G.R. No.

L-65295, 10 March 1987 truck or whether those headlights purposely shut off his headlights
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL v. accidently malfunctioned even before he reached the
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO moments before the collision intersection so as not to be
DIONISIO
detected by the police in the
J. Feliciano
police in the precinct which he
In the early morning of 1975, Dionisio was driving (Volkswagen) on his knew because he was a resident
way to home (Makati City) from a cocktails-dinner meeting with his in that place and is not far away
boss and had taken a shot or two. On his way home, his headlights from the intersection. The fact
suddenly failed where he hit a dump truck (owned by Phoenix and that he succeeded in switching his
driven by Carbonel, its regular driver) that was parked on the right lights on again at bright split
hand side of the street directing toward Dionisios car. The dump truck
seconds before the contact with
was park askew or not parallel to the street curb in such a manner as
to stick out onto the street partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. the dump truck rebutted his
There were no lights nor any early warning reflector devices set allegation of technical
anywhere near the car that evening been driven by Carbonel. malfunction.
Whether Dionisio was intoxicated There is no enough evidence to
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the at the time of the accident show how much liquor he had in
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the said truck. As a
fact taken and the effect of that
result, Dioniso suffered physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures. upon his physical faculties or
upon his judgment or mental
Dioniso commenced an action for damages in the CFI of Pampanga alertness. We are also aware that
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the one shot or two of hard liquor
negligent manner in which Carbonel parked the dump track entrusted may affect different people
to him by his employer. Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of differently.
Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered to jointly pay
the former for damages. Carbonel and Pheonix appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but the said court affirmed the decision The Supreme Court concluded from the factual circumstances outlined
of the trial court but modified the award of damages. that Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident but agreed that
the proximate cause of the accident and of his injuries was the
Issue: Whether or not Carbonel and Phoenix may be held jointly liable wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked
for damages as said dump truck was parked askew which was in other words, the negligence of Carbonel. That there was a
considered as the proximate cause of the accident. reasonable relationship between Carbonels negligence on the
one hand and t he accident and respondents injuries on the other
Ratio Decidendi: Both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by hand, however, the collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck
Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers
accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked negligence.
but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that
night when he smashed into the dump truck. Petitioners contended Cause and Condition. If the defendant has created only a passive
that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is
was parked, that negligence was merely passive and static condition said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
and that Dionisio recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
The Court raised the following factual issues and findings: situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter
are the result of the other active forces which have gone before.
BUT THE DISTINCTION IS NOW ALMOST ENTIRELY DISCREDITED.
Whether or not private No curfew pass was found on the
IT IS NOT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND CONDITION
respondent had a curfew pass person of Dionisio immediately WHICH IS IMPORTANT BUT THE NATURE OF THE RISK AND THE
valid and effective for that after the accident nor was any CHARACTER OF THE INTERVENING CAUSE.
eventful nights found in his car (Dionisio also
cannot produced any curfew pass The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
during the trial). The Court find of injury for anyone driving down the street and for having so created
that he was unable to prove this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. The truck driver
owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and other similarly
possession of a valid curfew pass
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
during the night of the accident created.
and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not Foreseeable Intervening Causes was defined as one which in
have such a pass during that ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one
night. which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other
Whether Dionisio was driving Patrolman Cuyno (presented
reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant
fast or speeding just before the witness) testified that people who may be negligent for that reason.
collision with the dump truck had gathered at the scene of the
accident told him that Dionisios The Court hold that Dionisios negligence was only contributory that
car was moving fast and did not the immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained the truck
have its headlights on. drivers lack of due care Dionisio may recover damages though such
Respondents objection fails to damages are subject to mitigation by the Courts.
take account of the fact that the
Petitioners also asked to apply the last clear chance doctrine. The
testimony of Cuyno is admissible theory is that while petitioners truck was negligent, Dionisio had the
not under the official records last clear chance of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries alone.
exception to the hearsay rule but The common law doctrine of contributory negligence prevented any
rather as part of the res gestae. recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
Whether Dionisio had purposely The Court believed that the plaintiffs negligence was relatively minor as compared with the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant. This doctrine permits the
turned off his cars headlights contention of the petitioner is
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
before contact with the dump more credible, that Dionision provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
1
casualty and failed to do so. But this will not apply. Art. 2179 of the other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
NCC is use to determine whose negligence (plaintiff or defendant) school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. To accept this independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on
quasi delicts seeks to reduce the risk and burdens of living in Overview: PSBA is being made to account by the parents of its student,
society and to allocate them among the members of the society. Carlitos Bautista, who was stabbed to death by assailants from outside
the school inside the school premises. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring to RTC decision to deny the schools motion to dismiss was correct,
his home whenever there was work to be done early the following affirming the order, following the rule on quasi-delicts (NCC Arts. 2180
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part
and 2176). The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the law on quasi-
of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked
when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa delicts does not apply, as there exists a contract between school and
in vigilando on the part of Phoinex. student including an obligation to safety; it rules that torts may be the
acts that break a contract and thus liability may still be incurred by the
Dispositive Portion: Decision of the appellate court is modified by school following NCC Art. 21.
reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
income and moral damages of Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such Topic: Obligations; quasi-delicts; torts
amount.
