seeking review by the court.

In the case of the DENR Secretary, its power to approve and enter into a MPSA is unmistakably administrative in nature as it
springs from the mandate of the DENR under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that "[t]he [DENR] shall
x x x be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources."

Contrary to the petitioners' position, the determination by the DENR Secretary as to (1) the propriety of the MGB Director's
recommendation of approval, and (2) the qualification of SRMI to undertake development and its compliance with the law, does
not involve the exercise of quasi-judicial power. Note that under Section 41 of DENR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 96-40,
initial evaluation of an application for an MPSA is made by the MGB Regional Office in the area covered by the application.
Thereafter, the application will be reviewed by the MGB Director for further evaluation. It is only after the MGB Director has
evaluated the application that the same will be forwarded to the DENR Secretary for final evaluation and approval. In approving
an MPSA, the DENR Secretary does not determine the legal rights and obligations of adversarial parties, which are
necessary in adjudication. In fact, it is only after an application is approved that the right to undertake the project
accrues on the applicant's part, and until then, no rights or obligations can be enforced by or against any party. Neither
does the DENR Secretary resolve conflicting claims; rather, what is involved here is the determination whether a certain
applicant complied with the conditions required by the law, and is financially and technically capable to undertake the contract,
among others. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., the Court stated that the powers
granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (natural resources) by law such as granting of licenses, permits, leases
and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or canceling applications, are all executive and administrative in nature. It
even further ruled that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts.

VIRGINIA M. GUADINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164891 June 6, 2011
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Provincial Treasurer of Quezon directed the Municipal Treasurer to conduct a public bidding for the materials to be used in the
repair and construction of Navotas Bridge. As a result of the bidding, the contract was awarded to V.M. Guadines Construction
Supply.
Purchaser Order No. 2019 for construction materials was issued. The materials consisting of lumber were stockpiled along the
road about five meters away from the Navotas Bridge, and received by Azaula. Azaula was then a Barangay Chairman
A team of DENR officials/forest rangers confiscated seventy-three (73) pieces of Macaasim which were stockpiled alongside the
Polillo-Burdeos road at Barangay Sibulan, approximately five meters away from the Navotas Bridge.
These forest products were confiscated in favor of the government pending submission of certain required documents. No
person or entity was apprehended as owner/possessor of the lumber. Since Azaula volunteered to take custody as a public
official in the locality, the CENR decided to turn over the seized lumber to him

the Sangguniang Bayan of Polillo resolved to formally request the DENR Regional Director to donate the seized lumber so it can
be used for the delayed repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge. The logs remained stockpiled near the said bridge,
apparently abandoned by its owner.

Later however, the Sanggunian passed a resolution requesting DPWH to send their personnel to work on the repair and
construction of the Navotas Bridge in the earliest possible time.

By February 5, 1993, the repair and construction of Navotas Bridge was finished. Disbursement Voucher authorizing the
Provincial Treasurer to pay V.M. Guadines was prepared. Petitioner received the payment for the lumber and other materials
she delivered for the repair and construction of Navotas Bridge.

In a Memorandum, CENR Polillo Station OIC Salvosa reported that despite warnings from forest rangers, workers headed by
Engr. Nierva of the PEO utilized the confiscated lumber in the construction of Navotas Bridge. Salvosa further informed the
CENRO that while Engr. Nierva claimed to be acting on official instructions from the Provincial Governor, they were not
furnished any copy of such directive or instruction.

In a letter dated, CENRO dela Cruz asked Azaula to explain why he should not be charged with estafa and malversation for
disposing the confiscated lumber without legal authority or clearance from the DENR Secretary.

CHARGED Azaula et al with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Criminal Case No. 20878) reads:

SANDIGANBAYAN rendered its decision convicting petitioner, Escara and Azaula of the crime charged

Petitioner and Azaula maintained that the lumber delivered by V.M. Guadines Construction Supply were not the same lumber
confiscated by the CENR.

Petitioner contends that what should have been filed against her was a case for violation of the Forestry Code and not the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RULING:

THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT

By accepting payment for delivery of lumber found to be without supporting documents as required by law, petitioner caused
undue injury or damage to the provincial government which had no obligation to pay for confiscated lumber considered as
government property. In fact, it is only the DENR Secretary or his representative who can dispose of such confiscated
lumber in accordance with forestry laws and regulations, pursuant to Section 68-A of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
which provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. - In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws[,] rules and regulations, the Department Head
or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed,
or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water[,] or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter."

Petitioners contention that she should have been instead prosecuted for illegal cutting, gathering and possession of timber or
other forest products under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 ignores the fact that she never came out to claim ownership of the
seized lumber until her appearance before the Sangguniang Bayan wherein she pleaded for consideration in the delayed
bridge construction project after the DENR confiscated the lumber she delivered. Except for her bare denial, petitioner failed to
refute the correctness of the statements she made as reflected in the official minutes of the Sanggunian session held on
December 14, 1992, duly certified by the Municipal Secretary and signed by the Sanggunian Members present
These statements revealed that petitioner was fully aware of the confiscation of her lumber stockpiled along the Polillo-Burdeos
provincial road, after she had delivered the same.

Apart from petitioners own statements, the Sandiganbayans finding that it was petitioners lumber which were later
confiscated by CENR forest rangers and used in the bridge repair and construction, was satisfactorily established by the
prosecutions documentary and testimonial evidence. As part of their official duties and following standard procedure, they
prepared the Confiscation Report and Seizure Receipt, and testified in court detailing the incident. Two other witnesses
corroborated their declaration that the confiscated lumber were actually used in the repair and construction of the Navotas
Bridge.

