The Transformative Power

of Partnerships

Africa
Progress
Report 2011
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

about the africa progress panel

The Africa Progress Panel brings together a unique group of leaders under the chairmanship of Kofi Annan. The
Panel monitors and promotes mutual accountability and shared responsibility for progress in Africa. Its three
focus areas are economic and political governance, finance for sustainable development, and achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals. The work of the Panel aims to track progress in these areas and draw
attention to critical issues and opportunities.

While the Panel does not purport to be speaking for Africa, it can speak with an African voice, with the
continents concerns and priorities as its guiding principles, and with the combined expertise, experience and
knowledge of its members. It calls for the fulfilment of commitments to Africa, without ever forgetting that the
main responsibility for progress rests with the continents leaders and that they themselves have entered into a
series of commitments that they need to fulfil.

about the africa progress REPORT

Every year, the Panel, with support from the Secretariat, draws on the expertise of a wide range of institutions
and actors to compile a concise overview of the progress Africa has made over the previous year. The report is
divided into two sections. The first highlights progress as well as the main obstacles to it in seven areas, namely
economic growth, governance, peace and security, social development, food and nutrition security, climate
change, and development cooperation and finance. The second section looks at the year ahead and identifies
key trends and obstacles. On that basis, the report provides a series of practical recommendations for policy
makers to catalyze action and accelerate much-needed progress.

SECRETARIAT This report may be freely reproduced,

in whole or in part, provided
Dawda Jobarteh, Acting Director
the original source is acknowledged
Violaine Beix

Sandra Engelbrecht

Benedikt Franke
Africa Progress Panel
Kwame Okyere P.O. Box 157
Temitayo Omotola 1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland
Carolina Rodriguez

2
 WHAT ARE
PARTNERSHIPS FOR
DEVELOPMENT?
For the purpose of this report we define
partnerships as voluntary and collaborative
relationships between various parties, both state
and non-state, in which all participants agree to
work together to achieve a common purpose
or undertake a specific task and to share risks,
responsibilities, resources, competencies and
benefits.

The basic concept of partnerships is simple and

straightforward to identify common ground
between different actors and to combine their
skills, resources and expertise. Partnerships for
development focus on the many areas where
actors, including private and public institutions,
companies and civil society organizations,
can engage in winwin relationships around
development objectives such as poverty
reduction, health, education, access to
opportunities and service delivery.

Effective cross-sectoral partnerships can make

it possible to overcome challenges that are
too difficult or complex for one organization
or sector to address alone. Partnerships can
also make efforts more effective by combining
resources and competencies in creative ways.
Collaboration can enable governments,
companies and organizations to improve
achievement of their own individual objectives
through leveraging, combining and capitalizing
on complementary strengths and capabilities.
Source: Based on the definition used by the UN Global Compact.
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

table of contents
FOREWORD 6
INTRODUCTION 8
PART I: LOOKING BACK: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 9
Economic Growth 10
Africas Swift Recovery from the Economic Crisis 10
The Low Quality of African Growth 11
Growth Outlook and Economic Potential 14
Governance 20
National Governance 20
Regional Governance 24
Global Governance 26
Peace and Security 27
Social Development 28
Poverty Alleviation 28
Education and Skills Formation 32
Gender Equality and Womens Empowerment 32
Health 33
Access to Water and Sanitation 37
Food and Nutrition Security 38
Volatility of Food Prices 38
Structural Barriers to Food Security 38
Agricultural Productivity 38
Climate Change 42
The Impact of Climate Change 42
Climate Change Politics 42
Climate Change Finance 42
Adaptation and Mitigation 43
Development Finance and Cooperation 46
Domestic Resource Mobilization 46
Traditional Bilateral Partners 46
Bilateral Partners from the Global South 47
Institutional Partners and Country Groupings 50
Philanthropy and Private Giving 51
Debt Relief 51
From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness 52

4
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

PART II: LOOKING AHEAD: PARTNERING FOR PROGRESS 53

How Partnerships are Already Contributing to Development 54
How Partnerships could be Driving Further Progress 57
Basic Service Delivery 57
Access to Opportunities 58
Access to Finance 58
Access to Health 58
Infrastructure 58
Agriculture 60
Low-Carbon Growth 60
Obstacles to Success 61
The Trust Gap 61
The Information Gap 61
The Imagination Gap 61
The Resources and Capacity Gap 61
The Perceived Benefits Gap 62
Who Needs to Do What 63
African Governments 64
International Donors 64
Private-Sector Actors 65
Civil-Society Actors 65
CONCLUSION 66
LIST OF ACRONYMS 68
NOTES 70

5
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
foreword
T he last year has been particularly eventful for the
continent, and the world as a whole. A growing
debt mountain in the United States, uncertainty
around Europes common currency and the
consequences of the earthquake in Japan are
reordering the industrialized worlds priorities. This and
the lingering repercussions of the global financial crisis,
accelerating shifts in the balance of economic and
political power, high food and fuel prices, and political
change in North Africa have transformed the policy
space in which African leaders and their partners
operate. By compounding existing challenges, but
also by creating new opportunities, these dynamics
are transforming prospects for ordinary Africans across
the continent.
The events of the last year have also accelerated
changes in how Africa is perceived and perceives
itself. The broader aftershocks of the financial crisis,
including currency and price volatility, fiscal crises
and asset-price collapse, have proved that no region,
for better or worse, can be seen as exogenous to
the world economy. They have also highlighted the
need for new growth poles and markets to sustain the
economic order in the developed world. As a result,
countries and companies are increasingly shifting their
attention from Africas problems to its vast potential
and abundant opportunities. In the process, they are
redefining the continents image.
On the continent, these shifts in perception are
accompanied by a heightened appreciation of the
need for African self-reliance in an uncertain world,
and by a palpable spirit of optimism despite some
high-profile setbacks. The fast recovery and strong
growth rates of many economies, plus numerous
examples of social and political progress, are feeding a
remarkable can-do spirit. This is reinforced by events
such as the Football World Cup in South Africa, the
peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the adoption of
new constitutions in Kenya and Niger, and unforeseen
political change in Egypt and Tunisia.
What was termed the hopeless continent ten years
ago has now unquestionably become the continent of
hope.1 Hope that strong growth rates will translate into
With the right combination of leadership, focused development plans,
and international support, enormous advances are possible.
6
jobs, incomes and irreversible human-development
gains; that the continents enormous wealth will be used
to foster equitable and inclusive growth and generate
opportunities for all; that economic transformation
and social progress will drive further improvements
in democratic governance and accountability as
the middle classes grow and demand more of their
politicians and service providers; and hope that rulers
who abuse their power to enrich themselves at the
expense of the poor and of democratic processes
are, at last, seeing the writing on the wall.
That many of these hopes actually seem attainable
shows how far the continent has come. Hope,
however, is not enough. Positive trends are being
offset in too many countries by structural governance
deficits. Violence, political turmoil, and uncertainty still
scar too many parts of the continent and add to the
challenges already at hand. The slow progress towards
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the
difficult task of providing productive employment for
rapidly growing numbers of young people, increasing
inequalities and food insecurity, the risk of contagion
through increasingly interconnected systems and
the effects of climate change all threaten past and
future gains. Despite repeated promises of reform by
the worlds most powerful countries and institutions,
Africans also remain heavily marginalized in world
affairs, with little say in and control over how decisions
affecting their countries are taken. The continents
enormous potential remains constrained by unfair
global rules and the ambivalent behaviour of many
partners, particularly with respect to tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade, distorting quotas and bloated
subsidy regimes.
Given these obstacles and challenges, it is all the more
remarkable that some countries in Africa have shown
such solid progress towards sustainable growth and
development. They offer clear proof that, with the right
combination of leadership, focused development
plans, and international support, enormous advances
are possible in even the most difficult circumstances.
However, all African countries face the increasingly
difficult task of mobilizing resources in an age of
austerity. As pressures on aid budgets increase, and

climate change adds new financing demands, African
leaders and international donors are realizing that
they cannot drive development on their own. Official
development cooperation remains vitally important
to build capacity, leverage other flows and achieve
specific results. Yet, there is also a growing need for
partnerships harnessing a broader range of actors and
their energy, creativity and resources to fill the gaps.
Such partnerships have already proven their
transformative power. Collaboration between the
private sector and international philanthropists
has led to significant reductions in malaria deaths.
Partnerships between mobile-phone providers and
governments have resulted in greater access to
credit in rural areas and transformed business across
entire regions. Partnerships between civil society
and intergovernmental organizations have led to
vastly improved agricultural methods and inputs for
smallholder farmers. By mobilizing resources, improving
efficiencies, or extending services, access and
opportunities to previously marginalized segments of
the population, partnerships can clearly complement,
expand and improve government-led development
efforts. If scaled up, they can even affect sustainable
structural change.
Current dynamics are highly favourable for
strengthening cross-sectoral collaboration. Over the
last years, new spaces have opened up for engaging
actors around their comparative advantages and
respective interests as the benefits of partnering
have become more obvious. The private sector
understands that it needs the access and knowledge
of local partners and national governments to
grasp the enormous commercial opportunities at
the bottom of the pyramid. Governments and civil
society organisations are recognizing the value of
the resources, capacities, and expertise the private
sector can bring to their development efforts. As the
interests of the various sectors continue to converge
and improvements in regulatory environments make
cooperating easier and safer, opportunities for
partnerships continue to grow.
Partnerships have already proven their transformative power.
7
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The core elements of effective partnerships are well
established, even though their combination may vary:
political leadership and vision from governments,
along with a supportive regulatory, legal and fiscal
environment; a private sector incentivized to invest
capital and ideas not just for immediate returns but
for longer-term change that will strengthen markets,
value chains and social stability; civil society afforded
the space by business and government to keep
both accountable for socially and environmentally
responsible behaviour; and international organizations,
African or otherwise, able to advocate global
standards and share best practices, especially from
other parts of the global South.
The idea of partnerships for development is hardly
new. For over a decade, MDG 8 has been calling for
stronger partnerships as a basis for achieving all other
goals. Despite the existence of many encouraging
examples, and valuable lessons learned, we are still not
seeing enough success stories replicated or brought
to scale to effect lasting structural change. Too many
actors still see the risks of engaging in partnerships
rather than the opportunities, and too many states
still fail to harness the developmental potential of
their civil society organizations or to provide the
enabling environment and incentive structures to
make partnerships attractive for private-sector actors.
This results in missed opportunities to tackle problems
and drive progress. Given the transformative power
of partnerships, it will be crucial to overcome these
blockages and convince all sides of the inherent
benefits of partnering for progress. This is the main
purpose of this report.
Kofi A. Annan
Chair of the Africa Progress Panel
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Introduction
I n last years Africa Progress Report, we called for
Africas resources to be turned into results for its
people. This continues to be an imperative as the
continents enormous wealth of human and natural
resources, strong economic growth, and windfall
from rising commodity prices are still not sufficiently
converted into socially productive ends such as
reduced poverty and inequality and the provision of
health, education and other public services.
We also argued that Africas progress needs to be
measured in tangible improvements to peoples
lives, and not only in figures of GDP and the growth
of trade and foreign direct investment. We stand by
this, and renew our call for African leaders to convert
economic progress and natural wealth into social
and political progress, achievement of the MDGs and
greater accountability to their people.
The way to do this is well charted. We know that
peace, stability, and the rule of law are the basic
conditions for progress. We also know that growth
must lead to job creation and diversification of the
economic base; that greater regional integration
and better infrastructure provide the foundation for
trade expansion and private-sector-led growth; that
empowering women increases household incomes,
nutrition and education levels, as well as agricultural
productivity; that transparency helps to spread the
benefits of Africas natural wealth more widely; and
that good governance, strong institutions and political
leadership are central to all of the above.
The revolutions in Northern Africa show that the
information age has changed the dynamics of
accountability and increased pressure on leaders
to deliver results for all their citizens. But, of course,
African leaders are not in this alone. They share some
of the responsibility for progress with their international
partners, many of whom have made extensive
Africas progress needs to be measured
in tangible improvements to peoples lives.
8
financial and political commitments to the continent.
The continents capacity to drive inclusive and
sustainable growth depends on the fulfilment of these
commitments, as well as on reformed global policies
and systems that support Africas special needs
particularly in climate change, international trade
and technology transfer.
As domestic resource mobilization and international
aid budgets fail to keep up with multiplying needs,
African countries and international donors must
look beyond traditional strategies and stimulate
development efforts additional and complementary
to their own. Partnerships for development are a prime
example of such efforts. Recent years have shown that
they can achieve tremendous results by pooling the
capacities, resources and expertise of various actors
around specific development challenges. If designed
and implemented carefully, such partnerships can
deliver more than the sum of every partners input
and bring much-needed versatility, creativity and
pragmatism to development efforts.
Against this backdrop, we begin our report by looking
back to assess the progress Africa has made over
the last year, looking particularly at how partnerships
have contributed. We then look ahead to assess how
to replicate and scale up successful partnerships and
how to create the policy framework and incentives
needed to spur further collaboration for progress.
Given the diversity of Africas 53 states (soon to be
54 with South Sudan) and their economies, societies
and policy environments, these recommendations
are broad and must be adapted and adjusted for
each country. We are nonetheless convinced that, if
implemented, they will accelerate progress by filling
crucial gaps in existing efforts, increasing resources for
development, and spreading access to opportunities,
goods and services across the continent.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

PART I
LOOKING BACK:
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Looking back at the last year, we note that
impressive progress, stagnation and discouraging
regression continue to coexist on the continent.
Widespread advances in economic growth and
social development contrast with a dangerous
erosion of democratic governance as well as
the increasingly evident reluctance of major
international donors to fulfil their commitments on
aid and climate finance. This section summarizes
major developments in the areas of (1) economic
growth, (2) governance, (3) peace and security,
(4) social development, (5) food and nutrition
security, (6) climate change, and (7) development
finance and cooperation.

9
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Economic Growth
W hen it comes to economic growth, three
issues stand out: Africas comparatively swift
and broad recovery from the global financial and
economic crisis, its continuing dependence on
narrow, commodity-driven growth that has had only
limited social benefits, and its positive growth outlook.
Africas Swift Recovery
from the Economic Crisis
I n the 5 years before the financial crisis, Africa
grew faster than most other world regions, with
more than 40 per cent of its countries enjoying an
average annual GDP growth rate of 5 per cent or
more.2 While a favourable global environment of
strong external demand, ample liquidity, extended
concessional financing and higher commodity
prices accounts for much of this growth, structural
changes within the continents economies
are beginning to take effect and are helping
accelerate growth across countries and sectors.
Among the most significant changes are a broad-
based surge in domestic demand for basic
consumer goods as a result of growing middle
classes and rapid urbanization, lower public debts,
increased openness to trade and higher investments
into enabling infrastructure. Many African countries
have also continued with deregulation, privatization
and other structural reforms that have significantly
improved the business environment (notably
Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Liberia), the financial sector
(Nigeria), as well as administration and governance
(Sierra Leone). Dynamic private sectors have
appeared across the continent, including the
flower business in Uganda, leather processing
in Ethiopia and the film industry in Nigeria, which
have helped underpin growth driven by the export
of primary commodities.3 Encouragingly, African
as well as international companies are taking
advantage of the improving enabling environment,
and vantage points like direct access to natural
resources, a large labour force and a fast-growing
Most African countries proved more resilient than during previous
crises and the continent as a whole avoided recession.
10
population, unencumbered by legacy technology
and systems.4
The global financial and economic upheavals of
20082010 interrupted Africas impressive growth
spurt.5 While the impact through financial channels
was generally weak, given the continents limited
financial integration and low level of cross-border
lending, many African countries were badly
affected by declining exports and foreign direct
investment (FDI).6 However, most countries proved
more resilient than during previous crises and the
continent as a whole avoided recession due to
the prudent counter-cyclical policies of national
governments and well-targeted support from the
international community.
Propelled by the strong performance of several
large economies, including Brazil, China, Germany,
France and India, most of Africa is now resuming its
growth spurt. While FDI inflows are recovering only
slowly from the global credit crunch,7 both total
exports and imports have picked up again, with
growth rates of 15.3 and 11.3 per cent respectively.8
Remittances, the continents second-largest source
of net foreign inflows after FDI, are also beginning to
recover from the slump in 2009, reaching nearly $40
billion in 2010.9 Not least because of the Football
World Cup in South Africa, tourism revenues have
also rebounded, with the continent receiving more
visitors over the last year than ever before.10
Based on these trends and global dynamics, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Sub-
Saharan Africas GDP to grow by 5.5 per cent
in 2011 and 5.8 per cent in 2012 (in real terms).11
However, this masks substantial differences
between countries. While the Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania
and Zambia are all expected to be among the
worlds ten fastest-growing economies, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Equatorial
Guinea and Eritrea are projected to grow at rates
far below the average.12 There are, however, two
notable economic realities that seem to apply to
most of the continent: the low quality of recorded
growth, and the enormous untapped potential.

The Low Quality of African Growth
A fricas current economic growth is not all positive.
It is generally not accompanied by much-
needed structural transformation and diversification,
and often does not translate into equitable human
development and public services.
Because of the immediacy of benefits, a lack of viable
alternatives and credit for long-term investments, as
well as distorted incentives, many African countries
continue to rely on export-led growth policies
focusing on the extraction of natural resources
and raw materials rather than value addition and
diversification.13 While natural-resource extraction
has accounted for only about a third of Africas real
GDP growth in the last decade,14 more than 80 per
cent of the continents export earnings come from
primary, generally unprocessed commodities. The
economies of several countries are geared towards
the export of single commodities, including copper
(Zambia) and aluminium (Mozambique). This has
resulted in unbalanced development, with weak links
between export-orientated and other sectors. With
the notable exceptions of Egypt, Tunisia and South
Africa, where manufacturing and services account
for 83 per cent of combined GDP,15 non-extractive
sectors and competitive industries remain heavily
under-developed in most African countries.16
The problem is caused, driven and compounded by
the poor quality of Africas economic relationships,
with both African and other countries. Despite the
increasing prominence of non-European partners,
and China in particular, the disadvantageous pattern
of Africa exporting unprocessed commodities and
importing manufactured goods persists. In fact, it is
becoming ever more entrenched as the resource
thirst of emerging partners continues to grow.17
With FDI concentrating in extractive industries,
the Doha Development Round unresolved, and
protectionism and other discriminatory measures
Many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth policies
focusing on natural resources rather than value addition and diversification.
11
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
against Africa unbroken,18 the continent has little
opportunity to escape this pattern and drive much-
needed economic transformation through trade
diversification.19
The one-dimensionality of Africas global trade
is all the more harmful, because trade between
African countries remains too weak to offer sufficient
alternative incentives for economic diversification.
Slow regional integration, a lack of connecting
infrastructure, and insufficient resource and production
complementarities between countries currently limit
intra-African trade to a mere 10 per cent of total
exports. In comparison, trade within the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounts for about
60 per cent of the regions total exports, and trade
within the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) accounts for 56 per cent of total exports.20
Without similar opportunities to profit from enlarged
markets, greater economies of scale and prosper
thy neighbour policies, African countries remain prey
to disadvantageous geographies and unfavourable
global dynamics.
The lack of economic diversification, in terms of both
export products and destinations, explains the high
volatility of African trade in recent years, and the
strongly adverse impact of the global economic
crisis through trade. It also explains why so little of
the continents high GDP growth translates into
social development and tangible improvements to
peoples lives. Driven by capital-intensive extractive
sectors, the current type of economic growth has little
positive impact on employment and income levels
and virtually no effect on employment-intensive
sectors such as agriculture.21 It is thus hardly surprising
that, despite a decade of strong economic growth,
poverty remains pervasive throughout the continent
and only one of Africas 34 Least Developed
Countries (Cape Verde) has managed to graduate
from this category since the adoption of the Brussels
Programme of Action in 2001.
economic growth IN AFRICA
African annual real GDP, 2008
USD billions 1,816* Compound annual
real GDP growth
Compound annual growth rate, %
2000-2008
%, constant exchange rates

1,684*
Emerging 8.3%
5.6 1,561 Asia

1,483 Middle East 5.2%

1,464*

5.5 1,400
Africa 4.9%

1,323 Central and

4.8%
4.9 Eastern Europe
1,258
Latin 4.0%
3.6 1,191 America
2.4 1,144
1.9
4.2 1,108 World 3.0%
1,067
839
694
461 Developed 2.0%
Countries

1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* 2010* 2011*

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2010); World Bank, World Development Indicators (2011); and McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move
*GDP figures for 2009-2011 are combined from actual, estimated and projected amounts from the IMF

AveraGE Projected Real GDP Growth for 2010-2011

(in per cent)

Below 0%

Between 0% and 2%

Between 2% and 5%

Above 5%

Insufficient data

Source: IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook: Rebalancing Growth

12
 GDP per capita and Growth Rates 2000-2009 IN SSA
GDP per capita 2000 GDP 2000 GDP Growth Annual % GDP 2009 GDP per capita 2009
(Current USD) (USD millions) 2000 2009 (USD millions) (Current USD)
Angola 639 9,129 3.0 0.7 75,493 4,081

Benin 339 2,255 5.8 3.8 6,653 745

Botswana 3,270 5,632 5.9 -3.7 11,823 6,064

Burkina Faso 224 2,611 1.8 3.5 8,141 517

Burundi 110 709 -0.9 3.5 1,325 160

Cameroon 635 10,075 4.2 2.0 22,186 1,136

Cape Verde 1,211 531 6.6 2.8 1,549 3,064

Central African Republic 256 959 2.3 2.4 2,006 454

Chad 165 1.385 -0.9 -1.6 6,839 610

Comoros 374 202 0.9 12.3 535 812

DRC 85 4,306 -6.9 2.7 10,575 160

Congo 1,061 3,220 7.6 7.6 9,580 2,601

Cte dIvoire 603 10,417 -3.7 3.6 23,304 1,106

Equatorial Guinea 2,371 1,254 13.5 -5.4 10,413 15,397

Eritrea 173 634 -13.1 n/a 1,873 369

Ethiopia 125 8,180 6.1 8.7 28,526 344

Gabon 4,109 5,068 -1.9 -1.0 11,062 7,502

Gambia 323 421 5.5 4.6 733 430

Ghana 255 4,977 3.7 4.7 26,169 1,098

Guinea 371 3,112 1.9 -0.3 4,103 407

Guinea-Bissau 165 215 7.5 3.0 165.26 519

Kenya 404 12,691 0.6 2.6 29,376 738

Lesotho 395 746 5.7 0.9 1,579 764

Liberia 199 561 25.7 4.6 876 222

Madagascar 254 3,878 4.8 0.4 8,590 438

Malawi 147 1,744 1.6 7.7 4,727 310

Mali 230 2,422 3.2 4.3 8,996 691

Mauritius 3,861 4,583 9.0 2.1 8,589 6,735

Mozambique 233 4,249 1.1 6.3 9,790 428

Namibia 2,143 3,909 3.5 n/a 9,265 4,267

Niger 163 1,798 -1.4 1.0 5,383 352

Nigeria 368 45,984 5.4 5.6 173,004 1,118

Rwanda 218 1,735 8.1 5.3 5,216 522

So Tom and Prncipe n/a n/a n/a 4.0 191 1,171

Senegal 474 4,692 3.2 2.2 12,822 1,023

Source: World Development Indicators Database (2011)

Seychelles 7,579 615 4.3 -7.6 764 8,688

Sierra Leone 150 636 3.8 4.0 1,942 341

South Africa 3,020 132,878 4.2 -1.8 285,366 5,786

Swaziland 1,380 1,490 10.1 1.2 3,001 2,533
Tanzania 307 10,186 5.1 5.5 21,368 503
Togo 253 1,329 -0.8 2.5 2,855 431
Uganda 253 6,193 3.1 7.1 16,043 490

