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Diacritics.
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STANLEYFISH
diacritics/March 1981 3
The significance of the work . does not lie in the meaning sealed
within the text, but in the fact that the meaning brings out what had
previously been sealed within us. When the subject is separated from him-
self, the resultant spontaneity is guided and shaped by the text in such a way
that it is transformed into a new and real consciousness. Thus each text
constitutes its own reader. . . . This structure pinpoints the reciprocity
between the constituting of meaning and the heightening of self awareness
which develops in the reading process. [pp. 157-9]
In other words, as the reader puts the work together, he is himself put together; as
the text "begins to exist as a gestalt in the reader's consciousness" [p. 121], the gestalt
that is the reader's consciousness is in the process of being altered by the structure it is
building; in response to an indeterminate set of directions, the reader is moved to
assemble the virtual object in his own way, but as that object takes shape it begins to
have a reciprocal effect on the way that the reader considers his own; the reader may
be following his individual disposition in the act of construction, but that disposition
is itself changed in an interaction with what it has constructed: "Hence, the constitu-
tion of meaning not only implies the creation of a totality emerging from interacting
diacritics/March 1981 5
And yet, in the end it falls apart, and it falls apart because the distinction on
which it finally depends-the distinction between the determinate and the inde-
terminate-will not hold. The distinction is crucial because it provides both the
stability and flexibility of Iser's formulations. Without it he would not be able to say
that the reader's activities are constrained by something they do not produce; he
would not be able at once to honor and to bypass history by stabilizing the set of
directions the text contains; he would not be able to define the aesthetic object in
opposition to the world of fact, but tie its production securely to that world; he would
have no basis (independent of interpretation) for the thesis that since the end of the
eighteenth century literature has been characterized by more and more gaps; he
would not be able to free the text from the constraints of referential meaning and yet
say that the meanings produced by innumerable readers are part of its potential.
It is important to realize how "firm" the determinacy/indeterminacy distinction
is for Iser. When he is at his most phenomenological [pp. 114; 118; 151-154; 202-203]
it sometimes seems that the very features of the text emerge into being in a reciprocal
relationship with the reader's activities; but in his more characteristic moments Iser
insists on the brute-fact status of the text, at least insofar as it provides directions for
the assembling of the "virtual object." Thus he declares in one place, "the stars in a
literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are variable"; and in another, "the
structure of the text sets off a sequence of mental images which lead to the text trans-
lating itself into the reader's consciousness"; and in still another, "the text itself ...
offers 'schematized aspects' through which the actual subject matter of the work can
be produced." Each of these statements (and there are countless others) is a version of
the basic distinction, reaffirmed unequivocally by Iser in the Diacritics interview
[june, 1980], "between a significance which is to be supplied, and a significance
which has been supplied" [p. 72] or, in other words, between what is already given
and what must be brought into being by interpretive activity.
Iser is able to maintain this position because he regards the text as a part of the
world (even though the process it sets in motion is not), and because he regards the
world, or external reality, as itself determinate, something that is given rather than
supplied. It is the objective status of the world that accounts for the difference
between literary and non-literary mental activity. In ordinary experience "the given
empirical object" acts as a constraint on any characterization of it; whereas in literary
experiences objects are produced by the mental images we form, images that endow
the "nongiven . . . with presence" [p. 137]. Sentences uttered in everyday life are
assessed in terms of their fidelity to empirical facts, but "for the literary text there can
be no such 'facts'; instead we have a sequence of schemata which have the function
of stimulating the reader himself into establishing the 'facts'" [p. 141]. The point is
This is an instance, in Iser's vocabulary, of the "changing perspectives" [p. 114] that
are juxtaposed in such a way as to stimulate the reader's search for consistency
[p. 120]. Thus, two "character perspectives," that of Allworthy as homo perfectus and
Blifil as apparent Saint, "confront one another" [p. 121], and the reader is led to reject
the simple designation of perfection and to formulate for himself a revised conception
of Allworthy's character. It is a perfect illustration of what distinguishes a literary from
a non-literary text. In a non-literary text, the connections are all supplied (by the
structure of empirical reality), and as a result the reader is left with nothing to do; but
in the literary text "textual segments" are presented without explicit indications of the
relationships between them, and as a result "gaps" open up which it is the responsibility
of the reader to close and fill.
