TECHNOLOGY FOCUS

Offshore Facilities

In the relentless quest for reserves replacement, global upstream oil and gas opera- Ian G. Ball, SPE, Subsea Domain Ltd.,
tors continue their migration into deeper waters. The latest generation of subsea was retained by Reliance Industries,
production facilities is widely applicable with confidence when specified correctly. Bombay, as Senior Advisor for deepwa-
However, selecting the optimum associated surface-processing facilities, and how ter challenges to open the KG basin off
best to link them to the subsea system, generally requires a more location-specific
deliberation. the east coast of India. Previously, he
was with Shell where he specialized in
While field developments in established deepwater provinces such as the Gulf of deepwater subsea and floating produc-
Mexico, Brazil, and west Africa continue to expand, new deepwater regions such tion, storage, and offloading field devel-
as in Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal off the east coast of India are being opment with assignments in Norway,
opened. However, even the well-established structural-design standards evolved
UK, and US Gulf of Mexico. Ball also
by the industry for the Gulf of Mexico were recently shown by hurricanes Katrina
and Rita to need a further overhaul in the way they are applied. had assignments in The Netherlands and
Brunei. He earned a BS degree in elec-
An unprecedented scarcity of equipment and resources suitable for deepwater trical engineering from the University
drilling and construction also has driven up the unit costs and project durations of Manchester Institute of Science and
sharply for deepwater developments in recent times. Technology. Ball cochaired the 2008 and
All these factors have, collectively, encouraged the industry to seek and qualify an 2009 SPE Annual Technical Conference
expanded and more flexible range of modular and integrated field-development and Exhibition Program Committees,
solutions that can be optimized and applied more quickly in a reliable and cost- and he serves on the SPE Executive
effective manner for the wider spectrum of deepwater challenges ahead. Among Advisory Committee and on the JPT
the most notable is the industrys first floating-drilling, -production, -storage, and Editorial Committee.
-offloading-based system that went into operation in deep water offshore west
Africa during the past year.

These innovative floating and subsea deepwater solutions, when demonstrated

by analyses and tests to be truly fit for purpose, are, however, only of meaningful
value if upstream operators respond proactively with practical ways to apply them
in the field quickly and confidently. JPT

Offshore Facilities additional reading available

at OnePetro: www.onepetro.org

OTC 19929 The Greater-Plutonio Riser Tower by Daniel de la Cruz,

BP, et al.

OTC 19857 Tahiti Spar as a Wet-Tree Concept by P. Griffin, Chevron,

et al.

SPE 124158 Northwest Hutton: Decommissioning the UK North Seas

First Large Platform With a Fixed Steel Jacket: Topside Removal
by Chris R. Farrow, BP, et al.

