Republic of the Philippines complaint was amended, that the payment was insufficient.
This Court
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131127 June 8, 2000
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, PRIME HOLDINGS,
INC. ESTATE OF RAMON U. COJUANGCO AND IMELDA O.
COJUANGCO, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Docket Fees; The ruling that the
timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar but it
should be noted that the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the
matter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances surrounding each case.The ruling that the timely filing of
correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar. It should be noted,
however, that the pronouncements of this Court on the matter have always
been influenced by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
surrounding each case. For instance, the Lazaro v. Endencia ruling was in
accordance with the then applicable law, i.e., Section 76 of Act No. 190 as
amended by Act No. 3615. In Malimit v. Degamo, this Court ruled that the
date of payment of docket fees and not the date of mailing is considered
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
369
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000 369
Yuchengco vs. Republic
the date of filing of a petition for quo warranto. In Garcia v.
Vasquez, this Court initially stated that a docket fee must be paid for a
second will executed by the same decedent. Subsequently, on a motion for
reconsideration, this Court reversed itself and held that the initial payment
for the first will presented for probate was sufficient compliance. This Court
was even more liberal in Magaspi v. Ramolete, where the docket fee was
paid upon the filing of the complaint. It turned out later, after the
ruled that under the circumstances, the case was docketed upon the first
payment and the trial court already acquired jurisdiction. However, the
correct fee based on the amended complaint was required to be paid.
Same; Same; Same; The timely filing of correct docket fees is
jurisdictional, but as shown by the Supreme Court decisions, considerations
of law and equity come into the picture.The rule is not as simple and
uncomplicated as Manchester makes it appear. There are other
determining circumstances, equally important. The timely filing of correct
docket fees is jurisdictional, but as shown by our decisions, considerations
of law and equity come into the picture. This situation likewise obtains in
the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Sandiganbayan; While the Supreme Court is
inclined to sustain the ruling that correct filing fees in civil cases must be
paid in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a
ruling that, in this case, the petitioner acted in justifiable good faith.In
the resolution submitted to us for review, the Sandiganbayan emphasized
that when P.D. No. 1606 was issued, the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court
was limited to criminal actions. The Sandiganbayan now tries civil cases.
While we are inclined to sustain the ruling that correct filing fees in civil
cases must be paid in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this does
not preclude a ruling that, in this case, the petitioner acted in justifiable
good faith. There was ample reason for uncertainty and doubt on the
intervenors part not merely as to the correctness of the amount to be paid
but whether or not docket fees should be paid at all.
Trusts; Words and Phrases; Constructive trust is that created by reason
of equity to answer the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment
it arises against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains
or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, hold.Considering that peti-
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Yuchengco vs. Republic
tioner seeks to recover properties, the ownership and possession of
which he was allegedly deprived through fraud, duress and/or coercion, we
hold that, assuming hypothetically these averments to be true, the legal
relationship of constructive trust was present among the parties concerned
in the said transactions. Constructive trust is that created by reason of
1
equity to answer the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. It
arises against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, hold.
Prescription; Statute of Limitations; The essence of the statute of
limitations is to prevent fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length
of time and not to defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they were
sufficiently submitted for judicial determina-tion.Under normal
circumstances, petitioners cause of action should have prescribed on
February 26, 1996, a month before petitioner was ordered by the
Sandiganbayan to pay docket fees or two months before the docket fees
were actually paid in the corrected amount of P14,825.00. However, we hold
that said payment could not be construed as belatedly made such as to
foreclose the prosecution of his claims. It should be noted that when the
issue on docket fees was raised, petitioner submitted the determination of
the same to the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan. As earlier stated,
he sought for the immediate resolution of this issue as early as October 27,
1994. In the alternative, petitioner proposed to post a bond to answer for
the docket fees, if such are payable. He even filed a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 123264, to seek an early resolution of this issue.
Clearly, petitioner did not sleep on his rights, and prescription has not set
in to bar his right to seek judicial relief. The essence of the statute of
limitations is to prevent fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted
length of time and not to defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that
they were sufficiently submitted for judicial determination.
