CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. In a criminal case, the prosecution filed a motion to take the testimony of its witness by
oral deposition in Laos, Cambodia, citing as its reason that this witness, himself the private
complainant, was sick and of advanced age. The trial court granted the motion. Is the trial court
correct?

No, the trial court is not correct. The applicable rule is Sec. 15, Rule 119 that reads:

When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as examination at the trial.

While the condition of the private complainant as being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of the Section 15, the same rule provides that he should be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. To take the deposition of a prosecution witness
elsewhere other than before the court where the case is pending would not only deprive the accused of
his right to attend the proceedings, but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witnesss deportment. It would also violate the right of the accused to meet the witnesses
face to face.

(RUA: For conditional examination of a defense witness before trial in a criminal case, please
read Secs. 12 and 13 of Rule 119. Note that the conditional examination of a witness for the accused
may be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated
by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior
court to be designated therein.)

It is different in civil cases. Rules 23 to 28 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allow the taking
of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,
notary public, or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or
before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in
a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party. (See: Harry L. Go et al. v. People et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012)

2. In what instances may habeas corpus be resorted to as post-conviction remedy?

The writ of habeas corpus may be resorted to as post-conviction remedy in any of the following
exceptional circumstances:

a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a

person;
 b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
c) the imposed penalty is excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
Under the Rule on DNA Evidence, habeas corpus may also be resorted to as post-conviction
remedy where the result of the DNA examination is favorable to the accused.

Thus, the writ of habeas corpus was held available where an accused was deprived of his right
against self-incrimination. (cited in de Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, Nov.
17, 2004).

But habeas corpus is not available as post-conviction remedy where the appeal is still pending.
(People v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 126170, Aug. 27, 1998)

3. What is the rule regarding Post-Conviction DNA Testing?

The rule on post-conviction DNA testing is expressed in A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Effective Oct. 15,
2007, as follows:

Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available,

without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final
and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is
relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction. (Rule on DNA Evidence, A.M. No. 06-11-5-
SC, Effective Oct. 15, 2007)

Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the
Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to
the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, if
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict,
unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.

A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the
petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.

4. As a general rule, courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. What are the exceptions?

The exceptions are:

1) When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused;

2) When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justrice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions;
 3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;

4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

5) When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

7) When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

8) When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

9) When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007)

5. C and L, who were charged as co-conspirators, were convicted of violation of R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in a judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan, imposing upon
each of them the penalty of imprisonment from six years and one month to twelve years and one
month. They filed separate appeals to the Supreme Court by filing their respective petitions for
review on certiorari. Ls appeal was dismissed on technicality. During the pendency of the appeal, C
died.

a) Should Cs appeal be dismissed on the ground that his death has rendered his appeal moot
and academic as his death has already extinguished his criminal liability?

No. Cs appeal should not be dismissed. The two petitions are so intertwined that the
absolution of C is ultimately determinative of the absolution of L. The exoneration of C will necessarily
signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on L. Thus, the SC, in this instance, has to
ascertain the merits of Cs appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against L.

Courts must still decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following instances: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (4) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

In the problem presented, the exceptional character of the appeal of C and L in relation to each
other, as well as the higher interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of Cs
petition and not dismiss it outright on the ground of mootness.

b) Does the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan as against C benefit L whose appeal
was dismissed on technicality?
 Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: An appeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. The phrase did not appeal
applies also to a co-accused who withdrew his appeal, failed to file an appellants brief, or filed a notice
of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same. The Supreme Court has at various
times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-
accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. Thus, the foregoing provision should be applied
to L whose appeal was dismissed on technicality. (Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.
140656, Sept. 13, 2007; Lindong v. People, et al., G.R. No. 154482, Sept. 13, 2007.)

6. The accused, who claims that he was illegally arrested, refused to enter a plea when
arraigned; whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for him. May he still question the
validity of his arrest?

Yes. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007).
Thus, the accused may still question the legality his arrest, etc. where, at the arraignment, it is the court
that entered the plea of not guilty for him.

7. Frank, who was 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, was charged
with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Crediting the accused with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the RTC rendered judgment sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal. The trial
court, however, suspended Franks sentence and ordered his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth, he being a juvenile in conflict with law. Is the trial court correct in
suspending Franks sentence?

No, the trial court is not correct.

Art. 192 of PD No. 603 provides that the benefits of the law on suspension of sentence shall not
apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to
one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted
of an offense by the Military Tribunals.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC also provides that the benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a
juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the
time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.

It is clear, therefore, that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of a suspended
sentence. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty
therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed,
but the imposable penalty which determines the disqualification of a juvenile.

Thus, where the youthful offender is charged with an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, he is not entitled to the benefit of suspended sentence although
the penalty actually imposed by the court is, say, reclusion temporal.

R.A. No. 9344, which took effect on May 20, 2006, did not change the foregoing ruling. Section
38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides the following: Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

R.A. No. 9344 merely amended Art. 192 of P.D. 603 in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Art. 192 of P.D. 603 and in Sec. 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344. Hence, juveniles who have been
convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death
are disqualified from having their sentence suspended.

