Franciso v House of Representatives

Facts

1. July 22, 2002 the HoR adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the disbursements and expenditures of CJ of the SC of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
2. June 22, 2003 Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes.
3. October 13, 2003 impeachment complaint was insufficient in form and was dismissed on October 22 for being insufficient
in substance. However, the committee report has not been sent.
4. October 23, 2003 (four months and three weeks) another impeachment complaint was filed against CJ Davide with a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of the Members of the HoRthe second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provisions of Section 5 Article XI
5. A lot of petitions were made to declare that the second impeachment was unconstitutional (18)
6. October 28, 2003 a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be transmitted to the Senate but was
not carried out because of lack of quorum. The Articles of Impeachment has not yet been forwarded.
- The court in its resolution resoved to:
o Consolidate the petitions and put them in status quo
o Require the HoR, Senate, and Solicitor general to comment on the petitions before November 3, 2003
4:30 om
o Set the petitions for oral arguments on NO 5
o Appointed distinguished legal experts and amici curiae
- HoR submitted a Manifestation asserting that the court has no jurisdiction to hear or prohibit from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate the impeachment cases
- Aquilino Pimentel filed a Motion to Intervene (same reason as above)
7. October 29 Senate field a Manifestation saying that the petitions are premature and have no basis in law or fact because:
a. It still hasnt received the Articles of Impeachment (commencement of impeachment court)
b. The issues raised pertain to the proceedings of the HoR
8. October 30, 2009 November 4, 2003 petitions were filed to ask the Court to leave intervention because it would put the
Congress and Court in a constitutional deadlock and the petitions beforehand were not yet ripe for judicial determination

Issues/Ruling/Ratio

1. November 5-6, 2003 principal issues were outlined based on the arguments of the amici curiae, arguments of the
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitr General Alfred Benipayo:
a. Whether the certiorari (a writ of a superior court to call up the records of an inferior court of a body acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity) jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked?
b. Who can invoke it?
c. On what issues and at what time?
d. Whether it should be exercised by the Court at this time?
e. Other issues:
i. Locus standi of petitioners
ii. Ripeness of the petitions
iii. Political question/justiciability
iv. HoR exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment
v. Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment
vi. Constitutionality of House Rules on Impeachment vis--vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution
vii. Judicial restraint
2. Summary of issues:
a. Does the power of judicial review extend to those arising from impeachment proceedings
b. Are the pre-requisites for the exercise of power of judicial review been fulfilled
c. Substantive issues yet remaining
3. Judicial Review
a. Section 1, Article VIII to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Justice Laural
(Angara v Electoral Commission) The judiciary mediates to allocate the constitutional boundaries it is inherent
in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself
b. It is an integral component of the system of checks and balances
c. The rationale of this from Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: this power given to the
SC was a product of their experience during martial law, stating further than the courts cannot evade this power by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question
d. Principles of Constitutional Construction
i. Verba Legis words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed
ii. Legis est anima the constitution should be interpreted in accordance to the intent of its framers
iii. Ut magit valeat quam pereat the constitution should be interpreted as a whole
iv. Resort to other aids is available depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
the framers understanding thereof
 e. Impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character outside the jurisdiction of judicial
review (heavy reliance on American authority)
i. Senate has the sole power to try impeachment cases excludes judicial review and includes senates
power to determine constitutional questions (Section 6, Article XI)
ii. Runs counter to the framers decision to allocate different fora the power to try impeachments and to try
crimes.
f. Reliance on American jurisprudents, the American constitution, and American authorities cannot be credited to
support the proposition of Sec 6, Article XI is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature and support the interpretation that it gives the Senate judicial powers
to determine constitutional questions in impeachment proceedings
i. No longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit
ii. We have cut the umbilical cord. Fr. Bernas
g. Major difference: US impliedly granted the SC its power, gave HoR exclusive rights to impeachment vs. Philippines
expressly provided for it in the constitution, provided HoR the power to initiate impeachment cases but with
limitations (Sec 3,4,5 of Article XI)
h. Judicial review of impeachment undermines their finality and leads conflict between Congress and the Judiciary
i. The constitution did not leave out the SC in impeachment trials, but set limits
ii. Romulo v Yniguez and Alejandrino v Quzon denial of petition for writes of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review
iii. In fact, there are a lot of cases where the SC exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action (Santiago v Guingona, Tanada v Angara, etc)
i. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances one section is not allowed to defeat another
4. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
a. Angara v Electoral Commission the power of judicial review is subject to several limitations
i. An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
ii. The person challenging the act must have a standing to challenge
iii. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possibility
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
5. Standing personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of governmental acts being challenged
a. Petitioners do not have standing since only CJ has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury
b. Petitioners have standing because in the past the court gave standing to tax payers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving public interest
c. Real-party-in-interest (has the capacity to sue) and Standing (constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
people who sue in public interest)
d. Petitioners say that their rights were vindicated with the unconstitutional acts of the HoR
e. When suing as a citizen interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal.
f. Suing as a taxpayer claims that public funds are illegally disbursed. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, he must prove that he has interest in preventing the illegal expenditure raised by taxation granted,
impending transmittal to Senate of Articles of Impeachment and ensuing trial of CJ will involve expenditure of
public funds
g. Suing as a legislator allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as legislator.
h. Associations with legal standing does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
i. Class suits persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous and judgement is under the res judicata principle
binding on all members of the class.
j. The PH Bar Association invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance in its petition. Given the
determinants below, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised are indeed of transcendental importance.
i. Characters of funds and assets are involved in the case
ii. Disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency of instrumentality of
the government
iii. Lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised
k. Motions of interventions intervenor to possess legal interest in the matter in litigation. It is not a matter of right,
but it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention
6. Ripeness and Prematurity something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into a picture (Tan v Macapagal, CJ Fernando)
a. The petitions raise in the main issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against CJ in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned the requisite has been complied with
b. Are the instant petitions premature? Salonga and Pangalangan no urgent need for the Court to render its
decision and to let the HoR raise the questions of constitutionality themselves and withdraw their signatures
c. The court is not persuaded. The withdrawal of the Representatives of their signature would not cure the House
Impeachment Rules or obliterate the questions of validity of the 2nd impeachment complaint. Also, the power to
question its constitutionality is given to the Judiciary. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of
power to grant it
7. Justiciability political question (Tanada v Cuenco, CJ Concepcion) is a question of policy questions under the
constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of government issues dependent on wisdom or a particular measure
a. 1973 the court vacillated on its stance on cases which involved political questions
b. The court refused to take jurisdiction over certain cases during Marcos regime CJ/Constitutional Commissioner
Concepcion clarified the Courts power of judicial review and its applications involving political questions
i. 1973 constitution Marcos held a plebiscite but it seemed that the new constitution will not be enacted
because of the many questions regarding it by the plebiscite. He formed a referendum (barangays) saying
that it would be unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
considered as the vote cast in the plebiscite. The new constitution has been ratified and the petitions
against this ratification was declared null because the SC proclaimed that it was a political question. No
evidence of a referendum and a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite
c. The SC has one main function settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. It is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and cannot escape this duty by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question
d. Judicial power is not only a power, but a duty which cannot be abdicated by the political question doctrine.
e. There are two species of political questions: truly political questions (beyond judicial review), and those which are
not truly political questions. However, there are no clear standards to differentiate them. In our jurisdiction, the
determination lies in the answer to the question whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. The petitions raise substantial issues:
i. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution. Not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary because it is a political question (what
constitutes an impeachable offense?)
ii. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
iii. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