Same; Same; A courts belated action after prolonged inaction on the
issue of the petitioners payment of docket fees is a supervening event beyond
the independent will and control of petitioner that tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.To punish petitioner for public respondents failure to
timely decide an issue pivotal to the success of his case would be setting a
bad precedent. It would give trial courts unbridled power and an unfair
weapon to frustrate the filing of actions. We hold that public respondents
belated action
371
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000 371
Yuchengco vs. Republic
after prolonged inaction on the issue of petitioners payment of docket
fees is a supervening event beyond the independent will and control of
petitioner that tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Article 1154 of
the Civil Code is applicable by parallelism, to wit: The period during which
the obligee was prevented by fortuitous event from enforcing his right is
not reckoned against him.
Supreme Court; Having the inherent power to amend and control the
processes and orders, to make them conformable to law and justice, the
Supreme Court has the avowed duty to uphold the right of all persons to a
speedy disposition of their cases and avert the precipitate loss of rights.As
earlier stated, equity and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the
present case necessitate this ruling. For among the parties in the case at
bar, the Sandiganbayan is the most equipped to afford petitioner the
opportunity to present his claims. Not only that; but going back to the
pronouncements of this Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion, where we recognized that the sufficiency of the docket fees is a
matter for the determination of the clerk of court and/or his duly authorized
docket clerk or clerk in-charge, the Sandiganbayan could have immediately
drawn petitioners attention if its clerk of court found difficulty in
determining the amount of chargeable docket fees from a reading of the
complaint. Even in the celebrated case of Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the trial court directed the plaintiff therein
to rectify the flaws in its amended complaint. That way, not only could the
Sandiganbayan have seasonably resolved the issues on docket fees but it
could very well have timely settled petitioners dilemma on what to do and
what was required to preserve his rights. Courts are mandated to promptly
administer justice. Having the inherent power to amend and control the
processes and orders, to make them conformable to law and justice we have
the avowed duty to uphold the right of all persons to a speedy disposition
of their cases and avert the precipitate loss of rights.
Actions; Docket Fees; Sandiganbayan; Parties filing civil actions before
the Sandiganbayan are liable to pay the required docket fees.While it may
be argued that petitioner could have very well amended his complaint and
alleged the monetary values of the properties he seeks to recover to comply
with Rule 141, Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court, we find, pro hac vice, that
petitioner acted in good faith when he contended that proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan are free of charge. The present rule must, however, be
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Yuchengco vs. Republic
stressed: parties filing civil actions before the Sandiganbayan are
liable to pay the required docket fees. The situation only differs in the case
2
at bar because of petitioners honest conviction manifested in his filing of a
reservation for the payments he made, after having been ordered by the
Sandiganbayan on (March 29, 1996 to pay the balance of P14,425.00 and
after the court denied his motion to post bond pending final resolution of
the motion to dismiss.
Same; Same; Same; The expansion of the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to include civil cases impliedly amended Section 11 of P.D. 1606
and Section 1, Rule IV, Part I of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
Be that as it may, petitioners position that subsequent amendments to PD
1606 did not expressly repeal Section 11 thereof is untenable. Petitioner
failed to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
to include civil cases im-pliedly amended the same and Section 1, Rule IV,
Part I of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the Supreme
Court enjoys exclusive power to promulgate the rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure. In addition, Republic Act No. 7975 amended Section 9 of
P.D. 1606 to read as follows: Rules of Procedure.The Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan. x x x Hence, Rule 141 Section 7(a) of the
Rules of Court applies to petitioners complaint and/or amended
complaints-in-intervention.
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Rules of Procedure; Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and thus, are retrospective in such
sense and to that extent.Petitioner argues that R.A. 7975, having been
promulgated on March 30, 1995 should not be retroactively applied. This is
not so, as statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, thus,
retrospective in such sense and to that extent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review to set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated October 9, 19961 dismissing petitioner's Amended-complaint-in-
intervention and the subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 19972 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue in this petition is whether or not, under the undisputed circumstances
at bar, the Sandiganbayan may dismiss the complaint-in-intervention for alleged
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees on time.
On July 16, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter, the Republic) filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and
Prime Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter, PHI), docketed as Civil Case No. 0002.
Alleging ownership of the properties of the Marcoses sought to be forfeited by the
Republic, petitioner Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint-in-
intervention on August 11, 1988, impleading the Republic, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
Marcos and PHI as defendants-in-intervention.3 Petitioner paid a docket fee of
P400.00.
On February 17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the
motion for intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.4 The Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 14, 1989, which petitioner opposed.
