1. Common Meaning Rule making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of "chocolate.
upon satisfactory proof of "chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the Committee Chairman
G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957
SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and VICENTE GELLA,
in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,Defendants-
Appellees.
Rogelio M. Jalandoni for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Jose P. Alejandro for appellee, Vicente Gella.
Nat. M. Balbao and F. E. Evangelista for appellee, Central
Bank of the Philippines.
BENGZON, J.:
The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may be
considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption
from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No.
601 as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953,
the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for
which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent
totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax
under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that
had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it
included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed
in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants
submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the grounds:
first, the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa
beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against
the Government without the latter's
consent. .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the motion,
and dismissed the case by his order of November 19, 1954.
Hence this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The lower court, appellant contends, erred in dismissing the
case and in holding that the term "chocolate" does not
include sun dried cocoa
beans.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax collected or
foreign exchange used for the payment of costs
transportation and/or other charges incident to importation
into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded to any importer
and the version that we got from the Lower House is "(cocoa
actual importation . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
In support of its contention appellant quotes from
dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the
words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice that
the quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut" "chocolate
bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal exemption refers to
"chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. We agree
with the Solicitor General and the other counsel of
respondents that in common parlance the law is presumed
to refer to it 1 - chocolate is a manufactured or finished
product made out of cocoa beans, or "cacao" beans as they
are locally known. We may take notice of the fact that
grocery stores sell powdered cocoa beans as chocolate,
labeled "cocoa powder", or simply "cocoa". They are,
however, really chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The
manufacture of chocolate involves several processes, such as
selecting and drying the cocoa beans, then roasting,
grinding, sieving and blending. 2 Cocoa beans do not become
chocolate unless and until they have undergone the
manufacturing processes above described. The first is raw
material, the other finished
product.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The courts regard "chocolate" as
"Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao beans without
the abstraction of the butter and always contains sugar and
added cacao butter. Rockwood & Co., vs. American President
Lines, D. C. N. J., 68 F. Supp. 224,
226.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled, crushed,
ground, and molded in cakes. It contains no sugar, and is in
general use in families. Sweetened chocolate is
manufactured in the same way but the paste is mixed wit
sugar, and is used by confectioners in making chocolate
confections. In re Schiling, 53 F. 81, 82, 3 C. C. A. 440.
In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of
strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, 3 we
are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for
"chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa
beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured
consumer product; the latter is ready for human
consumption; the former is
not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954 - suit
was brought in May 1954 - Congress approved Republic Act
1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for
"chocolate." This shows, maintains the appellant, the
Legislature's intention to include cocoa beans in the word
who reported House Bill No. 2676 which became Republic
Act 1197, declared before the House.
Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, after the word
'canned', strike out the words, 'fresh, frozen and' and also
the words 'other beef', on line 9 and on the same line, line 9,
after the word 'chocolate', insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)'
in parenthesis ( ). I am proposing to insert the words
'(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ) after the word chocolate,
Mr. Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and manifest the
intention of the past Congress that the word 'chocolate'
should mean 'cocoa beans.
In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman could
not have spoken of the Congressional intention in approving
Republic Act 601 because he was not a member of the
Congress that passed said Act. Naturally, all he could state
was his own interpretation of such piece of legislation.
Courts do not usually give decisive weight to one legislator's
opinion, expressed in Congressional debates concerning the
application of existing laws. 4Yet even among the legislators
taking part in the consideration of the amendatory statute
(Republic Act 1197) the impression prevailed that, as the law
then stood 5 chocolate candy or chocolate bar was
exempted, but cocoa beans were not. Here are Senator
Peralta's statements during the discussion of the same
House Bill No. 2576:
SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference report and I am
really bound by it, but, Mr. President, a few hours ago I
received some information which maybe the chairman
would like to know, to the effect that we allow chocolate bar,
chocolate candy to come this country except from the 17 per
cent tax when we do not allow cocoa beans, out of which
our local manufacturers can make chocolate candy,
exempted. So why do we not take off that exemption for
chocolate and instead put 'cocoa beans' so as to benefit our
manufacturers of chocolate candy?
xxx xxx xxx.
Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the chairman, only I was
just wondering if the chairman, might not consider the fact
that in view of the information, this seems to be inconsistent
we allow chocolate to come here exempt and not exempt
cocoa beans which is used by our manufacturers in making
chocolate candy.
And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying, in the same
connection:
MR. PRESIDENT, On the same page (page 1), line 9, delete
"cocoa beans". The text as it came to the Senate was
misleading. In the original law the exemption is for chocolate
beans)" giving the impression that chocolate and cocoa
beans are synonymous. Now I think this is a sort of a rider,
so your committee recommends the deletion of those
words. (Journal of the Senate, July 30, 1954, re H. B. No.
2576, Emphasis ours.)
Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs
would seem to show that in approving House Bill No. 2576,
the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of
chocolate with a view to favoring local manufacturers of
chocolate products. 6 A change of legislative policy, as
appellees contend 7 - not a declaration or clarification of
previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating, the
Government's new policy of exempting for the first
time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the President's
proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said
exemption (of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after
September 3, 1954 - not before. As a general rule, it may be
added, statutes operate
prospectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported
during January-October 1953, i.e. before the exemption
decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to
express our approval of the lower court's opinion about
plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it becomes
unnecessary to consider the other contention of defendants
that this is a suit against the Government without its
consent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ., concur.
Footnote
1
"As a general rule words used in a statute are to be given
their usual and commonly understood meaning .. ." C.J.S. p.
639.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2
CF. Encyclopedia Americana (1954) Vol. V, p. 129, 130;
Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1945 ed.) p.
948.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3
Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on the
claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption and an
alleged grant of exemption will be strictly construed and
cannot be made out by inference or implication but must be
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is
the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make
an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms. (Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. Vol. 2.
1303.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
4
Interpretation of laws is for the Courts (See 82 C. J. S. pp.
745, 746). Even statutes declaring "what the law was before"
are not binding on courts. Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil., 696,
49 Off. Gaz., 4825.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
5 good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup,
Section 2 of Republic Act 601 was amended first by
Republic Act 814 and later by Republic Act 871. In both
amendments "chocolate" was
retained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
6
Whereas the exemption of "chocolate" aimed to benefit
the consumers
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
7
See footnote 5.
2. Terms with legal meaning
G.R. No. L-5872 November 29, 1954
ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Cornelio R. Magsarili for petitioners.
De los Santos and De los Santos for respondents.
Alfonso S. Borja, as amicus curiae.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, petition this Court
for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in its
case No. 6677-R), declaring the respondent Crisostomo R.
Bernardo entitled to preference under Commonwealth acts
Nos. 20 and 539, in the acquisition of lot No. 462-A of the
"Capellania de Concepcion", also known as lot No. 4, block
No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, located in Malabon,
Rizal, and having an area of 208 square meters.
It is uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, the
Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic
Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong"
in Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the
expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands
acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for
resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or
occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein,
applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the
purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique
Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed
preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948,
the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the
petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter
upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals expressly finds that:
. . . It has been incontestably proven that the disputed lot
had been held under lease by appellee's deceased parents
and later by him (appellee) continuously from 1912 to 1947.
The appellee's predecessors paid the rentals due on the said
lot from the commencement of their leasehold rights up to
1936, when Teodora Santos died. The appellee continued
paying the rents on the same lot from 1936 to December 31,
1947, when the Government acquired the entire Capellania
de Concepcion estate. Since 1912 the values of the leasee
hold right of appellee amounts to about P4,000.00.
The alleged preferential right of the appellant to the
purchase of the disputed lot, which was also the main basis
of the decision of the Rural Progress Administration, is their
claim of actual occupation of the lot for many years before
the acquisition of the Concepcion estate by the Government.
The appellants' witness, Otilia Santos, however, said that the
late Romulo Bernardo had allowed his uncle, appellant
Enrique Bernardo, to stay in the premises since the year
1918. (petitioner's Brief, pp. 72-73).
The Court of Appeals also found that the house standing on
the lot had been since July 13, 1944, sold by petitioner
Enrique Bernardo to the respondent, who thereby became
its owner; that because of family relationship[, the
petitioners "were able to remain in the premises sue to the
tolerance of, and out of charity from, the appellee
(respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his deceased parents
who were the rightful lessees of the lot in question."
The Court of Appeals likewise found and declared in its
decision Bernardo required the petitioner to vacate the
premises. Finally, we understand that in Case No. 6734-R,
the Court of Appeals declared valid the sale of the house on
the lot in question made in 1944 by petitioner Enrique
Bernardo in favor of the respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo,
and that the aforesaid judgment is now final.
There are thus before us, disputing the right of preference to
the acquisition of the lot, the respondent who is the owner
of the house standing on said lot since 1944, and has held
the land in lawful tenancy since 1912, paying rents and taxes
thereon; and the petitioner, who was allowed by
respondent, out of the deference and charity, to gratuitously
occupy the lot and live therein since 1918. Upon the facts on
record, we are of the opinion that petitioner does not come
under the description "bona fide tenant or occupant"
employed in the statute (C.A. 539).
The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not
a tenant) has been defined as "one who supposes he has a
17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes
himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the
title is contested by any other person claiming a superior
right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good
faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil
Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith,
therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
over each another. The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls
short of this standard: for the precarious nature of his
occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to
protect and restore that possession to its real and legitimate
holders upon demand, could never be hidden the
Tambobong Estate, petitioner had already parted with the
house that was his remaining link with the occupancy of the
lot; and since 1945, even before the Government's purchase,
he had been required to vacate. Thus bereft of all stable
interest in the land, petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn
respondent's past deferential regard to his own advantage,
and to exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense for
the purpose of ousting his benefactors and wiping out the
investment that the latter, and their predecessors in interest,
had established and preserved charged for the lot in
question. That the law, in preferring "bona fide occupants,"
intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair
dealing may well be doubted.
The petitioners seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the
policy of the government, ever since the start of the
American sovereignty, had been to acquire the landed
estates for the benefit of their "actual occupants," as
allegedly exemplified in Acts 1170 and 1933 (friar Lands'
Acts), and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539
(Homesite Acts); that the words "bona fide occupants"
employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to
"actual" occupants. Two powerful REASONS nullify this
contention. The first is that section 7 of Act 1170 of the old
Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona
fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual"
and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the
Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely
used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing
the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the
acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second
reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies,
the government could not simply lay aside moral standards,
and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders,
unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of
their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts
instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that
the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak
and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of
trust.
That the underlying motive behind the Homesite Acts is the
desire that "the heads of the families concerned be given
opportunity to become the owners of their homes and
residential lots in which they and their forbears have been
raised and born" (Messages of the President, Vol. 4, pp. 288-
290), favors the respondents rather than the petitioner, for it
is an inalterable fact on record that the rentals and taxes on
the lot in question were always paid by the parents of
respondent Crisostomo Bernardo and continued by the latter
upon his parents' death, to the exclusion of herein
respondent.
As pointed out by the decision under review, had not the
respondents taken and maintained sincere and affirmative
steps to own their lands through a continuous and faithful
payment of their obligations, the chances are that the
petitioner would have been long ago speedily ejected from
the premises of the former landowners. To which may be
added that at present, not being the lessee of the lot, nor
the owner of the house standing thereon, the petitioner's
interest in this particular lot appears to be a purely
speculative one.
We therefore rule that a person who, at the time of the
acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the Government,
has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere
tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house
erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to
its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act.
No. 539. Whether or not the situation would be different if
the occupant were sublessee of the lot, need not be decided
in this case, the issue not being involved.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. and Jugo,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority solely because of the peculiar
facts of this case; but I am of the opinion that, between
a bona fide occupant and a tenant or lessee, the spirit of the
law is to prefer the former especially if the latter has already
a piece of his own.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
On December 12, 1947, the herein respondent Crisostomo S.
Bernardo filed an application with the Rural Progress
Administration for the purchase of lot No. 462-A of the
"Capellania de Concepcion", now lot No. 4, block No. 26, of
the Tambobong Estate plan, situated in Concepcion,
Malabon, Rizal, and containing an area of 208 square
meters. The herein petitioners, Enrique Bernardo, his wife
and children, also applied for the purchase of the same lot.
The basis of both applications is Commonwealth Act No. 20,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 539. In its decision
dated January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration
awarded the lot to the petitioners, and on July 9, 1948 the
corresponding deed was executed in their favor.
On July 26, 1948, res Bernardo filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against the petitioners and the Rural
Progress Administration, praying that the decision of the
Rural Progress Administration, as well as the corresponding
sale in favor of the petitioner be declared null and void; that
respondent Bernardo be declared entitled to purchase the
lot in question; that petitioners be order to vacate the and
surrender the possession thereof; and that the petitioners
be sentenced to pay respondent Bernardo, by way of
damages, the sum of P20.00 per month from February 1,
1945 until its surrender to said respondent. After hearing,
the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on February 15,
1950 a decision in favor of respondent Bernardo, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the
decision of the Rural Progress Administration dated January
12, 1948, as well as the sale of the lot in question by said
Rural Progress Administration to defendants Bernardo null
and void and of no effect; ordering said defendant Rural
Progress Administration to sell the lot in question to the
plaintiff who is the bona fide tenant of the lot in dispute and
the owner of the house standing thereon; ordering the
defendants Bernardo to vacate the lot in question and to pay
to the plaintiff damages in the sum of P20.00 per month,
representing the reasonable rental value for their illegal use
and occupation of said lot, from February 1, 1945 until the
said lot is vacated by defendant Bernardo; and sentencing all
defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
From this decision the petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, on April 17, 1952, affirmed the decision of
the court of origin in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
The latter have elevated the case before us on certiorari.
The facts relied upon by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the COurt of Appeals are to the effect that the deceased
parents of the respondent Bernardo and later said
respondent himself had been the lessee of the lot from 1912
to 1947; that respondent's predecessors paid its rental up to
19336 when his mother Teodora Santos died; that from 1936
respondent Bernardo in turn paid the rentals up December
31, 1947, when the Government acquired the entire
"Capellania de Concepcion" estate; that he owns the house
standing on the lot; that while the petitioners actually
occupied said lot since 1918, their occupancy was by mere
tolerance of and out of charity from respondent Bernardo
and his deceased parents; that the petitioners were required
by respondent Bernardo to vacate the premises on February
1, 1945, or two years before the acquisition of the
"Capellania de Concepcion" estate by the Government.
Upon the other hand, the petitioners' preferential right to
acquire the lot is premised on their actual occupancy since
1918.
Commonwealth Act No. 20, enacted on July 11, 1936, in
section 1, provided that "the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized to order the institution of expropriation
proceeding or to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
acquiring portions of large landed estate which are now used
as home sites and reselling them at costs to their bona
fide occupants." It will be noted that, under this provision,
portions of large landed estates used as homesites would be
expropriated or acquired by the Government for resale to
their bona fide occupants. Commonwealth Act No. 539,
enacted on May 26, 1940, and amending Commonwealth
Act No. 20, provides that "the President of the Philippines is
authorized to acquire private lands or any subdivide the
same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable
prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona
fide tenants or occupants or to a private individuals who will
work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire
and own lands in the Philippines." This latter provision differs
from Commonwealth Act No. 20 in the sense that private
lands are to be acquired or expropriated for subdivision into
lots or small farms for resale to their bona fide tenants or
occupants or to a private individuals who are qualified to
