Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 14

IHS Aerospace, defence & security

Conflict in the Ukraine


A case study of IHS capability

26th September 2014 ihs.com

Client briefing

James Green
Content director

Reed Foster
Head of military capabilities
IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Introduction
This case study presents examples of IHS coverage of the conflict in Ukraine:
The examples are drawn from the following products
IHS Janes Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre IHS Janes Intelligence Review
IHS Janes Terrorism & Insurgency Intelligence Centre IHS Janes World Armies
IHS Janes Defence Equipment & Technology Intelligence Centre IHS Janes World Air Forces
IHS Janes Satellite Imagery Analysis IHS Janes World Navies
IHS Janes Defence Weekly IHS Janes Sentinel
IHS Country Risk Daily Report

AA map
map of the distribution of Russian speakers and pro-Russian militia activity in Ukraine published in JMSA on 25 April
of the distribution of Russian speakers and pro-Russian militia activity in Ukraine published in JMSA 25 April

IHS 1534901

IHS Aerospace, defence & security


Copyright notice and legal disclaimer
2014 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution
as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of
authorship. The information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the opinions and analyses which are
based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement
contained herein. IHS and the IHS logo are trademarks of IHS. For more information, please contact IHS at www.ihs.com/CustomerCare.

2014 IHS 2 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

At-a-glance: IHS coverage of the conflict in Ukraine

10+ IHS experts

400 50
 Same-day reporting  Immediate reliable insight
 Primary sources  Critical context
 Exclusive content  Independent analysis
 Comprehensive coverage  Geo PDF format
Insight articles  Infographics  Temporal analysis Satellite images

 Kiev

Luhansk 

Donetsk 

90 15
 Event-driven updates  Military personnel
Infographic by Ria Chantler

 ORBATs  Aircraft inventories


 Procurement  Naval inventories
 Equipment in service  Aircraft distribution
Ukraine military updates  Command and control  Vessel classes and types Data-driven analytics

Source: IHS 2014 IHS: 1569430

2014 IHS 3 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Military capabilities & data analytics


IHS Janes Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Centre delivers
comprehensive analysis of global military capabilities. To visualise the data,
we have recently launched a number of interactive dashboards to enable
customers to conduct graphical analysis

Ukrainian defence spending has been leveraged in recent upon this particular platform to provide support to ground
years to improve the overall versatility and capabilities operations was likely due to both the availability of these
of aircraft serving in a combat role. However, despite the platforms to fly at the high sortie rate required by offensive
upgrades to accommodate improved weapons delivery operations as well as the aircrafts perceived strengths
and effect, the majority of close air support missions have to mitigate the growing layered air defence capabilities
been carried out by the Su-25. The continued reliance employed by separatist forces.

Ukraines combat aircraft inventory, September 2014

Combat aircraft type


Total Combat Aircraft in Service 264
Fixed wing 201

BELARUS Rotary wing 63


POLAND
RUSSIA

Service
Air Force 201
Kiev

UKRAINE Army Aviation 63

Ukrainian aircraft composition


Combat 264
MOLDOVA
Logistics 116

ROMANIA Trainer 114

C4iSR 11

Maritime 6

BULGARIA General aviation 3

Operator Country Service Primary Role Platform Variant


Ukraine Air Force Combat MiG-29 100
Su-24M 23

Su-25 33
Infographic by Ria Chantler

Su-27 45

Army Aviation Combat Mi-24D 62


Mi-24PU1 1

Source:IHS 2014 IHS: 1569434

2014 IHS 4 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Capability assessment: Ukraines air force


Flight training and aircraft losses

Flight training

2012 2013
Air forces flight training Air forces flight training

Activity: Completed: Activity: Completed:


Squadron tactical flight exercise 2 Squadron tactical flight exercise 14
Practical ground target firing 328 Practical ground target firing 111
Guided missiles launching 16 Guided missiles launching 30

Infographic by Ria Chantler


Practical bombing 398 Practical bombing 102
Average flight time per crew 190 Average flight time per crew 205

