G.R. No.
224302, November 29, 2016
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S.
CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., AND THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners, v. HIS EXCELLENCY
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA.
GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B.
JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE
PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, AND HON. VICTORIA C.
FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Quo Warranto under Rule 66 and Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 with Application for Issuance of Injunctive Writs1 filed by
petitioners Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Muntinlupa City, Branch 207; Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Alhambra) of RTC,
Manila, Branch 53; Judge Danilo S. Cruz (D. Cruz) of RTC, Pasig City, Branch 152;
Judge Benjamin T. Pozon (Pozon) of RTC, Makati City, Branch 139; Judge Salvador
V. Timbang, Jr. (Timbang) of RTC, Las Pias City, Branch 253; and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondents former President Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III (Aquino), Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa (Ochoa),
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi),
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg), Atty. Danilo
S. Sandoval (Sandoval), Atty. Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan (Jorge-Wagan), Atty.
Rosana Fe Romero-Maglaya (Romero Maglaya), Atty. Merianthe Pacita M. Zuraek
(Zuraek), Atty. Elmo M. Alameda (Alameda), and Atty. Victoria C. Fernandez-
Bernardo (Fernandez-Bernardo). The Petition assails President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.2chanrobleslaw
I
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential
Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a
Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the President,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations.3 A
few months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued
Presidential Decree No. 1606,4 which elevated the rank of the members of the
Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the
Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions
of three Justices each.5 Republic Act No. 79756 was approved into law on March
30, 1995 and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to
fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of three members each. Republic Act
No. 10660,7 recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the
Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement
calling for applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8 After screening and selection of
applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six
separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015, which
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1) For the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the SIXTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 1. AGUINALDO, PHILIP A. - 5 votes 4. DIZON, MA. ANTONIA EDITA CLARIDADES - 5 votes

2. ALHAMBRA, REYNALDO A. - 5 votes 5. SORIANO, ANDRES BARTOLOME - 5 votes10

3. CRUZ, DANILO S. - 5 votes

3) For the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:

4. POZON, BENJAMIN T. - 5 votes chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,

5. SANDOVAL, DANILO S. - 5 votes
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the EIGHTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
6. TIMBANG, SALVADOR JR. - 5 votes9 SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2) For the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
1. BAGUIO, CELSO O. - 5 votes
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:

2. DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, MA. TERESA E. - 5 votes

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
nominations for the vacancy for the SEVENTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the 3. FERNANDEZ, BERNELITO R. - 5 votes
SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:

4. PANGANIBAN, ELVIRA DE CASTRO - 5 votes

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. CORPUS-MAALAC, MARYANN E. - 6 votes 5. SAGUN, FERNANDO JR. T. - 5 votes

2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, MARIA THERESA V. - 6 votes 6. TRESPESES, ZALDY V. - 5 votes11

3. QUIMBO, RODOLFO NOEL S. - 6 votes

4) For the 19th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
1. MIRANDA, KARL B. - 6 votes

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,

the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following 2. ATAL-PAO, PERPETUA - 5 votes
nominations for the vacancy for the NINETEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
3. BUNYI-MEDINA, THELMA - 5 votes

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes
1. GUANZON, FRANCES V. - 6 votes
5. FIEL-MACARAIG, GERALDINE C. - 5 votes
2. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, MARISSA - 6 votes
6. QUIMPO-SALE, ANGELENE MARY W. - 5 votes
3. CRUZ, REYNALDO P. - 5 votes
7. JACINTO, BAYANI H. - 4 votes13
4. PAUIG, VILMA T. - 5 votes

6) For the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:

5. RAMOS, RENAN E. - 5 votes

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
12
6. ROXAS, RUBEN REYNALDO G. - 5 votes
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following
5) For the 20th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice: nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTY-FIRST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryYour Excellency:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following 1. JORGE-WAGAN, WILHELMINA B. - 6 votes
nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTIETH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the
SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes.
2. ECONG, GERALDINE FAITH A. - 5 votes

3. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, ROSANNA FE - 5 votes
4. ZURAEK, MERIANTHE PACITA M. - 5 votes
5. ALAMEDA, ELMO M. - 4 votes
6. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, VICTORIA C. - 4 votes
7. MUSNGI, MICHAEL FREDERICK L. - 4 votes14
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six
new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice
Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V.
Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6)
Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment papers were transmitted
on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took
their oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge.
Respondent Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths
of office before Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno);
while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of
office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza).15chanrobleslaw
Arguments of the Petitioners
Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, D. Cruz, Pozon, and Timbang (Aguinaldo, et al.),
were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
They assert that they possess the legal standing or locus standi to file the instant
Petition since they suffered a direct injury from President Aquino's failure to
appoint any of them as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Petitioner IBP avers that it comes before this Court through a taxpayer's suit, by
which taxpayers may assail an alleged illegal official action where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, deflected to an improper use, or wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Petitioner IBP also
maintains that it has locus standi considering that the present Petition involves an
issue of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, an assertion of a
public right, and a subject matter of public interest. Lastly, petitioner IBP contends
that as the association of all lawyers in the country, with the fundamental purpose
of safeguarding the administration of justice, it has a direct interest in the validity
of the appointments of the members of the Judiciary.
Petitioners base their instant Petition on the following
arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
PRESIDENT AQUINO VIOLATED SECTION 9, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IN THAT:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(A) HE DID NOT APPOINT ANYONE FROM THE
SHORTLIST SUBMITTED BY THE JBC FOR THE VACANCY FOR POSITION OF THE
16TH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN; AND
(B) HE APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY MUSNGI AND JUDGE ECONG AS ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE VACANCY FOR THE POSITION OF
21STASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
(C) THE APPOINTMENTS MADE WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHORTLISTS
SUBMITTED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EACH VACANCY, THUS
AFFECTING THE ORDER OF SENIORITY OF THE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to
reduce the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary, i.e., "to rid the
process of appointments to the Judiciary from the political pressure and partisan
activities."17chanrobleslaw
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate of the JBC, as
well as the limitation on the President's appointing power to the Judiciary,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
19th Associate
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the 17th Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz PNOY019446
Justice
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
Geraldine Faith A. 21st Associate
18th Associate Justice PNOY019447
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days Econg Justice
from the submission of the list.

It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees recommended Maria Theresa V. 17th Associate
19th Associate Justice PNOY019448
for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified Mendoza-Arcega Justice
nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the
President, who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. 20th Associate
Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear 20th Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda PNOY019449
Justice
and unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees
to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on
the President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the 18th Associate
21st Associate Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses PNOY019450
nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC. Justice

In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino's
for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, appointments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
20th and 21st Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the
position of the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the a. Michael Frederick L. Musngi, nominated for the vacancy of the
16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for 21st Associate Justice, was appointed as the 16th Associate Justice;
each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan
b. Reynaldo P. Cruz, nominated for the vacancy of the 19th Associate Justice,
Associate Justices. However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the
was appointed as the 17th Associate Justice;
appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary c. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, also nominated for the vacancy of the
21st Associate Justice, but was appointed as the 18th Associate Justice;
VACANCY IN THE PERSON BAR CODE SHORTLISTED
d. Maria Theresa V. Mendoza[-Arcega], nominated for the vacancy of the
SANDIGANBAYAN APPOINTED NO. FOR
17thAssociate Justice, but was appointed as the 19th Associate Justice;

Michael Frederick 21st Associate e. Zaldy V. Trespeses, nominated for the vacancy of the 18th Associate
16th Associate Justice PNOY019445 Justice, but was appointed as the 21st Associate Justice.
L. Musngi Justice