54 JPT FEBRUARY 2010

OFFSHORE FACILITIES
Offshore-Pipeline and -Riser IntegrityThe Big Issues
The dominant corrosion and integrity
issues affecting offshore rigid and flex-
ible pipelines and risers in the North
Sea were examined. For many aging
rigid pipelines, extension of life beyond
the design criteria is increasingly com-
mon, and the increasingly dominant
integrity issues are associated with
internal and external corrosion. The
use of flexible pipes is increasing expo-
nentially, and by definition they are
aging. Over the coming years, an
increasing number of flexible pipes
will reach the end of their design life;
therefore, prudent operators should
focus on understanding the integrity
status of their flexible pipes.
Introduction
Some of the earliest pipelines installed
in the North Sea have experienced a
wide variety of issues that required
intervention. One dominant issue was
pipeline instability. The early 1990s
saw issues with hot high-pressure
pipelines and upheaval or lateral buck-
ling. Failure of an early pipe-in-pipe
oil-line construction provided design
lessons that have benefited subse-
quent designs.
More recently, with the use of
corrosion-resistant alloys, risk from
hydrogen-induced stress cracking from
overprotection by cathodic-protection
systems has become a major issue.
However, this issue can now be resolved
This article, 1,000th written by Senior
Technology Editor Dennis Denney, con-
tains highlights of paper SPE 125060,
Offshore-Pipeline and -Riser Integrity
The Big Issues, by Jonathan Marsh
and Phil Duncan, J.P. Kenny and Ionik
Consulting, and Ian MacLeod, MCS,
prepared for the 2009 SPE Offshore
Europe Oil & Gas Conference & Exhibition,
Aberdeen, 811 September. The paper
has not been peer reviewed.
For a limited time, the full-length paper is available free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.
JPT FEBRUARY 2010
at the engineering stage by compliance
with design guidelines.
Compared to rigid pipelines, the
operational experience of flexible pipes
is relatively limited. The complex com-
posite nature of flexible-pipe construc-
tion means that there is a large range
of failure modes that occur in service.
A key conclusion from various studies
was that although there was a spread
of failure modes occurring in service,
breaches to the outer sheaths of flexible
pipes was the most common issue.
Internal Corrosion of Rigid
Pipelines and Risers
The primary internal-corrosion threats
vary for different pipeline types. Broadly,
these threats can be divided into water-
injection pipelines, multiphase oil- and
gas-production pipelines, and oil- and
dry-gas-transport lines.
Water-Injection Pipelines. The two
primary mechanisms for internal cor-
rosion of water-injection pipelines are
oxygen corrosion from poor deaera-
tion practice and microbial-influenced
corrosion (MIC) from poor hypochlo-
rite and biociding treatment. From
experience, MIC appears much more
of a threat than oxygen corrosion. In a
study of 23 pipelines, nine failed. The
failures were all attributed to MIC,
and the average life was approximate-
ly 8 years, with some as short as 4
years. The typical corrosion rate was 2
mm/a. As a result, some operators have
installed high-density-polyethylene
water-injection pipelines.
Multiphase-Production Pipelines. CO2
Corrosion. Despite the best efforts of the
chemical companies, various aspects of
CO2 corrosion continue to be an issue.
Where corrosion-inhibitor availability is
maintained, general corrosion of pipe-
lines usually is well controlled.
Problems usually are associated with
the following.
Areas of localized corrosion caused
by a lack of corrosion-inhibitor avail-
ability or systemic underdosing (oil
and gas)
Underscale or underdeposit corro-
sion (oil)
Preferential weld corrosion (oil and
gas)
Lack of corrosion-inhibitor availabil-
ity, or systemic underdosing, remains
a major problem. With older pipelines,
where an extension of life beyond the
original design life is common, it is
especially important that these issues
be dealt with because the remain-
ing wall thickness may require high
corrosion-inhibitor availability. This
is achievable but requires substantial
effort by the operator.
In multiphase pipelines, preferential
weld corrosion has been found to be
a substantial problem. Many corro-
sion inhibitors are highly effective
against parent-metal corrosion, but
are far less effective against weld or
heat-affected-zone corrosion. This is
especially problematic for 12% Ni
type welds.
In some older multiphase pipelines
with higher water cuts, there is evi-
dence of MIC taking place, even when
pipelines are hot and have reasonable
flow. Several riser-topside leaks have
been attributed to this mechanism.
Evidence from reduced H2S generation
and the positive effect on corrosion
control from biocide treatment support
this theory.
Erosion. Erosion is a problem that
can affect both new assets and older
facilities. The best way of maintaining
control of the risk is by solids monitor-
ing, well control, and flow modeling.
Oil- and Dry-Gas-Transport Pipe-
lines. Problems have been caused
55
predominantly by external corrosion.
For oil lines, CO2 corrosion usually
appears to be relatively well controlled
by corrosion inhibition, except when
specific problems with underdosing
and corrosion-inhibitor availability
have been noted. The dominant cor-
rosion issues in oil-transport lines
appear to be associated with decreas-
ing flow rates over time, leading to
wax/asphaltene deposits and water
dropout, which has led to increased
risk from MIC. The flow rate of the
crude-oil stream must be maintained
at a velocity greater than 1 m/s. As
the oil-flow rate drops below 1 m/s,
there is a rapid drop in the water-
entrainment capability of the crude
