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Under the present circumstances of this case, with the

appeal glaringly filed out of time, we need not tarry to


discourse further on other errors allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for utter
lack of merit. The Decision dated April 16, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60062, which affirmed
the Resolution dated March 31, 2000 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CN 00-05-03491-97,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ.,


concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond


the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
its labor officials findings rest. (CBL Transit, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 425 SCRA 367
[2004])

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G.R. No. 165424.April 16, 2008.*

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner, vs. CHONA


M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Family Code; Marriages; Annulment; Psychological Incapacity;


Immaturity hardly constituted sufficient cause for declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
577

VOL. 551, APRIL 16, 2008 577

Halili vs. Santos-Halili

In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his


immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as
testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted
sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to
psychological incapacity.In Republic v. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA
198 (1997), we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more
than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance
of some marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to
psychological incapacity. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element in petitioners personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations, had to be shown. In this,
petitioner failed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The report, and even the testimonies
given by petitioner and his expert witness at the trial, dismally
failed to prove that petitioners alleged disorder was grave enough
and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.The evidence adduced by petitioner
merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along
with each other as they constantly fought over petty things.
However, there was no showing of the gravity and incurability of
the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except
for the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the
psychological report. The report, and even the testimonies given by
petitioner and his expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to
prove that petitioners alleged disorder was grave enough and
incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Their not having lived together
under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one
of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.Petitioner also made much of the
fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. This, however, fails to move us considering that there may be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, a married
couple might

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Halili vs. Santos-Halili

have to live separately though the marital bond between them


remains. In fact, both parties were college students when they got
married and were obviously without the financial means to live on
their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one roof did
not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and


resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Santiago, Cruz & Sarte Law Office for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA,J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of


the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 26, 2004
decision1 and September 24, 2004 resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent
Chona M. Santos-Halili3 were only 21 and 19 years of age,
respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the
City Hall of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to
live with their respective parents and never lived together
but maintained the relationship nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly.
Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on dates
with other women. It was at this time that he started
receiving

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and


concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from
the service) and Lucas P. Bersamin of the Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Rollo, pp. 10-21.
2 Id., pp. 22-24.
3 Hereafter referred to as respondent.

579

VOL. 551, APRIL 16, 2008 579


Halili vs. Santos-Halili

prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he


was already a married man.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential
marital obligations to respondent.4 He claimed that he
thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall of
Manila was a joke and that the marriage certificate he
signed was fake. He also pointed out that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife and
never consummated the marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and held that, taken in totality, the evidence for
petitioner failed to establish his psychological incapacity.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of
evidence presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner
suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively
prevented him from complying with his essential marital
obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his
marriage with respondent.5 He failed to discharge the
burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own
testimony and a psychological report written by Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who
also testified on the matters contained therein.
_______________

4 It was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4138.


5 Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
376, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664; 268
SCRA 198 (1997).

580

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Halili vs. Santos-Halili

According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a


personality disorder characterized as a mixed personality
disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent
personality disorder brought about by a dysfunctional
family background. Petitioners father was very abusive
and domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings were
adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man,
they lacked affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew up
without self-confidence and very immature. He never really
understood what it meant to have a family, much less to be
a husband. According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much
evident in petitioners impulsive decision to get married
despite having gone steady with respondent for only six
months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent
were psychologically incapacitated to perform their
essential marital obligations as they never lived together
as husband and wife. They also never consummated their
marriage. Furthermore, they constantly fought. Their
separation was inevitable as they were both immature. Dr.
Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioners
psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish
his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report
and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly
constituted sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It had to
be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.6
In Republic v. CA and Molina,7 we ruled that the
psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to
psychological in-

_______________

6 Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 641,
650.
7 Supra note 5.

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VOL. 551, APRIL 16, 2008 581


Halili vs. Santos-Halili

capacity.8 Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor,


an adverse integral element in petitioners personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations,9 had to be shown. In
this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that
he and respondent had difficulty getting along with each
other as they constantly fought over petty things.10
However, there was no showing of the gravity and
incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly
inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or
conclusion to that effect in the psychological report. The
report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his
expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that
petitioners alleged disorder was grave enough and
incurable to bring about his disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. This,
however, fails to move us considering that there may be
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, a
married couple might have to live separately though the
marital bond between them remains.11 In fact, both parties
were college students when they got married and were
obviously without the financial means to live on their own.
Thus, their not having lived together under one roof did not
necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner
himself admitted that he and
_______________

8 Choa v. Choa, supra at p. 651.


9 Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007, 521
SCRA 121, 129-130.
10 For instance, they would frequently quarrel over respondents
insistence that petitioner pick her up on time whenever they go out on
dates.
11 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 22; 240 SCRA 20 (1995). See
Justice Padillas dissent, p. 48.

582

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Halili vs. Santos-Halili

respondent continued the relationship after the marriage


ceremony. It was only when they started fighting
constantly a year later that he decided to file a petition to
have the marriage annulled. It appears that petitioner just
chose to give up on the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Azcuna and Leonardo-De


Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., On Leave.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and


conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. (Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco,
441 SCRA 422 [2004])

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