-------------------------XXX--------------------------
Statement of the Case
PSBA v. CA
- The death of one Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the
G.R. No. 84698
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
February 4,1992
prompted his parents to file a suit for damages resulting from
negligence, recklessness, and insufficiency of safety
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides
precautions against said school, specifically its officials, at the
that the damage should have been caused by pupils or students of
RTC of Manila, which was presided over by Judge Regina
the educational institution.Article 2180, in conjunction with
Ordonez-Benitez. As defendants, PSBA et al sought the
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
dismissal of the case on the ground that PSBA, as an academic
This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde,
institution, is beyond the ambit of Article 2180 of the NCC,
Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals.
under which they are being sued. The RTC denied their
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180)
motion to dismiss, then the subsequent motion for
plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted
reconsideration.
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
- Defendants-turned-petitioners assailed the RTCs
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
dispositions before the CA, but the appellate court upheld the
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for,
ruling given by the RTC, and denied the subsequent motion
as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
for reconsideration, bringing the appellants to the Supreme
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
Court.
Same; Contracts; An academic institution enters into a contract
when it accepts students for enrollment; The contract between
Statement of Facts
school and student is one "imbued with public interest".
- 30 August 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death on
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
the second floor balcony of PSBA. Bautista was a student in
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
said school, a junior commerce major. It was established that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
the assailants were outsiders, not enrolled nor affiliated with
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
the school.
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
o His parents (the private respondents Segunda [?] and
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
Arsenia), filed suit for damages against the school
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life
and the following school officials: Juan D. Lim
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President),
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col.
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and Lt. M. Soriano
Same; Human Relations; Article 21; Any person who wilfully
(Assistant Chief of Security). The last, during the
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
proceedings, resigned from his position.
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
- 8 December 1987: The respondent Manila RTC, having
for the damage.Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline
overruled instant petitioners contentions, denies their
which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the
motion to dismiss the case.
private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who
- 25 January 1988: The RTC dismisses the motion for
allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra,
reconsideration as well.
the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the
- 10 June 1988: The CA affirms the trial courts orders;
justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award
petitioners file a motion for reconsideration.
damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
- 22 August 1988: The CA denies the motion for
should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
reconsideration.
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as
constituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at
Applicable Laws:
bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in - Art. 1157(5), NCC: Obligations arise from:
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court (5) Quasi-delicts
to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same - Art. 1162, NCC: Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall
could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not this Book, and by special laws.
be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material - Art. 2176, NCC: Whoever by act or omission causes damage
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay

2
 for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
- Art. 2180, pars. 1, 7, NCC: The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
XXX
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
- Art. 21, NCC: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Issues:
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the decision of
the RTC not to dismiss the case against PSBA?
Held Rationale:
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court disagrees with the CAs
basis for the decision being anchored on Arts. 2176 and
2180 of the NCC. The SC agrees with the CA that the case
must be remanded to the RTC for trial on its merits. But
the reason provided by the CA, which is that in light of
previous jurisprudence and the fact that Article 2180 is
a holdover from the Spanish era, the school
administrators should be made liable for damages until
they prove themselves absolved of liability in trial by
merits, is erroneous. The SC points out that Arts 2180
and 2176 establish the rule of in loco parentis (in place
of the parents Mikey) and that in the discussions
provided in the cases cited by the CA, it was clear that
the liability of the school exists only for the acts
performed by students while in school custody,
something which was established to have not been the
case here. Thus the rule on quasi-delicts does not apply.
The SC rules that despite the inapplicability of the rule
1. Yes.
on quasi-delicts, the school is still liable because all
academic institutions enter into a contract with all its
enrollees. Part of the obligations of this contract is the
providence of an adequate atmosphere of safety for its
students (x x x no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of
the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb.). Obligations from quasi-delict or tort* do not
govern, since these are extra-contractual and a contract
has been made here. However, in Air France vs.
Carroscoso, it was established that liability from tort
may still exist even if there is a contract, because the act
that breaks the contract may also be a tort. This rule
obeys Art. 21. The SC here dictates that a trial is
necessary in order to determine whether such willful
negligence really lies, in order that liability should be
properly determined.
Judgment: Case remanded to Manila RTC, the court of origin.
Notes:
* tort. 1. A civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the
form of damages; a breach of duty that the law imposes on everyone in
the same relation to one another as those involved in a given
transaction. 2. (pl.) The branch of law dealing with such wrongs.
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed.)
------------------------XXX---------------------------
AIR FRANCE, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438 , September 28, 1966
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate
the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the
tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-
Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the
date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane
ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but
that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and
consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.
HELD: YES TO BOTH.
Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was
issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong.
The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses.
Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's
Exhibits belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that
the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
3
reservation whatever. Furthermore, as hereinabove shown,
defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed.
The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a
verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to
him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight
difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's
ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court.
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to
a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in
the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by
its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say
that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken
word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ticket so issued is desirable.
Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion
that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the
finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight.