JRRF: 65 hr 53 min MDF: 47 hr 32 min JRRF: 36 hr 32 min MDF: 35 hr 30 min


JRRF: Joint Rapid Reaction Forces MDF: Main Defence Forces
Source: IHS 2014 IHS: 1569432

The significant decrease observed in 2012 to 2013 flight reaction forces was 120 hours short of what is recommended
training hours had a likely degrading effect upon the by NATO regarding minimum proficiency training. In 2013,
Ukrainian Air Forces ability to provide accurate and the average flight time was reduced by an additional 50%,
effective close air support to Ukrainian ground forces. Even likely compounding difficulties experienced in inter-service
the average flight time per crew in 2012 of 65 hours for rapid interoperability between respective ground and air forces.

Ukraine aircraft losses

Mi-24 Mi-8 Su-24 An-30 Il-76 Su-25 Su-27 An-26 MiG-29

1 1 2 1 1 1
Infographic by Ria Chantler

5 5 Rotary wing
Fixed wing

Source: IHS
9 2014 IHS: 1569431

The large number of aircraft lost to insurgent forces defence systems that degraded the operational tempo of
throughout the conflict in Ukraine illustrates that the air assets, in turn curtailing the mobility of Ukrainian
Air Force has adapted poorly to the challenged posed forces. The introduction of more robust air defence
by established anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones capabilities subsequently obviated any advantages to be
established by separatists. Initial stages of the conflict derived from Ukrainian air superiority or mobility.
witnessed the use of MANPADs and other short range air

2014 IHS 5 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Defence equipment profiles and data


IHS Janes Defence Equipment & Technology Intelligence Centre delivers
the worlds most comprehensive and reliable commercially available global
defence equipment and technology profiles and specifications, as well as
world-leading defence industry news and analysis

The Ukraine AF announced plans in 2005 to upgrade 25 Su-25UBM1 and four L-39M1s. The upgrade improves the
of its Su-25 fleet and retire the remainder. At the end of weapons control and navigation systems, providing for
September 2012 the MiGremont works handed over the improved bomb-aiming accuracy, weapons release from
first Su-25 in new pixelated camouflage. The aircraft was higher altitude (up to 5,000 m) and new attack options such
the fifth modernised Su-25M1, plus the single UBM1. as multiple programmed attacks against a given target.
The 299th Tactical Brigade at Nikolayev-Kulbakino now Targeting accuracy is improved by 30% and the Su-25M1 can
reportedly has 10 upgraded aircraft: five Su-25M1s, one employ weapons day and night and in poor weather.

Su-25K
Dimensions external
Length: 15.53 m (50 ft 11 in) (incl probe)
Height: 4.80 m (15 ft 9 in)
Wing span: 14.36 m (47 ft 1 in)
Wing aspect ratio: 6.1
Gross wing area: 33.7 m (362.7 sq ft)
Weight empty: 9,800 kg (21,605 lb)
Max T-O weight: 14,600 kg (32,187 lb) (normal), 17,600 kg (38,801 lb)
Max landing weight: 13,300 kg (29,321 lb)
Max wing loading: 522.2 kg/m (106.95 lb/sq ft)
Max thrust loading: 199 kg/kN (2.0 lb/lb st)
T-O run: 500 m (1,641 ft) (typical), 700 m (2,297 ft) (unpaved surface)
Service ceiling: 7,000 m (22,960 ft) (clean), 5,000 m (16,400 ft) (with max weapons)
Max level Mach number: 0.8 at S/L
Landing speed: 108 kt (200 km/h; 124 mph)
g limits: +6.5 (with 1,500 kg (3,307 lb) of weapons), +5.2 (with 4,000 kg (8,818 lb) of weapons)
Range: 405 n miles (750 km; 466 miles) (with 4,400 kg (9,700 lb) weapon load and two external tanks, at S/L)
675 n miles (1,250 km; 776 miles) (with 4,400 kg (9,700 lb) weapon load and two external tanks, at height)
Landing run: 650 m (2,133 ft) (normal), 750 m (2,461 ft) (unpaved surface)
Source: IHS 2014 IHS