acquire and own lands in the Philippines, the important
change being, for the purposes of this opinion , that resale
now be made to "bona fide tenants or occupants."
The theory of the trial court and the Court of Appeals is that,
as respondent Bernardo was admittedly the lessee of the lot
in question, he should enjoy priority. It was reasoned out
that said respondent having been paid, by his predecessors
and himself, the rentals for the land from 1912 to 1917, and
owning the house now standing on the lot is a "tenant"
within the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539; that the
petitioners could have stayed in the premises since 1918,
without being ejected by the original owners of the
"Capellania de Concepcion" estate, if respondent Bernardo
and his predecessors had not paid said rentals.
We are of the opinion that the law in this case has been
misapplied. To determine the real purpose of
Commonwealth Act No. 20 and Commonwealth Act No. 539,
we have only to recall that as early as April 26, 1904, Act No.
1120, otherwise known as the "Friar Lands Act," was
approved providing that the actual settlers and occupants of
lands acquired by the Government had preference over all
others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings. This was
followed on July 11, 1936, by Commonwealth Act No. 20,
authorizing the resale of homesites to their bona
fide occupants. This trend was adopted in Commonwealth
Act No. 260, approved on April 18, 1938, and
Commonwealth Act No. 378, approved on August 23, 1938,
which also expressly referred to bona fide occupants. The
purpose of Act No. 1120, known as the "Friar Lands Act" had
already been explained by this court in the case of Jocson vs.
Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; 378-379; as follows:
Acts 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting
homestead rights and special privileges under the laws of
the United States and various states of the Union. The
statutes of the United States as well as of the various states
of the Union contain provisions for the granting and
protection of homesteads. Their object is to provide a home
for each citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach financial misfortune, and
to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence.
Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens
shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to
pauperism. (Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24;
Franklin vs. Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 1982; Richardson vs.
Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.)
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of
homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster families
as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare.
The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of
free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are
cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives
permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection
and durability. (Wapples on Homestead and Exceptions, p.
3.)
This objective is readily embedded in Commonwealth Act
No. 20 which speaks of bona fide occupants; and we cannot
suppose that, presumably aware of legislative antecedents
our lawmakers ever intended to depart from such purpose in
enacting Commonwealth Act No. 539. Indeed, The rural
Progress Administration in its resolution No. 32, dated
August 7, 1949, (according to the petitioners, should be
1939) resolved "that it is the sense of this Board that the
words "bona fide occupants, as used in Commonwealth Act
No. 20, as amended, applies to the person actually
occupying any given lot, irrespective, of any former lease
contract with the previous owners of the homesite." It is
significant that this construction was given by the very
agency called upon to implement the law. But the Court of
Appeals argued that said resolution should be construed in
connection with paragraph 3 of resolution No. 252 dated
March 11, 1949, which reads in part as follows:
Resolved, to adopt as tentative rules covering the disposition
of lot in the Tambobong Estate, Malabon, Rizal, the
following:
(1) To award to the lessees the lots under their possession if
they have houses thereon and the area thereof does not
exceed 1,000 square meters. The RPA, however, reserves the
right to take away from said lessees any portion in excess of
1,000 square meters.
(2) That lots with houses even though surrounded by fence
be declared vacant.
(3) That sublessees who have been occupying lots for at least
five years be considered as bona fideoccupants and as such
with preferential right to purchase said lots if they possess
no other in the same estate.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that paragraph 3 of
resolution No. 252 requires bona fide actual occupation on
the part of the sublessees for at least five years prior to the
acquisition by the Government of the lot to be resold; and as
the petitioners were required by respondent Bernardo to
vacate the premises on February 1, 1945 they could not be
considered as having occupied the lot bona fide for at least
five years prior to December 31, 1947 when the "Capellania
de Concepcion" estate was purchased by the Government.
This construction is untenable since paragraph 3 of the
resolution No. 252 does not say that the bona
fide possession for five years should be counted in relation
or prior to the date of acquisition by the Government. Said
resolution, it may fairly be supposed, contemplates
possession from the time the sublessee actually occupies. In
the present case it is admitted that the petitioners have held
possession since 1918.
In this connection it may not be amiss to make reference to
Republic Act No. 1162 which, in its section 5, provides,
among other things, that "from the approval of this Act, until
the expropriation herein provided, no ejectment
proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any
tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas
herein authorized to be appropriated if he pays his current
rentals." Of course, said Act was approved in 1954, or after
the purchase by the Government of the "Capellania de
Concepcion" estate, but it is obvious therefrom that the
policy of the Government is to protect the actual occupants
as much as possible, with the view to enabling them to
acquire homesites. By analogy, we may consider the efforts
of respondent Bernardo to oust the petitioners in 1945, as
being of no decisive consideration.
We are also inclined to the view that the term "tenant" was
added by Commonwealth Act No. 539, not for the purpose
of giving such tenant any preference over an occupant, but
merely to expand the scope of the law by allowing resale to
persons other than a bona fide occupant; and this is clear
from the use of the alternative conjunction "or" between the
words "tenant" and "occupants" in Commonwealth Act No.
539. If the intention were otherwise, the law would have
expressly provided in the order in which they are
enumerated. This was exactly done in Republic Act No. 1162
which provides, in its section 3, that "the landed estates or
haciendas expropriated by virtue of this Act shall be
subdivided into small lots, none of which shall exceed one
hundred and fifty square meters in the area, to be sold at
costs to the tenants or occupants of said lots, and to other
individuals, in the order mentioned." In essence and effect,
Commonwealth Act No. 539 may be said to vest a certain
degree of discretion in the agency authorized to carry out
the law, to determine who is better qualified and should be
preferred to a given lot. In the case before us, the Rural
Progress Administration, after proper investigation, awarded
the lot to the petitioners and, in our opinion, this exercise of
discretion and judgment should not be interfered with in the
absence of gross abuse.
We are not ready to state that the Rural Progress
Administration had abused its discretion, because the
petitioners have lived on the lot since 1918 and they are
conceded more indigent than respondent Bernardo, coupled
with the fact that the latter allegedly owns another property
as his homesite. It is immaterial whether the petitioners
have occupied the lot in question by mere tolerance and out
of charity of respondent Bernardo, since this would not
detract from the bona fide character of petitioners'
possession which is all that is required by the law. In our
opinion, the petitioners have occupied the land with as
much good faith as a sublessee actually paying rentals; so
much so that the former owners of the land never
attempted to oust them; and they cannot be charged with
either ingratitude or unfair dealing and dishonesty towards
respondent Bernardo, for they merely accepted the benefit
intended to be conferred in Commonwealth Act No. 539.
The petitioners do not deny having been the subject of
respondent's benevolence to another question which he
may ventilate.
The relation of the parties herein which naturally gave way
to petitioners continued possession of the lot in question,
and the manner the petitioners acquired possession, are
contained in the following passage from the brief for the
defendant-appellant in CA-G.R. No. 6734-R, Crisostomo
Bernardo vs. Enrique Bernardo, in which the ownership of
the house standing on the lot was litigated and decided in
favor of respondent Bernardo:
The plaintiff-appellee Crisostomo S. Bernardo and the
defendant-appellant Enrique Bernardo are blood relatives. It
appears that the grandmother of the plaintiff-appellee, one
by the name of either Aniceta or Severina Bernardo, is the
sister of the defendant-appellant Enrique Bernardo. At one
time, (the exact time could no longer remembered) the
parents of Aniceta or Severina Bernardo and Enrique
Bernardo, occupied the lot subject of the land case. There
was a time however, when their parents died, the
grandmother of the plaintiff-appellee, together with his
parents(plaintiff-appellee's) left the premises, while the
defendant-appellant Enrique Bernardo was left behind on
the said lot. As the years went on the defendant-appellant
erected a new house on the lot the one now in question, and
continued to live therein up to the present time with his
children, who are the other defendants-appellants in the
land case. (Please refer to defendants-appellants' brief in the
land case and the documents or exhibits therein mentioned,
pages 3-5. Supra, pp. 4-5.)
At any rate, from a technical point of view, the term "tenant"
as used in Commonwealth Act No. 539 may be considered as
referring only to a lessee who is in actual possession,
thereby preventing one with wealth from acquiring lots for
business purposes. Suppose a lessee of 25 lots in a big
hacienda sublets the same to 25 actual occupants. In case
the Government should expropriate the hacienda for resale
in lots to "tenants or occupants," can it be seriously
contended that the lessee is to be preferred to the actual
occupants? An affirmative answer will be revolting to our
sense of proportion; and yet that is the effect of the majority
decision.
SEC. 27. Necessity of Entry by Lessee. Upon the execution
of a lease, naming a present term, the lessee has a right of
entry and of possession, but it seems well settled that he is
not a tenant until he enters. To create the relation of
landlord and tenant, there must be an entry by the lessee
under the lease, or holding of the possession of the premises
by the lessee that will be referable to the lease as his
authority. There is also authority to the effect that a lessee
does not have an estate until he enters, and that under the
common law, no estate for years could be created by a lease
or other common law, no estate for years could be created
by a lease or other common law conveyance, without an
actual entry made by the person to whom the land was
granted. . . . (32 Am. Jur., p. 50.).
The fact that respondent Bernardo had allowed the
petitioners to occupy the lot since 1918 is positive evidence
that said respondent has no need thereof; and it cannot be
gainsaid that Commonwealth Act Nos. 20 and 539 are
obviously intended, as heretofore already noted, to provide
the actual occupants with a piece of land which they may
call their own. Certainly the Government would have no
reason to worry about those who were or are already home
and landowners, much less to encourage "absentee" lessees.
Commonwealth Act No. 539 was conceived to solved a social
problem, not merely as a direct or indirect means of allowing
accumulation of land holdings. Indeed, in Republic Act No.
267, which authorizes municipalities to expropriate lands for
sale in lots, preference being given to Filipino bona
fide occupants and to Filipino veterans, their widows, and
their children, the policy of the Government was more or
less announced that "no such lot shall be sold to any person
who already owns a residential lot, and any sale made to
such person shall be void."
The petitioners have called attention to the fact that
respondent Bernardo paid the rentals from July, 140 to
December 31, 1947, only on April 2, 1947, when steps were
already being taken by the Government to acquire the
Tambobong Estate for resale to tenants or occupants. This
fact may not of course affect the status of respondent
Bernardo as a lessee, but in way justifies further the finding
of the Rural Progress Administration that the petitioners
should be preferred in the resale of the lot in question.
Another circumstance that influenced the COurt of Appeals
in affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
is that the house standing on the lot belongs to respondent
Bernardo. Apart from the fact the said house assessed at
P640, Philippine currency, was sold by the petitioners to
respondent Bernardo in 1944 for P1,050 in Japanese military
notes (or less than P100, Philippine currency) and the
petitioners remained in possession, we do not think that
respondent's ownership can affect the status of the
petitioners as bona fide occupants for the purpose of
Commonwealth Act No. 539. The same considerations
mentioned with respect to the possession of the land are
applicable.
Accordingly, we vote to reserve the appealed judgment and
to affirm the decision of the Rural Progress Administration
dated January 21, 1948, and the sale of the land in question
to the petitioners.
Pablo, J., concurs.
3. Diaz vs. Intermediate Appelant Court
G.R. No. L-66574
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA
and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et
al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for
petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976
with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case
No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other
things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during
infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow
of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that
Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of
his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and
December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to
wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp.
Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in
the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by
Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children,
filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti
Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru
counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the
Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by
Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order
excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared
her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial
court in its order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin
filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-
G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
(reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive
portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not
consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same is
hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the
Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner
as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-
appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same
respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984
right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether
hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate
children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral
relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation
of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate
of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero (Art.
982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate
of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son
and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-
appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore
a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988,
989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate
succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December
1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is
whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of
their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter?
Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the
New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They
contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the
legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil
Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants
the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary
conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate
child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein)
are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992,
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo
Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate
of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the
New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that
Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article
990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the
Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes
which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so
that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate
child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil
Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle
since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary
portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that
while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate
child from representing him in the intestate succession of
the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which
case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain
said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first
solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the
Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number
1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code
that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person
spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement
of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate
heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to
the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the
Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976
are final and executory. Such contention is without merit.
The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1,
1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not
entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in
the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated
December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders
were never made the subjects of either a motion for
reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders
which long became final and executory are already removed
from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide
anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a
judgment has become final and executory is to order its
execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in
ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980
excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., took no part.
4. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from
a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa
'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa
'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka
na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa
States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-
cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto
mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do
you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga
no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa
hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka
"ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala
kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-
sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob,
nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na
hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung
baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging
that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.
Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D.
Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to
other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted
the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the
facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200;
and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing
the information based on the ground that the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue"7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one
of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that
the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,
supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations
or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded,
the element of secrecy would not appear to be material.
Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all
the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal
cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby
a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the
parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill,
Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil
Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization of
all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one without his
knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is
taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is
but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say
here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is
what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a
recording of the observations and remarks of a person
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under
Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly
records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks
to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting
or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications
of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from their conversations being overheard. But this statement
ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the
undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversationsare often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-
social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals
and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which
dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that
the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note,
because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a
violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the
statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-
recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
amount corresponding to the value of undelivered bags of of P84,350.00, in consideration of the facilitation of the
contract with them as it was Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty,
cement. orders and certainty of delivery of the same to the private
through Mrs. Sanchez, that ordered or purchased several
respondent. Solidbank Managers Check Nos. 0011565 and
The undisputed facts:
0011566 were paid by Sanchez to petitioners. bags of cement and paid the price thereof without informing