iv. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

iv. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
8. Lis Mota courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis motaor crux of
the controversy. The consolidated petitions raise several constitutional issues
a. Resolution and legislative inquiry for this case is unconstitutional because However, the court said that the issue
of the constitutionality of the resolution and inquiry is too far removed from the issue of validity of the second
impeachment. It would require the court to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct
matter of legislative inquiries in general.
i. Violation of the rules and jurisprudents on investigations in aid of legislations
ii. Breach of doctrine of separation of powers
iii. Violation of the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary
iv. Assault on the independence of the judiciary
b. Notes that a standard for the conduct of legistlative inquries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duty
published rules of procedure and rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected
c. Macalintal - Even though 81 members of the HoR signed the resolution, it does not satisfy the requirement that it
must be filed by 1/3 members of the Members of the House (Sec 3(4), Aritcle XI) the complaint must be filed
and not merely endorsed for it to become the Articles of Impeachment and for Senate Trial to begin. Endorsement
is necessary only from at least one Member but signature and verification should be from 76 or more
representatives issues limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment
d. The court holds that the two remaining issues: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
9. Judicial Restraint court must exercise judicial restraint because the senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment (Pimentel). The court says that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.
a. Speaker De Venecia moral compulsion for the Court not to assume jurisdiction because they are subject to
impeachment also saying that the legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because they are also subject to them in cases where the court is an interested party, it acted with detachment
and fairness mentally and morally fit
b. The court cannot practice judicial restraint over justiciable issues because it is its duty.
c. Guidelines that have been adopted by this court in exercise of judicial review (see 12, essential requisites)
d. Speaker De Venecia judicial review of impeachments might lead to embarrassing conflicts between Congress and
judiciary the possibility of this occurrence is not a reason for this court to refrain from upholding the Constitution
in impeachment cases (why martial law was enacted) assumes that the branches of government would behave in
a lawless manner
10. Constitutionality of the rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings Adopted by the 12th Congress
 a. Speaker De Venecia Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rule do not violate Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; to file != initiate because in Section 3(2) of Article XI in the Constitution says
that filing can be done in 3 ways The first one was not initiated.
i. Verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the HoR
ii. Any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member
iii. 1/3 of all the members of the HoR
b. Initiate the act of initiating included the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
i. Understood by ordinary men to mean to begin, to commence, perform or facilitate the first action
ii. Fr Bernas: deemed initiated does not say impeachment proceedings are initiated rather than are
deemed initiated the initiation happened earlier
iii. Intent of framers (Mr. Maambong) The procedure was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. It is not the body which initiates it, it only approves or disapproves the resolution.
iv. Section 3 (1) The HoR shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment the
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. The HoR, by 1/3 vote of
its members, can bring a case to the Senate (sense of initiating all the cases of impeachment)
v. Section 3(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same office more than once
within a period of one year proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion proceeding is a
progressive noun (beginning, middle, end) and takes place in the HoR filing a complaint, processing of
complaint, forwarding of the resolution, processing in the Hor the proceeding is initiated when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
vi. Founded on the common understanding of the meaning of to initiate meaning to begin. The constitution
is ratified by the people, then ordinary people ready meaning into ordinary words and not to abstruse it
vii. Section 16 and 17 or Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution since the rules give the term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and referral
c. Justice Hugo Gutierrez the court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of
Sec 3(5) of Article XI Vera v Avelino; the court stated that their personal opinions on the matter at issue
expressed during this Courts our deliberations stand on different footing from the case properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings. not applicable because they did not rely on the personal opinions of the
Constitutional Commission but examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
d. Section 3(8) of Article XI provides that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section. congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules, the assumption is
misplaced. limited to the phrase to effectively carry out the purpose of this section, Section 3 (1-5) of Article
XI in the Constitution it is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law.
If the congress had absolute rule making power, then it would be a necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the Constitution without need of referendum
e. Osmena v Pendatum the HoR to interpret its rules and best judget of what constituted disorderly behavior of its
members. Paceta v Secretary of the Commission on Appoitments rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
f. It is still within the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, whether they are
constitutional.
g. Nixon v US is not applicable because the US Federal Constitution simply says that The HoR shall be sole power of
impeachment and nothing more. Unlike ours, there is a limit on that exclusive power
h. Therefore, the provisions of Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3(5)
of Article XI in the Constitution as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing
11. Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
a. It has been clear that the initial action in Section 3(5) Article XI of the constitution means filing another may not
be filed against the same official within one year period
b. The second impeachment complaint is not valid
12. Conclusion
a. The court found the existence in full of all the requisite condition for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power
and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the Constitution.
b. The claim, therefore that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively
set up a regime of judicial supremacy is patently without basis in fact and in law it is merely exercising its duty
as said by the constitution
c. Not doing this for the protection of a brethren (CJ Davide) the court is unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom (no personal reservations) to disqualify an institution because the SC is incapable of
impartiality is wrong
d. Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint filed against CJ Davide is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.

Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS

Facts

1. The petitioner invoked the Filipino First Policy in the 1987 Constitution (Sec 10, Article XII): , in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos. bit to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MCH) which owns the Manila Hotel
 2. Respondents provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. They ask
whether 51% shares form a part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the Constitution
3. GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the government under Proclamation No. 50 (Dec 8, 1896), decided to sell
through public bidding 31% to 51% of issued and outstanding shares of MHC to provide management expertise and/or
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of Manila
Hotel.
4. September 18, 1995 a close bidding was held and only 2 bidders participated Manila Prince Hotel Corporation and
Renong Berhad (Malaysian firm) P 2.42 more than the bid of the petitioner
5. Bidding rules of GSIS
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC the highest bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below or the highest bidder will lose the right to purchase the block of shares and GSIS will offer the block of
shares to other qualified bidders
i. The highest bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract, or other type of contract specified by the highest bidder in its
strategic plans for the Manila Hotel
ii. The highest bidder must execute Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS
b. Declaration of the winning bidder/strategic partner declared winning bidder after the ff. conditions are met
i. Execution of necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995
ii. Requisite approvals from GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of Government
Corporate Counsel) are obtained
6. September 28, 1995 - Renong Berhad was not yet announced as the winner, petitioner sent a letter to GSIS that matched
the bid price (44.00) of Renong Berhad.
7. October 10, 1995 - petitioner sent a Managers check to match the Bid of the Malaysian Group. GSIS refused to accept.
8. October 17, 1995 - The petitioners, apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded their match of bid, came to SC on prohibition
and mandamus. Court issued ToR to prevent the GSIS from giving the shares to the Malaysian firm
9. September 10, 1996 the case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the first division and was
set for oral arguments with former CJ Fernando and Fr Bernas
10. Petitioner invokes Sec 10 (2), Article XII of the Constitution Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony (history) and 51%
of the shares of MHC carries with it ownership of the business owned by GSIS (government owned and controlled
corporation) part of tourism, therefore part of national eceonomy any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock
of MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy the petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer
of the Malaysian firm
11. Prohibition on grave abuse of discretion GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a whimsical manner. Petition of mandamus
should fail because the petitioner has no legal right to what it demands

Issues/Ruling/Ratio

1. Sec 10(2), Article XII is a statement of principle, not a self-executing provision there must be existing laws to lay down
conditions under which the business may be done
a. Reiterates constitutional supremacy. Some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and to carry out the purposes of the framers.
i. A provision which is complete in itself becomes operative without the aid of legislation self-executing
nature and extent of the right conferred and liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
ii. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate it
is self-executing
iii. If legislation is needed to execute some provisions of the Constitution it would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law provisions of the constitution should be
considered self-executing
b. Respondents argue that Sec 10 (2), Article XII is not self-executing because of the discussions by the
Constitutional Commission
i. Preference to qualitied Filipinos qualified Filipinos vs non-qualified Filipinos qualified Filipinos against
aliens
ii. Qualified is used because the existing laws will law down conditions under which business may be done
iii. It is a matter of style
iv. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution. But it does not mean that it renders the provision
ineffective without legislation legislation must simply be in harmony with the constitution.
c. Respondents argue that non-self-executing nature of Sec 10(2) Article XII is implied from the first and third
paragraphs of the same section.
i. The argument is flawed. The first and third paragraph are non-self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures for them. But the second paragraph is not, because of the language does not require
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos
ii. The cases cited are merely provisions that are not self-executing
iii. Section 10 (2), Article XII is mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself. It simply means
that qualified Filipinos are preferred it is a right given by the constitution and therefore an action may
be maintained to enforce such rights even with absence of legislation in the subject
2. Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony in Sec 2, Article XII events that happened in the hotel make
it historic, but it still doesnt fall under the patrimony of the nation.
 a. National Patrimony (member of Constitutional Commission) does not only refer to natural resources but
cultural heritage.
i. Patrimony means heritage Manila Hotel is a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage
(history)
3. The constitutional provision is inapplicable because 51% shares are being sold, not the hotel itself shares cannot be
considered as part of National Patrimony. Also, if it is contrary to the constitution, it should have been filed before the
bidding, not after losing it
a. 51% may not be the hotel itself, but it cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
stands.
b. The term qualified Filipinos includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
i. Even if the foreigner is more qualified, the Filipino will still be preferred
ii. It is a Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns Filipino First Policy.
iii. Qualified means citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, not preferential
treatment of Filipino citizens or organizations
c. The word qualified is also determinable the Manila Prince Hotel was already pre-qualified by GSIS to be part of
the bidding process
4. The constitution addressed the state, not GSIS which has a separate identity form the State
a. Sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through Committee on
Privatization. The act of selling 51% is under the second and third categories of state action
i. When the activity it engages in is a public function
ii. When the government is involved
iii. The government has approved or authorized the action
b. When the constitution addresses the state government as elements of the State case = Executive Department
+ GSIS
5. The privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet risen because Renong Berhad has not yet failed to execute the
necessary contract with GSIS/MHC
a. The Malaysian firm is not yet the winning bidder (despite having the highest bid) highest bid != winning bidder
b. The Constitutional provisions are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties and should
be applied in choosing the awardees
c. If there is a foreign firm that submits the highest bid, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign country.
d. It may discourage foreign investors but it is the constitution always open to public scrutiny. Any persons desiring
to do business in the Philippines is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws.
e. There is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless the award was finally made. But the
petitioner has already matched the bid of Renong Berhad and GSIS is left to award the petitioner the shares
f. The Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. How much national pride will vanish if the
nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? How much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous, and well-being Filipino? Filipino First Policy
6. Conclusion GSIS is directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of shares of MHC to Renong Berhad and accept the
matching bid of the petitioner

Monetescarlos v Commission on Elections

Facts

Petitioner sought to prevent the postponement of the SK elections from May 6, 2002 because they will be unqualified to vote or run
for a position, as well as to retain the age limit of 15-21 years old. They sent a letter to COMELEC demanding that the SK elections
be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002, also asking for a reply 10 days upon receipt of the letter.10 days passed and petitioner did not
receive a letter. But received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress
the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. On March 6,
2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002,
the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report
recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456. The Bicameral Committees
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but
not more than 18 years of age. Then on March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on
March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19,
2002.