Sukhoi Su-28 (Su-25UT), with added side


elevation (centre) of Su-25K

2014 IHS 6 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Country risk insight


IHS Janes Country Risk Daily Report delivers contextual analysis of recent
and impending international security events
Ukraine ceasefire remains fragile despite All foreign armed formations, military equipment, and
memorandum on implementation and limited combatants and volunteers are required to withdraw from
withdrawal of forces (published 23 September) Ukrainian territory. The OSCE was given oversight of the
implementation of the memorandum provisions. Both
The Ukrainian government and the separatist leadership sides have claimed that withdrawal of forces has started.
in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions signed a There have been continual breaches of the ceasefire since 5
memorandum agreement on 20 September to outline the September, including several instances of shelling and two
implementation of the 5 September ceasefire agreement Ukrainian soldiers reportedly killed over the weekend.
between the two sides.
Forecast
Event The agreement appears to be slowly implemented on both
The memorandum was signed by the spokesman for the sides, but remains fragile, as indicated by the continued
National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, Andriy violations. Although the slow withdrawal of troops
Lysenko; OSCE envoy to Ukraine, Heidi Tagliavini; former represents progress, there are still a number of hurdles
Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma; Russias Ambassador to to be cleared before the situation can be considered
Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov; the Donetsk Peoples Republics stabilised, and implementing the roadmap towards a
(DPR) Prime Minister, Alexander Zakharchenko; and the more permanent agreement will be extremely difficult.
head of the Luhansk Peoples Republic (LPR), Igor Plotnitsky. It is not clear whether all militias (both pro-Ukrainian
government and separatist) will agree to disarm and stop
The memorandum contained nine points, including fighting. The long-term implementation of the peace
establishing a line between each sides armed forces to use roadmap will also depend on whether the new Ukrainian
as a reference point for the withdrawal of all military units parliament after elections on 26 October will actively
and weapons, including artillery and aviation. These are to implement autonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk
be removed at least 15km from each sides line, creating a regions, and whether Russia feels that the autonomy
30km demilitarised zone. provides it with sufficient influence over Kiev.

1569232

2014 IHS 7 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Terrorism & insurgency insight


IHS Janes Terrorism & Insurgency Centre is a world-leading source of OSINT
information, analysis and insight on non-state armed groups and their activities
Each day, the JTIC team filter, verify, geospatially tag and Event data captured by JTIC include:
record 100+ new events. In addition they provide daily Terrorism and counter-terrorism events, operations
insight on terrorism activity and ongoing analysis of more and statements
than 260 non-state armed groups.
Information on targets, tactics, casualties and weaponry
JTICs database supports threat assessment, time-difference
analysis, geospatial layering and data visualisation. Structured and geospatially enabled data

The following graphs show insurgency activity in


Ukraine by casualty numbers, targets and tactics.

Target Sectors Tactic

Assassination
Non-State Armed Groups
Public Sector
Stand-off/Area Attack
Other/Unknown

Government & Governance

Security Forces Social Groups

Commerce & Industry Sabotage


Riot
Engagement Raid
Kidnap
Civil Society Random or Indiscriminate
Wounding
Assault
National Infrastructure Identity Groups
Siege, Hostage, Hijack
Ambush Hit and Run

2014 IHS 8 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Independent satellite imagery analysis


IHS satellite imagery analysis offers timely, reliable insight and contextual
analysis to help analysts see the complete picture. We have analysed more
than 50 images since the start of the Ukraine crisis

Despite Russian claims to have withdrawn some troops Additional imagery captured on 31 March 2014 indicated
from its borders with Ukraine, our satellite imagery from an increased troop presence at Belgorod, including activity
March showed that Russian Army deployments to the around the training centres airfield. Photographs of
border region appeared to continue. Imagery captured on Belgorod initially depicted helicopter activity; while not
21 March 2014 shows Russian troop formations deployed to present in 21 March imagery, 1 x Mi-8/17 Hip and 2 x Mi-
a training centre west of Belgorod. 24/35 Hind helicopters are present in 31 March imagery.