On February 9, 1990, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for
reconsideration. 5 Hence, the Republic and the PCGG, on behalf of PHI, filed an
answer to the complaint-in-intervention dated June 19, 1990 and November 2,
1990, respectively.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
373
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000
Yuchengco vs. Republic
Balbino V. Diego for Imelda Marcos.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for
Cojuangco.
Meanwhile, PHI filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating that Imelda Cojuangco
and the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco claim ownership of PHI. Thus, on May
31, 1993, petitioner moved for leave to admit amended complaint-in-intervention
to implead the said claimants.6
On June 11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan, in open court, admitted the amended
complaint-in-intervention.7Consequently, amended answers-in-intervention were
373
filed by the Republic and the PHI on July 2, 1993.
On the other hand, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco
respondents (hereinafter, the Cojuangcos) filed a motion to dismiss8 the amended complaint-
in-intervention, dated August 25, 1993, on the ground of failure to state a cause

3
of action and lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the case, inasmuch
as petitioner did not pay the correct docket fees. They argued that the amended-
complaint-in-intervention failed to state the amount of the claim or the value of
the property subject of the complaint, in violation of the doctrine laid down
in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals.9
On September 6, 1993, petitioner filed a second amended complaint-in-
intervention with motion for leave. Later, on September 28, 1993, he also
opposed the motion to dismiss filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos on September
28, 1993. 10
PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a reply 11 alleging that since the amended
complaint-in-intervention is substantially an action for the recovery of ownership
and possession of shareholdings in the Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC), Section 7 (a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
applies, to wit:
Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention . . .
if . . . the stated value of the property in litigation is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P120.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00 150.00
3. P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00 200.00
4. P60,000.00 or more but less than P80,000.00 250.00
5. P80,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 400.00
6. P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00 600.00
7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 5.00
Further, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos contend that as the action
seeks to litigate the ownership and disposition of properties consisting of
subject shares, the amount of docket fees must be based on the total
value of the same.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder 12 dated November 29, 1993, maintaining that
no docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section
11 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, which provides:
Proceedings free of charge. All proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant
and/or his witnesses.
In their sur-rejoinder filed on January 28, 1994, 13 respondents PHI and
the Cojuangcos countered that the reason for the above-quoted Section
11 of P.D. 1606 is that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan at the time
of its enactment was limited to criminal actions. With the expansion of the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases, the payment of docket
fees has become a jurisdictional requirement.
On February 8, 1994 14, petitioner replied that the Sandiganbayan has no
power or discretion to ignore or amend the provision in Section 11 of P.D.
1606 simply on the basis of public policy. Petitioner points out that
Executive Order No. 14 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino did not
amend the said provision, hence, payment of docket fees in the
Sandiganbayan is legally without basis.
On September 21, 1994, petitioner re-filed his second amended
complaint-in-intervention 15 with motion to admit, wherein he sought to
include Y Realty Corporation as co-plaintiff-in-intervention and to join
Imelda R. Marcos as the representative of the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos.
On October 11, 1994, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed the motion to
admit second amended complaint-in-intervention, 16 contending that
jurisdictional issues should first be resolved before the most recent
motion is considered.
A motion for early resolution 17 was filed by petitioner on October 27,
1994. He averred that since the main issues in the motion to dismiss filed
by PHI and the Cojuangcos dwell on payment of docket fees and the
amount thereof, which may possibly involve the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, and it is unclear whether the filing of the complaint-in-
intervention tolled the running of the 10-year prescriptive period, there is
a need for the Sandiganbayan to resolve the motion to dismiss as soon
as possible.
4
On March 31, 1995, petitioner moved that he be allowed to post a
bond, 18 to answer for whatever docket fees he may be held to pay, with
the prayer that the running of the prescriptive period be deemed tolled
pending the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to dismiss.
In a Resolution dated April 17, 1995, 19 the Sandiganbayan deferred the
resolution of the motion to dismiss until trial, as the grounds raised
therein do not appear to be indubitable.