Zambia 309 3,238 3.6 6.3 12,805 990

Zimbabwe 530 6,607 -7.9 n/a 5,625 449

13
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Growth Outlook and
Economic Potential
T he low quality of growth notwithstanding, Africas
pre-crisis boom and its surprisingly fast and strong
recovery have reiterated the continents immense
economic potential. While poor policies, conflicts,
natural disasters and other seismic events may
disrupt growth in individual countries and sub-
regions and significant structural barriers remain to
be overcome, the fundamental trends and drivers
suggest a positive growth outlook for most of the
continent.
In the short-to-medium term, most African countries
will continue to profit from recovery in the global
economy, rising global demand for their resources,
growing interest in their markets and further
structural improvements in their business and
regulatory environments. The IMF expects to see FDI
rise further and demand for African bonds increase,
which should help governments to address crucial
infrastructure deficits.22 UNCTAD expects the dollar
value of remittances into Africa to grow by 4.5
and 6.7 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively,
which would further support the strengthening of
household consumption.23
In the medium term, most countries have enormous
potential for gains through targeting the informal
sector, easing labour-market rigidities, addressing
infrastructure deficits, promoting regional
integration, enhancing fiscal systems, boosting
administrative capacity and harnessing international
cooperation to improve resource mobilization.24
Partnerships between public actors and with the
private sector offer enormous opportunities to
address some of the structural barriers that have
been constraining Africas growth for decades.
The fundamental trends and drivers suggest a positive growth
outlook for most of the continent.
14
In the long-term, growth will increasingly reflect
interrelated social and demographic trends
particularly the rise of the African urban consumer
and the growth of affluent middle classes. McKinsey,
for example, estimates that, as a result of strong per
capita growth and rapid urbanization, 221 million
additional Africans will enter the market for basic
consumer goods by 2015.25 While growth trajectories
will continue to differ substantially (especially between
oil exporters and diversified economies), Africas
collective GDP is estimated to reach $2.6 trillion in 2020,
and consumer spending $1.4 trillion.26 Based on this
positive outlook, more and more African countries are
now regarded as promising investment destinations,
including Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.27
Yet enormous risks remain. In the short-term, sovereign
debt defaults in advanced economies could affect
banking systems and economies worldwide and
threaten the continents fragile recovery. In the
medium-term, insufficient economic diversification
may thwart Africas chances to move towards a path
of sustainable, inclusive, and ideally green growth.
In the long-term, accelerating climate change,
environmental degradation and unsustainable
pressures on finite resources may reverse economic
and social progress.
The overarching message from this brief review of
Africas economic growth is straight forward. In order to
make the most of the continents enormous potential,
and counter the risks in years ahead, African leaders,
with the help of their international partners, need to
accelerate economic diversification and structural
transformation.28 Without such transformation, growth
will remain inequitable jobless, volatile, and largely
inadequate for achieving the MDGs by 2015.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

Partnering around Africas infrastructure deficit

Africas lack of energy, transport and communications infrastructure has given rise to a number of promising
partnerships between public actors, including the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), the Programme
for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the EUAfrica Infrastructure Partnership. Given the
identified need for as much as $93 billion a year to close the continents infrastructure gap and increasing
pressure on public finances, many of these partnerships focus on mobilizing complementary resources.
They provide incentives for the private sector through: leveraging public flows; identifying opportunities for
publicprivate partnerships; helping to remove technical, political and knowledge barriers to investment;
providing risk-mitigation instruments; reducing inefficiencies in resource allocation; and coordinating the
rapidly proliferating initiatives around infrastructure development. Thus, partnerships have helped to refocus
much-needed attention on the sector and contributed to the significant increase of commitments from $7
billion in 2005 to nearly $40 billion in 2010.

Sources: World Bank (2009), African Country Infrastructure Diagnostic; PEI and ICA (2011), Infrastructure Investor: Africa An Intelligence Report.

15
 diversification of african economies

CLUSTERS OF African economies

10,000 Libya
USD

10,000 Libya
USD

Equitorial
Equitorial Mauritius
Guinea Gabon Mauritius
Guinea Angola Gabon
Angola Botswana
Botswana
Algeria Tunisia
Tunisia
Algeria South
South
DRCDRC Egypt
Egypt Namibia Africa
Africa
1000
1000 Namibia
Cte dIvoire
Cte dIvoire
Nigeria
Nigeria Zambia Morrocco
Chad
Chad Sudan Zambia Morrocco
Sudan Cameroon
Cameroon Senegal
Senegal
Mali Ghana Kenya
Kenya
Mali Ghana
100 Mozambique
Mozambique
100 Sierra Leone DRCDRC Madagascar
Madagascar
Sierra Leone Tanzania
Tanzania Uganda
Uganda
Rwanda
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Ethiopia

1010
2020 3030 4040 5050 6060 7070 8080 9090 100
100
Economic
Ecomomicdiversification
diversification
Manufacturing
Manufacturingand service
and sector
service share
sector ofof
share GDP, 2008,
GDP, %%
2008,
Clusters (only select countries represented)
Clusters (only select countries represented)
GDP perper
GDP capita
capita
Oil exporters Size ofof
bubble
Oil exporters Transition Transition < $500
< $500 $2,000 - $5,000
$2000 - $5000 Size bubble
Diversified Pre-transition $500 - $1,000 > $5,000 proportional
proportional
Diversified Pre-transition $500 - $1000 > $5000
toto
GDP
GDP
$1,000
$1000$2,000
- - $2000

Note: Selected countries include those whose 2008 GDP is aproximately USD 10 billion or greater, or whose real GDP
growth exceeds 7% over 2000-2008. 22 countries that account for 3% of African GDP in 2008 are excluded.

McKinseys framework illustrates four main clusters: diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies and
pre-transition economies. The framework highlights that despite important differences between the countries within
each category, they have similar economic structures and therefore share growth opportunities and challenges. This
framework, however general, provides insight for business and policymakers with a new categorization upon which
to make decisions.

Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010) Lions on the Move: The progress and potential of African economies.
Radial charts (opposite page) World Bank Development Indicators (2011)

16
 ECONOMIC CLUSTERS AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: IS the DIVERSIFICATION OF
THE ECONOMY TRANSLATING INTO SOCIAL AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT?
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
ACCESS TO WATER ACCESS
HUMANTODEVELOPMENT
ACCESSHEALTH
TO WATER H
Algeria Algeria Angola
Angola Algeria Algeria Angola
Angola
Sierra Leone 0
Sierra Leone 0 Chad Chad Sierra Leone0.0
Sierra Leone 0 Chad Chad Sier
Mali Mali 0.1 10 Congo, Republic
Congo, Republic Mali Mali 10 Congo, Republic
Congo, Republic Ma
100.0 0.1
nea Ethiopia Ethiopia 20 EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea Ethiopia Ethiopia 20 EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea Ethiopia
0.2 0.2
DRC 30 Gabon Gabon DRC DRC 200.0 30 Gabon Gabon

a
DRC

a
DRC DRC
DRC

at

at
0.3 0.3

d
40 40

no

no
0.4 50
Libya Libya 300.0 Libya Libya
50
0.4
geria Zambia Zambia 0.5 60 Nigeria Nigeria Zambia Zambia 60
0.5 Nigeria Nigeria
400.0 Zambia
70 70
0.6 0.6
Uganda Uganda 80 Uganda Uganda 500.0 80 Uganda
0.7 90 0.7
90
Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania Tanzania 0.8 100 Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania Tanzania
Cte d'Ivoire 600.0 100
0.8 Cte d'Ivoire
Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania
gypt Senegal Senegal Egypt Egypt Senegal Senegal Egypt Egypt Senegal
rocco Mozambique
Mozambique Morocco Morocco Mozambique
Mozambique Morocco Morocco Mozambique
bia Kenya Kenya Namibia Namibia Kenya Kenya Namibia Namibia Kenya
ica Ghana Ghana South Africa
South Africa Ghana Ghana South Africa
South Africa Ghana
CameroonCameroon Tunisia Tunisia CameroonCameroon Tunisia Tunisia Cameroon
Sudan Sudan BotswanaBotswana Sudan Sudan BotswanaBotswana
Rwanda Rwanda Madagascar Rwanda Mauritius
Rwanda Madagascar Madagascar
MauritiusMauritius Madagascar Mauritius Madagascar
Human Development
Improved Index(%
water source (HDI)
of population with access) HealthImproved
Expenditure
Human persource
Capita(%(Current
Development
water ofIndex US$) with access)
(HDI)
population
World average (=0.624) OECD average (=0.879;
World average (=86.8%) off scale)
OECD average (=99.0%) World average (=857.1; off average
WorldWorld scale)
average OECD average
(=0.624)
(=86.8%) OECD(=4653.8;
average
OECD off scale)
(=0.879;
average off scale)
(=99.0%) World av
Worl

ACCESS
ACCESS TOTO
MATERNAL HEALTHTELEPHONY
HEALTH
MOBILE ACCESS
ACCESS TO HEALTH
WATER
TOMOBILE
INTERNET
MATERNAL
ACCESS TO TELEPHONY H
A
Algeria
Algeria Angola
Algeria Angola Algeria
Algeria Angola
Algeria Angola
0.0 Angola Angola
Sierra
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone0
Leone 0.0 Chad
Chad Chad Sierra
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone Leone0.0 00
0.0 Chad ChadChad Sier
Sier
Mali
Mali Mali 100.0 Congo,
Congo, Republic
Republic
Congo, Republic Mali Mali
Mali 10 Congo,
Congo, Republic
Congo, Republic Republic Ma
10.0 5.0 10.0 Ma
nea Ethiopia
Ethiopia Ethiopia 200 Equatorial Guinea
EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea Ethiopia
Ethiopia Ethiopia 200
20 EquatorialEquatorial
Guinea Guinea
Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia
20.0 20.0 Ethiopia
Gabon 10.0 30
DRC Gabon Gabon

ta
DRC DRC 200.0
400 30.0 Gabon Gabon DRC DRC DRC
DRC 30.0 Gabon DRCDRC
DRC

da
400
40

no
40.0 Libya 15.0 40.0
(117) 300.0
600 50.0
Libya Libya (117) 50 600
50.0
Libya Libya
Libya (117)
20.0 60
geria Zambia
Zambia Zambia 400.0 60.0 Nigeria
Nigeria Nigeria Zambia Zambia
Zambia 60.0 Nigeria Nigeria
Nigeria Zambia
Zambia
800 800
70
70.0 25.0 70.0
Uganda
Uganda Uganda 500.0 80.0 Uganda Uganda 80
80.0 Uganda
1000 Uganda 30.0 1000 Uganda
90.0 90
90.0
Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania
Tanzania Tanzania 600.0
1200 100.0
Cte
Cte d'Ivoire
Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania Tanzania
d'Ivoire Tanzania 35.0 100
1200
100.0 Cte
Cte d'Ivoire
Cte d'Ivoire d'Ivoire Tanzania
Tanzania
gypt Senegal
Senegal Senegal Egypt
Egypt Egypt Senegal Senegal
Senegal Egypt Egypt
Egypt Senegal
Senegal
rocco Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique Morocco
Morocco Morocco Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique Morocco Morocco
Morocco Mozambique
Mozambique
bia Kenya
Kenya Kenya Namibia
Namibia Namibia Kenya Kenya
Kenya Namibia Namibia
Namibia Kenya
Kenya
ica Ghana Ghana South Africa
South Africa Ghana Ghana
Ghana South
South Africa
South Africa Africa Ghana
Ghana
Cameroon
CameroonCameroon Tunisia
Tunisia Tunisia CameroonCameroon
Cameroon Tunisia Tunisia
Tunisia Cameroon
Cameroon
Sudan Sudan Botswana
BotswanaBotswana Sudan
Sudan Sudan BotswanaBotswana
Botswana
Rwanda Madagascar
Rwanda Mauritius Madagascar Rwanda Rwanda Madagascar
Rwanda Mauritius Madagascar
Mauritius Mauritius Madagascar Mauritius Mauritius Madagascar
Health ratio
Maternal mortality Expenditure
(modeled
Mobile perestimate,
cellular Capita (Current
subscriptions US$)
per 100,000
(per 100live births)
people) MaternalImproved
Estimated
mortality
Mobile water
Internet source
users
ratio (%estimate,
per 100
(modeled
cellular ofinhabitants
subscriptionspopulation
(perper with access)
100100,000
people) live births) Maternal m
World average (=857.1; off(=260)
scale) OECD
OECDaverage
average(=4653.8; off scale) World average
World average
World average (=59.3) (=24.8)
OECD average (=100.0) World average
World
World average(=86.8%)
(=23)
average (=260)
(=59.3) OECD
OECD average
OECD
OECD average
(=23.9)
average (=99.0%)
average(=24.8)
(=100.0) Worl

ACCESS TO INTERNET ACCESS TO MOBILE TELEPHONY

Algeria Angola Algeria Angola
Sierra Leone 0.0
0.0 Chad Sierra Leone 0.0 Chad Sier
Mali Congo, Republic Mali 10.0 Congo, Republic Ma
5.0
nea Ethiopia Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia 20.0 Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia
10.0 30.0
DRC Gabon DRC Gabon DRC
15.0 40.0
Libya 50.0 Libya (117)
20.0 60.0
geria Zambia Nigeria Zambia Nigeria Zambia
25.0 70.0
Uganda Uganda 80.0 Uganda
30.0
90.0
Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania 35.0 Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania 100.0 Cte d'Ivoire Tanzania

gypt Senegal Egypt Senegal Egypt Senegal

rocco Mozambique Morocco Mozambique Morocco Mozambique
bia Kenya Namibia Kenya Namibia Kenya
ica Ghana South Africa Ghana South Africa Ghana
Cameroon Tunisia Cameroon Tunisia Cameroon
Sudan Botswana Sudan Botswana
Rwanda Madagascar Rwanda
Mauritius Mauritius Madagascar
Estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) Maternal m
World average (=23) OECD average (=23.9) World average (=59.3) OECD average (=100.0)

17
 Structural barriers to economic growth
Widespread infrastructure Unfavorable global TIME TO EXPORT
deficit rules Denmark 5
This graph compares the number of
days required before an entrepreneur
can export. Denmark as the country
Despite the proliferation of programmes The unbalanced global economic Mauritius 13 with the least amount of time to
to remedy Africas infrastructure deficit, system and its out-dated set Seychelles 17 export is included as a benchmark.

Source: World Bank 2011, Doing Business Report: Making a

the continent remains plagued by a of rules heavily disadvantage Swaziland 18
crippling lack of energy, transport and Africa. Bloated subsidy regimes, Madagascar 21

Difference for Entrepreneurs. SADC Regional Profile

telecommunication infrastructure. Current quotas, as well as high tariff and
non-tariff barriers constrain its Mozambique 23
annual investment needs are estimated
potential to escape unfavourable Tanzania 24
at USD 93 billion, with more than one
trading patterns and diversify its Botswana 28
third remaining unfunded and insufficient
maintenance creating additional needs economies. Namibia 29
for expensive rehabilitation. The World South Africa 30
Bank estimates that if Sub-Saharan Africa Lesotho 31
could improve its infrastructure to the Poor market quality SADC Regional
average
31.2
levels comparable with those in Mauritius, The majority of African markets Malawi 41
its growth of real GDP per capita would are plagued by their small market DRC 44
increase by 2.3 per cent a year. sizes, ethnic segmentation, Zambia 44
high-percentage of informal Angola 52
activity, significant productivity
ROAD DENSITY Zimbabwe 53
gaps, skill mismatches, and low
500 461 competitiveness. Particularly 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Kilometers per 100 square

Paved road density

kilometers of arable land

Total road density financial markets are still poorly Number of days
400 381
developed.
284
300 COST TO EXPORT
200 Malaysia* 450 This graph compares the cost per
150
Poor regulatory

Source: World Bank 2011, Doing Business Report: Making a

134 container to export. Malaysia as the
106 Mauritius 737 country with the lowest cost to export
100
34 29
environments Seychelles 876 is included as a benchmark.

0 Despite notable reforms in some Mozambique 1,100

African Other African Other
low-income low-income middle-income middle-income countries, Africa remains a Madagascar 1,197

Difference for Entrepreneurs. SADC Regional Profile

difficult place for entrepreneurs Tanzania 1,262
ELECTRICITY which face greater regulatory South Africa 1,531
700 Generation capacity 648 and administrative burdens,
Lesotho 1,680
Electricity coverage and less protection of property
Lines per thousand population

600 Namibia 1,686

and investor rights than in other
regions. Complex tax codes Malawi 1,713
500
and high compliance burdens Swaziland 1,754
400 imposed by an inefficient tax Angola 1,850
326
293 administration are powerful (SADC) Regional 1,856
300 average
incentives for small enterprises to Zambia 2,664
200 remain informal. Botswana 3,010
88 Zimbabwe 3,280
100
39 14 41 37 DRC 3,505
0
African Other African Other 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
low-income low-income middle-income middle-income
USD per container

WATER AND SANITATION

100 Insufficient access to finance
Per cent of population covered

Improved water 91
Improved sanitation 82 82 With FDI concentrating in the extractive sectors of
80 72 a limited group of resource-rich countries, high
61 risk ratings driving the cost of credit, and poorly
60 53 53
developed financial markets, most Africans
40 34 have very limited access to finance. The
consequences are significant. Low rural
20
access to credit hampers agricultural
Source: Yepes, Pierce and Foster in World Bank and the Agence

0 productivity, inadequate access to

African Other African Other
finance by SMEs impedes private sector
Francaise de Dveloppment (2010) Africas Infrastructure

low-income low-income middle-income middle-income

development in industry or high-value
TELEPHONE added services, and limited access to trade
600 557
finance constrains the diversification of exports.
Main line density
By remodeling risk-weighted assets, Basel II, the new
Lines per thousand population

Mobile density
500
Internet density framework for banking supervision and regulation, may
further adversely affect the cost of financing and inhibit cross-
400
border financial flows to countries where public and private
300
277 borrowers are rated at a higher level of risk such as LDCs.
252 235
This figure shows the worldwide
200
142 distribution of deposit accounts in
Bank loans per 1,000 adults
institutions per thousand adults.
100 48 55 Predicted values are used when data
38 29 8.2
49 or fewer
9 2 are not available.
0
African Other African Other 50 - 299 Source: Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce (2010) Measuring Financial
low-income low-income middle-income middle-income 300 - 799 No data Access around the World

18
Structural DRIVERS to economic growth
Demographic change Spread of technology Renewable energy
In contrast to what is happening in much Whether by connecting people with Africa has enormous potential for
of the rest of the world, Africas labour each other, linking rural areas to the energy production from renewable
force is continuing to expand. The world, spreading knowledge, improving sources solar, hydro, wind and
continent currently has more than 500 healthcare delivery or providing a basis geothermal. Almost all Sub-Saharan
million people of working age. By 2040, for small businesses through mobile African countries have sufficient
their number is projected to exceed banking, the rapid spread of information renewable resources, exploitable
1.1 billion. Over the last two decades, and communication technologies has with current technologies, to satisfy
three-quarters of the continents changed how Africas people interact many times their current energy
increase in GDP per capita came and its economies function. But the demand. (See chart on page 45.)
from an expanding workforce, the rest benefits of new technologies are in other
from higher labour productivity. While sectors, such as manufacturing, where
population growth can create intense they are allowing African countries to
pressure on resources, public institutions leap frog development stages.
and social stability, it also provides an
enormous opportunity for the continent.
THE GROWTH OF THE MOBILE NETWORK Regional integration
500
examples of growing Population Deepening regional integration holds
(ages 15-59) 450 enormous potential for economic
Route kilometers (thousands)

70 400
growth and social development
across the continent. According to
Per cent of total population

65
350 UNCTAD, an investment of $32 billion
300 to improve the main intra-African
60 road network alone could generate
250
around $250 billion in additional trade
55 200 over a period of 15 years. As part of
150
a broader development strategy,
50 regional integration can enhance
100 productive capacity, intensify
45
50 economic diversification, and
improve competitiveness. Pooled
0 0 resources and economies of scale
2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 1990 1995 2000 2005
would also allow African countries
Ghana Madagascar Fixed-line operators Mobile operators to participate more effectively in the
Namibia Uganda global economy.
Note: Data through 2050 are based on the United Na-
tions medium variant projection series.
Source: Ashford (2007) Africas Youthful Population: Source: Williams (2010), Broadband for Africa: Backbone
Risk or Opportunity? Population Reference Bureau. USA. Networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, USA.

Rise in domestic consumption Rise in global demand

By 2014, the number of households with income Africa will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural
of $5,000 or more is expected to reach 106 gas, minerals, food, and arable land. Fast growing demand for raw
million. Africa already has more middle-class materials has both positive and negative effects. On the negative
households (defined as those with incomes side, it may discourage or at least slow the build up of other sectors.
of $20,000 or above) than India. Africas rising On the positive side, it will induce FDI not only to explore the resources,
consumption will create more demand for local but also to develop infrastructure to reach and transport them which
products, sparking a virtuous cycle through are bound to have positive spill-over effects.
a growth in discretionary income. As a result,
consumer-facing sectors such as retailing, REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI IN AFRICA
banking, and telecom are set to grow fast.
North Africa
Increasing urbanization USD 24 billion
(slight decrease from 2007)
The high urbanization rate of the African continent
which exceeds that of any other region can be
a great asset by boosting productivity, demand,
and investment by creating economies of scale.
West Africa
There is a clear need to avoid urban crowding USD 26 billion
and slumification. (increased from 2007) East Africa
USD 6 billion
(increased from 2007)
AFRICAN URBAN POPULATION TREND
70 1,400
Urban population share of the total

60 1,200
The 2009 Revision in UN-Habitat (2010)

Central Africa
Source: World Urbanization Prospects:
African population (%)

Population (millions)

50 1,000 USD 4 billion

(increased from 2007)
40 800
The State of African Cities.

30 600

20 400 Southern Africa

USD 27 billion
10 200 (increase from 2007, mainly
driven by large inflows to South
0 0 Africa and Angola)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010*2020* 2030* 2040* 2050*
*Projections Source: Adapted from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009

19
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

Governance elections held over the last year were won by the
incumbents some of whom have been in power for
well over two decades.31 Unfortunately, this trend

T he last year has seen significant developments on
all levels of political and economic governance.
Nationally, democratic recessions and leadership
deficits are threatening to overshadow significant
improvements in economic governance in several
countries. Regionally, African states and their
organizations continue to pursue a growing array of
cooperative and integrative efforts despite capacity
constraints. Globally, the drive for much-needed
systemic reforms has stalled despite high hopes and
repeated declarations to the contrary.
National Governance
appears set to continue as only four of the fifteen
countries holding elections over the next year (not
counting the planned elections in Egypt and Tunisia)
will not include the incumbent seeking re-election.32
As the Economists Democracy Index indicates, an
increased number of elections has not necessarily
translated into a greater choice of candidates or
more democracy for the majority of Africans.33
This trend compounds the continents chronic
governance problems, including state fragility,
endemic corruption and widespread lack of basic
freedoms.34 With several leaders having extended
their tenures indefinitely, including by adjusting
constitutions and removing term limits, the disconnect
between rulers and their citizens as well as between

O verall, the quality of national governance as

measured by indices like the Ibrahim Index
of African Governance has remained virtually
elites and the broader population remains an
unfortunate characteristic of many African countries.

unchanged this year.29 However, as with the
continents economic growth, the averages hide
significant variations and trends across various
components. While many countries have seen
impressive improvements in economic governance,
nearly two-thirds have also seen disconcerting
deteriorations in political participation, human rights,
physical security and the rule of law.30
The refusal of Laurent Gbagbo to relinquish power
to the recognized winner of last years presidential
elections in Cte dIvoire and the heavy-handed
response of Muammar al-Gaddafi to calls for political
change in Libya are cases in point. However, while the
attempt of some leaders to cling to power has been
the most visible expression of democratic recessions,
others, including the dominance of the incumbent,
are equally worrying. Six of the nine presidential
But there are also signs of hope. Last year has seen the
adoption of new and improved constitutions in Kenya
and Niger, a peaceful referendum in South Sudan, the
first democratic elections in Guinea, and the fall of
autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Together with
the popular uprising in Libya, these transitions highlight
new dynamics of accountability and increased
pressure on governments to deliver tangible results
to their citizens. Several countries, including Liberia
and Mauritius, have made remarkable progress in
improving accountability, and more countries are
implementing regional and global good-governance
initiatives, including the African Governance Platform.
By early 2011, 31 countries had acceded to NEPADs
African Peer Review Mechanism (one more than last
year), and 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (two
more than last year) and were slowly implementing
the reviews recommendations.