oil; for light crudes flowing at very low
velocities (<0.2 m/s), even 0.2% water
entrainment may be difficult.
A second issue is the problem of
sour-service compatibility. Much of the
export/transport-pipeline infrastructure
in the UK sector of the North Sea is not
fully sour-service compliant. Strict con-
trols on H2S content are often in place.
This is becoming problematic because
production from many older facilities
contains increasing levels of H2S, caus-
ing field/well souring.
External Corrosion of Rigid
Pipelines and Risers
Anode Depletion. With respect to
external-corrosion threats, anode de-
pletion is an increasingly common
phenomenon below the water line
as pipelines age. Measured cathod-
ic-protection levels continue to be
adequate even after 30 years of ser-
vice. However, the condition of sacri-
ficial-anode systems is of concern with
respect to providing cathodic protec-
tion for the 15- to 20-year extended
life. Most of the riser and spoolpiece
anodes are in excess of 75% depleted.
Pipeline anodes have a high degree of
wastage, especially near the pipeline
ends. Therefore, the current anode
materials are inadequate to protect the
facilities for the predicted remaining
15- to 20-year life.
Coating Degradation. At and above the
water line, riser coatings often passed
the end of their service life in the late
1990s but were not renewed because
of low oil prices and reduced fabric-
maintenance spending. Anticorrosion
coatings do not last indefinitely. Even
left undisturbed, a paint system on a
56
riser exposed to a North Sea marine
environment is likely to remain intact
for less than 10 years.
Less visible is corrosion under pas-
sive fire protection or insulation. Also,
many riser topsides, while not insu-
lated, are coated with intumescent
passive fire protection. Similar in con-
cept to corrosion under insulation,
cracking in intumescent passive fire
protection can lead to water ingress
into the crack and corrosion of the
riser. The corrosion scale (5 to 6 times
more voluminous than the steel it
replaces) then pushes against the cov-
ering, extending the crack and allow-
ing more water penetration, which
leads to more corrosion.
Integrity of Flexible
Risers and Pipelines
Since 2001, the operational experience
of flexible pipe in terms of riser-years
has increased by more than a factor of
three. There is also a related increase
in the number of monitored cases of
damage, degradation, and failure. A
growing number of flexible-pipe assets
are reaching an operational experience
of 20 to 25 years. This represents
the original flexible-pipe design life in
many cases.
Previous studies concluded that
approximately 90% of flexible-pipe
damage and failure cases occur in the
first 4 years of operation. Should
flexible-pipe failure rates follow other
industry failure databases, it is possible
that there may be an increase in late-
life failures as the hardware reaches its
wear-out phase.
Effective Integrity Management. As
hardware ages, there is an increased
industry focus on the life-extension
potential of flexible-pipe systems. To
ensure a realistic target, it is essential
to have a well-documented operational
history of each flexible pipe in service.
This documentation normally is gener-
ated through an integrity-management
system and should cover the full life
cycle of the flexible pipe. Generally,
an effective integrity-management sys-
tem should ensure that a risk-based
approach is used to generate a spe-
cific integrity-management strategy.
This strategy will be used to define
the inspection, monitoring, testing,
analysis, and management measures
that must be implemented to ensure
the ongoing fitness for purpose of the
flexible-pipe system. An important
part of this system must include feed-
back from the periodic review of the
strategy to readdress any changes in
risk and the corresponding modifica-
tion of the strategy.
An integrity-management strategy in
place through the life of a flexible-pipe
system cannot guarantee that a flexible
pipe will be suitable for life exten-
sion. However, it will ensure that an
operator has the best possible chance
to extend the life on the basis of known
operating parameters through the life
of each flexible pipe. If operational
parameters (e.g., annulus condition,
temperature, pressure, bore-fluid com-
position, and anomalies) are not well
understood through the past life of a
flexible pipe, then it is likely that con-
servative assumptions will have to be
made with regard to the potential for
life extension.
Annulus Flooding of Flexible Pipes.
There are three key failure modes that
must be considered as a result of an
outer-sheath breach and flooding of
the annulus.
Corrosion-fatigue failure of armor
wires
General corrosion leading to metal
loss and failure of the armor wires
Stress-corrosion cracking of armor
wires
To mitigate risks associated with
flooding of the riser annulus, it is
important to understand the ongoing
condition of the annulus. The main
method used to perform this task is
vacuum-testing techniques. Inspection
contractors are developing inspection
technologies to provide an improved
understanding of the internal condition
of the riser armoring materials deep
within the annulus.
Conclusions
For rigid pipelines in aging assets
where design life has been exceed-
ed, the dominant integrity issues are
linked to internal and external cor-
rosion. For flexible pipes, although
the range of potential failure modes
is relatively large, breaches of the
outer sheath with subsequent seawater
ingress is the most common problem.
All of these issues can be controlled.
However, this requires knowledgeable
personnel, effective design, compre-
hensive testing, and effective corro-
sion-management systems. JPT
JPT FEBRUARY 2010
OFFSHORE FACILITIES

