1

Personal Details
Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator (1) Ranjan Mukhopadhyay (1) Visva-Bharati, Shantiniketan

(2) Prof. Pradeep Gokhale (2) Central University of Tibetan Studies,

Sarnath, Varanasi
Content Writer Nirmalya Guha Manipal Centre for Philosophy and
Humanities, Manipal University
Content Reviewer Heeraman Tiwari Professor, Centre for Historical Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Language Editor Raghavendra Rao Harnoor Freelancer, Hyderabad

Description of Module

Subject name Philosophy

Paper Name Logic-II
Module Name/Title Inferential Defect (hetvbhsa)

Module ID 7.33
Prerequisites Nyya theory of Anumna
Objectives To understand the defects of bad inferences from the Indian philosophical
perspective
Key words hetvbhsa, vyabhicra, bdha, svarpsiddhi, paksiddhi, satpratipaka
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Inferential Defect (hetvbhsa)

1. Basic Notions

According to the Naiyyikas, an inferential cognition (anumiti) is caused by two cognitions

(jnas),1namely, the cognition of pervasion (vypti) and the cognition of Site-located-ness
(pakadharmat). The process of the genesis of inferential cognition is the following. (1) Through
observation, the cognizing subject comes to know that any case of x is a case of y. Such a relation
between x and y, i.e., the inclusion of the cases of x in the cases of y, is called pervasion (vypti). (E.g.,
any case of smoke is a case of fire.)2 (2) The subject perceives x in z. (E.g., there is smoke on that hill).
This cognition is the cognition of Site-located-ness, i.e., the cognition about the presence of the Reason in
the Site.3(3) They remember the pervasion between x and y. (4) They cognize that z has x that is pervaded
by y.(5) Finally they inferentially cognize that z has y. In the smoke-fire case, this final cognition is: that
hill has fire.

As an epistemic process, inference is extremely useful and is a great source of valid cognitions
(prams). But all inferences are not correct. An inferential defect (hetvbhsa) is the factor that is
responsible for invalidating or corrupting an inference.

Before we discuss the inferential defects, we need to know a few other technical terms of Indian
epistemology. Like other intentional entities (saviayaka-padrthas), a cognition or jna is about
something. That something is called the content (viaya) of the cognition. When I cognize a pot, the
content of my cognition is that very pot. In other words, my cognition is about that pot (ghaa-viayaka).
The content of a cognition need not always exist in the real world. The content of an illusory cognition
(bhrama or a-yathrtha-jna) is not a real object. I may mistake a rope for a snake. That illusory snake
does not really exist.

Another relevant notion in this context is the notion of rivalry (virodha). Sometimes a cognition
C1 rivals another one, say C2, by blocking C2. Suppose, after having observed many cases of co-
existence of smoke and fire, and a few red-hot iron-balls, I have concluded that fire can exist without

1
For the sake of convenience, I shall use cognition as a count noun. Thus a cognition will henceforth mean a
piece of cognition.
2
y pervades x if and only if any case of x is a case of y.
3
When somebody infers y from x, y and x become the Target (sdhya) and Reason (hetu) respectively. The locus of
inference is called the Site (paka). When after seeing smoke on a hill, somebody infers that the hill has fire, fire,
smoke and the hill become the Target, Reason and Site of their inference respectively.
 3

being accompanied by smoke, although smoke must be accompanied by fire.4With this conclusion in
mind, I cannot infer smoke from fire. In this case, the cognition, smoke does not pervade fire blocks the
inference of fire from smoke. Thus the former becomes the rival (virodhi) of the latter. We can say that a
cognition cannot be generated in the presence of its rival cognition (virodhi-jna).

2. The General Definition

For the Old school Naiyyika (prcna-naiyyika), a hetvbhsa is a defective Reason (dua-hetu). But
according to the Neo Naiyyika, a hetvbhsa is the defect of an inferential Reason (hetu-doa). In this
essay, we are going to follow the Neo School.