South Sudan: Africas youngest nation

Following a peaceful referendum in January 2011, in which over 98 per cent of the voters endorsed
independence, South Sudan is set to become Africas newest nation on 9 July 2011. Governing the largely
undeveloped country will not be easy. Despite significant mineral wealth and great agricultural potential,
the new state will face challenges of public-service provision, economic governance, and peace and
security. It will also need to clarify important issues with North Sudan, particularly concerning demarcation
of the border (the longest in Africa), citizenship, and the sharing of oil revenues. While the government led
by President Salva Kiir and his successors will bear the main responsibility for tackling these challenges, it will
need significant support from within and outside the continent to ensure that South Sudan gets off to a good
start without further instability in the region.

20
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

M ost progress was undoubtedly made in the

area of economic and resource governance.
Many African countries significantly improved their
of total revenues, leaving these nations vulnerable
to shocks.37

domestic resource mobilization by deepening the
tax base, strengthening tax administration and
formalizing the informal sector. While the trend of tax
revenues is positive, in some countries, like Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and
Guinea-Bissau, annual per capita taxes are still
as low as $11.35 Many countries still collect only
half of what would be expected given their living
standards and economic situation.36 Elsewhere, tax
revenues are still dominated by taxes related to
resource extraction, which can be up to 66 per cent
Many countries have made progress in curbing
corruption, particularly in the extractive sector. Twenty-
one resource-rich African countries have now joined
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
and adopted its stringent standards on the verification
and publication of private-sector payments. The
Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and
Nigeria are already fully compliant. Nonetheless, Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to rank last in the Revenue
Watch Index, measuring governments willingness to
disclose information on their resource revenues.38

Partnering around transparency in extractive industries

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a partnership of governments, companies, civil
society groups, investors and international organizations that supports transparency and good governance
through verification and publication of payments and revenues from oil, gas and mining ventures. While
the responsible use of reported revenues naturally depends on national governments, EITI has already led
to improved investment climates, promoted economic and political stability for host governments, and
mitigated political and reputational risks for companies and investors. It shows how a partnership can help
define and advocate for sensible standards and then support their implementation. Given the importance
of commodity exports to many African economies, there is great scope to expand this type of initiative
beyond extractive industries.

A fricas international partners have continued to

make progress in controlling corruptive practices
of their companies operating on the continent. The
United States Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of July 2010, for example,
requires all oil, mining and gas companies registered
with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
to report their payments to foreign governments by
country and by project. Hong Kong has recently
introduced similar conditions for companies listed on its
exchange, and France and the United Kingdom have
recently revised their national anti-bribery laws and are
pushing for improved transparency laws at European
level. At their November 2010 summit, G20 states
agreed an ambitious anti-corruption action plan.39
Another encouraging sign is the growing role of civil
society organizations and independent oversight
institutions across Africa. While still unduly limited by
some governments, such organizations are becoming
an increasingly vocal and essential cornerstone of
democratization and anti-corruption efforts in many
countries. Empowered by advances in information and
communication technology including social media
(such as Twitter and Facebook) and crowdsourcing
platforms for social activism (such as Ushahidi), they
provide a crucial complement to governments and
the private sector, and keep both sides accountable
to each other and to the people.
However, parliaments, opposition parties and civil
society organizations are still too weak in many
African countries to provide effective checks and
balances to entrenched political elites.40 According
to Transparency International, corruption also remains
widespread, costing the continent billions of dollars
a year.41 In many areas, the fight against quiet
corruption the failure of public servants to deliver
goods and services paid for by governments remains
an uphill struggle.42 Accelerating population growth,
organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade, as
well as climate change, are adding new pressures on
local and national governance systems, particularly
in fast-growing cities and remote rural areas.

Many countries have made progress in curbing corruption,

particularly in the extractive sector.

21
 GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET
Country Name of leader Years Year of last Registered The leader Constitutional Constitutional Countries holding
(*incumbent president winner of last in power Presidential voters (1) originally change in change in the presidential
election) Election out of total came to the last 10 last 10 years: elections 2011-
(% won by) population (2) power years that Qualitative 2012
(million) through a favours the improvement (*incumbent
coup incumbent (3) of constitution seeking
(year) (years) (4) reelection)
(year)
Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Voter Turnout Database, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), BBC Country Profiles, CIA Factbook,

Algeria President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA* 12 2009 18.1 / 35 2008

(90.2%)

Angola President Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS* 31 1992 4.8 / 13.3 2010 2012 (*)
(49.6%)

Benin President Thomas YAYI BONI* 5 2011 (53%) 4.3 / 9.3 2011 (*)

Botswana President Seretse Khama Ian 3 0.7 / 2.1

KHAMA*

Burkina Faso President Blaise COMPAORE* 23 2010 3.9 / 16.7 1987 2002
(80.2%)

Burundi President Pierre NKURUNZIZA* 5 2010 3.5 / 10.2 2005

(91.6%)

Cameroon President Paul BIYA* 28 2004 4.7 / 19.7 2008 2011 (*)
(70.9%)

Cape Verde President Pedro Verona 10 2006 0.3 / 0.5 2011

Rodrigues PIRES* (51.2%)

Central African Republic President Francois BOZIZE* 8 2011 1.3 / 4.9 2003 2010 2011 (*)
(64.4%)

Chad President Lt. Gen. Idriss DEBY 20 2006 5.7 / 10.8 1990 2005 2011 (*)
ITNO* (64.7%)

Comoros Ikililou DHOININE Will take 2010 0.3 / 0.8 2001

office (61.1%)
May 2011

Congo President Denis SASSOU- 13 2009 1.7 / 4.2 1997 2002

Nguesso* (78.6%)

DRC President Joseph KABILA* 10 2006 (58%) 25.4 / 71.7 2011 2011 (*)

Cte d'Ivoire President Alassane OUATTARA >1 year 2010 5.5 / 21.5
(54.1%)

Djibouti President Ismail Omar GUELLEH* 12 2011 (80%) 0.2 / 0.8 2010 2011 (*)
African Election Project 14 Oct 2009 Rights Group Encourages Responsible Voting and IFES Election Guide.

Egypt Former President Mohamed Hosni 29 2005 31.8 / 82.1 2011

MUBARAK* (88.6%)

Equatorial Guinea President Brig. Gen. (Ret.) 31 2009 0.2 / 0.7 1979
Teodoro OBIANG NGUEMA (95.8%)
MBASOGO*

Eritrea President Isaias AFWORKI 18 1993 (95%) n/a / 5.9

Ethiopia President GIRMA 9 2007 (79%) n/a / 90.9

WOLDEGIORGIS*

Gabon President Ali Ben BONGO 1 2009 0.5 / 1.6

ONDIMBA (41.7%)

Gambia President Yahya JAMMEH* 14 2006 0.7 / 1.8 1994

(67.3%)

Ghana President John Evans Atta MILLS 2 2008 12.5 / 24.8

(50.2%)

Guinea President Alpha CONDE >1 year 2010 5 / 10.6 2010

(52.5%)

Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai SANHA 1 2009 0.5 / 1.6

(63.5%)

Kenya President Mwai KIBAKI* 8 2007 (46%) 14.3 /41.1 2010

Lesotho King LETSIE III 15

Prime Minister Pakalitha MOSISILI 13 2007 0.9/ 1.9

(National
Assembly
election)

Liberia President Ellen JOHNSON SIRLEAF 5 2005 1.3 /3.8 2011 (*)
(59.6%)

Libya Revolutionary Leader Col. 41 n/a / 6.6 1969

Muammar Abu Minyar AL-
QADHAFI

Madagascar Andry RAJOELINA 2 n/a /21.9 2009 2010 2011 (*)

Malawi President Bingu wa MUTHARIKA* 7 2009 (66%) 5.9 /15.9

22
 Country Name of leader Years Year of last Registered The leader Constitutional Constitutional Countries holding
(*incumbent president winner of last in power Presidential voters (1) originally change in change in the presidential
election) Election out of total came to the last 10 last 10 years: elections 2011-
(% won by) population (2) power years that Qualitative 2012
(million) through a favours the improvement (*incumbent
coup incumbent (3) of constitution seeking
(year) (years) (4) reelection)
(year)

Mali President Amadou Toumani 9 2007 6.9 /14.2 2012

TOURE* (71.2%)

Mauritania President Mohamed Ould Abdel 1 2009 1.1 /3.3 2008

AZIZ (52.6%)

Mauritius President Sir Anerood JUGNAUTH* 7 2008 n/a / 1.3

Morocco King MOHAMMED VI 11

Prime Minister Abbas EL FASSI 3 n/a / 32

Mozambique President Armando GUEBUZA* 6 2009 9.9 / 23

(76.3%)

Namibia President Hifikepunye POHAMBA* 6 2009 1 / 2.2

(76.4%)

Niger President Mahamadou ISSOUFOU >1 year 2011 (58%) 5.2 / 16.5 2010 2011

Nigeria President Goodluck JONATHAN 1 n/a / 155.2 2011 (*)

Rwanda President Paul KAGAME* 11 2010 3.9 / 11.4 2003

(93.1%)

So Tom and Prncipe President Fradique Bandiera 9 2006 (60%) 0.1 / 0.2 2011
Melo DE MENEZES*

Senegal President Abdoulaye WADE* 11 2007 4.9 / 12.6 2001 2012 (*)
(55.9%)

Seychelles President James Alix MICHEL* 7 2006 0.1 / 0.1 2011 (*)
(53.7%)

Sierra Leone President Ernest Bai KOROMA 3 2007 2.6 / 5.4 2008 2012 (*)
(54.6%)

Somalia Transitional Federal President 2 2009 n/a / 9.9

Sheikh SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED

South Africa President Jacob ZUMA 2 2009 (69%) 23.2 / 49

Sudan President Umar Hassan Ahmad 17 2010 7.6 / 45 1989 2005

AL-BASHIR* (68.2%)

Swaziland King MSWATI III 25 2005

Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso 2 n/a / 1.4

DLAMINI

Tanzania President Jakaya KIKWETE* 5 2010 20.1 /42.8

(61.2%)

Togo President Faure GNASSINGBE* 6 2010 3.6 / 6.8

(60.9%)

Tunisia Former President Zine El Abidine 23 2009 4.9 / 10.6 2002 2011
BEN ALI* (89.6%)

Uganda President Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta 25 2011 10.4 / 34.6 1986 2005 2011 (*)
MUSEVENI* (68.4%)

Zambia President Rupiah BANDA 2 2008 3.9 / 13.9 2011 (*)

(40.1%)

Zimbabwe President Robert Gabriel 23 2008 5.6 / 12.1 2011 (*)

MUGABE* (85.5%)
(1) Year of latest available data: Algeria 2004, Angola 1992, Benin 2006, Botswana 2009, Burkina Faso 2005, Burundi 2010, Cameroon 2004, Cape Verde 2006, Central African Republic 2005, Chad 2006,
Comoros 2006, Congo 2002, DRC 2006, Cote dIvoire 2000, Djibouti 2005, Egypt 2005, Equatorial Guinea 2002, Gabon 2005, Gambia 2006, Ghana 2008, Guinea 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2005, Kenya 2007, Liberia
2005, Madagascar 2006, Malawi 2009, Mali 2007, Mauritania 2007, Mozambique 2009, Namibia 2004, Niger 2004, Rwanda 2003, So Tom and Prncipe 2006, Senegal 2007, Seyschelles 2006, Sierra Leone
2007, South Africa 2009, Sudan 1996, South Sudan 2011, Tanzania 2010, Togo 2005, Tunisia 2004, Uganda 2006, Zambia 2008, Zimbabwe 2008.
(2) Total population 2011 estimate.
(3) Constitutional change includes the removal or extension of term limits, or the modification of their age limits.
(4) Constitutional change includes the decentralization or devolution of power, shortening or the creation of presidential term limits, the creation of anti-corruption or reconciliation mechanisms, and the
restoration of civilian rule.
Notes: Algeria: Constitutional amendment removed the presidential two-term limit in 2008. Angola: In 2010, the parliament approved a new constitution abolishing direct elections of the president.
Botswana: Parliamentary election in 2009, President elected by National Assembly. Burkina Faso: In 2002, constitutional amendment reduced the presidential term to five years. This has not been applied to
the incumbent president. Burundi: 2005 constitution guarantees representation of main ethnic groups, by setting out the share of posts they will have in parliament, government and in the army. Cameroon:
2008 constitutional amendment enables the incumbent president to run for a third term in 2011. Central African Republic: The 2010 constitutional amendment extended the terms of the President and
the National Assembly when it became apparent that, for technical reasons, elections could not be held in time. Chad: 2005 referendum removed constitutional term limits. Comoros: 2001 constitutional
referendum granted the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan, Moheli greater autonomy within the federation. Congo: 2002 constitutional referendum approved amendments aimed at consolidating
presidential powers. The presidential term was increased from five to seven years and the post of Prime Minister was abolished. DRC: January 2011 constitutional amendment eliminates the second round
of presidential elections. Djibouti: 2010 constitutional amendment allows the president to run for a third term. Egypt: Following Hosni Mubaraks resignation in early 2011, the military caretaker government
dissolved the constitution on 13 February 2011. Guinea: The 2008 coup was followed by the countrys first democratic elections and a new constitution in 2010. Kenya: Government of national unity. The new
constitution approved through a referendum in 2010 is set to reduce the power of the president, devolve power to the regions and abolish the position of prime minister. Lesotho: Parliamentary constitutional
monarchy. The Monarchy is hereditary with no legislative or executive powers. The leader of the majority party in the National Assembly is appointed Prime Minister. Madagascar: In 2009, elected President
Marc Ravalomanana was toppled by opposition leader Andry Rajoelina. In November 2010 voters approved a new constitution which lowers the minimum age for the president, allowing Rajoelina to
run for president. Mauritius: President was unanimously elected by National Assembly. Morocco: Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch following legislative
elections. Niger: Coup in 2010 led to 2011 democratic transition. The 2010 constitution, approved in referendum, designed to restore civilian rule and return democracy after ousted President Mamadou
Tandja had changed the constitution to stay in power. Nigeria: President Jonathan assumed the presidency after the death of President YarAdua. Elections took place in April 2011, at time of print (18 April
2011) results were yet to be officially confirmed. Rwanda: 2003 constitution adopted through referendum is aimed at reconciliation and bans the incitement of ethnic hatred. It established a presidential
system of government with separation of powers between the three branches of government. Senegal: 2001 new constitution approved by referendum, which shortens presidential term, limits holder to
two terms (but also gives president power to dissolve parliament). Sierra Leone: 2008 constitutional amendment grants the Anti-Corruption Commission the power to prosecute offenses involving corruption.
Somalia: Somalia has a transitional, parliamentary federal government. The Transitional Federal President was elected by the expanded Transitional Federal Assembly in 2009. Sudan: Total population
includes population of Sudan and South Sudan. Interim National Constitution of 2005 is part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the conflict in southern Sudan. Swaziland: Swaziland is a
monarchy. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Monarch from among the elected members of the House of Assembly. Constitution signed by the King in 2005 took effect in 2006 cementing the rule of the
King. Tunisia: President Ben Ali stepped down in Jan 2011. Interim President Fouad MBazaa was appointed in January 2011. 2002 Constitutional referendum included changes that abolished the three-term
limit for incumbent presidents and raised the age limit of a sitting president from 70 to 75, paving the way for the fourth term of former President Ben Ali. Uganda: 2005 constitutional amendments removed
presidential term limits and legalized a multiparty political system. Zimbabwe: Government of national unity. Zimbabwes 2011 election is set to take place after a constitutional referendum planned for 30
June 2011.

23
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

Regional Governance services and capital; peace and security; energy

and infrastructure; agriculture; trade; industry; and
investment and statistics).43 A growing number of
A frican states are increasingly acting on the
economic and political imperative of greater
regional integration. Over the last year, they have
regional and trans-regional initiatives, including the
Short Term Action Plan of the New Partnership for
Africas Development (NEPAD) and the Programme
continued to expand their cooperative and
for Infrastructure Development in Africa, as well as
integrative efforts in several areas and increasingly
innovative partnerships, are targeting the continents
rely on the political steering mechanisms of regional
serious deficit in connectivity infrastructure to drive
organizations for the coordination and pursuit of
increased physical integration through market
collective interests. Remarkably, these mechanisms
expansion and trade creation. Even though the East
are moving beyond mere geographic compositions
African Community had to postpone its plans to
in the form of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
create a common currency by 2014, the creation of
to encompass functional cooperation on topics
regional customs unions, free trade areas and other
ranging from reform of the United Nations (Committee
means of converging macroeconomic policy, as
of Ten Heads of State on the UN Reform) to the
stipulated in the Abuja Treaty, is progressing in many
impact of and responses to the global economic crisis
RECs.
(Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and
Central Bank Governors). Such functional and issue-
At the same time, Africas organizations remain
based cooperation has the potential to increase
plagued by widespread capacity deficits,
Africas bargaining power on the international stage.
fragmentation of efforts, lack of harmonization
and a tendency to concentrate on the formulation
At the 16th African Union Summit in January 2011,
of cooperation agreements rather than their
the continents leaders reaffirmed their commitment implementation.44 Many African states are struggling
to greater unity and integration through shared with the competing demands and agendas of their
values, and pledged to accelerate efforts in the various, often overlapping, memberships in regional
seven priority areas of the AUs Minimum Integration initiatives. Consequently, many decisions are not
Programme (free movement of persons, goods, being implemented at national level.45

The New Partnership for Africas Development

The New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) is the economic development programme of the
African Union which aims to provide an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic
cooperation and integration among African countries. It was set up in 2001 and integrated into the AU
structures in 2010. Focusing on six areas (agriculture and food security, climate change and natural resource
management, regional integration and infrastructure, human development, economic and corporate
governance, and cross-cutting issues such as gender and technology) it has helped to harmonize the policies
of African states. Through its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which encourages conformity to an
agreed set of governance standards through periodic reviews it has also begun to institutionalize a spirit of
self-monitoring. While severe problems remain with regard to the implementation of some of its programme,
NEPAD clearly shows the value intergovernmental partnerships can add to individual development efforts.

Functional and issue-based cooperation has the potential

to increase Africas bargaining power on the international stage.

24
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

Africas international and

intra-regional flight connections
Air traffic to and from Africa accounted for 4.1% of egypt
best connected internationally

the global scheduled air traffic in January 2011. 2005 2010

Intra Africa main Intra Africa main
destinations*: Sudan (22), destinations*: Libya (40),
Comparing January 2005 and January 2011, weekly Libya (17), Morocco (8),
Nigeria (4)
Sudan (40), Nigeria (13),
Morocco (12)
number of flights has increased by 10.2% globally Connected to: 12 countries Connected to: 15 countries
International top International top
while weekly number of flights to/from Africa has destinations*: Saudi Arabia destinations*: Saudi Arabi
(75), Germany (63), United (214), United Kingdom
increased by 84.9%. Arab Emirates (55), United (113), United Arab Emirates
Kingdom (29) (103), Germany (97)
Connected to: 38 countries Connected to: 44 countries
The weekly number of intra-Africa flights grew
by 49.9% between January 2005 and January 2011. ethiopia
2005 2010
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main
senegal destinations*: Kenya (17), destinations*: Kenya (24),
Djibouti (14), Nigeria (10), Djibouti (19), Sudan (16),
2005 2010 Sudan (5) Nigeria (13)
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main Connected to: 18 countries Connected to: 25 countries
destinations*: Mali (20), destinations*: Mali (17), International top International top
Cte dIvoire (14), Cte dIvoire (14), destinations*: United Arab destinations*: United Arab
Morocco (8), Gambia (8) Morocco (14), Gambia (14) Emirates (10), Italy (9), Emirates (21), India (15),
Connected to: 14 countries Connected to: 16 countries India (6), Thailand (3) Thailand (10), Italy (9)
International top International top Connected to: 12 countries Connected to: 16 countries
destinations*: France (21), destinations*: USA (15),
Italy (8), Spain (8), USA (7) Spain (10), France (8),
Connected to: 8 countries Italy (4) Kenya
Connected to: 9 countries
2005 2010
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main
destinations*: Tanzania destinations*: Tanzania
GUINEA BISSAU (53), Uganda (29), South (102), Uganda (64), Sudan
least connected country Africa (24), Sudan (6) (45), South Africa (30)
Connected to: 25 countries Connected to: 29 countries
2005 2010
International top International top
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main destinations*: United destinations*: United
destinations*: Senegal (3) destinations*: Senegal (4) Arab Emirates (24), United Arab Emirates (26), United
Connected to: 1 country Connected to: 1 country Kingdom (18), Netherlands Kingdom (24), Netherlands
International top International top (14), India (10), Qatar (1) (15), Qatar (15), India (7)
destinations*: Portugal (2) destinations*: Portugal (3) Connected to: 12 countries Connected to: 15 countries
Connected to: 1 country Connected to: 1 country

nigeria
2005
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Ghana (32),
Ethiopia (10), Cte dIvoire
(7), South Africa (4)
Connected to: 17 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (27), France (11),
Netherlands (11), United
Arab Emirates (6)
Connected to: 8 countries
2010
Intra Africa main
destinations*: Ghana (48),
South Africa (14), Egypt
(14), Ethiopia (13)
Connected to: 18 countries
International top
destinations*: United
Kingdom (33), United Arab
Emirates (16), Germany
(14), France (7)
Connected to: 11 countries
SOUTH AFRICA
best connected within africa
2005 2010
democratic republic of congo
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main
2005 2010 destinations*: Mozambique destinations*: Zimbabwe
Intra Africa main Intra Africa main (109), Botswana (89), (99), Botswana (90),
destinations*: South Africa destinations*: South Africa Namibia (87), Namibia (89),
(7), Kenya (7), Congo (7), (17), Ethiopia (10), Zimbabwe (55) Mozambique (71)
Ethiopia (1) Kenya (9), Congo (3) Connected to: 28 countries Connected to: 28 countries
Connected to: Connected to:
International top International top
7 countries 17 countries
destinations*: United destinations*: United
International top International top Kingdom (55), Germany Kingdom (55), United Arab
destinations*: France (3), destinations*: France (3), (25), United Arab Emirates Emirates (42), Germany
Belgium (2) Belgium (2) (14), Australia (9) (25), Australia (14)
Connected to: 2 countries Connected to: 2 countries Connected to: 23 countries Connected to: 22 countries

* The number of flights is a rounded average of the total number of departing flights per week for a selected country.
The average was computed using a representative week for each month over a whole year.

Number of flights to/from Africa Percentage increase of the number

per week and by region of flights per week to/from Africa
January 2008 - January 2011
7,000 50
45 46,2%
6,000
40
5,000 35
30 33,0%
Per cent

4,000
25
3,000
20
2,000 15
10 13,7%
1,000
5
0 0
Jan 2005 Jan 2008 Jan 2011 Europe Asia Middle East

Europe Middle East Asia North America South America

Source: Innovata LLC, IATA. Source: Innovata LLC, IATA.

