David A. Noveras vs. Leticia T.

Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in
the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in
2003, David abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further, she states that David
executed an affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and
real properties in the Philippines. After learning of the extra marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial
decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a
petition for liquidation of property since the spouses marriage has already been
dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community because they did not
execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should
apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not
submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the childrens legitimes.
Upon Leticias appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be
divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k.
David argues that the Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded
him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.
Issues: 1.Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper.
Held: 1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the
bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1)an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 2 of the
same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records,
only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 1 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 1. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (6) That at the time of the
petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties. Liquidation of the absolute
community of properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia
and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that
the spouses had been living separately since 200q when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June 200f. Having established that Leticia and David
had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

Facts:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland.
They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to
Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the
latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

Issue:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law.

Ruling:
Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if
the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
 Carlos A. Loria vs. Ludolfo P. Muoz

Facts:
Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr. (Muoz) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
with an application for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Carlos A.
Loria (Loria) alleging that he has been engaged in construction under the name, "Ludolfo
P. Muoz, Jr. Construction." In August 2000, Loria visited Muoz in his office in Doa
Maria Subdivision in Daraga, Albay. He invited Muoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a
subcontract of a P50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan.

Issue:
Whether or not Loria must return Munozs P2,000,000.00 under the principle of
unjust enrichment.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at
another persons expense or damage.
In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a
government project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan,
Albay. However, contrary to the parties agreement, Muoz was not subcontracted for the
project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the P2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muozs money without valid basis or
justification. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the
P2,000,000.00 to Muoz.
 WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 03, 2014

Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware
Products Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic made
automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged
that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan,
Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic
made automotive parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent
further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioners office to
respondents office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondents employees had
transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondents products,
especially its plastic made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, respondent discovered that petitioner had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design,
same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as respondents
plastic made automotive parts and to the same customers.
Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in
the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer
bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. Petitioners
manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from
respondents idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, petitioner deliberately
copied respondents products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused respondent
damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the date
of respondents complaint.

Issue: Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the
parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris.

Held:
 Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that funfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high handed method shall give rise
to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may
deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what the
law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair and
legitimate.
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.
 Edelina Ando vs Department of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014

Facts:
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen named Yuichiro Kobayashi.
In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later
married someone else.
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen named Masatomi Ando.
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time she wanted to use her
married name she wanted to use Andows name. However, the Department of Foreign
Affairs DFA told her that same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent
court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Ando is valid until
otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she insists that she should
be issued a passport bearing her married name even without a judicial declaration that her
marriage with Ando is valid because, according to the law, void and voidable marriages
enjoy the presumption of validity until proven otherwise. And also on that juncture, she
prayed that the court recognize her second marriage as valid.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief should prosper.

Held:
No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced. Edelina failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies. When her request for renewal of passport under her married
name was denied, she should have appealed the denial to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport
Act). Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be honored is not proper. The
proper remedy is for her to file a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact.
 VIAS VS. PAREL-VIAS
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