60. Only the appointment of Karl B. Miranda as the 20th Associate Justice is in
accordance with his nomination.18
Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee from each
of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and
no other; and any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation
of the Constitution. Hence, petitioners pray, among other reliefs, that the
appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, who belonged to the same
shortlist for the position of 21st Associate Justice, be declared null and void for
these were made in violation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
Arguments of the Respondents
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Office of the President
(OP), filed a Comment,19 seeking the dismissal of the Petition on procedural and
substantive grounds.
On matters of procedure, the OSG argues, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, President Aquino should be dropped as a
respondent m the instant case on the ground of his immunity from suit.
Second, petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. cannot institute an action for quo
warranto because usurpation of public office, position, or franchise is a public
wrong, and not a private injury. Hence, only the State can file such an action
through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, under Sections 2 and 3, Rule
6620of the Rules of Court. As an exception, an individual may commence an action
for quo warranto in accordance with Section 5, Rule 6621 of the Rules of Court if
he/she claims entitlement to a public office or position. However, for said
individual's action for quo warranto to prosper, he/she must prove that he/she
suffered a direct injury as a result of the usurpation of public office or position;
and that he/she has a clear right, and not merely a preferential right, to the
contested office or position. Herein petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have failed to
show that they are entitled to the positions now being held by respondents
Musngi and Econg, as the inclusion of petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. in the shortlist
for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice had only given them the possibility,
not the certainty, of appointment to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et
al., as nominees, only had an expectant right because their appointment to the
Sandiganbayan would still be dependent upon the President's discretionary
appointing power.
Third, petitioner IBP can only institute the certiorari and prohibition case, but not
the action for quo warranto against respondents Musngi and Econg because it
cannot comply with the direct injury requirement for the latter. Petitioner IBP
justifies its locus standi to file the petition for certiorari and prohibition by invoking
the exercise by this Court of its expanded power of judicial review and seeking to
oust respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices based on
the alleged unconstitutionality of their appointments, and not on a claim of
usurpation of a public office. Yet, based on Topacio v. Ong,22 a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is a collateral attack on a public officer's title, which
cannot be permitted. Title to a public office can only be contested directly in a quo
warrantoproceeding.
Moreover, it is the JBC, not petitioner IBP, which has legal standing to file the
present suit, as the dispute here is between the JBC and the OP. The fundamental
question in this case is "whether the JBC can corral the discretion of the President
to appoint, a core constitutional prerogative, by designating qualified nominees
within specific, artificial numerical categories and forcing the President to appoint
in accordance with those artificial numerical categories." The Court, though, is
barred from deciding said question because the JBC is not a party herein.
Fourth, petitioners have erroneously included Jorge-Wagan, Romero Maglaya,
Zuraek, Alameda, and Fernandez-Bernardo (Jorge-Wagan, et al.) as unwilling co-
petitioners in the Petition at bar. Apart from the fact that Jorge-Wagan, et al. do
not claim entitlement to the positions occupied by respondents Musngi and Econg,
non-appointed nominees for the positions of 16 th and 21st Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan cannot simultaneously claim right to assume two vacancies in said
special court.
And fifth, petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly filing the
instant Petition for Quo warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court.
Even in cases where the Court is vested with original concurrent jurisdiction, it
remains a court of last resort, not a court of first instance.
The OSG next addresses the substantive issues.

The OSG submits that the core argument of petitioners stems from their
erroneous premise that there are existing numerical positions in the
Sandiganbayan: the 1st being the Presiding Justice, and the succeeding 2nd to the
21st being the Associate Justices. It is the assertion of the OSG that the
Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices,
without any numerical designations. Presidential Decree No. 1606 and its
amendments do not mention vacancies for the positions of "2nd Associate Justice,"
"3rd Associate Justice," etc. There are no such items in the Judiciary because such
numerical designations are only used to refer to the seniority or order of
precedence of Associate Justices in collegiate courts such as the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, and Sandiganbayan.
The OSG further contends that the power to determine the order of precedence of
the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan is reposed in the President, as part of
his constitutional power to appoint. Citing Section 1, third paragraph of
Presidential Decree No. 160623 and Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan,24 the OSG explains that the order of precedence of the
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan shall be according to the order of their
appointments, that is, according to the dates of their respective commissions, or,
when two or more commissions bear the same date, according to the order in
which their commissions had been issued by the President. It is the averment of
the OSG that the constitutional power of the JBC to recommend nominees for
appointment to the Judiciary does not include the power to determine their
seniority. President Aquino correctly disregarded the order of precedence in the
shortlists submitted by the JBC and exercised his statutory power to determine the
seniority of the appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The OSG interprets Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution differently from
petitioners. According to the OSG, said provision neither requires nor allows the
JBC to cluster nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary; it only mandates that
for every vacancy, the JBC shall present at least three nominees, among whom the
President shall appoint a member of the Judiciary. As a result, if there are six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC shall present, for the
President's consideration, at least 18 nominees for said vacancies. In the case at
bar, the JBC submitted 37 nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan;
and from said pool of 37 nominees, the President appointed the six Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, in faithful compliance with the Constitution.
It is also the position of the OSG that the President has the absolute discretion to
determine who is best suited for appointment among all the qualified nominees.
The very narrow reading of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
proposed by petitioners unreasonably restricts the President's choices to only a
few nominees even when the JBC recognized 37 nominees qualified for the
position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. This gives the JBC, apart from its
power to recommend qualified nominees, the power to dictate upon the President
which among the qualified nominees should be contending for a particular
vacancy. By dividing nominees into groups and artificially designating each group a
numerical value, the JBC creates a substantive qualification to various judicial
posts, which potentially impairs the President's prerogatives in appointing
members of the Judiciary.
The OSG additionally points out that the JBC made a categorical finding that
respondents Musngi and Econg were "suitably best" for appointment as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The functions of the 16 th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice are no different from those of the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or
21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice. Since respondents Musngi and Econg were
indubitably qualified and obtained sufficient votes, it was the ministerial duty of
the JBC to include them as nominees for any of the six vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan presented for the President's final consideration.
Furthermore, the OSG alleges that it is highly unjust to remove respondents
Musngi and Econg from their current positions on the sole ground that the
nominees were divided into six groups. The JBC announced "the
opening/reopening, for application or recommendation" of "[s]ix (6) newly-created
positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Respondents Musngi and
Econg applied for the vacancy of "Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." In its
announcements for interview, the JBC stated that it would be interviewing
applicants for "six (6) newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan." It was only on October 26, 2015, the date of submission of the
shortlists, when the nominees had been clustered into six groups. The OSG notes
that there are no JBC rules on the division of nominees in cases where there are
several vacancies in a collegiate court. In this case, the OSG observes that there
were no measurable standards or parameters for dividing the 37 nominees into
the six groups. The clustering of nominees was not based on the number of votes
the nominees had garnered. The nominees were not evenly distributed among the
six groups, i.e., there were five nominees for 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice;
six nominees for 16th, 18th, and 19thSandiganbayan Associate Justices; and seven
nominees for the 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The OSG then refers to several examples demonstrating that the previous practice
of the JBC was to submit only one shortlist for several vacancies in a collegiate
court.
The other respondents had likewise filed their respective Comments or
Manifestations:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) In respondent Fernandez-Bernardo's
Comment,25cralawred she recognizes the legal, substantial, and paramount
significance of the ruling of the Court on the interpretation and application of
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, which will serve as a judicial
precedent for the guidance of the Executive and Legislative Departments, the JBC,
the Bench, and the Bar.
2) Respondent Musngi states in his Manifestation 26 that he will no longer file a
separate Comment and that he adopts all the averments, issues, arguments,
discussions, and reliefs in the Comment of the OSG.
3) In her Comment,27 respondent Jorge-Wagan maintains that she is not the
proper party to assail the validity of the appointment of the 16 th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice as she was nominated for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; and that she is also not the proper party to seek the nullification of the
appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. Not being a proper party-in-interest, respondent Jorge-Wagan argues that
she cannot be considered an "unwilling co-plaintiff."
4) Respondent Romero-Maglaya makes the following averments in her
Manifestation/Comment28: that she should not have been impleaded as a
respondent or an unwilling co-plaintiff in the instant Petition because her rights as
a nominee for judicial appointment were not violated; that she had no claim of
entitlement to the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that she had
no participation in the alleged violation of the Constitution or exercise of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
5) Respondent Econg manifests in her Comment29 that while she is adopting in
toto the arguments in the Comment of the OSG, she is also making certain factual
clarifications and additional procedural and substantive averments.
Respondent Econg clarifies that her real name is Geraldine Faith A. Econg, and not
Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
Respondent Econg believes that the present Petition is really for quo
warranto because it seeks to declare null and void the respective appointments of
respondents Musngi and Econg. Respondent Econg, however, asseverates that
petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. have no clear, unquestionable franchise to the Office
of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan simply because they had been included
in the shortlist submitted for the President's consideration. Nomination is not
equivalent to appointment and the removal of respondents Musngi and Econg will
not automatically grant petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. the right to the Office of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., except for
petitioner Alhambra, are even uncertain about their right to the position/s of
16th and/or 21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice/s as they have also applied for the
position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice in lieu of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, who eventually retired on July 22, 2016. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that petitioners' alternative remedy
of certiorari is proper, respondent Econg contends that petitioners only had 60
days to file such a petition from January 20, 2016, the date she and respondent
Musngi were appointed. Petitioners belatedly filed their Petition before the Court
on May 17, 2016.
Respondent Econg also raises the concern that if the Court affirms the petitioners'
position that there are no valid appointments for the 16th and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, the seniority or order of precedence among the Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices will be adversely affected. Respondent Econg avers that there
was only one list of nominees for the six vacant positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, considering that: (a) the announcement of the opening for
application/recommendation was for the six newly-created positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; (b) respondent Econg's application was for the
six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and (c) the
announcement of the public interview of candidates was for the six newly-created
positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Thus, respondent Econg prays for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the instant
Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit, and the
declaration that the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices are valid.
infirmities given the transcendental importance of the constitutional issue raised
herein.
The Petition at bar is for (a) Quo Warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of
Court; and (b) Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the same Rules.
Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court particularly identifies who can file a special
civil action of Quo Warranto, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULE 66
Quo Warranto