25
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Global Governance
D espite repeated declarations, the public re-
examination of global governance triggered by
the recent financial and economic crisis has not led
to significant changes to out-dated arrangements for
representation and decision-making. Also because
of the inadequate diplomatic capacity of many
governments, Africa remains heavily marginalized in
world affairs, with little control over how these affairs
affect its people.
In fact, the recent crisis seems to have complicated
Africas bid for a louder voice and greater
international representation. The inclusion of big
emerging economies like Brazil, China and India,
with their own (legitimate) concerns and priorities,46
risks further marginalizing less economically
powerful players. The G24, the intergovernmental
group representing developing countries in the IMF
and the World Bank, has calculated that the lions
share of the promised 6 per cent shift in IMF voting
power is actually a shift from developing countries
to emerging economies, thus further reducing
Africas say in these organizations.47 The crisis has
added weight to specialized bodies such as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the
Financial Stability Board, on which Africa has very
little representation even though its countries are
directly affected by the decisions taken.
Africa remains heavily marginalized in world affairs,
with little control over how these affairs affect its people.
26
At the same time, the broad-based consensus on
the need to adapt global governance to changed
political and economic realities has not disappeared.
At their summit in Seoul in November 2010, the G20
nations agreed to a series of measures addressing
global imbalances and pushing for further changes to
governance structures of the IMF and World Bank.48
The French G20 Presidency has vowed to implement
these measures as part of its ambitious reform agenda
focusing on the modernization of the international
monetary system. Also in November 2010, the EU
pledged to support Africa in its efforts to gain a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.49
South Africas membership in the G20 and the
increasingly institutionalized participation of the AU
and NEPAD in the groups meetings are important
steps towards ensuring that Africas concerns and
priorities are taken into account in the proposed reform
efforts. They may also encourage greater African
representation in other decision-making fora. It is
unrealistic to expect individual representation of most
African countries in every important organization, and
also unrealistic to expect single countries to set aside
their own national concerns in order to represent the
entire continent. Therefore, continental and regional
representation may prove the most effective way to
include African perspectives. Crucially, this may also
help to improve the legitimacy of organizations like
the G20.

PEACE AND SECURITY
P ervasive conflict and insecurity continue to slow
Africas progress. More than one fifth of the
continents population remains directly affected by
conflicts which continue to destroy socio-economic
infrastructure, erode institutional capacity,
aggravate poverty and human suffering, and make
it even more difficult to achieve the MDGs.50
With at least nine countries experiencing major
conflicts within their territories (two more than last
year) and the highest number of peacekeeping
missions (five UN, three regional and one hybrid),51
Africa continues to rank as the world region least
at peace.52 The seemingly intractable conflicts
in the Great Lakes Region, Darfur and Somalia
continue, while democratic recessions, including
the protracted electoral crisis in Cte dIvoire,
demographic change, increasing food and oil
prices, and growing inequalities have raised tensions
throughout the continent.53 The revolts in North
Africa, and particularly the civil war in Libya and
the international cooperation around the no-fly
zone, have added yet another dimension to Africas
complex security situation.
Most security challenges in Africa continue to
be a direct result of weak or poor governance,
including the absence of effective state institutions.
The ongoing spread of terrorism and organized
crime includes drug trafficking and illicit trade, the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and
the pervasiveness of piracy around the Horn of Africa.
Residual transnational militancy and fluid forms of
cross-border violence, such as that perpetrated by
Most security challenges in Africa continue to be a direct result
of weak or poor governance.
27
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
the Lords Resistance Army in Northern Uganda,
can all be traced to the continuing existence
of ungoverned spaces and high state fragility
throughout Africa.54
Many of these problems are further exacerbated by
increasing external stresses relating to accelerating
climate change, global economic dynamics and
increasingly volatile food prices. These raise the
likelihood of destabilizing large-scale population
movements and conflict over scarce natural
resources, including water and arable land.55
But the last year has also seen positive developments:
the peaceful referendum in South Sudan, strides
towards democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, and the
great progress Guinea and Niger have made towards
restored constitutional order and consolidated
peace. At intergovernmental level, operation
continues of the African Peace and Security
Architecture and the Regional Mechanisms for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In
November 2010, the AU began to assess procedures
for deploying its African Standby Force, and three of
the five regional brigades have now been declared
fully operational.56
However, enormous capacity and harmonization
problems persist at all levels of inter-African security
cooperation, as most states have been reluctant to
free resources for the new institutional architecture.
As a result, the AU remains dependent on
international support to finance, equip and sustain its
growing array of security initiatives. It is also subject
to internal disagreements on central political issues
and principles, including the legitimacy of outside
intervention in African affairs.
 AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
social development
A little over a decade after the Millennium
Declaration, many African countries remain
off-track to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals by 2015. 57 While increasing numbers of
success stories highlight the possibility of rapid
improvements in all key sectors and some
countries are on track to achieve most of their
targets, overall progress continues to be slow.
It is hampered by exogenous trends such as
accelerating climate change and by inadequate
policies, unmet commitments, lack of focus and
accountability and insufficient dedication to
sustainable development by both African states
and their international partners.
A particularly worrying development is the increase
in inequality both within and across African
societies.58 The UNDPs new inequality-adjusted
Human Development Index (HDI) shows that the
human development ratings of African countries
are substantially lower if adjusted for inequality in
the distribution of wealth. This adjustment reduces
ratings of some countries, including the Central
African Republic, Mozambique and Namibia, by
up to 40 per cent.59
The global financial crisis has also clearly shown
the importance for African countries of creating
mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable
segments of their populations against unexpected
shocks. Despite the efforts of some countries to
implement the AUs Social Policy Framework, basic
social security remains beyond reach for most
Africans, with less than 5 per cent of the working-
age population in Sub-Saharan Africa covered
by contributory pension schemes, unemployment
benefits or other social safety nets.60 As a result,
economic contraction and price volatility continue
to have a disproportionate effect on the poor.
But it is not all bad news. There is plenty of evidence
that with the right policy mix and international
support, African countries can still achieve many of
their MDG-based targets, particularly in the areas
of education and health. At the Review Summit
in September 2010, world leaders reaffirmed their
commitment to achieve the goals by 2015 and a
number of promising initiatives, such as the UNDPs
There is evidence that with the right policy mix and international support,
African countries can still achieve many of their MDG-based targets.
28
MDG Acceleration Framework, are under way to
identify, replicate and scale up success stories and
accelerate progress across the continent.61
Poverty Alleviation
T
o the detriment of hundreds of millions of Africans,
the continents strong economic growth has not
translated into widespread job creation and poverty
reduction. While there is still considerable controversy
around both the method of computation and the
actual level of Africas poverty rate,62 it is certain that
many African countries will not reach their poverty-
reduction goals by 2015 despite strong GDP growth.
UNCTAD projects that income per capita will grow at
only 2.7 per cent in 2011, and 2.8 per cent in 2012,
which is below the threshold of 3 per cent considered
as the minimum rate to make a substantial dent in
poverty and far below the rate needed to achieve
the MDGs in most countries.63
The need for greater progress is urgent. According
to the 2011 Rural Poverty Report of the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Sub-
Saharan Africa is home to nearly one third of the
worlds poor. While their share in the continents
total population is declining, their absolute numbers
have increased from 268 million to 306 million over
the last decade.64 The UNDPs Multi-dimensional
Poverty Index, which complements money-based
measures by considering multiple deprivations and
their overlap, even puts the number of poor Africans
as high as 458 million.65
While poverty remains a predominantly rural
phenomenon throughout Africa, rapid urbanization
is adding an increasingly important dimension.66
The continent already has the highest incidence of
slums over 62 per cent of the urban population
lives in such informal inner-city settlements and
accelerating rural flight is bound to swell the ranks
of the urban poor.67 Increasingly volatile food prices,
the uncertainties and effects of climate change
and a range of natural-resource constraints will also
complicate efforts to reduce poverty.68 At the same
time, positive trends include increasing agricultural
productivity, growing international interest in bottom-
of-the-pyramid business and the spread of mobile
and affordable technology. These offer new and
exciting opportunities for tackling poverty.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

Partnering around mobile technology to tackle poverty

The mobile money transfer service M-Pesa (M stands for mobile, Pesa means money in Swahili) is one of
the best examples of the transformative power of partnerships. With the initial support of the UK Department
for International Development (DfID) through a matching fund, the Kenyan mobile-phone service provider
Safaricom has created a service which allows users to make and receive payments, transfer money to other
users and non-users, and deposit and withdraw money without needing to visit a bank. By relying solely on
the ubiquitous mobile phone, M-Pesa has significantly expanded financial access among Kenyas poor. By
bringing the unbanked into the market it has also created new markets for goods and services tailored to
mobile banking. Already serving more than 14 million users in Kenya, this type of service is being replicated in
other African countries including Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. It clearly demonstrates that
partnerships for development can mature into self-sustaining and profit-making ventures with transformative
effects.

29
 MDG SCORECARD Tracking MDG Progress
No data Tracking progress on MDG
l Achieved l On-track l Off-track/slow l Regressing achievement is an immense
challenge due to a lack
of sufficient, reliable, and
Millennium updated data. There are
Development Goals also inconsistencies between

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
national and global tracking
Eradicate Achieve Promote gen- Reduce child Improve Combat HIV/ Ensure efforts that make it difficult
extreme universal der equality mortality maternal AIDS, malaria environmental to compare progress across
poverty and primary and empower health and other sustainability countries and regions but
Country hunger education women diseases commendable efforts have
Algeria l l l l l l l been made.
Angola l l l l l l l This infographic illustrates
Benin l l l l l l l overall MDG progress as
Botswana l l l l l l l seen in the African Economic
Outlook 2010 Report.
Burkina Faso l l l l l l l
Burundi l l l l l l l 2009 and 2010 data from
Cameroon l l l l l l other progress reports
highlight the following:
Cape Verde l l l l l l l
Central African Republic l l l l l l l
Chad l l l l l l l GOAL 1: POVERTY AND
Comoros l l l l l l l HUNGER
Congo, Republic l l l l l l l Despite progress in
DRC l l l l l l l many countries, the number
of people suffering from
Cte dIvoire l l l l l l l hunger on the continent has
Djibouti l l l l l l l increased.
Egypt l l l l l l l Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Equatorial Guinea l l l l l l l Ethiopia, DRC, Angola,
Eritrea l l l l l l l Mozambique and Malawi
Ethiopia l l l l l l l made the most progress in
GDP growth rate per person
Gabon l l l l l l l employed. Many countries
Gambia l l l l l l l increased labour productivity
Ghana l l l l l l l but Comoros, Rwanda,
Guinea l l l l l l l Equatorial Guinea, Chad,
Mali, Namibia, Tunisia, Eritrea,
Guinea Bissau l l l l l l l Botswana and Lesotho
Kenya l l l l l l l showed a decline between
Lesotho l l l l l l l 1992 and 2008.
Source: Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, African Economic Outlook 2010 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org

Liberia l l l l l l l In Burkina Faso, Comoros,

Libya l l l l l l l Djibouti, Lesotho, Zimbabwe,
Madagascar l l l l l l l Morocco, Libya and
Madagascar the prevalence
Malawi l l l l l l l of underweight children
Mali l l l l l l l increased.1 Undernourished
Mauritania l l l l l l l population decreased in
Nigeria and Ghana, but
Mauritius l l l l l l l increased in Gambia.
Morocco l l l l l l l Liberia,and Sierra Leone.2
Mozambique l l l l l l l
According to IFPRI, African
Namibia l l l l l l l countries that achieved the
Niger l l l l l l l most progress in combatting
Nigeria l l l l l l l hunger are: Angola, Ethiopia,
Ghana and Mozambique.
Rwanda l l l l l l l The largest deterioration
So Tom and Principe l l l l l l between 1990 and 2010 is
Senegal l l l l l l l seen in the DRC and Burundi,
Seychelles l l l which together with Chad
and Eritrea have the most
Sierra Leone l l l l l l alarming 2010 Global Hunger
Somalia l l l l l Index scores.3
South Africa l l l l l l l
Sudan l l l l l l
Swaziland l l l l l l l
Tanzania l l l l l l l
1 Data not available for Burundi, Cameroon,
Togo l l l l l l l Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Tunisia l l l l l l l Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland Tunisia, Sao
Uganda l l l l l l l Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde
Zambia l l l l l l l 2 FAO 2009 The State of Food Insecurity in
the World Economic Crisis
Zimbabwe l l l l l l l 3 International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute (IFPRI) (2010) Global Hunger Index
Satisfactory 44% 52% 69.8% 44.2% 13.5% 35.3% 28.3%
performance ratio

30
 GOAL 2: EDUCATION GOAL 3: WOMENS GOAL 4: CHILD MORTALITY GOAL 5: MATERNAL
African countries EMPOWERMENT Overall African under- HEALTH
continue to show The gender parity index five mortality rate DRC, Ethiopia and
overall progress in in primary education (U5MR) declined at an Nigeria, account for
net enrollment in primary (1991-2007) shows that insufficient rate to attain the 50% of all maternal deaths
education where Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, MDG target between 1990 globally. Although the
Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Madagascar, Namibia, South and 2008.U5MR progress has Maternal Mortality Ratio has
Madagascar, Mauritania and Africa, Swaziland and have been most striking in Eritrea fallen in both Nigeria and
Morocco showed significant regressed. Mauritius is the only and Malawi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Ethiopia, it needs to fall at a
improvement as did Burkina country that has managed Mozambique and Niger.1 much faster rate for the overall
Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, to maintain gender parity picture to change1.
Gambia, Ghana, Niger, for the same period. Other Progress remains slow in
Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland countries have only marginally Mauritania, So Tom and Most African countries are
and Togo. DRC and increased gender parity. Prncipe, Central African unlikely to achieve the
Equatorial Guinea reversed Republic and Swaziland. target as only ten countries
progress (1991- 2007). Womens representation in have reached an over 50%
African parliaments has made Between 1990-2008, there was contraceptive prevalence rate:
Guinea, Morocco, significant progress. Of 37 no change in DRC or Somalia. Mauritius, Morocco, Algeria,
Mauritania, Tunisia, Malawi, countries only six Guinea- while in Chad, Congo, Kenya, Cape Verde, Egypt, South
Madagascar, Tanzania and Bissau, So Tom and Prncipe, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe,
Togo have made significant Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the U5MR increased. Namibia, and Swaziland.
progress in improving primary Egypt and Cameroon show Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
completion rates while that parliamentary seats Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and
declined between 1990 and Morocco report the lowest
Burundi and Mauritius were held by women decreased 2008. Mozambique recorded
the only two countries to between 1990 and 2009. The adolescent birth rates on the
the greatest reduction, continent. It is highest in Chad,
register a setback.1 most progress was seen in followed by Malawi, Niger and
Rwanda followed by Angola, Mali, Mozambique and Niger.2
Ethiopia. Kenya was the worst
Mozambique, South Africa, performer, followed by Chad, 1 The Lancet (Hogan et al., 2010)
1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010) Assess- and Uganda.1 Congo, Lesotho, South Africa, 2 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
ing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium
Development Goals, MDG Report 2010 1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010) and Zimbabwe.
Between 2000 and 2008,
16 countries increased their Nigeria, So Tom and
GOAL 6: HIV/AIDS, Malaria mortality has dropped measles immunization: Prncipe, Senegal, Sierra
MALARIA AND OTHER in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Burkina Faso, Leone and Sudan. Benin,
DISEASES Rwanda, Zambia and the Cameroon, Central Chad, Cte dIvoire, Gambia,
Zanzibar region of Tanzania. African Republic, Congo, Egypt, Somalia, South Africa,
Africa has sustained the DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe
progress made in tackling HIV/ Between 2000 and 2008/2009
there was significant increase Guinea,Madagascar, Niger, reported a setback over the
AIDS. Namibia and Rwanda
in the use of insecticide- same period.2
made remarkable increase 1 UN (2010) The Millennium Development
in knowledge about HIV treated bed nets (ITN)to Goals Report 2 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
prevention between 2000 and protect from malaria. The
2008 but most countries will proportion of children under
not meet the 95% knowledge five sleeping under ITNs rose
target by 2010 set by the considerably in Gambia, in Egypt, Nigeria and except Algeria, Botswana,
UN. Condom use has also Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco.3 Nine countries Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
gained acceptance in some Rwanda, So Tom and are still classified by WHO as Mauritius, Morocco,
countries such as Burkina Prncipe, and Zambia.2 TB high-burden countries: Namibia, and the Seychelles.
Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mozambique, Namibia and The TB prevalence rate has Libya is the highest emitter of
been rising in Algeria, Cte Mozambique, Nigeria, South CO2 per capita in Africa.
Nigeria. As of December 2008, Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
some 3 million Africans were dIvoire, Mauritania, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe. Many countries showed an
estimated to be receiving
and Tunisia. It declined improvement in access to
antiretroviral therapy (44% of
the estimated need).1 safe drinking water. In 2008,
2 UN (2010) The Millennium Development Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti,
1 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update 2009 Goals Report 3 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
Egypt, Gambia, Mauritius,
Namibia, South Africa, and
Mixed progress in africa GOAL 7:
Tunisia reached over 90%
coverage. DRC, Ethiopia,
100 ENVIRONMENTAL Madagascar, Mauritania,
SUSTAINABILITY1 Mozambique, Niger, Sierra
90 Leone and Somalia had less
Many countries are yet
than 50% coverage.
80 to include environmental
Source: Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals,

sustainability in their national Progress in sanitation is still

70 development plans. Most are slow. Only Algeria, Egypt,
60 failing to honor commitments Libya, and Mauritius have
made at the World Summit
Per cent (%)

90% of their population

50 on Sustainable Development with access to improved
(WSSD) and NEPADs sanitation. Benin, Burkina
40
Environment Initiative. Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,
African Economic Outlook 2010 .

30
Africa is the lowest emitter
Madagascar, Mozambique,
20 of carbon dioxide as a
Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo
global region. CO2 emissions
10 have less than 20%.
between 1990 and 2006
0 decreased in most countries
Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 4 Goal 5 Goal 6 Goal 7 1 AU, AfDB, UNECA and UNDP (2010)
Achieved On-track Off-track-slow Regressing

31
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Education and Skills Formation
P rimary education continues to be one of Africas
greatest success stories. According to the latest
figures, the majority of African countries are on track
to achieve the goal of universal primary education
by 2015, with Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique and Tanzania having made notable
progress.69 This has been achieved through abolition
of school fees, greater public investments and
improved donor support, particularly through the
World Banks Education for All Fast Track Initiative.
There is less success in other areas such as the
quality of education, completion rates, enrolment in
secondary and tertiary education, basic education
reform, and teacher recruitment.70 Meeting the
relevant targets will be an enormous challenge.
More than 31 million African children, most of them
girls, remain out of school and the number of new
teachers needed between now and 2015 alone
equals the continents entire current teaching
force.71 With an enrolment rate of merely 6 per cent,
low female participation, and over 40 per cent of
faculty positions vacant, higher education remains a
particularly serious stumbling block in the continents
quest for strong and sustained growth. This is despite
the growing engagement of international donors
and collaborative initiatives like the Partnership for
Higher Education in Africa or the Association for the
Development of Education in Africa.72
There is still a notable lack of strategic planning for and
access to skills development as part of the broader
education curriculum. The acquisition of skills linked
to market-needs plays an essential role in human
development, employment generation, poverty
reduction and sustainable economic growth. While
the share of secondary school students enrolled in
technical and vocational programmes has increased
to 13 per cent in Mali, 16 per cent in Rwanda, and
18 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it
remains below 2 per cent in Niger, Chad and Sudan.73
Crisis-induced spending cuts in both African and
partner countries, quickly growing youth populations
and the prevalence of armed conflict in many parts
of the continent complicate efforts to address these
The empowerment of Africas women is critical
to the achievement of all MDGs.
32
and other serious shortfalls. However, the spread of
information and communication technology offers
chances to bridge some of the gaps in innovative
ways, including through web-based education and
testing platforms, e-learning, and long-distance
mentoring.
Gender Equality and
Womens Empowerment
T he empowerment of Africas women is critical to
the achievement of all MDGs, not just the goal of
gender equality. Fortunately, awareness of the link
between womens empowerment and development
continues to grow. Although gender-disaggregated
data remain patchy, the results of increased efforts
are beginning to show.
In October 2010, the AU launched African Womens
Decade, and there are encouraging signs of progress
to come.74 Last year showed a continuing upward
trend in the political participation of African women,
who now hold 18.5 per cent of parliamentary positions
(from 15 per cent in the previous year). Womens
representation in parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa
is now higher than in South Asia, the Arab states or
Eastern Europe.75 Most countries are also on track to
achieve gender parity in primary education by 2015. A
growing number, including Senegal, Benin and Burkina
Faso, have integrated gender concerns into their
national development plans and poverty-reduction
strategies, also because international partners like the
Millennium Challenge Corporation have made gender
reform a prerequisite for grant disbursement.76 Lesotho
has even achieved the greatest overall improvement
of any nation in the World Economic Forums Global
Gender Gap Index over the last five years.77
Despite these encouraging signs, Africa remains
plagued by substantial and debilitating gender
gaps in health, employment, and wages.78 For every
headline success, thousands of women continue to
find their talents and aspirations blocked by formal
and informal barriers. If adjusted for gender equality,
human development ratings drop substantially
across the entire continent.79

For reasons ranging from labour-market conditions
to access to education to social barriers, cultural
values and attitudes in the household, the vast
majority of women in Sub-Saharan Africa continue
to face income and job insecurities.80 The economic
crisis has further increased both the informalization
of jobs held by women and their share of vulnerable
employment.81 Even though women make up the
majority of the agricultural workforce, producing as
much as 80 per cent of the continents food, they still
own less than 1 per cent of Africas land. They are
still the first, along with their children, to suffer under
economic contraction, food insecurity and violent
conflict.
This is not only a personal tragedy for millions of
women and their families, but a major brake on
Africas development. Failing to use womens energy
and skills slows progress towards achievement of the
MDGs, weakens governance and accountability,
and hampers the implementation of much-needed
reforms. Empowering women, on the other hand, is
proven to increase household incomes, nutrition and
education levels, and agricultural productivity, and
to decrease fertility, population growth and carbon
emissions.82 Africa still has a long way to go in realizing
the enormous potential of its women.
Health
I ncreased financing and a strategic scale-up
of effective interventions have led to some
remarkable results in health this year. For example,
enough insecticide-treated mosquito nets have
been distributed to protect more than 578 million
people at risk of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As a result of these and similar efforts, 11 African
countries have shown reductions of over 50 per cent
in the number of confirmed malaria cases, and the
majority of African states are now on track to halt the
advance of malaria by 2015.83
Eleven African countries have shown reductions
of over 50 per cent of confirmed malaria cases.
33
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
While Africa as a whole is unlikely to meet the goal
of reducing infant mortality by 2015, some countries
have achieved outstanding reductions, including
Mozambique (over 70 per cent), Malawi (68 per
cent) and Niger (64 per cent).84 Although maternal
mortality remains unacceptably high across the
continent, the limited available evidence indicates
that some countries, including Burundi, Cape Verde
and Egypt, are achieving substantial reductions.
This suggests that current efforts to reduce maternal
mortality are working but need to be further scaled
up and complemented by increased investments in
information systems and accessible and affordable
services. Africas leaders agreed at the AU Summit
in July 2010 to increase financial and political
support for female and child health, and to intensify
cooperative efforts through partnerships like the
Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal
Mortality in Africa (CARMMA).87
While the goals of reducing maternal and infant
mortality across all Africa remain distant, there
are several important milestones within reach. The
elimination of polio, measles, guinea-worm disease
and mother-to-child transmission of HIV is possible, but
requires a strong final push.88 The expansion of routine
immunization across the continent is progressing
and the introduction of several new vaccines,
including for meningitis and pneumococcal disease,
is already yielding substantial benefits.89 A promising
malaria vaccine is in the final testing stages and its
introduction may be only a couple of years away.90
Many of these recent achievements were made
possible by effective partnerships between and
among governments, international organizations,
the private sector, philanthropic actors and civil
society. Particularly innovative funding mechanisms
such as the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and
Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight
Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria have helped to turn
international goodwill into results on the ground.
 140

opportunities for WOMEN in africa 120

FEMALE Education & literacy

100 Moldova Australia

Namibia
(measured in percent ot total female population)

South Africa
Mauritius
Botswana
80
Iran, Islamic Rep
Literacy rate, women

Tanzania Kenya Tunisia

Malawi Uganda Algeria
Nigeria Madagascar
60 Cameroon Zambia
Ghana

Sudan

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010)

Cte d'Ivoire Morocco

Womens Economic Opportunity Index.