According to Nyyasiddhnta-muktval (an auto-commentary authored by Vivantha on his

Bhpariccheda), an inferential defect of the inference I is the qualified content of a cognition that
rivals I. Viavantha does not directly give this definition. It has been extracted from what he says in the
commentary. Vivantha writes:

The definition is the following. The property of being a hetvbhsa [of the inference I] is the
property of being the content c, by which a cognition, that possesses c, rivals I. Example: contents
such as deviation (vyabhicra); for a cognition having deviation as its content rivals an inference.
Here content should be understood as qualified content (viia-viaya). Now, even if an
illusory cognition, having bdha as its content, rivals an inference, there would be no problems.5

Vivantha uses a few technical terms in the passage quoted above. Let us try to understand some of
those. According to Nyya, a snake is not a simple object; it is rather an object-complex. It is a property-
holder (dharmin) that has the property called snake-ness (sarpatva). Snake-ness resides in the snake
through the relation of inherence (samavya). Thus every object can be analyzed in terms of three
aspects; the property, property-holder and relation. When the snake gets perceived, the object-trio appears
in the content of the perception. The property, property-holder and relation appear in the perception as the

4
A red-hot iron-ball (tapta-aya-golaka) has fire, although it does not emit smoke. This means that
smoke does not pervade fire, since all the cases of fire are not cases of smoke.
5
lakaantuyad-viayakatvenajnasyaanumiti-virodhitvatattvam. tath hi ---- vyabhicrdi-
viayakatvenajnasyaanumiti-virodhitvttedo. yad-viayakatva ca yda-viia-
viayakatvabodhyam, tenabdha-bhramasyaanumiti-virodhitve pi nakati.Nyya-siddhnta-
muktval, The Chapter on Inference. See str (1968, pp. 375-379).
 4

qualifier (vieaa or prakra), qualificandum (vieya) and cognitive relation (sasarga) respectively.
In the case of a valid cognition (pram) having the form, this is a snake, the qualifier (which is snake-
ness) is related to the qualificandum (which is just the yonder object denoted by the word that) in
reality. But in the case of an illusory cognition having the same form, something else happens. Due to
insufficient light or physical defects, the cognizing subject sees something, maybe a rope, without
capturing its essential property. But the resultant cognition must have a qualifier, although the qualifier
has not been captured by the sense organs of the subject. To fill in the blanks in the cognition, the
memory of the subject provides the cognition with a qualifier through an extraordinary connection called
jna-laka. Roughly speaking, the subject remembers a property they have known before. That
property is snake-ness in this case and the subject cognizes an illusory snake. The point to be noted here is
this. When the cognition is valid, the property that appears as the qualifier (i.e., snake-ness) really
qualifies the property that appears as the qualificandum (i.e., the object denoted by the word this), since
in reality the cognized object is a snake. On the contrary, when a rope is mistaken for a snake, i.e., when
the cognition is illusory, the qualifier snake-ness does not really qualify the qualificandum, which is a
rope. In reality, snake-ness is not related to a rope through inherence. The gist of the whole discussion is
this: when the content of the cognition C is qualified (viia), Cis valid or correct; the content of an
illusory cognition cannot be qualified, since its qualifier does not qualify its qualificandum in reality.
What is the relevance of a qualified content in our discussion? The Neo Naiyyika wants to say
that even an illusory cognition may rival an inference I by blocking the genesis of I. That being the case,
the content of that illusory cognition would not be considered an inferential defect of I. Suppose, Ram
infers fire from smoke on a hill. But for some reason, John cannot see any fire there. That means, John
has an illusion of the absence of fire. That being the case, the content of Johns illusory cognition having
the form, there is no fire on the hill would not be an inferential defect of Rams inference, this hill has
fire, since it has smoke. When the blocking cognition is valid, then and only then does its content
become a defect of the blocked inference. I reiterate: only a valid cognition possesses a qualified content.
A cognition having non-qualified content may block an inference; but the content of that cognition will
not be an inferential defect.
Let us consider a genuine inferential defect. Any inference is based on the cognitions of pervasion
and Site-located-ness. Thus the inference, z has y, since z has x, is based on the following cognitions:
(1) Pervasion: Any case of x is a case of y.
(2): Site-located-ness: z has x.
One cannot inferentially claim/assert z has y, since z has x without asserting/claiming (1) and (2).
Suppose somebody infers smoke from fire. The moment they inferentially assert that this hill has
smoke, since it has fire, they also assert:
 5

(1) Pervasion: Any case of fire is a case of smoke.