Facts: Glenn Vias (petitioner) and Mary Grace Parel-Vias (respondent) with the latter
already pregnant, were married in April 26, 1999. The baby died in child birth. Petitioner
alleged that the cause of death due to malnourishment was by the respondent's heavy
drinking and smoking during pregnancy. The couple cohabited. The job of the petitioner
was a bartender while the respondent worked as a production engineer.
Sometime in March 2006, the respondent left the conjugal residence which the
petitioner found out that his wife left to Dubai for work. In of which on February 18,
2009, Glenn filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.
Glenn sought professional help which he submitted himself to psychological evaluation
by Clinical Psychologist Dr. Nedy Tayag. Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his
marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship." On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace's personality through
data gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo who knew Mary Grace since
college.
Mary Grace, the eldest among four siblings, is a college graduate and belongs to a middle
class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife.
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during
quarrels. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits.
At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai
and romantically involved with another man. She likewise concluded that the couple's
relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to
each other. Hence, she recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple's
marriage.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Ruling: The instant petition lacks merit. The lack of personal examination or assessment
of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. The testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag, and
Rodelito, and the documentary evidence do not suffice to prove the cause, gravity, and
incurability of the respondent's condition. The evidence merely shows the respondents
outgoing, strong-willed, and no inclination to household chores. Likewise, the
respondents act of living with another man within four years into the marriage cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when
they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in
later.
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or
less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living
together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Graces departure from
their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability
to comply with her obligation to live with her husband. A careful reading of Dr. Tayags
testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were
married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him
of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did
she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondents condition was
grave and incurable.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires.
While the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace
is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenns spouse.
 Celerina J. Santos vs. Ricardo T. Santos
G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Facts:
Upon prior petition by Ricardo that his wife, Celerina, be declared presumptively
dead, the RTC of Tarlac City granted it on July 27, 2007. According to Ricardo, he and
his wife were married in 1980; they first lived in San Juan, but after a year moved to
Tarlac City. Due to business reverses, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as
domestic worker in Hongkong, She applied in an employment agency, and left in
February 1995, never to be hard again. He exerted efforts to locate Celerina, but the same
proved futile; he inquired from his relatives but no one gave him any information; 12
years had since passed between the time she left abroad and the filing of the petition. On
November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision
declaring her presumptively dead with the Court of Appeals. According to her, she
learned about Ricardos petition only in October, 2008, and she could no longer avail of
appeals, motion for reconsideration or new trial. She was deprived of her day in court
when Ricardo alleged she was a resident of Tarlac City, when her true residence was in
Quezon City, their conjugal home; Ricardo left the conjugal home in May, 2008. She also
never left abroad as a domestic worker. The court also did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition since it was never published in a newspaper of general publication; the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor s Office was also not notified on
the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment
declaring presumptive death.

Ruling:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's
judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic
fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
 MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO
G.R. NO 176492, October 20, 2014

Facts:
Leonardo and Marrietas marriage was dissolved by reason of psychologyical
incapacity in 1996, hence Leonardo filed a complaint for partition over their property
consisting of a house and lot,since according to him, there was no more reason to
maintain their co-ownership. In her defense, Marrieta claimed that the property had been
sold to their children Joseph Raymond and Joseph Leo.She also moved for dismissal of
the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC Bacolod City, the action for
partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Per decision of the MTCC, it
ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded moral damages in
favour of Marrieta.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that article 129 of the family code has no
application in the present case, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the case.

Ruling:
No. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages
on the spouses property relations. The SC ruled that what governs them is Art. 147 of the
Family Code. Under this article, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. In the case at bar since
the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, thus, the property is jointly owned by them in equal shares.
 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL
DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA vs. MARIANO TULIAO
G.R. No. 205664, June 09, 2014

Facts: In 2002, Mariano Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of
structure with damages against the Department of Education with MTCCs Tuguegarao
City. He alleged that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land and that a
portion of the said property was allowed by his predecessors in interest to be used by the
Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an access road for the schoolchildren in going to
and from the school. In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being
constructed on the land, he demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the
property. The respondent, however, refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for
reasonable rent, but his demand was also ignored.
In its defense, the DepEd denied the material allegations of the complaint and
averred that it did not state a cause of action. Even if there was, the same was already
barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was adverse,
peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty d50h years. It
also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to vacate. As
owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value. In
2010, the MTCC rendered its decision, ruling that Tuliao was the registered owner of the
subject property and, thus, had a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
said property. Further , it found that respondents possession of the subject property was
merely tolerated by Tuliao. For said reason, his right to recover it was never barred by
laches. As to the structures, the MTCC stated that it could not allow the immediate
removal thereof in view of the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code and
directed Tuliao to exercise his options under said article. The MTCC declared that the
plaintiffs prayer that the structures built on his lot be removed immediately cannot be
allowed in view of the provision of Article 448.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Tuliao has better right over DepEd.
2. Whether DepEd can be compelled to remove the structure built.
Held: 1. Yes. In actions for recovery of possession, the plaintiff must show proof to
support his claim of his right to possession of the property. The defendant in turn must
show proof to controvert the plaintiffs claim; otherwise the court will rule for the
plaintiff. Thus, when a landowner filed an action for recovery of possession against a
public school which built a gymnasium on a parcel of land which the owner allowed the
school to use as an access road for the schoolchildren, and the plaintiff showed as
evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over the property, the lone testimonial
evidence the DepEd presented is not sufficient to controvert the landowners case. In
addition, the landowners claim is not barred by laches when the schools possession of
the property is not adverse, and when the landowner brought suit two years after he
learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium over the property.
2. No. At any rate, the MTCC was fair when it stated that it could not order the
immediately removal of the structures and directed Tuliao to exercise his option under
Article 448, which reads: Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and incase of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
If that would not be feasible or practical for DepEd, its remedy is to file an action
for expropriation.
 HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, REPRESENTED BY REMEDIOS CHAN,
PETITIONERS, vs. PAZ LENTEJAS VAN DER KOLK, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 207266, June 25, 2014