40 Togo
Pakistan
Egypt
Senegal
Benin
Burkina Faso Ethiopia
20 Chad

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Primary and secondary education, women (total years of schooling)
100

WOMENS Access to finance in africa

90 Sweden
Belgium
Germany
80 Denmark

70

Mauritius
(Economic Opportunity Index (1-100)

60 Tunisia South Africa

Overall Score

50 Namibia
Venezuela, RB
Botswana

Tanzania Morocco
40 Benin Ghana Kenya
Algeria
Zambia Senegal Malawi Egypt
Uganda Burkina Faso Nigeria
Madagascar
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010)

Cameroon
Womens Economic Opportunity Index.

30 Ethiopia
Togo
Cte d'Ivoire Pakistan
Chad

20
Yemen

Sudan

10

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Access to Finance
Countries analysed in the Womens Economic Opportuniy Index
Selected countries for reference
African countries

34
 womens opportunites in select african countries

Botswana Chad
World average World average
Best in world Labour Policy Best in world Labour Policy

General Business Labour General Business Labour

Environment Practice Environment Practice

Womens Legal and Access to Womens Legal and Access to

Social Status Finance Social Status Finance

Education Education
and Training and Training

Nigeria South Africa

World average World average
Best in world Labour Policy Best in world Labour Policy

General Business Labour General Business Labour

Environment Practice Environment Practice

Womens Legal and Access to Womens Legal and Access to

Social Status Finance Social Status Finance

Education Education
and Training and Training

Notes
On the radial charts:

Indicator scores are normalised to lie within a consistent range between 0-100, based on source
Tanzania
data. Section scores are the weighted sum of the underlying indicator scores. All scores 0-100 World average
where 100=most favourable. Best in world
Labour Policy
On the methodology:

The Womens Economic Opportunity Index is a dynamic quantitative and qualitative scoring
model constructed from 26 indicators that measure specific attributes of the environment for General Business Labour
women employees and entrepreneurs in 113 economies.
Environment Practice
Five category scores are calculated from the unweighted mean of underlying indicators and
scaled from 0-100, where 100=most favourable. These categories are: Labour policy and practice
(which comprises two sub-categories: Labour policy and Labour practice); Access to finance;
Education and training; Womens legal and social status; and the General business environment.
Each category or sub-category features either four or five underlying indicators.

The overall score is calculated from a simple average of the unweighted category and indicator
scores. That is, every indicator contributes equally to its parent category and every category Womens Legal and Access to
contributes equally to the overall score. This is the baseline score for the Womens Economic Social Status Finance
Opportunity Index.

The womens access to finance programmes indicator assesses whether governments or the
formal financial sector have programmes aimed at providing fi nancial accounts to women, Education
improving both access to loans and financial literacy. and Training
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Womens Economic Opportunity Index.

35
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

Partnering for health I: The global initiatives

Global health partnerships have received great public attention, and have transformed the quality and
scope of health provision across Africa, saving millions of lives. Successful collaborations include advocacy
on a particular disease (UNAIDS), improving coordination between multiple initiatives (the Rollback Malaria
Initiative), or delivering much-needed services, financial and medical resources, and technologies to
national governments (the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI). GAVI and the
Global Fund in particular demonstrate how partnerships across sectors and between organizations can
achieve objectives that no single agency or actor could achieve alone.

Partnering for health II: Eliminating river blindness

The African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) is one of the longest-running partnerships for
health on the continent. Focusing on community-directed treatment, APOC involves a broad range of
financial, scientific and operational partners, including a network of 15 NGOs and 19 African countries.
Implemented by WHO, with financing managed by the World Bank, the partnership has come close to
eliminating river blindness. Besides reducing the number of infections by over 16 million cases and providing
regular treatment to over 50 million people, the partnership has helped to reclaim abandoned arable land
for settlement and agricultural production.

Source: WHO (2011).

Partnering for health III: SMS for life

The SMS for Life initiative is a publicprivate partnership harnessing standard technology to improve local
access to and availability of essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The Roll Back Malaria Partnership,
Novartis, Vodafone, IBM and the Ministry of Health in Tanzania jointly used a combination of mobile phones,
Short Messaging Service (SMS) technologies and easy-to-use websites to track and manage the supply of
malaria drugs. The initiative was built on a generic and highly scalable platform that could be used for other
medicines or products and could be replicated across the continent with minimal adaptation and high
impact.

E ncouragingly, this goodwill has been reconfirmed

over the last year. Leaders at the G8 Summit
in June 2010 pledged to mobilize $5 billion to
accelerate progress on MDG 4 and 5 as part of the
Muskoka Initiative to reduce maternal and new-born
deaths in developing countries.91 At the MDG Review
Summit in September 2010, world leaders, private-
sector actors, philanthropic organizations and civil
society pledged a total of $40 billion for health over
the next five years. The Global Funds replenishment
in October 2010 yielded $11.7 billion for the global
fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for 2011
2013 (up from $9.7 billion for 20082010); several
donors, including Australia and Norway, have
announced new commitments to GAVI ahead of the
forthcoming replenishment meeting.
These generous pledges, provided that they
materialize, contrast markedly with the reluctance of
African governments to fulfil their own commitments.
Many of them fall short of the Abuja target of
allocating 15 per cent of their public expenditure to
health; 19 countries spend less on health now than
they did when they signed the Abuja declaration in
2001.92
Because of insufficient investments by national
governments and largely disease-specific efforts
of donors, most of Africas health systems continue
to be seriously understaffed, inefficient and
characterized by glaringly inequitable access.93
They remain largely inadequate to deal with many
of the continents health challenges. These include

36
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

both the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the
extremely poor, and the silent epidemic of non-
communicable diseases such as cancers, diabetes
and cardiovascular diseases expected to increase
significantly over the next 20 years. The number of
Africans with diabetes, for example, is expected to
rise from 12.1 million to 23.9 million.94
progress also compounds and widens existing
inequalities, as improvements in sanitation and
water access are largely bypassing the poor.101 These
inequities are becoming increasingly apparent in
Africas cities where almost half the poor population
suffers from at least one preventable disease caused
by lack of safe water and sanitation.102

Increased intergovernmental activism includes

Access to Water and Sanitation the G8 Partnership on Water and Sanitation, the
G20 Working Group on Water and Sanitation and

I n July 2010, the UN General Assembly declared
access to clean water and sanitation a human right.
Implementing this right will be a particular challenge
in Africa where more than 40 per cent of people
live in water-deprived areas. The amount of water
available per person in Africa is not only far below the
global average already, but is declining even further
as groundwater levels fall and precipitation patterns
change as a result of accelerating climate change.
At present, only 26 countries are on track to attain
the water-provision target to halve the proportion of
the population without sustainable access to clean
drinking water by 2015.95 Only nine African countries
(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Rwanda, Botswana,
Angola, South Africa and Egypt) are expected to
meet the MDG target of halving the proportion of
the population without sustainable access to basic
sanitation by 2015.96 At current trends, Africa will miss
this target by over 300 million people.97
the African Ministers Council on Water and its
African Water Facility. This has not yet translated
into national policies and investments necessary
to address the lack of progress. By investing only
an average 0.2 per cent of GDP in sanitation and
hygiene, most African countries have missed the
2010 targets of the eThekwini Declaration which
called for the sector-specific allocation of 0.5 per
cent of GDP.103 As a result, total investment in Africas
water sector remains far below the AfDB estimate of
$11 billion per year required to meet the continents
drinking water supply and sanitation needs.104 Other
obstacles to progress are poor governance of the
water sector, both nationally and with respect to
Africas 63 shared water basins,105 the growing
water needs of African agriculture, a lack of private-
sector capacity in manual drilling, and limited
capacity of community-based maintenance of
water infrastructure.106

This slow progress is highly problematic because
improved access to safe water and sanitation is
essential to improve health.98 Currently, only 60 per
cent of people in Sub-Saharan Africa have access to
improved sources of drinking water and less than half
have access to basic sanitation facilities.99 More than
a quarter still have to practise open defecation, thus
protracting water- and hygiene-related diseases
such as diarrhoea and worm infections.100 The slow
At the same time, a number of innovative
partnerships, such the AfDBs Rural Water Supply
and Sanitation Initiative, the CEO Water Mandate,
the Sanitation and Water for All Partnership and
Ecotacts commercialized provision of affordable
sanitation in urban slums, have shown that rapid
progress is possible.107 There is also enormous
potential for expanding simple water-harvesting
techniques and savings from utility reforms.

Partnering around affordable sanitation services

With the support of partners like the United Nations Foundation, Ashoka, UNICEF, and the Coca Cola
Company, the social enterprise Ecotact provides affordable sanitation services in informal settlements and
urban slums in Kenya. By setting up pay-per-use toilet facilities, Ecotact has improved hygiene in targeted
communities, reduced pollution from human waste, generated employment opportunities for the urban
poor and restored dignity through the provision of sanitation services. It also delivers highly impressive
economic returns, especially if lower healthcare costs, reduced disruption to schooling and higher work
productivity are considered. Built on commercial viability, Ecotacts model is highly scalable and, given the
rapid growth of urban slums across Africa, should be highly replicable.

Sources: UNDP (2011), Growing Inclusive Markets Initiative

37
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
food and nutrition
security
E ven though several African countries are on the
verge of meeting their MDG targets for hunger
reduction, the continent as a whole continues to be
the worlds most food-insecure region.108 Hunger and
malnutrition remain pervasive in many countries, and
rising food prices are compounding the situation for
millions across the continent, particularly in zones of
protracted conflict and in fast-growing urban areas.109
Volatility of Food Prices
F ood prices are higher now than at any time
since 1984.110 Even though the World Banks Food
Price Watch sees Sub-Saharan Africa less exposed
to risks related to soaring food prices as domestic
food production is increasingly replacing imports
and recent harvests have been good,111 the price
spikes have deepened existing macro and micro
vulnerabilities. On the macro level, countries with a
high share of food imports and limited fiscal space
like Burundi are driven deeper into current-account
deficits and the possibility of social unrest as they
become unable to use subsidies and price controls
to shield their populations from inflation. On the micro
level, higher prices make life even more difficult for
Africas poorest, who already spend between 60
to 80 per cent of their income on food. Faced with
reduced access to food and increased vulnerability
to the seasonality of local food prices and markets,
households are forced into unavoidable compromises,
such as choosing cheaper (often less nutritious) food,
selling productive assets, withdrawing children from
school, forgoing healthcare, or simply eating less than
they need.
The recurrence of food-related crises over the last
few years has focused international attention on the
tragic state of food security in Africa and given rise
to a number of supportive initiatives such as the G8s
LAquila Food Security Initiative, the Global Agriculture
and Food Security Program, and the World Banks
Global Food Crisis Response Program. The French
G20 Presidency has also prioritized food security, and
especially the moderation of speculative trading in
food commodities, for the 2011 Summit in Cannes. It is
Food prices are higher now than at any time since 1984.
38
planning to host the first ever meeting of the Groups
Ministers of Agriculture before the Summit. In addition,
there are attempts to create more transparency of
food stocks held by large exporters to avoid panic
caused by market uncertainty about the availability
of essential commodities.112
Structural Barriers to Food Security
A
t the same time, the fact that the number of
Africans suffering from hunger had already been
on the increase well before prices spiked suggests
that chronic and structural problems rather than
mere price fluctuations continue to underlie much
of the continents food insecurity. These problems
include: disadvantageous international trade rules
and subsidy regimes; a debilitating lack of essential
infrastructure such as irrigation and storage systems;
inadequate agricultural research; a lack of improved
seeds, fertilizers, and plant protection material; poor
soil and water management systems; poor access to
credit and marketing services; as well as inefficient
and wasteful agricultural value chains. Agricultural
productivity is also affected by social realities such as
persistent poverty and insufficient access of women
to land and other essential resources.
These structural barriers are increasingly compounded
by global trends. In the short-term, the gap between
the continents domestic food supply and demand
will widen as global consumption patterns continue
to shift towards meat products, and more profitable
bio-fuels supplant food crops. In the mid-to-long-
term, the continents food system will experience an
unprecedented confluence of pressures, including
through the reinforcing impacts of population growth,
climate change and environmental degradation.113
Agricultural Productivity
O ver the last year, African countries and their
partners have increased their commitment
to raise agricultural productivity on the continent,
including through multi-stakeholder partnerships. For
example, the Comprehensive African Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) now has 25
signatory countries (seven more than last year)
committed to spending at least 10 per cent of their
national budgets on agriculture, to accelerate growth
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

in the sector to at least 6 per cent a year. Nineteen
countries have finalized Agricultural Investment Plans.
Practical efforts to boost agricultural production are
beginning to yield results in many countries, including
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania.
Focused international assistance and innovative
partnerships, like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA), have helped governments to intensify
production. Methods include: the introduction
of high-yielding varieties of crops and improved
techniques such as micro-dosing of fertilizers and
drip irrigation; increased accessibility of production-
enhancing inputs, credit and other financial services
such as weather-indexed crop insurance; and
improved markets and information. The increasing
engagement of the private sector, including through
the promotion of agricultural growth corridors and
agro-industrialization, will help to increase resources
available for agricultural investments.
These successes remain too small to feed the
continent. Global food production will have to
increase by 70 per cent over the next 40 years to keep
pace with population growth, and a significant part
of that increase will have to come from Africa. There
is an urgent need to scale up successful interventions,
focus on Africas army of smallholder farmers and
increase emphasis on staple food crops. There is also
a need to ensure that the growing foreign investments
in Africas arable land, sometimes referred to as land
grabs, are transparent, add to the continents food
security, benefit local farmers and communities,
and avoid undermining social, environmental and
governance systems.114
The dire social consequences of the recent food
crises have shown that efforts to improve agricultural
productivity and connectivity on the supply side need
to be complemented by better risk management,
efficient social safety nets and targeted nutritional
programmes on the demand side. As with the
implementation of agricultural development plans,
national governments ultimately bear responsibility
for this.

Partnering around the potential of Africas smallholder farmers

A critical constraint to agricultural growth in Africa is lack of access to financing across the agricultural value
chain, particularly among smallholder farmers. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has
initiated financial partnerships and risk-sharing instruments with a number of institutions to mitigate the risk of
lending by commercial banks and other financial institutions to smallholder farmers and value chains that
support them. So far, AGRA and its partners have used $15 million in loan guarantee funds to leverage $160
million from commercial banks in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, benefiting more
than 85,000 smallholder farmers and helping to boost regional food security. AGRA is also cooperating with
the Central Bank of Nigeria to help leverage a $500 million governmental risk sharing initiative into $3 billion
in new lending from commercial banks to support agricultural value chains and farmers in Nigeria.

Practical efforts to boost agricultural production

are beginning to yield results in many countries.

39
 FOOD securityAND HUNGER
Price volatility

Maize prices in East African countries and world price 2006-2009

Food price changes
Q1 2010 to Q1 2011
600

Source: FAO (2009b) based on national statistical databases.

Maize +74%
500
USD per metric ton

Wheat +69%
400
Palm oil +55%
300
Soybeans +36%
200
Beef +30%
100
Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group

0
06

06

06

07

07

07

08

08

08

09

09

9
l0

l0

l0

l0
n

pr

ct

pr

ct

pr

ct

pr
Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
Ja

Ja

Ja

Ja
A

A
O

Uganda Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia International

Food Security Risk Index

FOOD SECURITY
Rank Country
1 Afghanistan
2 DR Congo
3 Burundi
4 Eritrea
5 Sudan
6 Ethiopia
7 Angola
8 Liberia
9 Chad
10 Zimbabwe

Chad
Afghanistan
Sudan
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Liberia

DR Congo Burundi

Angola

Food Security Risk

Zimbabwe
Extreme risk
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
No Data

Maplecroft 2011
This map is the visual representation of the Maplecroft Food Security Index (FSI). It provides a quantitative
assessment of the availability, stability and access to food supplies, as well as the nutritional outcomes that
result from food insecurity. Each country is assigned an index score based on its performance across 18 key maplecroft
indicators, classified into four sub-indices: extreme risk, high risk, medium risk and low risk. www.maplecroft.com

40
 global Hunger index and FOOD PRODUCTION
rm ly

Lo e
ng
i ng

rat
Ala eme

us
i
1999-2001 = 100

rm

de
rio

w
tr

Ala

Mo
Ex

Se
1990 * Algeria 2000
2010 Angola 2007
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
no data Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
DRC
Congo, Republic
Cte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
* Egypt
no data Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Sources: Food and nutrition security Source - IFPR Global Hunger Index 2010 Data underlying the calculation of the 1990 and 2010 Global Hunger Indices.

Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
* indicates
value of
a *
* Libya
less than 5 Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Source: African Statistical Yearbook 2010 (UNECA, AUC, AfDB).

no data So Tom and Prncipe

Senegal
no data Seychelles
Sierra Leone
no data Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
* Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
IFPRI Global Hunger Index 2010 Agricultural and Food Production Index

41
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
CLIMATE CHANGE
C limate change is already placing enormous
burdens on African societies and economies,
and further complicating their development. At the
same time, international efforts to counter its effects
offer the continent new chances to profit from its vast
carbon sinks, leapfrog dirty technologies, and embark
on a path of green growth and clean development.
The Impact of Climate Change
F or millions in Africa, the effects of climate change
are already manifest in increasingly frequent
storms, droughts and floods, changing weather and
precipitation patterns as well rising temperatures.115
In combination with existing environmental
degradation,116 this reduces agricultural productivity
and threatens food security,117 increases water stress,
facilitates the spread of vector-borne diseases
such as malaria, and erodes valuable human
habitat. Through the acidification of seawater, rising
sea levels and the spread of storm-surge zones,
climate change also directly threatens the lives and
livelihoods of millions of Africans dependant on the
oceans for food and income.118
By all indicators, African countries are among the
most vulnerable to the effects of sustained climate
change.119 According to Maplecrofts Climate Change
Vulnerability Index, 12 of the 25 countries most at risk
are African, with high levels of poverty, population
density, and reliance on flood- and drought-prone
agricultural land.120 These countries are finding it
increasingly difficult to feed their people, protect them
from the vagaries of nature, grow their economies and
conserve their environments. The risk of resource-based
conflict and destabilizing mass migrations only adds to
these other multiple insecurities.
Climate Change Politics
A pproaching the 16th Conference of Parties (COP
16) on climate change in Cancun in December
2010, the African Ministerial Conference on the
Environment (AMCEN) continued to develop the
continents common position and provided African
By all indicators, African countries are among the most vulnerable
to the effects of sustained climate change.
42
negotiators and Heads of State and Government
with an improved communication and negotiation
strategy.121 The Cancun Summit did not result in
a comprehensive agreement or legally binding
treaty. However, it did anchor previous agreements
in the formal negotiation process, clarify details in
important areas, revitalize the multilateral process
led by the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and establish a Green Climate
Fund to help facilitate financial support to developing
countries. With COP 17 poised to take place in Durban
in November 2011, African states, supported by the
AU, AfDB and NEPAD, have an opportunity to push
for clarification and implementation of agreements
reached in Copenhagen and Cancun.
Climate Change Finance
A frican countries require substantial additional
resources to help them adapt to the unavoidable
consequences of climate change. For reasons
of design, sequencing, coordination, and lack of
absorptive capacity, they have been unable to
benefit from financing instruments of the Kyoto
Protocol, such as the Clean Development Mechanism
and the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation Programme. The Copenhagen
Accord includes the commitment to support
developing countries adaptation and mitigation
efforts with additional resources. This is in the form of
fast-start finance ($30 billion for 20102012) and long-
term finance ($100 billion a year by 2020), with 40 per
cent of each fund earmarked for Africa.
To date, most of the fast-start finance appears to
be coming from existing ODA budgets.122 The High-
Level Advisory Group on Climate Finance convened
by the UN Secretary-General and co-chaired by
Ethiopias Prime Minister Meles Zenawi concluded
that the long-term finance could be mobilized in
addition to existing ODA budgets by auctioning
emission rights, establishing a carbon-dioxide tax or
emissions-transaction fee for international carbon
trades, and relocating funds from fuel subsidies in
developed countries to adaptation activities in
developing countries.123
Despite persisting uncertainty about the sources and
disbursement of proposed financing as well as the
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

level of political commitment, there are already well
over 20 bilateral and multilateral funds dedicated
to receiving and managing pledged resources.124
These include the Global Environmental Facility, the
World Banks Green Climate Fund and the AfDBs
Africa Green Fund. This proliferation of funds runs
contrary to the Paris principles for aid effectiveness
by complicating the reporting, monitoring and
verification of financial commitments and will need
addressing at the forthcoming High-Level Meeting on
Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The proliferation of funds
also adds to the already heavy administrative burden
placed on recipient states and to their growing
distrust in the willingness of richer countries to go
beyond the formulation of elaborate mechanisms.
At the same time, there is growing realization that
transfers of public revenue and carbon taxes in
developed countries can provide only part of
the solution. Reliance on carbon markets is also
problematic, given Africas insufficient access, the
low price of carbon and the uncertainty surrounding
international negotiations and market mechanisms.
Consequently, there is increasing focus on the
potential of the private sector and international capital
markets to complement the compensatory activities
of developed countries through leveraging public
flows, financing large-scale infrastructure projects and
promoting market-based adaptation activities.125
Adaptation and Mitigation
green policies such as fostering sustainable land and
watershed management, combating deforestation,
using taxes and market-based instruments to
shift consumer preference, and promoting green
investment and innovation. They have also continued
to engage in multilateral initiatives like the Congo Basin
Forest Fund, the Lake Chad Sustainability Programme
and the creation of Regional Climate Centres. The
Climate Information for Development in Africa (Clim-
Dev) Programme aims to improve the continents
analytical capacity, knowledge management and
access to information on climate change.
Partners are also stepping up their supportive efforts
across Africa. The World Bank, for example, has
earmarked $7 billion for adaptation initiatives across
the continent and is already implementing its climate
change strategy for Africa in ten countries. This
includes a project to improve a congested public-
transport system in Nigeria, and the Lighting Africa
initiative to provide carbon-free lighting to 250 million
Africans by 2030.126
None of this, however, is enough to spark and
drive the required transformation towards green
growth and environmental sustainability.127 Much
more is needed, from both African states and their
development and business partners, to ensure
that the continent has the resources, mechanisms
and technologies necessary to adapt to the
effects of climate change. This requires investment
in transformative mitigation measures such as
increasing renewable-energy generation and

S everal African states, including Ethiopia and

Rwanda, have made notable progress in
implementing their National Adaptation Programmes
of Action. They have incorporated adaptation
into their development agendas, and are pursuing
transmission capacity, and promoting sustainable
land management. Given Africas low rate of
electrification and deficient power grids, there is
great opportunity for the deployment of alternative
sources of energy for personal consumption.

Partnering around clean household technology

Worldwide, nearly three billion people use polluting, inefficient stoves or open fires for indoor cooking and
heating. This causes significant health problems and contributes to climate change through the emission of
greenhouse gases. Several partnerships involving public and private actors, including the Global Alliance
for Clean Cookstoves, are successfully promoting the use of fuel-efficient stoves. These can save up to three
tons of carbon per year (per stove) and have significant economic and health benefits. For Africa, the aim is
to convert 100 million homes to clean-cooking technology by 2020, saving as much as three hundred million
tons of carbon a year. Progress to date is encouraging, with millions of improved stoves already distributed
across the continent and markets for clean household-cooking solutions emerging in many countries.