We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. Nor do
we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
"surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". And this
because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager
at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager".Why, then, was he
allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had
no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; and that the decision of
the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the
like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver:
First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage
covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg;
Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and
Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there
is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish
the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongful expulsion.
On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air
France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has
been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony
before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry
made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento,
who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was
asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one
on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for
defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the
trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but
defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior
reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class
ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken,
surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one
to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the
humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the
plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's
witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the
meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of
plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the
quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term
"bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts
therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse,
he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
4
 affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the
express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its
contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating circumstances that
defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the
presence of many passengers to have him
thrown out of the airplane to give the "first
class" seat that he was occupying to, again using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white
man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven
that this "white man" had any "better right" to
occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was
occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the
defendant to him.40
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
employees need not be essayed.
It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil
Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and,
we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think
so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the
best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence.
Exemplary damages are well awarded.
The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is
that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.
The right to attorney's fees is fully established.
The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt
that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. We do not
intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised
as it was here should not be disturbed.
Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys'
fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial
court. The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The
dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does
not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner.
So ordered.
-----------------------------XXX---------------------------
CONTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ESTRELLA
(Culpa Aquillana vs. Culpa Contractual)
FACTS:
On Dec 29, 1978, Estrella and her granddaughter Fletcher
boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTD bus bound for Pasay, they
never reached their destination because their bus was
rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in South
Expressway. Estrella and Fletcher were brought to Makati
Medical Center and their injuries were diagnosed.
Estrella and Fletcher filed a Complaint for damages against
CDCP, BLTB, Payunan and Datingguinoo who were the
drivers of the tractor and bus, alleging that:
o that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the
drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were
negligent and did not obey traffic laws;
o that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees;
o that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it
lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its
passengers to grave danger;
o that they suffered actual damages amounting to
P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for
Fletcher;
o that they suffered physical discomfort, serious
anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched
reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and
lifelong social humiliation;
5
 o that defendants failed to act with justice, give
respondents their due, observe honesty and good
faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary
damage; and
o that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
RTC:
Held that CDCP and BLTB and their employees are jointly and
severally liable for damages
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has
acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to
their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract
of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of
negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.
Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it
owned bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed
that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the
time of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised
the presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed
to rebut thus making it and its driver liable to respondents.
-Unsatisfied, Estrella and Fletcher elevated the case to the CA.
CA:
Affirmed RTC with modifications for damages.
-Petitioner claims that the liability for actual damages and attorneys
fees are based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held
liable.
SC:
Affirmed CA and RTC with modifications as to the damages
awarded.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action
for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts
or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be
instituted against the employer for an employee's act or
omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Payunan, Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner
solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual damages suffered by
respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was
established that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because
of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the police
investigator.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the
owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the
same. We held, thus:
-the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the
injured passenger or the latter's heirs.
-After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of
action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of
action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not
recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the
intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the
driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were
jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts
concurred to produce the same injury.
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a
part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and
several" obligation, the relationship between the active
and the passive subjects is so close that each of them
must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole
obligation. In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement
Corporation, we reiterated that joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo:
o universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which
he participates, but is also jointly liable with his
tort feasors.
o general rule that joint tort feasors are all the
persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in,
aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to
the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act
themselves.
o Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable
for the tort which they commit. The persons
injured may sue all of them or any number less
than all. Each is liable for the whole damages
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable
for the whole damage.
o Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The
damages can not be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly
and severally liable for the whole amount.
o Of course the court during trial may find that
some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and
that others are not liable. The courts may
release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors.
And this is true even though they are charged
jointly and severally.
-------------------------XXX------------------------------
TITLE: BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO
PON vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. And DATE: G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988
PONENTE: PARAS, J.:
PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company (BLTB) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of
Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines) driven by Ruben
Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas,
Quezon which collision resulted in the death of Aniceto Rosales,
Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena
Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB
Bus No. 1046.
The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the
bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus
No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing
thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to
slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It
was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the
deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri
instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers
praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs.
Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon.
ISSUE:
6
W/N the actions of the private respondents are based on culpa
contractual
RULING:
NO. A reading of the respondent court's decision shows that it
anchored petitioners' liability both on culpa contractual and culpa
aquiliana, to wit:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and
injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB: was the negligence of the
driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by
overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend
of the highway which was divided into two lanes by a continuous
yellow strip. The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in his cross-
examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending bend of
the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone . It is no surprise then that
the driver of the Superlines bus was exonerated by the lower court. He
had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in such a
dangerous situation. These facts show that patient imprudence of the
BLTB driver.
It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the
duty to see that the road is clear and not to proceed if he can not do so
in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver
has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time
to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction
comes into view.
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation. (Art. 2165, Civil Code).
In failing to observe these simple precautions, BLTB's driver
undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence demanded by the
circumstances.
We now come to the subject of liability of the appellants.
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his
employer, appellant Armando Pon is primarily liable (Article 2176,
Civil Code).
On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is
also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of
or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its
employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees (Article 1759, Civil Code).
