Original Article

Philosophy and Social Criticism

122
Schopenhauer and the The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permission:

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DOI: 10.1177/0191453715576265
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Jordi Cabos
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany

Abstract
Although suffering in Schopenhauers works may be explained by how the will to life is objectified
in the world, a more precise inquiry leads us to elucidate the significance of this experience in his
writings. This article claims in the first place that suffering in this authors works is triggered by
multiple sources and takes various forms. In fact, and this is the articles second claim, these
sources coincide with some later scholars characterizations of modern suffering. The main aim is
to show the value of Schopenhauers works in understanding modern malaise. This article is
divided into 4 parts: in the first part, some considerations about suffering and modernity are
indicated; in the second part, the place of suffering in Schopenhauers works is explored; in the
third part, some of sufferings sources are analysed; finally, a number of dimensions that may be of
great value in better understanding modern malaise are noted.

Keywords
Malaise, modern suffering, modernity, pain, Arthur Schopenhauer

Despite the suffering, the restlessness, and all I had thought intolerable, now that it was gone, all
was well, better than it had even been? It was an odd feeling. Everything in the house was in its
place, but the rooms felt empty, as if the executor had been through them, as if the most impor-
tant items of furniture had carefully, sensitively all been removed somewhere. (S. Marai)1

I Introduction
As has been the case in previous ages, modernity appears to entail its own specific
malaise.2 Although approaching the notion of modernity is beyond the scope of this

Corresponding author:
Jordi Cabos, University of Bremen, Bibliothekstrae 1, Bremen 28359, Germany.
Email: cabos@uni-bremen.de

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2 Philosophy and Social Criticism

article, here modernity refers to the historical period in western Europe that started in the
17th century with the growth of the Enlightenment (promoting rationality, progress and
autonomy) and continues until the present day, carrying new forms of capitalist organi-
zation and social structures.3
Modernity sets up a way to relate with corporality, for which the body becomes the
hub of an individuals life. In aiming to meet their needs, individuals are confined to an
economic system that not only seems to erode their self-determination but also shapes
their inclinations.4 The modern age is associated with an experience of meaninglessness
whereby life appears ephemeral, fugitive, and contingent as it never was before.5 The
problem is not only what to do to sustain ones life but also what to do once needs are
met: emptiness, despondency and fatigue become the substratum of the modern ethos.
Modernity furthermore involves escalating scientific knowledge. Individuals may
suffer from an excess of rationalization that envelops their lives; however, at the same
time, the unique ways they can understand themselves and lead their lives seem to be
through knowledge.6 Although one cannot speak of an absolute truth any more, some
evidence is required for interpreting the world and leading ones life. Individuals may
suffer from failing in their attempts to find happiness, mental or bodily health, self-
realization, or any other contemporary idea of eudemonia.
It is regarding this modern malaise that this article claims two hypotheses. On the one
hand, it asserts that in Schopenhauers works, we may find a disclosure of some sources
of suffering that later scholars used to characterize modern malaise. On the other hand,
despite the fact that the origin of suffering in this authors works can be explained by
movement that contradicts the will to life,7 we propose that suffering in Schopenhauers
works is triggered by manifold phenomena. It is true that there are multiple excerpts in
his works in which the relationship between suffering and the will to life is emphasized,8
and we neither question nor negate this statement. We postulate that Schopenhauers
portrayal of suffering is more complex than that. The German philosopher not only con-
ceives of suffering as a phenomenon that is triggered by diverse sources but also consid-
ers that these sources are fundamental to diagnosing modern distress. This article asserts
the value of Schopenhauers portrayal in understanding multiple dimensions of modern
malaise.
In relation to the procedure, although suffering is found throughout all of Schopen-
hauers works, only those excerpts that contain concrete descriptions of this experience
have been selected. The following reflection is set forth in three parts: in the first part, the
place of suffering in the world and the way it is triggered are explored; in the second part,
manifold sources of suffering are analysed; and, finally, some considerations are dis-
cussed to understand suffering in the modern age.

II Schopenhauer and modern suffering

Behind our immediate experience, mediated by representation, there is another entity
that is the metaphysical core of reality: the metaphysical will (the thing-in-itself) [der
Wille]. This metaphysical will is the internal mechanism that blindly governs the exis-
tence of everything: the absence of goals, of all boundaries, belongs to the essence of
[this] will in itself, which is an endless striving.9 It is expressed in a scale of levels

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Cabos 3

or Ideas that remain beyond time and space; the greater the objecthood of the will (i.e. the
higher the Idea), the more susceptible that type of being is to suffering.10 In the world of
representation in living beings this metaphysical will appears as the will to life [Wille
zum Leben]. Unlike the metaphysical will, what [the will to life] wills is always life,
precisely because life is nothing but the presentation of that willing for representation.11
The multiple manifestations of life individuals survival, procreation, pursuit of happi-
ness and so on are its goals. In this sense, individuals many-sided attempts to fulfil the
demands of this will to life, which are restless and rooted in the metaphysical foundation
of reality, are evidence for how essential suffering is to all life.12
In individuals, the movements of the will to life are associated with the body. Only the
sensations of the senses do not stimulate the will and can be considered painless; any
other representation arises as contrary to the will (i.e. provokes pain). Whereas pain is
what thwarts the will, pleasure is what is in accordance with it.13 Suffering encompasses
a dissatisfaction of the will, as well as a feeling of boredom and emptiness once this pri-
vation has been overcome. It may acquire manifold forms:

The perpetual efforts to banish suffering do nothing more than alter its form. This is orig-
inally lack, need, worries over how to sustain life. If (and this is extremely difficult) we are
successful in driving out pain in this form, then it immediately appears in a thousand others,
varying, according to age and circumstances, as sex drive, passionate love, envy, jealousy,
hatred, anxiety, ambition, greed, illness, etc., etc. If it ultimately cannot find any other form
in which to appear, then it comes in the sad grey garments of satiety and boredom, and we
then try hard to fend it off. Even if we finally succeed in driving these away, it can hardly be
done without letting the pain back in one of its previous forms and so beginning the dance
all over again.14