Sec. 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of

6) In respondent Sandoval's Comment,30 he avows that he opts not to join the
a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
petitioners as he subscribes to the principle that the heart and core of the
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
President's power to appoint is the freedom to choose. The power to appoint rests
on the President and the President alone. Respondent Sandoval has already
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
accepted the fact that he was not appointed despite being nominated by the JBC
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and he is looking forward to
another opportunity to apply for a higher position in the Judiciary.
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
Respondents Zuraek and Almeda have not filed their comments despite notice and
are deemed to have waived their right to do so.
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act
On November 26, 2016, the JBC belatedly filed a Motion for Intervention in the
Petition at bar, or more than six months from the filing of the herein Petition on
Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. - The
May 17, 2016 and after Chief Justice Sereno, the Chairperson of the JBC herself,
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
administered the oath of office of respondent Econg, whose appointment is now
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe
being questioned for having been done in disregard of the clustering of nominees
that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must
by the JBC.
commence such action.
II
The Ruling of the Court Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with
permission of court. - The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an
The Court takes cognizance of the present Petition despite several procedural action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the
officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the
action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
xxxx
Sec. 5. When an individual may commence such an action. - A person claiming to
be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
In Topacio v. Ong,31 the Court pronounced that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another.
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case
of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for
a quo warrantopetition to be successful, the private person suing must show a
clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to
be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the
action. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
th
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16 Saridiganbayan Associate
Justice, did not have a clear right to said position, and therefore not proper parties
to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list of nominees had given
them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed to the position,
given the discretionary power of the President in making judicial appointments. It
is for this same reason that respondents Jorge-Wagan, et al., nominees for the
21stSandiganbayan Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as respondents or
unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding. Neither can the IBP initiate a quo
warranto proceeding to oust respondents Musngi and Econg from their currents
posts as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices for the IBP does not qualify under Rule
66, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court as an individual claiming to be entitled
to the positions in question.
Nevertheless, the Court takes in consideration the fact that the present Petition is
also for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which alleges that President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in his appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Court the expanded
power of judicial review, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article VIII
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza Decision)32 that a "petition
for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions."
In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the OSG
cites Topacio in which the Court declares that title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, such as by certiorari and prohibition.33chanrobleslaw
However, Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio, the writs
of certiorari and prohibition were sought against Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong on the ground that he lacked the qualification of Filipino citizenship
for said position. In contrast, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
puts under scrutiny, not any disqualification on the part of respondents Musngi
and Econg, but the act of President Aquino in appointing respondents Musngi and
Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which allegedly violated the
Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. This would not be the first time that the Court, in the exercise of its
expanded power of judicial review, takes cognizance of a petition
for certiorari that challenges a presidential appointment for being unconstitutional
or for having been done in grave abuse of discretion. As the Court held in Funa v.
Villar34:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no serious disagreement as to
the propriety of the availment of certiorari as a medium to inquire on whether the
assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed the
constitution or was infected with grave abuse of discretion. For under the
expanded concept of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, the corrective
hand of certiorari may be invoked not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." "Grave abuse of discretion" denotes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant case in view of the
allegation that then President Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her appointing power
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted.)
Even so, the Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent taking
into account that when this Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then
the incumbent President who enjoyed immunity from suit. The presidential
immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of government of this
country, even though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution. 35 The
President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
attention."36 It is sufficient that former Executive Secretary Ochoa is named as
respondent herein as he was then the head of the OP and was in-charge of
releasing presidential appointments, including those to the
Judiciary.37chanrobleslaw
Since the Petition at bar involves a question of constitutionality, the Court must
determine the locus standi or legal standing of petitioners to file the same. The
Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it
by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged; while "interest" refers to material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest
of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.38chanrobleslaw
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,39 the Court acknowledged exceptional
circumstances which justified liberality and relaxation of the rules on legal
standing:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so
as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a "citizen" or "taxpayer."
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it
was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure
of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:
"In matter of mere public right, however ... the people are the real parties... It is at
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use
of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
xxxx
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done
in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the
"transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such
liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court
resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of
the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had
no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and
civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of
laws, regulations and rulings.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to
show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of
"transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, where the Court ruled that the enforcement
of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural
resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, wherein the Court held that "given
the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the
standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct
injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, while the Court noted that the petitioners may not
file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01"
involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing
requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by
this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
While neither petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. nor petitioner IBP have legal standing to
file a petition for quo warranto, they have legal standing to institute a petition
for certiorari.
The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for justifiable reasons,
did not follow, could have caused all nominees direct injury, thus, vesting them
with personal and substantial interest, as the clustering limited their opportunity
to be considered for appointment to only one of the six vacant positions for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice instead of all the six vacant positions to which the
JBC found them as qualified for appointment. This is the far-reaching adverse
consequence to petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. that they have missed. More
importantly, for a complete resolution of this Petition, the Court must inevitably
address the issue of the validity of the clustering of nominees by the JBC for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, insofar as it seriously impacts on the
constitutional power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary, which
will be explained below.
One of the fundamental purposes of the IBP is to improve the administration of
justice.40 As the association of all lawyers in the country, petitioner IBP has an
interest in ensuring the validity of the appointments to the Judiciary. It is
recognized that the administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of
the judge and the lawyer.41 Definitely, lawyers cannot effectively discharge their
duties if they entertain doubts, or worse, had lost their faith in judges and/or
justices. It is clearly imperative for the IBP to prevent that situation from
happening by exercising vigilance and ensurmg that the judicial appointment
process remains transparent and credible.
Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of transcendental
importance and of public interest, and for the above mentioned reasons, the Court
shall accord petitioners the legal standing to sue.
The instant Petition fundamentally challenges President Aquino's appointment of
respondents Musngi and Econg as the 16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. Petitioners contend that only one of them should have been appointed as
both of them were included in one cluster of nominees for the 21stSandiganbayan
Associate Justice. The Petition presents for resolution of the Court the issue of
whether President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
and gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each specific
vacant position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The issue is of paramount
importance for it affects the validity of appointments to collegiate courts and,
ultimately, the administration of justice, for if there are questions as to the right of
the appointee to his position as judge/justice, then doubts shall likewise shadow
all his acts as such. This will indubitably undermine the faith of the public in the
judicial system. Since at hand is a constitutional issue of first impression, which will
likely arise again when there are simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, it is
imperative for the Court to already resolve the same for the guidance of the Bench
and Bar, and the general public as well.
The OSG also prays for the dismissal of this Petition on the additional ground that
petitioners, by coming directly before this Court, violated the hierarchy of courts.
Relevant to this matter are the following pronouncements of the Court
in Querubin v. Commission on Elections42:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original jurisdiction over applications
for the issuance of writs of certiorari, however, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
dictates that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The rationale behind the principle is
explained in Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion in the following
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and
now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The
strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus (f) When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
(g) When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an
course of law;
exception to the policy.