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its
passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its
passengers safely to their destination. That obligation is so serious that
the Civil Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious person
(Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Article 1756, Civil Code). In the present case,
the appellants have failed to prove extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this
legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus driver of
BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the owner
must answer for injuries or death to its passengers.
The liability of BLTB is also solidarily with its driver, even though the
liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus
company from contract.
Conclusively therefore in consideration of the foregoing findings of the
respondent appellate court it is settled that the proximate cause of
the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of
the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of
the BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus in a
lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and
Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against
petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact that in an action
based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold
it responsible for the payment of the damages sought by the passenger.
By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express
obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art.
1756, New Civil Code).
Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute
insurer against all risks of travel and are not liable for acts or accidents
which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that responsibility of a
common carrier for the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code is not susceptible of a precise and
definite formulation." (p. 13, Rollo) Petitioners' contention holds no
water because they had totally failed to point out any factual basis for
their defense of force majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that
the cause of the collision was the sole negligence and recklessness of
petitioner Armando Pon. For the defense offorce majeure or act of God
to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively
without human intervention.
------------------------xxx------------------------
GUTIERREZ v. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 34840
Sept. 23, 1931
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of
private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on a
bridge. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and
was owned by saturnine Cortez. The automobile was being operated by
Bonifacio Gutierrez (defendant), a lad 18 years of age, and was owned
by Bonifacios father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the
time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother,
together with several other members of the Gutierrez family were
accommodated therein.
A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez
(plaintiff) suffered a fracture right leg from the collision which
required medical attendance for a considerable period of time.
ISSUE:
1. WON both the driver of the truck and automobile are liable
for damages and indemnification due to their negligence;
2. What are the legal obligations of the defendants?
HELD:
Bonifacio Gutierrezs obligation arises from culpa aquiliana.
On the other hand, Saturnino Cortezs and his chauffeur Abelardo
Velascos obligation rise from culpa contractual.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence
pure and simple. As to the Gutierrez Family, Bonifacio, being a minor,
was an incompetent chauffeur that he was driving at an excessive rate
of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck; he lost his
head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license
to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of
his son. Pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the
damages caused by the minor.
As to the liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck,
and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, it arise from that of contract.
Further, they contend that there existed a contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiff, Narciso Gutierrez for keeping his foot outside the
truck, which occasioned his injury. However, this was not pleaded. The
evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in the
extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters.
WHEREFORE, judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
Narciso Gutierrez. Gutierrez Family, Saturnino Cortez and Abelardo
Velasco are jointly and severally liable.
--------------------------xxx--------------------------
JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-41423
Feb. 23, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for
conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan
City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by
defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Bulacan from Pangasinan.
Petitioner, Luis Joseph, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo
truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to
Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake
a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same
time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the
process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to
veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a
7
result, petitioner Luis Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his
legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of
contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and
Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up
truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and
never was an owner of the pick-up truck while petitioner Luis Joseph
filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto
Pagarigan, Patrocinio Perez and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants as he cannot ascertain who between them are
the real owner of the cargo.
ISSUE:
1. WON the cause of action based on quasi-delict is a bar to the
cause of action for breach of contract of carriage;
2. WON respondents are solidary liable to the petitioner
HELD:
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful
act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be
violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations.
However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or
wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by
law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only
one cause of action involved and the judgment on the compromise
agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar
to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to
petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court
found them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his
amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents
jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the
amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary
debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that
said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution
be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which
would countenance such a procedure.
------------------------------xxx--------------------------------
G.R. No. 115849 January 24, 1996
FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK (Formerly Producers
Bank of the Philippines) and MERCURIO RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLOS EJERCITO, in substitution of
DEMETRIO DEMETRIA, and JOSE JANOLO,respondents.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank),
which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6
parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria
and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a
purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by
Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later
however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion,
sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was
not authorized to enter into such an agreement, hence there was no
valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued
Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et
al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said
Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court
denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the
case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law
office, filed a separate civil case against Demetria and Janolo seeking to
have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against
the Bank. Demetria et al argued that the second case constitutes forum
shopping.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is forum shopping.
2. WON there was a perfected contract of sale between the
parties?
Held:
1. Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest
and parties between the first case and the second case. There is
identity of interest because both cases sought to have the agreement,
which involves the same property, be declared unenforceable as
against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case
is in the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the
name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here
because Henry Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to
have the bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with
Demetria et al. The Supreme Court did not lay down any disciplinary
action against the ACCRA lawyers but they were warned that a
repetition will be dealt with more severely.
In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation
encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was originally
understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As to
the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a
plaintiff to commence personal actions "where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of
the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec, 2 [b]).
As to remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of
pursuing civil liabilities independently of the criminal, arising from the
same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility vehicle involved in a
vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or
culpa criminal each remedy being available independently of the
others although he cannot recover more than once.
2. Article 1318 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid
and perfected contract as follows: (1) Consent of the contracting
parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. The 3 are
present in this case. The procedure in the sale of acquired assets as
well as the nature and scope of the authority of Rivera on the matter is
clearly delineated in the testimony of Rivera himself, which testimony
was relied upon by both the bank and by Rivera in their appeal briefs.