Suffering therefore becomes a necessary state, according to Schopenhauer. It is not an

accident of the being but rather the being itself.15 This omnipresence of suffering in exis-
tence was used years after Schopenhauers works to characterize modern malaise. In the
modern age, suffering has become a universal feature: a part of the human condition that
is just as unavoidable as death. Its novelty lies in the transformation from a temporary
state into a permanent condition. If, in the previous world order, suffering was associated
with natural disasters, bad weather, illness, grieving, but unless the irrevocable was
involved things eventually returned to the normal state, in the new modern order, suf-
fering has turned into a permanent state.16
This omnipresence of suffering influenced the conception not only of human suffer-
ing but also of non-human animals suffering. Considering that both human and non-
human animals are manifestations of the same will, they share what is essential; both
are similar psychologically and somatically.17 Each non-human animal, insofar as it
possesses the faculty to know, has increased sensitivity and thus is able to experience
pain.18 In Schopenhauers works, we can find one of the first western attempts similar
to Benthams19 to condemn the suffering caused to non-human animals. Schopenhauer
rebuked the way the European system of morality conceived non-human animals, depict-
ing them as things, means to ends of any sort.20 This system promoted the illusion that
humans were essentially different from animals and had an immortal anima rationalis.21

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4 Philosophy and Social Criticism

Later scholars considered the supposed superiority attributed to humans and all the pain
derived from it as vital for the development of modernity.22
However, despite the reign of suffering over existence, according to the Frankfurt phi-
losopher, diverse phenomena modulate its appearance. Suffering does not originate
exclusively from a specific cause but rather from a set of interrelated phenomena. Instead
of the notion of causes, Schopenhauer uses the notion of sources [Quellen] of suffering,
and he applies this notion to suffering as well as to pleasure and envy.23 This use seems
to hint at a concrete way to fathom the origins of this experience, leading us to the next
section.

III Sources of modern misery

In the modern age, subjective phenomena such as misery seem to have lost their specific
references and their causes appear blurred. Misery is embodied in diverse forms that
weaken the causeeffect explanation.24 Although there is in Schopenhauers works a
general clarification of suffering in existence (i.e. the will to life), suffering is triggered
by different phenomena to various intensities and degrees.
Schopenhauer draws on the notion of a major source [Hauptquelle] of suffering.25 On
the one side, the notion of source implies that suffering emanates from manifold phe-
nomena, which means that the origins of this experience are uneven, as noted by later
scholars: the lasting significance of this new experience depended on a variety of fac-
tors.26 On the other side, the fact that there are major sources may entail a type of gra-
duation, which makes us consider that each source may influence the genesis of suffering
to various degrees. In other words, the trigger of suffering does not respond to a regular
relationship between cause and effect but rather is the result of diverse sources that pro-
voke it to varied degrees and forms. Modern suffering seems to be homeless; there is no
unique place where it dwells, and its entanglements involve different actors. In the next
sections, following Schopenhauers ideas, 5 sources are analysed: the non-fulfilment of
will, the struggle among individuals, boredom, abstract ability and misjudgement.

III:1 Modern Tantalus: Privation and meaninglessness

One of the sources of suffering in Schopenhauers works is the will. Life appears as a
transition between will and satisfaction: when this transition is rapid, happiness arises;
when it is slow, suffering commences.27 The most general way by which this transition
is triggered is in affirming the will to life, which implies that an individual, even as she
captures the world in her representation, continues to be dominated by her will.28 Suf-
fering emerges as a non-fulfilment of the will: [suffering] is nothing other than unful-
filled and thwarted willing.29 The more intense the act of willing, the greater the
pain; suffering is presented as an obstacle to the will to life: when an obstacle is placed
between it and its temporary goal, we call this inhibition suffering.30 In other words,
every time an obstacle inhibits the will, suffering is triggered.
Life becomes harmful because humans conduct themselves guided by deprivation,
trying to fulfil their will. However, although fulfilling the will brings willing to an end,
for every wish that an individual fulfils, at least 10 are left denied. This is because desire

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Cabos 5

lasts a long time and demands go on forever; fulfilment is brief and sparsely meted out.
But even final satisfaction itself is only illusory.31 The problem is that the fulfilled wish
quickly gives way to a new one . . . No achieved object of willing gives lasting, unwa-
vering satisfaction.32 As long as individuals are subject[s] of willing, [they] will never
have lasting happiness or peace.33 Thus, a life that is led by fulfilling the will is a life
that can be compared with the revolving wheel of Ixion: it keeps drawing water from the
sieve of the Danaids, [becomes] the eternally yearning Tantalus.34
Later scholars found in this yearning the core of capitalism. As Karl Marx noted in the
first lines of his Capital: the wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of produc-
tion prevails appears as an immense collection of commodities . . . The commodity
is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs
of whatever kind.35 However, instead of fulfilling individual will, modern society
increases individuals sensation of penury,36 evident in the current duplicity of adver-
tisements.37 Modern capitalist society constantly appears to update this dissatisfaction,
and as occurred in the myth of Tantalus, modern individuals are those who now strive
to reach the fruit and the water but find that these goals are always just out of their
reach.

III:2 Egoists, villains and the mistreated

To satisfy their ambitions, individuals appear to be disposed to do almost anything. The
principium individuationis makes individuals feel separation from one another and com-
pete against one another to achieve their own benefit.38 According to Schopenhauer, this
ambition is carved into the nature of the will itself and entails a contradiction because
will and ambition are one and the same. Individuals struggle to achieve that supposed
good that promises them a considerable benefit; instead, a great amount of suffering
is triggered. This struggle will be considered here in terms of three phenomena: egoism,
malice and injustice.
Egoism reaches its highest degree in humans and becomes self-interest when guided
by reason.39 Egoism implies not only that every individual tries to grab what he wants
from everyone else but also that each individual will even completely ruin another per-
sons happiness or life in order to increase his own well-being by some insignificant
amount.40 In modernity, this egoism becomes a type of institution that not only com-
mands individuals decisions but also legitimates certain financial measures and is used
as a factor of production.41
Egoism may generate malice that [it] ultimately springs from a high degree of ego-
ism.42 The villain not only affirms the will to life as it appears in his own body, but goes
so far in this affirmation as to negate the wills that appear in other individuals.43 The
villain feels no doubt in eradicating the existence of others if they oppose the endea-
vours of his own will.44 Others suffering in egoism is accidental, whereas in malice,
it becomes an end in itself, finding pleasure in both humans and non-human animals
pain.45
Schopenhauer condemns the brutal and capricious ways people provoke suffering in
non-human animals to affirm themselves: he rails against fishing and hunting,46 dog-
fights, the use of beasts of burden,47 vivisection, deer-stalking, bull-fighting, racing,48