Issue/Ruling/Ratio

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over this case?

a. No, because the Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. In the instant
case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of power of the judicial review. Preventing Congress
from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
 creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
b. Article VIII of the Constitution - "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted
into law.
2. Do the petitioners have personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit?
a. None, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. Petitioners seek to enforce a
right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the
passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less
than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this
classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July
15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.
b. RA No. 9164 - Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which
fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old this right is limited to those
who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old
c. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
3. Conclusion - The petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Endencia v David

Facts

1. Petitioners declare that Sec 13 of Republic Act 590 as unconstitutional and ordering the appellant David (Collector of
Internal Revenue) to refund Endencia P1,744.45 and ugo P2,345.46 (income tax) the collection of income tax form
judges was a diminution of their compensation and in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines

Issue/Ruling/Ratio

1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 590 Sec 13 can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on salary of judicial
officers
a. Sec 9, Article VII The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
b. In the Perfecto case, it was held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax because it would be
a diminution of their salaries during office against the constitution. Congress then promulgated RA 590 to
counteract that decision No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution of
his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
c. Conflict between the SC interpretation and legislations RA can legislation do this? determined by the
separation of powers
d. In RA 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation
interpretation of the meaning of the phrase found in Sec 9, Article VII on the Constitution invasion of the well-
defined jurisdiction of the Judiciary
e. Collection of income tax on a salary is actual diminution. However, it would seem that one of the main reasons
behind the enactment of the law was the feeling that members of the SC should not enjoy exemptions, and that as
citizens, patriotism and love for country, they should pay their taxes. However, it is not only the judiciary who is
exempted from tax (President, schools, AFP sent to Korea etc) to preserve the independence of the Judiciary
f. The amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers could not be large
or substantial. If it were otherwise, it does not outweigh the provisions of the Constitution and it is based on public
policy or interest. It is like when members of congress are exempt to arrest when charged with the commission of
a crime.
2. Conclusion collection of income tax from judicial officers violates the Constitution. The legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate the Constitutional provision.

Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts

1. Petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from making any deduction of taxes from their salaries, stating that it is
contrary to the provision of Sec 10, article VII of the Constitution.
2. Early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively and announced that it would continue with the deduction of
withholding taxes from the SC to the lower courts
 3. The intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the grant of exempt from payment of income tax of the Judiciary
give substance to equality among the three branches of government SC discarded the ruling in Perfecto v Meer and
Endencia v David.

Issues/Ruling/Ratio

1. Should the judges be exempt from income tax?

a. Comparison of constitutional provisions
i. 1935 - shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office
ii. 1973 - The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office No
salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall
be exempt from payment of income tax
iii. 1987 - The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased
does not contain a similar provision as 1973
b. Asser the independence of the judiciary to exempt them from tax does not promote equality (economic
immunity) independence of the judges is far greater importance than any revenue
i. Bernas their salary shall not be diminished but may be subject to general income tax they are not
the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in government
ii. Removed the phrase after decreased because there is an understanding that a provision similar to Sec 6
Article XV will appear Dencia v David will not apply anymore
iii. Bengzon - The understanding is that there will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions
salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from tax
2. Conclusion
a. The framers of the Constitution have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec 10, Article VII
b. The petition for Prohibition is dismissed.

Filoteo v Sandiganbayan

Facts

1. Petitioner was a police investigator of the Western Police District and was suspected as the mastermind of the armed
hijacking of a postal delivery van. He and several co-accused pleaded not guilty.
2. Evidence for the Prosecution
a. May 3, 1982 - Bureau of Post mail was hijacked by armed men at 4:30 pm along MacArthur highway. An old blue
Mercedes Benz took over their van and aimed an armalite at the driver (Miranda). During the incident, they
confirmed they saw Frias, Liwanag, Mendoza, and Saguindel (accused). They were brought to Kalookan and left
there. They reported it to the Kalookan Police Station.
b. The postal van was recovered in Quezon City with a few missing items (checks and warrants, tools, fuel, etc)
c. May 6, 1982 - They sought the assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine constabulary.
d. May 29, 1982 - They captured Frias and Alcantara in an entrapment operation. They were also able to corner Perez
in his house and capture Raul Mendoza. Captain Ferrer and Lt. Pagdilao agreed to meet in Novaliches to apprehend
Martin Mateo, which they did. They all pointed to Filoteo as the mastermind of the crime and they found the checks
in the neighborhood, not in the petitioners house.
e. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and named Saguindel, Relator, and Miravalles as his confederates. He
claimed that on the day of the crime, he was in Plaza Lawton waiting for his accomplices.
f. On May 30, 1982, the petitioner executed a sworn statement which says what he did in the crime and who were
the other criminals involved. He also executed two other documents on the same day. One was a certification
stating that he voluntarily surrendered the checks and vouchers, and that he guided the SOG to the residence of
Rodolfo Miranda (owner of the Mercedes). The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested
his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the revised penal code and agreed to the following acts
i. He refused to avail counsel offered by the SOG
ii. He was arrested because he was part of the hijacking operation
iii. SOG confiscated from him numerous checks and a Mercedes Benz
iv. He was not hurt or maltreated in any way
g. Miranda denied that he was a part of the group and said he had no idea what the car was borrowed for.
h. Miravalles, Saguindel, and Relator were later captured. Liwanag, Mateo, and Perez also executed sworn statements
and waived their right to counsel. All of them waived their right for counsel. Miravalles, Saguindel, and Relator
availed their right to remain silent until such time as they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and
Mendoza, and Severino Castro (postal employee) executed a similar affidavit. Some were identified by the postal
truck drivers (Miranda, Bautista, Tagudar)
3. August 8 1983 - It was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.
4. September 20, 1983 Sandiganbayan issued orders for arrest and fixed bail of 13k each.
5. Evidence for the Defense
a. Petitioner claimed that as a patrolman since August 21, 1978, he was a recipient of several awards.
 b. He admitted knowing only Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he participated in
regarding a theft case at Shemberg Makati Corporation. Mateo visited the petitioner and seeked assistance to lead
a new life, therefore he was made an informer and was paid from the police intelligence fund.
c. Mateo was accustomed to borrowing the petitioners owner-type jeep whenever he was given an assignment, but
he was saw riding it with some male companions. Mateo denied this, however, the petitioner refused to lend him
his jeep but gave Mateo travel allowance.
d. Mateo urged petitioner to lend him his jeep in order to follow-up the bank robbery case. Petitioner borrowed the old
Meredez from Miranda. Petitioner told Mateo to return the car between 2 to 3 in the afternoon, but he never came.
Mateo returned 8 pm.
e. May 29, 1982 Mateo escorted a group of military men to the petitioners house and refused to give any reason to
their visit but arrested him. The petitioner denied participation of the crime. Nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.
f. He was repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking and was tortured into admitting. They informed
his wife that he was being investigated, but no details were given. Out of his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino was
able to visit him and revealed to him the maltreatment, but he was advised to just cooperate so the SOG would no
incriminate him. Mateo then came to the petitioners cell and admitted to have been forced to implicate the
petitioner.
g. A prepared statement was shown to the petitioner and he refused to sign it. However, he was forced to do it. He
also picked out Castro in a police lineup because he was threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta.
h. The petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment but it was dismissed because their claimed
that the petitioner failed to appear despite subpoenas (which the petitioner swore he never received).
i. The petitioners alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera (reason for celebration while waiting for Mateo)
6. The petitioners were claimed guilty by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it
was denied. A new petition was then created with the following issues
a. Determination of guilt based on preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt
b. Connection that since he borrowed the car, he was part of the hijacking
c. The findings were without basis in the evidence
d. His signature in the checks were to indicate his admission of accountability
e. His request was refused even though he showed evidence of maltreatment and coercion
f. His participation in the hijacking was planned by the SOG
g. They set aside the inter-locking confessional statements
h. Unexplained possession of stolen checks raised the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery
i. Filoteos denials and alibirs cannot be entertained for being weak and implausible. They should have been
sustained because he was not identified by the victim-witnesses and none of the checks were found in his
possessions
j. Have been proven without reasonable doubt but the evidence only confirms the conspiracy
k. The court did not state the legal basis of the rejection of his first petition
7. The petitioner filed an alternative petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court
a. PD 1486, as amended by PD 1606, decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on
certiorari by SC in accordance with Rule 45 of Rules of Court. Section 2 questions of law maybe raised in the
petition for review, finding of facts are not to be reviewed.
b. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable on raising pure questions of law in Rule 45.
However, this court has taken cognizance of question of facts in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court criminal cases by public officials and criminal
cases involving ordinary citizens equality
c. Rule 65 certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.