Petitioners do not have the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which an application for certiorari will be directed. Indeed, referral to the (h) When public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictates, or
Supreme Court as the court of last resort will simply be empty rhetoric if party- when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
litigants are able to flout judicial hierarchy at will. The Court reserves the direct
invocation of its jurisdiction only when there are special and important reasons
clearly and especially set out in the petition that would justify the same.
(i) When the orders complained of are patent nullities; and

In the leading case of The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, the Court enumerated
the specific instances when direct resort to this Court is allowed, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (j) When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. (Citations
omitted.)

(a) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time; Inasmuch as the Petition at bar involves a constitutional question of
transcendental importance and of first impression and demanded by the broader
interest of justice, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, resolves to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the same.
(b) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
Lastly, respondent Econg opposes the Petition at bar for being filed out of time.
According to respondent Econg, the 60-day period for petitioners to file this
(c) Cases of first impression; Petition commenced on January 20, 2016, the date she and her co-respondent
Musngi were appointed by President Aquino. Based on respondent Econg's
argument, the 60-day period ended on March 20, 2016, Sunday, so petitioners
(d) When the constitutional issues raised are best decided by this Court; only had until March 21, 2016, Monday, to timely file the Petition. For their part,
petitioners aver that after learning of the appointments of respondents Musngi
and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the media, they obtained
copies of the shortlists for the vacancies for the 16 th to the 21st Sandiganbayan
(e) When the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored;
Associate Justices on March 22, 2016. Counting the 60-day period from March 22,
2016, petitioners allege that they had until May 21, 2016 to file their Petition.

Rule 65, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states
that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. The question though is when
said 60-day period began to run in this case. The Court refers to its ruling
in Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President.43 In said case, the Court declared that
appointment is a process. For an appointment to be valid, complete, and effective,
four elements must always concur, to wit: "(1) authority to appoint and evidence
of the exercise of authority, (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence
of the transmittal, (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment, and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications." The Court
expounded on the importance of the last element as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and
taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of
the office.
Javier v. Reyes is instructive in showing how acceptance is indispensable to
complete an appointment. On 7 November 1967, petitioner Isidro M. Javier
(Javier) was appointed by then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba as the Chief of Police of
Malolos, Bulacan. The Municipal Council confirmed and approved Javier's
appointment on the same date. Javier took his oath of office on 8 November 1967,
and subsequently discharged the rights, prerogatives, and duties of the office. On
3 January 1968, while the approval of Javier's appointment was pending with the
CSC, respondent Purificacion C. Reyes (Reyes), as the new mayor of Malolos, sent
to the CSC a letter to recall Javier's appointment. Reyes also designated Police Lt.
Romualdo F. Clemente as Officer-in-Charge of the police department. The CSC
approved Javier's appointment as permanent on 2 May 1968, and even directed
Reyes to reinstate Javier. Reyes, on the other hand, pointed to the appointment of
Bayani Bernardo as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on 4 September 1967. This
Court ruled that Javier's appointment prevailed over that of Bernardo. It cannot be
said that Bernardo accepted his appointment because he never assumed office or
took his oath.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very
evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision
in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of
the entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to
appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear
that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to
simulate the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the
appointee.44 (Citations omitted.)
The records show that on January 25, 2016, the appointment papers were
transmitted to and received by the six newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices, including respondents Musngi and Econg, who, on the same day, already
took their oaths of office. Therefore, pursuant to Velicaria-Garafil, the
appointment process became complete and effective on January 25, 2016. If the
Court is to count the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari from January 25, 2016, it expired on March 25, 2016. The present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed on May 17, 2016.
Just like any rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to the strict
observance of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, viz.: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. There should be
an effort, though, on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.45chanrobleslaw
The peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the issues involved
herein, justify the relaxation of the 60-day period for the filing of this Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition. Indeed, the official act assailed by petitioners is the
appointment by President Aquino of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which was completed on January 25, 2016 when
said respondents took their oaths of office. Yet, petitioners could not have sought
remedy from the Court at that point. As basis for petitioners' opposition to the
said appointments, they needed to see and secure copies of the shortlists for the
16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It was only after petitioners
obtained copies of all six shortlists on March 22, 2016 that petitioners would have
been able to confirm that no one from the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice was appointed to any of the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice; and that respondents Musngi and Econg, both in the shortlist for
the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, were appointed as the 16th and
18thSandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively. In addition, respondent Econg
is not unjustly prejudiced by the delay, but will even benefit from the Court
resolving once and for all the questions on her right to the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court reiterates that there can be no valid objection to its discretion to waive
one or some procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment to
address and resolve the constitutional question of transcendental importance
raised in this Petition, the same having farreaching implications insofar as the
administration of justice is concemed.46chanrobleslaw
President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists
for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy."
The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if there is only
one vacancy to consider at a time. The power of the President to appoint members
of the Judiciary is beyond question, subject to the limitation that the President can
only appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every
vacancy. However, the controversy in this case arose because by virtue of Republic
Act No. 10660, creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three
members each, there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate Justice of said
collegiate court; and that the JBC submitted six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
On one hand, petitioners assert that President Aquino's power to appoint is
limited to each shortlist submitted by the JBC. President Aquino should have
appointed the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from the nominees in the
shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the 17thSandiganbayan
Associate Justice from the nominees in the shortlist for the 17th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, and so on and so forth. By totally overlooking the nominees for
the 16thSandiganbayan Associate Justice and appointing respondents Musngi and
Econg, who were both nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, as
the 16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively, President Aquino
violated the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that President Aquino acted in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution and well-within his discretionary power to
appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees
by the JBC into six separate shortlists and collectively considered all 37 nominees
named in said shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The primordial question then for resolution of the Court is whether President
Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the nominees
in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.
The Court answers in the negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary.47 It is a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities.48 The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-vis
the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10,
1986, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of members of
the Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts. At present it is the President
who appoints them. If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the
President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. In this
proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of
seven members, called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will
still appoint the members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees
of this Council.
MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO: And the Council will, whenever there is a vacancy, recommend
three.
MR. CONCEPCION: At least three for every vacancy.
MR. RODRIGO: And the President cannot appoint anybody outside of the three
recommendees.
MR. CONCEPCION: Nomination by the Council would be one of the qualifications
for appointment.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is apparent from the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that nomination by
the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this only
means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by
the JBC. It cannot be disputed herein that respondents Musngi and Econg were
indeed nominated by the JBC and, hence, qualified to be appointed as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to
choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone
nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds
herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially
when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President
Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC
had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the
position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of
the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective
appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding
Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into seven divisions, with three members
each. The numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the 20
Associate Justices is determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their
commission or appointment by the President.
This is clear under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and
compensation. - x x x
xxxx
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other
Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the
same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by
the President.
Consistent with the foregoing, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan similarly provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence.-
xxxx
(b) Rule on Precedence - The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the
other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate
Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments.
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among the Four
(4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals,50 which involved the Court of Appeals, another collegiate
court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission
has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such
document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority
of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the
commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more
appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments
by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3,
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the
2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to
this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way
to the law they seek to implement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual
appointment by the President.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the
seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling
the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission
papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would
be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus,
unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.
There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice should not each be assigned a specific number by
the JBC. The Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions were created without any
distinction as to rank in seniority or order of preference in the collegiate court. The
President appoints his choice nominee to the post of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice, but not to a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice position with an identified
rank, which is automatically determined by the order of issuance of appointment
by the President. The appointment does not specifically pertain to the 16 th, 17th,
18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice's ranking is temporary and changes every time a
vacancy occurs in said collegiate court. In fact, by the end of 2016, there will be
two more vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.51 These vacancies will
surely cause movement in the ranking within the Sandiganbayan. At the time of
his/her appointment, a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice might be ranked 16 th, but
because of the two vacancies occurring in the court, the same Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may eventually be higher ranked.
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for
every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional
mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering
impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the
chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's
option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster;
and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed
from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies.
The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the
President's appointing power.
 Additionally, in 1995, when Republic Act No. 7975 increased the divisions in the
To recall, the JBC invited applications and recommendations and conducted Sandiganbayan from three to five, which similarly created six simultaneous vacant
interviews for the "six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC, with then Supreme Court
Sandiganbayan." Applicants, including respondents Musngi and Econg, applied for Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa as Chairman, submitted a single list of nominees
the vacancy for "Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Throughout the from which former President Fidel V. Ramos subsequently chose his six
application process before the JBC, the six newly-created positions of appointees. Reproduced in full below was the nomination submitted by the JBC on
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were not specifically identified and differentiated said occasion:
from one another for the simple reason that there was really no legal justification
to do so. The requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and July 17, 1997
responsibilities are the same for all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. If an
individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for HIS EXCELLENCY
all the other vacancies. It was only at the end of the process that the JBC PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS
precipitously clustered the 37 qualified nominees into six separate shortlists for Malacaan, Manila
each of the six vacant positions.
Dear Mr. President:
The Court notes that the clustering of nominees is a totally new practice of the
JBC. Previously, the JBC submitted only one shortlist for two or more vacancies in a chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 9 of
collegiate court. Worth reproducing below are the examples cited by the the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit the
OSG:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary nominations (in alphabetical order) for six (6) positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, per the JBC Minutes of July 9 and 16,
77. For instance, in June 2011, there were 2 vacancies for Associate Justice of the 1997:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Supreme Court. Out of 30 candidates, the JBC submitted to the President only 1
short list of 6 nominees. Based on this short list, President Aquino appointed 1. Asuncion, Elvi John S.
Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela Perlas-Bernabe. 2. Badoy Jr., Anacleto D.
3. Castaeda Jr., Catalina D.
78. In January 2012, there were 3 vacancies for Associate Justice of the CA. Out of 4. De Castro, Teresita Leonardo
sixty-three (63) candidates, the JBC prepared only 1 short list of 13 nominees for 5. Fineza, Antonio J.
these 3 vacancies. Based on this short list, President Aquino appointed Associate 6. Flores, Alfredo C.
Justices Ma. Luisa C. QuijanoPadilla, Renate C. Francisco, and Jhosep Y. Lopez. 7. Gustilo, Alfredo J.
8. Hernandez, Jose R.
79. In June 2012, there were 3 vacancies for Associate Justice of the CA. Out of 53 9. Ilarde, Ricardo M.
candidates, the JBC submitted to the President only 1 short list of 14 nominees 10. Laggui, Pedro N.
who obtained the required number of votes. Based on this short list, President 11. Lee Jr., German G.
Aquino appointed Associate Justices Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Oscar V. Badelies, 12. Legaspi, Godofredo L.
and Marie Christine Azcarraga Jacob.52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 13. Makasiar, Ramon P.
14. Mallillin, Hesiquio R.
15. Martinez, Wilfredo C. Quisumbing and Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario), per the JBC Minutes of even date,
16. Mirasol, Teodulo E. to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
17. Nario, Narciso S.
18. Navarro, Flordelis Ozaeta 1. Abdulwahid, Hakim S. - 6 votes
19. Ortile, Senecio D.
20. Pineda, Ernesto L.
21. Ponferrada, Bernardo T. 2. Mendoza, Jose C. - 6 votes
22. Quimsing, Godofredo P.
23. Rivera, Candido V. 3. Perez, Jose P. - 5 votes
24. Rosario Jr., Eriberto U.
25. Salonga, Josefina Guevara
26. Sultan, Justo M. 4. Villaruz, Francisco, Jr. H. - 5 votes
27. Umali, Mariano M.
5. De Leon, Magdangal M. - 4 votes
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto attached.