Meanwhile, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed petitioner's motion to post
bond on the ground that the same should not be construed as a
substitute for the actual payment of the proper docket fees, because
payment of docket fees should not be subject to any contingency. 20
On the other hand, petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration of the
Resolution dated April 17, 1995 insofar as the deferment of the issue on
payment of docket fees and the amount thereof. In the alternative,
petitioner prayed that his motion to post bond be granted. 21 PHI and the
Cojuangcos also moved for the reconsideration of the April 17, 1995
Resolution. 22
Meanwhile, petitioner prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss in
view of the passage of Republic Act No. 7975 23 which, like Executive
Order 14, did not amend Section 11 of P.D. 1606. 24
In the meantime, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 123264, 25assailing public respondent's decision to
defer adjudication on the issues raised in PHI's and the Cojuangcos'
motion to dismiss. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by this Court
for being premature. 26
On March 29, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion to post bond and ordering petitioner (plaintiff-in-
intervention therein) to pay the balance of the docket fee in the amount of
P14,425.00. 27 Petitioner paid with reservation. 28
PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a motion for reconsideration, 29 arguing that
the Sandiganbayan erred in the computation of the docket fees and in
allowing petitioner to pay additional docket fees beyond the prescriptive
period. They again invoked Rule 141, Section 7 (a) of the Rules of Court
and averred that the PTIC, registered in the name of PHI, has a stated
value of P1.6 billion. Accordingly, as petitioner claims to own 31% of
PTIC, which has a more recent value of P1,078,260,896.56, he should be
made to pay at least the sum of P5,391,154.35.
On May 7, 1996, 30 the Sandiganbayan denied PHI's and the Cojuangcos'
motion for reconsideration of its April 17, 1995 Resolution.
Thereafter, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos filed their answer to the
amended complaint-in-intervention. 31
On June 11, 1996, petitioner moved that the amount of P14,425.00 be
refunded to him, 32 insisting that proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
should be free of charge.
The Sandiganbayan, on October 9, 1996, issued the assailed resolution
granting the motion to dismiss and denying petitioner's motion to admit
second amended complaint-in-intervention. 33
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 34 dated October 30, 1996,
and PHI and the Cojuangcos filed their opposition. 35 The Republic filed a
manifestation 36 dated December 24, 1996 adopting the arguments raised
by PHI and the Cojuangcos.
On October 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 37 Hence this petition.
As earlier stated, the main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is
whether or not petitioner is barred from asserting his alleged causes of
action against respondents by reason of non-payment of the proper
docket fees.
The Sandiganbayan cited several cases spanning from 1932 to 1987 to
the effect that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action. 38
The ruling that the timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all
too familiar. It should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of this
Court on the matter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal
and equitable circumstances surrounding each case. For instance,
the Lazaro v. Eudencia 39 ruling was in accordance with the then
applicable law, i.e., Section 76 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No.
3615. In Malimit v. Degamo 40, this Court ruled that the date of payment
5
of docket fees and not the date of mailing is considered the date of filing
of a petition for quo warranto. In Garcia v. Vasquez 41, this Court initially
stated that a docket fee must be paid for a second will executed by the
same decedent. Subsequently, on a motion for reconsideration, this
Court reversed itself and held that the initial payment for the first will
presented for probate was sufficient compliance. This Court was even
more liberal in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 42 where the docket fee was paid
upon the filing of the complaint. It turned out later, after the complaint was
amended, that the payment was insufficient. This Court ruled that under
the circumstances, the case was docketed upon the first payment and
the trial court already acquired jurisdiction. However, the correct fee
based on the amended complaint was required to be paid.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan adhered strictly to the rule
enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 43 to wit:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. Any amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case, insofar as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
In Manchester, this Court stated that the allegation in the body of the
complaint of damages suffered in the amount of P78,000,000.00, and the
omission of a specific prayer for that amount, was intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of correct filing fees if not to mislead
the docket clerk in the assessment of the correct fee. The ruling was
intended to put a stop to such an irregularity. In the case at bar, however,
we note that there is no such irregularity or attempt to mislead in the
instant petition before us.
We also note that the Manchester ruling did not become the final
statement on the matter. In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion, 44 the
Court ruled:
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
In the said case, the payment of the correct fee within "a reasonable
time" but in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period was allowed. In another case 45 decided after Manchester, this
Court made some more distinctions:
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar
pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there
is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this
event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In
other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion,
permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every
claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule
now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment
of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has
set in and consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of
both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of
the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant,
unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But
where . . . the fees prescribed for an action involving real property
have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real
property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages
because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is
imply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no
amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Court did, or
6
 allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of
damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within
the relevant prescriptive period.
The rule is not as simple and uncomplicated as Manchester makes it
appear. There are other determining circumstances, equally important.
The timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional, but as shown by
our decisions, considerations of law and equity come into the picture.
This situation likewise obtains in the case at bar.