Issue/Ruling/Ratio

1. Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?
a. The court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession with the documentary proof that he was made to sign the
same through torture and without the presence of counsel, of which he was denied.
b. In Magtoto v Manguera, the court held that the provisions of the 1973 constitution must be prospectively applied
therefore the 1987 Constitutions provision on needing the waiver in writing or in the presence of counsel is not
retroactive. Therefore, to waiver a right without paper or counsel in the 1973 Constitution should be admissible.
c. Morales-Galit doctrine an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was
announced on April 26, 198 Article 8 and Article 4 of Civil Code the petitioners contention that Sec 12,
Article III of the Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him cannot be sustained.
d. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal constitutional provision in the Bill of Rights, not a penal
statute
e. People vs Sison misplaced because the confession was executed May 19, 1983 after the promulgation of Morales
on April 26, 1983.
f. The court still has to determine if the waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. He was tortured, but the
investigating officer testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right, the
petitioner did not inform him that is father-in-law was a lawyer. He also did not invoke his right to counsel while
talking to Jimmy Victorino.
 g. It should be emphasized that the petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused
knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.
2. Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
a. Allegation of torture was negated by the medical report. There is no reason to maltreat him because the
investigating team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent.
b. When he was presented before the municipal court of Meycauayan, the petitioner waived his right to present
evidence if he had been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against the alleged torturers upon
learning of its dismissal
c. Signatures in different documents were consistent human experience shows that handwriting reflects disposition
evident that the signature was voluntary
d. Whether the petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question addressed to trial
courts.
3. Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper?
a. The petitioner questions the manner of his arrest he should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he
entered his plea in the trial court. The only move the petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint
for grave coercion, threat, & maltreatment. The complaint was offshoot of his alleged maltreatment. He did not do
anything to revive it upon dismissal.
4. Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
a. He borrowed a car to use knowing that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. He was not identified by
the victims because he drove the postal van. The checks were not found in his home, but he gave it to his kumare
in the neighborhood.
b. His alibi was weak because the distance between the scene of the crime and place of his alibi was a mere 30
minutes away. It would have been possible for him to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed.
c. He was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Brigandage or Robbery
a. The respondent court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under PD 532 since the robbery was
perpetrated on a national highway, it must have been violated.
b. People v Isabelo Puno it takes more than the situs of the robbery for it to be under PD 532 brigandage is to
prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not for one act of robbery, but for several indiscriminate
commissions presently, there is no evidence presented that the outlaws were grouped for more than just one
robbery or grouped beforehand for a robbery
c. It is defined robbery in Art 293 in relation to Art 295 and punished by Art 294 (5) in the Revised Penal Code.
d. Conclusion - petition is denied but decision is partially modified co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined
in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v Land Tenure Administration

Facts

1. Tuasan & Company vs Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon writ of execution of judgements against the respondents
and orders of demolition of houses of evictees and judgment debtors
2. November 16, 1960 JM Tuason applied for a writ of prohibition in the Court of First Instance of QC against the Land
Tenure administration, Auditor General, and Solicitor General to restrain them from instituting expropriation proceedings of
the petitioners land in QC (Tatalon Estate), as expressly and specifically authorized by RA 2616 that became a law without
executive approval on August 3, 1959 the act was unconstitutional because the legislation aimed at depriving it if its
property for the benefit or squatters even if the property had been subdivided and being sold in public Caluag issued a
writ of preliminary injunction
3. Evectees Rosete and Dizon petitioned the Court of First Instance (Yatco) to suspend the order of demolition of their houses
they were tenants of Tatalon Estate according to RA 2616 Section 4 (After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in
section two of this Act shall have been initiated and during the pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment proceedings
already commenced shall be continued and such lot or any portion thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to
any person other than the present occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public document) denied because
no expropriation proceedings have been filed
4. February 4, 1961 - The evictees went to the CA, praying that
a. Judge Yatco be enjoined from issuing orders of demolition cases No. Q1401 and 1402
b. Caluag be enjoined from enforcing the preliminary injunction he had issued
c. The Land Tenure Administrator be commanded to institute the expropriation proceedings authorized by RA 2616
5. The CA ordered the issuance of the preliminary injunction. JM Tuason moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction of the
CA, pointing out that said jurisdiction is to take cognizance of certiorari proceedings and to issue injunction was said in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction the orders of the city court are not appealable because it was a question of constitutionality of
RA 2616 CA refused to lift the preliminary injunction
6. SC enjoined enforcements of orders of CA and Land Tenure Administration to defer the filing of the expropriation
proceedings until further orders
7. Land Tenure Administration filed a proceedings against Caluag and JM Tuason. Its motion to dismiss the prohibition case
and dissolve the preliminary injunction was denied. When CA quashed Caluags preliminary injunction, the LTA attorneys
 tried to file the complaint for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate Caluag prohibited the clerk to docket the complaint
he had no knowledge of the CA resolution even after being served a certified copy
8. LTA says that the issuance of injunction in the prohibition case, denial for motion to dismiss, refusal to dissolve injunction,
and refusal to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction
order Caluag to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition case and from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction
issued, and allow the expropriation case to be docketed