In February, we used Airbus Defence and Space imagery to the Bora-class PGGJM Samum (pennant 616) berthed
identify and track major surface combatants of the Russian at Sevastopol. Samum is one of two Bora-class PCGJMs
Navys Black Sea Fleet. The right-hand image illustrates assigned to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

2014 IHS 9 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Military capability insight


Driven by titles such as IHS Janes Defence Weekly, IHS delivers daily insight
on military capability events, developments and trends
MH017 most likely downed by Russian-backed
separatists (published 18 July)

Key points
There is growing evidence that Russian-backed Ukrainian
separatists were responsible for the downing of Malaysia
Airlines flight 017 over Ukraine

A Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) system captured by the separatists


may have been responsible for the shoot down

A growing body of evidence points to Russian-backed


separatists as being responsible for the shoot down of
Malaysia Airlines (MH) flight 017 on 17 July. The aircraft
was flying in airspace over the Russia-Ukraine border near
the city of Donetsk when it appears to have been shot
down by a Russian-made Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) surface-to-
air-missile (SAM) battery.

US intelligence sources confirm that the aircraft was hit


by a SAM, while former Soviet and Ukrainian air defence
specialists in Kiev told IHS Janes that this missile was
either from a Buk unit controlled by the Russian-backed
rebels in Ukraines eastern regions or possibly from a Ironically, OAO Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, the defence
battery located on the territory of Russia itself. industrial conglomerate that produces the Buk SAM
system, was one of the several Russian companies hit with
The Ukrainian military has no Buk systems in this part a list of new US sanctions on the day before MH17 came
of the country any longer, said one former air defence down and was added to the US Treasury Departments
forces officer. The Buk units that were based in this region Office of Foreign Asset Control list.
were taken over by Russian-backed separatists on 29 June
when they overran a Ukrainian military installation. The Other analysts pointed out that on the morning MH017 was
separatists posted photos of their new acquisitions on Russian shot down, a captured Buk system was seen in the town of
social media on the same day, but deleted these internet Snezhnoe, which is approximately 15 miles southeast of the
postings on 17 July as soon as it was clear that the aircraft crash site. Later in the day, the same Buk battery was filmed
downed was a civilian airliner and not a military target. heading to a known rebel position south of the city, which
was about 20 miles southeast of the reported crash site.
The same former air defence officer also pointed out that
the Ukrainian military has safeguards in place to prevent The most plausible theory, said a NATO intelligence specialist,
this kind of an accident from ever occurring. There is a is that the separatists believed that they were shooting at
datalink from the civilian air traffic control system that another military target like the Antonov An-26 that was
monitors all commercial airline and civil aviation flights, brought down earlier that week. When they saw that they
he explained. This input into the air defence command had instead shot down a Malaysian airliner they panicked,
provides full coverage of all non-military flights, so it is which accounts for their panicked deletions of all social media
nearly impossible for a Ukrainian armed forces unit to postings related to this incident, said the NATO source.
have brought down this airliner. It is almost certainly
one of these rebel bands operating in the east of Ukraine, Supporting this theory are radio conversations between
operating with Russian assistance and simply shooting at Ukrainian separatists and Russian military intelligence
anything that passes over their heads. (GRU) officers operating in Ukrainian territory that were

2014 IHS 10 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

recorded by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and will be interesting to see if we ever find this Buk battery
released late on 17 July. In these conversations a scouting again or if someone now tries to dump it into the river.
team from the separatists reports that it has visited the
aircraft crash site and has some bad news in that the The NATO analyst pointed out that this also explains
aircraft is a civilian airliner and not a military aircraft. The reports that the aircrafts flight recorders have not been
officer the team is speaking with said the aircraft was left at the accident scene per international regulations
probably trying to drop spies (into Ukraine) and should and accepted practice, but instead may have been sent to
not have been flying over a war zone. Moscow in order to doctor this evidence as well.

The NATO intelligence specialist pointed out that the Other evidence, he said, cannot be hidden, such as the
recordings show that the Russian helpers realise that they radar tracks of the battery and the talkback between the
now have an international incident on their hands - and radar and the missile after it has launched. These and other
they probably also gave the order for separatists to erase all electronic emissions are electronic fingerprints that have
evidence - including these internet postings. He added: It been recorded and will not take long to analyse.