(2) Site-located-ness: This hill has fire.
Rivaling or blocking an inference means blocking either the inference itself, or the associated cognition of
pervasion or the associated cognition of Site-located-ness. Blocking is of many types. We shall first
discuss a cognition that would block the cognition of pervasion. In the smoke-from-fire case, the
cognition of pervasion is rivaled by the valid cognition of this fact: it is not true that any case of fire is a
case of smoke; for a red-hot iron-ball has fire, although it does not emit smoke. This fact is deviation
(vyabhicra) with respect to the pervasion, any case of fire is a case of smoke. Actually deviation is an
anti-pervasion factor. Thus we can say that a genuine inferential defect of the inference, this hill has
smoke, since it has fire is the content of the cognition that has the following form: it is not true that any
case of fire is a case of smoke. Likewise, the defect called deviation of the inference, z has y, since z has
x is the content of the cognition, it is not true that any case of x is a case of y. We may notice here that
the cognition itself is not the defect, although it is the blocker in this case. The real defect (i.e., deviation)
or vyabhicra-hetvbhsa here is the fact that y does not really pervade x. We may remember that any
case of x is a case of y is equivalent to y pervades x, which in turn is equivalent to x is pervaded by y.
We shall now reconsider and exemplify the definition given above inthe light of all the technical
terms we have just discussed. The cognition, it is not true that any case of fire is a case of smoke rivals
the inference, this hill has smoke, since it has fire by blocking it. Blocking is the first criterion
mentioned in the definition. The second criterion is qualified-ness (viiatva) of the content of the rival
cognition. This criterion can be met only when the rival cognition is valid. We may remember that only a
valid cognition possesses a qualified content. The rival cognition, it is not true that any case of fire is a
case of smoke is valid, since smoke does not really pervade fire. Therefore, its content is qualified. As
both the criteria mentioned in the definition are met, the content of the cognition, it is not true that any
case of fire is a case of smoke is an inferential defect of the inference, this hill has smoke, since it has
fire. The defect in this case is deviation, since it opposes pervasion.

3. A Few Inferential Defects

We have already discussed vyabhicra, whose formal name is sdhraasavyabhicra. There are
defects of five major types; savyabhicra (or anaikntika), viruddha, asiddhi, satpratipaka and bdha.
Savyabhicra and asiddhi have several subtypes.6We shall discuss a few inferential defects:

6
According to Bhpariccheda, savyabicra is of three typessdhraa, asdhraa and
anupasahrin, and asiddhi too is of three types--raysiddhi, svarpsiddhi and vypyatvsiddhi.
 6

Bdha: This is nothing but the Site without the Target.7 Suppose somebody infers fire at a place where
there is no fire. In this case, the Target itself is absent from the Site. This defect opposes the inference
itself. i.e., when the inference is z has y, and there is no y in z, the defect of the inference would directly
oppose the inference itself, not its pervasion or Site-located-ness.

Svarpsiddhi: Suppose somebody infers, z has y, since z has x when z does not really have the Reason
x. Here the absence of x in z is the inferential defect called svarpsiddhi. Example: The defect of the
inference, This lake is a substance, since it has smoke is the absence of smoke in the lake.8

Paksiddhi: An un-established (aprasiddha) Site, i.e., a Site that is not found anywhere is the defect
called paksiddhi. The defect of the inference, A hill made up of gems has fire is the hill made up of
gems (since such a thing is not found anywhere).9

4. Satpratipaka and a Modified Definition of Inferential Defect

So far we have seen that an inferential defect of the inference I is the content of a valid cognition that
rivals I. The content of a valid cognition is a fact. But there is a defect called satpratipaka, which need
not be a fact. A sat-pratipaka is an equally strong rival (pratipaka). Guha (2015) writes:
Let us consider the following example. A physician has observed that anybody who eats
strawberries every day, suffers from a disease called Coccinistercus. She has also observed that
anybody who eats blackberries every day, never suffers from that disease. She has not found any
counterexample to either of those observations. Now she comes across a small boy who eats both
strawberries and blackberries every day. There is absolutely no way she can check the boy for the
symptoms of Coccinistercus. What will she conclude? Two different practices of the boy insist
her to form two contradictory conclusions. One must be wrong. But she does not know which one
is wrong. Both the contradictory Reasons are equally strong and they counterbalance each other.
In this case, both the inferences are faulty. This defect is called counterbalancing
(satpratipaka).

In order to accommodate the cases in which two equally strong pervasions oppose each other, the
definition of the inferential defect should be modified a bit. The modified definition is the following:

7
sdhya-nyoyatrapakastvasaubdhaudhta. Bhpariccheda by Vivantha, The Chapter on Inference. See
str (1986, p. 406).
8
hradodravyadhma-vattvdatrsiddhirathpar. See str (1986, p. 406).
9
paksiddhiryatrapakobhavenmai-mayo giri. Ibid, p. 404.
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An inferential defect of the inference I is the content (viaya) (i) that belongs to the cognition C,
which rivals I, and (ii) the invalidity of Chas not been established (agrhita-aprmnyaka). A piece of
cognition whose invalidity has not been established may be called an un-invalidated cognition. Such a
cognition is either a valid one, or something, which has not been invalidated so far.

