Académique Documents
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Morales (1960)
FACTS:
CFI: Hermenegilda S. Morales to pay P7,000 to a creditor Francisca
Gallardo
writ of execution was issued and delivered to the Sheriff who garnished
and levied execution on the sum of P7,000 out of the P30,000 due from
the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. Inc., to Morales as beneficiary whose
husband Luis Morales died by assassination.
Morales asked the sheriff to quash and lift said garnishment or levy on
execution invoking Rule 39, section 12, subdivision (k) of the Rules of
Court but it was denied.
All moneys, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not
exceed five hundred pesos, and if they exceed that sum a like exemption
shall exist which shall bear the same proportion to the moneys, benefits,
privileges, and annuities so accruing or growing out of such insurance that
said five hundred pesos bears to the whole annual premiums paid.
Morales appealed maintaining that it was a life insurance for it insured her
husband for injuries and/or death as a result of murder or assault or
attempt thereat
ISSUE: W/N the insurance is a life insurance and not an accident insurance
HELD: NO. order appealed from is reversed, and the garnishment in dispute
hereby set aside and quashed
It is contended in behalf of the company that Basilio was killed which "making an arrest
as an officer of the law" or as a result of an "assault or murder" committed in the place
and therefore his death was caused by one of the risks excluded by
the supplementarycontract which exempts the company from liability. This contention
was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the victim comes within the purview of the exception
clause of the supplementary policy and, hence, exempts the company from liability.
Held: NO. Basilio was a watchman of the Manila Auto Supply which was a block away
from the house of Atty. Ojeda where something suspicious was happening which
caused the latter to ask for help. While at first he declined the invitation of Atty. Ojeda to
go with him to his residence to inquire into what was going on because he was not a
regular policeman, he later agreed to come along when prompted by the traffic
policeman, and upon approaching the gate of the residence he was shot and died. The
circumstance that he was a mere watchman and had no duty to heed the call of Atty.
Ojeda should not be taken as a capricious desire on his part to expose his life to danger
considering the fact that the place he was in duty-bound to guard was only a block
away. In volunteering to extend help under the situation, he might have thought, rightly
or wrongly, that to know the truth was in the interest of his employer it being a matter
that affects the security of the neighborhood. No doubt there was some risk coming to
him in pursuing that errand, but that risk always existed it being inherent in the position
he was holding. He cannot therefore be blamed solely for doing what he believed was in
keeping with his duty as a watchman and as a citizen. And he cannot be considered as
making an arrest as an officer of the law, as contended, simply because he went with
the traffic policeman, for certainly he did not go there for that purpose nor was he asked
to do so by the policeman.
Much less can it be pretended that Basilio died in the course of an assault or murder
considering the very nature of these crimes. In the first place, there is no proof that the
death of Basilio is the result of either crime for the record is barren of any circumstance
showing how the fatal shot was fired. Perhaps this may be clarified in the criminal case
now pending in court as regards the incident but before that is done anything that might
be said on the point would be a mere conjecture. Nor can it be said that the killing was
intentional for there is the possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot merely to
scare away the people around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit the
victim. In any event, while the act may not exempt the triggerman from liability for the
damage done, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of
the victim. The victim could have been either the policeman or Atty. Ojeda for it cannot
be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the deceased precisely because he wanted
to take his life.
NATURE
- Juan Biagtan was insured with Insular for P5k and a supplementary contract Accidental Death Benefit
clause for another P5k if "the death of the Insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely through
external and violent means sustained in an accident . . . and independently of all other causes." The clause,
however, expressly provided that it would not apply where death resulted from an injury "intentionally
inflicted by a third party."
- One night, a band of robbers entered their house. Juan went out of his room and he was met with 9 knife
stabs. He died. The robbers were convicted of robbery with homicide.
- The family was claiming the additional P5k from Insular under the Accidental Death Benefit clause.
Insular refused on the ground that the death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by 3rd parties and
was therefore not covered.
RATIONALE
- Whether the robbers had the intent to kill or merely to scare the victim or to ward off
any defense he might offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of inflicting the injuries
was intentional.