Lastly, COA Auditor Mendoza, who, along with the Municipal Engineer of Polillo, was tasked to investigate the purchase of the
materials used in the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge after the completion of the project, also confirmed that the
lumber used bore the white paint marking "DENR" and contained hatchet numbers when they inspected the same from under
the new wooden bridge. He prepared three reports explaining his findings. He then recommended to the Provincial Auditor that
the money paid to the supplier be refunded to the government and that administrative and criminal actions be instituted against
the supplier and the concerned public officials. Consequently, the COA disallowed the payment of the amount of P70,924.00,
deducting from the original amount of P83,228.00 the amount paid for common materials such as kawad and nails. The lumber
used in the new bridge consisted of 3,172 board feet while the volume of the confiscated lumber was around 4,000 board feet.31

In support of her claim that the lumber she delivered were not those confiscated by the CENR personnel, petitioner presented
as witness PO2 Reny I. Marasigan of the PNP Polillo Station. Marasigan testified that he issued a certification dated June 9, 2000
stating that the lumber confiscated near the Navotas Bridge in 1993 were deposited for safekeeping and are still intact at the
back of their building. These rotting lumber on the ground were photographed by petitioner. However, Marasigan failed to
present proper documents evidencing the official transfer of custody of the seized lumber by the CENRO to their headquarters.
In fact, Marasigan signed the Confiscation Report and Seizure Receipt as part of the apprehending team while it was Azaula who
signed as the "Receiving Officer." Moreover, prosecution witnesses Salvosa and his forest rangers, as well as Abanica and
Mendoza, all categorically declared that the lumber confiscated near the Navotas Bridge were used in the repair and construction
of the bridge.

As to petitioners contention that the subsequent confiscation of the lumber she delivered, even if true, was no longer her
concern because she had already fulfilled her contractual undertaking to provide the lumber for the bridge repair and
construction, the same is untenable.

Basic is the rule that provisions of existing laws and regulations are read into and form an integral part of contracts, moreso in
the case of government contracts. Verily, all contracts, including Government contracts, are subject to the police power of the
State. Being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, such power is deemed incorporated into the laws of the land, which are part
of all contracts, thereby qualifying the obligations arising therefrom. Thus, it is an implied condition in the subject contract
for the procurement of materials needed in the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge that petitioner as private
contractor would comply with pertinent forestry laws and regulations on the cutting and gathering of the lumber she
undertook to supply the provincial government.

Petitioners actual knowledge of the absence of supporting legal documents for the lumber she contracted to deliver to the
provincial government -- which resulted in its confiscation by the CENR personnel -- belies her claim of good faith in receiving
the payment for the said lumber.

DENR V. DARAMAN (J. Panganiban)

Facts:
1. The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277
2. Based on the version of the Prosecution, Pablo Opinion, a forest ranger, was in his house when a vehicle driven by
Daraman passed by. That he stopped the said vehicle and found that it contains 62 pieces of assorted lumber. Daraman claimed
that the assorted lumbers were not his and that is owned a certain Asan (who owns a furniture shop). He then took hold of the
vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt.
3. Based on the version of the Defense, Daraman alleges that he was just instructed by his employer to get wood shavings
from a furniture shop owned by Asan and that Asan only requested him to deliver the assorted lumber in his house (Asans
house). That when Opinion apprehended him, he told him that the document for the said assorted lumber is in the hands of Asan
but Opinion did not believe him and impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber.
4. DENR-CENRO of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and
vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession
and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive
Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.
5. The Trial court acquitted the accused and ordered the release of the vehicle to its owner.
6. Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only
insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof. He contended that the vehicle had already been
administratively confiscated by the DENR. He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance,
which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

ISSUE:
1. WHO HAS THE JURISIDCTION TO CONFISCATE THE VEHICLE USED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 68-A OF P.D 705?

RULING: THE DENR

A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers
the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products
and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts; equipment covers physical facilities
available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a
want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by
Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of
vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport
used in the movement of any forest product.
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
secretary or a duly authorized representative.

DAGUDAG VS PADERANGA, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2017, JUNE 19, 2008

Forest products, conveyances and effect`ts which were seized by DENR officials urusant to PD No. 705 are considered in custodia
legis and cannot be subject of an action for replevin

FACTS:
The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (ONORMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of
NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The
shipments were falseley declared as cassaval meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the DENR. Upon inspection, the crew
of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the Certificate of Origin and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest
products, as required by DAO No. 07-94. After due notice, the illegal forest products were confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint dated March 16, 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger Edman (Edma) prayed that a writ of
replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and
that judgment be rendered ordering defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. During the
hearing for the writ of replevin, Judge Paderanga showed manifest partiality in favor Edma. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of
replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo Salceda to take possession of the forest products.
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an affidavit-complaint charging Judge Paderanga with gross
ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a judge.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of replevin is proper
RULING:
No, the issuance of the writ of replevin is improper.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, as cited in Factoran, Jr. v CA, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance
of cases pending before administrative agencies. Smiliarly in Dy v CA and Paat v CA, the Supreme Court held that a party must
exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts.
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint
for replevin and damages. Section 8 of PD No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the DENR Secretary
are appealable to the President; and (3) the courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special
civil court for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy, the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of
the DENR shall be directed to that agency - not the courts.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for
replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the
DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
custody of the forest products.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accorance with law.