The vyabhicra defect of the inference, this hill has smoke, since it has fire is the fact that
smoke does not pervade fire. This fact meets both the criteria, since the cognition that represents it rivals
the inference and the cognition is a valid one. The invalidity of a valid cognition cannot be established,
since it does not exist. Thus the cognition is un-invalidated. And the rivaling pervasion-cognitions in our
Coccinistercus case are: anybody who eats strawberries everyday suffers from a disease called
Coccinistercus and anybody who eats blackberries everyday never suffers from that disease. Neither of
these cognitions is known to be invalid. Therefore, both are un-invalidated. Thus the modified definition
accommodates the cases of sat-pratipaka.

A loose translation of what Vivantha writes about the un-invalidated-ness of sat-pratipaka is

as follows:

According to some scholars, sat-pratipaka is the content that belongs to the cognition C1, which
is such that (i) C1s invalidity has not been known, (ii) C1 is about something that is pervaded by
the absence of the Target, and (iii) C1 is co-temporal with another cognition C2, which is about
something that is pervaded by the Target and C2s invalidity also is not yet known.10

Suppose Ram has attained the cognition C2 that has the form, z has y that is pervaded by x. (y is
pervaded by x means any case of y is a case of x.) Ram does not know whether C2 is invalid. At the
same time suppose he also attains the cognition C1 that has the form, z has w that is pervaded by
the absence of x. Ram does not know whether C1 is invalid. In this case, C1 and C2 would mutually block
each other and there would be no inference at all, since y and w would try to establish x and the absence
of x respectively at the same time. Here the content of C1 is the sat-pratipaka defect of the inference, z
has x, since z has y, and likewise the content of C2 is the sat-pratipaka defect of the inference, z has the
absence of x, since z has w.

5. Conclusion

10
aghtprmyaka-sdhya-vypya-vattvopasthiti-klnghtprmyaka-tad-abhva-vypyavattvopasthiti-
viayas tathetyanye. Nyyasiddhnta-muktval. See str (1968, p. 390).
 8

We may visualize the classical Indian logical system as a large cylindrical machine with an inference-
generator and a few filters. At one end of the machine, the generator is located. It has a schema, which is,
z has y, since z has x. One can instantiate this schema by replacing x, y and z by any entities. Thus one
may get, This hill has fire, since it has smoke or This hill has smoke, since it has fire or anything else.
Each instantiation is an inference. There are a number of filters in the cylindrical system, and those are
associated with a description of the world. The description or database consists of several statements.
Suppose the following statements are part of the database of a logical system:

S1: Hill1 does not have smoke.

S2: Hill2 does not have fire.

S3: Hill3, Hill4, Kitchen1 and Kitchen2 have smoke.

S4: Every case of smoke is a case of fire.

S5: It is not the case that every case of fire is a case of smoke.

S6: There is no golden hill.

S7: Every case of ice is a case of the absence of fire.

S8: Kitchen2 has ice.

We would assume that none of the above statements is known to be false (i.e., we do not have evidence
against the validity of these statements). Of course all of them need not be valid. Now from S4 and S3, we
may infer Hill3 has fire, Hill4 has fire etc. Those inferences would be valid, since no filter would block
them inside the cylinder.

Suppose Ram tries to infer, Hill1 has fire. The Site-located-ness-cognition associated with this
inference is, Hill1 has smoke, which is blocked by S1. The inferential defect of this inference is the
content of the cognition, Hill1 does not have smoke. Let us also assume that the content is a fact with
respect to the world described in the database. The name of the defect is svarpsiddhi.

In the cylindrical system, there is a particular filter that would be activated if an inference that has
been generated has a svarpsiddhi defect. Thus each defect is connected with a filter. If an inference is
defect-free, no filter in the cylinder would be activated and the inference would freely go out of the
system and get validated. But a defective inference cannot pass all the filters of the system and would not
 9

get validated.

The western logical systems are formal, whereas the Indian system is associated with a database/
world. The defect of an Indian inference is not just a structural/ formal defect; it is either a fact or a state
of affairs that seems to be right. The effort to understand the Indian logical system in terms of the western
logical terms may be a little misguiding. In this essay, we tried to see the idea of logical defects from an
Indian perspective.