Take note, however, that in People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20, cited
in People v. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, it was held that although
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the suspension
of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond
the age of 21 can no longer avail himself of the provisions of Secs. 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to suspension
of his sentence because this has already become moot and academic.

8. May the offended party in estafa and violation of BP 22 arising from the single act of
issuing a bouncing check intervene through a private prosecutor in both criminal cases?

Yes. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Rules of Court allow the
offended party to intervene through a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings.
However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in
either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the
law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In
short, while two crimes arise form a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. (Rodriquez v.
Ponferrada, et al., G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)
 9. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused files a demurrer to evidence. In
resolving the demurrer to evidence, should the trial court likewise decide the civil aspect of the case
and determine the civil liability of the accused?

The answer should be qualified as follows:

a) If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court:

If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived his
right to present evidence. In this situation, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil
aspect, unless the offended party has waived the civil action, or has reserved his right to institute it
separately, or has instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.

In case of conviction, the trial court should state in its judgment the civil liability or damages to
be recovered by the offended party from the accused.

In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; or (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.

But if the accused is acquitted and there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, then the civil action based
on the delict is deemed extinguished.

b) If the demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court:

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence because the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient, the accused may present evidence regarding both the criminal and civil aspect
of the case.

If the court grants the demurrer to evidence because the evidence so far presented by the
prosecution is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence
is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. Thus, if the court grants the demurrer,
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case shall proceed, except if the trial court finds that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R.
No. 165496, Feb. 12, 2007)

10.a. The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. May the
prosecution appeal from the order granting demurrer to evidence?

No. An order granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused is an adjudication of the
case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. An appeal from said order would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. This is based on the finality-of-acquittal rule which means that
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.

b) If appeal is not a remedy against an order granting demurrer to evidence, what then is the
remedy?

The remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon a
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In Sanvicente v.
People, 441 Phil. 139 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA which reversed the
acquittal of the accused upon a demurrer to evidence, holding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity
of a certain letter marked as Exh. LL which positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime charged.

To put it another way, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate
the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To this rule, there are exceptions as follows: (1) when
the prosecution is denied due process, as in the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72670,
Sept. 12, 1986, where the Supreme Court declared the sham trial a mock trial, and the predetermined
judgment of acquittal was held unlawful and void ab initio; (2) when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.

Thus, double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity
to present its case or where the trial was a sham. (People v. Laguio Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16,
2007)

In People v. Sandiganbayan and Barcenas, G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, it was held that
although the grant of demurrer is not subject to appeal it is still reviewable through certiorari under
Rule 65.

The Supreme Court ruled, in Ysidoro v. Hon. Leonardo-de Castro et al., G.R. No. 171513, Feb. 6,
2012, that the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated
on two exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion
by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double
jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve review of facts
and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question
of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the judgment is
legally correct. In the other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per
se void on jurisdictional grounds. (RUA: A petition purportedly brought under Rule 65 should be
dismissed if it does not raise any jurisdictional ground, as when, for example, it seeks to have the
evidence reviewed by the higher court.)
 11. Jayson was involved in a vehicular collision where Nestor, the driver of the other vehicle,
died. Evangeline, Nestors wife, sustained only minor injuries, although their vehicle was heavily
damaged. Jayson was charged with two offenses before the MeTC of Pasig City, namely: (1) Criminal
Case No. 82367, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries; and (2) Criminal Case No.
82366, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Jayson pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted the penalty of public censure. Invoking his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367, he moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
on the ground of double jeopardy, but the trial court denied Jaysons motion. Is the trial court correct
in refusing the quashal of the information?

No, the trial court is not correct. In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro et al., G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17,
2010, the Supreme Court, held that double jeopardy has already set in. Citing the opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in the earlier case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, March 29, 1968, it said: as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.

12. If the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated homicide, but on appeal the appellate
court found him guilty of attempted homicide as the accused had insisted all along, may he apply for
probation?

Yes, as held by the Supreme Court (En Banc) in Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, Dec. 13,
2011.

Arnel Colinares was charged before the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, with frustrated
homicide. Convicted of frustrated homicide, he was meted the penalty of from 2 years and 4 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to
the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. He then went to the SC on petition for review on
certiorari. The SC found him guilty of attempted homicide only as the injury he had inflicted on the
victim was not fatal. The SC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Is Colinares entitled to
probation? Yes. The SC held: In appealing his case, Colinares raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction for attempted
homicide only, which crime calls for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, he sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the SCs finding that Colinares was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty.

13. May a judgment be promulgated in a criminal case even in the absence of the counsel for
the accused?

Yes. The presence of counsel for the accused is not indispensable for promulgation. (Icdang v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185960, Jan. 25, 2012)
 14. Is the fresh period rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005, applicable in criminal cases?

Yes. In Yu v. Samson-Tatad, et al., G.R. No. 170979, Feb. 9, 2011, the SC ruled that its
pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14,
2005, should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Neypes is also applicable in special proceedings where record on appeal is required. (Zayco, et
al. v. Hinlo Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008)