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6 Philosophy and Social Criticism

and any other cruelties committed against non-human animals.49 These actions are taken
to satisfy humans will at the expense of negating the will of the non-human animal:
[Humans] affirm their existence to the point of negating the existence of an animal.50
However, this is an evil that has to be denounced and repaired.51
Unrestrained egoism provokes injustice, the perpetuation of which can be triggered
by violence or cunning. Using violence, injustice is achieved through physical causation,
whereas using cunning, injustice is achieved by supplying the other persons will with
illusory motives that lead him to follow [the perpetrators will] while he thinks he is fol-
lowing his own,52 which occurs because the wrongdoer falsifies the victims cognition
through a lie.
Among other phenomena, this injustice has its social manifestation in poverty, exploi-
tation and the assault on property, which entail that a persons forces are not applied in
his or her interest but on behalf of others who benefit from it. The person who commits
injustice is affirming his own will above and beyond its appearance, to the point of
negating the others will.53 According to Schopenhauer, this misuse of alien forces
under the name of slavery or the proletariat may be explained by luxury: for one group
to satisfy its most superfluous and refined necessities, others are subjected to all types of
mistreatments.54
As later scholars denounced, in modernity, injustice is provoked not only through
physical violence55 but also through how the situations that cause suffering are inter-
preted. It seems possible to hypothesize that the illusory motives underlined by Scho-
penhauer as sources of injustice become central in understanding late-modern suffering,
specifically in how peoples reality and their misery is depicted.56 This idea is present
in what Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call the new spirit of capitalism, which they
define as the set of beliefs associated with the capitalist order that help to justify this
order and, by legitimating them, to sustain the forms of action and predispositions com-
patible with it.57 An example of this may be found in how some consequences derived
from the recent financial crisis (massive unemployment, seizure of properties and so
forth) that triggered amounts of suffering among populations and their solutions
were explained by governments, in particular, in those European countries that were
more severely affected.
In this sense, the German philosopher seems to denounce the considerable erosion of
independence that modern society carries (i.e. the overt penalties and covert aggressions
of working life),58 considering not only the constraints of freedom that some socio-
economic conditions impose but their uses and abuses as well. In fact, most of the later
social critique of modern capitalist society focused on egoism as an explanation for pov-
erty and exploitation in the face of those with unprecedented wealth.59

III:3 Swinging forth: Leisure and Philistines

It is Ennui! (Cited in Dalle Pezze and Salzani, 2009) his eye swollen with uninten-
tional tears, [he] dreams of scaffolds as he smokes his hookah pipe. [You] know him
reader, that delicate monster, [hypocrite] reader, my fellow, my brother!60 These are
the last words with which Charles Baudelaire closes To the Reader in The Flowers of
Evil and with which he invites the reader to assume the lethal presence of this delicate

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Cabos 7

monster. After all the efforts made to achieve progress, wealth and autonomy, modernity
has also become a span of disappointment since it became evident that life itself in its
most delicate manner may swallow any meaning.
Modern daily routines confirm that if humans experience suffering under neces-
sity, the distress provoked by the absence of needs is at least as harmful as the pain
associated with privation. According to Schopenhauer, if the first motive of human
life is becoming free from necessity, the second one is escaping from boredom once
needs are met. Human life swings back and forth like a pendulum between pain and
boredom.61 Pain and boredom are its last constituents and stand in a double antag-
onism (because when an individual succeeds in removing herself from one, she
comes closer to the other): external or objective antagonism and internal or subjec-
tive antagonism.
Regarding objective antagonism, whereas privation produces pain, abundance trig-
gers boredom. Regarding subjective antagonism, susceptibility to one is inversely pro-
portional to the other: the more one feels pain, the less one experiences boredom.62
Although affluent social classes make out the most feigned necessities to liberate them-
selves from boredom, their susceptibility to it is defined by the individuals mental
power. Intellectual obtuseness is associated with a lack of sensitivity, which makes one
less susceptible to pain but simultaneously gives rise to inner emptiness. Boredom has
been considered by some later scholars to be a phenomenon associated exclusively with
modernity.63
Schopenhauers diagnosis not only considers the harmful effects of boredom as a state
opposed to necessity (i.e. once privation ceases) but also addresses the problem of lei-
sure.64 According to him, modern society promotes a type of leisure that impedes any
possibility of thought. Leisure is a time when one returns to oneself, choosing the best
activity according to ones mental power. However, instead of cultivating themselves,
in the modern age, citizens abandon themselves to a leisure that inflicts more torment
on them: consumption, banal pastimes and cruel practices are at the centre of modern
entertainment.
People may take up leisure activities from considering only the satisfaction that the
will to life experiences in them, carrying with it all sorts of miseries. Philistines, who are
constantly and in the most serious manner preoccupied with a reality that is not real, epi-
tomize this idea: oysters and champagne are the highpoints of their existence. Their great
affliction is that idealities do not entertain them, but that, instead, they always need rea-
lities to escape from boredom.65 However, realities soon run out, driving them into a
deeper inner vacuum.
This way of living dedicated to satisfying the most futile material necessities has
also been associated with modern malaise.66 As Hannah Arendt noted one century after
Schopenhauer, once a modern individual has liberated himself from necessity and
achieved the possibility of dedicating himself to the greatest activities, he decides to
spend his free time in nothing but consumption, and the more time left to him, the
greedier and more craving his appetites.67 In this regard, boredom in Schopenhauers
works is another source of suffering not only because of the malaise that boredom itself
implies but also because of the damage incurred by liberating oneself from this delicate
monster.