Once more, on November 23, 2009, the JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief
6. Tijam, Noel G. - 4 votes
Justice Reynato S. Puno (Puno), submitted to former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single list of nominees for two vacant positions of
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto attached.
Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which President Macapagal-Arroyo
ultimately appointed Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza. The And, as mentioned by the OSG, the JBC, during the Chairmanship of Supreme
letter of nomination of the JBC reads: Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, submitted to President Aquino on June 21,
2011 just one list of nominees for two vacant positions of Supreme Court
November 23, 2009
Associate Justice, from which President Aquino eventually appointed Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. Such list is fully quoted
Her Excellency
hereunder:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Malacaang Palace June 21, 2011
Manila
His Excellency
Your Excellency: President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
Malacaang Palace
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, Manila
the Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit nominations for two (2)
positions of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (vice Hon. Leonardo A. Your Excellency:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
the Judicial and Bar Council has the honor to submit nominations for the two (2)
positions of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SUPREME COURT, per the JBC Minutes of
even date, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Reyes, Jose, Jr. C. - 7 votes
2. Robles, Rodolfo D. - 7 votes
3. De Leon, Magdangal M. - 6 votes
4. Reyes, Bienvenido L. - 6 votes
5. Bernabe, Estela Perlas - 5 votes
6. Dimaampao, Japar B. - 5 votes
Their respective curriculum vitae are hereto attached.
There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired the
power of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory
authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court. The clustering by the JBC of
the qualified nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
appears to have been done arbitrarily, there being no clear basis, standards, or
guidelines for the same. The number of nominees was not even equally distributed
among the clusters.
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary
power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely
maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount
Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.
This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires
the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the
JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said
constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18
nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice;
but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC
submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All
the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other
four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.
The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the situation wherein
there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, to which the President
shall make appointments on the same occasion, regardless of whether the JBC
carried out combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies. The
President is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider
as one the separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. As
the Court already ratiocinated herein, the requirements and qualifications, as well
as the power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all the vacant posts in a
collegiate court; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then
he/she is also qualified for all the other vacancies. It is worthy of note that the JBC,
in previous instances of closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts, such as
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, faithfully observed the practice of
submitting only a single list of nominees for all the available vacancies, with at
least three nominees for every vacancy, from which the President made his
appointments on the same occasion. This is in keeping with the constitutional
provisions on the President's exclusive power to appoint members of the Judiciary
and the mandate of the JBC to recommend qualified nominees for appointment to
the Judiciary.
The Court denies the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in this Petition.
In its Motion for Intervention, the JBC echoes the arguments of the OSG in the
latter's Comment that the dispute is between the JBC and the OP and it cannot be
decided by the Court since the JBC is not a party, much less, a complaining party in
this case. The JBC asserts that it has legal interest in the matter of litigation
because it will be adversely affected by the judgment or decision in the present
case, having submitted the controverted shortlists of nominees to the OP. The JBC
likewise claims that its intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties in the case. The JBC, thus, prays
that it be allowed to intervene in the instant case and to submit its complaint-in-
intervention within 30 days from receipt of notice allowing its intervention.
Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the
Court.53 The allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of
intervention must be shown. The procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a
great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be
secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable
provision.54chanrobleslaw
It bears to point out that petitioners did not name the JBC as a respondent in this
case because petitioners precisely wanted the shortlists submitted by the JBC
upheld; they were on the same side. Petitioners already presented the arguments
for the constitutionality of and strict adherence by the President to the separate
shortlists submitted by the JBC for the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. Significantly, not one of the parties moved, and
not even the Court motu proprio ordered, to implead the JBC as an indispensable
party herein.
The JBC avers in its Motion for Intervention that it has a legal interest in the
Petition at bar and its intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties in the case.
The Court is unconvinced.
The instant Petition was filed before this Court on May 17, 2016, yet, the JBC filed
its Motion for Intervention only on November 26, 2016, more than six months
later, and even praying for an additional 30-day period from notice to submit its
complaint-in-intervention. Therefore, allowing the intervention will undoubtedly
delay the resolution of the case; and further delay in the resolution of this case will
only perpetuate the doubts on the legitimacy of the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to the detriment of said
court, in particular, and the entire justice system, in general. What is more, unless
promptly resolved by the Court, the instant case is capable of repetition given the
forthcoming vacancies in collegiate courts, particularly, the Supreme Court.
Even if the intervention of the JBC will evidently cause delay in the resolution of
this case and prejudice to the original parties herein, are there compelling
substantive grounds to still allow the intervention of the JBC? The JBC, through its
own fault, did not provide the Court with a way to make such a determination. The
Revised Rules of Court explicitly requires that the pleading-in-intervention already
be attached to the motion for intervention.55 The JBC could have already argued
the merits of its case in its complaint-in-intervention. However, the JBC not only
failed to attach its complaint-in-intervention to its Motion for Intervention, but it
also did not provide any explanation for such failure.
The Court can reasonably assume, as well, that the JBC is well-aware of President
Aquino's appointment of the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including
respondents Musngi and Econg, on January 20, 2015. The six newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices all took their oaths of office on January 25, 2016
at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices
Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Chief Justice
Sereno, who is also the Chairperson of the JBC; while respondent Musngi, with
Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court
Associate Justice Jardeleza on the same occasion and at the same venue. Despite
its knowledge of the appointment and assumption of office of respondents Musngi
and Econg in January 2016, the JBC did not take any action to challenge the same
on the ground that President Aquino appointed respondents Musngi and Econg in
disregard of the clustering of nominees by the JBC through the separate shortlists
for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The silence of the JBC all
this while, for a period of eleven (11) months, can already be deemed as
acquiescence to President Aquino's appointment of respondents Musngi and
Econg.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion for Intervention of the JBC.
There are several other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the
Court takes cognizance of as a separate administrative matter.
The Court takes cognizance of several other matters covered by the new rules and
practices adopted by the JBC.
Item No. 1: The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the JBC promulgated on
September 20, 2016 JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council" (Revised JBC Rules), to take effect on October 24, 2016. Notably, the
Revised JBC Rules explicitly states among its Whereas
clauses:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREAS, the President of the Philippines may appoint only one from the list of at
least three nominees for every vacancy officially transmitted by the Council to the
Office of the President[.]
This is an obvious attempt by the JBC to institutionalize through the Revised JBC
Rules its newly-introduced practice of clustering nominees for simultaneous
vacancies in collegiate courts. The timing likewise is disturbing as the instant case
is pending resolution by this Court and with existing and upcoming vacancies in
several collegiate courts, i.e., the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, and even
this Court. As the Court has categorically declared herein, the clustering by the JBC
of nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts constitute undue
limitation on and impairment of the power of the President to appoint members
of the Judiciary under the 1987 Constitution. It also deprives qualified nominees
equal opportunity to be considered for all vacancies, not just a specific one.
Incorporating such Whereas clause into the Revised JBC Rules will not serve to
legitimize an unconstitutional and unfair practice. Accordingly, such Whereas
clause shall not bind the President pursuant to the pronouncements of the Court
in the present Petition.
Item No. 2: The same Revised JBC Rules deleted a significant part of JBC-009, the
former JBC Rules, specifically, Rule 8, Section 1, which
provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court. - In
every case involving an appointment to a seat in the Supreme Court, the Council
shall give due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court. For
this purpose, the Council shall submit to the Court a list of candidates for any
vacancy in the Court with an executive summary of its evaluation and assessment
of each of them, together with all relevant records concerning the candidates from
whom the Court may base the selection of its recommendees.
The deletion of this provision will likewise institutionalize the elimination by Chief
Justice Sereno of the voting by the Supreme Court Justices on who among the
applicants to the Supreme Court they believe are most deserving.
Through Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the JBC had accorded through the years due
weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court for the vacancies
in said Court. The JBC had consistently complied with said rule and furnished the
Court in prior years with the list of candidates for vacancies in the Court, together
with an executive summary of the evaluation and assessment of each candidate by
the JBC and all relevant documents concerning the candidates, for the incumbent
Justices' consideration, but stopped doing so ever since Chief Justice Sereno
became the Chairperson of the JBC. Although the JBC was not bound by the list of
recommendees of the Court, the JBC at least took the list under advisement. The
deletion of the foregoing provision from the Revised JBC Rules formally
institutionalizes Chief Justice Sereno's unilateral decision to abandon a well-
established rule, procedure, and practice observed by the Court, and completely
precludes the incumbent Supreme Court Justices from expressing their views on
the qualifications of the applicants to the vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The Court calls attention to the fact that the JBC, in JBC-009 and the Revised JBC
Rules, invites the public to give any comment or opposition against the applicants
to the Judiciary.
According to Rule 1, Section 9 of JBC-009:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 9. Publication of list of applicants. The list of applicants or recommendees
which the Council shall consider in a given time shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and once in a newspaper of
local circulation in the province or city where the vacancy is located. The
publication shall invite the public to inform the Council within the period fixed
therein of any complaint or derogatory information against the applicant. x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
by the Court (Jardeleza, among them), missed their chance to be
nominees.]57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Supreme Court Justices were also not given the opportunity to know the
applicants to the succeeding vacant position in the Court (to which Associate
Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa was eventually appointed) as Rule 8, Section 1
of JBC-009 was again not followed.

