[G.R. No. 110147. April 17, 2001]METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS and ALFONSO ROXAS CHUA, respondents.
If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Once determined to be final, the order may be the subject of an
appeal, as in the present case.
The Case

Filed before this Court is a Petition for Review under rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
December 22, 1992 Decision[1] of the Court of appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 28679. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against private respondent. [2]
The CA affirmed the April 10 and the July 23, 1992 Orders[3]of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
46), which denied herein petitioners Motion to Strike Out or Expunge from the records respondents
Notice of Appeal.
Also questioned is the May 3, 1993 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:[5]

Petitioner Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank for short) brought an action for a sum of money
against private respondents Pacific Multi Commercial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. on
November 25, 1982. Private respondents failed to file their answer and were, for that reason, declared
in default.
On May 26, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment for Metrobank[,] ordering the private respondents
jointly and severally liable to pay the following amounts:
1. The sum of P964,377.49 representing the unpaid balance of the loan as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;
2. Interests on the unpaid balance at the rate of 14% per annum on the unpaid principal from August
10, 1982 until said principal is fully paid;
3. Penalty charges at the rate of 8% per annum on the outstanding interest, computed from the date of
default up to the full payment of the obligation;
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due and collectible; and
5. The costs of this suit.
After the decision had become final, Metrobank moved for the execution of the judgment in its
favor. The trial court granted Metrobanks motion and, among other things, the deputy sheriff garnished
the shares of stock of private respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. in the Club Filipino.
On July 17, 1991 the sheriff sold at public auction respondent Roxas Chuas Certificate of Ownership No.
809 in the Club Filipino to the Metrobank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to the
Metrobank.However, on August 12, 1991, respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. filed with the respondent
trial court a motion to hold in abeyance the delivery to Metrobank of the certificate of ownership and
to declare the sale to Metrobank as null and void on the ground that the certificate of ownership was
the conjugal property of respondent Roxas Chua, Jr. and his wife Kiang Ming Chu. Metrobank opposed
the private respondents motion.
On September 30, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying private respondent Roxas Chuas motion
to hold in abeyance the delivery of [the] certificate of ownership to Metrobank and to declare the sale
as null and void. Private respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. moved for a reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the court in its order dated February 18, 1992. Accordingly, on March 26, 1992, private
respondent filed a notice of appeal from the order of the court.
On April 6, 1992, Metrobank moved to strike out or expunge from the record the notice of appeal of
respondent Roxas Chua, Jr. on the ground that private respondent, having been declared in default,
ha[d] no standing to file the notice. However, the court, in its order dated April 10, 1992 denied the
petitioners motion.
Metrobank moved for reconsideration but again [its] motion was denied by the court in another order
dated July 23, 1992. Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside these orders of April 10, 1992 and
July 23, 1992 [issued by] the respondent court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Relying on Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, the CA ruled that a defendant may appeal
a judgment of default without need to set aside the order declaring him in default.
The CA also disallowed the new grounds raised before it by petitioner. More important, the appellate
court held that those grounds were not proper in a petition for certiorari, because they did not involve
grave abuse of discretion or jurisdiction. Ruled that CA:
It is next contended by the petitioner (1) that on the assumption that the certificate of ownership which
the sheriff had levied upon execution is conjugal property of private respondent and his wife Kian Ming
Chu, nonetheless private respondent would not have the requisite standing to question the validity of
the sale insofar as his wifes ownership is concerned because only the latter can question the sale and
(2) that the order of February 18, 1992, denying private respondents motion to set aside the sale of a
certificate of ownership, is not appealable. These grounds are being raised for the first time in the
present petition. The trial court has had no opportunity to pass on them and it is unfair to find that it
committed a grave abuse of discretion for something it has not done. Moreover, these grounds are not
proper for a petition for certiorari. If at all they should be raised in defense in the pending appeal
brought by the private respondent. It is hardly necessary to state that the function of the writ of
certiorari is to keep a lower court within its jurisdiction and that, therefore, only jurisdictional questions
may be raised. Mere errors of judgment may be corrected by appeal. If, as petitioner contends, private
respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. has no standing to question the sale of the certificate of ownership
insofar as the sale of his wifes share is concerned, and that at any rate the order denying private
respondents motion to set aside the sheriffs sale is not appealable, these questions should be raised
either in petitioners brief on appeal or in a motion to dismiss the appeal of private respondent.[6]
Hence, this recourse.[7]
Issues

