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Qatar vs Bahrain binding force. International agreements do not take a single form under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, and the Court has enforced this rule in the past.
* Treaties. While treaties are generally in written form, there are writers who hold that even an
oral agreement can be binding. However, only written agreements that are new come under the In this case, the Minutes not only contain the record of the meetings between the parties, it also
provisions of the Vienna Convention. No particular form is prescribed. contained the reaffirmation of obligations previously agreed to and agreement to allow the King
of Saudi Arabia to try to find a solution to the dispute during a six-month period, and indicated
Facts: On 8 July 1991 Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting the possibility of the involvement of the I.C.J. The Minutes stipulated commitments to which the
proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to parties agreed, thereby creating rights and obligations in international law.
"sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two States". Qatar contended that the This is the basis therefore of the existence of international agreement.
Court had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute by virtue of two "agreements" concluded
between the Parties in December 1987 and December 1990 respectively, the subject and scope Additional information: There is no doubt that language plays a vital role in influencing a
of the commitment to the Court's jurisdiction being determined, according to the Applicant, by a courts decision as to whether an agreement has been entered into and in this particular
formula proposed by Bahrain to Qatar on 26 October 1988 and accepted by Qatar in case, the language was the main focus of the I.C.J and it was the contents of the Minutes
December 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the "Bahraini formula"). By letters of 14 July and that persuaded the I.C.J. to reject the Bahrain foreign ministers claim that he did not
18 August 1991, Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar. intend to enter into an agreement. Where this is compared to general U.S. contract law,
where a claim by one of the parties that no contract existed because there was no meeting of the
By a Judgment of 1 July 1994, the Court found that the exchanges of letters between the King of minds might be the ground upon which a U.S. court would consider whether a contract did exist
Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar of 19 and 21 December 1987, and between the King of Saudi with more care and thought than the I.C.J. gave the foreign minister of Bahrains claims.
Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain of 19 and 26 December 1987, and the document headed
"Minutes" and signed at Doha on 25 December 1990 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, were international agreements creating rights and obligations
for the Parties; and that, by the terms of those agreements, the Parties had undertaken to
submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them, as circumscribed by the Bahraini
formula. The Court decided to afford the Parties the opportunity to submit to it the whole of the
dispute. After each of the Parties had filed a document on the question within the time-limit
fixed, the Court, by a Judgment of 15 February 1995, found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate
upon the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain which had been submitted to it; that it was now
seised of the whole of the dispute; and that the Application of the State of Qatar as formulated
on 30 November 1994 was admissible. In the course of the written proceedings on the merits,
Bahrain challenged the authenticity of 82 documents produced by Qatar as annexed to its
pleadings.

Arguments: On the part of the Bahrains (D) Foreign Minister, he argued that no agreement
existed because he never intended to enter an agreement fails on the grounds that he signed
documents creating rights and obligations for his country. Also, Qatars (P) delay in applying to
the United Nations Secretariat does not indicate that Qatar (P) never considered the Minutes to
be an international agreement as Bahrain (D) argued. However, the registration and non-
registration with the Secretariat does not have any effect on the validity of the agreement.

Issue: Whether or not an international agreement creating rights and obligations can be
constituted by the signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged.

Held: Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that
the Minutes were only a record of negotiation and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.s
jurisdiction, both parties agreed that the letters constituted an international agreement with