A similar provision can be found in the Revised JBC Rules as Rule 1, Section Item No. 3: The JBC currently has no incumbent Supreme Court Associate Justice
8:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary as consultant. By practice, since the creation of the JBC, the two (2) most senior
Supreme Court Associate Justices had acted as consultants of the JBC. From 1987
Sec. 8. Publication of List of Applicants. The list of applicants who meet the until 2016, the following Associate Justices of this Court, during their incumbency,
minimum qualifications and the Council's evaluative criteria prescribed in Sections served as JBC consultants:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2 and 3 of Rule 3 of these Rules, which the Council shall consider in a given time,
shall be published once in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Supreme Court Associate Justices as JBC
Period
Consultants
The publication shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against
applicants may be filed with the secretariat of the Council. A copy of the list shall
likewise be posted in the JBC website. (Emphasis supplied.) December 10, 1987 to April 13,
Pedro L. Yap+
1988
Yet, Chief Justice Sereno, without consulting the Court en banc, has done away
with the settled practice of seeking the views of the incumbent Justices on the
applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court. Marcelo B. Fernan+ January 5, 1988 to June 29, 1988

To recall, Chief Justice Sereno had previously disregarded Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-
Andres R. Narvasa May 6, 1988 to December 5, 1991
009, during the nomination process for the vacancy of Supreme Court Associate
Justice following the retirement of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad on May 22,
2014. As Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion narrated in his Separate Concurring Leo M. Medialdea+ July 21, 1988 to November 4, 1992
Opinion in the Jardeleza Decision56:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[Of particular note in this regard is this Court's own experience when it failed to January 16, 1992 to March 30,
Ameurfina M. Herrera
vote for its recornmendees for the position vacated by retired Associate Justice 1992
Roberto A. Abad, because of a letter dated May 29, 2014 from the Chief Justice
representing to the Court that "several Justices" requested that the Court do away December 21, 1993 to November
with the voting for Court recornmendees, as provided in Section 1, Rule 8 of JBC- Josue N. Bellosillo
13, 2003
009. When subsequently confronted on who these Justices were, the Chief Justice
failed to name anyone. As a result, applicants who could have been recommended