Petitioner submits, for the consideration of this Court, the following issues:
a) The finding and holding of the Former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals that
the private respondent may appeal the judgment [by] default, rendered against him by the lower Court
is contrary to the facts of the case as set out in the said questioned Decision, Annex A hereof;
b) The Former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals completely evaded
[confrontation of], and thus failed to rule on, the issue raised by petitioner on the continuous loss of
standing of the private respondent throughout the entire execution stage of the judgment by default;
c) The petitioner duly raised before the lower Court the issue that the February 18, 1992 Order of the
lower Court, Annex FF hereof, which is the subject of the private respondents appeal, cannot be the
subject of an appeal as the same is merely interlocutory in nature and not appealable, so much so that
the said lower Court has had the opportunity to pass upon that issue, contrary to the finding and holding
of the former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals that said issue was allegedly
raised before it for the first time by the petitioner; and
d) The said issue that the February 18, 1992 Order, which is the subject of the private respondents
appeal, cannot be the subject of an appeal as the same is merely interlocutory in nature and not
appealable can properly be raised as a ground in a petition for certiorari.[8]
In the main, the Court will resolve the propriety of respondents appeal to the CA of the RTC Orders.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts Orders allowing private
respondents appeal. Petitioner further contends that respondent had already been declared in default,
and that such status subsisted because the default order was not lifted. It adds that the appeal should
have been disallowed, since the trial court Decision had long become final and executory. What was
being appealed was a mere order of execution, which was interlocutory in nature and not subject to
appeal.
For easier understanding, let us briefly restate the pertinent facts of the present case. On May 3, 1983,
private respondent was declared in default in Civil Case No. 82-14134.[9] On May 26, 1983, the trial court
rendered a Decision[10] ordering him to pay petitioner the amounts mentioned therein. The Decision
became final and executory.
After executing on the various properties owned by private respondent, the trial court directed the
sheriff to sell at public auction the Club Filipino share owned by private respondent.[11] On July 17, 1991,
a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as purchaser of that share. [12] Private respondent
then filed a Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale
void.[13] On September 30, 1991, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion of private
respondent.[14] The latter then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, he filed a
notice of appeal questioning the trial courts Order denying the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery
of the Club Filipino share and to declare the auction sale void.[15]
The subject matter of this case, therefore, is whether private respondent can appeal from the denial of
the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void.
In its Decision, the CA stated that parties in default did not need to have the order of default against
them lifted before they could appeal. In other words, a party in default is not precluded from filing an
appeal, as provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court (in effect at the time), which
states:
Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to
appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall
it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.
A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may
also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is
contrary to law.
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him
as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default
has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.[16]
The above provision, particularly its third paragraph, clearly states that one who has been declared in
default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default.[17] Hence, the mere fact that the trial
court has not lifted its default order does not bar herein respondent from filing an appeal.
If at all, petitioner ought to have challenged the default status of private respondent when he filed his
Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale. However, the denial of that Motion
being final in character as we shall now show, he is allowed by the Rules to appeal therefrom.
Paragraph 1 of the above-quoted Rule provides that decisions and final orders are appealable. Because
the RTC Orders were final, not merely interlocutory, the CA did not err in allowing respondents appeal.
It has been held that [a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of
the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits.[18] It refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some
point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy. [19] Conversely, a final order is
one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether an
order is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. [20]
In the present case, the April 10, 1992 Order denied private respondents Motion to hold in abeyance
the delivery of the Certificate of Sale of his Club Filipino share and to declare the sale void. After
rendering the Order, the trial court did not need to do anything more to settle the rights of the
parties. Upon the affirmation of the validity of the sale, the Certificate of Sale was to be delivered to
petitioner as the new owner. Indeed, while appeal does not lie against the execution of a judgment, it
is available in case of an irregular implementation of a writ of execution.[21] This was the factual scenario
in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
8. WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (WTC), CHI TIM CORDOVA AND ROBERT TIONG KING
YOUNG, petitioners, vs.EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent

FACTS:WTC obtained from respondent a loan in the amount of US$75,000, with 8.75% interest per
annum, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, signed by Cordova and Young as representatives of WTC.
Cordova and Young executed a Surety Agreement binding themselves as sureties of WTC for the loan.
Respondent bank made a final demand for WTC to pay its obligation, but petitioners failed to pay.
Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay it $75,603.65 or P2,018,617.46 plus interest,
penalty, attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation; and the cost of suit.

In their Answer, petitioners stated that WTC obtained the $75,000 loan; that Cordova and Young bound
themselves as its sureties. They claimed that only one demand letter, dated was made by respondent.
They added that the promissory note did not provide the due date for payment. Petitioners also claimed
that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date was purposely left blank, to be agreed upon by
the parties at a later date. Since no maturity date had been fixed, the filing of the Complaint was
premature, and it failed to state a cause of action. They further claimed that the promissory note and
surety agreement were contracts of adhesion with terms on interest, penalty, charges and attorneys fees
that were excessive, unconscionable and not reflective of the parties real intent. Petitioners prayed for
the reformation of the promissory note and surety agreement to make their terms and conditions fair,
just and reasonable. They also asked payment of damages by respondent.

The RTC, rendered decision that the judgment is rendered based on the pleadings filed by the opposing
parties and the documents annexed thereto. The defendants are ordered to pay solidarily and to pay the
stipulated interest of 8.75% per annum to be reckoned from the date that the obligation was contracted
until the filing of this suit. Thereafter, the legal rate shall apply. Petitioners appealed, but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred when it affirmed the RTCs judgment on the pleadings.

HELD:Petitioners argue that a judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered because their Answer
tendered genuine issues and disputed the material allegations in the Complaint. In this case, at issue is
the propriety and validity of a judgment on the pleadings. Both the RTC and Court of Appeals recognize
that issues were raised by petitioners in their Answer before the trial court. The essential question in such
a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. This is the distinction between a proper
case of summary judgment, compared to a proper case for judgment on the pleadings.

In sum, no cause to disturb the findings of fact the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the RTC as to the
reasonableness of the interest rate of 8.75% per annum on the loan. No persuasive reason to contradict
the ruling of both courts that the loan secured by petitioner WTC, with co-petitioners as sureties, was
payable on demand. Respondents complaint could not be considered premature. Nor could it be said to
be without sufficient cause of action therein set forth. The judgment rendered by the trial court is valid as
a summary judgment, and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
9. JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting
in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and
CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014, J. Leonen

A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods:
first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition
for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed
to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some
definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation. In the present case, [Contreras] counsel
received a copy of the RTCs decision dated September 13, 1993 on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition
for relief from judgment should have been filed on or before November 14, 1993. However, the records
showed that the petition was filed only on December 15, 1993, or ninety-one (91) days later.