2014 IHS 11 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

Scenario modelling
Janes Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Centre regularly
publishes scenario-modelling articles to signpost alternative futures
Eastern rising - Ukraine struggles to maintain second round. Although Poroshenko is an openly pro-
territorial integrity (published 17 April) European politician, he has also worked closely with the
pro-Russian side of Ukraines political spectrum and is likely
Scenario 1: Government eases secessionist activity to be able to improve Ukraines relations with Russia.
(Probability: moderate)
This scenario would come to pass if the government Risk factor
manages to successfully suppress secessionist tendencies Scenario 1 Risk
in eastern Ukraine. This would need the security operation Political risk Significant
undertaken in the east of the country to avoid causing Social risk Moderate
heavy casualties among the pro-Russian protesters, thus Economic risk Significant
deferring a Russian military intervention. Military & security risk Moderate
External risk Significant
Pro-Russian protests would not stop altogether, but Total country risk Significant

they would be unlikely to escalate to a point where Source: IHS 2014 IHS

demonstrators join in their hundreds of thousands.

The government would still be able to hold the presidential Scenario 2: Russia intervenes militarily, annexes
election in eastern and southern Ukraine, albeit with some east (Probability: moderate)
irregularities, and claim that the new president enjoys Despite assurances to the contrary by senior Russian
legitimacy across the whole of Ukraine. That, in turn, officials, Russia is likely to seize an opportunity if one
would further decrease the risk of a Russian intervention. presents itself to annex the industrial east of Ukraine and
some provinces in the south, for economic and strategic
For this scenario to occur, government security forces reasons. Industrial facilities in eastern Ukraine were
would have to refrain from using excessive force in designed by Soviet planners to complement enterprises
suppressing pro-Russian separatists and liberating operating in Russia, which is why the Donbass region is
buildings seized by demonstrators. such an alluring prospect for Russia economically. Control
over southern Ukrainian provinces would be important for
In addition, as the process of constitutional reform unfolds strategic reasons if Russia were to acquire a land bridge to
over the next few months, the government would have the Crimean peninsula.
to be seen to be making major concessions to Russian-
speaking Ukrainians by agreeing to devolve substantial This scenario has become more likely since pro-Russian
powers, notably in the areas of education and culture, to gunmen, allegedly with the support of Russian intelligence
regional governments. Ultranationalist groups would also and military forces, seized a number of towns and cities
have to heed the governments call to refrain from sending in eastern Ukraine in mid-April. The governments move
representatives to eastern Ukraine. to restore order, through a proclaimed anti-terrorist
operation, raises the risk of significant bloodshed, which
From the perspective of Ukraines territorial integrity could provide Russia with the pretext to launch a full
in the three to seven year outlook, the very processes invasion of eastern Ukraine. Despite its rhetoric, the interim
that are necessary to maintain peace in Ukraine today - government has so far shown a degree of restraint in its
decentralisation of authority and devolution of sensitive operations, and appears to be taking a gradual approach.
language and education policies - will undermine the However, the risk of violence remains high during this
countrys unity in the medium-to-long term. Russia is period. Likewise, Russia might be tempted to intervene if
likely to seek to continue to foment pro-Russian sympathies ongoing constitutional reform does not result in substantial
in Russian-speaking areas, and secessionist referenda might devolution of power to provincial governments, or in
become permissible under Ukraines new constitution. the unlikely event that an ultranationalist, such as Oleh
Tiahnybok of Svoboda or Right Sectors Yarosh, is elected
In the event that the presidential election is held as planned, as president. Indicators suggesting that a Russian military
Petro Poroshenko is likely to be elected as president in the invasion is imminent would include the amassing of supply