November 20, 2003 to July 14,
Jose C. Vitug
2004
Artemio V. Panganiban July 21, 2004 to December 19, 2005
January 1, 2006 to November 5,
Leonardo A. Quisumbing
2009
December 11, 2006 to October 4,
Consuelo Y. Santiago
2009
Renato C. Corona November 6, 2009 to May 16, 2010
Antonio T. Carpio October 5, 2009 to May 16, 2010
September 10, 2012 to January 28,
2014
Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
September 10, 2012 to [August
2016]
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro June 4, 2012 to August 23, 2012
[February 1, 2014] to [August
2016]58
Without notice, warning, or explanation to the Supreme Court En Banc, Chief
Justice Sereno recently unceremoniously relieved Supreme Court Associate
Justices Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr. and Teresita J. Leonardo De Castro as JBC
consultants, and in their stead, the Chief Justice appointed retired Chief Justices
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Artemio V. Panganiban, and Reynato S. Puno as JBC
consultants. The experience and wisdom of the three retired Chief Justices are
undisputed. However, practicality and prudence also dictate that incumbent
Associate Justices of the Court should be retained as JBC consultants since their
interest in the Judiciary is real, actual, and direct. Incumbent Associate Justices of
the Court are aware of the present state, needs, and concerns of the Judiciary, and
consultants from the Court, even if they have no right to vote, have served, from
the organization of the JBC, as the only link to the supervisory authority of the
Court over the JBC under the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Hon. Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez already sits as a regular member of the JBC representing the
Retired Supreme Court Justices, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the 1987
Constitution, which expressly describes the composition of the JBC, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
These changes in settled rules and practices recently adopted by the JBC under
Chief Justice Sereno are disconcerting. There appears to be a systematic move by
the JBC, under Chief Justice Sereno to arrogate to itself more power and influence
than it is actually granted by the Constitution and this Court, and at the same time,
to ease out the Court from any legitimate participation in the nomination process
for vacancies in the Judiciary, specifically, in the Supreme Court. This behooves the
Court, through the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, to take a
closer look into the new rules and practices of the JBC and ensure that these are in
accord with the 1987 Constitution, the pertinent laws, and the governmental
policies of transparency and accountability in the nomination process for vacancies
in the Judiciary.
Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution gives the JBC the principal function
of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary," but it also explicitly states that the
JBC shall be "under the supervision of the Court" and that "[i]t may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(2) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
The Administrative Code of the Philippines, defines supervision as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. - Unless otherwise expressly
stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular
agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defmed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
(2) Administrative Supervision. - (a) Administrative supervlSlon which shall govern
the administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and
regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited
to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; or
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification
of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass
upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them;
(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1) appointments and other
personnel actions in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions
under the Code, except when appeal is made from an action of the appointing
authority, in which case the appeal shall be initially sent to the department or its
equivalent, subject to appeal in accordance with law; (2) contracts entered into by
the agency in the pursuit of its objectives, the review of which and other
procedures related thereto shall be governed by appropriate laws, rules and
regulations; and (3) the power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions
of regulatory agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-judicial functions;
and cralawlawlibrary
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing
the relationship of particular agencies, the word "supervision" shall encompass
administrative supervision as defined in this paragraph.
The Court also provided the following definition of supervision in the Jardeleza
Decision59:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of
supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the
conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising
officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such
rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to
such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
(Citation omitted.)
"Supervision" is differentiated from "control," thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done
or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act.60 (Citations omitted.)
The Court had recognized that "[s]upervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority
to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and
effective."61chanrobleslaw
In the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court shall take up the
aforementioned Item Nos. 2 and 3 as a separate administrative matter and direct
the JBC to file its comment on the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition
for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The
Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associate
Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with
the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID.
The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar
Council in the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket
as a separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and
Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item
No.2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the
removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as
consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of this
Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment
on said Item Nos. 2 and 3within thirty (30) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and
OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL
V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE
SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOK SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions
filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which
there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with
the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the
Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated
comment, to which the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and
the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed
on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the
petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims
made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although they
admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed
three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain
that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the
Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,
1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done
was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it
with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate
proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a
revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate
passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills
earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY
EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY
EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved by
the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254,
which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which
was approved by the Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE
REWARD TO ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES)
which was approved by the President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation
of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House of Representatives on August
2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the
result of the consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with
indications of the dates on which the laws were approved by the President and
dates the separate bills of the two chambers of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
(December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE
THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28,
1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE
THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,
INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-
ADDED TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR
THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR
SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS
FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF
STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR
THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW
SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in
the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in
the House, passed its own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy
that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as
members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner
Tolentino, concerns a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what
substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a
separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, "taking
into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be
considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is
submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to
the subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another
which covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution.
(emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the
Philippine Senate possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual
differences between constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose
or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the
decision to drop the phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according
to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict
the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino
contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the
words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills
were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The
supposed indicia of constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an
unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be recalled that the
1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it
was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became necessary to
provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution was
done by the National Assembly, acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose
members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to
curtail the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the
following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any
such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its
members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may
be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the
Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty
days from the opening of the next regular session of the same legislative term,
reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly.
And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted
to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly
vetoed the proposal. It deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten,
the proposal was approved by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution
No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR
CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the
people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI,
24 of the present Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively"
was added to the American text from which the framers of the Philippine
Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied.
Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose
amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other
Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own
without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House,
however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject
matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's
power to concur is clear from the following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently
without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can
practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace
of the original bill. For example, a general revenue bill passed by the lower house
of the United States Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an
inheritance tax . This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The
amending authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme
Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone
Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of
Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also
more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be
more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the
legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to
propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a
corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill
initiated in the House of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this
power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As
petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is
referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new
bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to
make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to
originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its
other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the
Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is
to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S.
No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No.
11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that
they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their
repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different
between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this
premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the
Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No.
11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to
be mere amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very
tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as
Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing
differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of
the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because
the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its
original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three readings. It was
enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be
passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to
the Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. When the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act
prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a conference
committee, the question was raised whether the two bills could be the subject of
such conference, considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by
the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House
bill is passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a
similar nature is passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two
bills be the subject of a conference, and can a law be enacted from these two bills?
I understand that the Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to
investments in government securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was
introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of
deposits in banks but also investigation of investments in government securities.
Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe that no law can be
enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in
cases like this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been
approved by the Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but
precisely because the Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter, the
conference committee had to be created, and we are now considering the report
of that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630 are distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners'
(Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because the President separately certified
to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his certification was
ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same
revenue bill which at the moment was being considered. Otherwise, to follow
petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills
as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely versions
of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at
the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22,
1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be
certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No.
9210 for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that time was
being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with other
bills, by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in
the main decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the
requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to
the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before
a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days."
There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof
shall be allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members
three days before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art.
VI, 26 (2) of the present Constitution, thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three
readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form
before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the
occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency,
especially in a country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic
condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous budget deficit does not make
the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its enactment
any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these
cases) believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630,
because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second
and third readings on the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by
the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due coequal
departments of the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution
and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of
the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in
the Senate where it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in
its final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second
and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time
between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and its
approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate
on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be
two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and
(2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting
process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their
positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were substantially
achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc.
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
(MABINI)) that in violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and
the people's right to know (Art. II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee
met for two days in executive session with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to
hold such sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it
was only in 1975 when a new rule was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its
American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing
open hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule
in 1975, at least staff members were present. These were staff members of the
Senators and Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be their
confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the
conference were excluded. There is no showing that the conferees themselves did
not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for
claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests,
conferees keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right to know was
fully served because the Conference Committee in this case submitted a report
showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee
reports must contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in
or other amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached to the
Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could thus ascertain
what changes had been made in the original bills without the need of a statement
detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No.
1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee.
Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of
the conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the
provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides
specifically that the conference report must be accompanied by a detailed
statement of the effects of the amendment on the bill of the House. This
conference committee report is not accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr.
Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection
with the point of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan, but this provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill
have been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it
can be easily seen from the reading of the bill what the provisions are. Besides, this
procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for
the provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision
cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or
phrases inserted in or deleted from the provisions of the bill included in the
conference report, and we cannot understand what those words and phrases
mean and their relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but when
the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference report, that is not
necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when
the ruling was appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the
House was called, it was sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new
provisions as long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this
Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an
opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the conference committee
is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may
propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is
subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that
it would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by
the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the constitutional
injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the
Philippines in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These
committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left
without instructions. Normally the conference committees are without
instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to as "the little
legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees have almost
unlimited authority to change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes
introduce new measures that were not in the original legislation. No minutes are
kept, and members' activities on conference committees are difficult to
determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill
on export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee
but I could not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a
report to both houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then
the committee is discharged and new members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference
committees. We cite it only to say that conference committees here are no
different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we
noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI,
16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings,"
including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body
itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716
violates Art. VI, 26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed
by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of
its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross
revenue "in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other
fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established,
assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or national authority or
government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103
of the National Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to
PAL, by amending 103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS
TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its
intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of
accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of
the law by specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order