A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double
period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition
for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under Section 1, Rule
38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for reconsideration is required before a
petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed judgment or order an
opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal,
considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal
only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the
reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsels failure to file a timely notice
of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.
10. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, INC. VS. FAR EAST BANK, NOW B.P.I. G.R. No. 159926, January 20,
2014.

Extrinsic Fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, must emanate from an act of the adverse party,
and not by the petitioners own counsel.

FACTS: Petitioner Pausukan Seafood House issued four real estate mortgages in favor of Respondent Far
East Bank & Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippine Islands). When the unpaid obligation secured by
Pinausukan totaled more than Php15M, respondent commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgages. Two weeks after, the sheriff issued a notice of sheriffs sale, setting the
lands for public auction.

Upon learning of the impending sale, Pinausukan brought an action for the annulment of the mortgages
contending that Bonier (President of Pinausukan) obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and
entered into the mortgages without Pinausukans consent through a board resolution. Pinausukan applied
for the issuance of a TRO to stop the extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction.

RTC: The case was assigned to Branch 108, RTC in Pasay City. The counsels of the parties did not appear
in court on their scheduled hearing, despite having agreed thereto. The RTC dismissed the case for failure
to prosecute, and the order attained finality.

The sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale over the property. The notice was received a week later by
Pinausukan, claiming surprise over the turn of events. Pinausukan learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor,
its counsel, had not informed it about the order of dismissal of the case.

CA: Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA seeking nullification of the dismissal, stating
that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to inform his client of the
developments of the case. In addition, Pinausukan was never notified that its attorney had changed his
office and address. Pinausukan asserts that Atty. Villaflor constituted professional misconduct amounting
to EXTRINSIC FRAUD, properly warranting the annulment of their cases dismissal.

The CA dismissed the petition, citing the failure to attach affidavits of witnesses attesting to the extrinsic
fraud as required by Sec.4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment grounded on extrinsic fraud should be
granted by the CA.

RULING: The appeal lacks merit.

1. Nature and statutory requirements for an action to annul a judgment or final order.

There are only two remedies available to a party aggrieved by a decision rendered by a CFI that had
attained finality namely:

a) Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, akin to the petition for relief from judgement under Rule 38;
and
b) Sec. 513 of the Code of CivPro, stipulating that an aggrieved party under a judgment rendered by a CFI
who had been deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence could present
his petition to the SC within 60 days after he learns of the judgment.

Act No. 136 (An Act providing for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands) vested original
jurisdiction in the CFI over all civil actions in which the subject of litigations is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. The CFI retained this jurisdiction under R.A. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948).

The policy of judicial stability enunciates that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction could not
be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely:

a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice; and

b) to put an end to judicial controversies.

Given the extraordinary nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment, Pinausukan must be mindful of
the following statutory requirements as set forth in Rule 47:

1) The remedy is only available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.

2) The ground for action of annulment of judgment is limited to extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

a. Extrinsic Fraud- where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit;
or where the attorney fraudulently of without authority connives at his defeat.

b. Intrinsic Fraud- acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the
difference is that the acts or things, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication
of the case.

3) The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within 4 years from discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppels.

a. Laches- failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could have been done earlier.

b. Estoppel- precludes a person who has admitted or made a reperesentation about something as true
from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation.

4) The petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relief upon
for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.
2. Pinausukans petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective.

The procedural defect in Pinausukans petition was its disregard of the fourth requirement consisting in
its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the
cause of action.

The substantive defect related to the neglect of Atty. Villaflor did not constitute extrinsic fraud because
based solely on the allegations, they do not constitute extrinsic fraud as contemplated under Rule 47. The
petitions own language states that what is involved is mistake and gross negligence of the petitioners
own counsel. In applying Rule 47, mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to intrinsic fraud. By
its nature, extrinsic fraud related to a cause that is collateral in character, it relates to an act of the
prevailing party which is committed outside of the case. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will
not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by ones own lawyer.

Wherefore, the court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the CA; ORDERS the petitioner to pay cost of suit.
11. G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND TOURIST INN, and
TEODORICO ADARNA, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Facts:May 2, 1989 - Davao Light & Power Co., Inc filed a verified complaint for recovery of money and
damages against Queensland Hotel and Teodorico Adarna.

The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

The ex parte application was granted. The attachment bond was valued at P4,600,513.37.

After the attachment bond was submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment was issued.

May 12, 1989 - The summons and a copy of the complaint, writ of attachment and a copy of the
attachment bond were served on defendants. Subsequently, the sheriff seized the latter's
properties.

Thereafter, defendants filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue
the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the
attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cause and over the persons of the defendants. Davao Light opposed the said motion.

The Trial Court issued an Order denying the Motion to Discharge. But when appealed through
certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the Order. The Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy
on Preliminary Attachment were declared null and void and the attachment was discharged.

Issue: Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before
acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person.

Held: Yes. The petition is granted.

A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in
virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of
which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter." The phrase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing
of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the commencement of the
action;" and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced by
the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply
for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by
law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.

The Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex
parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the
applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the
defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not
incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's
attachment bond.

There are two (2) ways of discharging an attachment: first, by the posting of a counterbond; and second,
by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.

With respect to the other provisional remedies, i.e., preliminary injunction (Rule 58), receivership (Rule
59), replevin or delivery of personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also issue ex parte.