Post-Mortem Analysis of MODUs

in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Several hurricanes have passed through

the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) resulting in
mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs)
parting moorings or collapsing, but
none have come close to the devasta-
tion caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, in August and September 2005.
Twenty semisubmersible MODUs suf-
fered significant mooring impairment,
and eight jackups were declared total
losses (with many more suffering addi-
tional settlement and other damage). In
the aftermath of these hurricanes, which
followed Hurricanes Lili and Ivan, the
industry re-examined and upgraded the
standards for setting MODUs.

Overview of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina
moved through the US GOM. Katrina
was the second Category-5 hurri-
cane of the 2005 Atlantic season. In
September 2005, Hurricane Rita also
tracked through the GOM. Hurricane
Rita reached Category-5 strength
before entering the warm waters of the
oil- and gas-exploration regions in the
central GOM where it passed over the
deeper outer-continental-shelf (OCS)
structures as a Category-4 hurricane.
Rita weakened to a Category 3 before
making landfall along the upper coast
of Texas.
This article, written by Senior Technology
Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights
of paper OTC 20144, Post-Mortem
Analysis of MODUs in Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, by Malcolm Sharples,
Offshore: Risk and Technology Consulting
and John Stiff, ABSG Consulting, pre-
pared for the 2009 Offshore Technology
Conference, Houston, 47 May. The
paper has not been peer reviewed.
Copyright 2009 Offshore Technology
Conference. Reproduced by permission.
Fig. 1Trajectory of some of the MODU failures in Hurricane Rita.
Sixteen semisubmersible MODUs were
in the vicinity of Hurricane Katrina, with
two other MODUs stacked, undergoing
repairs. Of these MODUs, five suffered
complete mooring failure, two had partial
failure, and one incurred limited anchor
slippage. Most of the semisubmersibles
were on the less-severe west side of
the storm track. However, Hurricane
Rita passed to the south of most of the
semisubmersible MODU fleet leading to
more MODUs being exposed to severe
conditions. Seven semisubmersibles suf-
fered complete mooring failure, four suf-
fered partial failure, and one had limited
anchor slippage.
The route of Hurricane Rita prob-
ably was the worst possible regarding
the number of jackups exposed. Many
of the jackups were in water depths
where the storm was greater than the
design extremes, and in many cases the
storm was greater than the 100-year
extreme for the location. During these
hurricanes, there were approximately
90 jackups in the GOM. Of those, 25
jackups were impacted by Katrina and
54 were impacted by Rita. Two were
a total loss in Katrina, and six were a
total loss in Rita. Of those that survived
impact, seven were surprising survivals
in Hurricane Katrina and sixteen were
surprising survivals in Hurricane Rita. Of
the jackups damaged, but not destroyed,
only three independent-leg jackups and
two mat-supported jackups needed to
return to the shipyard for repair. Five
independent-leg jackups and four mat-
supported jackups were repaired on
location and returned to work.
Semisubmersible MODUs
Eighteen semisubmersible MODUs were
reported as being in the proximity of
Hurricane Katrina. Four were within 25
miles of Katrinas storm track, with the

The full-length paper is available for purchase at OnePetro: www.onepetro.org.