43
Climate change Vulnerability l Low* l Moderate l High l Severe l Acute

Weather Economic Overall

Health Habitat Loss
Disasters Stress Vulnerability
Country Year 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030
Algeria l l l l l l l l l l
Angola l l l l l l l l l l
Benin l l l l l l l l l l
Botswana l l l l l l l l l l
Burkina Faso l l l l l l l l l l
Burundi l l l l l l l l l l
Cameroon l l l l l l l l l l
Cape Verde l l l l l l l l l l
Central African Republic l l l l l l l l l l
Chad l l l l l l l l l l
Comoros l l l l l l l l l l
Congo, Republic l l l l l l l l l l
DRC l l l l l l l l l l
Cte dIvoire l l l l l l l l l l
Djibouti l l l l l l l l l l
Egypt l l l l l l l l l l
Equatorial Guinea l l l l l l l l l l
Eritrea l l l l l l l l l l
Ethiopia l l l l l l l l l l
Gabon l l l l l l l l l l
Gambia l l l l l l l l l l
Ghana l l l l l l l l l l
Guinea l l l l l l l l l l
Guinea Bissau l l l l l l l l l l
Kenya l l l l l l l l l l
Lesotho l l l l l l l l l l
Liberia l l l l l l l l l l
Libya l l l l l l l l l l
Madagascar l l l l l l l l l l
Malawi l l l l l l l l l l
Mali l l l l l l l l l l
Mauritania l l l l l l l l l l
Mauritius l l l l l l l l l l
Morocco l l l l l l l l l l
Mozambique l l l l l l l l l l
Namibia l l l l l l l l l l
Niger l l l l l l l l l l
Nigeria l l l l l l l l l l
Rwanda l l l l l l l l l l
So Tom and Principe l l l l l l l l l l
Senegal l l l l l l l l l l
Seychelles l l l l l l l l l l
Sierra Leone l l l l l l l l l l
Somalia l l l l l l l l l l
South Africa l l l l l l l l l l
Sudan l l l l l l l l l l
Swaziland l l l l l l l l l l
Tanzania l l l l l l l l l l
Togo l l l l l l l l l l
Tunisia l l l l l l l l l l
Uganda l l l l l l l l l l
Zambia l l l l l l l l l l
Zimbabwe l l l l l l l l l l
* No African countries fall under the Low category for any of the indicators.
Source: Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis, DARA & Climate Vulnerable Forum. http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/

44
africas Green Growth Potential
Technical potential for renewable energy power generation and
electricity markets by 2050 (exajoules a year)
12000
OECD Europe
10000
North America

Source: Renewable Energy Potentials (2008)

8000 Transition Economies
Latin America
6000
Rest of Asia
4000 OECD Pacific
2000 Middle East
Africa
0 (Source: REN21,

Po Prod ricity
tia tion

n
re

En an

E le l
ic

nsu ity
r

re

y
Off ind

E le a l

ta
P

we

tio
PV

Figures from
On ind

erg
c tr
sho
CS

sho

e
rm

Co ctric
l To
W

Oc

mp
ten uc
po
lar

ct
lar

e
Renewable Energy

E le
dro

oth
So

So

Hy

Potentials 2008.)
Ge

MAIN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION FUNDS

A - Adaptation M - Mitigation REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
Fund - name and acronym Type Adminstered by Areas of Date Pledged Deposits Approved Disbursed Share to
focus operational (USD mn) (USD mn) (USD mn) (USD mn) Africa
Africa Green Fund Multilateral African Development Bank A 2011* no data no data no data no data 100%
Adaptation Fund Multilateral Adaptation Fund Board A 2009 216 202 34 9 36%
Amazon Fund (Fundo Amaznia) Multilateral Brazilian Development Bank A, M, 2009 1,027 51 7 7 0%
REDD
Clean Technology Fund Multilateral World Bank M 2008 3,792 1,493 1,453 227 42%
Congo Basin Forest Fund Multilateral African Development Bank REDD 2008 83 83 17 12 100%
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Multilateral World Bank REDD 2008 221 174 12 10 26%
Forest Investment Program Multilateral World Bank REDD 2009 559 102 3 3 no data
GEF Trust Fund - Climate Change Multilateral Global Environment Facility - A, M 2006 1,032 1,033 934 735 15%
focal area 4 + 5 completed
GEF Trust Fund - Climate Change Multilateral Global Environment Facility A, M 2010 1,156 339 7 0 no data
focal area 5
Global Climate Change Alliance Multilateral European Commission A, M, 2008 226 225 187 21 62%
REDD
Global Energy Efficiency and Multilateral European Commission M 2008 170 60 60 60 no data
Renewable Energy Fund
Green Climate Fund Multilateral World Bank A 2011* no data no data no data no data no data
Hatoyama Initiative - private sources Bilateral Government of Japan A, M 2008 4,000 1,360 1,360 0 no data
Hatoyama Initiative - public sources Bilateral Government of Japan A, M 2010 11,000 3,960 3,960 0 no data
International Climate Fund, Formerly Bilateral Government of the United A 2011 4,717 40 no data no data no data
ETF Kingdom
International Climate Initiative Bilateral Government of Germany A, M, 2008 519 516 504 504 14%
REDD
International Forest Carbon Initiative Bilateral Government of Australia REDD 2007 216 67 48 48 0%
Least Developed Countries Fund Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2002 262 219 144 92 66%
MDG Achievement Fund Multilateral UNDP A, M 2007 90 90 90 71 27%
Environment and Climate Change
window
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Multilateral World Bank A 2008 972 306 287 8 40%
Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Multilateral World Bank M 2009 307 24 no data no data no data
Program for Low Income Countries
Special Climate Change Fund Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2002 149 134 99 74 29%
Strategic Climate Fund Multilateral World Bank A, M, 2008 0 0 no data no data no data
REDD
Strategic Priority on Adaptation Multilateral Global Environment Facility A 2004 50 50 49 49 20%
UN-REDD Programme Multilateral UNDP REDD 2008 126 95 76 51 21%
* Operationalization envisaged for 2011
Source: The Climate Fund Update, http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/

45
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Development Finance
and Cooperation
A s African states are improving their domestic
resource mobilization, and becoming
increasingly attractive investment destinations,
the overall share of assistance from international
partners in their development finance continues to
decline, having now fallen to an average of about
10 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI).128 The
importance of this assistance, however, remains high
as predictable, concessional and targeted aid helps
to lubricate the ability of governments to respond to
the needs of their people, leverage other flows and
ensure that they achieve developmental results. This
having been said, several states, including Burundi,
Guinea-Bissau and Mali, remain almost wholly
dependent on international aid.129
Domestic Resource Mobilization
I n 2002, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development highlighted the need for African states
to complement, and ultimately replace, external aid
flows with domestic resources for development. Since
then, many states have significantly strengthened
their capacity to mobilize domestic resources
through improving tax administrations, deepening
the tax base, segmenting taxpayers and reducing
widespread tax exemptions, particularly in the
extractive industries. Thirty-one countries have joined
the African Tax Administration Forum to promote
and facilitate cooperation among revenue services.
However, in many states revenue performance
remains weak and too little of the mobilized resources
are invested in social development.
For many countries, aid continues to represent a
significant proportion of development finance.
According to the African Economic Outlook 2010,
of the 48 African countries with data available, 12
receive more aid than tax revenues, 24 receive
aid equal to at least half the tax revenues, and 34
receive aid exceeding 10 per cent of tax revenues.130
Aid flows are only one measurement of partners commitment
to development, but they remain an important one.
46
Encouragingly, aid already represents less than 10
per cent of tax revenue in 14 countries.
Traditional Bilateral Partners
A
id flows are only one measurement of partners
commitment to development, but they remain
an important one.131 For both the promises to double
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa
made by the G7 at their 2005 Summit in Gleneagles,
and the intermediate goal of the EU Roadmap to
deliver 0.56 per cent of EU GNI in aid, 2010 was the
target year. The most recent figures show that only
three G7 countries (Canada, Japan and the US) have
met their 2010 spending targets for Africa.132 While
all others have fallen short of their promises, there
are some important differences between them. The
UK has made a more ambitious pledge, and has
shown commendable increases in ODA to Africa
since Gleneagles, particularly over the last year,
and has fallen just short of its target. By contrast, Italy
made an ambitious commitment but is delivering
less aid now than it did at the time of the Gleneagles
Summit, raising further doubts about its credibility
at top decision-making tables. Both Germany and
France are somewhere in between. While they have
made ambitious pledges and have shown notable
increases in ODA to Africa, they have fallen far short of
their promises. Preliminary figures suggest that OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors
overall have met just over half (52 per cent) of the
increases in aid promised between 2004 and 2010.133
The consensus on increasing development
assistance has undoubtedly been tested by the
global economic crisis. Although some traditional
donors such as Germany have already returned to
strong growth, policies of fiscal austerity will continue
to put significant pressure on aid budgets for some
time. The last year has already seen a noticeable
decrease in new commitments to Africa, and the
OECD predicts a further reduction in the growth rate
of aid, with the most marked deceleration in aid to
Africa.134 The US administration has already agreed
significant cuts in its foreign affairs and aid budgets
in recent congressional negotiations.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

The G8 Muskoka Summit

In June 2010, the G8 met in Muskoka, Canada. Development issues on the agenda included maternal,
newborn and child health, food security and accountability. As in previous years, several African leaders
were invited to participate in selected aspects of the Summit, but there were very few noticeable outcomes
for Africa beyond a slightly improved accountability framework, and the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal,
Newborn and Child Health which commits G8 members to spend an additional $5 billion between 2010 and
2015 to accelerate progress towards MDGs 4 and 5 in developing countries.

I t is doubtful that most donors will achieve the target

of dedicating 0.7 per cent of GNI to development
assistance by 2015. While Denmark, Luxembourg,
transactions or international transport to cover the
increasing need for such resources.

the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden continue to

exceed the target, the most recent DAC figures show
that most donors would have to almost double current
ODA disbursements to reach it.135 Nonetheless, the
announcements by France, Germany and the UK of
sticking to the 0.7 per cent target, and in the case of
the UK to reach it as early as 2013, leave some space
for hope, even though current budget freezes mean
that spending will need to increase drastically in a
short amount of time.
The financial climate has accelerated several trends
in how aid is viewed, managed and delivered.
There is renewed interest in ways to increase the
developmental impact of aid without necessarily
increasing its volume, such as results-based
financing, cash-on-delivery aid, the consolidation
of engagements to reduce aid fragmentation, and
bringing in the private sector.136 Increasing pressures
on public finances have also led to renewed
attempts to include expenditures for peacekeeping,
climate finance and even the schooling of
immigrants in ODA budgets. Repackaged and
recycled commitments are increasingly opaque
and difficult to monitor. The same pressures have
sparked a search for complementary, if not
alternative, sources of development finance,
including market-based instruments. Several states
including France, and the European Parliament,
are investigating the use of levies on financial
Bilateral Partners from
the Global South
A lthough it remains difficult to separate their
provision of technical and financial assistance
from trade and investment activities, emerging
economies like Brazil, China and India are undoubtedly
providing an increasingly important share of Africas
development finance.137 Their growing willingness and
ability to provide grants and concessional finance
has increased the resources available to African
states. It has also helped African states to reduce
their dependence on OECD DAC aid, with its inbuilt
policy conditionalities, high administrative costs and
underlying Western development models.
Most emerging partners are styling their commercial
engagement in Africa as SouthSouth cooperation,
complementing it with increasingly comprehensive
development initiatives including financial assistance,
infrastructure provision, and training and education.
More Southern partners are emulating Chinas biennial
Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC), which
has evolved into an important platform for ambitious
pledges and commitments to the continent. More of
them are also recognizing the political and commercial
benefits of sharing their own development experiences
with African countries, sometimes in triangular
partnerships with traditional donors.

Emerging economies are undoubtedly providing an increasingly important

share of Africas development finance.

47
 development finance
Tracking the Gleneagles Commitments
total 2010 oda as volume of total 2010 oda commitment

Canada
USD 1.9 Bn delivered Italy
USD 1.5 Bn target USD 1.2 Bn
USD 5.0 Bn

Japan*
France USD 1.6 Bn

G7 USD 28.9 Bn delivered in 2010

USD 38.2 Bn
2010 target
USD 4.4 Bn
USD 8.0 Bn
USD 1.4 Bn

Source for all data on ODA: ONE/DATA Report 2011

UK

Germany USD 5.1 Bn

USD 5.5 Bn
USD 3.4 Bn
USD 6.7 Bn
US
USD 9.6 Bn
USD 8.8 Bn

Notes: * Japan figures for ODA and targets tracks bilateral ODA net of debt relief only, but G7 totals are based on Japan's total ODA (with 2010 targets
incorporating a Japan flatlined multilateral estimate from 2009 onwards.)

At Gleneagles, three G7 countries set 'volume targets' (Canada, Japan and the US). Four G7 countries set ODA targets as a per cent of GNI.

TOTAL G7 ODA AND ODA TO SSA GLOBAL G7 ODA AS % OF GNI

(2010 prices, excluding debt) (excluding debt)
Total ODA SSA
Change 2004-2010
20
UK 0.6%
104%
10
0.56% EU target for 2010 UK

20
France 0.5%
10 43%

France
20
Germany
10 25% 0.4%
Per cent of GNI

Germany
USD BIllions

20 Canada
Canada
10 81% 0.3%
G7
40
Note: These charts are based on actual values. Please note that

US
targets are based on smoothed multilateral for 2004 and 2005

20 71% US
0.2%
Japan
20
Japan Italy
10 92%
0.1%
Source: ONE/DATA Report 2011

20
Italy
10 36%

0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

represents portion of ODA to SSA

48
 NET CAPITAL INFLOWS, NET PRIVATE AND EXTERNAL DEBT, SSA 2005-2010
OFFICIAL INFLOWS TO SSA 2001-2009

80
350 35
70
300 30
60
250 25
50

USD Billions

Percent %
200 20
USD Billions

40

150 15
30

20 100 10

10 50 5

0 0 0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-10
Total debt in $ billion Total % of GDP
Worker remittances Net private and
official inflows Total debt service $ billion Total debt service
% of GDP
Net debt flows (includes official creditors, private Source: ECA and AU (2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011, Governing development in
creditors, net medium and long-term debt flows and net Africa - theECA
Source: roleand
of the
AUstate in economic
(2011) Economic transformation
Report on Africa 2011, Governing
short-term debt flows) development in Africa the role of the state in economic transformation

Net equity inflows (includes net FDI and net portfolio

equity inflows) TOTAL OFFICIAL AND TOTAL PRIVATE
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD FLOWS FROM OECD DONOR COUNTRIES
Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, OECD
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
500

450
DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
TAX SHARE, 1990 - 2007, SSA
400
35
350
355
30
300
USD Billions

25
250
Per cent (%) GDP

20
200

15 150
121

10 100

5 50

0 0
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
19 0
19 1
19 2
19 3

19 5
19 6

19 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
20 2
20 3

20 5
20 6
94

97

04

07
9
9
9
9

9
9

9
9
0
0
0
0

0
0
19

19

19

20

Official Flows
Upper Middle Income
Total Private Flows More Complete CGP
Lower Middle Income (philanthropy, remittances Total Private Flows
Lower Income and investments)
Source: African Economic
Source: Outlook
African 2011Outlook 2011
Economic Sources: OECD, Hudson
Source: Institutes
Hudson Center
Institutes for Global
Center Prosperity
for Global (CGP)
Prosperity index
(CGP) includes
index
Note: Based on GNI per capita, economies are classified as lower income, calculations includes
of numerous other private
calculations flows from
of numerous othercorporations,
private flows foundations, charities,
from corporations,
Note: Based on GNImiddle
lower per capita,
andeconomies are classified as lower income, lower middle and
upper middle. individuals, universities
foundations,and religious
charities, organizations.
individuals, universities, and religious organizations.
upper middle.Classification
Classificationby
bythe
theAfrican
AfricanEconomic
EconomicOutlook.
Outlook.

49
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

Partnering around development experiences I: South-South cooperation

SouthSouth cooperation (the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between countries of
the global South) has become an important form of development partnership. While there is a tendency
to style purely commercial deals with this label, the development effects of SouthSouth cooperation are
beyond doubt. The sharing of relevant experiences and best practices, in particular, has helped African
countries avoid mistakes, leapfrog technologies and practices, and accelerate progress. Examples include
Brazil and India sharing experiences in the rural health sector, Malaysia providing assistance in banking
and legal issues, Indonesia sharing experience on sustainable rice production, and South Korea providing
expertise on access to low-cost technology and education.

Partnering around development experiences II: Triangular partnerships

Triangular partnerships combine the resources of traditional development partners with the development
experiences of emerging economies from the global South around specific development objectives in
Africa. Encouraging examples include the Feed the Future Programme through which the US cooperates
with Brazil to bolster Mozambiques agricultural productivity. Specifically, the US funds and helps to organize
targeted education activities based on Brazils agricultural-extension experiences. Some Brazilian seed
varieties are well suited to Mozambiques climate, offering higher yields and better resistance to disease
and pests.

Institutional Partners and and adopted an action plan to 2013, explicitly based
around partnerships for development.139
Country Groupings

W ith bilateral aid budgets under increasing
pressure, intergovernmental institutions like the
World Bank, the IMF, and the AfDB, as well as country
groupings like the EU and OECD, have consolidated
their central role in Africas development. Given their
wealth of expertise and resources, and experience with
some of the earliest success stories, they have become
crucial champions of partnerships for development,
adapting their strategies to reflect their growing
support. In February 2011, for example, the World Bank
launched its new, partnership-based Africa strategy,
to guide the Banks work in the region through 2016.138
At the 3rd EUAfrica Summit in Libya in November 2010,
the EU presented a Green Paper on Development
In November 2010, the G20 joined the ranks
of intergovernmental groupings engaging in
international development by adopting the Seoul
Development Consensus on Shared Growth and
its Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. To
avoid overlap or competition with the G8, the G20
focus is on growth-related (rather than social or
humanitarian) aspects of Africas development,
including infrastructure development, job creation
and financial inclusion. While many of the proposed
initiatives and actions are encouraging, it remains to
be seen whether the current French presidency can
enthuse more sceptical group members.

50
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

The G20 Multi-Year Action Plan for Development

The Multi-Year Action Plan is part of the Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth agreed at the
2010 G20 Summit in South Korea. It specifies concrete and time-bound actions to be taken up to the end of
2014, including on infrastructure, human resources and development, private investment and job creation,
food security, growth resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge sharing.
Collective action through partnerships and accountability form the core principles of the Plan, some
aspects of which have already been implemented, including the establishment of a High-Level Panel on
Infrastructure Investment which is chaired by APP member Tidjane Thiam.

Philanthropy and Private Giving flexibility and reach of other development

actors. They also often prove more willing to take

P rivate capital flows have become a widely calculated risks.

recognized source of development finance.
Even throughout the global economic downturn,
such flows have outpaced official development
spending. They are also recovering faster than most
other flows.140 Reasons for this quick recovery include
the arrival of new philanthropic actors, such as
philanthropic investment firms that attract socially
minded investors and intermediaries as well as the
accelerating spread of innovative ways of giving
and lending, such as web-based platforms like McC4
or Kiva that allow for the effective accumulation of
small-scale contributions. There is a notable increase
in home-grown philanthropy, with some of Africas
richest individuals establishing private foundations to
help address social and environmental problems in
their countries.
By providing catalytic funding, leveraging resources,
supporting long-term research and implementing
partnerships, philanthropic actors are increasingly
important in overcoming crucial obstacles to
progress. Whether by driving the development of an
effective malaria vaccine (Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation), increasing smallholder agricultural
productivity with better seeds, soils and markets
(Rockefeller Foundation) or improving the climate
resilience in rural communities (Ford Foundation),
they fill important gaps left by insufficient resources,
Debt Relief
D espite the enormous progress made in
recent years through bilateral debt relief and
multilateral efforts like the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative, massive debt burdens
continue to constrain the development prospects
of many African countries. On average, they still
have to spend 4.8 per cent of GDP on servicing their
(collective) external debt of $300 billion.141
The repercussions of the global economic crisis,
increasing extension of concessional loans by
Southern partners and the efforts of several countries
to tap international markets to fund ambitious
public-spending programmes have renewed
concerns about debt sustainability and the possibility
of a new debt crisis. According to the IMF and the
World Bank, 28 African low-income countries are
now rated as having a high or moderate risk of
experiencing debt distress more than at the time of
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) six years
ago.142 Moreover, 13 Sub-Saharan African countries
that have reached their HIPC completion points and
consequently received billions of dollars in debt relief
are seeing renewed risks of debt distress.143

Massive debt burdens continue to constrain the development prospects

of many African countries.

51
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
From Aid Effectiveness to
Development Effectiveness
T here is widespread agreement that aid is not
the answer to Africas problems and that it must
be used not only to save lives in the short-term, but
also to strengthen systems and increase countries
capacity to drive their own development through
economic growth and transformation in the long-
term. There is also agreement that the available
resources must be used effectively and efficiently to
maximize their developmental impact. Unfortunately,
progress in implementing the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action
remains slow.
With OECD donors failing to meet their 2010
implementation benchmarks, a significant proportion
of aid remains plagued by inefficiencies in delivery,
management and disbursement. More than half of
OECD DAC aid, for example, is still delivered behind
schedule, causing an estimated deadweight loss
of as much as 20 per cent of total aid.144 Other
problems include unnecessarily high transaction and
administrative costs due to a proliferation of initiatives
and lack of coordination, burdensome conditionality,
medium- and long-term unpredictability, a lack of
alignment to country systems, and a fragmented
Available resources must be used effectively and efficiently
to maximize their developmental impact.
52
aid architecture. Many of these problems also
hamper the implementation and spread of effective
partnerships.
Aid effectiveness, as defined by the Paris Declaration,
also places obligations on the recipients of aid, which
many African states have yet to fulfil. They have
been particularly slow when it comes to increasing
the transparency of aid usage and the establishment
of joint mechanisms for reviewing progress on their
commitments. Recent surveys suggest that only 15
per cent have such a review mechanism in place.145
Even though several studies predict significant
efficiency and effectiveness gains from increased
transparency, African nations have also been slow
in endorsing the International Aid Transparency
Initiative, through which 18 donors have agreed
common reporting standards.146
Positive developments include the African Platform
on Development Effectiveness, created by
African states before the 4th High-Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011. The
European Union and other institutional donors have
made further progress in harmonizing initiatives
and increasing coherence of their efforts, including
by involving the private sector in aligned and
complementary activities.147
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

PART II
LOOKING AHEAD:
PARTNERING FOR
PROGRESS
The last year has shown that the state of progress
in Africa is almost as diverse as the continent
itself. While enormous challenges remain in
many sectors and countries, there are also
encouraging signs of progress. The next few
years will be critical as African countries attempt
to translate this progress into tangible results and
sustained transformation for their people ahead
of the 2015 MDG deadline. Given the proven but
heavily underutilized potential of partnerships for
development, the second part of our report is
dedicated to them.