The plaintiffs, therefore, at that meeting of August 1987 regarding their
purpose of buying the property, dealt with and talked to the right
person. Necessarily, the agenda was the price of the property, and
plaintiffs were dealing with the bank official authorized to entertain
offers, to accept offers and to present the offer to the Committee before
which the said official is authorized to discuss information relative to
price determination. Necessarily, too, it being inherent in his authority,
Rivera is the officer from whom official information regarding the
price, as determined by the Committee and approved by the
Conservator, can be had. And Rivera confirmed his authority when he
talked with the plaintiff in August 1987. At any rate, the bank placed its
official, Rivera, in a position of authority to accept offers to buy and
negotiate the sale by having the offer officially acted upon by the bank.
The bank cannot turn around and later say, as it now does, that what
Rivera states as the banks action on the matter is not in fact so. It is a
familiar doctrine, the doctrine of ostensible authorityThe authority of a
corporate officer in dealing with third persons may be actual or
apparent. From the evidence found by respondent Court, it is obvious
that petitioner Rivera has apparent or implied authority to act for the
Bank in the matter of selling its acquired assets. Indeed, we see no
reason to disturb the lower courts (both the RTC and the CA) common
8
finding that private respondents evidence is more in keeping with
truth and logic - that during the meeting on September 28, 1987, Luis
Co and Rivera confirmed that the P5.5 million price has been passed
upon by the Committee and could no longer be lowered Hence,
assuming arguendo that the counter-offer of P4.25 million extinguished
the offer of P5.5 million, Luis Cos reiteration of the said P5.5 million
price during theSeptember 28, 1987 meeting revived the said offer. And
by virtue of the September 30, 1987 letter accepting this revived offer,
there was a meeting of the minds, as the acceptance in said letter was
absolute and unqualified.Taken together, the factual findings of the
respondent Court point to an implied admission on the part of the
petitioners that the written offer made on September 1, 1987 was
carried through during the meeting of September 28, 1987. This is the
conclusion consistent with human experience, truth and good faith
----------------------------xxx----------------------------
VDA DE SEVERO ET AL v. GO, ET AL
FACTS:
The late Ricardo Severo was an employee of the private
respondents Luningning Feliciano Go and Joaquin Go (Go), first as baker of
'Joni's Cakes and Pastries," owned by GO located Sta Cruz, Manila and
finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to February 16, 1972. On the
latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away and/or carnapped
the car owned by GO and driven by Severo who, in his efforts to resist the
carnappers, was shot and killed by the latter. Up to now, the parties
responsible for Severo's death have not been Identified nor apprehended.
On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and
minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an action against respondents-
employers before the trial court for "Death Compensation and Damages"
in the total amount of P74,500.00.
GO, filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the court have no
jurisdiction over the case but was denied by the court. On May 3, 1975,
private respondents filed their answer traversing the material allegations
of the complaint and raised as special affirmative defenses that the lower
court has no jurisdiction over the claim of the petitioner and that the
complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action.
During the pre-trial, GO again filed a motion to dismiss
reiterating their allegation that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
claim of PETITIONERS and that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. Petitioners filed a reply (opposition) contending that their claim is
not for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act but for
damages under Article 1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence,
cognizable by the regular courts.
The respondent court (CFI SAMAR), acting on the latest motion
to dismiss, issued an order stating that petitioners' cause of action falls
within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the proper
forum was the Workmen's Compensation Commission. It declared itself
without jurisdiction:
The Court after a careful consideration of the grounds in the
defendants' motion, and considering the allegation of the complaint
describing their main cause of action, which is a claim for death
compensation and damages, is of the opinion and so holds that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The plaintiffs' right to
relief being derived on an accident resulting in death of Ricardo Severo, an
employee of the defendants, while engaged in the performance of the
task assigned to him, this Court is devoid of statutory competence to pass
upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claim, as of the time the cause of
action accrue, falls within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, Workmen's Compensation Commission, thru its regional offices under
the Department of Labor, a body empowered to act upon all claims for
compensation for death, injury or sickness.
Relying on Robles v. Yap Wing: claims for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act were cognizable by the regular courts,
but since then, as provided in Section 46 thereof as amended, 'the
Workmen's Compensation shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide
claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5 of the Act
provides that the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude
all other rights and remedies accruing to an employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under
the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury.
SC: Petition of Severos widow and child was remanded to the
trial court.
Ruling in Robles v. Yap Wing was already abandoned. In the case
Floresca v. Philex Mining :
The court lay down views available on complaint for damages
regarding the death of an employee: One view is that the injured
employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover
damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act)
with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer
pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case,
is that the remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is
exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the
action is selective and the employee of his heirs have a choice of availing
themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of
his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or
his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words,
the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Court
rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by
the WCA as laid down in the Robles case.
As clarified by Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his
concurring opinion in Ysmael, "the employee or his heirs have the choice
of cause of action and corresponding relief, i.e., either an ordinary action
for damages before the regular courts or a special claim for limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the
Workmen's Compensation Commission ... However, tills right of choice is
qualified in that the employee should be held to the particular remedy in
which he has staked his fortunes and must pursue even his alternative
claim for compensation exclusively in the same regular courts once he has
opted to seek his remedy there rather than in the Workmen's
Compensation Commission.