Facts:

Plaintiffs herein are the sole surviving heirs of the late spouses Paciano Yabao
and Mercedes Cano. They are the absolute co-owners of the parcel of land designated as
Lot 2473, situated at Brgy. Capoocan, Calbayog City, containing an area of 6,433 square
meters more or less, declared in Declaration of Real Property ARP No. 96-01015-00398
in the name of the late Paciano Yabao, with an assessed value of 2,760.00. Sometime in
1996, defendant herein asserted claim of ownership and allowed a person to possess the
above-described property notwithstanding vehement opposition thereto by plaintiffs
herein. Notwithstanding demands for the defendant to vacate the premises usurped and
occupied by her, she refused and still continues to refuse, to leave the said premises.

The Heirs of Yabao prayed that they be declared the co-owners and possessors of
a parcel of land designated as Lot 2473 located in Brgy. Capoocan, Calbayog City
(subject lot); that possession thereof be restored to them; and that Van der Kolk be
ordered to pay them attorneys fees, litigation expenses as well as reasonable rental of -
2,000.00 per month.

Issue:

1. WETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE

THE RESOLUTION DECREEING RESPONDENTS (AS PLAINTIFFS) AS THE
LAWFUL CO-OWNERS AND POSSESSORS OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PRESENT CASE

Held:

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned as errors
in several instances. In the case of Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera
Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Incorporated, 24 the Court enumerated such
instances. Thus: For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds
not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following instances: (1) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the
contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration
of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. In the case at
bench, the Court agrees with the observation, analysis and conclusion of the CA. The
several errors committed by the MTCC, which when taken collectively, justify the
reversal of its December 4, 2006 Decision. The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC
erred when it granted the reliefs prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because the same were not
warranted by the allegations in the complaint. The Court notes that the allegations
pertinent to the petitioners cause of action, particularly on their claim of ownership and
right to possession over Lot 2473, were not supported by any document annexed to the
complaint. Mere assertions, as what the petitioners proffered, do not suffice.

Accordingly, the petitioners entitlement to their claims was not proven by

preponderance of evidence. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the MTCC should have,
after it declared Van der Kolk in default, directed the Heirs of Yabao to adduce evidence
to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. After all, he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
 Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation vs. Castro, et al.

G.R. No. 189061, August 6, 2014

Facts:
The petitioner Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation is the lessee of
two parcels of land in Cabanatuan City. Its president, Dr. Manglicmot, is married to
Adoracion Cloma who is the registered owner of the property. Inside said property stands
a residential building, which is now the subject matter of the dispute, owned by the
respondents.
The property has been subjected to different transfers because of foreclosure, until
Adoracions father, Tomas Cloma, bought the two parcels of land from Union Bank in an
auction sale conducted on July 13, 1993. Tomas subsequently leased the property to the
petitioner and thereafter, sold the same to Adoracion. Several suits were brought by the
respondents against the petitioner, including the case at bench, which is an action for
Ownership, Recovery of Possession and Damages.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a lease agreement between the petitioner and the
respondents as regards the residential building.