12. Bond: THOMAS YANG vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ, PresidingJudge, Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch XXII, GeneralSantos City, SPS. RICARDO MORANTE and MILAGROS
MORANTE; G.R. No. 73317 August 31, 1989
13. Replevin: TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS G.R. No. 165895 June 5, 2009

Replevin. The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property,
must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application,
the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to
the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the courts order upon application
by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent
thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on
procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was
not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent
of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof
is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements.
The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under
these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being
both unlawful and unconstitutional. Terlyngrace Rivera Vs. Florencio L. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, June
5, 2009.

14.Injunction:BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL PHILIPPINES, INC.) Vs.

CLARK TRADING CORPORATIONG.R. No. 175284 September 19, 2012

15. SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

SUMMARY : Mother of two seeks spousal and child support from rich husband.

FACTS:On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself
and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from
the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus
also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed).
Respondent filed an MFR asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with familys social and financial
standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of
the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The MFR was denied. His second MFR also
having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA nullified RTCs ruling and
changed the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance
of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving
groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well, and thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from
the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also
noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children. Petitioner appealed.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in arrears

DECISION: The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, the amount of
support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to
the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support
of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.

16.Receivership:GORGONIO PANDES vs. HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of
Negros Occidental, JOSE AZCONA, Ex-Officio ProvincialSheriff of Negros Occidental, and UY TIONG OH G.R.
No. L-6666 May 12, 1954

17. P.L. UY REALTY CORP. v. ALS MANAGEMENT AND DEV. CORP. and ANTONIO S. LITONJUA G.R. No.
166462, October 24, 2012, VELASCO, J.

Absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity is sufficient.

Facts: PLU(vendor) and ALS(vendee) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage covering a parcel
of land. Subsequently, the parties executed a Partial Release of Mortgage attesting to the payment by ALS
of the first installment. ALS, however, failed to pay the 2nd payment despite demands. PLU filed a
Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage and Annulment of Documents. RTC dismissed the case for being
premature. CA affirmed. PLU again filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
under Rule 68 of the ROC. RTC again dismissed the case for being premature. CA affirmed. Issue: Whether
or not the 2 cases filed by PLU constituted as res judicata.

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the Court may motu proprio dismiss a case
when any of the 4 grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action, is present. Correlatively, Secs. 47(b) and (c) of Rule 39 provides for
the 2 concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment, respectively. The
elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action be shown in the 2 cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
judgment" would apply. If as between the 2 cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

All the elements of res judicata, as a "bar by prior judgment," are present here. The previous complaint
for foreclosure of mortgage was dismissed by the trial court for being premature. The dismissal action,
when eventually elevated to CA was affirmed and the affirmatory resolution of the Court becoming final
and executory. Further, the element of identity of parties is considered existing even though Litonjua was
only impleaded in the 2nd case. Absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply;
substantial identity is sufficient. Clearly, the instant complaint must be dismissed.

18. 18. Conclusiveness of judgment:ANDREW TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WU SEN
WOEI, respondents. G.R. No. 142401 August 20, 2001

SUMMARY: Respondent invested $80,000 in Petitioners hatchery business. The latter was only able to
repay $10,000. Thus, respondent filed a complaint with the NBI. Before the NBI, the petitioner signed an
Affidavit of Undertaking promising to pay his debt. Subsequently, he filed a case for annulment of
document claiming that he signed the affidavit under duress. RTC held in his favor, but CA reversed. The
decision became final. ANOTHER case was filed by respondent this time, an action to collect the remainder
of petitioners debt. In this 2nd case, the petitioner still insisted on using the defense of signing the
affidavit under duress. RTC held in petitioners favor, but was reversed by CA which held that no, under
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, you cannot use the same defense. Petitioner filed a petition
for review of the 2nd CA decision. SC affirmed the CA. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
which is also known as preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel, issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action.

FACTS: Respondent Wu Sen Woei, a Taiwanese national, met Petitioner Andrew Tan, a Filipino, in Taiwan.
Petitioner convinced respondent to invest in the formers business (a hatchery business, where they
probably make hatchets*) Respondent gave $80,000, to which the petitioner only repaid $10,000.
Respondent then lodged a complaint with the NBI to recover the balance, and before the NBI the
petitioner signed an Affidavit of

Undertaking where he and his sister bound themselves to pay the balance in installments ($10,000
monthly).

(1st case) Petitioner field an action for annulment of document with the RTC, claiming that he was coerced
into signing the undertaking. RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed and dismissed petitioners
complaint.

(2nd case) In the meantime, respondent was able to collect $25,000, leaving a balance of $45,000. He filed
an action for the collection of a sum of money to collect the said balance, alleging that the petitioner had
defrauded him. The respondent filed the case (presumably) in the RTC, a case which he (presumably) lost,
which he (definitely) appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC. This 2nd case is what is now being
lifted to the SC through a petition for review. (Note: in the 2nd case, petitioner is still claiming that the
affidavit had been executed under duress)

CA held that based on the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the petitioners claim that the Affidavit
had been executed under duress was rendered ineffective by the CA decision in the 1st case, where the
CA ruled that the affidavit was an admission against interest, a clear acknowledgment by Tan of his
obligation to Wu Sen Woei. *That is a joke.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed and denied MR. Case lifted
to SC through petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE/HELD:(1) WoN the affidavit of undertaking is valid. (Or rather, has the earlier decision by the CA,
regarding the same issue, become conclusive upon the parties) (YES)

RATIO (1) Yes, the affidavit of undertaking is valid on the basis of the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment.

The CAs earlier decision concerning the validity of Tans affidavit of undertaking has become conclusive
on the parties, pursuant to Sec. 47(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The parties are bound by the matters
adjudged and those that are actually and necessarily included therein.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as preclusion of issues or
collateral estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action

The concept clearly applies to the present case, because petitioner again seeks refuge in the
alleged nullity of the same affidavit, the question on the validity of which has already been settled. The
same question cannot therefore be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.