JPT FEBRUARY 2010 57

Diamond Ocean Voyager and Noble Jim
Thompson almost coincident with the
storm track. Another four MODUs were
within 50 miles of Katrinas storm track.
At the time of Hurricane Rita, three semi-
submersible MODUs were within 25
miles of the storm track and another four
were within 50 miles of the storm track.
Component Failures. Data were col-
lected on mooring failures, supplement-
ed by data from failures in Hurricanes
Lili and Ivan. It is important to know
where mooring lines fail and how far
anchors are dragged because the poten-
tial to cause damage to subsea equip-
ment is governed by what is dragged
over the seabed.
Most striking was the number of
mooring lines that failed at the fairlead:
more than 80% of the line failures
occurred at, or close to, the fairlead
and, hence, did not result in a dragged
mooring component. For a drifting
MODU to not drag any component
across the seabed, all the lines must
break at the fairlead, and there were
only two cases in which less than 100 ft
of line was dragged beneath the hull.
There were few cases of dragged
anchors. In most cases, the anchors
held well, and managed to hold a load
greater than the mooring-line strength.
In some cases, the anchors slipped up to
a few thousand feet before resetting suf-
ficiently for the mooring line to break,
but that appeared to be the exception.
Mooring Failures. The offshore indus-
try has been extremely successful in
evacuating platforms in a timely fash-
ion ahead of hurricanes and without
loss of life. In the 2004 and 2005
hurricane seasons, there were some
small spills from damaged pipelines,
but these were minor compared to
potential losses. Also, the spills may not
have been related to MODU-mooring
failures. Fig. 1 shows the trajectory of
some of the MODUs that suffered fail-
ures in Hurricane Rita.
It was in the areas of asset loss and
industry reputation that the greatest
damage occurred. There was a percep-
tion (exacerbated by lack of understand-
ing of the details) that the industry had
not done a good job and that the drifting
MODUs were responsible for much of
the shut-in production. This perception
was misinformed: Even though there
was a large number of fixed platforms
destroyed and pipelines damaged, result-
58
ing in the majority of the GOM pro-
duction being shut in for months, the
vast majority of the damage was related
directly to hurricane loads on the infra-
structure, not caused by drifting MODUs.
The greatest drifting-MODU damage,
caused by dragged anchors, was to the
MARS oil-/natural-gas-export lines. This
damage could have resulted in the field
and its entire production pass-through
being shut in for 3 months. The actual
consequences, however, were more than
an order of magnitude less because the
facility had been independently subject
to severe wind damage that resulted in
an 8-month shut-in.
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike
Fortunately, the 2006 and 2007 hur-
ricane seasons were relatively benign,
thereby allowing companies to imple-
ment necessary MODU modifications
and become more familiar with a risk-
based approach to MODU setting. It
was not until 2008 that the MODU fleet
was put to a real test. On 1 September
2008, Hurricane Gustav, a Category-3
hurricane, passed several MODUs
before landfall west of the Mississippi
delta. On 13 September Hurricane Ike
made landfall at Galveston, Texas, hav-
ing passed over several MODUs.
Hurricane Gustav was a relatively
normal storm and was not partic-
ularly large, so it affected only the
MODUs it passed directly over. There
were three semisubmersible MODUs
close to its path, with the Transocean
Amirante almost directly in the path.
The Transocean Amirante stayed near
its location, but did part seven of its
eight mooring lines. No other MODUs
were reported to have suffered any
other mooring damage.
Hurricane Ike was a strong Category-2
storm when it passed over the main
drilling areas, with a very large radius
of maximum winds and it generated
its largest waves many miles north of
its track. The size of the storm exposed
MODUs to high winds for a much
longer time than would normally be
expected for a strong Category-2 storm.
Of approximately 10 semisubmersibles
in the path, two MODUs parted all
their moorings and went adrift, both of
which were close to the storm eye, and
three MODUs suffered some level of