- The exception in the accidental benefit clause invoked by the appellant does not
speak of the purpose whether homicidal or not of a third party in causing the
injuries, but only of the fact that such injuries have been "intentionally" inflicted this
obviously to distinguish them from injuries which, although received at the hands of a
third party, are purely accidental.
- Examples of unintentional:
>> A gun which discharges while being cleaned and kills a bystander;
>> a hunter who shoots at his prey and hits a person instead;
>> an athlete in a competitive game involving physical effort who collides with an
opponent and fatally injures him as a result.
- In Calanoc vs. CA: Where a shot was fired and it turned out afterwards that the
watchman was hit in the abdomen, the wound causing his death, the Court held that it
could not be said that the killing was intentional for there was the possibility that the
malefactor had fired the shot to scare the people around for his own protection and not
necessarily to kill or hit the victim. A similar possibility is clearly ruled out by the facts in
this case. For while a single shot fired from a distance, and by a person who was not
even seen aiming at the victim, could indeed have been fired without intent to kill or
injure, nine wounds inflicted with bladed weapons at close range cannot
conceivably be considered as innocent insofar as such intent is concerned.
- In Hucthcraft's Ex'r vs. Travelers' Ins. Co. (US case): where the insured was waylaid
and assassinated for the purpose of robbery, the court rendered judgment for the
insurance company and held that while the assassination of the insured was as to him
an unforeseen event and therefore accidental, "the clause of the proviso that excludes
the (insurer's) liability, in case death or injury is intentionally inflicted by any other
person, applies to this case."
DE LA CRUZ V. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., G.R. NO. L-21574, JUNE 30,
1966
Chris, a boxer, is a holder of an accident insurance policy. In a boxing match, he died after being
knocked out by the opponent. Can his father who is a beneficiary under said insurance policy
successfully claim indemnity from the insurance company?
Yes. Clearly, the proximate cause of death was the boxing contest. Death sustained in a
boxing contest is an accident. (De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., G.R. No.
L-21574, June 30, 1966)
FACTS:
HELD:YES.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
(1) No. In this case, Condition 27 of the Insurance Policy of the parties
reads:
As the terms are very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity
whatsoever, it must be taken and understood in its plain, ordinary and
popular sense.
Tan, in his letter addressed to Sun Insurance Office dated April 3,
1984, admitted that he received a copy of the letter of rejection on April 2,
1984. Thus, the 12-month prescriptive period started to run from the said
date of April 2, 1984, for such is the plain meaning and intention of Section
27 of the insurance policy.
It also begs to ask, when does the cause of action accrue? The
insureds cause of action or his right to file a claim either in the Insurance
Commission or in a court of competent jurisdiction commences from the
time of the denial of his claim by the Insurer, either expressly or impliedly.
But the rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in the first
instance (i.e. at the first occasion or for the first time), not rejection
conveyed in a resolution of a petition for reconsideration. Thus, to allow the
filing of a motion for reconsideration to suspend the running of the
prescriptive period of twelve months, a whole new body of rules on the
matter should be promulgated so as to avoid any conflict that may be
brought by it, such as:
(2) No. The Eagle Star case cited by Tan to defend his theory that the
rejection of the claim shall be deemed final only of it contains words to the
effect that the denial is final is inapplicable in the instant case. Final
rejection or denial cannot be taken to mean the rejection of a petition for
reconsideration. The Insurance policy in the Eagle Star case provides that
the insured should file his claim, first, with the carrier and then with the
insurer. The final rejection being referred to in said case is the rejection by
the insurance company.
It will be recalled that El Oriente, took out the insurance on the life of its manager, who
had had more than thirty-five years' experience in the manufacture of cigars in the
Philippines, to protect itself against the loss it might suffer by reason of the death of its
manager. We do not believe that this fact signifies that when the plaintiff received
P104,957.88 from the insurance on the life of its manager, it thereby realized a net profit
in this amount. It is true that the Income Tax Law, in exempting individual beneficiaries,
speaks of the proceeds of life insurance policies as income, but this is a very slight
indication of legislative intention. In reality, what the plaintiff received was in the nature
of an indemnity for the loss which it actually suffered because of the death of its
manager.