Even though the two actions are technically different, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
applies because under the principle, the identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of
issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

Significantly, petitioner no longer questioned the CA decision in the 1st case.

Note: Petitioners assertion that the affidavit was executed under duress is contradicted by the
events that took place following its execution. Petitioner did not immediately question its validity, he paid
at least $25,000, and even asked for a reduction of the installments due. RULING: Petition denied.

19. FLEXO

ROSENDO T. UY, MEDRING SIOCO, BOBBY BERNARD S. UY and LUISA T. vs.

HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, as Judge of Branch 101, Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City; BENITO
PALOMADO, PIO BERMEJO and SANTOSNGALIOG.R. No. 131237 July 31, 2000

20. DOUGLAS F. ANAMA vs. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPOUSES SATURNINA BARIA &TOMAS CO and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO MANILA, DISTRICT II,G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012.

Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion
that fails to comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should
not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the
court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by
the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the
Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty
to enforce the same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based
on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and final yresolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for
in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.

Xxxxx As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right
without the needed notice and hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of
Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez, it was written:

It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe that a copy of the
motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated party, like
litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2,
Rule 37), or a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which
instances a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in order
to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application.

Based on the quoted decision, it is clear that the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing involving
litigated motions do not apply to a motion for writ execution of a judgment that has already become
final and executory because no appeal was perfected within the prescribed period. This is because the
execution of such final decision is precisely no longer a litigated matter. Execution of such judgment is
a matter of right

21. Garnishment:BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CARLITO LEE G.R. No. 190144 August 1,
2012

Distinction between attachment and garnishment (1999 Bar Question) Attachment refers to corporeal
property in the possession of the judgment debtor. Garnishment refers to money, stocks, credits and
other incorporeal property which belong to the judgment debtor but is in the possession or under the
control of a third person. Right to Choose may be waived by the judgment obligor If the judgment obligor
does not exercise the option, he waives such right, and the sheriff shall levy first on personal property,
then on real property. The sheriff shall only sell property sufficient to satisfy the judgment and other
lawful fees (Villarin v. Munasque, 568 SCRA 483).

Q: The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. The judgment obligee subsequently received
information that a bank holds a substantial deposit belonging to the judgment obligor. If the bank denies
holding the deposit in the name of the judgment obligor but your client's informant is certain that the
deposit belongs to the judgment obligor under an assumed name, what is your remedy to reach the
deposit? (2008 Bar Question)

Levy It is the act by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the property of the
judgment debtor for purposes of the execution sale.

A: A motion may be filed for a court order requiring the proper bank officer to appear in court for
examination under oath as to such bank deposit, and subsequently move for a court order authorizing the
filing of an action against such bank for the recovery of the judgment obligors deposit/interest therein
and to forbid a transfer or other disposition of such deposit/interest within 120 days from notice of the
order (Secs. 37 and 43, Rule 39).

Garnishment It is the act of appropriation by the sheriff of the of debtors property in the hands of third
persons. This is proper if the property involved is money, stocks, other incorporeal property (Regalado,
2012). Garnishment is a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and
owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution
except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It places the attached
properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper tribunal on the
plaintiffs claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy. Implementation
of Judgment if the obligee is absent at the time of payment When the judgment obligee is not present at
the time the judgment obligor makes the payment, the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the
money received must be remitted to the clerk of court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited
in a fiduciary account with the nearest government depository bank. Sheriffs are not permitted to retain
the money in their possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money
collected directly to the judgment oblige (Pea, Jr. v. Regalado II; A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010).

NOTE: The garnishee or the third person who is in the possession of the property of the judgment debtor
is deemed a forced intervenor. Jurisprudence: It is a settled rule that upon service of the writ of
garnishment, the garnishee becomes a virtual party or forced intervenor to the case and the trial
court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply (BPI v Carlito Lee G.R. No. 190144,
August 1, 2012).

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR SPECIFIC ACTS Specific Acts Procedure in garnishment 1. 1. 2. A notice
is served upon the third person or garnishee having in possession or control of the credits in favor of
the judgment obligor; the garnishee shall make a written report to the court within 5 days from service
of notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds to satisfy the
judgment. If sufficient, the garnishee shall deliver the amount in cash or certified check shall be
delivered directly to the 2. 3. 4. 5. 115 Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts vesting title;
Sale of real or personal property; Delivery or restitution of real property; Removal of improvements on
property subject of execution; and Judgments for the delivery of personal property (Sec. 10, Rule 39).