mooring-system damage but remained
near their location. Study is continuing
regarding why the mooring lines part-
ed, and new lessons are anticipated.
Hurricanes Katrina
and RitaJackup MODUs
The results from Hurricane Katrina show
that the Ocean Warwick and Rowan New
Orleans were overloaded by a factor of
approximately 2.5. Seven jackups in
the path of the storm were similarly
overloaded and survived and, thus, were
termed surprising survivals. Two other
jackups were marginally overloaded and
were termed expected survivals.
Hurricane Rita caused more dam-
age to the jackup fleet than any storm
worldwide previously. Six jackups failed
completely: GSF Adriatic VII drifted
118 miles northwest, GSF High Island III
drifted 108 miles northwest, Rowan Fort
Worth was never found, Rowan Halifax
sank on location, Rowan Louisiana drift-
ed 103 miles northwest and was subse-
quently repaired, and the Rowan Odessa
sank near location. These jackups were
estimated to be structurally overloaded
by a factor exceeding 2. Sixteen jackups
were determined to be surprising sur-
vivals. Of these, some were overloaded
by a factor exceeding 2.5. Four of the
mat-supported jackups were reported to
have moved, but without damage to any
structures or any consequence to wells.
Another point of note was the GSF High
Island II, which settled on location with
some structural failure of the legs.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
some of the drilling contractors under-
took extensive and detailed hindcast
studies to ascertain the causes of the
jackup failures. These studies often
included the effects of increasing the
air gap.
In Hurricane Ike, two independent-
leg jackups became total losses. The
reasons for the losses were still being
investigated at the time of writing,
although both rigs were subjected to
forces well in excess of design.
Jackup Performance
The structural performance of the
jackups, without exception, was much
greater than anticipated. There were
no jackups that failed in hindcast site-
specific metocean conditions that were
below the marine-operating-manual
design condition for comparable water
depth and soil conditions. While all the
data on soils were not available or not
known, in sites with known data, there
were no unexpected foundation under-
performances (i.e., those that failed all
exceeded the preload values used to site
the jackup). JPT
JPT FEBRUARY 2010
OFFSHORE FACILITIES
MA D6: A Fast-Track Deepwater Project
The MA D6 field-development project
in 1100 m of water is the first deep-
water development on the east coast
of India. The MA D6 project has been
one of the fastest deepwater projects
of its size involving a large amount of
technical content in a location with
minimal established infrastructure.
The full-length paper describes the
technical aspects of the project and
the resulting designs that were select-
ed, and it outlines the logistical issues
associated with this first deepwater
and fast-track project in the region.
Subsea System Architecture
The MA D6 field is in the KG D6
Block 60 km from the east coast of
India and is exposed to the eastern
monsoon from April until September
and to cyclones in the following
months. This limits the safe and effi-
cient operations of offshore construc-
tion vessels to a window extending
from December to April.
The occurrence of cyclones led the
operator to select a floating produc-
tion, storage, and offloading (FPSO)
vessel equipped with a disconnect-
able turret buoy that required a riser
system designed for both connected-
and disconnected-turret-buoy situa-
tions. The limited working window
caused the project installation to be
This article, written by Assistant Tech-
nology Editor Karen Bybee, contains
highlights of paper OTC 20174, MA
D6Going Beyond the Limits of Deep
Water Fast Track Projects, by Georges
Michel, Willy Gauttier, and Pierre
Savy, Technip, originally prepared for
the 2009 Offshore Technology Con-
ference, Houston, 47 May. The paper
has not been peer reviewed.
Copyright 2009 Offshore Technology
Conference. Reproduced by permission.
The full-length paper is available for purchase at OnePetro: www.onepetro.org.
60
split into two phases: one before the
monsoon season of 2008 to allow
first oil on arrival of the FPSO and
the second one the following year for
the full production system. However,
the engineering design of the whole