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Private respondent Tri-Realty is a developer and them of any special arrangement nor disclosing to them that
5. Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words
contractor with projects in Bulacan and Quezon City. There were deliveries to private respondent from Amon
SECOND DIVISION Lines & Spaces and respondent corporation are distinct and
Sometime in February 1992, private respondent had
AMON TRADING CORPORATION and JULIANA MARKETING, Trading Corporation and Juliana Marketing of 3,850 bags and
P e t i t i o n e r s, difficulty in purchasing cement needed for its projects. Lines separate entities. They added that there were purchases or

3,000 bags, respectively, during the period from April to June

& Spaces, represented by Eleanor Bahia Sanchez, informed
orders made by Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty which they were
- versus - private respondent that it could obtain cement to its 1992. However, the balance of 2,200 bags from Amon
about to deliver, but were cancelled by Mrs. Sanchez and the
satisfaction from petitioners, Amon Trading Corporation and
Trading Corporation and 3,000 bags from Juliana Marketing,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS andTRI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT AND its sister company, Juliana Marketing. On the strength of
consideration of the cancelled purchases or orders was later
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
R e s p o n d e n t s. such representation, private respondent proceeded to order or a total of 5,200 bags, was not delivered. Private
reimbursed to Lines & Spaces. The refund was in the form of
from Sanchez Six Thousand Fifty (6,050) bags of cement
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - respondent, thus, sent petitioners written demands but in
- - - - -x a check payable to Lines & Spaces.
from petitioner Amon Trading Corporation, and from Juliana
DECISION reply, petitioners stated that they have already refunded the
Marketing, Six Thousand (6,000) bags at P98.00/bag.

amount of undelivered bags of cement to Lines and Spaces Lines & Spaces denied in its Answer that it is
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Private respondent, through Mrs. Sanchez of
represented by Eleanor B. Sanchez and pleads in defense
per written instructions of Eleanor Sanchez.
Lines & Spaces, paid in advance the amount of P592,900.00
lack of cause of action and in the alternative, it raised the

This is an appeal by certiorari from the through Solidbank Managers Check No. 0011565 payable to
defense that it was only an intermediary between the
Amon Trading Corporation, and the amount of P588,000.00 Left high and dry, with news reaching it that Eleanor Sanchez
Decision dated 28 November 2002 of the Court of Appeals
[1]
private respondent and petitioners.[2] Soon after, though,
payable to Juliana Marketing, through Solidbank Managers had already fled abroad, private respondent filed this case
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60031, reversing the Decision of the counsel for Lines & Spaces moved to withdraw from the case
Check No. 0011566. A certain Weng Chua signed the check for sum of money against petitioners and Lines & Spaces.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, and holding for the reason that its client was beyond contact.

petitioners Amon Trading Corporation and Juliana Marketing vouchers for Lines & Spaces while Mrs. Sanchez issued

to be solidarily liable with Lines & Spaces Interiors Center
(Lines & Spaces) in refunding private respondent Tri-Realty
Development and Construction Corporation (Tri-Realty) the
receipts for the two managers checks. Private respondent
Petitioners plead in defense lack of right or cause
On 29 January 1998, the Regional Trial Court of
likewise paid to Lines & Spaces an advance fee for the
of action, alleging that private respondent had no privity of
12,050 cement bags at the rate of P7.00/bag, or a total Quezon City, Branch 104, found Lines & Spaces solely liable

to private respondent and absolved petitioners of any
liability. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
reads:
Wherefore, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering
defendant Lines and Spaces
Interiors Center as follows: to
pay plaintiff on the complaint
the amount of P47,950.00 as
refund of the fee for the
undelivered 5,200 bags of
cement at the rate of P7.00 per
bag; the amount of P509,600.00
for the refund of the price of the
5,200 undelivered bags of
cement at P98.00 per bag; the
amount of P2,000,000.00 for
compensatory damages; as well
as the amount of P639,387.50 as
attorneys fees; and to pay Amon
Trading and Juliana Marketing,
Inc. on the crossclaim the sum of
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees.[3]
Private Respondent Tri-Realty partially appealed
from the trial courts decision absolving Amon Trading
Corporation and Juliana Marketing of any liability to Tri-
Realty. In the presently assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held
petitioners Amon Trading Corporation and Juliana Marketing
to be jointly and severally liable with Lines & Spaces for the
undelivered bags of cement. The Court of Appeals disposed-
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the decision of the court a quo is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and
another one is entered ordering the
following:
Defendant-appellee Amon Trading
Corporation is held liable jointly and
severally with defendant-appellee
Lines and Spaces Interiors Center in
the amount of P215,600.00 for the
refund of the price of 2,200
undelivered bags of cement.
Defendant-appellee Juliana Marketing
is held liable jointly and severally with
defendant-appellee Lines and Spaces
Interiors Center in the amount of
P294,000.00 for the refund of the
price of 3,000 undelivered bags of
cement.
The defendant-appellee Lines and
Spaces Interiors Center is held solely in
the amount of P47,950.00 as refund of
the fee for the 5,200 undelivered bags
of cement to the plaintiff-appellant
Tri-Realty Development and
Construction Corporation.
The awards of compensatory damages
and attorneys fees are DELETED.
The cross claim of defendants-
appellees Amon Trading Corporation
and Juliana Marketing is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
Pained by the ruling, petitioners elevated the
case to this Court via the present petition for review to
challenge the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THERE
WAS A CONTRACT OF
AGENCY BETWEEN LINES
AND SPACES INTERIOR
CENTER AND RESPONDENT;
Private respondent, on the other hand, goes over
II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS
AND RESPONDENT HAS the top in arguing that contrary to their claim of innocence,
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT.[5]
petitioners had knowledge that Lines & Spaces, as
represented by Eleanor Sanchez, was a separate and distinct
At the focus of scrutiny is the issue of whether or
entity from Tri-Realty.[8] Then, too, private respondent stirs
not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling
up support for its contention that contrary to petitioners'
that petitioners are solidarily liable with Lines & Spaces. The
key to unlocking this issue is to determine whether or not claim, there was privity of contract between private
Lines & Spaces is the private respondents agent and whether
respondent and petitioners.[9]
or not there is privity of contract between petitioners and
private respondent.
Primarily, there was no written contract entered
into between petitioners and private respondent for the
We shall consider these issues concurrently as
delivery of the bags of cement. As gleaned from the records,
they are interrelated.
and as private respondent itself admitted in its Complaint,
private respondent agreed with Eleanor Sanchez of Lines &
Petitioners, in their brief, zealously make a case
Spaces for the latter to source the cement needs of the
that there was no contract of agency between Lines &
former in consideration of P7.00 per bag of cement. It is
Spaces and private respondent.[6] Petitioners strongly assert
worthy to note that the payment in managers checks was
that they did not have a hint that Lines & Spaces and Tri-
made to Eleanor Sanchez of Lines & Spaces and was not
Realty are two different and distinct entities inasmuch as
directly paid to petitioners. While the managers check issued
Eleanor Sanchez whom they have dealt with just
by respondent company was eventually paid to petitioners
represented herself to be from Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty
for the delivery of the bags of cement, there is obviously
when she placed her order for the delivery of the bags of
nothing from the face of said managers check to hint that
cement. Hence, no privity of contract can be said to exist
private respondent was the one making the payments. There
between petitioners and private respondent.[7]
was likewise no intimation from Sanchez that the purchase
order placed by her was for private respondents benefit. The
meeting of minds, therefore, was between private
respondent and Eleanor Sanchez of Lines & Spaces. This
contract is distinct and separate from the contract of sale
between petitioners and Eleanor Sanchez who represented
herself to be from Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty, which, per her
representation, was a single account or entity.
The records bear out, too, Annex A showing a
check voucher payable to Amon Trading Corporation for the
6,050 bags of cement received by a certain Weng Chua for
Mrs. Eleanor Sanchez of Lines & Spaces, and Annex B which
is a check voucher bearing the name of Juliana Marketing as
payee, but was received again by said Weng Chua.Nowhere
from the face of the check vouchers is it shown that
petitioners or any of their authorized representatives
received the payments from respondent company.
Also on record are the receipts issued by Lines &
Spaces, signed by Eleanor Bahia Sanchez, covering the said
managers checks. As Engr. Guido Ganhinhin of respondent
Tri-Realty testified, it was Lines & Spaces, not petitioners,
which issued to them a receipt for the two (2) managers
checks. Thus-
Q: And what is your proof
that Amon and Juliana were paid of
the purchases through managers
checks?
A: Lines & Spaces who
represented Amon Trading and Juliana
Marketing issued us receipts for the
two (2) managers checks we paid to
Amon Trading and Juliana Marketing
Corporation.
Q: I am showing to you
check no. 074 issued by Lines &
Spaces Interiors Center, what relation
has this check to that check you
mentioned earlier?
A: Official Receipt No. 074
issued by Lines & Spaces Interiors
Center was for the P592,900.00 we
paid to Amon Trading Corporation for
6,050 bags of cement.
Q: Now there appears a
signature in that receipt above the
printed words authorized signature,
whose signature is that?
A: The signature of Mrs.
Eleanor Bahia Sanchez, the
representative of Lines and Spaces.
Q: Why do you know that
that is her signature?
A: She is quite familiar with
me and I saw her affix her signature
upon issuance of the receipt.
[10]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Without doubt, no vinculum could be said to exist
between petitioners and private respondent.
There is likewise nothing meaty about the
assertion of private respondent that inasmuch as the
delivery receipts as well as the purchase order were for the
account of Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty, then petitioners should
have been placed on guard that it was private respondent
which is the principal of Sanchez. In China Banking Corp. v.
Members of the Board of Trustees, Home Development
Mutual Fund[11] and the later case of Romulo, Mabanta,
Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles v. Home
Development Mutual Fund,[12] the term and/or was held to
mean that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and
and the disjunctive or; or that one word or the other may be
taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the
intended purpose. It was accordingly ordinarily held that in
using the term "and/or" the word "and" and the word "or"
are to be used interchangeably.
By analogy, the words Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty
mean that effect shall be given to both Lines & Spaces and
Tri-Realty or that Lines & Spaces and Tri-Realty may be used
interchangeably. Hence, petitioners were not remiss when
they believed Eleanor Sanchezs representation that Lines &
Spaces/Tri-Realty refers to just one entity. There was,
therefore, no error attributable to petitioners when they
refunded the value of the undelivered bags of cement to
Lines & Spaces only.
There is likewise a dearth of evidence to show
that the case at bar is an open-and-shut case of agency
between private respondent and Lines & Spaces. Neither
Eleanor Sanchez nor Lines & Spaces was an agent for private
respondent, but rather a supplier for the latters cement
needs. The Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:
Art. 1868. By the contract
of agency a person binds himself to
render some service or to do
something in representation or on
behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter.
In a bevy of cases such as the avuncular case
of Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] the Court
decreed from Article 1868 that the basis of agency is
representation.
. . . On the part of the
principal, there must be an actual
intention to appoint or an intention
naturally inferable from his words or
actions and on the part of the agent,
there must be an intention to accept
the appointment and act on it, and in
the absence of such intent, there is
generally no agency. One factor which
most clearly distinguishes agency from
other legal concepts is control; one
person - the agent - agrees to act
under the control or direction of
another - the principal. Indeed, the
very word "agency" has come to
connote control by the principal. The
control factor, more than any other,
has caused the courts to put contracts
between principal and agent in a
separate category.
Here, the intention of private respondent, as the
Executive Officer of respondent corporation testified on, was
merely for Lines & Spaces, through Eleanor Sanchez, to the remaining balance of the amount paid corresponding to
of the undelivered bags of cement to Lines & Spaces. because of his clients vanishing act. Left with an empty bag,

supply them with the needed bags of cement. the undelivered materials. Private respondent likewise paid
Moreover, the check refund was payable to Lines & Spaces, so to speak, private respondent now puts the blame on
Q: Do you know the in advance the commission of Eleanor Sanchez for the
defendant Lines & Spaces in this case? not to Sanchez, so there was indeed no cause to suspect the petitioners. But this Court finds plausible the stance of
materials that have yet to be delivered so it really had no
A: Yes, sir.
scheme. petitioners that they had no inkling of the deception that means of control over her. Finally, there is no paper trail
Q: How come you know
this defendant? was forthcoming. Indeed, without any contract or any hard linking private respondent to petitioners thereby leaving the