Remedy when a party refuses to comply with the judgment Contempt in case of refusal to comply with
the judgment of the court 1. GR: No. The judgment debtor cannot be cited in contempt of court.
Generally, contempt is not a remedy to enforce a judgment. 2. 3. Vacate the property The sheriff must
oust the party. A demolition order from the court is required to effect removal of an improvement
constructed by the defeated party. Deliver The sheriff will take possession and deliver it to the wining
party Comply The court can appoint some other person at the expense of the disobedient party and
the act shall have the same effect as if the required party performed it. XPNs: 1. Refusal to perform a
particular act or special judgments under Sec. 11 where he may be cited in contempt. 2. In case of the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite under Rule 61, the judgment debtor may still be cited for
contempt even if the decision is not a special judgment and requires the latter to pay money. Execution
of Judgments for the following specific acts if the judgment debtor refuses/fails to comply Judgments
for Specific Act (Sec. 10) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts, vesting title. Sale of real
and personal property Delivery or restitution of real property Removal of improvements on property
subject of execution Delivery of personal property NOTE: A judgment of specific acts may be performed
by other person if the party refuses to comply with the judgment and the act by such other person shall
have the same effect as if performed by the party himself. In such case, the disobedient party incurs no
liability for contempt (Regalado, 2012). Manner of Execution Court can appoint some other person at
the cost of the disobedient party and the act when so done shall have the same effect as if done by the
required party. Sell such property and apply the proceeds in conformity with the judgment. If the party
refuses to deliver, a writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the defendant to vacate is in the
nature of a habere facias possesionem and authorizes the sheriff to break open the premises where
there is no occupant therein. EXECUTION OF SPECIAL JUDGMENTS Special Judgment One which requires
the performance of any act, other than the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal
property, which a party must personally do because his personal qualifications and circumstances have
been taken into consideration (Sec. 11, Rule 39; Regalado, 2010). Effect of failure to comply with special
judgments Failure to comply with special judgment under Sec. 11 is punishable by imprisonment (Sec.
11, Rule 39). How executed When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those
mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ
of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or
upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be
punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment (Sec. 11, Rule 39). If party refuses to vacate
property, remedy is not contempt. The sheriff must oust the party. But if demolition is involved, there
must be a special order. The officer may destroy, demolish or remove the improvements upon special
order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee. The officer shall take possession and
deliver to the party entitled thereto.

EFFECT OF LEVY ON THIRD PERSON Effect of levy on execution to third persons It creates a lien in favor
of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the
time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing (Sec. 12, Rule 39). 116 CIVIL
PROCEDURE Encumbered property may be levied For purposes of the levy, a property is deemed to
belong to the judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or
otherwise dispose of for value. In a contract of mortgage, the debtor retains beneficial interest over the
property notwithstanding the encumbrance, since the mortgage only serves to secure the fulfillment of
the principal obligation. Indeed, even if the debtor defaults, this fact does not operate to vest in the
creditor the ownership of the property; the creditor must still resort to foreclosure proceedings. Thus,
a mortgaged property may still be levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtors obligations
(Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. Albano, A.M. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011). 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
22. G.R. NO. 203947 FEBRUARY 26, 2014RUFA RUBIO et.al.,Petitioners vs. LOURDES
ALABATA,Respondent.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano
Alabata and respondent Lourdes Alabata were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration
of heir ship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the RTC of Dumaguete the case was decided in
favor of petitioner. Initially Lourdes appealed the decision of the RTC, however, she later withdrew the
appeal, which in turn turned the decision final and executory. It was on August 20, 1997, the Entry of
Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments. However despite the finality
of the decision it was never executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at the Public Attorneys Office,
Dumaguete City, was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been issued. They explained
that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in
charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned
from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of the said
development. When petitioners followed up with PAO-Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of
respondent was still pending. In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the
RTC-43decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said
decision had become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.
On December 5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment which
was raffled to RTC-42. On February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses,
RTC-42 granted her Motion to

Dismiss and ordered petitioners case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision can be subject of revival under the rules of court

HELD: Yes. While generally, as provided by Rule 39 Section 6, once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5)
years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a
motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment becomes final. However, due to the events that transpired, the Court find it proper to relax the
rules and allow the revival of judgment. To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result
in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision
and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.
23. Certiorari: AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION (ARBA), represented by JOSEPHINE B.
OMICTIN, Petitioner, vs. LORETO G. NICOLAS and OLIMPIO CRUZ, Respondents.

G.R. No. 168394 October 6, 2008

FACTS: The Philippine Banking Corporation (PhiliBanking) was the registered owner of two parcels of land
located in Barangay Mintal, Davao City. On September 7, 1989, DAR issued a notice of coverage to
PhilBanking. DAR declared that subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of CARL or R.A. No. 6657.
PhilBanking immediately filed its protest. Despite objections, the DAR caused the cancellation of the titles
of the subject parcel of lands. Ownership was passed to the Republic of the Philippines. This was followed
by the distribution of said land to the farmer-beneficiaries belonging to ABRA by virtue of a CLOA, more
particularly described as TCT No. CL-143. PhilBanking then executed a deed of assignment in favor of
respondents. As assignees and successors-in-interest, respondents continued PhilBankings protest over
DARs takeover of their lands. Respondents then filed their complaints before the local DARAB in Tagum
City, Davao del Norte. PhilBanking instituted before the RTC a complaint for reinstatement of title and
recovery of possession, while respondents prayed for the cancellation of the CLOA and reinstatement of
titles previously registered under the name of PhilBanking. DARAB (Tagum) then rendered a decision in
favor of respondents. Aggrieved by the local DARAB ruling, petitioner appealed to the DARAB Central
Office which overturned the decision of its local office. Respondents then filed a MR and supplemental
motion for reconsideration but both were denied by DARAB. Dissatisfied with the Central DARAB ruling,
respondents elevated the matter to the CA. The CA granted the appeal. Hence the instant petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) reinstating the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Tagum City, Davao del Norte.

ISSUES:

1) WON THERE WAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION.

2) WON THE NATALIA CASE APPLIES IN THE PRESENT CASE.

3) WON THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARL.

HELD:

1) Yes. Respondents are the lawful assignees and successors-in-interest of PhilBanking. Hence they
have a valid cause of action. As lawful assignees, respondents stand to be directly benefited or
injured from the resolution of this case. To protect whatever rights and interests they may have
in the subject lands, they rightfully pursued the actions initiated by their assignor,
PhilBanking. Respondents action is premised on the prior classification of the subject land as
exempt from the coverage of the CARP.