It is all very neat until one begins to examine the textual segments that constitute
the category of the "given." Consider the characterization of Allworthy as a perfect or
allworthy man. In order for Iser's account to be persuasive, perfection in humankind
must be understood (at least at first) to be incompatible with being taken in by a
hypocrite; for only then will the "Allworthy perspective" and the "Blifil perspective"
be perceived as discontinuous. But one can easily imagine a reader for whom per-
fection is inseparable from the vulnerability displayed by Allworthy and for such a
reader there would be no disparity between the original description of Allworthy and
his subsequent behavior. That is, the text would display "good continuation" (a
characteristic, according to Iser, of non-literary texts) and would not, at least at this
point, present a gap or blank for the reader to fill up. I am not urging this reading
against Iser's, but merely pointing out that it is a possible one, and that its possibility
irreparably blurs the supposedly hard lines of his theory: for if the "textual signs" do
not announce their shape but appear in a variety of shapes according to the differing
expectations and assumptions of different readers, and if gaps are not built into the
text, but appear (or do not appear) as a consequence of particular interpretive strate-
gies, then there is no distinction between what the text gives and what the reader
supplies; he supplies everything; the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just
as variable as the lines that join them.
Let me make clear what I am not saying. I am not saying that it is impossible to
give an account of Tom Jones which depends on a distinction between what is in the
text and what the reader is moved, by gaps in the text, to supply; it is just that the
distinction itself is an assumption which, when it informs an act of literary description,
will produce the phenomena it purports to describe. That is to say, every component
in such an account-the determinacies or textual segments, the indeterminacies or
gaps, and the adventures of the reader's "wandering viewpoint"-wili be the products
of an interpretive strategy that demands them, and therefore no one of those com-
ponents can constitute the independent given which serves to ground the interpretive
process.
The point can be made again with another of Iser's examples, a chapter in Vanity
Fair entitled "Arcadian Simplicity." The "textual segment" is, according to Iser, a
"signal from the author," a "pointer" that "ensures that the reader will never lose sight
of the narrator's views on the social ambitions" [p. 114] of Becky Sharpe. As a signal or
diacritics/March 1981 7
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the end, "the characters'images of each other become more and more monstrous"
[p. 193]. The dialogue is thus "endless"(i.e. not ended by a clear and unambiguous
achievement of understanding)and it is endless because, "in HilaryCorke'swords,the
dialogue is 'not a transcriptof what he or she would have said in "reallife" but rather
of what would have been said plus what would have been implied but not spoken plus
what would have been understoodthough not implied.'"
One's responseto this can only be, as opposed to what?That is, howeveraccurate
this is as an account of conversation in Compton-Burnett,it is a perfectly accurate
account of conversation in everyday life. Iser and Corke seem to believe that in
everyday life we are in the position of being able to attend to what has been said
independently of what is implied or of what is understood because it goes without
saying. That is, they think that the pragmaticconditions of face-to-face discourse
serve to fix the meanings of words, whereas in fictional discourse meanings are the
products of a structure of assumptions and hypotheses, a structure which we, as
readers,build. But in fact, it is just such a structurethat is responsiblefor the shape
diacritics/March1981 9
One should note first of all that in making his argument Iser is continually
shifting his terms in order to make his different points. In the first sentence the literary
text is itself an object, a part of the world, as indeed it must be if the directions or
"schemata" or "textual segments" are to occupy the position of "given" in relation to
what must be supplied. But in the second sentence the literary text is suddenly not
perceivable through the senses and is thus as far as one can tell no longer an object at
all. I suppose that what Iser means is that the things, persons and events to which a
literary text refers are not perceivable through the senses, but that the literary text
itself is. The text and the world, then, are both "things", but they are different things
and therefore they are interpreted differently. But this is to assume precisely what is in
dispute, the objectivity of either the text or the world. The issue is not whether there
are differences between them (or more properly between the material world and the
world in the text) but whether those differences are equivalent to the distinction
10
diacritics/March 1981 13