Issues/Ruling/Ratio

1. Did CA have jurisdiction to lift, quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction issued by Caluag?
a. No, it is null and void.
b. The authority of the CA to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, and habeas corpus is limited
by the statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction existence of a right to appeal to it from the
judgement on the merits in the main case
c. The execution of ejectment had become final and not appealable the CA cannot interfere or else it would be a
circle of litigation
2. Did Caluag act without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction of the prohibition case?
a. The preliminary injunction was an incident to the main prohibition case prevent the principal case and remedy to
be granted therein should be rendered void authorized by Section 7 Rule 67 of Rules of Court
b. However, the Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing the constitutionality of
statues and treaties (Sec 10, Article VIII) destroyed by the terms of Sec 2, Article VII inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, and Sec 10 only applies when the
issues are faced by the SC
c. It is true that the mere fact a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional will not entitle a party to have its
enforcement enjoined. However, there is an exemption writ of prohibition pleads the injury to the proprietary
rights of JM Tuason
i. It is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an invalid
law where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its enforcement
d. However, whether the injury is real or not, it is not for the SC to decide, but to determine absence or excess of
jurisdiction the issuance of preliminary junction by the Court of First Instance is not a grave abuse of discretion
not excess of jurisdiction
e. The injunction has no real prejudice at present not because we cannot anticipate the final decision of Judge Caluag
on the issue of constitutionality, but because the LTA only has 2M when the lot is 6,034,865.95.
f. LTA and evictees assume that upon filing of the condemnation petition, the land owner will be barred from
enforcing its final judgements of ejectment against the possessors of the land (Section 3 of Rule 69 on
Eminent Domain) not warranted because the RA 2616 is only applicable if the government takes possession of
the land in question by depositing its value
g. RA 2616 does not provide for a deposit of the current rentals. Bill of Rights: private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation, Sec 4 Article XIII: congress may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of lands filing condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot
lawfully suspend condemnees dominical rights executory judgement of ejectment have been obtained against
the occupants

Santiago v COMELEC

Facts

1. Petition for Prohibition (Rule 65, Rules of Court) is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Sec 2, Article XVII
a. Congress upon a vote of of all its members
b. Constitutional convention
2. December 6, 1996 respondent Delfin (founding member of Movement for Peoples Initiative) and COMELEC filed a Petition
to Amend the Constitution lift the term of elective officials by Peoples Initiative asked the COMELEC for an order
granted under Sec 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
a. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country
b. Publication of said order and attached petition for initiative on the 1987 Constitution and newspapers
c. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers
3. Provisions to be amended: Sec 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, Section 8 or Article X
a. Petition for Initiative will be first submitted to people 12% of voters filed to COMELEC
b. Given the number UND 96-037, COMELEC chairman issued an order
i. Publication of the petition with 1987 constitution and notice of hearing in 3 newspapers at their own
expense not later than Dec 9 1996
ii. Setting the case for hearing on Dec 12 1996
4. A hearing was done and COMELEC directed both sides to file their memoranda within 5 days.
5. December 18, 1996 petitioners filed this special civil action for prohibition
a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. Senate Bill 1290 (An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative by Santiago) is pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments
 b. RA 6735 provides for three system of initiative (Constitution, statutes, and local legislation) but it failed tos
provide any subtitle on the initiative on the Constitution meaning it was left for some future law.
c. RA 6735 covers laws not constitutional amendments
d. COMELEC Resolution 2300 (govern the conduct of initiative on Constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws) beyond the scope because only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law
e. Peoples initiative is limited to amendments, not revisions
f. Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative
6. COMELEC grants Delfin Petition expenses to the national treasury for re-registration of voters = 180M.
7. December 19, 1996 SC required respondents to comment on the petition with 10 days and issued a TOR with the Elfin
Petition. January 2, 1997, the respondents argued that
a. It would not entail expenses to the national treasury amounting to 180M
b. All expenses are al for the account of the respondents
c. The only pending petition before COMELEC is the signature gathering that is within the jurisdiction of COMELEC
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v COMELEC
d. RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of the people initiative to propose amendments COMELEC
Resolution 2300 SC upheld that COMELEC can promulgate guidelines and rules for both national and local use
(SBMA v COMELEC) Sec 2 Article XI-C, Sec 20 RA 6735
e. Senate Bill 1290 contains a provision delegating the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations
f. Amendment alteration of one or a few specific provisions. Revision contemplates a re-examination of the entire
document (PH Constitution by Bernas)
g. Delfin says that he filed a Initiatory pleading to start the signature campaign
8. Solicitor General
a. RA 6735 peoples initiative to amend the constitution. Sec 2 recognizes and guarantees that power. Sec 3 includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same power to amend it. Sec 5 repetition of the initiative on the
Constitution
b. Separate subtitle on the Constitution is not necessary for RA 6735 because it is national in scope and deemed
included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
c. Senate Bill 1290 is not proof that RA 6735 does not deal with the initiative on the Constitution
d. Extension of terms and limits amendment, not revision
e. COMELEC Resolution 2300 and its rule-making power was validly issued under Sec 20 or R 6735
9. January 14, 1997 SC confirmed TOR, noted comments and Motion to Lift TRO, granted motion for Intervention by Raul
Roco, and set the case for hearing on January 23, 1997
10. January 17, 1997 - Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) petitioned
a. Delfin petition is a revision because it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure and affects other provisions synchronization of election, policy on equal access to opportunities to public
service, prohibition of political dynasties
b. To remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the vision of the 1987 Constituion
c. Delfin petition counter the purpose of an initiative dissatisfaction, not premium for good performance
d. RA 6735 is inadequate to be called the enabling law that implements the peoples initiative and it cannot be
remedied by the COMELEC Resolution 2300
11. January 20, 1997 Roco filed his Petition in Intervention and says that RA 6735 is the enabling law that implements the
peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments (co-authored the Bill) gives power to COMELEC by Section 20
a. But COMELEC has no jurisdiction because the petition was a petition to initiate the signing and COMELEC only has
power over petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of voters cannot assit them in securing
the required number of signatures
12. January 21, 1997 IBP raised the following arguments
a. Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Sec 2, Article XVII
b. COMELEC Resolution 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
c. Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect does not have the required number of voters
d. Revision of the constitution, not an amendments