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
*Stateless persons are those who do not have a nationality (de facto or de jure statless).
De Jure stateless are those who have lost their nationality while de Facto stateless are
those who have nationality but to whom protection is denied by their state when out of
the state.
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S.
Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to the Commonwealth
Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682.
Thereafter the People's Court ordered his release. But the deportation board taking
his case up, found that having no travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this
country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After
the corresponding investigation, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration on
April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944,
without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of
entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available
transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been
arrested on March 18, 1948. In May, 1948, he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial
Jail together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels.
In July and in August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu
Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his companions alleging lack of
authority to do so. In October, 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee
abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has
been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration
believes it is for the best interest of the country to keep him under detention while
arrangements for his deportation are being made.
For the Petitioner: 1) that having been brought to the Philippines legally by the
Japanese forces, he may not now be deported. It is enough to say that the argument
would deny to this Government the power and the authority to eject from the Islands
any and all of those members of the Nipponese Army of occupation who may still be
found hiding in remote places. 2) he may not be deported because the statutory
period to do that under the laws has long expired.
The proposition has no basis. Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 any alien who enters this country "without inspection and admission by the
immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to deportation
within five years. In a recent decision of a similar litigation (Borovsky vs.
Commissioner of Immigration) we denied the request for habeas corpus, saying: "It
must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of
exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements
for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien
under confinement for a reasonable length of time. However, under
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established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.
"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the
difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic
arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away.
Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish
keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry
out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this
presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government
is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand, the
record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he
was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him
abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned
under the pretence of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government
admits that it cannot deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a
period our courts will not interfere.
"In the United States there were at least two instances in which courts fixed a time
limit within which the imprisoned aliens should be deported otherwise their release
would be ordered by writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, supposing such precedents
apply in this jurisdiction, still we have no sufficient data fairly to fix a definite
deadline."
The difference between this and the Borovsky case lies in the fact that the record
shows this petitioner has been detained since March, 1948. However, considering
that in the United States (where transportation facilities are much greater and
diplomatic arrangements are easier to make) a delay of twenty months in carrying
out an order of deportation has not been held sufficient to justify the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, this petition must be, and it is hereby denied.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the
circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from confinement. He has not been
convicted for any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him
no pretext to keep him imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law has been intended to
protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag.
Our vote is the same as one we cast when the case of Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
L-2852, was submitted for decision although, for some misunderstanding, our vote was
overlooked at the time of the decision was promulgated. Our vote is to grant the petition and to
order the immediate release of petitioner, without prejudice for the government to deport him
as soon as the government could have the means to do so. In the meantime, petitioner is entitled
to live a normal life in a peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice.
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Goldwater vs Carter terminating treaties without approval. There is no showing that Congress has rejected
the Presidents claim. It is Congress choice to challenge the President not the Courts.
*Topic: Authority to terminate. While the Vienna Convention enumerates those who have the
capacity to enter into treaties, it does not say who may terminate a treaty. Logically, however, the Where the Constitution is silent this case is controlled by political standards. Congress has
authority to terminate should also belong to the one who has the authority to enter into the treaty. terminated treaties without Presidential approval.
(Question: Can the President unilaterally terminate a treaty? Goldwater vs Carter discussed this
question relative to Pres. Carters termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan. No decision was
reached except to say that the matter was not yet ripe for judicial review.

Facts: President Carter terminated a defense treaty with Taiwan. Neither the Senate nor the
House have taken action to prevent or contest the action. Several members brought this claim
alleging the President has deprived them of their Constitutional role. In the present posture of
this case, we do not know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the
Legislative and Executive Branches. Although the Senate has considered a resolution
declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any mutual defense
treaty, no final vote has been taken on the resolution.

Arguments:

P) The Constitution makes specific mention that the President needs the approval and consent
of the Senate to make a treaty, therefor the contra positive is true: President cannot terminate a
treaty without approval and consent of the Senate. If so, a constitutional case and controversy
are ripened for decision. Whether the decision making authority is Constitutionally valid is a
determination left to the courts.

Def) The issue is a political question where the PL is asking the court to issue an advisory
opinion on whether the President can or cannot terminate a treaty.

Issue: Whether the President, in terminating at treaty with another country, needs the approval
of Congress, and if so does it involve a political question?

Held: The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the court for dismissal.

Rule: The President is authorized to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.

Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial
review. Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the
President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action
asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President and the
Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal considerations. The Judicial Branch
should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we
would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial
resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve
the conflict

Court Rationale: If Congress had challenged the Presidents authority to terminate, then the
court would have justiciable issue to decide. Without a challenge the issue only involves a
political question. Neither the Senate nor the House have taken any action, thereby rendering
the case unripe for decision. There is no specific language preventing the President from

Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 113191)
* Immunities. Because they are international personality, they can also be given the immunities
and privileges of international persons. Their immunities, however, have for basis not sovereignty,
as it is for states, but the need for the effective exercise of their function.
Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
ADB and the latters violation of the labor only contracting law. Two summonses were must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs
("DFA"). ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement
Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44
of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The
Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement"). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of
the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit
and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision.
Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA
sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision
from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1) Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
No. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement (Art. 50(1) and Section 5
respectively), the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all
acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement
granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB
is independent of the municipal law. One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal
writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,
such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
2) Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has
descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver
of its immunity from suit.
No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts
with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
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recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
private act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for
profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
3) Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged,
entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's
foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable
to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international
community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to
have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international
arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign
state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State
to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the practice is
for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could
not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon,
the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make,
in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a
manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed
the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign
immunity. In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states
bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
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