to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title
that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is
103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which
becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation. The
titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of the
NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that
sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before
they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now
made by PAL was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all
franking privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was
not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient
description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking
privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be
unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it
is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in
the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general
proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that
what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out
the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in
any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the
publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law
granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime
without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions,
the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the
same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus
different from the tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax
in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to
be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of
newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax
applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were
critical of Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted
the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be
discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales tax
or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or consuming
tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted from both
taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and
ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were
component of goods to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of regulation is not
related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively
unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press
is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are
withdrawn "absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions
from the VAT, such as those previously granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires,
enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority, and many more
are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially
withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the
fact that transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption
under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to
show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are granted for a
purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some
cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal
benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural,
marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds,
seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar,
livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects
of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and
services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-
60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate
against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the
following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292
(1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection
afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by
the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and
peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in
preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax,
is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it
lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to
others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious
groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license
fee on those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax
could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without
restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and
the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its
payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press
pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom
under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles,
the proceeds derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing
copies which are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the
sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting
that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so
incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic
imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of
vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to
make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC,
as amended by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay
for the expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those
relating to accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and
therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this
fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the
VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses
and the rule on taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the
obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to
existing contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred
payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations
to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is
something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the
contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities
from numerous sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a
lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a
contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even
though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of
one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens
upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid
unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the
obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v. Machuca
Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing
laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co.
v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as
having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of
the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that
authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as
the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is
equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is
exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less
poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise be
exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are
essential goods and services was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of
the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming
that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting
those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference
between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the example given
by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses
in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes
are thus differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax that the State
be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153
(1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v.
Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform
and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.
To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies
equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of
Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716
was enacted. R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the
original VAT Law was questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in
these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and
regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the
challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is
uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold
to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the
Cooperative Union of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David
argues that the law contravenes the mandate of Congress to provide for a
progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus
places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which,
like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a
progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted
to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as
possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the mandate to Congress is
not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes,
which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited
with the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the
present Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the
taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive
effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A.
No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other
transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services
are exempted from the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural,
marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds,
seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or
services to enhance agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar,
livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects
of citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and
services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-
60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which
involve goods and services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income
groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or for
lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right or privilege to use
patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films, tapes and
discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels,
restaurants and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars
for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of franchise grantees
of telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of
constitutional violations by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in
the abstract. There is no fully developed record which can impart to adjudication
the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in the concrete the
application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on property
rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been assessed the
VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions
asked which are no different from those dealt with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A
mere allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of
such unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such
a provision as void on its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to adhere
to the authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection
clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to
such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must
prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete
case. It may be that postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of
suits. This need not be the case, however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to
such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual case and not an abstract or
hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating
abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of
advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is
made that "there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us. Under Art .
VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1, 2
can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have the judicial
power to determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is
"the power of a court to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have
the right to sue and be sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22
Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative and executive power. This
power cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts
either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII, 5, or by statute, as in the
case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's
"jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon a court or judge to
take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6
Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court
cannot inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the
Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of
legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption
to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a
constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated
exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in
1984, because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption
was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted
cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991,
but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987
the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the
government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated
revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of
strengthening the cooperatives by way of the grant of tax exemptions," by
providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods
and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No.
1955 singled out cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and
sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, 5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to
withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore granted to
private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis which then
beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had restored the tax
exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No.
93, 1, but then again cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions
were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including
government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not
really require that cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to promote
their growth and viability. Hence, there is no basis for petitioner's assertion that
the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of vacillation, as far as
the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this
indecision that the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a
matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to
the discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption and there is no
discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be
charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution
cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution
under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies
cooperatives the equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are
exempted from the VAT. The classification between electric and other
cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that there is
greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible,
especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide them with other
necessities in life. We cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional
validity of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining
its enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the
conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by
petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does
not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity,
desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the body which is
electorally responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said, "legislators
are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194
U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No.
115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of
legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting for it
in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in
the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature,
much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the
temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate opinion.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ, maintained their dissenting
opinion.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of
the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September
16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m.
on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier,
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was
first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for
lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head
count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence
of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following
transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives,
as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House
of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound
recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13
in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain
the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of
the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is
no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree
that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is
that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3)
that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule
XVII, 103 of the rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference
committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked
for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning
the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat
Rep. Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albanos motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation
of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point
of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have
been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996,
because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained
upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of
the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Courts power
under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in
view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,
respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules
of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by
each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought
in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as
that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification
of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule,
the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of
the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved
the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7] This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings[9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose
of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.Consequently,
mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary
legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as
it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in
the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the
rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and
also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared
itself as follows: The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of
the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the
servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused,
but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the
court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that
an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure
upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of
the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself,
or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at
will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes
of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an
emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation
of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not
properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three
readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote.Dismissing this
contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill
in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit,
either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making
any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its
entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The
failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through
the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding
his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a
rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a
majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v.
Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial
in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the
working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the
rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1,
nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review. [19]Implicit in
this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that
the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of
Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
those relating to national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have
already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent
error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself,
it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to
call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At
the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion,
the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have
been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislatorsnightmare
because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the
other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991
and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his
answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces The bill is approved on second reading. If there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can
always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial
consideration.[24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court
cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding
the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional
actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the
constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members
be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.[28]Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the
votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have
been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly
as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the
session.[29] It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the
parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day
Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader
moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep.
Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The
fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyos
question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and
would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. [31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in
signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be
acted with grave abuse of his discretion.Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to
lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motionto adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged
the presence of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to
be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No.
7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have
objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry
Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report [36] but not to
the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted,
Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. [37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996
are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this
doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT
cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not
been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts.[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on
Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic
theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary
for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit
upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to
the President contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the
conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. [41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the
rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three
new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases
and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on
the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240,
was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the
most permanent character, thus: They should be public, because all are required
to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or
at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals.As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

___________________

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any
House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. [49]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.