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8 Philosophy and Social Criticism

III:4 Getting off the tree: Disappointment and suspicion

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we
cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis.68 Max Weber made
this comment at the beginning of the 20th century, expressing the main worry of some
scholars at that time. Reason and the knowledge it carries are not necessarily tied to a good
life. In fact, if something may characterize the reflections on modern suffering, it is the
suspicion that reason may not be a good guide in human affairs. However, this suspicion
erupted years before with some authors, one of whom may have been Schopenhauer.
To approach the role of reason, we should pay attention to his distinction between
intuitive knowledge [intuitive Erkenntni] and conceptual knowledge [Wissen]. Intuitive
knowledge is the most immediate form of knowledge that all living beings share, and
it enables them to operate in the world without concepts.69 In contrast, conceptual
knowledge is the knowledge derived from reason and formed by concepts: [T]o know
[Wissen] in general means: to have the mental power to reproduce at will those judge-
ments that have their sufficient cognitive ground in something external to themselves.70
According to Schopenhauer, knowledge is abstract consciousness: it fixes in rational
concepts what is cognized in other ways;71 only abstract cognition is knowledge; and
since this is conditioned by reason, we cannot, strictly speaking, say that animals know
anything.72 This does not mean that he negates non-human animals knowledge but
rather that he believes they possess another type of knowledge, intuitive cognition and,
thus, consciousness. Whereas plants have life but not consciousness, non-human animals
possess consciousness but not conceptual knowledge.
In diverse parts of his work, Schopenhauer repeats that increased knowledge increases
the sensation of pain. In this context, knowledge should be understood namely in rela-
tion to the degree of cognition in general, not merely abstract knowledge [Wissen].73
There is an intensification of pain that is directly correlated with an increase in
clarity of cognition and an increase in consciousness.74 The heightened pain intensity
associated with increased knowledge does not derive from knowledge itself which
is painless but from the obstruction of the will that is accompanied by knowledge; this
is why plants do not feel pain and why the ability to feel suffering is limited in the lowest
animals (e.g. insects).75
In human beings, through the work of reason, this degree of consciousness achieves
its highest point. Reason stands for the ability to form abstract concepts;76 it transforms
intuitive knowledge into abstract knowledge.77 Reason leads to the increased intensity of
individuals pain, the causes of which are in abstract thoughts, and these often strike
[them] as unbearable, inflicting torments that dwarf all the sufferings of animals in com-
parison.78 The greatest sufferings do not lie in the present, as intuitive representations
or immediate feeling, but rather in reason, as abstract concepts, tormenting thoughts.79
This elevated intensity entailed by abstract ability can also be evidenced in certain
extreme cases in which people cause themselves physical injury as means of distraction
from an unbearable thought.80
Reason involves a high awareness of time that may trigger discomfiture because of
the disquiet, frustrated expectancies and false hopes that it generates.81 A hopeless mis-
hap is the same as a quick death blow, whereas an accident following which hope is

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Cabos 9

constantly reborn is a type of death that tortures slowly.82 In regard to weal and woe,
individuals should keep a tight rein on [their] imagination.83 The possibility of
transcending the present moment contributes to enlarging wear and woe [it] brings
their possibility much nearer than it actually is, and envisions them in the most terri-
fying manner.84 In consequence, the pain may increase until the individual is beside
herself.
According to Schopenhauer, this increased intensity of painful experiences carried by
abstract capacity appears to explain madness: [W]hen this sort of sorrow or painful
knowledge [Wissen] or remembrance is so agonizing that it becomes absolutely
unbearable . . . the individual succumbs to it.85 Madness is introduced by nature to
save the individual from insufferable knowledge: the mind so profoundly tormented
will tear apart the threads of his memory . . . and thus escape into madness from the
mental pain that exceeds its strength.86 As occurs with the dog that recognizing his
former master after many years, has no recollection of the time that elapsed, the mad-
man recognize[s] particular things in the present and also many particular things from
the past, but fail[s] to understand their inter-connection.87 He finds relief from his pain
in the madness.
However, the mere presence of reason in each person does not imply that all people
suffer equally. The differences in levels of consciousness provoke variations not only
among non-human animals but also among humans. Greater intellect causes heightened
sensitivity, which occurs with pleasures as well as with torments: the greater the intellect,
the more intense these experiences. Individuals with higher intelligence have a greater
ability to feel and, therefore, experience suffering more intensely.88 This is why the gen-
ius suffers most; her extraordinary intellect causes circumstances that would be trifling
for common people to have a deep impact on her.89
Distinctly, as was the case with his contemporaries (such as Fichte, Hegel and Schel-
ling), reason in Schopenhauers works, although it is necessary in the full urgency of
life, where quick decisions, bold actions and swift, sure interventions are required, can
easily ruin everything if it gains the upper hand.90 Considered to be a product of reason,
abstract knowledge does not ensure liberation from misery. This does not mean that rea-
son is completely useless; many human achievements can only be accomplished with
the help of reason . . . even while some others can be better achieved without the appli-
cation of reason.91 Reason seems to have a subordinate role in leading a virtuous life:
[R]eason is not its source, but has a subordinate role92 in sustaining resolutions once
they have been made and providing maxims to struggle against the weakness of the
moment, and lending consistency to action.93
Schopenhauer might be considered one of those who began to suspect reason, declar-
ing the possible barrenness of this faculty to achieve a good life. This lack of trust in rea-
son was one of the constant topics in subsequent discussions; even a number of current
scholars, seeing how individuals govern themselves in late modernity, are sceptical
about the usefulness of reason for leading a good life, now under the notion of auton-
omy.94 The free use of this faculty seems to be neither a sign of superiority in the face
of other living beings nor a bringer of joy. Schopenhauer seems to deflate the promise of
that Promethean tree disclosed years later by Max Weber noticing that reason could
go hand in hand with misery.