This is what the petitioners did in filing their complaint for
"Death Compensation and Damages" before respondent Court. Petitioners
have opted to seek their remedy before the regular court. Their demand
for compensation is predicated on the employer's liability for the death of
their employee (Ricardo Severo) imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code
which reads: Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are
obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers,
workmen, mechanics or other employees even though the event may
have been purely accidental or entirely due to fortuitous cause if the
death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment ...
Petitioner's claim for compensation based on the Civil Code
pertain to the jurisdiction of the regular courts (Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus
Co., 32 SCRA 442).x
-----------------------------XXX----------------------------
FABRE JR. ET AL v. CA, ET AL
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR No. 28245, dated September 30, 1992, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay
damages to private respondent Amyline Antonio, and its resolution
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
FACTS:
9
 Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a
1982 model Mazda minibus.
They used the bus principally in connection with a bus
service for school children which they operated in Manila.
The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired
in 1981, after trying him out for two weeks.
His job was to take school children to and from the St.
Scholasticas College in Malate, Manila.
Private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship
Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation
of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La
Union and back in consideration of which private respondent
paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at
5:00 oclock in the afternoon.
However, as several members of the party were late, the bus
did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue
and EDSA until 8:00 oclock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio
Cabil drove the minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair,
so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it
being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour
through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve
on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which
he described as siete. The road was slippery because it was
raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of
50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The
bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and
rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and
landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series
of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree
which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline
Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down
by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It
took three persons to safely remove her from this position.
She was in great pain and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve
until it was too late. He said he was not familiar with the area
and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took
in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign
on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed
down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day,
November 3, 1984. On the basis of their finding they filed a
criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case
was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the
latters fence. On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance the case
against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the
RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.
As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is
permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she
described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence
regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after the
accident, she was taken to the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay, Lingayen. As
this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was transferred to the
Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given
sedatives. An x-ray was taken and the damage to her spine was
determined to be too severe to be treated there. She was therefore
brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General Hospital and later to
the Makati Medical Center where she underwent an operation to
correct the dislocation of her spine.
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS:
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly
checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the driver was
properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the
negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the
accident subject of this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio
Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of
plaintiff Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees;
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
respect to Amyline Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other
plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as
follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner
Cabil failed to exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his
vehicle considering the time and the place of the accident. The Court of
Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves presumptively
negligent.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
III. WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN
THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.
HELD:
Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of
compensatory damages in the amount of P600,000.00. It is insisted
that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable, an award of
P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly speculative.
Amyline Antonio testified that she was a casual employee of a company
called Suaco, earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer of Avon
products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners
contend that as casual employees do not have security of tenure, the
award of P600,000.00, considering Amyline Antonios earnings, is
without factual basis as there is no assurance that she would be
regularly earning these amounts. With the exception of the award of
damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine
whether to decide this case on the theory that petitioners are
liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on
the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although the relation
of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature,
nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In
either case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner Porfirio
Cabil, was negligent.
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his
employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These
factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive,
supported as they are by the evidence.
Considering the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that
it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even
on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and
that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent
and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave
rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were
themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by
finding that the applicant possessed a professional drivers
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in
supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
10
 In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the
bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had
been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St.
Scholasticas College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a
two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters,
such as whether he could remember the names of the children he
would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to
drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to
La Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the
presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.
Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an
earlier departure (made impossible by the congregations delayed
meeting) could have averted the mishap and (2) under the contract,
the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither
of these contentions hold water. The hour of departure had not been
fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of
the accident. With respect to the second contention, it was held in an
early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver
directions as to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but
exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from
recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the
automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either of the
locomotive engineer or the automobile driver.
As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of
carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the
business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held:
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air
for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a
sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public,
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by
proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the
Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of
Amyline Antonio. However, we think the Court of Appeals erred in
increasing the amount of compensatory damages because private
respondents did not question this award as inadequate. To the
contrary, the award of P500,000.00 for compensatory damages which
the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable considering the contingent
nature of her income as a casual employee of a company and as
distributor of beauty products and the fact that the possibility that she
might be able to work again has not been foreclosed. In fact she
testified that one of her previous employers had expressed willingness
to employ her again.
With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the
factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless
supported by evidence in the records of this case.
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within
the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral
damages in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners
are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral
damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since
Cabils gross negligence amounted to bad faith. Amyline Antonios
testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and co-passengers,
fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured
as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was
also properly made. However, for the same reason that it was error
for the appellate court to increase the award of compensatory
damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase the award of
moral damages and reduce the award of attorneys fees, inasmuch as
private respondents, in whose favor the awards were made, have not
appealed.
As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can
be sustained either on the theory of quasi delict or on that of
breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts
below held, petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus,
may be made to respond jointly and severally to private
respondent. We hold that they may be.