A: Lines & Spaces latter clueless that private respondent was their true client.
represented by Eleanor Bahia The fact that the deliveries were made at the evidence to show any privity of contract between it and
Sanchez offered to supply us cement Private respondent should have, at the very least, required
when there was scarcity of cement construction sites of private respondent does not by itself petitioners, private respondents claim against petitioners
experienced in our projects. petitioners to sign the check vouchers or to issue receipts for
[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
raise suspicion that petitioners were delivering for private lacks legal foothold.
the advance payments so that it could have a hold on

respondent. There was no sufficient showing that petitioners petitioners. In this case, it was the representative of Lines &
We cannot go along the Court of Appeals
Considering the vagaries of the case, private
knew that the delivery sites were that of private respondent Spaces who signed the check vouchers. For its failure to
disquisition that Amon Trading Corporation and Juliana respondent brought the wrong upon itself. As adeptly establish any of these deterrent measures, private
and for another thing, the deliveries were made by
Marketing should have required a special power of attorney surmised by the trial court, between petitioners and private respondent incurred the risk of not being able to recoup the
petitioners men who have no business nosing around their
respondent, it is the latter who had made possible the wrong
form when they refunded Eleanor B. Sanchez the cost of the value of the materials it had paid good money for.
clients affairs. that was perpetuated by Eleanor Sanchez against it so it
undelivered bags of cement. All the quibbling about whether
must bear its own loss. It is in this sense that we must apply WHEREFORE, the present petition is
Lines & Spaces acted as agent of private respondent is inane
the equitable maxim that as between two innocent parties,
Parenthetically, Eleanor Sanchez has absconded
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision and the
because as illustrated earlier, petitioners took orders from the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done
to the United States of America and the story of what
should be the one to bear the resulting loss. [15] First, private Resolution dated 28 November 2002 and 10 June 2003, of
Eleanor Sanchez who, after all, was the one who paid them
happened to the check refund may be forever locked with
respondent was the one who had reposed too much trust on
the managers checks for the purchase of cement. Sanchez the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 60031, are
her. Lines & Spaces, in its Answer to the Complaint, washed Eleanor Sanchez for the latter to source its cement
represented herself to be from Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 29
its hands of the apparent ruse perpetuated by Sanchez, but needs. Second, it failed to employ safety nets to steer clear
purportedly a single entity. Inasmuch as they have never
of the rip-off. For such huge sums of money involved in this January 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
argues that if at all, it was merely an intermediary between
directly dealt with private respondent and there is no paper case, it is surprising that a corporation such as private
petitioners and private respondent. With no other way out, Branch 104, in Civil Case Q-92-14235 is hereby REINSTATED.
trail on record to guide them that the private respondent, in respondent would pay its construction materials in
Lines & Spaces was a no-show at the trial proceedings so
advance instead of in credit thus opening a window of No costs.
fact, is the beneficiary, petitioners had no reason to doubt
that eventually, its counsel had to withdraw his appearance SO ORDERED
opportunity for Eleanor Sanchez or Lines & Spaces to pocket
the request of Eleanor Sanchez later on to refund the value
6. Noscitur a sociis
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR.,
ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms.
ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by
RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private
respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C.
Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias,
Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis,
Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the
National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for
an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director
Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the
Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the
preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-
ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the
recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator
Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the
opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them.
Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and
Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias
(Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents'
Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed
a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to
Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring
developments that transpired after the filing of the petition
and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE
the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, the STATUS
QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the
original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct
respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192,
Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1,
1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to
comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental
Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in
said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-
267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes
were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case
No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-
480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of
petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their
clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy,
ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously
evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992
of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and
obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation
of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant
lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by
committing subornation of perjury, falsification and
fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-
54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation
and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary
of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'"
(Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination
between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its
Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a)
"despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution
directing respondents to maintain the status quo,
respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b)
the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September
22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining
the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent
Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in
tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation
of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated
by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached
to Rollowithout paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the
last peaceable uncontested status which preceded the
present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time
of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992
wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their
respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that
petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their
respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits
as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents
and/or any and all persons acting under their authority
desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until
further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615
thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on
the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental
Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has
no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a
government official or employee, there are conditions
required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached
to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners
adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or
employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted
private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel
and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without
pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has
the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman,
pending the investigation of the administrative complaints
filed against said officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to
Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11),
invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than
six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension
given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770
was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall
exercise such other power or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners
claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and
employees facing administrative investigation conducted by
his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension
himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter
alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the
Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers,
namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against public officials or employees at fault; (2)
recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,
censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the
recommendation (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 9-
10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call
that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what
the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive
but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power
"to recommend the suspension" of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a
punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.
Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"
should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan
v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman
the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is
imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set
forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has
to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to
conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient
manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be
given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v.
Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a
statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an
injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford,
Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the
procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be
interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E.
644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman
such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task
committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case,
said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it
was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940];
Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding
that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of
acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only
preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans
heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee
under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive
suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or
office to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his
bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266),
which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to
"suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his
bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government officials
and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805),
concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries
and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase
"subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was
deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his
authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions
that the proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the
proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
"subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read
"suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be
deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before
and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is
that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend all officials and employees under
investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are
employed "in his office" or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent
therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can
proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without
affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges
against them during the preliminary conference and even
after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of
Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13).
Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that
assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend erring public officials and employees
who are working in other departments and offices, the
questioned order remains null and void for his failure to
comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman
Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the
questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even
without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of
evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein
also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to
the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners
herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the
suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore,
as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in suspending
an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges
against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of
a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1)
the charts against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to
preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining
authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination
of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of
the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the
Ombudsman issued the order of preventive suspension only
after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the
administrative complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive
Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges
in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the
answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by
petitioners of the members of the private respondent
(Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a
preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the
respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit
their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list
of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-
337) while private respondents submitted their list of
exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-
348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director
Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with
manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension
of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably
on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing
their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive
suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary
of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion
should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the
Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to
constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken
by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the
preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate
language used by counsel for private respondents hurled
against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1)
Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private
Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-
5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's
cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must
be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward
his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA
459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against
the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a
disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the
use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than
not, creates more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in
the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions
of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of
relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-
judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline
of members of the bar separate and apart from the present
special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status
quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec.
24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or
employee administratively charged before him pending the
investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts
thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to
reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension.
For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has
authority to suspend petitioners preventively while the case
is in progress before him. Equally important is the
determination whether it is necessary to issue the
preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully,
I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive
suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral argument to
the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the
preventive suspension of respondents are warranted by the
facts. We may be suspending key government officials and
employees on the basis merely of speculations which may
not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand,
deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous
preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the
National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the
hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of
public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to
replace them in their respective functions as those
substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The
proper care of mental patients may thus be unduly
jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the
parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to
justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec.
24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or
employee administratively charged before him pending the
investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts
thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to
reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension.
For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has
authority to suspend petitioners preventively while the case
is in progress before him. Equally important is the
determination whether it is necessary to issue the
preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully,
I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive
suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral argument to
the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the
preventive suspension of respondents are warranted by the
facts. We may be suspending key government officials and
employees on the basis merely of speculations which may
not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand,
deprive them of their right to due process. The simultaneous
preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the
National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the
hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of
public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to
replace them in their respective functions as those
substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The
proper care of mental patients may thus be unduly
jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the
parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to
justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
7. Ejusdem generis
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED
FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for private
respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to
review the decision rendered by respondent judge, in Civil
Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein,
are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products
of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are
marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those
of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc.,
under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent,
Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private
respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized
for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its
highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all
the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with
ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs
pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and
obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of
the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
The controversy arose from the order of defendant,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein,
requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from
the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear
the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the
explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents
to comply with said order will result in the institution of the
necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order.
Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form,
from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in
part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly
and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all
the language in which such containers are marked, with the
words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants
less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated
February 16, 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to
print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words,
"This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed
by the above quoted provision of Law, and from taking any
action to enforce the above legal provision against the
plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled
milk products, pending the final determination of the case,
Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits.
On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General
brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to
the Supreme Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent court
in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in
view of the absence of any injunction or restraining order
from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until
their final disposition therein.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an
action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for
preliminary injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the
respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding
with FTB I.S. No. I . entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute
of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc."
pending final determination of Civil Case No. 52276. The
facts of this special civil action show that on December 7,
1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in their
individual capacities and in their capacities as Public
Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine Association
of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade
Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or
misbranding. Among other things, the complaint filed