riser system was needed at the early
stage of the project to address all
the interferences between the various
risers during installation and opera-
tions and to define all the riser equip-
ment in a pliant-wave configuration
(Fig. 1), such as buoyancy modules,
riser-anchoring piles, and tethers
and clamps.
The field production system is
based on the production of six wells
through a production manifold, the
injection of part of the produced gas
into the reservoir by a satellite well,
and the export of the gas to the future
KG D6 gas-development field though
a gas-export manifold (GEM).
The four 8-in.-inside-diameter (ID)
flexible production risers connect the
FPSO to the production manifold, the
four 8-in.-ID gas-export flexible risers
connect the FPSO to the GEM, and
the gas-injection well is connected
directly to the FPSO with a 6-in.-ID
flexible riser/flowline. Each subsea
tree is linked to the production mani-
fold with 6-in.-ID flexible flowlines/
jumpers, and control of all the subsea
structures is achieved by a dynamic-
umbilical connection between the
FPSO and the production manifold
and with static umbilical jumpers
connecting the production mani-
fold to the seven subsea trees and
the GEM .
Phase 1 of the project consisted of
the addition of two flexible produc-
tion risers, the gas-injection riser, and
two production jumpers and associat-
ed equipment, totaling 14 km of lines
out of an overall total of 32 km, and
their installation together with the
Fig. 1Pliant-wave riser system.
free-issued dynamic umbilical and
two umbilical jumpers. Installation
of the moored turret buoy and the
production manifold was performed
by the main contractor.
First Challenge: Flexible-
Structures Design
It was important to determine rapidly
the flexible-riser structure designs
and lengths to confirm the orders of
raw material to meet the delivery date
because the manufacturing slots in
the factory were very tight. This was
a challenge because some of the basic
pieces of information required for the
design were still to be confirmed.
The supply scope for the riser sys-
tem of the MA D6 field development,
issued in December 2006, had very
limited design and functional speci-
fications. The first production risers
that were proposed were designed
for mild operating temperatures
and without any specific thermal-
insulation requirement. Hence, the
construction of the riser was very
conventional, and a polyamide ther-
moplastic was selected for the pres-
sure sheath.
While the procurement of raw
material already had begun for the
JPT FEBRUARY 2010
fabrication of the flexible risers, a
more stringent design temperature
was imposed very rapidly and some
thermal insulation was required. As
a consequence, the following major
changes had to be made:
The polyamide thermoplastic
material had to be replaced by a poly-
vinylidene fluoride material (bilayer),
compatible with much higher fluid
temperatures. The design of the end
fitting also had to be modified.
To achieve a lower overall-heat-
transfer coefficient, syntactic foam
was added onto the static section of
the riser and onto the infield sec-
tions. On the dynamic section of the
risers, where the buoyancy modules
are clamped, no insulation foam was
added, but the outer sheath thickness
was increased. This kept the clamp-
ing system of the buoyancy modules
simple and of lower cost.
Second Challenge:
Flexible-Riser Configuration
The second challenge was to reach an
acceptable riser configuration, given
the many constraints and require-
ments. The preselected riser configu-
ration was a free-hanging configura-
tion, where the total top tension of
every riser (180 tons for an 8-in.
riser) was supported by the FPSO.
Quickly, it appeared that the turret
buoy in disconnection mode was not
sufficiently buoyant to support the
freestanding risers. Furthermore, the
excursion amplitude of the FPSO was
too extreme to be accommodated by
a free-hanging riser configuration.
Hence, it became obvious that the
riser-configuration system had to be
modified to reduce the top tensions
and be more compliant to the FPSO
excursion amplitudes. A pliant-wave
configuration was adopted and, com-
bined with a significant increase of
the buoyancy capacity of the turret
buoy, was able to meet the differ-
ent requirements.
Third Challenge:
Riser Interference
The riser system on the MA D6 field
is exposed to extreme environmental