It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals this Court exonerated the jeepney driver from liability to the
injured passengers and their families while holding the owners of the
jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was
expressly tried and decided exclusively on the theory of culpa
contractual. As this Court there explained:
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo [the
driver] and spouses Mangune and Carreon [the jeepney owners] were
negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are
jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot
be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of
the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible.
Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach
be due to the negligence of his driver .
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and
her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and
the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of
contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative
causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such
causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do
not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is
the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier
and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the
driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate
and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages.
Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private
respondent Amyline Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning
capacity of plaintiff Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees; and
6) costs of suit.
-----------------------------XXX-----------------------------
EMERENCIANA VDA DE MEDINA ET AL v. CRESCENCIA
1. FRANCHISE; SALE WITHOUT APPROVAL OP THB PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION, EFFECT OF.The sale of franchise, or any
privilege pertaining thereto, without the approval of the Public Service
Commission, is not binding against the public or the Service
Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee of record
continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the
Commission and tp the public.
2. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; "CULPA CONTRACTUAL";
NATURE OF LlABILITY OF CARRIER.Where there is a breach of the
carrier's contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their
destination (culpa contractual), the liability of the carrier is not merely
subsidiary or secondary, but direct and immediate (Article 1755, 1756,
and 1759, New Civil Code).
3. DAMAGES; NOMINAL DAMAGES; WHEN AWARD
IMPROPER.Where the court has already awarded compensatory and
exemplary damages that are in themselves a judicial recognition that
plaintiffs' right was violated, the award of nominal damages is
unnecessary and improper. Nominal damages can not coeyist with
compensatory damages.
11
 Appeal by defendant Guillermo Cresencia from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its civil case No. 19890,
sentencing appellant, jointly and severally with his co-defendant
Brigido Avorque, to pay plaintiffs Emerencia M. Vda. de Medina and her
minor children damages in the total amount of P56,000, P50,000
attorneys' fees, and costs.
It appears that on May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney bearing
plate No. TPU-2232 (Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque, smashed into
a Meralco post on Azcarraga Street, resulting in the death of Vicente
Medina, one of its passengers. A criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence was filed against' Avorque, to which he pleaded
guilty on September 9, 1953. The heirs of the deceased, however,
reserved their right to file a separate action for damages, and on June
16, 1953, brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque and
appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner and operator of
the jeepney in question.
Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any answer; while
defendant Cresencia answered, disclaiming liability on the ground that
he had sold the jeepney in question on October 14, 1950 to one Maria
A. Cudiamat; that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one buyer
after another, until the vehicle was purchased on January 29, 1953 by
Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner thereof at the time of the
accident. In view of Cresencia's answer, plaintiffs filed leave, and was
allowed, to amend their complaint making Rosario Avorque a co-
defendant; and the latter, by way of answer, admitted having
purchased the aforesaid jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged in
defense that she was never the public utility operator thereof. The case
then proceeded to trial, during which, after the plaintiffs had presented
their evidence, defendants Guillermo Cresencia and Rosario Avorque
made manifestations admitting that the former was still the registered
operator of the jeepney in question in the records of the Motor Vehicles
Office and the Public Service Commission, while the latter was the
owner thereof at the time of the accident; and submitted the case for
the decision on the question of who, as between the two, should be
held liable to plaintiffs for damages. The lower court, by Judge Jose
Zulueta, held that as far as the public is concerned, defendant
Cresencia, in the eyes of the law, continued to be the legal owner of the
jeiepney in question; and rendered judgment against him, jointly and
severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for P6,000 compensatory
damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary datmages,
P10,000 nominal damages, F5,000 attorneys fees, and costs, while
defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from liability. From this
judgment, defendant Cresencia appealed.
RULING:
As held in the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, , which the court
below cited, that the law (section 20 [g], C. A. No. 146 as amended)
requires' the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a
franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased
without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee; and that if
property covered by the franchise is transferred or leased without this
requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the public or the
Service Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee of record
continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the
Commission and to the public. There we gave the reason for this rule to
be as follows:
"* * * Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or
lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service Commission so
that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the
public. In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is granted,
there should be a public hearing, with notice to all interested parties, in
order that the Commission may determine if there are good and
reasonable grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property
covered by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to public
interest. * * *"
The above ruling was later reiterated in the cases of Timbol
vs. Osias, as the sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly
without the approval of the Public Service Commission, appellant
herein, Guillermo Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator
thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for the
consequences incident to its operation. Wherefore, the lower court did
not err in holding him, and not the buyer Rosario Avorque, responsible
for the damages sustained by plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente
Medina resulting from the reckless negligence of the jeepney's driver,
Brigido Avorque.
Appellant also argues that the basis of plaintiffs' action being the
employer's subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code for
damages arising from his employee's criminal acts, it is defendant
Rosario Avorque who should answer subsidiarily for the damages
sustained by plaintiffs, since she admits that she, and not appellant, is
the employer of the negligent driver Brigido Avorque. The argument is
untenable, because plaintiffs' action for damages is independent of the
criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the
employer's subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a
breach of the carrier's contractual obligation to carry his passengers
safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this
reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver
Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier for
in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary
or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and
1759, New Civil Code).