Issues/Ruling/Ratio

1. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC.
a. Roco filed with COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or
authority to entertain it. COMELECs failure to act on Rocs motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the
petition rendered the petition under Sec 2 Rule 65, Rules of Court
i. Petition for prohibition without or in excess of its jurisdiction speedy remedy
b. COMELEC has no jurisdiction because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN asserts that Delfin Petition does not contain number of required signatures.
c. Case may be considered as a special civil action for certiorari under Sec 1, Rules of Court brush aside
technicalities in cases of transcendental importance
2. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
 a. Sec 2 Article VII people initiative to amend the constitution requires legislation to exercises this right (Bernas
emphasizes on this). It is a recognized right, but cannot be exercised without the legislation of Congress except
for the percentage of the requirement and does not destroy the substantive right to initiate
b. It was also made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Sec 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
not REVISE the Constitution
c. Has Congress provided the implementation of the exercise of this right? The rules means the details on how the
right is to be carried out
i. RA 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
ii. Sec 20 RA 6735 was silent as to amendments on the Constitution directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject
iii. Sec 5 RA 6735 does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution
iv. No subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution stress on hierarchy of values not scope of the
initiative but the nature and character (national might mean national law) extends to say that the
subtitling is not even accurate
v. It does not have a particular provision for the amendment of the Constitution, unlike for national and local
laws (only mentions the word constitution, enumerates it in the three systems of initiative, and reiterates
constitutional requirements 12%)
d. Conclusion: RA 6753 is inadequate as initiative on amendments to the Constitution and cannot be cured by
empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of the Act
e. COMELEC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations only if the law is complete in itself and fixes a
standard, which RA 6735 both fails to do.
3. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on
the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
a. No, because it does not have that power under RA 6735. Reliance on its constitutional power is misplaced because
the law (RA 6735) does not satisfy the completion and sufficient standards.
4. Whether the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition
a. Yes. The Delfin petition does not contain the required number of voters.
b. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing nothing before is cognizable by
the COMELEC Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA 6735, then it cannot be entertained by
COMELEC Petition was entered as UND, meaning undocketed.
5. Conclusion
a. Granting the petition
b. Declaring RA 6735 inadequate
c. Declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution
d. Ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin Petition
e. TOR is made permanents against the COMELEC but lifted against private respondents

Gonzales v COMELEC

ISSUE
The issue at hand is whether the Republic Act 4913 and Joint Resolutions 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the
Philippines is constitutional or not.

FACTS:

1. On March 16, 1967 the Senate and House of Representatives (HoR) passed the following resolutions:
Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 1: proposing that Sect 5, Art VI of the Constitution of the Philippines be amended
so as to increase the membership of the HoR from a maximum of 120 to a maximum of 180.
RBH No. 2: calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution; the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second
Tuesday of November 1971.
RBH No. 3: proposing that Sect 16, Art VI of the same constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of HoR to become delegates to the aforementioned Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their
respective seats in Congress.
2. On June 17, 1967, Congress passed a bill which upon approval by the President became Republic Act 4913 providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by
the people at the general elections which shall be held in November 14, 1967.
3. On October 21, 1967, Ramon A. Gonzales filed a petition that prays for the judgment:
Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that
will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the
Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from
passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
4. On October 31, 1967, the Philippine Constitution Association filed in the Court the petition in GR L-28224 for review by
certiorari of the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dismissing the petition therein.
5. On the issue of jurisdiction:
 The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers for Congress
It is part of the inherent powers of the People- as the repository of Sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours- to
make, and hence, to amend their own fundamental law.
Congress acts as a constituent assembly when amending the Constitution empowered by the Constitution to do so,
therefore they do not have the final say on whether or not they are acting within their limits whether or not a
resolution filed by Congress as a constituent assembly is constitutional is well beyond the jurisdiction of the SC
6. It is urged that the said resolutions (RBH No, 1 and 3) are null and void because:
Reasons to be Void
1. The members of Congress,
which approved the
proposed amendments, as
well as the resolution
calling a convention to
propose amendments, are,
at best de facto
Congressmen.
2. Congress may adopt either
one of the two alternatives
propose amendments or
call a convention therefor
but may not avail of both
that is to say, propose
amendment and call a
convention at the same
time
3. The election in which
proposals for amendment
to the constitution shall be
submitted for ratification,
must be a special election,
in which officers of the
national and local
governments such as the
elections to be held on
November 14, 1967 will
be chosen
4. The spirit of the
constitution demands that
the election, in which
proposals for amendment
shall be submitted to the
people for ratification, must
be held under such
conditions which,
allegedly, do not exist as
to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to
have a fair grasp of the
Supported by: Reversed by:
Section 5, Article VI of 1935 1935 Constitution
Constitution Until such reapportion shall have
(The House of Representatives shall been made, the HoR shall have the
be composed of not more than one same number of Members as that
hundred and twenty Members who fixed by law for the National
shall be apportioned among the Assembly, who shall be elected by
several provinces as nearly as may the qualified electors from the
be accorded to the number of their present Assembly districts.
respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one The provision does not support the
Member. The Congress shall by law view that upon expiration of the
make an apportionment within three period to make the apportionment,
years after the return of every a Congress which fails to make it
enumeration, and not otherwise. dissolved becomes illegal
Until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who
shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present Assembly
districts. Each representative district
shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous and compact territory.)
In fact the term or has oftentimes
been held to mean and or vice-
versa when the spirit or context of
the law warrants it. The subject
matter of RH2 is different from RH1
and RH3
Political question.
Article XV of the Constitution
(The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their
ratification.)
Nothing to indicate that the election
must be special.
Section 2 of RA 4913
(See Attached RA 4913)
Main diff between the present
situation and the obtaining in
connection with the formal
proposals does not arise from the
law enacted but the major political
parties had taken sides during the
amendments. A legislation cannot
be nullified by reason of the failure
of certain sectors of the community
to discuss it sufficiently.
 nature and implications of The sufficiency or insufficiency
the said amendments. depends in the view of those who
concur this opinion and who insofar
as the phase of the case, constitute
the minority believe that RA 4913
is constitutional