2) Yes. The ruling in Natalia Realty Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform is applicable to the
present case. We agree with the CA that the facts obtaining in this case are similar to those
in Natalia Realty. Both subject lands form part of an area designated for non-agricultural
purposes. Both were classified as non-agricultural lands prior to June 15, 1988, the date of
effectivity of the CARL.. Contrary to what petitioners think, the Natalia ruling was not confined
solely to agricultural lands located within townsite reservations. It is also applicable to other
agricultural lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL. This is
 subject to the condition that the conversion was made with the approval of government agencies
like the HLURB.

3) Yes. The findings of facts of the DARAB Central Office were not supported by the substantial
evidence and cannot be deemed final and conclusive. We are not persuaded. Section 54 of the
RA No. 6657 provides that any [DAR] decision, order, award, or ruling on any agrarian dispute or
any matter pertaining to its application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation and
other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the CA by certiorari. It also provides
that the findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.
Verily, for the DARAB findings of fact to be considered final and conclusive, they must be
supported by substantial evidence. This, the CA found wanting. It is the duty of the court to
protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny
justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.

24.Expropriation REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OFPUBLIC WORKS

AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS (BPI)G.R. No.
203039 September 11, 2013

25.Contempt ISABELO ESPERIDA, LORENZO HIPOLITO, and ROMEO DE BELEN vs. FRANCO K. JURADO,
JR., G.R. No. 172538 April 25, 2012

Facts: Petitioners Isabelo Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against respondent Franco K. Jurado, Jr. before the Labor Arbiter. However, unable to obtain
a favourable decision from the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, petitioners elevated the case to the CA.
Respondent then files a motion for reconsideration of the decision. During pendency of the motion,
respondent filed a Petition to declare petitioners in Contempt of court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient, the court ordered a resolution giving the petitioners 15 days to
submit their answer. The CA denied the motion for extension of time filed by petitioners counsel. The
latter also filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration of the March 02, 2006 Resolution and For
Admission of Respondents Answer) which was both denied due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed contempt of court.

Ruling: Sections 31[16] and 4,2 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the procedural
requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. The law requires that there be
a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity
to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This is due process, which must be
observed at all times.

It is settled that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must
be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Considering the nature of
contempt proceedings and the fact that petitioners actually filed their Answer, albeit belatedly, the
CA should have been more liberal in the application of the Rules and admitted the Answer.

26. NESTOR T. GADRINAB vs. NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO ANDELENA LOPEZ G.R. No.
194560 June 11, 2014

27. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYORREINALDO A. BAUTISTA,

JR., vs.ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENGG.R. No. 188913 February 19, 2014

Facts:In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the subject demolition
advices for the enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against Alexander Ampaguey,
Sr. et.al; Demolition Order No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen, Sr., et.al, all in Busol
Watershed, Baguio City. As it is, the aforesaid individuals filed a petition for injunction (Case No. 31-
CAR-09) while Magdalena Gumangan, et al. filed a petition for identification, delineation and
recognition of ancestral land claims with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction (Case No. 29-CAR-09).

Respondent in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the following separate temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:

(1) 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09; and

(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction7 in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.

Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were
issued in willful disregard, disobedience, defiance and resistance of this Courts Decision in G.R. No.
180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case. Petitioner contends that respondents act of
enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and demolition advices is tantamount to allowing
forum shopping since the implementation of the demolition orders over the structures in the Busol
Forest Reservation had already been adjudicated and affirmed by this Court.

Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in NCIP
Case Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve
the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly members of the indigenous
cultural communities/indigenous peoples. In addition, he maintains that the orders and writs he
issued did not disregard the earlier ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 180206 because the Court has in
fact affirmed the power of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction
without any prohibition against the issuance of said writs when the main action is for injunction.
Issue:Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.

Held:The court ruled in affirmative.

The said orders clearly contravene the courts ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan, et.al.
who are owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner are
not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.

The court finds that petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed
Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No.180206 and in the case at bar,
except that different writs of injunction are being assailed.

While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and
G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer),
the court is constrained by the principle of stare decisis in granting the instant petition.

Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are simply enforcing the
previous demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-
in- interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by respondent. Despite
the Courts pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor of those
occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by petitioner, and
hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation, respondent still issued the
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.

Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Courts ruling on a matter submitted for the
second time before his office. Hence Atty. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under Section 7 of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rule.

28. Interpleader: WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. Vs.
LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TANG.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976

WACKWACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN
G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 CASTRO, C.J.:

FACTS: In its amended and supplemental complaint of October 23, 1963, the WackWack Golf &
Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation),
alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its membership
fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila, entitled
"Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. WackWack Golf & Country Club, Inc." and also by virtue of
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto,
deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president and the secretary of
the Corporation and of the People's Bank & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation,
pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan,
on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue
of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an
assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of
membership fee certificate 201; that under its articles of incorporation and by-laws the Corporation
is authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership fee certificates to persons duly elected or
admitted to proprietary membership, all of which have been issued as early as December 1939; that
it claims no interest whatsoever in the said membership fee certificate 201; that it has no means of
determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without power to issue
two separate certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another
membership fee certificate to the defendant Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation and
by-laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201serial no. 1199 held by the defendant Tan and
the membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee proceed from the
same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz".
For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued
by the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is null and void
because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the
outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new
certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI
of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan, holder of membership fee
certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action
or bring a separate action to protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal and beneficial
interest in the subject matter of this litigation; and that he is made a part so that complete relief may
be accorded herein. The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be rendered, after hearing, declaring
who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and
cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. In separate
motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.