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10 Philosophy and Social Criticism

III:5 The ambivalence of duty

Despite the fact that reason and abstract knowledge do not ensure a good life, it appears
that for Schopenhauer, they enhance individuals ability to address misery: [P]eople sur-
pass animals as much in power as in suffering.95 Reason and the abstract knowledge that
it provides may allow individuals to break their servitude to the will to life.96 However,
the power that abstract knowledge confers on them does not derive from abstract knowl-
edge itself [Wissen] but rather from a living cognition that . . . remains independent of
dogmas which, as abstract cognition, are preoccupations of reason.97 If abstract knowl-
edge liberates an individual from suffering, it is because of the intuitive knowledge of the
world that it embraces.98 In other words, if reflection has some value in the face of mis-
ery, it is because it may become a copy or repetition of the original intuitive world.99
Given that the modern attitude was characterized as ambivalent (an attempt to sup-
press the friction derived from two opposite standpoints attempting to grasp the same
issue),100 Schopenhauers attitude concerning abstract knowledge seems to be modern.
On one side, abstract knowledge is incidental subdued to the real essence of the world
and may increase humans woes, as we noticed; but on the other side, when it captures
the world properly, abstract knowledge becomes the only chance that humans have to
overcome suffering. This implies that despite the fallibility of reason and abstract knowl-
edge, not all abstract knowledge shares the same status; multiple truths are derived from
the immediate intuitive knowledge of the world, and some of these are more accurate
than others. Their misrecognition extends to three domains that acquired crucial interest
in the next few decades after the publication of Schopenhauers works: the pursuit of
happiness, health care and individual self-fulfilment.
The German philosopher denounces the extended manner in which people live their
lives pursuing pleasure, happiness and satisfaction. Leading ones life chasing these
entails misjudging the worlds essence because, contrary to what individuals think, pain
and torment are positive and pleasure and happiness are negative: [A]ll satisfaction, or
what is generally called happiness, is actually and essentially only ever negative and
absolutely never positive.101 In this context, negativity stands for the nature of a num-
ber of phenomena that require a previous negation of pain to exist. Schopenhauer states
that only pain is positive because it is a primary and immediate phenomenon; thus, hap-
piness can never be anything more than the liberation from a pain or need.102
Governing ones life by pursuing happiness, ignoring the fact that only pain is posi-
tive, is the surest way to increase misery: [T]he failure to recognize this truth, encour-
aged by optimism, is the source of much unhappiness . . . in doing so we bring pain
down on ourselves, which is undeniably real.103 As other authors confirmed later, in
modernity, the search for happiness has become a commercial matter that defines indi-
viduals relationships with the world.104 Considering how therapeutic culture was devel-
oped in the 20th century, the tireless attempt to achieve happiness is, as Schopenhauer
would state, what keeps the modern individual away from it.
Furthermore, Schopenhauer seems to be one of the first to relate bodily pathologies
with the activities associated with the modern age. The unnatural exertions that they
compel not only are a source of illness but also make people inept: just as excessive
exertion ruins the eyes, so it ruins the brain.105 For instance, writing under market

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Cabos 11

demands may lead to neglect of ones health.106 As he later attested, health becomes a
preoccupation as well as an occupation for avoiding misery:

We should above all strive to maintain a high degree of perfect health, whose flourishing
entails cheerfulness. The means for this, as is well known, are the avoidance of all excess
and debaucheries, of all violent and disagreeable emotions, also all mental exertion that is
too great or too prolonged, two hours daily of brisk movement in fresh air, much cold bath-
ing and similar dietary measures. Without proper daily exercise no one can stay healthy.107

Illness turns into a healing power of nature that redresses the individuals negligence.
Health comes to be a constituent of the self that has to be conquered by an individuals
carefulness; it is not random that most of Schopenhauers reflection on health is in the
first volume of his Parerga and Paralipomena in a chapter entitled What One Is. This
carefulness should be applied to the body as well as to thought. In fact, the greatest mis-
understanding is to ignore the physiological dimension of mental processes. Thought is
an organic function of the brain and, accordingly, behaves analogously to all other
organic activities.108 The delusion of an immaterial, simple and essentially, constantly
thinking soul that has no need for anything in the world induced vast miseries.109
This reduction of thought into a physiological process may be the inauguration of a
problem that later culminated in the decomposition of the contemplative experience.
As Hannah Arendt underscored, in modernity, thought becomes a reckoning with con-
sequences and a function of the brain,110 which entails a considerable loss of human
experience. What in Schopenhauers works forestalls illness was the object of attention
of later scholars. Perhaps it is because Schopenhauer as did Otto von Bismarck, Cosima
Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, Franz Kafka, Rainer Maria Rilke and Thomas
Mann111 turns to health care to find relief from an unspecific malaise that pours out
from the structure of modern times itself.
In addition, the German philosopher denounces the fact that in modernity, one may
lose sight of what one really is and the opportunity to develop oneself owing to miscon-
ceived socialization. Sociability represents one of the most dangerous, even destructive
inclinations112 of human beings; almost all our suffering arises from society113
because it conceals behind the appearance of diversion, communication, social plea-
sures, and so on, great and often irremediable evils.114
First, sociability causes individuals to lead their lives considering others opinions
more than their own. As scholars highlighted later, the distinction between oneself and
others has become increasingly blurred in the modern age.115 On one side, according to
Schopenhauer, when an individual heeds others opinions, he is evaluating his life with
foreign concepts. Others opinions cannot be right because the place for what we are for
others is their alien consciousness; it is the representation as which we appear in
it.116 Others opinions disrupt and may spoil the free development of what one really
is because they do not consider ones nature. On the other side, leading life considering
others opinions may entail a pathological need for recognition that finds in pretence
(luxury, honour, splendour, rank, fame and social position, etc.) the fulfilment of all
[individuals] vanities and pretensions, and also [their] flaunting and swaggering.117
It may propel individuals to behave and be in specific manners that constrict their