include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any
statement sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as
"imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk. and
omitting to mark the immediate containers of their filled
milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with
other equivalent words as required under Section 169 of the
Tax Code. The Board proceeded to hear the complaint until it
received the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of First Instance on March 19, 1963.
Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and
Special Civil Action No. 52383 were heard jointly being
intimately related with each other, with common facts and
issues being also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the
respondent court issued its decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No. 52276:
(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring
plaintiffs to print on the labels of their filled milk products
the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age" or words with equivalent
import and declaring as nun and void and without authority
in law, the order of said defendant dated September 28,
1961, Annex A of the complaint, and the Ruling of the
Secretary of Finance, dated November 12, 1962, Annex G of
the complaint; and
In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board,
its agents or employees from continuing in the investigation
of the complaints against petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No.
2, or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the
petitioners of their filled milk products and declaring as null
the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent Board
on said complaints. (pp. 20- 21, Rollo).
From the above decision of the respondent court, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board
joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION 169
OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169
OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND THAT
COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO
ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER AUTHORITY TO
PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER
TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF FOOD
LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION,
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE
FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING,
MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT OF
FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5, Rollo).
The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the
Tax Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169 was
enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed
a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which
penalized the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the
specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169).
However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141
and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision,
without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax
Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific
and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and
"condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section,
would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in
whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is
restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they
follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the
"Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of
the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in
whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed.
Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not
condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried,
dessicated, to which has been added or which has been
blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk
fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance
of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore,
between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former,
the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty
part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or
safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed
milk and filled milk.
The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an
opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of
Section 169, it being a product distinct from those specified
in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk
has been replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as
fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the
Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section
169. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government
called upon to execute or implement administrative laws
command much respect and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central
Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-19337,
September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan, et. al. vs. The
Municipality of Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 887; Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-
12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).
This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is
suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. The
Petitioners themselves admitted that: "the filled milk
products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are
safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants
of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino
infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any
defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been
fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled
milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the
declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that
filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a
deprivation of property without due. process of law.
Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent
manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against
manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed
milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in
which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has been
removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The
enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents
only but not against other persons similarly situated as the
private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial
of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally
enforced, would similarly offend against the Constitution.
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).
As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of
Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost
its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax
purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his
authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his
predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were
repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph
IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the
parties, to wit:
... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the
specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the
enforcement of the requirement in regard to the placing of
the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject
which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the
said Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p.
102, Rollo).
Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to
enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code
which provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall
also "give effect to and administer the supervisory and police
power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is
untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police
power only when necessary in the enforcement of its
principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of
all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected
therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the
promotion of the health of the nation and is thus
unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive
function of the Food and Drug Administration of the
Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No.
3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720 provides:
Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug
Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to
hold hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters
touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate
processes of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to
subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator,
recommending food and drug standards for adoption. Said
Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly
within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe
assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The
decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and
Drug Administrator.
Section 26. ...
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be
conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which
shall submit recommendation to the Food and Drug
Administrator.
(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator
from the reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any
article of food or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to
Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall
cause notice thereof to be given to the person or persons
concerned and such person or persons shall be given an
opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the correctness
of the finding or charge in question.
(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to
the knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such
character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted
against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the
Secretary of Justice through the Secretary of Health,
together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board
of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary
evidence on which the charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the
Food and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution
pursuant to subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this
Act whenever he believes that public interest will be
adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.
The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that
petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair
Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to
prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or
misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on
the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the
Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also
intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted.
To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would
be the result were their instant petition granted, would only
cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce
confusion and conflict of official action which is neither
practical nor desirable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed en toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
8. Expressio unius et exclusio alterius
G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) assails
the July 19, 20001 and April 3, 2001 resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59139.
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and
other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount
of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency millers tax and
manufacturers sales tax,3 among other deficiency taxes,4 for
taxable year 1987. The deficiency millers tax was imposed
on SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals,
Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on
its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner
denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for
review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423.
In its March 10, 2000 decision, the CTA cancelled SPMCs
liability for deficiency manufacturers tax on the sales of corn
and edible oils but upheld the Commissioners assessment
for the deficiency millers tax. SPMC moved for the partial
reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the millers tax
assessment but it was denied.
SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review of the CTA decision insofar as it upheld
the deficiency millers tax assessment. In its July 19, 2000
resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
principal ground5 that the verification attached to it was
signed merely by SPMCs chief financial officer without
the corporate secretarys certificate, board resolution or
power of attorney authorizing him to sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping. SPMC sought a
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMCs
appeal?
SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given due
course since it substantially complied with the requirements
on verification and certification against forum shopping. It
insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the
merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3%
millers tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to
UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an
ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to
millers tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates
two exemptions from the millers tax: (a) the milled products
in their original state were actually exported by the miller
himself or by another person, and (b) the milled products
sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article by the buyer or
manufacturer of the milled products. The exportation may
be effected by the miller himself or by the buyer or
manufacturer of the milled products. Since UNICHEM, the
buyer of SPMCs milled products, subsequently exported
said products, SPMC should be exempted from the millers
tax.
The petition must fail.
Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from
the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which
lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.6
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a
sworn certification against forum shopping.7 Failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a
petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.8
A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred
upon it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied
by or are incidental to its existence through its board of
directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. 9 Hence,
physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board
of directors.10 In the absence of authority from the board of
directors, no person, not even the officers of the
corporation, can bind the corporation.11
SPMCs petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate that
the person who signed the verification/certification on non-
forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC merely relied
on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to
represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the
corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to
defend or protect it from assessments and to recover
erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power
of attorney, secretarys certificate or board resolution to
prove the affiants authority was attached to the petition.
Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the
petition lacked proper verification, it was to be treated as an
unsigned pleading subject to dismissal.12
In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court upheld the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition on the
ground that the verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by PET Plans, Inc.s first vice-president
for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any certification
that he was authorized to sign in behalf of the corporation.
In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court
ruled that the petition should be dismissed outright on the
ground that the verification/certification against forum
shopping was signed by BPI Leasing Corporations counsel
with no specific authority to do so. Since the counsel was
purportedly acting for the corporation, he needed a
resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically
authorized him to institute the petition and execute the
certification. Only then would his actions be legally binding
on the corporation.15
In this case, therefore, the appellate court did not commit an
error when it dismissed the petition on the ground that it
was signed by a person who had not been issued any
authority by the board of directors to represent the
corporation.
Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMCs claim of
substantial compliance or to its plea for a liberal application
of the rules. Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the
orderly administration of justice.16 Substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance such as
the requirement on non-forum shopping,17 as well as
verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.18
But even if the fatal procedural infirmity were to be
disregarded, the petition must still fail for lack of merit.
As the CTA correctly ruled, SPMCs sale of crude coconut oil
to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% millers tax. Section 168
of the 1987 Tax Code provided:
Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of
rope factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil
mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories.
Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and
mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and
desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to
three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the
rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch,
dessicated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by
them, including the by-product of the raw materials from
which said articles are produced, processed or
manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling
price or market value of these articles at the time they leave
the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this
tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-
product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured
and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil,
copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, shall be
removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported
without returning to the Philippines, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products: Provided further, That
where the planter or the owner of the raw materials is the
exporter of the aforementioned milled or manufactured
products, he shall be entitled to a tax credit of the miller's
taxes withheld by the proprietor or operator of the factory
or mill, corresponding to the quantity exported, which may
be used against any internal revenue tax directly due from
him: and Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, miller's
or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the
milling process shall not be allowed against the miller's tax
due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a
refined sugar factory as provided hereunder. (emphasis
supplied)
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the
1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to
the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-
products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original
state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article
or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or
by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide
that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials
enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of
products utilizing the said materials was covered by the
exemption. Since SPMCs situation was not within the ambit
of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% millers tax
imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
SPMCs proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope
of the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must
not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable
presumption is that the State has granted in express terms
all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is
limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be
intended beyond what was meant.19
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon
which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does
not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language
of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not
to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.21
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of
restrictive interpretation.22 Its application in this case is
consistent with the construction of tax exemptions
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMCs
claim for tax exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
9. Doctrine of casus omissus
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the
facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete
and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to
wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
in the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable
cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not
guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of
the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54.
A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp.
1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is
excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the
answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the
opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the
ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination
of this single question of law: Is a justice the peace included
in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any
province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of
the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force
and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid
any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a
election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited
section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.
No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or
take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code
omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission
revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices
of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to
be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or
qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such
modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace
were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein
were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of
the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration
because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic
and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by
any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance,
Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the
courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is
sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is
because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is
a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422).
According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions
according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace,
and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help
to justify and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582
enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which
was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768.
(Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a
relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be
shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4
amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature,
several amendments were made through the passage of
Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at
bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced
until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was
approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions
of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The
present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos.
599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in
1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the
history of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for
elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he
holds said public office to election at any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the
position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner
or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of being deprived of his office
and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever
for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing
provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election."
(Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace
provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any
municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of
his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold
any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5
years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall
not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified
of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31,
1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in
the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions
in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.
No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or
take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
(Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation
was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the
election. Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the
police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any
Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate
or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or
takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to
vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor
more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2
months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the
right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December
3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was
enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and
Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor
of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural
police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any
election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the
legislative development or history of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as
averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that
in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace"
were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180),
the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did
not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other
words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the
phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the
peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge,"
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology
would seem to justify the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep.
Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from
its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus"
already comprehended in the broader term "judge". to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the
effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more
particular application to statutes that should be strictly
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had
construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly
destroyed congressional records which might have offered
construed against the government since proceedings under
some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357
it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that
which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the
penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the
first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
state.
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and
additional clarifications from these records proved futile.
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict
background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the
reason hid equity. spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law
intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among
common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under
McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified
by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase,
defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
municipality. but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only
true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes
been a substitution of terms.
justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason
that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the
same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is
and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single
and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning
prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by
the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers. Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found
enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature
will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is
that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat
likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said
the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S.,
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule
of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal
is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
peace must be held to have been intentionally and
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District
the Revised Election Code.
court in the U.S. has well said:
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean
"casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the
such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning
omission has been clearly established. In the case under
intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature
which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v.
did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
Construction 56.)
political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, justices of the peace were just called As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States,
"judges." the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been
narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent
with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also
Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915)
25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein
is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the
officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the
prohibition under the old statute, are now within its
encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within
its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the
brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the
phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace",
found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to
include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges
but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace
or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the
peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge
thereof to engage in partisan political activities would
weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other
hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election
Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited
from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate
courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are
given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases
(See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are
authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion
cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates
for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in
election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate
situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein
is the fact that the administrative or executive department
has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did
not give due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others,
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as
justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note
that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner
was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election
Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House
Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that
proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace
are already expressly included among the officers enjoined
from active political participation. The argument is that with
the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly
acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of
the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No.
2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a
whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180.
In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-
codification of the existing election laws at the time that it
was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has
become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest
any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the
reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into
consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's
contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of
the peace from participating in partisan politics. They were
prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No.
1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by
the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed
the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com.
Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the
trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion
alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the
peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of
Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise
known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not
be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of
omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to
exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section
54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given
the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no
reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of
its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating
them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not
so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be
invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by
the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded
for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
10. Doctrine of last antecedent
MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T.
ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee.
Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants.
Ramon de los Reyes for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First
Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus against
respondent and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to
compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner
Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the
Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine
National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate
mortgage on certain properties.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts,
which reads as follows:
Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the
following facts:
1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank
in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, the same having been
incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2,
1954;.
2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real
properties;.
3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of
Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954,
in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No.
897 approved on June 20, 1953; and.
4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay
their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay
certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953,
refused to accept petitioner's offer to pay the said
indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate;
The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No.
879, which provides:
SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred, is
further amended to read:
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon
application of all persons specified in section one hereof and
within one year from the approval of this Act, and under
such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the
recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided
in section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment
shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total
amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and
certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the
Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance
without interest: Provided, That upon application and
subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by
the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be
issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole
or a part of the total salaries or wages the right to which has
been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the
face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not
exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the
payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the
approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may
directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches
or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by
the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to
any association or corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for
such settlement.
The question raised is whether the clause "who may be
willing to accept the same for settlement" refers to all
antecedents "the Government, any of its branches or
instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by
the Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any
citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines.
The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine
National Bank is that said qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it
refers only to the last antecedent.
Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of
Republic Act No. 879 was to include veterans of the
Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the
beneficiaries of the Backpay Law, Republic Act No. 304, in
recognition of their great sacrifices in the resistance
movement. as shown by the following quotation from the
Congressional Record:
. . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by
this public servant for three objectives: First, to serve as a
source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or
disabled veterans, and to their wives or orphans. Secondly,
to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the
last war, and particularly to those who have given their all
for the cause of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the
discrimination that has been committed either through
oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the
Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, and guerrillas or the
so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the resistance
movement. (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th
Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74; quoted in Appellant's
brief, pages 13-14.).
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before
the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said
phrase from the preceding ones.
But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done
by the appellee, still there are cogent and powerful reasons
why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last
antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance of the
backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association,
or corporation, which are not government entities or owned
or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of
Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount
to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by
compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory
note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very
much lower than the current or even the legal one.
The other reason is found in the Congressional Record,
which says:
Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and
"act", insert the word "amendatory".
Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?.
Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the
provision of section 2. I believe, gentleman from Cebu, that
section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the
use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations and
indebtedness in favor of the government. (Congressional
Record No. 64, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session May 11,
1953 page 41; quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.).
As there would have been no need to permit by law the use
of backpay certificates in payment of debts to private
persons, if they are willing to accept them, the permission
necessarily refers to the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies or other instrumentalities, etc.
Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that
many officials and employees of the Philippine Government,
who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have
already received their backpay certificates and used them for
the payment of the obligations to the Government and its
entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic
Act No. 304.
The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different from the present
one. In the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation was incurred on January 27, 1950. He
brought the action on November 10, 1950, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which was
approved on June 18, 1948; that is, one year and almost
eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of the
provisions of section 2 of Act No. 304, because said section
provides that the application for recognition of backpay must
have been filed within one year after the approval of said Act
No. 304, and the debt must be subsisting at the time of said
approval, Diokno having incurred the debt on January 27,
1950, and brought action on November 10, 1950. It was,
therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to accept or not his
backpay certificate in payment.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of
1948, held that the phrase "who may be willing to accept the
same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate
antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its
agencies.
The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice,
in his letter of June 19, 1953, remarked that the clause "who
may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all
antecedents, including the Government and its agencies. We
are not impressed with this observation of the Secretary, for
we believe that his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, correct
for the reasons we have stated above.
In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his
debt to the Philippine National Bank on January 2, 1953;
hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory
Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case
falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of
the Amendatory Act No. 897.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and the appellee is ordered to accept the backpay
certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B.
Florentino, in payment of his above cited debt to the
appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date
when he offered said backpay certificate in payment.
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
11. Reddendo singula singulis
G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161 January 21, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant
Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Norberto
P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Constancio S. Vitug for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani y Marinay
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, (a)
sentencing him to "life imprisonment" for the murder of Jose
Siyang and ordering him to indemnify the victim's heirs in
the sum of P6,000 and (b) further sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor for the attempted
murder of Eduardo Domingo and ordering him to indemnify
the victim in the sum of P2,000 (Crim. Cases Nos. II-192 and
II-198).
Issue as to dismissal of the appeal.After the appellant had
filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was
forty-seven days late. Appellant's counsel de oficio did not
oppose the motion. Action thereon was "deferred until this
case is considered on the merits". (Resolution of March 7,
1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellee's brief.
That preliminary question should first be resolved.
The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was
promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy thereof was
served on his counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1,
1963 he filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A
copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail on
July 13, 1963 on defendant's counsel through his wife. He
had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to
appeal (if the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal
should be computed from the date of notification and not
from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his
notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or forty eight
days from July 24th.
Silvestre B. Bello, defendant's counsel, filed a sworn
statement, accompanying the notice of appeal. In that
affidavit, he stated that the trial court's order, denying his
motion for reconsideration, although admittedly received by
his wife on July 13th, was never brought to his attention and
that he came to know of the order only on September 7th
when he verified the expediente of the case and discovered
that an order of denial had been issued. He averred that his
wife must have lost the envelope containing the order.
The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have
been submitted and that the defendant should have filed a
motion praying that the tardy appeal be given due course.
After considering the gravity of the two penalties imposed
on the accused and the earnest plea of defense counsel, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal without prejudice
to the right of the Solicitor General to "raise the question of
jurisdiction on the ground of a very much belated appeal".
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting
an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for
new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his
attorney.
The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It
connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The clear terms of
section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be
effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the
judgment.
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood
that import of section 6 (which is confirmed by the practice
in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for
reconsideration was filed on March 1st, which was the
fifteenth or last day of the reglementary period.
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be
counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the
decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by
registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation"
in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment"
(see section 6 of Rule 120), while the word "notice" should
be construed as referring to "order". That construction is
sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis:
"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression
to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the words should be taken distributively" (76
C. J. S. 175).
Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th
on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which
to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That
construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory
character of the rule governing appeals in civil cases which is
embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10,
1963, was fifty-eight days late. A regoristic application of
section 6 justifies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for
by the prosecution.
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review
of his case was lost by reason of his counsel's inadvertence
and considering further that the briefs have been submitted,
the Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any
possible miscarriage of justice (Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, 1