1 These motions were duly opposed by the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment
and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs
against the Corporation.

ISSUE: WON there is propriety and timeliness in the filing of the remedy of interpleader.

HELD: A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. 7
He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. 8 He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has
arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. 9 Otherwise, he may be
barred by laches 10 or undue delay. 11 But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. 12 It has been held that a stakeholder's
action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of
one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to
the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the
suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him
by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE Interpleader ( Rule 62) Jurisdiction MTC where the value of the claim or
the personal property does not exceed P300,000 or P400,000 in Metro Manila or where the value of
the real property does not exceed P20,000 or P50,000 in Metro Manila. Venue Where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiff resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides
at the option of the plaintiff(Sec. 2, Rule 4). RTC if the value exceeds the above amounts or if the
subject matter is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the RTC [Judiciary Act of 1980; BP Blg 129 (sec
19(2), Sec 33(3)as amended by RA 7691]

NOTE: The venue of special civil actions is governed by the general rules on venue, except as otherwise
indicated in the particular rule for said special civil action. Who May File A person who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants having claims upon the same subject matter (Sec 1, Rule 62). RTC Where the petitioner or
1. the respondent resides

NOTE: It would be error to file at the election of the the petition with the SC which petitioner (Section
2, has no original jurisdiction to Rule 4). Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. 2. All persons who have or claim any interest which
could be affected by the declaration. 3. A person may file an action for reformation of an instrument,
to quiet title or to consolidate ownership under Art. 1607 of the Civil Code under this Rule (similar
remedies) entertain a petition for declaratory relief (Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 14,
1997). Declaratory Relief ( Rule 63)

NOTE: The rights of persons not made parties to the action do not stand to be prejudiced by the
declaration (Sec. 2). Since their rights are not to be prejudiced by their noninclusion, the failure to
implead such person does not therefore, affect the jurisdiction of the court over the petition (Baguio
Citizens Action, Inc. v. The City Council, G.R. No. L-27247, April 20, 1983).

When To File Within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, it may be barred by laches or undue delay. This is
because after judgment is obtained against the plaintiff by one claimant, he is already liable to the
latter (Wackwack Golf & Country Club v Won, GR L-23851 March 26, 1976).

The petition must be filed before there is a breach of contract or violation of the statute or ordinance
(Sec 1, Rule 63). PROVISIONAL REMEDIES Supreme Court on certiorari Supreme Court under Rule 65
Review of Judgments of COMELEC AND COA (Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65) 1. 2. 3. 4. RTC, 1. CA SC,
Sandiganbayan, COMELEC in aid of their appellate jurisdiction (A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC). 2. 3. Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus (Rule 65) 4. RTC, if it is directed against a municipal trial court, a corporation,
a board, an officer or a person. CA or with the SB, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts
appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or omission of MTC /RTC, it shall be filed exclusively
with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 4, Rule 65). 151 The party aggrieved by a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
Within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if
allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein
fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. A person
aggrieved by any Within 60 days from tribunal, board or officer notice of the exercising judicial or
judgment, order or quasi-judicial functions resolution. In case a which has acted without motion for
or in excess of its or his reconsideration or jurisdiction, or with grave new trial is timely abuse of
discretion filed, whether such amounting to lack or motion is required or excess of jurisdiction (Sec.
not, the petition shall 1, Rule 65). be filed within 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion (Sec. 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC). UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY
OF CIVIL LAW REMEDIAL LAW Jurisdiction RTC, CA, SC, (Sec. 7, Rule 66) SB in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction (PD 1606, 4 as amended by RA No 8249, 4) Quo warranto Venue With the SC, CA, or in the
RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents
resides. When the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in the RTC of the City
of Manila, in the CA, or in the SC (Sec. 7, Rule 66). Who May File The government through the Solicitor
General or a Public Prosecutor. It may also be filed by a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another (Secs. 2,3 and 5, Rule 66). When
To File Within 1 year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose. Government or any of its instrumentalities (Riano, 2009) At anytime before the
actual taking and entering into possession of the real property Mortgagee At any time after the
mortgagor defaults in the payment of his debt A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate(Sec 1, Rule 69). It can be made anytime and the right to demand partition does not
prescribe. Prescription does not run in favor of coowner or co-heir against his co-owner or co-heirs as
long as there is a recognition of the co-ownership expressly or impliedly (Art. 494, NCC)

The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner had already been made independently
liable in Civil Case No. 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect
be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case.

Facts: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club Inc., operating under Philippine laws, filed a complaint to
compel Lee and Tan (claimants) to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims upon the ownership
of its membership fee certificates 201. The complaint further alleged that Lee claims ownership of the
subject matter by virtue of decision rendered in a civil case 26044 of the CFI Manila and that Tan
claims to be a lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him. Defendants filed their separate motion to dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action and bar by prescription.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint to interplead will prosper? Ruling: The interpleader will not
prosper. It has been held that an action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been
rendered against him in favor of one of the contending parties, especially where he (plaintiff) he had
prior notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of judgment and neglected the opportunity
to implead the adverse claimants. Because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter. Moreover, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated
adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse
claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. The interpleader suit
cannot prosper because the Petitioner had already been made independently liable in Civil Case No.
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the final judgment in the said civil case.
 The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader
in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting
claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy
of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because tohe entitled to this remedy the
applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made independently liable to any of the
claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present
interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot
prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and,
therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final
judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee
certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to
establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the
purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said
civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be
sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable de

29. Foreclosure:ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES LINDOG.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011