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12 Philosophy and Social Criticism

self-determination. As Axel Honneth has observed, in late modernity, the act of praising
certain characteristics or abilities seems to have become a political instrument whose
unspoken function consists in inserting individuals or social groups into existing struc-
tures of dominance.118
Second, dedicating oneself to the demands of society over what one is involves con-
siderable constraint, annoyance, and even danger.119 Social life implies a burden; it
obliges an individual to live together with others who are mostly attempting to liberate
themselves from their bitterness through social life, and nothing noble can result from
it.120 Social life also constricts individuals powers, and the greater the individual, the
greater this constraint: [E]very society requires mutual accommodation and a mutually
agreeable temper . . . Compulsion is the inseparable companion of every society; each
one demands sacrifices, which are the more difficult, the greater our own individuality
is.121 Society compels us to shrink, or even disfigure ourselves, for the sake of harmony
with others.122 Social conventions about how individuals have to develop themselves
seem to deface their individualities and may even be used to legitimate some groups
viewpoints beyond the grade of truth that they contain: in order to please . . . it is abso-
lutely necessary to be platitudinous and narrow-minded.123
As later scholars denounced, social context acquires a crucial role in diagnosing and
understanding modern distress.124 Intrinsically linked with the financial order, modern
society seems to set up conventions by which individuals must lead their lives: concrete
skills and competencies,125 consumption practices126 and multiple versions of a self-
realized life127 may arise as alternatives for achieving individual self-fulfilment. Instead,
however, these conventions constrict individuals. For Schopenhauer, leading life by
social conventions that ignore ones nature provokes in individuals the bitterest of all
suffering, that is, dissatisfaction with [themselves], which is the inevitable result of
[their] ignorance about [their] own individuality.128
With these remarks, Schopenhauer seems to underline, as later scholars have,129 that
the modern individual has to lead her life guided by some truths and be responsible for
her happiness, her health and her self-fulfilment, which may become a source of distress.
In this sense, abstract knowledge not only allows the individual to notice that she does
not live properly but also seems to enable her to correct this matter. However, not just
any abstract knowledge can allow for this self-correction; only abstract knowledge based
on a reliable intuitive knowledge of the world can do so: the modern individual must
change his life but feel in himself the true nature of the world.130

IV Conclusion
This article has argued that suffering in Schopenhauers works does not originate from a
unique cause but rather from various sources: the non-fulfilment of the will, the struggle
among individuals, boredom, abstract ability and the misjudgement of certain truths trig-
ger suffering to manifold forms and degrees. We also noted that these sources coincide
with some later scholars analyses of modern distress. Schopenhauers approach to these
sources may be considered one of the first endeavours to disclose modern malaise.
Our article is subject to at least three limitations. First, our concept of modernity is
an arguable weakness. This notion has been widely discussed, and we followed those

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Cabos 13

scholars who have surmounted the historical component of this process, assuming that
modern malaise cannot be separated from the evolution of modern society. Second,
although the article shows how Schopenhauer discloses a number of sources that were
approached by later scholars to characterize modern suffering, there is an important lim-
itation in the type of suffering discussed. We made no distinction among the multiple
categories that may conceptualize this experience such as suffering, pain, distress,
malaise, fatigue, boredom, emptiness, vacuum, meaninglessness and so forth and that
may reveal a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. This is a complex but revealing
issue that is beyond the scope of this article. Third, another limitation lies in the fact that
despite showing parallelisms between Schopenhauers disclosure and those of later scho-
lars, we gave a brief outline of it. We are aware that a wide-ranging evaluation of this
hypothesis, considering more concrete and more detailed approaches to this topic, would
be decisive in clarifying these findings.
This article has raised many questions that require further investigation. First, more
research is required to determine Schopenhauers influence over later scholars to diag-
nose modern malaise. Second, a more accurate distinction among the notions used to
characterize modern suffering should be made to establish whether such differentiation
obliges us to reconsider the status of Schopenhauers diagnosis. Third, a detailed
approach to the possible parallelism between the philosopher of Frankfurt and later scho-
lars in denouncing modern malaise is required.
What seems quite clear is that the discomfort disclosed by Schopenhauer is not
strange to us. For Schopenhauer and later scholars, suffering is a part of the animal con-
dition human and non-human and is not triggered by a unique cause but rather by
multiple phenomena that provoke its varied forms and degrees.
Suffering may appear as disquiet produced by the dissatisfaction of the will, as an
obstacle to its fulfilment. This distress has acquired a central role in the capitalist order
because it seems that consumer society has found in this deprivation a counterpart to
shape individuals decisions; individuals are gradually persuaded that only when they
satisfy this lack will life be worth living, paving the way for egoism.
As Schopenhauer shows and social critique denounced afterwards, modern malaise
may also be associated with a blind self-interest. Egoism has become not only a type
of institution that constrains the individuals freedom, considering his or her dependency
on fulfilling personal interest, but also a source of injustice. The German philosopher
warns us that whereas egoism stands at the centre of modern life, injustice will exist
in its most diverse forms (exploitation, inequality, poverty, etc.). For some groups to ful-
fil their most feigned necessities, others are condemned to the most grievous conditions.
However, once the modern individual is liberated from necessity, he is left with an
irreconcilable feeling of emptiness. His free time may become a source of misery, and
the supposed gain becomes a problem. Modern society carries a range of leisure activ-
ities that rather than increasing individuals strengths, trap them into satisfying the most
primary necessities; modern pastimes may constrict individuals powers, causing them
to deploy their powers in a type of futile entertainment that denies any idea of self-
determination.
Trusting in reason to achieve a good life appears to be unsuccessful. Considering how
individuals guide themselves in modern capitalist society, reason appears to be subdued

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14 Philosophy and Social Criticism

to the will. Schopenhauer shows us that reason and the abstract knowledge associated
with it do not have the last word regarding a good life. However, paradoxically, misjud-
ging (in Schopenhauers words, leading ones life with barren notions) certain truths con-
cerning happiness, health care and self-fulfilment may also trigger distress.
The pursuit of happiness becomes the centre of modern life. However, guiding ones
life based on pursuing happiness is the surest way to increase ones misery; the modern
individual ignores that her resolute attempts to achieve happiness may be the root of her
malaise. Faced with the uneasiness produced by the modern ethos, individuals may also
experience disturbances that derive from neglecting their health; health care thus
becomes a requirement for the good life. Moreover, the type of socialization entailed
by modern society may become another source of distress; it keeps the individual away
from herself in favour of alien opinions and conventions that restrain her power. Recog-
nizing misjudgement in relation to the pursuit of happiness, health care and individual
self-fulfilment, Schopenhauer appears highlight that the modern individual requires
some certainties to lead life and that these should be derived from accurate knowledge
of the world. Living life successfully depends on the individual, on his ability to grasp
the essence of the world; as later authors proposed, the modern individual suffers from
his own irresponsibility, from an inability to respond to his own decisions.
The discussion is not easy. It seems that at least for the present author despite the
shifts of the modern world and the distance between us and Schopenhauer, his disclosure
applies to the core of life today. He unmasks the stuffiness that may underlie our modern
lives, as a shadow that accompanies the weight of an age, as a trace without a perpetrator:
only the course of modernity.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no funding with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this
article.

