CIVIL LAW
the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
1. HONASAN II VS. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. NO. 159747. APRIL 13, 2004
** Ombudsman recognizes its concurrent -jurisdiction
with other investigative body of the government.
FACTS: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed
an affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), that on 27 July 2003, acrime of coup d
etat was committed by military personnel who
occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo
Honasan, II and early morning og the same date,
Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military
rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement
aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of
support to the chain of command of the AFP and the
Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National
Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which
they believe is the only program that would solve the
ills of society. A sworn statement was also submitted by
AFP Major Perfecto Ragil.
Senator Honasan appeared at the DOJ to file a
Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction
over the case, since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office by a group
of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should
be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan.
He then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano
and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel
in issuing an order, directing him to file his respective
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the
ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no.
95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not
published
HELD: Publication of Laws and
Regulations; Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of
investigation and does not regulate the conduct of
persons or the public, in general.
Petitioners contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not
published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt
the Ombudsmans dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT
founded on a proper reading and application of
jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001,
an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the
Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid
down the rule in the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94
Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations
which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date,
has not yet been modified or reversed.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain
any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or
prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Taada v. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of
the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES
NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general. Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioners
submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has
to be published.
2. CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
NO. L-15127. MAY 30, 1961.
FACTS: Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university
up to the first semester of the fourth year. During all the
school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant Law College, he was awarded scholarship
grants and his tuition fees were returned to him after
ends of the semester. During all the school years in
which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law
college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the
mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law
and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff
enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the
defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees,
because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano
having severed his connection with defendant and
having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of
the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff
left the defendants law college and enrolled for the
last semester of his fourth year law in the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the
college of law of the latter university.
After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he
applied to take the bar examination. To secure
permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of
his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff
petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had
paid back the P1,033.87 which defendant refunded to
him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to
defendant the said sum under protest.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the
scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to
sign the following contract, covenant and agreement:
In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by
the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum
No. 38, on the subject of Scholarship, addressed to
All heads of private schools, colleges and
universities, -- When students are given full or partial
scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are
merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract entered into
between Cui and Arellano University was void as
against public policy.
HELD: It has been consistently held under the principles
relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to
the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize
or uphold a transaction which in its object, operation,
or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the
public welfare, to sound morality, or to civic honesty.
If Arellano University understood clearly the real
essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s.
1949, it should have not entered into a contract of
waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to
sound morality and civic honesty.
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949
is sound policy. Scholarships are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students
in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of
that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of
an educational institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
Good morals? It is good customs; those generally
accepted principles of morality which have received
some kind of social and practical confirmation. The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
and keep them in school is not good customs.
The University of the Philippines which implements
Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted
children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer
to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and
universities of the United States after which our
educational practices or policies are patterned.
In these institutions scholarships are granted not to
attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda value but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest or
a first lien.
** The stipulation in a contract, between a student
and the school, that the students scholarship is good
only if he continues in the same school, and that he
waives his right to transfer to another school without
refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is
contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void
because scholarships are awarded in recognition of
merit and to help gifted students in whom society has
an established interest or a first lien, and not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige
and increase its business potential.
3. LEAL VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
NO. L-65425. NOVEMBER 5, 1987.
FACTS: a document entitled Compraventa, written
entirely in the Spanish language, was executed by the
private respondents predecessors-in-interest, Vicente
Santiago and his brother, Luis Santiago, in favor of
Cirilo Leal, the deceased father of some of the
petitioners, Pursuant to this Compraventa, the title
over the three parcels of land in the name of the
vendors was cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of Cirilo Leal, who immediately took
possession and exercised ownership over the said
lands.
When Cirilo died the subject lands were inherited by
his six children. The properties were either mortgaged
or leased by the petitionerschildren of Cirilo Lealto
their co-petitioners.
Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and
offered to repurchase the subject properties.
Petitioners, however, refused the offer. Consequently,
Vicente Santiago instituted a complaint for specific
performance.
After trial, the court rendered its decision, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the same was still
premature considering that there was no sale nor any
alienation equivalent to a sale.
The petitioners seasonably filed a motion to amend
the dispositive portion of the decision so as to include
an order for the cancellation of the annotations at the
back of the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in their
favor.
the present controversy arose is the abovementioned
Compraventa, more particularly paragraph (b)
thereof, which is now the subject of varying and
conflicting interpretations.
It is admitted by both parties that the phrase they
shall not sell to others these three lots but only to the
seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors is
an express prohibition against the sale of the lots
described in the Compraventa to third persons or
strangers to the contract. The petitioners, endorse the
decision penned by Justice Paras, which states, in
part:
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, there is grave doubt re the validity of the
ostensible resolutory condition here, namely, the
prohibition to sell the lots to persons other than the
vendor (appellant); uncertainly, a prohibition to