Cranch 135, 2 L. ed. 60, where Chief Justice Marshall
discussed the merits of a mandamus action although the
Court held that it had no power to issue that writ).
Uncontroverted facts.There is no dispute that sometime
after twilight on the night of June 11, 1953 in the place
called Centro at the commercial street of Angadanan,
Isabela, Jose Siyang (Syang), the town assistant sanitary
inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire. Death resulted
from internal hemorrhage caused by the following four (4)
through and through gunshot wounds which followed an
oblique direction from the point of entry to exit:
1. Entry, chest about 2- inches from level of the nipple.
Exit, at the back level of twelfth dorsal vertebrae to the right
side.
2. Entry, above right clavicle (suprasternal notch) middle
portion. Exit, at the back at the level of the right angle of
scapula.
3. Entry, anterior aspect of left shoulder. Exit, at the back of
shoulder about 2- inches from tip of armpit (left side).
4. Entry, anterior aspect of right forearm middle in slight
oblique direction from the point of entry to exit. (Exh. F.
Certificate issued by Pablo H. Gaffud, M.D.).
By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill
Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He sustained a through and
through wound in the palm of his right hand which caused
his confinement in the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June
11 to 22, 1953 (Exh. E, Certificate issued by J. L. Maddela, Sr.,
Resident Physician).
More than three years from the time that tragedy
transpired, or on October 2 and 3, 1956, appellant Tamani
signed and thumbmarked two sworn statements before the
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), wherein
he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and
Mayor Domingo; that his companion on the occasion of the
shooting was Domingo Cadawan; that on the morning of
June 11, 1953 he and Cadawan were dismissed as policemen
and that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, Matias de la Fuente
and Rufino de los Santos instigated him to liquidate Mayor
Domingo (Exh. A and B). The two statements are in English, a
language which Tamani understands (19 tsn II Valencia).
Inasmuch as the crimes, murder and attempted murder,
have been proven, meaning that the corpus delictihad been
established, and appellant Tamani had confessed having
committed the same, there should be an airtight case
against him. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction.An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (Same as See. 96,
Rule 123, 1940 Rules of Court).
Tamani's confession is corroborated by the undisputed
evidence of the corpus delicti.
However, during the trial, he repudiated his confession. He
assailed its voluntariness. He set up the defense of alibi.
Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang, the father of
the deceased Jose Siyang, he endeavored to prove that the
latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor She had just taken her supper. She and her daughter,
Tumaneng. Thus, a simple case, where the extrajudicial Emiteria Ibarra, were sitting on the veranda. It was while
confession is corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, chewing her buyo that Mrs. Ibarra heard somebody trip in
became controversial, complicated and perplexing. her yard on the cement floor intended as the base of a tank.
Almost simultaneously, she heard the grunting (ngik-ngik) of
her pig. When she trained her flashlight on the intruder and
Version of the prosecution.In addition to Tamani's
recognized Doro (appellant Tamani) with a gun and called
extrajudicial confession (Exh. A and B), the prosecution
him, the latter answered, "Tia" (Aunt).
offered the testimonies of complainant Domingo, Doctor
Pablo H. Gaffud, Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra, Emiteria Ibarra,
Ilustre D. Mendoza, Mariano G. Almeda, Teodoro Colobong Mrs. Ibarra saw that Teodoro Tamani passed under the eaves
and Martin Caniero. of her house, crossed the bamboo fence separating her from
the vacant lot of Pedro Pua and proceeded to the corner of
the vacant lot near the gate of galvanized iron sheets and the
The prosecution's evidence discloses that Domingo was the
edge of the cemented pavement which was in front of Pedro
mayor of Angadanan since 1947. Prior to June 11, 1953, he
Pua's store (see sketch, Exh. C). As appellant Tamani passed
was suspended from office by the Governor. During
the fence, he produced a "cracking noise". Emiteria Ibarra
Domingo's suspension, Villamor Tamani, the vice-mayor,
testified:
functioned as acting mayor. He appointed as policeman his
second cousin, appellant Teodoro Tamani who was then
twenty-four years old. The vice-mayor used to appoint Q. Who say (saw) Teodoro Tamani? A. My mother and
Teodoro Tamani as policeman whenever Domingo was myself, sir.
suspended. Teodoro Tamani resigned as policeman shortly
before June 11th. In the afternoon of June 10th, Domingo
Q. What was the appearance of Teodoro Tamani when you
was reinstated and he reassumed the office of mayor.
saw him after your mother lighted him with the light of the
flashlight? A. When my mother flashed the flashlight
The reinstatement of Domingo was obviously resented by towards him at the same time my mother called, "Doro" and
Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani because it meant the then he answered "TIA" and he was carrying a firearm, sir.
termination of his tenure as acting mayor. On June 10th
Teodoro Tamani and Domingo Cadawan (also a former
Q. Why do you know that when you and your mother heard
policeman like Teodoro Tamani) were summoned for a
the cracking of the fence Teodoro Tamani went inside the
conference by the vice-mayor to his house at Barrio Aniog,
fence? A. We know it because of the cracking of the
Angadanan. Present at the conference were the vice-mayor
fence, besides that we saw him proceeded towards the
and his men, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos. It
fence, sir.
was decided at that meeting that Mayor Domingo should be
liquidated. De la Fuente handed to Teodoro Tamani a
carbine. Q. After Teodoro Tamani entered that fence as you say, what
happened, if any? A. He proceeded towards the gate of
the Chinese, sir.
Appellant Tamani and Cadawan spent the night in the vice-
mayor's house. On the following morning of June 11th,
Cadawan was sent on a mission to the poblacion of Q. What happened, if any, after Teodoro Tamani went to that
Angadanan to ascertain the whereabouts of the quarry, gate? A. Upon arriving at the gate we heard the gun
Mayor Domingo. At around seven o'clock in the evening, reports, sir.
Cadawan returned to the vice-mayor's house and apprised
appellant Tamani that Domingo was in front of the store of Q. How many gun reports, if you remember? A. Maybe
Pedro Pua at the town's commercial street. eight (8) or nine (9), sir.
Cadawan and Teodoro Tamani proceeded with dispatch to
Q. Do you know where the gun reports came from? A.
the poblacion, making shortcuts by passing through the
Yes, sir, because I saw the sparks of the bullets when they
yards of neighboring houses. Tamani carried the carbine. On were fired, sir.
entering the yard of the house adjoining Pedro Pua's store,
Cadawan stumbled. The resulting noise attracted the
Q. Did you know who fired? A. I know, sir.
attention of the owner of the house, Mrs. Ibarra, who
focused a flashlight at Tamani and, on recognizing him,
uttered his nickname, Doro. She had known Doro since Q. Who? A. Teodoro Tamani, because he was the only one
childhood. She saw that he was carrying a gun. who entered with a gun, sir (74-75 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
Q. Who fired? A. Teodoro Tamani, sir.
Q. Why do you say that he was the one who fired? A.
Because the gun reports came from the place where he
stood at the gate, sir (77 tsn Jan. 16, 1959).
From the place where Cadawan and Tamani had positioned
themselves, they had a good view, through the holes of the
gate, of Mayor Domingo and his group in front of Pua's store
(Exh. A). The mayor was engaged in conversation with a
group of persons on the cemented pavement ( pasillo of
sidewalk) in the front of the store in Centro at the town's
commercial street. Standing near the wall of the store were
Hermoso Alicam, Liberato Tanam, Primitivo Tallog, Martin
Caniero, Toedoro Colobong, Gaspar Ibarra, Francisco Siyang
and Gonzalo Siyang. Mayor Domingo was standing in front of
the group, walking and gesticulating as he talked. Jose Siyang
was leaning against a post somewhat apart from the group
(Exh. C, 6 tsn March 3, 1959).
Mayor Domingo was recounting his experience in Manila
during his suspension. He was standing on the culvert which
bridged the canal separating the pasillo and the street (See
Exh. C). As he talked, he gestured and swung his hands up
and down with palms open, facing Pua's store and his
audience. Jose Siyang, who was apart from the group of
listeners, was about two to three meters on Mayor
Domingo's right, leaning one of the post which supported
the roof shading the pasillo or cemented pavement. Jose
Siyang was in line with Mayor Domingo while, in contrast,
the group of listeners was standing side by side close to the
galvanized iron wall of the store, facing Mayor Domingo who
was telling stories.
In the meanwhile, Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan were
standing on the vacant lot in close proximity to the gate of
galvanized iron sheets where the pasillo ended. Cadawan
opened a hole in the gate, about three inches in diameter,
through which Teodoro Tamani inserted the barrel of the
carbine. Tamani fired at Mayor Domingo who was the target.
Jose Siyang, a second cousin of Teodoro Tamani, like Vice-
Mayor Tamani, "was farther on the right side of Mayor
Domingo along the line of fire" (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani
fired two volleys. Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter saw from the
veranda the flashes of fire emitted by the carbine of Teodoro
Tamani.<re||an1w> They left the veranda and went
inside the house.
At the moment the first volley of gunshots was fired, which
was between seven and seven-thirty, Mayor Domingo had
raised his right hand. The palm of his right hand was hit. Jose
Siyang was also hit. Domingo and his listeners dispersed and
sought refuge inside Pua's store. While Domingo ran for
cover, a second volley was fired. The volley's came from
behind the iron gate on the vacant lot or "from the
southwest end" of the cemented pavement behind the gate.
While inside the store, Mayor Domingo heard the moaning
of someone in an agony of pain. That person turned out to
be Jose Siyang who had sustained four gunshot wounds and
was hovering between life and death. Siyang died before
eleven o'clock that same night.
Constabulary soldiers and peace officers arrived at the scene
of the shooting and conducted an investigation. Mayor
Domingo was taken to the provincial hospital. Doctor Gaffud
conducted an autopsy on the body of Jose Siyang in the
municipal building. On the following day empty shells were
found by the Constabulary soldiers near the galvanized iron
gate (6 tsn. III Calixto).
Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan left the scene of the shooting.
They ran, passing the same route that they had taken in
coming, and went direct to the house of Vice-Mayor
Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. Teodoro Tamani stayed
overnight in the house of the vice-mayor. Cadawan, who
reported to the vice-mayor that Mayor Domingo was dead,
proceeded to Barrio Clakcab and returned the murder
weapon to Matias de la Fuente.
The trial court accepted the foregoing version as the basis of
the judgment of conviction. It noted that in 1956 when NBI
Agent Mariano G. Almeda arranged a confrontation between
Teodoro Tamani and Mrs. Ibarra, she identified him as the
person whom she saw in her yard in the evening of June 11,
1953. During the confrontation, Tamani trembled, became
pale and remained silent.
Teodoro Tamani sometime after the shooting went into
hiding at Cabagan and Santo Tomas, Isabela, where he was
arrested by Mayor Domingo by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 245 and 246 of the justice of
the peace court of Angadanan (Exh. 3, 4, 5 and 6, 11 tsn
March 3, 1959). Appellant went into hiding although his wife
was about to deliver her baby.
As to the motive for shooting Mayor Domingo, Teodoro
Tamani explained that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, his
second cousin, ordered the liquidation of the mayor so that
he could not assume office and the vice-mayor would
become mayor (Exh. A). Appellant Tamani was chosen to
execute that task because he had lost his job as policeman
Siyang and invited him for a walk. Francisco Siyang followed
when Mayor Domingo was reinstated (Exh. A, p. 2).
On the other hand, Mayor Domingo said that when Teodoro
Tamani was still a policeman, the mayor had scolded him for
not reporting for work and for working as cook of Vice-
Mayor Villamor Tamani and plowing his field. The other
motive was that since Teodoro Tamani is a relative of the
vice-mayor, who was a "political enemy" of the mayor, he
(appellant Tamani) could act as a policeman when the vice-
mayor became mayor after the elimination of the incumbent
mayor (11 tsn March 3, 1959).
On the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness, Mrs. Ibarra,
the trial judge made the following findings:
The Court concentrated attention on the attitude and
observed the gestures, features, demeanor and manner of
testifying and the emphasis, gestures and inflection of the
voice of prosecution witness Juana Vitorri de Ibarra during
all the time she was on the witness stand in the direct and
cross-examination, and her answers were prompt, concise,
responsive to interrogatories, outspoken, and entirely devoid
of evasion or any semblance of shuffling, and her entire
testimony was given with calm, self-possession, an erect
front, and unhesitating accent. The Court is convinced of her
sincerity and credibility and the truthfulness of her
testimony, in great contrast with defendant's manner of
testifying. (pp. 859-60, Record).
The trial court concluded that the intended victim was
Mayor Domingo and not Jose Siyang.
Appellant's version and contentions.In this appeal
appellant's counsel de oficio argues that the trial court erred
(1) in disbelieving Tamani's alibi; (2) in assuming that his
extrajudicial confession was voluntary; (3) in not giving
credence to the testimony of defense witness Francisco
Siyang, that his son, Jose Siyang, was shot by Policemen
Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng; (4) in giving credence
to circumstantial evidence, and (5) in the alternative, in not
holding that appellant Tamani committed the complex crime
of homicide with lesiones grave.
Appellant Tamani, having abjured his confession, gave the
following version of the case by means of his testimony and
the testimony of his other witness, Francisco Siyang(Syang):
Francisco Siyang was the father of Jose Siyang, the town
sanitary inspector, who with his wife and four children,
resided with Francisco Siyang at his house in Centro,
Angadanan. Francisco Siyang is an uncle of Vice-Mayor
Villamor Tamani. At around six-thirty in the evening of June
11, 1953 Venancio Respicio dropped at the house of Jose
his son to the store of Pedro Pua which was around four
blocks from their house.
Francisco Siyang noticed that Jose Siyang was in front of
Pua's store with Mayor Domingo, Policemen Alfonso Gomez,
Gaspar Ibarra, Graciano Manguelod and Melchor Tumaneng,
teachers Primitivo Tallog, Teodoro Colobong and Martin
Caniero, Mariano Dalodad (a barber) and Juaning Aliangan, a
farmer. Jose Siyang was leaning against a post, obliquely at
the right of Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang allegedly
approached Jose and told him that his wife and children
were waiting for him so that they could take supper. Jose
answered "yes, father".
While Francisco Siyang and Jose Siyang were standing side
by side in front of Pua's store, Mayor Domingo made a signal
by stretching and raising his hand with open palm and
bringing it down. Suddenly, Policeman Ibarra, who was
standing in front of Jose Siyang, fired his carbine at the latter,
hitting Jose Siyang in the chest. Policeman Tumaneng
followed by firing with his carbine successive shots at Jose
Siyang, hitting the latter in the breast. Tumaneng was on the
right side of Ibarra, obliquely facing Jose Siyang.
After Jose Siyang fell, Francisco Siyang went to his succor and
raised him. Jose Siyang told his father: "Father, I am dying,
my children." When Jose Siyang was brought to the
municipal building, he was breathing feebly. He could not
talk anymore. He expired in the municipal building. His body
was brought home by Francisco Siyang.
In the morning of June 12th, Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani
with some Constabulary soldiers arrived at the house of
Francisco Siyang while the remains of Jose Siyang still lay in
state. After the burial of Jose Siyang in the afternoon, a
Constabulary sergeant investigated Francisco Siyang and
took him to Ilagan, where he was further investigated. He
gave a sworn statement accusing Ibarra and Tumaneng of
having killed Jose Siyang (Exh. 1).
On the basis of that statement, a criminal complaint for the
murder of Jose Siyang was filed on June 20, 1953 by
Constabulary Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales in the justice of
the peace court of Angadanan against Venancio Respicio and
Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod (Exh. 2, Crim.
Case No. 244). The complaint was dismissed on August 12,
1953.
Other complaints for the murder of Jose Siyang and for
frustrated murder perpetrated on Mayor Domingo were filed
in the justice of the peace court against Villamor Tamani,
Teodoro Tamani, Domingo Cadawan, Rufino de los Santos
and Matias de la Fuente but they were later dismiss (Exh. 3
to 6, Crim. Cases Nos. 245 and 246).
In October, 1956 Mariano G. Almeda of the NBI headed a
team of agents that investigated the shooting of Jose Siyang
and Mayor Domingo. Francisco Siyang was investigated
orally in Ilagan by Almeda. The investigation was interrupted
by former Congressman Samuel Reyes. It was not finished.
Appellant Tamani, in support of his alibi, testified that Jose
Siyang was his second cousin. Tamani was a resident of
Centro in the poblacion of Angadanan. At around three
o'clock in the afternoon of June 11, 1953 he was in the
house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. He
wanted a recommendation for a job in the Angadanan
Sawmill. The place known as Centro in the poblacion, where
Pedro Pua's store is located, is around two kilometers from
Barrio Aniog. Vice-Mayor Tamani gave to Teodoro Tamani
the recommendation between four and five o'clock. The
vice-mayor prevailed upon Teodoro Tamani to stay and they
agreed to go to town on the following day.
So, Teodoro Tamani slept in the house of his cousin, the vice-
mayor, on the night of June 11th. On the morning of June
12th, Vice-Mayor Tamani and Teodoro Tamani went together
to Centro in the poblacion. When they reached Centro, they
learned of Jose Siyang's death, for which reason they viewed
his body in the house of Francisco Siyang. They arrived at
Siyang's house at around eight and eight-thirty in the
morning. They learned that Jose Siyang was shot in front of
Pedro Pua's store.
Teodoro Tamani did not go to the Angadanan Sawmill on
June 12th. He delivered the letter of recommendation on
June 13th to the manager of the sawmill. He worked in the
sawmill as laborer for two weeks only. He resigned due to
the heavy work. He could not remember the name of the
manager of the sawmill.
He denied that he shot Jose Siyang and Mayor Domingo. He
did not participate in the commission of the crime. He said
that he was in the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani on the night
of June 11th.
On October 2, 1956 NBI Agent Almeda picked him up from
his house for questioning in connection with the shooting of
Siyang and Mayor Domingo. Almeda was accompanied by
Alfonso Salvador, a Constabulary soldier. Tamani was brought
to the municipal building. From there, he was taken to
Ilagan. He was brought by Almeda to the provincial jail at
Calamagui, Isabela, where he (Tamani) was delivered to
Pedro Tamayo, a prisoner who was acted as mayor of the cell
(brigada). Tamani was formally received by the provincial
guard from Almeda at around six and six-thirty in the
evening of October 2nd.
Upon delivering Tamani to Tamayo, Almeda allegedly told
Tamayo: "Bahala kayo rian, Tamayo, at ako ang bahala sa
iyo". Twenty minutes later, Pedro Tamayo, Juanito Dassig,
Juan Pecano, Ernesto Castaeda and other convicts started
maltreating Tamani. The alleged maltreatment consisted of
the following:
First, they ordered Tamani to squat on the cemented floor
inside the cell (brigada).
Second, after squatting on the cement floor, they ordered
Tamani to stand and then started boxing him for one hour.
Third, they removed all his clothings and put Tamani inside a
drum where prisoners dropped their human waste. He was
required to stay inside the drum for five minutes, after which
they brought him out and poured on him water to was his
body from the human waste.
Fourth, they made Tamani pulverized pepper and they
placed the pulverized pepper in his anus, penis and testicles.
Tamani was maltreated because the tormentors wanted him
to admit that he was the one who shot Jose Siyang and
Mayor Domingo. As he could not endure the maltreatment
he admitted he had shot Siyang and Domingo. The
maltreatment was stopped after he made the admission.
Around ten to ten-thirty on that same night, Almeda
returned to the jail and asked Tamayo: "Does he admit
now?" Tamayo answered in the affirmative. Almeda then
took Tamani out of the jail and brought him to the second
floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda called for NBI Agent No.
101 who came out of a room with a typewriter. Agent No.
101 placed his typewriter on a table. Almeda told Tamani
"Now, I am going to take your statement that you shot Jose
Siyang and Mayor Domingo."
At first Tamani told Almeda that he knew nothing about the
shooting because he was in Barrio Aniog when Domingo and
Siyang were shot. Thereupon, Almeda told Tamani not to
deny the shooting because Juana Vitorri Vda. de Ibarra
recognized him when he stumbled before the shooting at a
place near the fence between the lots of Pedro Pua and Mrs.
Ibarra. Tamani maintained his innocence about the shooting.
Thereafter, Almeda and NBI Agent No. 101 slapped the face
of Tamani. They brought him to a toilet. They pushed his
head into the toilet bowl (iniodoro). They held his hair and
pushed his face toward the mouth of the toilet bowl for five
minutes. When Tamani could not endure the torture
anymore, he told Almeda that he would admit the crime.
Almeda and Agent No. 101 brought Tamani to the table on
the second floor of Puring's Restaurant. Almeda told Tamani:
"You better admit now that you shot the two victims, that
you took the gun from Matias de la Fuente and that Villamor
Tamani and Rufino de los Santos are the masterminds".
Tamani admitted that version for fear that he would again be
maltreated. His affidavit, Exhibit A, was signed at Puring's
Restaurant on the night of October 2, 1956. The contents of
Exhibit A "are all the versions of Director Almeda". Tamani
admitted his signature and thumbmarks in Exhibit A. On the
following morning of October 3rd, Almeda and Agent No.
101 brought back Tamani to the jail.
Tamani admits that he signed Exhibit B also, his
supplementary confession. However, he insists that he
signed it on the night of October 2nd and not on October
3rd. He said that he never excluded Domingo Cadawan and
that he never incriminated himself as the triggerman. He
might have signed Exhibit B in connection with his signing of
Exhibit A on the night of October 2nd because when he
signed Exhibit A, there were several sheets of paper which
he signed and thumbmarked. He allegedly did not know the
contents of Exhibit B when he affixed his signature thereon.
He says that the incriminatory statements in Exhibits A and B
are not true. (See pp. 3-4, 17-28, Appellant's Brief).
The trial court rejected the foregoing version of the defense
after noting the improbabilities in Francisco Siyang's
testimony and after concluding that the appellant had not
overcome the presumption that his confession was
voluntarily executed.
The shooting incident was undoubtedly another episode in
the political rivalry between Mayor Domingo and Vice-Mayor
Tamani. That circumstance has given a political complexion
to these two cases. It may explain why the evidence has
become muddled, if not baffling. It was to be expected that,
to suit the ulterior motivations of the contending parties
there would be same insidious manipulation of the evidence.
Thus, on June 12th, the day following the shooting and
before Jose Siyang was interred, Constabulary soldiers,
accompanied by Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, investigated
Francisco Siyang (51-52 tsn Aug. 26, 1960). On June 14,
1953, or four days after the shooting and while Mayor
Domingo was in the hospital, Francisco Siyang (the uncle of
Villamor Tamani and the star witness for the defense and the
father of the victim, Jose Siyang) executed an affidavit in