Notes
1. Marai (2011: 37).
2. Taylor (1991: 2). Bourdieu et al. (1999: 629). Ehrenberg (2012: 23). Martynkewicz
(2013: 159).
3. Modernity has to be differentiated from modernism, which may represent a denouncement of
modern conditions; Bauman (1991: 3); Armstrong (2005: 2).
4. Marx (1990: 163).
5. Baudelaire (1964: 13).
6. Weber (1988: 253).
7. Hoff (1972: 363). Bobko (2001: 22).
8. Schopenhauer, Samtliche Werke (1988: The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, p. 215).
Hereafter, the following abbreviations adopted for the cited works are: BM: On the Basis
of Morals (in Schopenhauer, 2009); FW: On the Freedom of the Will (in Schopenhauer,

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Cabos 15

2009); PPI: Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. I (Schopenhauer, 2014); and PPII: Parerga and
Paralipomena, vol. II [see Schopenhauer, 1988 for the Arthur Hubscher edn; there is also a US
edn, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York:
Clarendon Press, 1974)]; WWRI: The World as Will and Representation, vol. I; WWRII: The
World as Will and Representation, vol. II [see Schopenhauer, 1988 for the Arthur Hubscher
edn; there is also a US edn, WWRII: The World as Will and Representation, vol. II (New York:
Dover, 1966)]. For the quotes in text, the Cambridge edition edited by Christopher Janaway
is used.
9. WWRI, p. 366 and WWRII, p. 404.
10. According to this, because they are considered to be at the highest level of objecthood, human
beings should suffer more than non-human animals (WWRI, p. 215). However, this seems to
be problematic in Schopenhauer. On the one hand, human beings possess the faculty of reason,
which may help them achieve Stoic equanimity [Gelassenheit]: taken as a whole, Stoic ethics
is in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to adapt that great privilege of humanity, rea-
son, to an important and salutary end, namely that of raising us above the suffering and pain
that every life encounters (WWRI, p. 107); in fact, reason allows us to participate to the
highest degree in that dignity which attaches to us as rational beings in comparison with
non-human animals. On the other hand, human beings are also capable of experiencing the
temporary relief afforded by aesthetic pleasure, becoming a pure, will-less, painless, timeless
subject of cognition (WWRI, pp. 211, 306). In contrast, non-human animals are unable to have
aesthetic experiences (WWRI, p. 233).
11. WWRI, p. 324.
12. ibid. 366.
13. ibid.: 120. See Magee (1997: 126). Although this discussion is beyond the scope of this article,
according to Schopenhauer, there may be other types of pleasures that cannot be considered
will-full pleasures. Certain aesthetic pleasures seem to be more positive than the mere fulfil-
ment of the will. A first example of this may be the aesthetic pleasure derived from music; in
musical aesthetic pleasure, the pleasure is more positive than the mere relief of pain (WWRI,
p. 312). Music may evoke in the subject emotions of pure joy and easy happiness, awaken-
ing the emotions of our innermost being. See Neill, Schopenhauer (2011: 33949 [348]). A
second example seems to be the pleasure based on the experience of the sublime. According to
Schopenhauer, sublime pleasure results when an individual is able to achieve the calm of con-
templating an object even when it appears to be threatening his or her bodily or psychological
well-being (WWRI, p. 238). As Sandra Shapshay underlined, sublime pleasure is not only will-
less but also mixed with some degree of pain. See Sandra Shapshay, Schopenhauers Trans-
formation of the Kantian Sublime (2012: 479511 [490]). Both examples seem to reinforce
the idea that Schopenhauers conception of pleasure is more complex than the will-full one.
14. WWRI, p. 371.
15. Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche (1995: 167408 [241]).
16. Szakolczai (2003: 29).
17. BM, p. 240.
18. WWRI, p. 366 and PPII, p. 316.
19. Bentham (1970: 44, 58, 282).
20. BM, p. 162.
21. ibid.: 239.

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16 Philosophy and Social Criticism

22. Derrida (2002: 22898 [247]). Steiner (2013: 199).

23. WWRI, pp. 376, 377; WWRII, pp. 632, 663; PPI, pp. 357, 459 and PPII, p. 312.
24. Baudrillard (1992: 100). Bauman (1991: 29).
25. WWRI, p. 393 and PPI, p. 375.
26. Szakolczai (2003: 29).
27. WWRI, p. 196.
28. ibid.: 196, 387 and PPII, p. 443.
29. WWRI, p. 429.
30. ibid.: 365.
31. WWRI, p. 231.
32. ibid.
33. ibid. Two misinterpretations of the role of the will in suffering need to be clarified. On the one
hand, Schopenhauer does not mean that the will is impossible to satisfy but rather that its ful-
filment is temporary and can likely change into forms of dissatisfaction: absolutely every
human life flows between willing and attaining. The nature of every desire is pain: attainment
quickly gives rise to satiety: the goal was only apparent: possession takes away the stimulus:
the desire, the need re-emerges in a new form (WWRI, p. 371). On the other hand, he also does
not mean that all individuals are inevitably subdued to their will. Some individuals can trans-
cend the demands of empirical consciousness (ibid.: 44951).
34. ibid.: 231.
35. Marx (1990: 125).
36. Leach (1993: xv). Pfaller (2012: 191207 [193]).
37. Mautner (2010: 28).
38. WWRI, p. 404.
39. BM, p. 196.
40. WWRI, p. 393.
41. Honneth (2012: 6379 [76]).
42. WWRI, p. 428.
43. ibid.
44. ibid.
45. PPII, p. 205. Although it is beyond the scope of this work, unlike the villain, the egoist is able
to relieve others suffering. It does not matter that he may do it for reward, esteem, rep-
utation, or benefit; the fact is that his action may achieve the alleviation of anothers suf-
fering (BM, p. 228), and this way of being compassionate is not necessarily superficial. See
Fox, Boundless Compassion (2006: 36987 [380]).
46. BM, pp. 2412.
47. ibid.: 244.
48. ibid.: 162.
49. ibid.: 245.
50. WWRI, p. 440.
51. Despite all that can be said about humans ability to inflict suffering, they also have access to
the great mystery of ethics (BM, p. 209). According to Schopenhauer, humans are able to feel
compassion which is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, is essential to it, does not
rest on presuppositions, concepts, religions, dogmas, myths, upbringing and education . . . it
is original, immediate, resides in human nature itself (BM, p. 213). Humans may guide