The Sandiganbayan Law itself, Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides:
Sec. 11. Proceedings free of charge. All proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant
and/or his witnesses.
Petitioner points out that when former President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 14 in 1986 which expanded the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases, she did not repeal or
amend Section 11 of P.D. 1606 on filing fees.
Similarly, when Congress in 1994 enacted Republic Act No. 7975 further
strengthening the functional and structural organization of the
Sandiganbayan, it did not amend the provision on non-payment of fees
even as it amended or repealed several sections of the original law.
When Congress in 1997 passed Republic Act No. 8429 further amending
P.D. 1606, it did not touch the section on non-payment of court fees. If
Congress in repealing various parts of P.D. 1606 did not touch Section
11, what is the basis of the Sandiganbayan's ruling on repeal or
amendment?
In the resolution submitted to us for review, the Sandiganbayan
emphasized that when P.D. No. 1606 was issued, the jurisdiction of the
anti-graft court was limited to criminal actions. The Sandiganbayan now
tries civil cases. While we are inclined to sustain the ruling that correct
filing fees in civil cases must be paid in all courts, including the
Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a ruling that, in this case, the
petitioner acted in justifiable good faith. There was ample reason for
uncertainty and doubt on the intervenor's part not merely as to the
correctness of the amount to be paid but whether or not docket fees
should be paid at all.
Equitable considerations are equally significant. Unlike the basis of the
Manchester ruling, there is no evidence in the present case that the
petitioner tried to evade the payment of correct fees or in any way tried to
mislead that court and its employees. On the contrary, petitioner paid
dues and asked the Sandiganbayan what are the correct docket fees, if
the dues paid are not accurate. When Sandiganbayan came out with its
own computation, petitioner paid the corrected amount.
Correctly, petitioner asserted that the Sandiganbayan's resolution,
assuming it was correct, was not something that could have been
reasonably anticipated by the ordinary litigant.
Indeed, the actions of the Sandiganbayan clearly call for the application
of equitable considerations. On February 17, 1989, it admitted the
complaint-in-intervention. Answers thereto were filed by PHI and the
Cojuangcos. On June 11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended complaint-in-intervention. More important, the lower court
denied the motions to dismiss filed by respondents questioning the
incorrect payment of docket fees in its resolutions dated April 17, 1995,
March 29, 1996 and May 7, 1996. Petitioner was thus led into believing,
long before the ten year prescriptive period expired, that its complaint-in-
intervention would stay admitted.
However, the Sandiganbayan on October 9, 1996 and October 6, 1997
issued the Resolutions now before us in this petition for review.
Petitioner's complaint was dismissed for non-payment of the prescribed
docket fees, without obvious regard to the implications of the reversal of
its earlier rulings.
Moreover, on October 27, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the resolution
of the issue on correct docket fees. When no decision was forthcoming,
petitioner on March 31, 1995 filed a motion to post bond to answer for
whatever additional fees that may be assessed later. On April 17, 1995,
the Sandiganbayan decided to defer the resolution of respondents'
motions to dismiss until trial. Petitioner even elevated the inaction of the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari but this
was dismissed for being premature. It can thus be seen that, far from
committing the irregularity illustrated in Manchester, petitioner did the
opposite in this case.
More specifically, petitioner's alleged causes of action before the
Sandiganbayan constitute the following:
7
 1. Claims on the 6% stockholdings in PTIC which he alleged to
have bought from Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata but were
purportedly transferred to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group by
coercion, duress and force majeure (Martial Law);
2. Claims on the 25% shares of General Telephone & Electronics
Corporation (GTE) in Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) which petitioner was prevented from acquiring
by virtue of a "put and call" agreement with GTE;
3. (Alternative Third Cause of Action) Claims on the 4.6% shares
in PTIC.
Considering that petitioner seeks to recover properties, the ownership
and possession of which he was allegedly deprived through fraud, duress
and/or coercion, we hold that, assuming hypothetically these averments
to be true, the legal relationship of constructive trust was present among
the parties concerned in the said transactions. Constructive trust is that
created by reason of equity to answer the demands of justice and prevent
unjust enrichment. It arises against one, who, by fraud, duress or abuse
of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, hold. 46
Correspondingly, actions thereon prescribe after ten (10) years as
provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code:
The following actions must be brought within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues:
1. Upon a written contract;
2. Upon an obligation created by law;
3. Upon a judgment.
(Emphasis provided).