Ilagan about the shooting. He made it appear in that
statement that Patrolmen Ibarra and Tumaneng, two
followers of Mayor Domingo, were the killers of Jose Siyang
and that they commenced to shoot Siyang when Mayor
Domingo made a prearranged signal (Exh. 1).
As already noted, on the basis of that affidavit, Constabulary
Lieutenant Tomas P. Gonzales filed in the justice of the peace
court of Angadanan a complaint for murder against
Policemen Ibarra, Tumaneng and Manguelod and one
Venancio Respicio, an alleged nephew of the mayor (Exh. 2,
Crim. Case No. 244). According to Francisco Siyang's
affidavit, Respicio, a compadre of Jose Siyang, acted as decoy
in bringing Jose Siyang to the place where he was
brought to the house of Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra? A. In
assassinated. Domingo repeatedly denied that Respicio was
his relative by consanguinity or affinity. Francisco Siyang
made it appear that his son was murdered because he
testified against Domingo in the case where the latter was
charged with theft. Because of that theft case Domingo was
suspended. That murder complaint (Exh. 2) against the
followers of Mayor Domingo was dismissed.
After the mayor was released from the hospital, he and the
chief of police investigated the shooting. The chief of the
police filed a complaint for murder dated July 8, 1953 against
Vice-Mayor Tamani, Teodoro Tamani, Rufino de los Santos,
Matias de la Fuente, Arsenio Dayang and Medardo
Tamani.<re||an1w> The complaint was amended by
including Domingo Cadawan as a defendant and excluding
Dayang and Medardo Tamani (Exh. 3 and 4, Crim. Case No.
245). For the shooting of Mayor Domingo, a complaint for
frustrated murder was filed by the chief of police against the
same persons (Exh. 5 and 6, Crim. Case No. 246).
Both complaints were dismissed apparently for lack of
evidence. As the shooting was unsolved crime, the
intervention of the NBI became necessary.
On June 4, 1956 Francisco Siyang executed an affidavit in
Ilagan before NBI Agent No. 39. He deviated from his 1953
affidavit by naming Melchor Tumaneng alone ("Melchor
Tomines") as the assassin of his son, Jose Siyang. He stuck to
his original theory that Mayor Domingo masterminded the
assassination of his son (Exh. G).
As already noted, four months later, or on October 2 and 3,
1956, an NBI investigating team headed by Mariano G.
Almeda, a lawyer and an assistant to the NBI Director,
secured a confession from appellant Teodoro Tamani that
he, with the assistance of Domingo Cadawan, shot Mayor
Domingo and Jose Siyang (Exh. A and B). It may be assumed
that the NBI was asked to handle the case so that political
considerations would not color and influence the course and
outcome of the investigation.
Before Tamani executed his confession, Almeda and his
agents, assisted by Constabulary soldiers, interviewed
several persons in Angadanan and made an ocular inspection
of the scene of the crime. They investigated Mrs. Ibarra and
her daughter. They learned that Teodoro Tamani had entered
Mrs. Ibarra's yard and was recognized by her and that,
immediately thereafter, she heard gunshots from the
direction where Tamani had posted himself. Thus, Tamani
became a prime suspect. He was apprehended and brought
to the house of Mrs. Ibarra for a confrontation. Almeda
testified:
Q. What did you do, if any, when Teodoro Tamani was
the presence of Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her
daughter I confronted them and asked Juana Vittori Vda. de
Ibarra and her daughter whether they knew Teodoro Tamani
and both claimed that he is the very same fellow who
entered the yard that night with a gun and also they heard
shots from the direction of the said accused Teodoro Tamani
after which Teodoro Tamani was trembling and he became
pale.
Q. And did Teodoro Tamani say anything when he was
pointed out by Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra and her
daughter? A. He did not utter anything. He simply became
pale and trembling. (16 tsn June 12, 1958, II Valencia).
Tamani's confession (Exh. A and B) was the basis of the
information for murder and frustrated murder against him in
these two cases.
Findings: Appellant Tamani's defense of alibi, which can be
fabricated with facility, cannot be given serious
consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the
afternoon and night of June 11th, it was physically possible
for him to be at the scene of the shooting at the time that it
was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor
Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers
from the store of Pedro Pua. The victim was shot in front of
the store.
The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such
as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused
at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. "The accused must show that he was
at some other place for such period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the place where the
crime was committed at the time of its commission" (People
vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 2 SCRA 764, 768).
Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement.
Moreover, it was not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or
by any other person. Its concocted character is manifest.
Appellant Tamani argues that he signed his confession,
Exhibit A, because he was tortured or maltreated. He claim
that he does not remember having signed his supplementary
confession (Exh. B) although he admits the authenticity of
his signature and thumbmark therein.
NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that Tamani's
sworn statements were freely executed. Tamani's testimony
on the alleged maltreatment was not corroborated. As
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, certain details in the
confession, which only Tamani could have supplied, are
indications of its voluntariness and give it spontaneity and
coherence.
Those details are (a) that Teodoro Tamani and Cadawan
conferred with Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in the latter's
house at Aniog at three o'clock in the afternoon of the day
preceding the shooting; (b) that Matias de la Fuente and
Rufino de los Santos were present at the conference and it
was decided to liquidate Mayor Domingo to enable the vice
mayor to act as mayor; (c) that De la Fuente handed to
Tamani and Cadawan the carbine to be used in the killing; (d)
that Cadawan and Tamani slept in the vice-mayor's house on
the night of June 10, 1953; (e) that Cadawan went to the
poblacion in the morning of June 11th in order to ascertain
the whereabouts of Mayor Domingo; (f) that Cadawan
returned in the afternoon and informed Tamani that
Domingo was at Pua's store; (g) that Cadawan stumbled in
the yard of Mrs. Ibarra; (h) that after firing the shots, the two
returned to the vice-mayor's house; (i) that Teodoro Tamani
slept in the house of the vice-mayor after the assassination;
(j) that Jose Siyang was standing on the right side of Mayor
Domingo "along the line of fire"; (k) that Jose Siyang was his
second cousin and the second cousin of the vice-mayor and
(l) that the hole in the gate was three inches in diameter.
Those circumstances might not have been known if the
confession had been executed under duress. NBI Agents
Almeda and Mendoza could not have manufactured all these
details.
There is one significant inconsistency in appellant Tamani's
testimony on March 26, 1962 which impairs his credibility.
He claimed that his supplementary confession, Exh. B, was
translate to him in Tagalog but that he did not understand
Tagalog on or before October 3, 1956 (117 tsn I Valencia).
However, when he testified on January 11, 1962 and he was
asked to repeat what NBI Agent Almeda told in Tagalog to
the prisoner, Pedro Tamayo, Tamani was able to repeat
verbatim the word: "Bahala kayo rian Tamayo at ako ang
bahala sa iyo" (83 tsn II Calixto). He repeated the same
Tagalog words in the later part of his testimony (86 tsn) and
at the hearing on April 5, 1962 (127 tsn I Valencia).
Agent Almeda testified that appellant Tamani understands
English, being a former policeman, and that Tamani read
Exhibit B, which is in English and which NBI Agent Mendoza
translated to him in Ilocano. Tamani did not deny that he
knows English. His petition to this Court that he be granted
bail, which petition bears his signature, is in English.
(See Rollo).
There is no merit in appellant Tamani's contention that the
trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of
Francisco Siyang (Syang) that Jose Siyang was shot by
policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng, the latter being allegedly a
houseboy of Mayor Domingo. The inconsistencies on vital
details in Siyang's two affidavits and his testimony signify
that he deliberately perverted the truth. His testimony
exhibits the earmarks of untrustworthiness. It was squarely
refuted by Martin Caniero and Teodoro Colobong. It should
be underscored that Francisco Siyang is the uncle of the vice-
mayor (58 tsn Aug. 26, 1960).
In his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1) he declared that Policemen
Ibarra and Tumaneng shot his son, Jose Siyang, whereas, in
his 1965 affidavit (Exh. G) he alleged that only Tumaneng
(Tomines) shot his son.
Francisco Siyang, a farmer, was already seventy-six years old
when he testified in 1960. On direct examination he testified
that his son was shot in the breast by Gaspar Ibarra, who
was immediately followed by Melchor Tumaneng. Tumaneng
allegedly hit Jose Siyang in the left part of the breast below
the clavicle (48 tsn I Valencia). That was also Francisco
Siyang's declaration in his 1953 affidavit (Exh. 1): that Ibarra
fired first.
However, Francisco Siyang on cross-examination testified
differently. He declared that Tumaneng fired first and that
the second shot was fired by Ibarra. Francisco Siyang said
that he was sure that Tumaneng fired first at his son (89, 92,
93 tsn I Valencia). The following is an example of his
confusing testimony:
Q. How many shots did Gaspar Ibarra fire at your son? A.
Only one, sir.
Q. Who fired the two first shots, if you know? A. Melchor
Tumaneng, sir.
Q. Did you actually see or not the two successive shots at
your son? A. I saw him, sir.
Q. Who fired the other two shots which according to you
your son was hit by five (5) gunshots A. Gaspar Ibarra, sir.
Q. Do you mean to say that Gaspar Ibarra fired first one shot
and then two shots, all in all three shots? A. Gaspar Ibarra
fired only one, sir. (93 tsn I Valencia).
Q. Who was the first who shot your son, according to you?
A. Melchor Tumaneng.
Q. Where was Melchor Tumaneng at the moment he shot
you? A. He was at the gate of the fence.
Q. But he was inside with the group of persons at the media
de agua of the store of Pedro Pua. Is it? A. Yes, sir (21 tsn I
Calixto).
NBI Agent Almeda, after investigating Francisco Siyang,
found his theory incredible. Almeda did not believe that
Francisco Siyang could have seen or identified the assailant
who was behind the fence. According to Almeda, Francisco
Siyang merely suspected certain person as the killers of his
son. He could not identify positively the killers.
Other grave inconsistencies in Francisco Siyang's affidavits
and testimony are discussed in the trial court's decision.
Appellant Tamani further contends that the trial court erred
in relying on thirteen circumstances in order to convince
itself that Tamani was the culprit. Among those
circumstances are that Tamani went into hiding sometime
after the shooting and that the motive for the attempted
murder of Mayor Domingo was to prevent his reinstatement
and to enable the vice-mayor to become permanent mayor
and ensure that appellant Tamani would again become a
policemen.
Judge Pedro C. Quinto's painstaking analysis of the evidence
and his conscientious scrutiny of the discrepancies in the
testimony and affidavits of Francisco Siyang demonstrate
that the guilt of Tamani has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. A thorough perusal of the record leads to the
conclusion that the trial court did not commit the errors
imputed to it by the appellant.
The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least
expectation on his part that he would be assaulted, is
murder because of the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery (alevosia). Appellant Tamani
deliberately employed a mode of execution which tended
directly and specially to ensure the consummation of the
killing without any risk to himself arising from the defense
which the victim could have made (Par. 16, Art. 14, Revised
Penal Code). Siyang, unarmed and without any intimation
that the gunshots intended for Mayor Domingo would hit
him, was not in a position to defend himself against the
unseen assailant. Treachery may be appreciated even if
there was a mistake as to the victim (People vs. Mabug-at,
51 Phil. 967; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307).
As to Mayor Domingo, the accused was not able to perform
all the acts of execution which would consummate the killing
(Art. 6, Revised Penal Code). The accused was not able to do
so, not because of his spontaneous desistance but because
he failed to inflict on the mayor a mortal wound. The mayor
was able to avoid the second volley by taking refuge in the
store of Pedro Pua. But there is no doubt that the accused
was animated by the intent to kill and that the shooting was
perpetrated in a treacherous manner. Hence, the offense
against the mayor is attempted murder (People vs. Kalalo, 59
Phil. 715).
The alternative contention of appellant Tamani that should
be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones
graves is not well-taken. As already pointed out, the killing of
Siyang cannot be characterized as homicide. It was qualified
by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the
mayor. So, the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as
a mere physical injury. It was overt act manifesting the willful
design of the accused to liquidate the mayor.
The infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and
of the wound in the palm of the mayor's right hand was not
the result of a single act.<re||an1w> The injuries were
the consequences of two volley of gunshots. Hence, the
assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be categorized as a
complex crime.
To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder with
attempted murder would result in the imposition of the
death penalty. That eventuality would be worse for him.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on the
appellant for the killing of Siyang. (Arts. 64 [1] and 248,
Revised Penal Code). The use of the term "life
imprisonment" is not proper (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Zaldivar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Barredo, J., took no part.
12. Use of shall and may
G.R. No. L-35910 July 21, 1978
PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN
THAT and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul
the orders of respondent Judge of August 4, 1971, October
30, 1971 and March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent
Judge to decide petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis of
the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City
Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already
submitted by the petitioner and respondents.
Since only questions of law were raised therein, the Court of
Appeals, on October 13, 1972, issued a resolution certifying
said case to this Court pursuant to Section 17, paragraph (4)
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are as
follows:
It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee
filed an ejectment suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in
the City Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioner. A
decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970,
which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the
respondent Court and docketed therein as Civil Case No. C-
2036.
During the pendency of the appeal the respondent court
issued on March 23, 1971 an order which reads:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of
Court of Caloocan City, is hereby directed to transmit to this
Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the
hearing of this case before the City Court of Caloocan City,
and likewise, counsels for both parties are given thirty (30)
days from receipt of this order within which to file their
respective memoranda, and thereafter, this case shall be
deemed submitted for decision by this Court.
which order was apparently received by petitioner on April
17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been
forwarded to the respondent court, petitioner filed on May
5, 1971 a 'MOTION EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM
WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION
OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN
DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY
COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY' which was granted by
respondent court on May 7, 1971. However, before the
petitioner could receive any such notice from the
respondent court, the respondent Judge issued an order on
August 4, 1971 which says:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her
appeal the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on
September 28, 1971, citing as a ground the granting of his
ex-parte motion to submit memorandum within 30 days
from notice of the submission of the stenographic notes
taken before the City Court. Private respondents filed their
opposition to the motion on September 30,1971. In the
meantime, on October 20,1971, petitioner filed her
memorandum dated October 18, 1971. On October 30, 1971
the respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Then on January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion for leave
to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972. Hence
this petition.
The sole inquiry in the case at bar can be stated thus:
Whether, in the light of the provisions of the second
paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant
to submit on nine the memorandum mentioned in the same
paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to
dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute; or,
whether it is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to
decide the appealed case on the basis of the evidence and
records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to
submit a memorandum on time notwithstanding.
The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296,
otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the
city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested ... . (Emphasis supplied).
it on the merits, not by dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for
doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And
as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties,
the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the
submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses
not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance
is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis
of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or
municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not
empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure
of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is
the Court's mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis
of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24,
1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the
Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case
either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or
brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on
request.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not
essential requirements. They may be submitted and/or
made only if so requested.
Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and
dangerous as it may defeat the litigant's right to appeal
granted to him by law. In the case of Republic vs. Rodriguez
(L-26056, May 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 378) this Court
underscored "the need of proceeding with caution so that a
party may not be deprived of its right to appeal except for
weighty reasons." Courts should heed the rule
in Municipality of Tiwi, Albay vs. Cirujales
(L-37520, Dec. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 390, 395), thus:
The appellate court's summary dismissal of the appeal even
before receipt of the records of the appealed case as
ordered by it in a prior mandamus case must be set aside as
having been issued precipitously and without an opportunity
to consider and appreciate unavoidable circumstances of
record not attributable to petitioners that caused the delay
in the elevation of the records of the case on appeal.
In the instant case, no notice was received by petitioner
about the submission of the transcript of the stenographic
notes, so that his 30-day period to submit his memorandum
would commence to run. Only after the expiration of such
period can the respondent Judge act on the case by deciding
WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4, 1971, OCTOBER 30, 1971 AND
MARCH 15, 1971 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID
AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO
DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.
Muoz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J, concurring:
I concur with the setting aside of the questioned dismissal of
petitioner's appeal on the ground that the record shows
quite clearly that there was no failure on part of petitioner-
appellant to prosecute her appeal in respondent judge's
court. Petitioner had been granted in respondent judge's
Order of May 7, 1971, 30 days from notice of submission of
the transcripts within which to file her memorandum on
appeal, yet her appeal was dismissed per his Order of August
4, 1971 for alleged failure to prosecute (by failure to file the
memorandum) even before she had received any such
notice. Upon receipt of the dismissal order, petitioner had
promptly moved for reconsideration and filed her
memorandum on appeal.
I am not prepared at this stage to concur with the ratio analogous provisions of Rule 50, section 1 for dismissal of
decidendi of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar appeal by the higher appellate courts and taking into
that the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the account that Rule 40, section 9 of the Rules of Court now
appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his expressly authorizes the court of first instance to dismiss an
memorandum, but rather it is the Court's mandatory duty to appeal before it "for failure to prosecute."
decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and
records transmitted to it." I entertain serious doubts about
such pronouncement, once when the court of first instance
"requests" the party-appellant to submit a memorandum or
brief on appeal under the provisions of Republic Act No.
6031 amending section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, such
"request" is tantamount to a requirement for the proper
prosecution of the appeal; thus, when the appellant willfuly
fails to file such memorandum or brief, the judge should be
empowered to dismiss the appeal, applying suppletorily the
analogous provisions of Rule 50, section 1 for dismissal of
appeal by the higher appellate courts and taking into
account that Rule 40, section 9 of the Rules of Court now
expressly authorizes the court of first instance to dismiss an
appeal before it "for failure to prosecute."

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J, Concurring:

I concur with the setting aside of the questioned dismissal of

petitioner's appeal on the ground that the record shows
quite clearly that there was no failure on part of petitioner-
appellant to prosecute her appeal in respondent judge's
court. Petitioner had been granted in respondent judge's
Order of May 7, 1971, 30 days from notice of submission of
the transcripts within which to file her memorandum on
appeal, yet her appeal was dismissed per his Order of August
4, 1971 for alleged failure to prosecute (by failure to file the
memorandum) even before she had received any such
notice. Upon receipt of the dismissal order, petitioner had
promptly moved for reconsideration and filed her
memorandum on appeal.

I am not prepared at this stage to concur with the ratio

decidendi of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar
that the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the
appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his
memorandum, but rather it is the Court's mandatory duty to
decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and
records transmitted to it." I entertain serious doubts about
such pronouncement, once when the court of first instance
"requests" the party-appellant to submit a memorandum or
brief on appeal under the provisions of Republic Act No.
6031 amending section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, such
"request" is tantamount to a requirement for the proper
prosecution of the appeal; thus, when the appellant willfuly
fails to file such memorandum or brief, the judge should be
empowered to dismiss the appeal, applying suppletorily the