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Cabos 17

themselves through rational principles in trying to eradicate others misery. They found insti-
tutions that protect individuals from injustices (WWRI, p. 405): on one side, they create insti-
tutions to fight the mistreatments committed against humans e.g. the abuses perpetrated in
western colonies (BM, p. 230); on the other, they protect animals through legislation (PPI,
p. 440) and form foundations that shield them from human cruelties (BM, p. 244 and WWRI,
p. 442).
52. WWRI, p. 398.
53. ibid.: 397.
54. PPII, p. 261.
55. Farmer (2005: 31).
56. Boltanski and Honneth (2013: 81114 [104]).
57. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 10).
58. Bourdieu et al. (1999: 629).
59. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 38).
60. Dalle Pezze and Salzani (2009: 534 [5]).
61. WWRI, p. 368.
62. PPI, pp. 34952.
63. Pezze and Salzani (2009: 534 [7]). Meyer Spacks (1995: 21).
64. Young (1987: 142).
65. PPI, p. 366.
66. Rojek (1993: 216).
67. Arendt (1998: 133).
68. Weber (1949: 49112 [57]).
69. WWRI, Kantian Appendix, p. 520.
70. WWRI, p. 60.
71. ibid.
72. ibid.
73. WWRI, p. 366.
74. ibid.
75. PPII, p. 316.
76. WWRI, p. 47.
77. ibid.: 74.
78. ibid.: 353.
79. ibid.: 352.
80. ibid.: 353.
81. PPII, p. 310.
82. ibid.: 662.
83. PPI, p. 462.
84. ibid. However, some lines later, Schopenhauer writes: we should look at things that concern
our weal and woe only with eyes of reason and judgement, and operate with dry and cold
deliberation, with mere concepts and in the abstract (PPI, p. 463). The possibilities of reason
and abstract knowledge in relation to suffering should be distinguished from those of other
mental phenomena associated with human abstract ability (imagination, hope, false expectan-
cies and so forth).
85. WWRI, p. 227.

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18 Philosophy and Social Criticism

86. ibid.: 228.

87. ibid.
88. PPI, p. 350.
89. WWRII, pp. 431, 437. Although individuals with superior intellectual powers will suffer
most, they can be transported by way of mere cognition . . . to a region where pain is essen-
tially alien, into the atmosphere of the lightly living gods; namely, in a realm where there is
no pain, but all is cognition (PPI, p. 358).
90. WWRI, p. 68.
91. ibid.: 70.
92. As we will see in the next section, reason and the abstract knowledge it carries play a subor-
dinate role in achieving a virtuous life because they become means by which multiple essential
truths derived from the intuitive knowledge of the world are translated: concepts are barren
when it comes to the true and inner nature of virtue . . . [concepts] can only be used in an abso-
lutely subordinate way, as tools for elaborating and safeguarding things that we already know
(WWRI, p. 435).
93. ibid.: 69.
94. Ehrenberg (2013: 2354 [31]).
95. WWRI, p. 43.
96. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, reason may additionally have a salutary role.
First, reason enables individuals to have aesthetic experiences through which they can find
relief from their woes; it grants them access to the highest pleasures: our powers of cognition
belong to sensibility; hence their preponderance enables the pleasures consisting in cognition,
or the so-called intellectual pleasures, which will be the greater, the more decisive that prepon-
derance is (PPI, pp. 3578). Second, reason influences peoples attitudes in the face of others
suffering. Reason may be helpful in mitigating their suffering through compassionate atti-
tudes: [the] faculty of reason quickly gave people insight into this source of suffering and
made them concerned to diminish it, or even remove it where possible (WWRI, p. 405). Reason
and the abstract knowledge associated with it enable individuals to lead their lives through
rational principles, such as harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can, that
take into consideration others pain (BM, pp. 20912). Abstract knowledge, though, enables peo-
ple who committed crimes to reintegrate into society; it provides them with a more correct
apprehension of what is objectively present, of the true circumstances of life and makes someone
realize that work and honesty are a safer, and indeed an easier route to his own well-being than
roguishness (BM, p. 255). Third, reason also enables an individual to achieve ascetic resignation:

. . . he recognizes the whole, comprehends its essence, and finds that it is constantly
passing away, caught up in vain striving, inner conflict, and perpetual suffering. Wher-
ever he looks, he sees the suffering of humanity, the suffering of the animal kingdom,
and a fleeting, fading world. [This recognition] becomes the tranquilizer of all and
every willing. . . . [he] achieves the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true
composure, and complete will-lessness (WWRI, p. 448).

97. WWRI, p. 336.

98. ibid.: 48.
99. ibid.

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Cabos 19

100. Bauman (1993: 9).

101. WWRI, p. 376.
102. ibid.
103. PPI, p. 43.
104. Illouz (2007: 52).
105. PPI, p. 472.
106. ibid.: 473.
107. ibid.: 345.
108. ibid.: 472.
109. ibid.
110. Arendt (1998: 322).
111. Martynkewicz (2013: 87).
112. PPI, p. 452.
113. ibid.: 453.
114. ibid.: 449.
115. Baudrillard (1992: 141).
116. PPI, p. 376.
117. ibid.: 379.
118. Honneth (2007: 32347 [323]).
119. PPI, p. 452.
120. ibid.
121. ibid.: 447.
122. ibid.: 448.
123. ibid.
124. Honneth (1994: 48).
125. Sennett (1999: 57).
126. Langman (1992: 4082 [68]).
127. Illouz (2007: 467).
128. WWRI, p. 362.
129. Martynkewicz (2013: 159). Ehrenberg (2013: 247).
130. You must change your life [Du musst dein Leben andern] is the last verse of the sonnet
Achascher Torso Apollos, written by Rainer Maria Rilke and published in 1908 (1955:
557). A suggested interpretation of this verse is provided by Peter Sloterdijk, Du musst dein
Leben andern (2014: 47).

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