53
A lthough the idea of partnership for development
is hardly new, it is currently experiencing a well
deserved renaissance as development needs
MAIN PARTNERSHIP
continue to multiply, governments increasingly
struggle to meet them, and a growing number of
exemplary partnerships are showing what is possible.
Attention is focused particularly on the potential of Main Public Sector
such partnerships to catalyse the energy, creativity Actors Africa
and resources of nongovernmental actors, such as National Governments and their Agencies
the private sector and civil society. African Union (AU) and its Programmes (including NEPAD)
African Development Bank (AfDB)
Despite the increasing attention, valuable lessons Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*
learned and successes in Africa and elsewhere, Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU)
East African Community (EAC)
we do not see nearly enough of these successes Economic Community of Central
replicated or brought to scale across the continent. African States (ECCAS)
We do not see effective partnerships in nearly Economic Community of West African
enough sectors. Consequently, many opportunities States (ECOWAS)
to tackle problems and drive development are Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA)
being missed. So, what can we do to realize more of Intergovernmental Authority on
the potential of partnerships for development, and Development (IGAD)
spur more collaboration for progress? Southern African Development
Community (SADC)

*Official partner organizations of the AU

How Partnerships Are Main International

Organizations
Already Contributing and Country Groupings
to Development International Organizations:
United Nations (UN) and its Specialized Agencies
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

T he examples in the first part of this report show the

enormous contribution partnerships are already
making to development efforts across the continent.
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
World Bank Group
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
They show that, under the right circumstances and Asian Development Bank (ADB)
European Bank for Reconstruction
with the right leadership, partnerships can fill crucial
and Development
gaps in existing development efforts, mobilize Inter-American Development
additional resources, and extend opportunities, Bank (IDB) Group
services and access to everything from infrastructure, Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs)
health and education to income, finance and European Investment Bank (EIB)
International Fund for Agricultural
markets. They can also help to reduce risks and costs,
Development (IFAD)
optimize the allocation of scarce resources, create Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
synergies, increase efficiencies, contribute to policy Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
development, and drive research and technological
progress by spreading knowledge and expertise. Country Groupings:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The examples also show that partnerships can Arab League
take many forms. As challenges and opportunities European Union (EU)
multiply, and interests and motivations converge, G8
G20
models have spread from small-scale cooperation
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
between the private sector and civil society at Organization of American States (OAS)
community level, and publicprivate partnerships Organization for Economic Cooperation
around large-scale projects, to a vast array of possible and Development (OECD)
forms. However different, all these partnerships share Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
two characteristics. They allow actors to combine

54
MODELS and actors

Partnerships between:
African Governments

African Governments and Developed Country Governments

Public sector
partnerships

African Governments with Developing Country Governments (South-South Cooperation)

African Governments /Developed Country Governments/ Developing Country Governments (Triangular

cooperation)

African Governments and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)

African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and Global International Organizations (e.g. UN)

African Governments and African Companies

African Governments and Developed Country Companies

Public-private sector

African Governments and Developing Country Companies

African Governments, Developed Country Governments and Developed Country Companies

partnerships*

African Governments, Developing Country Governments, and Developing Country Companies

African Governments, African Companies and African International Organizations (e.g. AU)

African Governments, Developed Country Company and Developed Country International

Organizations (e.g. EU)

African Governments, African Companies and Global International Organizations (e.g. UNDP)

African Governments, Developed Country Companies and Global International Organizations

African International Organizations (e.g. AU), Global International Organizations (e.g. World Bank),
and Developed Country Companies

African Governments and African CSOs

African Governments, African CSOs, and Developed Country CSOs

civil society (CSOs)

African CSOs
partnerships

African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs

African CSOs and African Companies

African CSOs and Developed Country Companies

African CSOs and Developed Country CSOs and Developed Country Companies

African Governments and Global CSOs

African International Organizations (e.g. AU) and African CSOs

* All combinations can also include CSOs.

LEGEND
ACTOR REGIONAL SCOPE

Public sector Multilateral/International Organizations African

Developing/Global South
Developed Country
Private sector Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and Civil Socierty Organizations (CSOs) Global

55
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
their capacities, expertise, resources, networks and
comparative advantages in a way that adds value
for each of them, and they allow them to engage
in areas and issues in which they would or could not
engage on their own.
Many of the examples underline the central role
of the private sector.148 They prove that businesses
have much to contribute to development efforts,
and that, with the right incentives, information and
enabling framework, they can deliver clear winwin
outcomes for themselves and wider society. They also
show that, built around commercial viability, private-
sector approaches to development challenges are
often scalable.
Many businesses now consider engaging in
development as more than an issue of corporate
social responsibility or philanthropy. Increasingly,
they regard development activities as essential
to their core business and a promising avenue
towards growth, greater market share, increased
efficiencies and lower risks and costs.149 This
convergence between business interests
and development objectives is changing the
traditional one-dimensional model of government-
led development.150 As businesses realize the
commercial opportunities and benefits involved,
they are increasingly willing to complement the
Businesses have become the newest and arguably some
of the most important allies of traditional development actors.
56
development efforts of African governments and
international donors, and bridge important gaps in
a results-oriented (because profit-driven) manner.
Together with philanthropic organizations, businesses
have become the newest and arguably some of the
most important allies of traditional development actors.
Engaging them in partnerships has added much-
needed capacity, expertise and resources as well as
versatility, creativity and pragmatism to development
efforts across the continent and has created manifold
opportunities to accelerate progress.
At the same time, partnerships for development
are not without their risks and potential pitfalls. If not
coordinated with existing initiatives and closely aligned
to national development frameworks, partnerships
can complicate, dilute and even undermine other
development efforts. They can also lead to harmful
competition for resources and unnecessary duplication
of effort. Partnerships often have high transaction costs,
and complex decision-making processes can further
burden already overstretched governments and
cause problems of accountability and ownership. In
combination with the tendency of many partnerships
to develop in isolation, these well-known problems
make it imperative to integrate partnerships closely
into broader development strategies driven by African
governments.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

How inclusive business models help to spread development

According to recent studies, people living on less than $8 a day have a combined annual income of
roughly $5 trillion. More and more companies invest in understanding this segment of the population, often
called the bottom of the pyramid. As they redesign or invent products to fit the cash flow of the poor,
integrate them into their value chains, offer service rather than ownership models, and leverage existing
distribution and payment platforms, development cooperation is undergoing one of its most fundamental
transformations yet. Africa is at the centre of this change. Spurred by the success of business models like
M-Pesa, more and more companies are extending their business to Africas poor, whether as employees,
producers, suppliers, distributors, customers or sources of innovation. In the process, they are increasing
access and opportunities, creating jobs, raising living standards, developing functional markets, cultivating
entrepreneurship and spreading innovation. A number of donors, including Germany and the UK, have
already expressed a clear interest in fostering the spread of inclusive business models to complement and
expand government-led development efforts.

Sources: International Finance Corporation (2010), Inclusive Business 2010: Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; Business Action for Africa et al. (2010), Accelerating Progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals through Inclusive Business: Delivering Results: Moving to Scale.

How Partnerships Basic Service Delivery

Could Be Driving P oor access to basic services and public goods
such as water, housing, healthcare and energy
Further Progress is becoming an increasingly serious development
challenge for millions of Africans. Conventionally seen
as a concern for governments, there is increasing

T here is no doubt that effective partnerships

are already contributing to development
across Africa but also that the number of
evidence that partnerships for development can help
to improve access to basic services by increasing the
efficiency and scope of delivery, offering alternative
people benefiting remains too small to effect sources and methods of access, significantly reducing
systemic change. By whatever count, the number operating and unit costs, and pioneering novel
of successful partnerships for development is methods of payment such as pay-as-you-go which
miniscule compared with both the potential and can cater to the cash-flow realities of Africas poor.
the need for them. Too often, activities remain
small-scale, localized and isolated, as partners There is no shortage of encouraging examples from
lack the capacity, resources or incentives to scale Africa and beyond, including d.lights production
up their operations, replicate them elsewhere, or of affordable solar-powered lamps for extremely
deliver more than piecemeal change. poor clients, Vestergaard Frandsens LifeStraw for
easy and cheap filtration of drinking water, and the
Of course, partnerships for development are not, Quality Public Services Action Now Coalition of
and will never be, a panacea for the continents Trade Unions.
many problems. Even brought to scale, they
cannot solve governance deficits or conflicts, at Partnerships can do more than just increase access to
least not in the short term; they cannot prevent services or improve their quality; they can also help to
refugee flows, droughts or crime. But they can help curb the politics of patronage, corruption and lack of
to improve access to and quality of development transparency. For example, several service providers
in many ways and, if scaled up, they can effect have begun to work with mobile-phone companies
sustained social and economic transformation, to develop direct-payment systems enabling users
particularly in the following key areas. to pay providers without recourse to intermediaries.

57
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
Efficient and affordable public services are central to
human development and economic activity. There
is also increasing demand for services, especially in
fast-growing urban areas. Therefore, there is great
scope for replicating proven and commercially
viable delivery models across places and sectors,
and for nurturing micro-economies of agglomeration
around these models.151
Access to Opportunities
P artnerships have contributed significantly to
poverty reduction and social development
across Africa by extending opportunities to
previously marginalized populations. They have
contracted smallholder farmers to produce
sorghum for beer-making and helped women to
establish local distribution businesses for soft drinks.
Particularly partnerships built around the power
of modern telecommunication technology have
created valuable new platforms for development,
including through the low-cost provision of banking
and other enabling services previously inaccessible
to most Africans. Partnerships have also increased
opportunities by creating or strengthening markets,
integrating local populations into value chains,
reducing numbers of intermediaries, and promoting
skills formation. There is great scope to stimulate
further economic growth, employment and human
development by spreading access to affordable
connectivity, applications and services, as well as
economic opportunities, to more of Africas people,
particularly women.
Access to Finance
I nsufficient access to finance hampers the efforts and
ambitions of individuals, companies and countries,
and constrains entrepreneurship, innovation and the
expansion of markets. Collaborative initiatives such
as the mobile-phone-based money-transfer service
M-Pesa, the Partnership for Making Finance Work for
Africa or AGRAs cooperation with Standard Bank of
South Africa and the Millennium Challenge Account
to increase commercial lending to smallholder
farmers, have already shown how to improve access
to finance by leveraging existing flows, mitigating
risks and facilitating the development of the financial
sector. But particularly the all-important small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are so central
to job creation and economic growth as well as
58
the rural economies that are so central to poverty
reduction still lack sufficient access to finance.
There is thus great scope to expand proven business
models such as micro-finance, micro-insurance,152
m-commerce, linkage and community banking,
remote distribution, and payroll-based lending.153
Access to Health
L ack of access to healthcare facilities, medical
practitioners and medicine is one of the biggest
and most fundamental challenges for Africas
poor and the continents development. It reduces
productivity, places enormous costs on society,
and prevents progress on every MDG. More
than in any other area, partnerships in the health
sector have proven their potential to complement
and expand on the efforts of the public sector.
Successes include raising awareness, developing
and distributing vaccines and treatments, reducing
costs, and increasing information on the availability
of treatments. There remains great scope to expand
partnerships further to strengthen health systems,
increase the number of skilled healthcare personnel,
and leverage the market size for investments in
research and development. There is also a need
to identify the reasons for the enormous success of
healthcare partnerships and replicate them across
other sectors.
Infrastructure
I mprovements to Africas transport, energy and
communication infrastructure have particular
impact on economic development and efforts
to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.154 Evidence collected by the
World Banks Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic,
for example, has shown that improvements in
transport, energy and communications infrastructure
have contributed substantially more to African per
capita growth over the past decade than structural
policies, and that an improved infrastructure stock
could increase GDP growth rates in Africa by as much
as 1 per cent.155 Partnerships for development are
already contributing to infrastructure improvements
by helping to raise capital, accelerate project
delivery, reduce operating costs and improve
maintenance, but given the enormity of the
challenge there is great potential and need for
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

Replicable models of increasing access to finance

Approach Example/s Comment

The Equity Bank model Equity Bank The clearest proof that an exceptionally profitable business can
be built by providing appropriate and affordable banking services
dedicated to economically active low-income consumers in Africa.
Leasing for small Burkina Bail Small-business demand for alternative forms of finance, including
businesses leasing, remains high.
Overdraft finance and Equity Bank, Unsecured overdrafts for small businesses are a fraught proposition
cash-flow smoothing Mbinga, for conservatively inclined banks but Mbingas kifuku product
for small businesses Stanbic shows it can be done. Equitys biashara imara product and Stanbic
Uganda Ugandas warehouse-receipts product are both serious attempts
to address business cash-flow fluctuations with alternative forms of
collateral.
SME lending Banque Misr Banque Misr proves it is possible to lend money profitably to very
small businesses. Other organizations such as Access Holding and
ProCredit, both active in Africa, also demonstrate that it is possible
to replicate a standardized approach to small-business lending in
different jurisdictions.
Bundling insurance MLife, If consumers start to experience the benefits of insurance by
through small loans MicroEnsure seeing it pay off a microloan or compensate a farmer for weather-
damaged crops, this will reinforce perceptions of its value among
poorer consumers. Working through the continents burgeoning
commercial micro-lenders could be a significant growth opportunity
for insurers.
Paying social Absa-David Subsidizing banks to open basic bank accounts into which social
payments through payments, such as an old-age grant, can be paid extends access
bank accounts while also providing beneficiaries with safe and cost-free means of
receiving money.
The Mini ATM FNB As these devices are mobile-enabled, no landlines are required. The
small size of the terminals means they can be housed in very small
retail outlets and the retailer, not the bank, dispenses the cash.
Mobile payments M-banking The demographics of mobile-phone use, the early success of
M-Pesa and other models, and the continuing flux around evolving
business models all mean that this continues to be a space that will
repay careful monitoring. Although the operational complexities
and required investment are significant, the potential for large-scale
success is clear.
Source: Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa.

59
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
scaling up financing and operating models that have
worked. Also, current partnerships are concentrated
in a small number of African countries (such as South
Africa and Nigeria) and sectors (such as energy and
telecommunications), leaving significant scope for
both functional and geographical expansion.
Agriculture
A griculture is a key driver of economic growth,
poverty reduction, human security and
social development. Partnerships have already
helped to increase efficiency at all stages of
the agricultural value chain from production to
storage, trading, processing and retailing. They
have increased access to finance, inputs like
seeds and fertilizer, and weather information.
Partnerships have supported basic and advanced
research, and fostered a more holistic approach
to rural development by promoting agricultural
growth corridors and agro-industries. Nonetheless,
Africa requires even greater sustainable increases
in agricultural productivity to accommodate
population growth and changing consumption
patterns, achieve food security for its people,
and produce enough surpluses to help meet
60
growing global demand for food and other
agricultural products. There is particularly great
scope for partnerships to strengthen agricultural
value chains and improve access to rural credit,
including weather-indexed crop insurance, and
to productive inputs and markets.
Low-Carbon Growth
G iven its abundance of renewable resources
and the general absence of high-carbon
legacy industries, Africa is well placed to
embark on low-carbon growth. Partnerships
have proven their ability to enhance energy
and resource efficiency. Examples include the
distribution of more efficient and less polluting
cookstoves, increased access to mitigation
technology, and support for investment in low-
carbon infrastructure and renewable-energy
generation. 156 Inter national support initiatives,
particularly those agreed as part of the UNFCCC
process, offer real opportunities to finance,
scale-up, and embed such partnerships at
the heart of Africas development and growth
agendas on both the individual and industrial
levels.

Obstacles to Success
U nfortunately, the transformative potential of
partnerships remains constrained by several
obstacles. Specific operational and programmatic
blockages vary, but many relate to poor enabling
environments and governance deficits. These include
weak institutions, burdensome bureaucracies,
insufficient access to courts and other legal facilities,
and budgetary and human-resource limitations of the
public sector. Partnerships involving the private sector
are not scalable or replicable where governments
fail to remove such obstacles and cannot offer the
necessary legal guarantees or incentive structure
to underwrite a viable growth strategy. Endemic
corruption is another major challenge: many good
partnerships are impeded or even prevented by
corruption, such as when unnecessary intermediaries
pocket part of the benefits.157 In addition to such
hurdles related to poor regulatory environments and
weak governance, there are at least five structural
and often crosscutting gaps hampering the initiation
and spread of successful partnership models.
The Trust Gap
T raditional suspicions remain one of the most
basic obstacles to new or larger partnerships.
Many governments and non-governmental
organizations continue to mistrust the private-
sector profit motive. They continue to view it
mainly as a cause of social, environmental and
economic problems, rather than as part of a
potential solution. There is widespread suspicion
that many companies engage in partnerships
merely for reputation management, and that
the benefits are offset by companies harmful
behaviour in other areas. Many also fear
increased corruption and reduced control as
a result of companies growing engagement
in delivery of public goods and services.
Companies, on the other hand, often mistrust the
reliability of government commitments, and may
view attempts to address social weaknesses as
coming at their expense. This trust gap is caused
and compounded by transparency deficits, and
the resultant lack of information and clarity about
what each partner wants from the relationship.
61
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
The Information Gap
T he lack of reliable, up-to-date and symmetrical
information and data across many parts of Africa
severely hinders the planning and implementation
of partnerships, particularly if the private sector is
involved. Even the most enterprising companies
are reluctant to scale up investment in partnerships
without full understanding, or at least a deeper
appreciation, of the needs, trends and benefits
involved. Partnerships are often also hampered
by insufficient information on the motivations,
capabilities, resources and comparative advantages
of potential partners.
The Imagination Gap
T he information gap feeds into a gap in imagination.
Without sufficient information, it is difficult for
many actors to escape institutional mindsets and
cultures, to envisage new partnership models and
pro-poor modifications of sourcing, production and
distribution. Even with the necessary information,
many actors struggle to see beyond traditional
dichotomies and overcome institutional scepticism.
Yet, this is often necessary to free the human and
financial resources to drive replication or scaling of
imaginative solutions knowing the dots is one thing,
connecting them is another.
The Resources and Capacity Gap
E ven though new financing methods including
hybrid financing that uses a mixture of debt,
equity and other financial instruments, are constantly
being developed, there continues to be a notable
lack of resources to plan, implement and operate
partnerships for development. Given shareholder
pressure for short-term profits, many international
companies are reluctant to devote the necessary
resources and capacities to partnerships with distant
prospects of value creation. Many African actors,
particularly in civil society and non-governmental
organizations, simply do not have resources for up-
front investments or capacities to staff and operate
scaled-up partnerships. Here, national governments,
international donors and multilateral development
banks can play a particularly constructive role
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
by providing catalytic investments to meet initial
financing needs for scaling up or replication.
The Perceived Benefits Gap
B usinesses are primarily interested in partnerships
with potential to generate benefits such as
future resource streams. Therefore, low ceilings
to perceived benefits, or insufficient scale, may
prevent private-sector companies from engaging
in a particular partnership. This may explain why
small economies like Niger or Mali have difficulty
in attracting publicprivate partnerships or those
62
built around inclusive business models. By contrast,
large and populous countries like Nigeria or
South Africa can offer economies of scale, large
numbers of potential consumers and consolidated
markets. This highlights the enormous potential
for regional integration to increase perceived
benefits through market expansion. Another
obstacle to replication concerns the perceived
benefits of intellectual property and trademarks.
A partnership around an entrepreneur with a
good idea may resist the replication of that
idea by others, especially if the replication is
perceived to deny business opportunities to the
original entrepreneur.
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

WHO NEEDS
TO DO WHAT
The conditions needed to foster successful
partnerships and adapt them to other regions,
countries, and sectors are not a mystery. They
include: a viable growth strategy based on
realistic assessments of demand, receptivity, risks
and absorptive capacity; a clear delineation
of respective responsibilities and commitments;
sufficient resources, capacity and expertise; full
transparency; harmonized expectations and
a common vision among partners; and the
fulfillment of commitments. Naturally, the precise
ingredients vary from case to case and are
always firmly grounded in the local context, which
reduces the usefulness of general prescriptions
and recommendations. However, it is clear that
all actors can do more to remove blockages,
facilitate the spread of successful partnership
models across the continent, and increase their
developmental impact.

63
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

African Governments

A frican governments bear the main responsibility for the continents progress. While they depend on
supportive global policies and agreements, it is up to them to provide the plans, frameworks and
conditions for their countries development and the realization of their peoples potential. Similarly, when it
comes to fostering partnerships and maximizing their developmental impact, it is up to African governments
to create the necessary conditions and incentive structures. They can do much to improve the attractiveness,
scalability and sustainability of partnerships, and to contribute constructively at all stages.

African governments can strengthen partnerships for development by...

Clearly articulating, prioritizing and communicating development needs
Providing an enabling environment, which includes clear policies, sufficient administrative capacities at
all levels of government, and supportive legal and regulatory frameworks
Facilitating access to financial incentives, investment-risk-mitigation instruments and other benefits to
increase the attractiveness of partnerships
Providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing gaps at all stages of partnerships
Driving regional integration to increase market size and improve scalability and sustainability of
partnerships
Coordinating local, national and regional authorities to minimize the administrative burden on potential
partners
Leveraging the skills, resources and expertise of the African Diaspora to fill capacity gaps
Raising awareness through gathering and disseminating information, highlighting best practices and
drawing attention to specific opportunities
Ensuring full transparency of processes and accountability for results
Improving liaison mechanisms with the private sector and civil society, including through dedicated
contact persons and clear responsibilities in the office of the Head of Government and social ministries.

international donors

I nternational donors have made a series of commitments to Africa, which they need to keep. They share
responsibility for Africas progress, particularly when it comes to ensuring a level playing field, correcting
harmful global realities, particularly with respect to trade, climate change, the international financial
system and achieving the MDGs. Given their resources, expertise, networks and influence there is much
that international donors can contribute to initiating and supporting partnerships for development.

International donors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

Leveraging their power to convene different types of stakeholders to facilitate and catalyze them
around specific development challenges
Mobilizing resources for partnerships and providing seed and catalytic funding to help bridge financing
gaps at all stages of partnerships
Providing risk mitigation and other supportive guarantees, including by assuming some of the risks
Building the capacity of actors to engage constructively in partnership
Helping to collate information and guidelines by supporting the study of effective partnerships and the
dissemination of results
Minimizing overlap of initiatives and ensuring maximal coordination between initiatives
Providing forward-looking data on planned investments to facilitate partnership building around them.

64
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

Private-Sector Actors

T he private sector is increasingly important in Africas development. However, there are still too many
companies not adhering to fundamental principles of corporate responsibility, such as those articulated
in the UN Global Compact. While private-sector actors should at least do no harm, there is enormous
scope for businesses to add social, economic and environmental value. They can do so by modifying their
business models to target the poor or integrate local communities and producers into their value chains, but
also through cross-sectoral partnerships around specific development challenges. As providers of resources,
innovation and expertise, private-sector actors often hold the key to the success of such partnerships.

Private-sector actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

Showing leadership and building in-company commitment for partnerships
Managing expectations within companies and among partners
Managing shareholder expectations for short- and long-term results
Freeing human and financial resources for the identification, planning and implementation of
partnerships
Mobilizing business networks and sharing knowledge, lessons learned and expertise
Fostering peer learning
Using social-investment budgets to facilitate entry into new places or segments that may not otherwise
meet the financial-viability threshold for core business activities
Examining their entire business model to identify potential contribution to and opportunities for collaboration
Contributing expertise in project design, management and implementation to the solution of large-
scale challenges
Helping shape policy through constructive input, preferably through harmonized business associations
Improving their relations and capacity to engage with governments and civil society
Clearly communicating support needs and requirements for engaging in partnerships.

Civil-Society Actors

C ivil-society actors, including non-governmental civic and social organizations, citizen groups, trade
unions, the media and faith-based organizations, play a crucial function in the system of accountability
that underlies the success of all partnerships. Given the identified problems caused by lack of information
and misperception of benefits and risks, there is also great scope for them to mediate and broker partnerships
for development as well as draw attention to opportunities and need for such partnerships.

Civil-society actors can strengthen partnerships for development by...