Ruling:

Yes. Given the existence of the lease, the petitioners claim denying the
respondents ownership of the residential house must be rejected.1wphi1 According to
the petitioner, it is Adoracion who actually owns the residential building having bought
the same, together with the two parcels of land, from her father Tomas, who, in turn,
bought it in an auction sale. The Supreme Court ruled that it is settled that once a contact
of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however
strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better
right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee." Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
 Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr. vs. Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero
G.R. No. 199448, November 12, 2014
Facts:
Complainant Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero and Bernabela N. Obrero initiated a case
for forcible entry against defendant Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr. Complainants claimed that
they are the registered owners of the land in question based on a TCT registered under the
name. They claimed they were in possession thereof based on improvements erected
therein utilized for residential and business purposes prior to the alleged acts of
Respondent who forcible fenced the perimeter of the land with barbed wire. By way of
defense, defendant claimed that the land was sold by complainants to his late father as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Being one of the heirs, he is one of the owners
thereof. In fact, they left a caretaker to oversee the land. Despite the sale, complainants
supposedly attempted to remove the fence and even built concrete structures on the land
using it for dwelling purposes.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant is liable.

Held:
The defendant was held liable. In an ejectment case, title is not involved as the
sole issue is the determination of who is entitled to the physical or material possession of
the premises or possession de facto. Thus, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue but only to determine who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property. As such, any adjudication
of the ownership issue is not final and binding; it is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.
Here, both parties anchor their right of possession on ownership. Between a Deed
of Absolute Sale and a TCT, it is the TCT which must prevail. A certificate of title is
evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the
attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Hence, as
holders of the Torrens title over the subject land, the respondents are entitled to its
possession. Further, in the Deed of Absolute Sale, no sale was perfected as the parties
failed to agree on the purchase price. Thus, defendants claim of possession had no
sufficient basis and it cannot overthrow the attribute of possession attached to the
respondents certificate of title.
Regarding the criminal case involving the Quitclaim, it is immaterial to this
ejectment case. Questions on the validity of a Torrens title are outside the jurisdiction and
competence of the trial court in ejectment proceedings which are limited only to the
determination of physical possession. This is in consonance with the settled doctrine that
questions relating to the validity of a certificate of title during ejectment proceedings are
deemed and proscribed as collateral attack to such title. A Torrens certificate of title
cannot be the subject of collateral attack. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished except in a direct proceeding. Thus,
issues as to the validity of the respondents title can only be definitively resolved in a
direct proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTCs.
VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I.
QUINTOS, JR., ET AL. vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away,
leaving to their 10 children ownership over the subject property. An action for partition
was subsequently brought before the RTC. However, for failure of the parties and their
counsels to appear despite due notice, the case was dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent
siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10
siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled and the Register of Deeds issued a new
one. The respondents subsequently sold their 7/10 undivided share in favor of the spouses
Candelario. The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and damages against
the respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the action for Quieting of Title and damages should prosper.

Ruling:
No. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. The first requisite
was not complied with. Petitioners alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondents, in
2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the
subject lot without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners inability to offer
evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the
ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim.
 Gabriel Jr. et al. vs. Crisologo
G.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2014

Facts:

Carmeling Crisologo for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with

Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L.
Tingga-an.

Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels
of land with a total area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered
by, two (2) certificates of title; that the properties were covered by an Assessment of Real
Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated; that
sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her
properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and
constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her
daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and
verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures
thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00
per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they
reneged on their promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject
properties despite several demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the subject
premises they were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully
holding the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the
subject properties due to petitioners illegal occupation.

Issue:

Whether or not Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels
of land.

Ruling:

Yes. Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.
When it is shown that the plaintiff in a case of accion publiciana had a valid title issued in
her name in 1967, within the period which the Supreme Court held that titles issued over
the same properties were valid; that she has been paying the realty taxes on the said
properties since l969; that she likewise appointed an administrator of the disputed lands,
and more importantly, there is no question that she offered to sell to petitioners the
portions of the subject properties occupied by them, then she deserves to be respected and
restored to her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code.
 Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs.
Ley Construction And Development Corporation
G.R. No 161589, November 24, 2014

Facts:

Penta Pacific leased its properties to Ley Construction. Both parties then entered
into a contract to sell. Ley Construction failed to pay its amortizations prompting Penta
Pacific to file an action for ejectment. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or accion
reivindicatoria.

Ruling:

In resolving, the Supreme Court ruled that, a defendant's claim of possession de

Jure or his averment of ownership does not render the ejectment suit either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary
proceeding that can proceed independently of any claim of ownership. Even when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.