HOLDING/RULING:
In AS much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring RA 4913 and RBH No. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and
invalid, the petition as they are hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to cost.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4913

AN ACT SUBMITTING TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE FOR APPROVAL THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES PROPOSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES IN RESOLUTIONS OF BOTH HOUSES NUMBERED ONE
AND THREE ADOPTED ON MARCH SIXTEEN, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVEN

Section 1. The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both
Houses Numbered One

and Three, Both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people for approval at the
general election which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

Section 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling places. The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.

Section 3. The provisions of Republic Act Numbered One hundred eighty, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Election
Code, insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith, are hereby made applicable to the election provided for in this Act.

Section 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval of said amendments shall be printed in English and
Pilipino and shall be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections: Provided, however, That at the back of said
ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions of Both Houses of Congress Numbered One and three, both adopted on March sixteen,
nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, proposing the amendments; Provided, further, That the questionnaire appearing on the face of
the ballot shall be as follows:

Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?

Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section sixteen of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?

To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall write the word "Yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local
dialect in the blank space after each question; to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in
Pilipino or in the local dialect.

Section 5. The boards of election inspectors shall prepare and sign four copies of the returns of the citizens in their respective
polling places on a form to be prescribed by the Commission on Elections. One copy shall be deposited in the ballot box for valid
ballots, and the three copies shall be delivered to the respective municipal treasurers, who shall immediately forward, by registered
mail, one copy to the Commission on Elections, one copy of the Secretary of the Senate, and one copy to the Secretary of the House
of Representatives.

Within thirty days after the opening of the third regular session of the Sixth Congress of the Philippines, the Senate and House of
Representatives shall hold a joint session, canvass the returns, and certify the result thereof.

Section 6. The sum of one million pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry into effect the provisions of this Act.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 17, 1967

Tolentino v COMELEC

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution
No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No.
01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official
and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further
provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first
12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the
nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to
require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet
the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph
4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as
taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained
personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and

(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and
place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and
failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want
of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official
notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by
small percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on
May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes
cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that
the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the
procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator
Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However,
upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the
senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto
Giongona, Jr.

Planas v COMELEC

Summary: Charito Planas filed a petition to the Supreme Court in order to prohibit the implementation of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 73 scheduling a plebiscite to ratify or reject the proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, citing constitutional provisions. Other identical actions were filed including a supplemental urgent motion for issuance of
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction from implementing PD No. 73 and any other similar proclamations related to
such. The Supreme Court justices decided on a vote of 6 to 3 to dismiss all petitions finding it unnecessary to pass upon the question
given the postponement of the said plebiscite to an indefinite time in the future, until further notice.

I. Facts: (Timeline of Events)

1. March 16, 1967: Congress called for a convention to propose amendment to the Constitution. Later held on November 10, 1970.

2. June 1, 1971: Convention officially commenced.

3. September 21, 1972: President issued Proclamation No 1081 placing the Philippines under Marial Law.

4. November 29, 1972: Convention approved the Proposed.

5. November 30, 1972: President issued PD No. 73 submitting the Proposed Constitution to the People of the Philippines for
ratification or rejection.

6. December 7, 1972: Charito Planas filed petition GR No. L-35925 to nullify PD No. 73 because:

(1) PD 73 has no legal effect because only Congress can call a plebiscite.

(2) No proper submission was going to be made for ratification because there was no freedom of speech, press or assembly.
December 17, 1972: President suspends Proclamation No. 1081 (Martial Law) for free and open debate of the proposed
constitution.

7. January 12, 1973: President announces P.D. No. 86 to organize the Citizens Assemblies in the guise of consulting about the
Martial Law.

8. January 17, 1973: Secretary of Justice delivered to Chief Justice (CJ) Concepcion a copy of Proclamation No. 1102 signed by the
President that certified the ratification of the proposed constitution by an overwhelming majority as determined by the votes
gathered from members of the Barangays (Citizens Assembly).

II. Issues

1. Is PD 73 justiciable, and/or as a result, valid or invalid?

2. Did the 1971 Convention exceed their authority in approving Sec. 2, 3 (2) and 12 of Art. XVII of proposed constitution and could
they still perform their functions despite Martial Law?

3. Did Martial Law affect a. PROPER submission of proposed Constitution to a plebiscite d/t curtailed freedom of speech, press etc.
and b. Validity of Proc No. 1102? 4. Should petitions contesting legality of PN 1102 be dismissed?

III. Holding

1. PD No. 73 s legality is justiciable. On the validity, 6-3 justices believe that it has become moot and academic due to the
suspension and subsequent passing of Proc. No. 1102.

2. 4 Justices believed it was moot and academic; 5 justices voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. Likewise concurred that
they still held authority.

3. Martial Law per se did not necessarily prevent the freedom to ratify the proposed constitution. The issue of validity of PD No. 1102
was not properly raised; although it fell short of conforming to Art XV of 1935 Constitution (Transitory Provisions) it was deemed
recognizable and legitimate.

4. Yes.

Javella v Executive Secretary

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against
the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present
1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for
himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the
immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve
proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election
held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have
the same import and objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-
justiciable.

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been
ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an
amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings held in such
Citizens Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than
21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must
be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes
cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and
logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the
Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent
violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive"
charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive.
But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizens assemblies relied upon in
Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor
the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the
Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that
there have been no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with
Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of
the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the
members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the
Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to
the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102,
and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had
salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The
intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document
certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and
attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas,
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being
more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed
Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to
the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V,
X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of
the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people
have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare
that the new Constitution is not in force.