Helping to identify and communicate development needs and partnership opportunities
Playing a crucial intermediary role between companies, governments, local entrepreneurs and
communities, as well as national and international finance institutions and donors
Collecting and sharing information on lessons learned and available supportive initiatives to help practitioners
Providing crucial checks and balances through monitoring partnership implementation, highlighting
shortcomings and reporting mismanagement
Supporting project improvements through collecting and sharing feedback at grassroots level
Supporting the development and utilization of accountability tools
Helping to identify, inform and educate (potential) beneficiaries of partnerships
Harnessing and sharing their experience in cultivating change agents at grassroots and national levels
Identifying synergies between initiatives and formulating a common agenda
Helping to improve coordination between initiatives to minimize unnecessary overlap and inefficiencies.

65
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011
CONCLUSION
D rawing broad conclusions from Africas raucously
diverse experience over the last year is not
easy, even though some things have not changed.
The continent remains marginalized at the top
tables of global decision making and vulnerable
to global economic trends. It continues battling to
achieve social progress against a backdrop of rapid
population growth, increasing urbanization and poor
management of its human and natural resources.
The most striking developments have been in the
political arena. Governance deficits are on display at
all points of the African compass, including Libya to
the north, Somalia to the east, Zimbabwe to the south,
and Cte dIvoire to the west, with political progress in
many other countries looking distinctly fragile.
And yet... there are strong grounds for hope, even
where there has been most conflict and political
turmoil. It is too early to say how things will turn out
in countries facing difficult transitions. But leaders and
people across the continent have not missed the
point: the role of the state is to serve its citizens, not
its rulers.
As we have argued before, the key ingredient for
progress remains good governance by the global
community to ensure that Africas place and potential
are fully supported, and most importantly by African
leaders and people, to ensure that the continents
vast resources are geared to positive ends.
The lingering effects of the global economic and
food crises, as well as accelerating climatic and
Partnerships do not shift the responsibility for progress away from
the shoulders of African leaders and international donors,
even though they can help to spread the burden.
66
demographic changes, complicate the achievement
of responsive governance around a shared economic
vision. But, as Africas growth and development
agendas continue to converge, new approaches and
solutions are becoming possible, and necessary. As
we have argued throughout this report, partnerships
for development are among the most promising, and
potentially most effective, of these new options. They
can complement, expand and improve government-
led development efforts and, if scaled up, can effect
positive structural change and sustained economic
and social transformation.
Against this background, we have assessed how
to strengthen, replicate and scale up the many
successful examples of partnerships already evident
in Africa and how best to create the policy framework
and incentives needed to spur further collaboration
for progress. We have come to the conclusion that
all actors can do more to facilitate the spread of
successful partnership models across countries and
sectors and that doing so is in their own self-interest.
National governments can do more to ensure the
regulatory conditions that allow partnerships to
mature beyond small-scale and localized projects.
International donors and institutions can do more to
initiate and provide seed funding, risk mitigation and
other supportive guarantees to innovative models.
Private-sector actors can do more to move beyond
traditional patterns of sourcing, production, and
distribution, and expand their operations to previously
marginalized segments of the African population.
And civil society organizations can do more to play a
constructive intermediary role and provide expertise
and access at grassroots and national levels.

The success of partnerships depends on clear
delineation of respective roles, the availability
of reliable information and, above all, the right
incentives. For the private sector, profit-seeking is at the
heart of the incentive structure, but brand validation
and corporate responsibility also matter. National
governments want access to networks, expertise and
resources. Civil-society organisations want to see their
specific issues addressed, and donors want to offset
demands and increase the impact of their activities.
Fortunately, understanding and acceptance of
these different motivations is growing among the
various actors. Together with the convergence of
development objectives and business interests, rising
pressures on international aid, as well as ample proof
that partnerships can mature into self-sustaining and
profit-making ventures with transformative effects this
makes collaboration an increasingly attractive option
for all sides.
However, in spite of the enormous value they can
add, partnerships for development are certainly not
a panacea for all of Africas problems. Even brought
to scale, there are many challenges they cannot
solve. As governments try to harness capacities and
resources that are additional and complementary
to their own, partnerships for development are only
one instrument in their arsenal albeit an increasingly
powerful one. They do not replace good governance,
strong institutions and political leadership as the core
ingredients of progress. On the contrary, partnerships
depend on them to be able to fulfill their potential.
Partnerships do not replace good governance, strong institutions
and political leadership as the core ingredients of progress.
67
The Transformative Power of Partnerships
Crucially, partnerships also do not shift the responsibility
for progress away from the shoulders of African leaders
and international donors, even though they can help
to spread the burden. Donors still need to fulfill the
extensive financial and political commitments they
have made to the African continent and it remains
up to African leaders to inspire processes and build
practical capacities to translate the continents
wealth and potential into tangible results for its
citizens. It also remains up to them to protect these
citizens from the vagaries of nature and the volatilities
of the global economy, provide them with adequate
public services and afford them the opportunities to
feed and educate their children and make a decent
living. For this they need to meet the interlinked
challenges of growing their economies, conserving
their environments, and achieving the MDG-based
targets they set themselves a decade ago.
This is possible. We have seen renewed proof that
rapid progress is achievable even in the most
resource-deprived and insecure circumstances. We
have seen that good governance, transparency
and accountability bring results, and that economic
growth can drive development if it leads to job
creation, structural transformation and the spread
of opportunities. And we have undoubtedly seen
that partnerships for development can help to fill
gaps, expand efforts and accelerate progress. We
therefore end by calling on African leaders and their
partners across regions and sectors to intensify their
collaboration for the continents progress.
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

list of ACRoNYMS
AAP Africa Action Plan HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative/
AEC African Economic Community Programme)
AEO African Economic Outlook IATI International Aid Transparency Initiative
AfDB African Development Bank ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
AFMI African Financial Market Initiative ICC International Criminal Court
AGF Africa Green Fund ICT Information and Communication
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act Technology
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa IFAD International Fund for Agricultural
AICD African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Development
AMCEN African Ministerial Conference on the IFFIm International Finance Facility for
Environment Immunization
AMCOW African Ministers Council on Water IFI International Financial Institution
AMFm Affordable Medicines Facility Malaria IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
APDev African Platform for Development IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on
Effectiveness Development
APOC African Programme for Onchocerciasis IHP International Health Partnership
Control IIED International Institute for Environment and
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism Development
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture ILO International Labour Office
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations IMF International Monetary Fund
ASF African Standby Force IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
AU African Union Change
AUC African Union Commission ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
AWF African Water Facility LDC Least Developed Country
C10 Committee of Ten MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
CAADP Comprehensive African Agriculture MDG Millennium Development Goal
Development Programme MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
CAHOSCC Conference of African Heads of State and MIP Minimum Integration Programme
Government on Climate Change MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index
CARMMA Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
Maternal Mortality in Africa NEPAD New Partnership for Africas Development
CDI Commitment to Development Index OAU Organization of African Unity
CDM Clean Development Mechanism ODA Official Development Assistance
CEWS Continental Early Warning System OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern and Development
Africa PCD Policy Coherence for Development
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial
DAC Development Assistance Committee Accountability (Partnership)
EAC East African Community PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African in Africa
States PSC Peace and Security Council
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African PSD Private Sector Development
States PPP PublicPrivate Partnership
EDF European Development Fund REC Regional Economic Community
EFA Education for All REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement Forest Degradation
EU European Union SADC Southern Africa Development Community
FAAP Framework for African Agricultural SDR Special Drawing Rights
Productivity SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa UNEP UN Environment Programme
FOCAC Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
FSB Financial Stability Board Organization
FTI Fast Track Initiative UNFPA UN Population Fund
FTT Financial Transaction Tax UNICEF UN International Childrens Emergency
GAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security Fund
Program UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccination and WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable
Immunization Development
GEF Global Environment Facility WEF World Economic Forum
GDP Gross Domestic Product WDR World Development Report
GNI Gross National Income WHO World Health Organization
HDI Human Development Index WTO World Trade Organization

68
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

notes
All data used in this report are drawn from official and readily available sources, which are referenced below.
Every effort has been made to cite the most recent figures, even though occasionally preference has been
given to older but more reliable data. As with every report, the reader should be aware of the inherent limitations
of the available data and projections as well as the considerable controversies around the prevailing methods
of measuring progress. To the best of our knowledge, the information and data presented in this report was
accurate and the most up to date available as of 20 April 2011.

Quoted averages may mask significant differences between individual countries and within regions. As far as
possible, all amounts are adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Unless stated otherwise, amounts are quoted in
United States Dollars.

Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce material from this report for educational, not-for-profit
purposes providing that they acknowledge the Africa Progress Report 2011 as the source.

1 The Economist (2000), The Hopeless Continent

2 IMF (2010), Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa: Weathering the Storm
3 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and
Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy
4 Boston Consulting Group (2010), The African Challengers: Global Competitors Emerge from the Overlooked Continent
5 UNCTAD and Hochschule fr Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin (2011), The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008-2009 and Developing
Countries
6 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and
Shared Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy
7 UNCTAD (2011), 5th Global Investment Trends Monitor
8 AUC and UNECA (2010), Economic Report on Africa
9 World Bank (2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments; see also World Bank (2011), Migration and
Remittances Factbook 2011; UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update Regional Annex for SSA
10 UNWTO (2011), World Tourism Barometer 2011
11 IMF (2011), World Economic Outlook Update
12 The Economist (2011), Africas Impressive Growth; see also Steven Radelet (2010), Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading
the Way
13 AUC and UNECA (2011), Governing Development in Africa: The Role of the State in Economic Transformation
14 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
15 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
16 AfDB, C10, UNECA, AU Commission and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2010), Achieving Strong, Sustained and Shared
Growth in Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy, p. 34; UNTAD and UNIDO (2011), Economic Development in Africa Report 2011
17 AfDB (2010), Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa, AfDB Policy Brief, Vol. 1, Issue 4
18 Experts Group convened by Germany, Great Britain, Indonesia and Turkey (2011), The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a
Final Deal, Interim Report
19 UN-OHRLLS, UNDP and UNECA (2010), Outcome Document of the Africa Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Review of the
Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action
20 AfDB (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010
21 ODI (2010), Economic Growth and the MDGs, Briefing Paper 60; see also AfDB, AUC, and UNECA (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa
toward the Millennium Development Goals
22 IMF (2011), Emerging Africa Expected to See Rise in Investment
23 UNCTAD (2011), Global Economic Prospects January 2011 Update Regional Annex for SSA
24 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa
25 McKinsey Quarterly (2010), Africas Path to Growth: Sector by Sector
26 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies
27 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa
28 AUC and UNECA (2011), Economic Report on Africa 2011: Governing Development in Africa The Role of the State in Economic
Transformation
29 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance
30 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010), Ibrahim Index of African Governance
31 Only elections that took place between April 2010 and April 2011 are considered
32 Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (2011)
33 Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat
34 Freedom House (2011), Freedom in the World 2011
35 AEO (2010), Database on African Fiscal Performance
36 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid
37 C-10 (2010), Domestic Resource Mobilization across Africa: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options
38 Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International (2010), Revenue Watch Index 2010
39 G20 (2010), Anti-Corruption Action Plan: G20 Agenda for Action on Combating Corruption, Promoting Market Integrity and
Supporting a Clean Business Environment, Annex III to G20 Seoul Summit Document

69
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2011

40 UNECA (2010), Opposition Parties in Africa: Fighting for Survival

41 Transparency International (2010), Corruption Perceptions Index 2010
42 World Bank (2010), Quiet Corruption: Undermining Development in Africa
43 AU (2011), Decisions and Declarations of the 16th Ordinary AU Summit
44 The Economist (2011), The African Union: Short of Cash and Teeth
45 Continental Advisory Research Team (2010), State of the Union Continental Report 2010
46 Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2010), Growth and Responsibility: The Positioning of Emerging Powers in the Global Governance System
47 G24 (2010), Communiqu of 7 October 2010; see also Ngaire Woods (2010), The G20 Leaders and Global Governance, GEG
Working Paper 2010/59
48 G20 (2010), The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration
49 EU (2010), Tripoli Declaration
50 World Bank (2011), World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development
51 Center on International Cooperation (2011), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011
52 Institute for Economics & Peace (2010), The Global Peace Index 2010
53 See Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen Hendrix (2010), Food Insecurity and Conflict: Applying the WDR Framework, World Development
Report 2011 Background Paper; Frances Stewart (2010), Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict, World Development Report 2011
Background Paper
54 Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer (2010), Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper
55 Alex Evans (2010), Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict, World Development Report 2011 Background
Paper; see also The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2010), Resource Scarcity in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation?
56 AU PSC (2011), Report of the Peace & Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa
57 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
58 There are substantial discussions on the effects of inequality. See, for example, The Economist (2011), The rich and the rest: What to
do (and not to do) about inequality
59 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
60 ILO (2010), The World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond
61 UN General Assembly (2010), Resolution A/65/L.1. For more information on the MDG Acceleration Framework see UNDP (2010),
Unlocking Progress: MDG Acceleration on the Road to 2015.
62 See, for example, Institute for Economic Affairs (2011), A New Understanding of Poverty
63 ILO (2011), Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery; see also UNCTAD (2011), World Economic Situation
and Prospects 2011
64 IFAD (2011), Rural Poverty Report 2011
65 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
66 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa
67 UN-HABITAT (2010), State of the Worlds Cities 2010/2011: Cities for All Bridging the Urban Divide. See also Ben Arimah (2010), The Face
of Urban Poverty: Explaining the Prevalence of Slums in Developing Countries, United Nations University Working Paper No. 2010/30
68 Emmanuel Skoufias et al (2011), The Poverty Impacts of Climate Change, World Bank Economic Premise no. 51
69 UNESCO (2011), EFA Global Monitoring Report: The Hidden Crisis Armed Conflict and Education
70 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
71 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
72 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010), The Worlds Women 2010: Trends and Statistics
73 UNESCO (2011), Building Human Capacities in Least Developed Countries to Promote Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development
74 AU (2010), Nairobi Declaration on the African Womens Decade
75 UNDP (2010), Human Development Report 2010
76 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
77 WEF (2010), The Global Gender Gap Report 2010
78 UN Commission on the Status of Women (2011), To Promote Womens and Girls Access to Education, Training, Science and
Technology; UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 2010;
79 UNDP (2010), The Gender Inequality Index 2010
80 Agence Franaise de Dveloppement and World Bank (2010), Gender Disparities in Africas Labor Market
81 ITUC (2011), Living with Economic Insecurity: Women in Precarious Work
82 FAO (2011), The State of Food and Agriculture; CGD (2010), The Economics of Population Policy for Carbon Emissions Reduction in
Developing Countries, Working Paper 229
83 WHO (2010), The World Malaria Report 2010
84 WHO (2010), World Health Statistics 2010
85 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; Also
see Margaret Hogan et al (2010), Maternal Mortality for 181 Countries, 19802008: A Systematic Analysis of Progress towards Millennium
Development Goal 5, The Lancet, Vol. 375, Issue 9730
86 APP (2010), Maternal Health: Investing in the Lifeline of Healthy Societies & Economies
87 AU (2010), Summit Declaration on Maternal, Infant and Child Health and Development
88 See Global Polio Eradication Campaign (2010), Annual Report 2010; WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Annual Measles Initiative Report
2010; Carter Center (2011), Guinea Worm Disease Campaign Nears Eradication Goal; WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and
AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 2010
89 GAVI (2010), Saving Lives & Protecting Health: Results and Opportunities
90 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2011),
91 G8 (2010), Muskoka Declaration
92 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing The Path to Universal Coverage
93 WHO (2010), The World Health Report 2010: Health Systems Financing The Path to Universal Coverage; WHO and UN Habitat (2010),
Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings
94 UNSG (2011), Uniting for Universal Access: Towards Zero New Infections, Zero Discrimination, and Zero AIDS-Related Deaths, Report by
the Secretary-General; see also WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF et al. (2010), Children and AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 2010; Whitaker Group
(2011), Africa Health News; World Diabetes Foundation (2010), Annual Review 2010; AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing
Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010
95 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas
96 UNEP (2010), African Water Atlas

70
 The Transformative Power of Partnerships

97 WaterAid (2011)
98 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
99 UN (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
100 WHO and UNICEF (2010), Joint Monitoring Report 2010: Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water
101 UNECA (2010), Equal Access to Basic Services in African LDCs: The Need for Coherent, Inclusive and Coherent Policy Frameworks
102 WHO and UN Habitat (2010), Hidden Cities: Unmasking and Overcoming Health Inequities in Urban Settings
103 AICD (2010), Annual Report
104 AfDB (2010), Financing Investments in Water for Growth
105 AfDB (2010), Water Sector Governance in Africa
106 UNDG (2010), MDG Good Practices Report 2010
107 The Global Compact (2010), The CEO Water Mandate Guide to Responsible Business Engagement with Water Policy
108 International Food Policy Research Institute (2010), Global Hunger Index 2010
109 AfDB, AU, UNECA and UNDP (2010), Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Report 2010; FAO
(2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises
110 The Economist (2011), The Future of Food: What is Causing Food Prices to Soar and What Can Be Done about It?
111 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch
112 World Bank (2011), Food Price Watch
113 UK Government Office of Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability
114 IIED (2011), Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts?
115 WMO (2010), 2010 Equals Record for Worlds Warmest Year, Press Release 96/2010
116 FAO (2011), The State of the Worlds Forests 2011
117 The Economist (2011), Climate Change and Crop Yields: One Degree Over; see also UNDP (2011), Fast Facts: Climate Change and UNDP
118 UNEP (2010), Environmental Consequences of Ocean Acidification: A Threat to Food Security
119 DARA (2010), Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010: The State of the Climate Crisis; David Wheeler (2011), Quantifying Vulnerability to
Climate Change: Implications for Adaptation Assistance, Center for Global Development Working Paper 240
120 Maplecroft (2010), Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2010
121 UNEP (2010), AMCEN Gets New Tool for Communicating Climate Change and Promoting an Effective Response in Africa
122 WRI (2011), Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges
123 The Secretary-Generals High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010), Final Report
124 Development Initiatives (2011), Monitoring Climate Financing Architecture
125 WEF (2011), Scaling Up Low-Carbon Infrastructure Investments in Developing Countries, The Critical Mass Initiative Working Report 2011
126 World Bank (2009), Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa
127 UNEP (2011), Green Economy Report
128 OECD (2011), Statextracts
129 OECD (2011), Statextracts
130 AEO (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010: Public Resource Mobilization and Aid
131 CGD (2010), Commitment to Development Index 2010
132 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011
133 ONE (2011), ONE/DATA Report 2011 (based on the figures released by the OECD DAC on 6 April 2011)
134 OECD DAC (2011), Development Aid Reaches an Historic High in 2010, Press Release
135 OECD DAC (2011), ODA Figures as Released on 6 April 2011
136 OECD (2010), The OECD Fragmentation Index 2010
137 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), Africas Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners: Options
for Africas Development
138 World Bank (2011), Africas Future and the World Banks Support to It
139 EU (2010), EU Development Policy in Support of Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, Green Paper
140 Hudson Institute (2010), 2010 Index of Philanthropy and Remittances
141 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (2010), External Debt in Africa, Policy Brief 3
142 IMF and IDA (2010), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) Status of
Implementation
143 IMF and World Bank (2010), Preserving Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries in the Wake of the Global Crisis
144 OECD (2010), Indicators for Progress on the Implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
145 AfDB, AU and NEPAD (2010), Issue Paper on Ownership, Sustainability and Accountability for Results, 2nd Regional Meeting on Aid
Effectiveness, Tunis, 4-5 November 2010
146 Development Initiatives (2009), The Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency
147 OECD (2011), The Role of the Private Sector in the Context of Aid Effectiveness: Consultative Findings Document Final Report
148 See, for example, IFC (2010), Inclusive Business 2010 Telling Our Story: Base of the Pyramid Investments; APP and Concern Universal
(2010), Doing Good Business in Africa: How Business Can Support Development; WBCSD (2010), Doing Business with the World: The New
Role of Corporate Leadership in Global Development; UN Global Compact et al (2010), Innovating for a Brighter Future: The Role of
Business in Achieving the MDGs
149 Business Action for Africa et al (2010), Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals Through Inclusive Business:
Delivering Results: Moving to Scale
150 Accenture Development Partnerships (2011), Cross-Sector Convergence: A New View of Global Development; see also Michael
Porter and Mark Kramer (2011), The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value, Harvard Business Review
151 World Bank Institute (2009), A Way to Effective Service Delivery in Fragile States: Public-Private Partnerships
152 See Allianz Group (2011), Learning to Insure the Poor: Micro-Insurance Report; Swiss Re (2011), Micro-Insurance: Risk Protection for
4 Billion People
153 See Mark Napier, ed. (2010), Real Money, New Frontiers: Case Studies of Financial Innovation in Africa
154 UN-HABITAT (2011), Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa
155 AICDS (2009), Africas Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation
156 WBCSD (2007), Investing in a Low-Carbon Future in the Developing World
157 WBCSD (2005), Business for Development: Business Solutions in Support of the Millennium Development Goals

71
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Africa Progress Panel would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Gill Bates (SIPRI), Christoph
Benn (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), Timothy Brewer (WaterAid), Audette Bruce
(UNDP), Daniel Coppard (Development Initiatives), Wouter Deelder (Dalberg), Dustin Dehez (Freie Universitt
Berlin), Shanta Devarajan (World Bank), Nicolas Douillet (UNDP), Hania Farhan (Mo Ibrahim Foundation), Ricardo
Fuentes (UNDP), Cosmas Gitta (UNDP), Richard Gowan (NYU Center on International Cooperation), Alan Hinman
(The Taskforce for Global Health), Aubrey Hruby (The Whitaker Group), Andreas Hbers (ONE), Michael Keating
(UN), Michel Lavollay (PublicPrivate Partnerships Europe), Franklyn Lisk (Warwick University), Carlos Lopes
(UNITAR), Aileen Marshall (World Bank), Jason McGeown (Maplecroft), Jonas Moberg (EITI), Benito Mller (Oxford
University), Kate Norgrove (WaterAid International), Warren Nyamugasira (African Monitor), Paatii Ofosu-Amaah
(AfDB), Patrick Osakwe (UNCTAD), Judith Randel (Development Initiatives), Alistair Rivers (Innovata LLC), Zahid
Torres-Rahman (Business Action for Africa), Elisabeth Sandor (OECD), Guido Schmidt-Traub (CDC Climat AM),
Lindiwe Sibanda (FANRPAN), Elisabeth Skns (SIPRI), Tesfai Tecle (AGRA), Filippo Veglio (World Business Council
for Sustainable Development), Alyson Warhurst (Maplecroft), and Sharon Wiharta (SIPRI).

The APP would also like to acknowledge the generous support from the United Kingdoms Department for
International Development, the French Government and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Cover design, infograhics, overall design and layout: Violaine Beix, Thad Mermer, Carolina Rodriguez and
Blossom Communications. Copy-edited by Nina Behrman.

Printed by Imprimerie Lenzi, Geneva Switzerland.

 The Africa Progress Panel promotes Africa's development by tracking progress,
drawing attention to opportunities and catalyzing action.

PANEL MEMBERS

Kofi Annan Graa Machel

Chair of the Africa Progress Panel, former President of the Foundation for Community
Secretary-General of the United Nations and Development and founder of New Faces New
Nobel Laureate Voices

Tony Blair Linah Kelebogile Mohohlo

Patron of the Africa Governance Initiative and Governor, Bank of Botswana
former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Olusegun Obasanjo
Former President of Nigeria
Michel Camdessus
Former Managing Director of the International Robert Rubin
Monetary Fund Co-Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign
Relations and former Secretary of the United
Peter Eigen States Treasury
Founder and Chair of the Advisory Council,
Transparency International and Chairman of Tidjane Thiam
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Plc.

Bob Geldof Muhammad Yunus

Musician, businessman, founder and Chair of Economist, founder of Grameen Bank and
Band Aid, Live Aid and Live8, Co-founder of Nobel Laureate
DATA and ONE

Africa Progress Panel

P.O. Box 157
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland

info@africaprogresspanel.org
www.africaprogresspanel.org

The Africa Progress Panel prints on recycled paper