Under normal circumstances, petitioner's cause of action should have
prescribed on February 26, 1996, a month before petitioner was ordered
by the Sandiganbayan to pay docket fees or two months before the
docket fees were actually paid in the corrected amount of P14,825.00.
However, we hold that said payment could not be construed as belatedly
made such as to foreclose the prosecution of his claims.
It should be noted that when the issue on docket fees was raised,
petitioner submitted the determination of the same to the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan. As earlier stated, he sought for the
immediate resolution of this issue as early as October 27, 1994. In the
alternative, petitioner proposed to post a bond to answer for the docket
fees, if such are payable. He even filed a petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 123264, to seek an early resolution of this issue.
Clearly, petitioner did not sleep on his rights, and prescription has not set
in to bar his right to seek judicial relief. The essence of the statute of
limitations is to prevent fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length
of time and not to defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they
were sufficiently submitted for judicial determination.
To punish petitioner for public respondent's failure to timely decide an
issue pivotal to the success of his case would be setting a bad precedent.
It would give trial courts unbridled power and an unfair weapon to
frustrate the filing of actions. We hold that public respondent's belated
action after prolonged inaction on the issue of petitioner's payment of
docket fees is a supervening event beyond the independent will and
control of petitioner that tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 1154 of the Civil Code is applicable by parallelism, to wit:
The period during which the obligee was prevented by fortuitous
event from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.
As earlier stated, equity and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding
the present case necessitate this ruling. For among the parties in the
case at bar, the Sandiganbayan is the most equipped to afford petitioner
the opportunity to present his claims. Not only that, but going back to the
1awphil
pronouncements of this Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion, 47 where we recognized that the sufficiency of the docket
fees is a matter for the determination of the clerk of court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge, the Sandiganbayan could
have immediately drawn petitioner's attention if its clerk of court found
difficulty in determining the amount of chargeable docket fees from a
reading of the complaint. Even in the celebrated case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 48 the trial court directed
the plaintiff therein to rectify the flaws in its amended complaint. That
way, not only could the Sandiganbayan have seasonably resolved the
issues on docket fees but it could very well have timely settled petitioner's
dilemma on what to do and what was required to preserve his rights.
8
 Courts are mandated to promptly administer justice. Having the inherent
power to amend and control the processes and orders, to make them
conformable to law and justice 49 we have the avowed duty to uphold the
right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and avert the
precipitate loss of rights.
As a final note, petitioner's manifestation that he is withdrawing some of the
causes of action alleged in his complaints-in-intervention and the subsequent
amendments thereto should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan for proper
determination and action. This should be taken into consideration by the
Sandiganbayan in determining anew the docket fees payable by petitioner.

While it may be argued that petitioner could have very well amended his WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially GRANTED. The
complaint and alleged the monetary values of the properties he seeks to questioned Resolutions are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to submit to public
recover to comply with Rule 141, Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court, we respondent Sandiganbayan the value of the properties he seeks to recover and
find, pro hac vice, that petitioner acted in good faith when he contended to pay the proper docket fees therefor within thirty (30) days upon determination
that proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are free of charge. The thereof either by the Sandiganbayan or its clerk of court, which in turn is directed
present rule must, however, be stressed: parties filing civil actions before to act with dispatch on the matter.
the Sandiganbayan are liable to pay the required docket fees. The
situation only differs in the case at bar because of petitioner's honest SO ORDERED.
conviction manifested in his filing of a reservation for the payments he
made, after having been ordered by the Sandiganbayan on March 29,
1996 to pay the balance of P14,425.00 and after the court denied his
motion to post bond pending final resolution of the motion to dismiss.

Be that as it may, petitioner's position that subsequent amendments 50 to

PD 1606 did not expressly repeal Section 11 thereof is untenable.
Petitioner failed to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction to include civil cases impliedly amended the same and
Section 1, Rule IV, Part I of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, the Supreme Court enjoys exclusive power to promulgate the
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure.

In addition, Republic Act No. 7975 51 amended Section 9 of P.D. 1606 to

read as follows:

Rules of Procedure. The Rules of Court promulgated by the

Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with
the Sandiganbayan. . . .

Hence, Rule 141 Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court applies to petitioner's
complaint and/or amended complaints-in-intervention.

Petitioner argues that R.A. 7975, having been promulgated on March 30, 1995
should not be retroactively applied. This is not so, as statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, thus, retrospective in such sense and to that extent. 52