and operating conditions. Because of
a very strong surface current, each
individual riser with all its distributed
buoyancy is exposed to large lateral
excursions. Furthermore, during dis-
JPT FEBRUARY 2010
connection, the turret buoy drops
by approximately 100 m. Hence, the
overall configuration of every riser
is affected significantly. As a conse-
quence of these extreme loads, there
were interference issues between all
risers when considering possible com-
binations of events. This issue was
mitigated by adjusting per riser pair
the height of the hog-bend section.
After an optimized dynamic-umbili-
cal configuration was provided by the
client, at a later stage of the engineer-
ing, when the interference with adja-
cent flexible risers was re-examined,
again serious clashing issues were
detected. Because the fatigue per-
formance of the dynamic umbilical
was essentially linked to the selected
configuration, the decision was made
to modify a flexible-riser configura-
tion instead of that of the dynamic
umbilical. The consequence of that
late change was yet another increase
of the riser length and the amount of
distributed buoyancy.
Fourth Challenge:
Procurement and Subcontracts
Within the time frame of less than
11 months between the award of
the project at the end of 2006 and
the mobilization of the first vessel in
Europe, the project team had to place
all subcontracts both in Europe and
in India while engineering work was
still progressing. The main concern
was the delivery of all the risers in a
period when the raw-material supply
was a major issue in the industry. For
the risers, a total of 450 buoyancy
modules was manufactured in less
than 6 months.
The suction piles (two per riser)
were being manufactured when the
results of the geotechnical engineer-
ing survey were obtained in mid-
2007, and they had to be redesigned.
As a result, their weight increased
significantly. All the piles of the sys-
tem (Phase 1 and Phase 2) had to
be installed before the start of riser
installation but also before the arrival
of the FPSO. Therefore, their delivery
was on the critical path.
No infrastructure except the port of
Kakinada was available on that part of
the east coast of India. It was neces-
sary to establish a temporary base to
store and prepare all the equipment;
to select adequate quays and shel-
tered areas to load out the risers and
umbilicals from the heavy-lift vessels
(HLVs) to the Deep Constructor, a
powerful deepwater pipelay vessel;
and to contract locally all services to
organize the custom clearances of the
vessels and assist the intermediate
mobilization of the vessels. A major
effort was made to place all these sub-
contracts within the best quality and
safety standards of the industry in a
region where no deepwater opera-
tions had ever been undertaken and
with minimum infrastructure.
Fifth Challenge:
Complete Offshore Installation
Before the Monsoons
Five vessels were mobilized from
December 2007 to May 2008:
The Deep Constructor for the
installation of all the lines and the
suction piles.
The Skandi Achiever for all satu-
ration-diving work, additional light
construction work, and surveys. In
addition, the Skandi Achiever was
equipped with laying winches as a
backup for Deep Constructor to install
the flexible flowlines and jumpers.
Two HLVs were necessary to
transport from Europe the 10 flexible
reels, the dynamic-umbilical carou-
sel, the three static-umbilical reels,
the suction piles, and all the buoy-
ancy modules, for a total weight of
more than 5,000 tons.
A dynamically positioned Class 2
assistance vessel was mobilized from
India for all ancillary work.
Results
Only 17 months elapsed between
the award of the MA D6 contract
and its offshore completion. During
this period, all the usual prepara-
tory phases of the project were con-
ducted simultaneously rather than in
sequence to integrate all the technical
data and specifications made progres-
sively available to the project team
until the mobilization of the offshore
campaign. Although it may appear
that each technical particularity of
this project may be standard in the
deepwater subsea industry, it was the
first time they were implemented in
a single project executed in such a
fast-track mode. This project was a
success thanks to a fully integrated
and dedicated project team. JPT
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