2014 IHS 12 September 2014


IHS | Conflict in the Ukraine: A case study of IHS capability

convoys on the Russian-Ukrainian border and the transfer of In the short term, the federalisation of Ukraine and
at least 40,000 additional troops to the border regions. extensive devolution of powers to regional governments
in the domains of culture and education would be a
The seizure of military bases in the east by pro-Russian necessary first step towards resolving the ongoing
protesters, and the defection of large numbers of soldiers crisis. This process would be likely to be facilitated by a
and security force personnel, could spark a civil war, with redrawing of Soviet-era administrative boundaries and
the Ukrainian armed forces and police forces splintering the creation of larger regions that better correspond to
along regional lines in their support for Russia against the economic and cultural realities on the ground.
Ukrainian government in Kiev, a development in which Finally, and most importantly, few things are likely to
Russia would be likely to intervene militarily. bind the whole of Ukraines population closer together
than successful anti-corruption reforms, administrative
The larger, better-trained, and better-equipped Russian modernisation, and economic development. If
military would be likely to prevail eventually in any Russian-speakers can be convinced that they would be
military conflict on Ukrainian soil. However, a robust economically better off in a united Ukraine rather than
anti-Russian partisan movement would be likely to as citizens of Russia, then the countrys identity crisis is
develop in any territories annexed by Russia. Any Russian likely to be considerably easier to overcome.
intervention would probably be limited to eastern and
southern regions of Ukraine. Economically, a Russian Risk factor
annexation of eastern Ukraine, the primary source of the Scenario 3 Risk
countrys foreign currency revenues, would be likely to Political risk Significant
bankrupt the Ukrainian state. Social risk Significant
Economic risk High
Risk factor Military & security risk Significant
Scenario 2 Risk External risk Moderate
Political risk Significant Total country risk Significant
Source: IHS 2014 IHS
Social risk High
Economic risk High
Military & security risk Critical
External risk High
Total country risk High Conclusion
Source: IHS 2014 IHS
The Ukrainian government will struggle to
successfully suppress attempts at ecessionism in
eastern Ukraine and preserve the countrys territorial
Scenario 3: Regional differences settled peacefully integrity. Avoiding such a scenario would require
(Probability: low) substantial decentralisation of power and guarantees
of cultural autonomy to predominantly Russian-
There is a low likelihood that over the next 6-12 months speaking eastern and southern Ukraine.
the Ukrainian government will be able to resolve the
ongoing political and cultural conflict between western Should the government succeed in staving off
and eastern provinces peacefully and permanently, and secessionism and preventing a Russian military
therefore stabilise the Ukrainian political system. intervention, international loans that are expected to
The crisis of identity politics afflicting Ukraine is come in over the next one to two years are likely to be
deeply rooted in history and is likely to require decades sufficient to prevent a sovereign default and collapse of
of concerted policy effort to overcome. It is further the countrys financial sector.
exacerbated by the fact that western and central provinces
on the one hand, and the eastern region on the other, have Nevertheless, risks of a Russian military intervention
conflicting economic interests; the west and centre are will remain acute until at least June 2014.
predominantly agricultural, whereas the east is industrial.
Ukraines geographical position as a buffer state Even if a Russian intervention is not triggered by the
between Russia and Europe makes it subject to political crisis in eastern Ukraine, Russia is likely to continue to
manipulations from both sides. Russia is unlikely maintain its troop levels close to Ukraines borders as a
to abandon its efforts to foment anti-European and means of applying pressure and to offer a contingency in
even secessionist attitudes in a country that it sees as the event that it wishes to launch a military intervention.
permanently part of its political and cultural space.

2014 IHS 13 September 2014


Contacts
Neil Dempsey
Director, product management
neil.dempsey@ihs.com
+44 (0) 203 253 2449

James Green
Content director
james.green@ihs.com
+44 (0) 203 253 2193

Reed Foster
Head of military capabilities
reed.foster@ihs.com
+44 (0) 203 159 3532

IHS Customer Care:


Americas: +1 800 IHS CARE (+1 800 447 2273); CustomerCare@ihs.com
Europe, Middle East, and Africa: +44 (0) 1344 328 300; Customer.Support@ihs.com
Asia and the Pacific Rim: +604 291 3600; SupportAPAC@ihs.com