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been
questioned. Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record that the award of
P10,000 by way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of law,
since nominal damages can not co-exist with compensatory damages.
The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize a right
that has been violated, in order to preclude further contest thereon;
"and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him" (Articles 2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court
below has already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages
that are in themselves a judicial recognition that plaintiff's right was
violated, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper.
Anyway, ten thousand pesos can not, in common sense, be deemed
"nominal".
With the modification that the award of P10,000 nominal
damages" be eliminated, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs
against appellant. So ordered. Vda. de Medina, et al. vs. Cresencia, et al.,
99 Phil. 506, No. L-8194 July 11, 1956
------------------------------XXX-----------------------------
G.R. No. 84458, 6 November 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS,
LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA AND GORGONIO
VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION
J. Regalado
On 11 May 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia,
owned by herein petitioner at the port of San Jose Mindoro, bound
for Manila. On 12 May 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North
Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a
gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp. took
over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel.
One hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, the
Stevedoring Corp. started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana
who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to
the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the
vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital
where he later expired 3 days thereafter. On 15 May 1975, the
cause of his death according to the death certificate being
hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic
bone lacerating the urinary bladder.
12
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
for breach of contract of carriage. In its answer, Aboitiz denied
responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel
was completely under the control of respondent Stevedoring Corp.
as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz; it is also averred
that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the
latter cannot be held liable under the follow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz filed a third party complaint against Pioneer
Stevedoring Corp imputing liability thereto for Anacletos death as
having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane
operator who was an employee of the Stevedoring Corp. under its
exclusive control and supervision. Stevedoring Corp on the other
hand raised its defense that Aboitiz had no cause of action against
them considering that the latter is being sued for breach of contract
of carriage to which the former is not a party and that it was
Anacletos gross negligence as the proximate cause of his death;
and that the filing of the third party complaint was premature by
reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence filed against the crane operator.
The RTC ordered Aboitiz to pay the Vianas for damages incurred
and Pioneer was ordered to reimbursed Aboitiz for whatever amount
the latter paid to Vianas. Both company appealed but it only granted
the Stevedoring Company and absolved the same for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence
against the crane operator. CA further affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the victim is guilty of contributory negligence
that caused his death.
Ratio: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the vessel owners dock or
premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carriers conveyance or
had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from
all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see
after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for
example, such person remains in the carriers premises to claim his
baggage.
It is apparent that what prompted the Court to rule as it did is the
fact of the passengers reasonable presence within the carriers
premises. The primary factor to be considered is the
existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence
of the victim on or near the petitioners vessel. When the
incident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes,
which he had every right to do, form petitioners vessel. A carrier is
duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one hour prior to the incident, the
victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to
prove this. What is clear is that at the time the victim was taking
his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minijm time
of one hour allowed for the passengers to disembarked, it may be
presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he
went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioners premises
was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which
was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was
admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioners vessels
that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim is still
deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
Under the law, common carriers are, form the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case. More
particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus,
were a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to
an action for breach of contract of carriage, that is, the failure of the
carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the
instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
passengers with extraordinary diligence which such relation subsists.
There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinary diligent in
requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were
strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of
preventing entry into the forbidden area. While the victim was
admittedly contributorily negligent, still the petitioners aforesaid
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate cause
and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented the
victims death.
Dispositive Portion: Petition is denied and the judgment appealed
from is affirmed. Stevedoring Corp is not within the ambit of the
rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding
presumption of negligence foisted on common carriers like Aboitiz.
---------------------------XXX--------------------------
CALALAS v. CA
CASE TITLE: VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
PRINCIPLE/s: CULPA AQUILIANA v. CULPA CONTRACTUAL
FACTS: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas.
As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
While on its way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena
and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-
fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of
the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done
under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23
to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Oligario, an
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period
of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck.
RTC ruled against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas
of liability, holding that it was the driver (Verena) of the Isuzu truck
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who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
CA reversed RTC on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based
on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. CA
further dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga: (1)P50,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3)P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (4)P1,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; and (5)to pay the costs. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s: Whether Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 finding Verena (driver) and Salva (owner) of the truck liable
for quasi-delict and therefore res judicata will set in.
RULING: No. Sunga was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case
No. 3490 and in the petition the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to Calalas' jeepney. On the other hand, the issue
in the petition is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers,
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
Calalas jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of Verena. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability
to a person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function
of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the
Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It
provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption
of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of Calalas to prove
that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
Now, did Calalasdriver carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? The Court negates. Several factors militate against Calalas
contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the
broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway
in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides: Sec. 54.
Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any
vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or
unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
highway.
Second, it is undisputed that Calalas driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a)
of the same law. It provides: Exceeding registered capacity. No
person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or
more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a
peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was Calalas unable to overcome the presumption
of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but
also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to Calalas contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption
of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in the seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of Calalas contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Calalas should
have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.
Therefore, CAs judgment was affirmed finding Calalas liable to Sunga
since he failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.
Theres discussion on the merit of awarding moral damages. Sunga is
not entitled since no bad faith on the part of Calalas.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11,
1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.
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