alienate should not exceed at most a period of twenty
years, otherwise there would be subversion of public
policy, which naturally frowns on unwarranted
restrictions on the right of ownership.4
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE: Whether the paragraph (b) of Compraventa,
are not contrary to public policy?
HELD: Yes. Art. 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
states: That contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. Public order signifies the public wealpublic
policy.5 Essentially, therefore, public order and public
policy mean one and the same thing. Public policy is
simply the English equivalent of orden publico in Art.
1255 of the Civil Code of Spain.6
One such condition which is contrary to public policy is
the present prohibition to sell to third parties, because
the same virtually amounts to a perpetual restriction
on the right of ownership, specifically the owners right
to freely dispose of his properties. Thus, we hold that
any such prohibition, indefinite and unlimited as to
time, so much so that it shall continue to be
applicable even beyond the lifetime of the original
parties to the contract, is, without doubt, a nullity.
4. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO
G.R. NO. L-68470. OCTOBER 8, 1985.
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines who married Richard Upton, a citizen of the
United States in Hongkong. After 10 years of marriage
and two children, they got divorced in Nevada,
United States of America, where the petitioner
subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn. One year
after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the Regional
Trial Court Branch 115 in Pasay City praying to for the
accounting of the business, the Galleon Shop, and to
be given the right to manage the business, on the
ground that the business is conjugal property. He
further contends that the divorce is not valid and
binding in the Philippines, as it is contrary to local law
and public policy, therefore he has legal standing to
claim said property. On her part, the petitioner filed for
dismissal of the civil case contending that the private
respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because in the divorce
proceedings, by which the alien spouse is bound, the
private respondent agreed that they had no
community property. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the property is located in
the Philippines so the divorce decree has no bearing in
the case. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from
the Filipina spouse, has legal standing on the alleged
conjugal assets, in the Philippines?
HELD: No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines as it is against morals, good customs and
public policy. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which the Philippines may recognize,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada, USA is valid,
thus, in the spirit of comity, it is recognized as also valid
in the Philippines. Hence, the private respondent, as
he is bound by the decision of his own coutry's Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he has no
legal standing in the Philippine court as husband of the
petitioner as the divorce legally dissolved their
marriage. He is further estopped by his own
representation before the foreign Court in the divorce
proceedings, from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. To maintain the petitioner to still be
legally obligated to the divorced husband is a
discrimination against her in her own country. Hence, it
is only just that the petition be granted. The civil case
against petitioner with the RTC was dismissed. Note:
This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when the
Family Code took effect. It became the basis for the
codification of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
5. BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. NO. L-23678. JUNE 6, 1967.
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate
children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived
him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two (2)
wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of
partition claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the
deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be
governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of
two separate wills.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law be applied in the
case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens
successional rights
HELD: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article
10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and
domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should
be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does
not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid. The
Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are
not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.
6. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. JADER
GR NO. 132344. FEBRUARY 7, 2000.
FACTS: In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law
student at the University of the East. He failed to take
the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which
he was given an incomplete grade (INC). He enrolled
for the second semester as a fourth year student, and
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete
grade which was approved by the Dean.
In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean
met to deliberate who among the fourth year students
should be allowed to graduate. Jaders name
appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the
investiture ceremonies and later he gave blowout
celebrations. He thereafter prepared himself for the
bar examination. He took a leave from work for five (5)
months to attend a review class in preparation for the
Bar examination. Upon learning of his deficiency, he
dropped the review class and was not able to take
the Bar examination..
However, he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations because his academic requirements
were not complete because it appears that his INC
rating was not removed.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages alleging that
he suffered moral shock, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was
not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising
from the UEs negligence. He prayed for an award of
moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees
and cost of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be
held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the
case.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for
damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school
to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to where he
or she had already complied with the entire
requirement for the conferment of a degree or
whether they should be included among those who
will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the
result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for
the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of
all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the
essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance
that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar
exams since that is precisely the immediate concern
after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. Petitioners
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and in
misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence
and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
damages; we hold that respondent should not have
been awarded moral damages. It is also respondents
duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent
should have been responsible enough to ensure that
all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order. Certainly, taking
the bar examinations does not only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must
meet.
7. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 81262 AUGUST 25, 1989
FACTS: Respondent. Tobias was employed by
petitioner Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager.
In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which
it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who
actually discovered the anomalies and reported them
his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President
and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner
Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one
week forced leave, not to communicate with the
office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave
the office keys.
When private respondent Tobias returned to work after
the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him
and called him a crook and a swindler. Tobias was attorneys fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the
then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also
instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the
anomalies.
The police investigators submitted a laboratory crime
report clearing private respondent of participation in
the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator submitted a report finding Tobias
guilty. This report however expressly stated that further
investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum
suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing
of criminal charges against him.
Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through
Falsification of commercial document while the fifth
was for of Article 290 of the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints
were dismissed by the fiscal.
In the meantime Tobias received a notice from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision.
However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners
appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor
arbiters decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of
Labors order with the Office of the President. During
the pendency of the appeal with said office,
petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into
a compromise agreement regarding the latters
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
RETELCO. However, petitioner Hendry, without being
asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC of
Manila rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent by ordering petitioners to pay actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
RTC decision to the CA. On the other hand, Tobias
appealed as to the amount of damages.
HELD: The Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent
and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the
fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous
transactions, petitioner Hendry told plaintiff (private
respondent herein) that he was the number one
suspect and to take a one week vacation leave.
The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue
when private respondent returned to work after his
one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work,
Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. Tobby,
you are the crook and swindler in this company.
Considering that the first report made by the police
investigators was submitted only on a later date the
statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless.
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter
the right to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
8. RCPI VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-44748. AUGUST 29, 1986.
FACTS: Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI).
However, at the end of the telegram were the
following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN
WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for
Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages based on
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention
to malign Loreto and that the attached message was
an insider joke between RCPI employees which was
not meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed
liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the
libelous acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was
read by his employees and it affected greatly his
business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of
Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the appellate court. The cause of action of private
respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new
Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract
thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not
being sued for its subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or
precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident now complained of. The
company had not imposed any safeguard against
such eventualities and this void in its operating
procedure does not speak well of its concern for their
clienteles interests. Negligence here is very patent.
This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its
employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of
its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and
conducts its business through its employees. It cannot
now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To
hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the
general public availing of the services of RCPI of an
effective and adequate remedy.
9. PADILLA VS. CA
129 SCRA 559
10. TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO
G.R. NO. L-19671. NOVEMBER 29, 1965.
FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a
prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage
was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain
Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and
Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in
a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However
after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was
single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the
Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She
then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo
Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8,
1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and
her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano
is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit
divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with
her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought
and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the
Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the
other for damages.
11. DONATO VS. LUNA
G.R. NO. L-53642. APRIL 15, 1988.
FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner
Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the
lower court in Manila. This was based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before
the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979,
Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage which
was Donatos second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a
certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato
defensed that his second marriage was void since it
was solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and
Donato had lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a
joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license
was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil
Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until
November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy
pending before the lower court be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the juvenile and domestic relations court on
the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial
question.
HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on
prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused if it
was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage
and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis
of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
12. DELA CRUZ VS. EJERCITO
G.R. NO. L-40895 NOVEMBER 6, 1975
Facts: On May 20, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was
charged with bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Angeles City Branch IV for having married
Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on September 15, 1973
while her prior marriage to Teodoro G. David was
undissolved. The information was filed at the instance
of her first husband (Criminal Case No. 3128). On
August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same
court at its San Fernando Branch III a complaint for the
annulment of her marriage to Sergeant Gaccino on
the ground of duress (Civil Case No. 4188). Defendant
Gaccino did not answer the complaint. Judge
Mariano Castaeda, Jr. ordered the Provincial Fiscal
to investigate whether there was a collusion between
the parties. A special counsel of the Fiscal's office
reported that there was no collusion. . On December
16, 1974 Judge Castaeda rendered a decision
annulling the marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to
Gaccino. No appeal was taken from that decision. It
became final. In view of the annulment of her second
marriage, Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975
a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. The private
prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the
motion.
Issue: whether the bigamy case became moot or
untenable after the second marriage, on which the
prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled
Held: We hold that the finding in the annulment case
that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de
la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is
determinative of her innocence and precludes the
rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy.
To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding
would be unwarranted. As pointed out in the Merced
case, supra, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy
that the second marriage be declared valid if its
validity was questioned in a civil action.
And even supposing arguendo that the decree
annulling the second marriage was questionable or
erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by
default, still that would not prevent the decree from
having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a
void judgment"
13. TE V CA
G.R. NO. 126746. NOVEMBER 29, 2000

FACTS: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on

September 14, 1988. They did not live togetherafter
marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to agirl. Thereafter,
Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted
a second marriage whilemarriage with Liliana was
subsisting. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and
subsequentlyan administrative case (revocation of
engineering license for grossly immoral act) against
Arthurand Julieta Santella (2ndwife of Arthur). Arthur
petitioned for the nullity of his marriage withLiliana.RTC
and Board rendered decision while the petition
for annulment of first marriage waspending.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is

a prejudicial question and had to be resolved
firstbefore criminal and administrative case be
rendered judgment?

HELD: NO. A marriage, even one which is void or

voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declaredotherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it
cannot be used as a prejudicial question to the
priorcriminal case and administrative case against the
petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage wasclearly
a void ab initio. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is
the prevailing rule: the absolutenullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is afinal judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.