5. People v.

Burgos

FACTS: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting
members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao
del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man
defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched.
Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the
NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been
tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made
only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done
without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and
that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to General
Orders 6 and 7.

Issue: Did the trial court erred in holding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of P.D No. 9
in relation to General Orders No. 6 and 7?

Ruling:The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence. The
court stated that the appellants having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree
measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the investigator who
conducted the investigation gives rise to the provocative presumption that indeed torture and physical violence may
have been committed as stated. The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscals Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when
the extrajudicial statement was being taken. With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain
the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.

We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial
court found Masamloks testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility
which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was totally
uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly
he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be
his membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. It can not
be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it
was intended to secure his freedom.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As held in the case of People v. Bania where after stressing that
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on
the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.

12. Lazarte vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Petitioner , as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance
Committee, and other NHA officials were charged for violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Information
specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager,
Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage
and prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public
funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said construction company
as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3)
the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have
been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual
participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005. On 2
March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioners motion to quash.

Issue:
1. Was the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime
charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused?

Ruling: No. The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows: 1. The accused is a
public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him; 2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts
during the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public position; 3. He causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or private party; 4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross
inexcusable negligence.

Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information: A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment.
The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes. The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detre of the rule is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient.

On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused in the allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime
itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a
penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. When conspiracy is
charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or
information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as
in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation
in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts
of others, for the act of one is the act of all.

15. People vs Molero

Facts: The original complaint of Pacita Molero, dated March 22, 1977, charged her father with the crime of rape
allegedly committed "on or about the 13th day of February, 1976." Except for the date which is "on or about the 5th
day of February, 1976" in the March 30, 1978 complaint, the facts alleged in the two complaints were exactly the
same.
The appellant was originally arraigned under the March 22, 1977 criminal complaint. He pleaded "Not Guilty." During
the trial, Pacita Molero, the complaining witness testified that she was raped by her father on February 5, 1976. In
view of Pacita's testimony, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The motion
was granted. Accordingly, the corrected criminal complaint dated March 30, 1978 was filed. The appellant filed a
motion to quash the criminal complaint on the ground that the appellant had been previously in jeopardy of being
convicted of the offense charged citing Section 1(h), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied.
Arraignment followed. The appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Thereafter, hearings were conducted resulting in the
conviction of the appellant.

The appellant now contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the instant case was filed and he was
brought to trial to answer for the crime of rape allegedly committed on February 5, 1976. He argues that the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 2148 on ground of variance between allegation and proof amounted to his acquittal,
citing People v. Opemia (98 Phil. 698). He points to the fact that the criminal complaint alleged that he committed the
crime of rape on February 13, 1976 and yet the prosecution's evidence shows that the alleged crime was committed
on February 5, 1976.

Issue: After arraignment and where the appellant has pleaded "not guilty"it is still proper to amend the date of the
commission of the crime?

Ruling: Yes. The applicable rules are Sections 10 and 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. These
rules provide:
"Time of the commission of the offense - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged
to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information
or complaint will permit."
xxxxxxxxx

"Amendment - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant."

Applying the rules, the amendment sought by the Prosecution should have been granted. The precise time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element of the offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint
changing the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976, a difference of
eight (8) days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the appellant.

25. Ivler vs Judge San Pedro

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle.

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivlers Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivlers constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the
information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

RULING: YES. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954.
There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for damage to
property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case against the same accused for reckless driving, arising
from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for
both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga, Yap v. Lutero,
People v. Narvas, People v. Silva, People v. Macabuhay, People v. Buan, Buerano v. Court of Appeals, and People
v. City Court of Manila. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions. x x x.

We hold that prosecutions under Article 365should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.

35. Chua vs Court of Appeals

Facts: On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a
complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts
of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 285721 for falsification of public
document, before the MeTC of Manila, against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua. Herein
petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter. During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors
Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first
witness. After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainants counsels as private prosecutors in the case on
the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case.

Issue: Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721?

Ruling: Yes. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of
the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the
same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a
person
is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil
action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the
civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in
the trial of the criminal action.

45. Garces vs Hernandez

Facts: The RTC-Batangas acquitted the respondent of murder. After the promulgation of judgment, Atty. Florentino
H. Garces entered his appearance as counsel for the father of the victim, Roman Garces (petitioner), and filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision respecting respondents civil liability. The trial court dismissed
the motion and ruled that: As regards the manifestation on the right of the private Prosecution to claim civil damages
where the acquittal of the accused was based on grounds of reasonable doubt, suffice it to state that while such right
subsists in favor of the Private Prosecution, the matter should be properly prosecuted in an appropriate separate civil
action and not in the same criminal case which gave rise to such right.

Issue: Whether respondents who were charged with but acquitted of murder are civilly liable to the heirs of Rustico
Garces (the victim)?

Ruling: No. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In his Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, petitioner admitted that he did not waive the civil action or
reserve the right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action Petitioners
remedy then was, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, to appeal within the reglementary period the trial courts
decision, which was silent on the civil aspect of the case.

Technicality aside, on the merits, the petition just the same fails. Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission,; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.

Under the immediately-quoted rule, a trial court, in case of acquittal of an accused, is to state whether the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove his guilt or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and in either case, it
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. From the earlier-quoted
portion of the decision of the trial court, however, particularly the following portions:

In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that can be arrived at by the Court in
convicting the accused. Physical and testimonial evidence presented by the Prosecution have failed
to elicit in the mind of the Court the conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held
criminally liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a matter of fact, the physical evidence
in his case instead of strengthening only weakened its case.
 x x x These actuations of the accused eloquently speak of their innocence in the face of
unreliable evidence presented by the Prosecution (emphasis and underscoring supplied),

the Court finds that the acts or omissions from which the civil liability of respondents might arise did not exist.

55. Respicio vs People

Facts: On October 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and falsification of official document under Article 171, par.4 of the RPC for
having signed the self-deportation order involving the 11 Indian nationals who had been charged with the unlawful
manufacture of regulated drugs. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner died.

Issue: WON the death of the petitioner extinguished his criminal liability?

Ruling: Yes. Considering that the death of petitioner occurred during the pendency of the appeal, albeit at any stage
of the deliberation of his motion for reconsideration of the decision affirming his conviction, his criminal liability in two
criminal cases was thereby extinguished pursuant to Article 89, RPC which provides:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.